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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (8) (4)
Box 91325

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	110049Z MAR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#120	3/11/81	P1/F1
2. cable	070246Z MAR 81, 4p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#121	3/7/81	P1/F1
3. cable	062256Z MAR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#122	3/6/81	P1/F1
4. cable	040221Z MAR 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#123	3/4/81	P1/F1
5. cable	031741Z MAR 81, 4p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#124	3/3/81	P1/F1
6. cable	282135Z FEB 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#125	2/28/81	P1/F1
7. memo (8103655)	Dennis Blair to Richard Allen re: meeting with Leisler-Kiep, 1p R 5/18/00 NLSF97-030#126	6/18/81	P1/F1
8. memo (8102987)	James Rentshler to Allen re: Meeting with Bernd von Staben, 1p R " "#127	5/26/81	P1/F1
9. memcon	re: President's meeting with Chancellor Schmidt, 9p D " "#128 R	5/21/81 12/7/05	P1/F1 #1
10. memo	Rentshler to Allen re: President's second meeting with Schmidt, 2p R " "#129	5/22/81	P1/F1
11. memo (8102425)	Rentshler to Allen re: Pacifism in FRG, 1p R " "#130	5/1/81	P1/F1
12. cable	241631Z APR 81, 7p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030#131	4/24/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (8) (4)
Box 91325

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. memo (8102191)	William Stearman to Allen re: Meeting with Stauffenberg, 1p R 5/18/00 NLS F97-030 #132	4/28/81	P1/F1
14. memo (8102189)	Donald Gregg to Allen re: Request for meeting, 1p P " " #133	4/17/81	P1/F1
15. cable	190256Z MAY 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLS F97-030 #134	5/19/81	P1/F1
16. cable	172034Z MAY 81, 2p P 7/28/00 NLS F97-030 #135	5/17/81	P1/F1
17. cable	090850Z APR 81, 1p R " " #136	4/9/81	P1/F1
18. bio (8101625)	2p D " " #137	2/22/80	P1/F1
19. memo	Allen to the President re: Apel, 1p, " #138	3/24/81	P1/F1
20. talking points	re: Allen's meeting with Lambsdorff, 2p R " " #139	3/18/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1102 0700100
O R 110040Z MAR 81 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

NLS F97-030 #120
BY WOT, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3017

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN 9497
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 3549
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8639
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4041
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8798
USMISSION USNATO 0887
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8497
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 061102
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 3/31/11 (EWING, RAYMOND C.)

TAGS: PINT WB PL

SUBJECT: BERLIN: UK PROPOSAL FOR BONN GROUP POLISH
CONTINGENCY STUDY

REF: USBERLIN 518

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~

2. DEPARTMENT FINDS USBER REWRITE OF UK PROPOSAL (REPTEL)
PREFERABLE TO ORIGINAL, AND SUBJECT TO CAVEATS IN PARA
THREE BELOW, US REP SHOULD TABLE IT AT NEXT APPROPRIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC 1102

DTG: 110040Z MAR 81 03N1 034747
TOR: 070/0359Z

DATE 05/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BONN GROUP MEETING.

3. OUR COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- WE FIND ONE POINT IN FIRST PARAGRAPH (POLAND; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; BERLIN ASPECTS) CONFUSING. PAPER STATES THAT "GIVEN THE WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS OPEN TO THE EAST, IT WILL BE PROFITABLE TO PLAN FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES." WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE OPPOSITE WAS IN FACT THE CASE, THAT DUE TO THE VERY WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS (AS THE USSR PAPER POINTS OUT) PLANNING FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES WOULD BE NEITHER USEFUL NOR FEASIBLE.

-- IN PARAGRAPH ON "POLITICAL CONTEXT," WE BELIEVE THAT POINT ON GDR'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY ON THE WEST IS SOMEWHAT OVERSTATED. LAST SENTENCE OF THAT PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE REDRAFTED TO MAKE POINT THAT WHILE THE GDR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ITS ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO INTO ACCOUNT, TO SPEAK OF THE GDR AS BEING INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE WEST STRIKES US AS AN EXAGGERATION.

-- IN SECTION 6.D.(4), WE WOULD SUGGEST SOME OTHER WORD THAN "REMOVE" TO DESCRIBE ACTION WHICH SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE WITH BERLIN MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS. WE WONDER WHAT THEY COULD DO TO "REMOVE" BERLINERS.

-- FINALLY, WHILE WE SEE NO REASON WHY WORST CASE POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THIS STUDY, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT ITEMS 6.C.(3) AND 6.C.(4) ARE IN A DIFFERENT ORDER OF MAGNITUDE FROM THE OTHER POSSIBLE MEASURES CITED. CLEARLY, THESE TWO MEASURES WOULD PROBABLY INDICATE THAT SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO ALLOW THIS CRISIS TO ACCELERATE FAR BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF BERLIN GIVEN THEIR REALIZATION OF

WHAT ACTIONS OF THIS TYPE AGAINST THE ACCESS REGIME WOULD MEAN IN TERMS OF ALLIED REACTION.

4. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THE PAPER MAKE AT LEAST A BOW IN THE DIRECTION OF CONTINGENCY

SECSTATE WASHDC 1102

DTG: 110049Z MAR 81 PSN: 034747
TOR: 070/03502

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PLANNING. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A REFERENCE SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL, BUT WOULD EXPECT THAT IT WOULD REMIND DECISION-MAKERS OF THE POLITICAL MECHANISMS (WAG, NAC, SPC) WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTROLLING IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE ALLIED RESPONSE. OF COURSE, WE SEE NO NEED FOR SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO BERCONS/LIVE OAK PLANS. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 1102

DTG:110049Z MAR 81 SSN: 034747
TOR: 070/0359Z

DATE 05/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP
EOB: EURE, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7821/01 0000304
O R 070246Z MAR 81 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

NLS F97-030 #121

BY LDJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2898
USMISSION USBERLIN 9474

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3888
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8628
USMISSION USNATO 0028
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8489
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8449
WHITE HOUSE 6517
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 057021
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/6/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: PL NATO UR PGOV WG

SUBJECT: BERLIN UK PROPOSAL IN BONN GROUP ON POLISH
CONTINGENCY STUDY

REFS: (A) BONN 4378 (NOTAL); (B) STATE 52124 (NOTAL)

1. ENTIRE TEXT SECRET.

2. DEPARTMENT FINDS UK PROPOSAL FOR BONN GROUP STUDY
DESCRIBED REF (A) GENERALLY SATISFACTORY. WE PARTICULARLY
LIKE ITS RELATIVELY LIMITED SCOPE AND SHARE UK VIEW THAT

SECSTATE WASHDC 7821

DTG: 070246Z MAR 81 58N: 020097
TOR: 066/0306Z

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

DETAILED BONN GROUP PLANNING AT THIS POINT WOULD BE NEITHER USEFUL NOR DESIRABLE. WE ALSO AGREE WITH UK PROPOSAL THAT WORK ON THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT SHOULD BE VERY RESTRICTED. OBVIOUSLY, ANY LEAK REGARDING FACT OF THIS STUDY WOULD BE HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE AND COULD JEOPARDIZE NOT ONLY THIS PROJECT BUT RELATED WORK UNDERWAY IN OTHER FORA. IN OUR VIEW, BONN GROUP STUDY SHOULD WHEN COMPLETED BE INTEGRATED INTO BROADER CONSIDERATION OF POLISH CONTINGENCIES UNDERWAY IN POLITICAL DIRECTORS' CONTEXT, AT WHICH TIME WE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER WHETHER BONN GROUP STUDY SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO NATO CONSIDERATION OF POLISH CONTINGENCIES. WE ARE REPEATING REF (A) TO INFO ADDRESSEES, AND WE WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME USBERT'S COMMENTS ON UK PROPOSAL, INCLUDING SPECIFIC SOVIET/GDR MEASURES DISCUSSED THEREIN.

3. AS A GENERAL RULE, WE HAVE PROCEEDED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A SOVIET MOVE AGAINST BERLIN IN THE WAKE OF AN INTERVENTION IN POLAND IS UNLIKELY, AT LEAST DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD FOLLOWING AN INTERVENTION. WE ASSUME THAT ONE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOLLOWING INTERVENTION IN POLAND WOULD BE TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY OF STRONG, UNIFIED WESTERN RESPONSE. SOVIET PRESSURE ON BERLIN, GIVEN THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS, WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY SERVE TO SOLIDIFY WESTERN POSITION, AND THE SOVIETS ARE CERTAINLY WELL AWARE OF THIS.

4. IN THE EVENT OF A VERY FIRM ALLIED RESPONSE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LOOK AROUND FOR APPROPRIATE COUNTERMOVES OF THEIR OWN AND THEY COULD WELL FIX UPON BERLIN. IN THIS EVENT, WE SHARE ASSUMPTION IN UK PAPER THAT SOVIETS COULD, WITHOUT BREAKING THE LETTER OF EXISTING TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, CAUSE US SERIOUS INCONVENIENCE IN AND AROUND BERLIN. LIST OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS IN SECTION A (STEPS AGAINST GERMANS) WHICH SOVIETS MIGHT TAKE STRIKE US AS REASONABLE, WITH EXCEPTION OF POINT A.3 REGARDING PRISONER BUY-OUT PROGRAM. IN THIS CASE THE IMPACT WOULD BE OF SUCH A DELAYED NATURE, GIVEN THE SOMEWHAT SPORADIC IMPLEMENTA-

SECSTATE WASHDC 7821

DTG:070248Z MAR 81 08N1 029697
TORI 066/0308Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TION OF THIS PROGRAM THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT BE INCLINED TO USE IT. MOREOVER, ENDING THIS HIGHLY LUCRATIVE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT WELL BE RESISTED BY THE GDR. AS FAR AS SECTION B (STEPS AGAINST ALLIES) IS CONCERNED, THE NINE POSSIBLE STEPS LISTED CLEARLY VARY GREATLY IN TERMS OF THEIR SERIOUSNESS AND THEIR IMPACT. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, MOST RECENTLY IN 1977, THE IMPACT WHICH ACTION AGAINST FLAG PATROLS WOULD HAVE. THE SOVIETS MAY ASSUME THAT INCREASING THEIR PATROLS IN WEST BERLIN AND STEP UP OF THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF THEIR PATROLS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BRINGING ON STRONG ALLIED REACTION. ITEMS 3, 4, 5, 6 AND 7 STRIKE US AS EASILY WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY SHOULD SOVIETS DECIDE TO EMBARK ON PRESSURE CAMPAIGN. AS FAR AS ITEM B.8 (CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE 1972 FINAL QUAD PROTOCOL) IS CONCERNED, THE SOVIETS HAVE OCCASIONALLY HINTED INFORMALLY AT THIS POSSIBILITY SINCE THE PROTOCOL WAS CONCLUDED. HOWEVER, WE WONDER WHETHER, IN THE EVENT THE SOVIETS WERE SKIRTING ALONG THE EDGES OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT IN A PRESSURE CAMPAIGN, AND WERE BEING ASSAILED FOR THEIR OWN VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THEY WOULD WANT TO GIVE US A FORUM WHICH WE COULD USE TO PROTEST THESE ACTIVITIES. ITEM B.9, I.E., THREATENING MILITARY ACTIVITY AROUND THE WESTERN SECTORS, STRIKES US AS BEING LEAST LIKELY AND MOST SERIOUS OF MEASURES LISTED BY THE BRITISH.

5. AS FAR AS ALLIED REACTION IS CONCERNED, WE SHARE VIEW IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF UK PAPER THAT WE SHOULD REACT "QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THOUGH NOT PROVOCATIVELY." WHAT THIS MEANS IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY AS THE EXACT SCALE OF SOVIET PRESSURE

SECSTATE WASHDC 7821

DTG:070246Z MAR 81 58N: 020607
TOR: 066/0308Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #7821/02 0600305
O R 070246Z MAR 81 ZPFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2899
USMISSION USBERLIN 2475INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3889
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8629
USMISSION USNATO 0826
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8490
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8480
WHITE HOUSE 6318
BT~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 057821NODIS
BECOMES CLEAR. WE SHARE UK DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE
USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO DEVELOP DETAILED PLAN FOR
POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES. IN GENERAL, GIVEN ALLIED
SITUATION IN BERLIN AND WHAT ONE CAN ASSUME WOULD BE A
VERY NERVOUS BERLIN POPULACE, A CALM, RESOLUTE ALLIED
STANCE WOULD CLEARLY BE IN ORDER. UNLESS BONN OR USBER
FEEL OTHERWISE, WE WOULD NOT SEE ANY PARTICULAR USE
AT THIS TIME IN CONSIDERING RETALIATORY MOVES IN
THE BERLIN CONTEXT, I.E., AGAINST SOVIET FACILITIES IN
THE WESTERN SECTORS. RATHER, WE SHOULD, AS A GENERAL
RULE, AGREE THAT THE ALLIES WILL OBSERVE LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND INSIST THAT
SOVIETS DO THE SAME. STORSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 7821

DTG:070246Z MAR 81 ZONI 020600
TOR: 066/0308Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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SIT: 800

EOB: AFRECON, EURE, EURW, NUOUN, SCINU, EUR, WEUR, OEPOL

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #7692 0600415

O 062256Z MAR 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#127

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2005
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0186
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0061
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3099
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 3013
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1042
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 4729
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 9109
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4520

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8498
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0032
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0639
RUDORRA /USNMR SHAPE BE
RUSNAAA /USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 057692
LIMDIS, SHAPE AND CINCEUR FOR POLADS
E.O. 12065: XDS-3 03/05/91 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE ..)

TAGS: NATO, MNUC, MMOL

SUBJECT: ERW PROGRAM STATUS

REF: STATE 28412

1. (S) AS THE DETAILS OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET BECOME PUBLIC, WE CAN EXPECT A HOST OF PRESS REPORTS, SOME OF WHICH WILL BE

SECSTATE WASHDC 7692

DTG: 062256Z MAR 81 58N1 020025
TOR: 060/0501Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACCURATE AND OTHERS OF WHICH WILL BE WELL WIDE OF THE MARK. IN ORDER TO PREEMPT ANY POSSIBLE CLAIMS OR ALLEGATIONS IN THIS REGARD ABOUT US PROGRAMS FOR ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS, THIS CABLE PROVIDES POSS WITH INFORMATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THOSE PROGRAMS. PARAGRAPH TWO CONTAINS TALKING POINTS FOR EMBASSIES TO USE IN INFORMING SENIOR ALLIED OFFICIALS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN AN EXTREMELY LOW-KEY MANNER, AND SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS ANTICIPATING POSSIBLE PRESS REPORTS RATHER THAN REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN US POLICY. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED OR TAKEN AS THE BEGINNING OF CONSULTATIONS ON ERW WITH THE ALLIES.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY, ADDITION TO THE FY 1981 DEFENSE BUDGET AND ITS PROPOSED AMEND-

MENT TO THE FY 1982 DEFENSE BUDGET WILL BE SENT TO CONGRESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS USUAL THERE WILL BE THE STANDARD COLLECTION OF PRESS REPORTS, SOME ACCURATE, AND OTHERS LESS SO. IN ORDER TO PREEMPT ANY POSSIBLE CLAIMS IN THIS REGARD ABOUT THE US ERW PROGRAMS, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THOSE PROGRAMS.

-- IN APRIL 1978, PRESIDENT CARTER DECIDED TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF ERW BUT TO CONTINUE WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF THE EIGHT-INCH NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND LANCE WARHEADS, WHILE LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION OF INSTALLING ENHANCED RADIATION COMPONENTS AT A LATER DATE.

-- AT THE OCTOBER 1978 NPS SECRETARY BROWN BRIEFED THE ALLIES CONCERNING THE US PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH PRODUCTION OF ERW COMPONENTS AND ALSO OF MODERNIZED WARHEADS FOR THE LANCE AND EIGHT-INCH ARTILLERY, WHICH COULD BE CONVERTED TO ER CAPABILITY AT A LATER TIME.

-- CONSISTENT WITH THESE PLANS, THE FY 81 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUTHORIZATION BILL SIGNED BY PRESIDENT CARTER DIRECTED DOE TO PRODUCE AND STOCKPILE THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND WARHEAD COMPONENTS FOR THE ERW.

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DTG:062256Z MAR 81 ZSN: 020025
TOR: 000/0501Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE 1982 DEFENSE BUDGET SUBMITTED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION INCLUDED FUNDING FOR PRODUCTION OF THE MODERNIZED WARHEADS WHICH, AMONG OTHER FEATURES, RETAIN THE CAPABILITY OF BEING MODIFIED TO HAVE AN ENHANCED RADIATION FEATURE SHOULD A DECISION BE MADE TO INSTALL THE ENHANCED RADIATION ELEMENTS INTO THEM.

-- NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO INSTALL THE ENHANCED RADIATION ELEMENTS INTO THE MODERNIZED WARHEADS. WE WILL KEEP OUR ALLIES INFORMED.

-- WE WILL CONSULT IN ADVANCE OF A DECISION TO DEPLOY ERW IN WESTERN EUROPE. STOESEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 7602

DTG:062256Z MAR 81 50N1 029025
TORI 066/0501Z

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SITI FILE

EOB: EURE, EURN, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3593/01 0021811

O O 031741Z MAR 81 ZPPG

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#124

BY LDJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2734
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 3081
AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE 0887
USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 9930
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 8354
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 4668
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0074

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8280

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6303

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 053593

NODIS

E O 12065. GDS 2/13/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO SEEK FUNDING FOR CW
MODERNIZATION

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE FY 1981 DOD BUDGET SUPPLEMENTAL,
THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WILL BECOME PUBLIC IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, WILL INCLUDE FUNDS TO BEGIN CONSTRUCTION AND TO
PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR A BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
FACILITY. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 3593

DTG: 031741Z MAR 81
TOR: 002/1813Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECRETARY TO SELECTED FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE SUBJECT. ACTION EMBASSIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER IT AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, COMPLETING THE SALUTATION LINE AS APPROPRIATE.

3. BEIN TEXT.

DEAR

THE US GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF, AS YOU KNOW, TO IMPROVING THE ALLIANCE'S CAPABILITY AND MAINTAINING

THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS DETERRENT. WE WILL BE SUBMITTING TO CONGRESS A SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST CONTAINING PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING THIS NATION'S DEFENSE EFFORTS. AMONG THESE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THERE WILL BE A REQUEST FOR FUNDING TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZING OUR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS.

THESE FUNDS WILL PERMIT US TO BEGIN CONSTRUCTION OF A BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPON PRODUCTION FACILITY. THIS DECISION IS CLEARLY ONE FOR THE US TO MAKE ALONE. SHOULD WE, IN SEVERAL YEARS TIME, DECIDE THAT DEPLOYMENT IS DESIRABLE, WE WILL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH ANY ALLY CONCERNED.

THERE IS PRESSING NEED TO MODERNIZE OUR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. WE KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY THE PROSPECT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND HAVE PUT SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES INTO DEVELOPING THEIR CAPABILITIES. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE HAD ALARMING INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS BY SOVIET AND OTHER COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS, CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN, AND REPORTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET TRANSFER OF SUCH WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL. THE ALLIANCE HAS LONG BEEN AGREED ON THE NEED TO RETAIN A CHEMICAL WEAPONS RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AS A DETERRENT AGAINST SOVIET USE OF SUCH MUNITIONS. TO FAIL TO MAINTAIN SUCH A DETERRENT WOULD BE TO INVITE THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPONS, AND LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR OWN CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS ARE STEADILY AGING. ALTHOUGH THE BINARY WEAPONS WE WOULD EVENTUALLY PRODUCE WOULD

SECSTATE WASHDC 3893

DTG:031741Z MAR 81 38N1 024309
TORI 062/1813Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT BE MORE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE THAN EXISTING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEY WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT SAFETY ADVANTAGES IN STORAGE, TRANSPORT, AND HANDLING, BECAUSE THE CHEMICALS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE NOT LETHAL UNTIL COMBINED AND ARE NOT COMBINED UNLESS THE WEAPON IS ACTUALLY FIRED.

IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO FOREGO THE SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ADVANTAGE OF BINARY MUNITIONS. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY NEGLIGENT TO ALLOW OUR DETERRENT CAPABILITY IN THIS AREA TO LAPSE. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS, THAT WE PLAN TO MOVE AHEAD WITH A PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZING OUR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY BY CONSTRUCTING A BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS ACTION WILL PROVOKE, AS DO MOST PROGRAM DECISIONS OF CONSEQUENCE, SOME DEGREE OF CONTROVERSY. THE RATIONALE FOR OUR DECISION IS A STRONG ONE, HOWEVER, WHICH WE CAN AND WILL DEFEND SUCCESSFULLY.

I HAVE SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS (GENSCHER), (CARRINGTON), (COLOMBO) (FRANCOIS-PONCET), (NOTHOMB), AND (VAN DER KLAUW).

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER HAIG

4. FOR USNATO: YOU SHOULD BRIEF SYG LUNS ON THE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE.

5. FOR PARIS: YOU SHOULD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH FOR THE CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH IN THE ABOVE MESSAGE.

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DTG:031741Z MAR 81 58N1 024309
TOR: 062/1813Z

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3593/02 0621811
O D 031741Z MAR 81 ZPPB
FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2735
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 3652
AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE 0808
USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0931
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 8355
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 4969
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0075INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8281
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6304~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 053593
NODISBEGIN TEXT. I REALIZE THAT THIS U.S. DECISION DOES NOT
AFFECT FRANCE IN ANY DIRECT MANNER, BUT I NONETHELESS
BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT ON
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THIS SORT. WE HAD A GOOD
VISIT IN WASHINGTON AND I LOOK FORWARD TO FUTURE
OPPORTUNITIES TO PURSUE ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3593

DTG:031741Z MAR 81 SSN: 024406
TOR: 062/1813Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #0124 0502140
O P 200135Z FEB 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2672

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3685
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3281
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 9448
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3475
BT~~SECRET~~ STATE 052124

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2/28/01 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.)

TAGS: PL, NATO, UR, PGOV

SUBJECT: UK PROPOSAL ON BONN GROUP POLISH CONTINGENCY STUDY

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING FEBRUARY 28 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER, UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR BULLARD ADVISED THAT LONDON WAS INSTRUCTING UK BONN GROUP REP TO PROPOSE THAT BONN GROUP STUDY IMPLICATIONS FOR BERLIN OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND. EAGLEBURGER WELCOMED BULLARD PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT WE WOULD INSTRUCT US BONN GROUP REP TO SUPPORT UK INITIATIVE.

3. WHEN UK PROPOSAL IS ADVANCED, US REP IN BONN GROUP SHOULD SUPPORT IT. WE WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE WHEN PARAMETERS OF UK PROPOSAL ARE CLEARER. HAIG

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #125BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PSNI 021467

TORI 060/02147Z

RTGI 282136Z FEB 81

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/19/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS.

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
 DE RUEHC #1266 0491919
 R 181759Z FEB 81
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN 2171

UNCLAS STATE 041266
 E.O. 120651 N/A

TAGS: PDIP US GW

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMIN
 GENSCHER

REF: BONN 21594

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
 REAGAN TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE
 UPON MY ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOR
 THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND THE CHANCELLOR IN
 NOVEMBER. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONTINUATION OF CLOSE
 COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR NATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF
 FREEDOM, PROGRESS AND PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

SINCERELY,

/s/ RONALD REAGAN HAIG

PSN: 008041

TOR: 080/08149Z

BTG: 181759Z FEB 81

DATE 02/04/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL, VP
EOB:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEHC #7181 0221921
Z 221921Z JAN 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USAF HOSPITAL WIESBADEN AB FLASH

UNCLAS STATE 017181
FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE PARTY, ATTN: SHELDON KRYS
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PINR, IR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE 52
--- AMERICANS HELD CAPTIVE IN IRAN.

BEGIN QUOTE.

WELCOME TO FREEDOM.

WHILE WE AT HOME CANNOT BEGIN TO KNOW THE DEPTH OF YOUR FEELINGS, WE WANT YOU TO KNOW OF OUR PROFOUND RESPECT FOR YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM UNDER THE MOST DEMANDING CIRCUMSTANCES.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW OF OUR DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO YOUR FUTURE AND THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO YOUR RETURN AND TO THE RESTORATION OF BOTH YOUR FAMILY AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

OUR MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS TO ENSURE THAT YOU ARE QUICKLY REUNITED WITH YOUR FAMILIES AND THAT YOU ARE ONCE AGAIN ABLE TO ENJOY THE PRECIOUS BLESSINGS OF FREEDOM.

AS DIFFICULT AS THIS EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN FOR EACH OF YOU, IT CONTAINS LESSONS FOR US ALL. PLEASE KNOW THAT WE ARE

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02/04/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH EACH OF YOU, AND THAT THIS EPISODE IN OUR HISTORY WILL
BE EVER WITH US AS, TOGETHER, WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

END QUOTE

NEWSOM

PSN: 029605

TOR: 022/19129Z

BT: 201921Z JAN 81

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RECEIVED 18 JUN 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 18 JUN 81

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*NSD
12/16/81*

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

TURKEY

LEISLER-KEIP, ~~HEPP~~ **WALTER**

POLAND

AA

SUBJECT: ALLEN MTG W/ LEISLER-KEIP ON JUN 19

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

June 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Leisler-Kiep,
Friday, June 19, 11:00 a.m.

Any information that Herr Leisler-Kiep can give on the following topics would be useful:

- Germany Economic Assistance Efforts to Turkey. (We estimate it will take 2-3 years of austerity measures for Turkey to turn its economy around. Will Germany be able to sustain its effort for that long?) (C)
- Schmidt's Durability. Does the CDU estimate that the SPD-FDP coalition will endure to the end of its term? (C)
- Poland. What would be German reaction to a Soviet intervention? How long would the window last during which the West could take decisive counter-measures? On the other hand, what would be the effects of Soviet restraint for the rest of 1981? (C)
- Shaping Public Opinion. How can we counter the current Soviet "peace offensive" and seize the rhetorical initiative ourselves? (C)

Defense budget \$3 billion SHORT

DECLASSIFIED
NLS #F97-030 #125
BY MSH, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 18, 1987

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TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 26 MAY 81

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*MSP
12/16/98*

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

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VON STADEN, BERNT

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR ALLEN MTG W/ GERMAN ON 26 MAY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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FOR RVA mtg.
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DICK ALLEN _____

IRENE DERUS _____

JANET COLSON _____

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MEMORANDUM

2987

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

May 26, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Berndt von Staden (U)
(Tuesday, May 26 - 2:00 p.m.)
2:30

Von Staden will be interested primarily (as will we) in post-morteming the Schmidt visit. You might wish to use the occasion to reinforce (or inquire about) a number of substantive points:

-- TNF. Frankly inform von Staden that the U.S. made a significant bow to German sensitivities by agreeing to the communique language they wanted but that they should be under no illusions about our determination to follow through with both sides of the December 1979 decision. We count on continuing German commitment to modernization. (C)

-- Mitterrand. Ask von Staden if he has received any readout on the Chancellor's Sunday morning meeting in Paris with the new French President. (C)

-- Namibia. Since Schmidt indicated some skepticism about the accuracy of our Southern African analysis (and particularly the situation inside Angola), it might be well to reiterate our policy approach in that area. (C)

Von Staden may wish to raise the nuclear release question which Schmidt touched on briefly with the President during their second round of talks last week. Time permitting, you might elicit von Staden's views on the Italian political situation following Forlani's weekend fall. (S)

Attached for purposes of quick "refresher" reading are summaries of the President's two meetings with Schmidt. (U)

Attachments:

- Tab A Memcon Between the President and Chancellor Schmidt
- Tab B Summary of the President's Second Meeting with Schmidt

~~SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Review on May 26, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030 #127
BY MSD, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the
Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Richard V. Allen

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
His Excellency Guenter Huonker, Minister
of State, Chancellor's office
His Excellency Berndt von Staden, Security
Adviser for the Chancellor
Guenther van Well, State Secretary,
Foreign Office

DATE, TIME May 21, 1981
AND PLACE: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 noon, Oval Office

After an exchange of initial pleasantries, The President asked the Chancellor his opinion of the elections in France.

The Chancellor responded that he has known Mitterrand for 15 years, and last saw him three years ago. The Chancellor speculated about the composition of the cabinet, with Cheysson as foreign minister, Charles Hernu as defense minister and Jacques Delors with the economic portfolio. He indicated that the likely outcome of the French election will be renewed emphasis on pursuit of continuity in French policy. He indicated that following the election, the financial markets were "very nervous," and that "we have intervened within five days to the tune of DM 6 billion in order to stabilize the franc."

The Chancellor opined that Mitterrand will not appoint communists to his government at this time. However, he indicated that in order to win the legislative elections, the socialist candidates will have to form alliances in individual constituencies, bargaining with various parties including communists and the Gaullists. He said that, in his opinion, only after the second ballot on June 24 "will we know if the communist party can be kept outside the government."

On the other hand, he indicated there could be a swing to the right between now and the legislative elections. He noted that

~~SECRET~~

Review on May 21, 2010
Extended by R.Allen
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

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NLS M1460 #1
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 12/7/05

Mitterrand is a great tactician, and may anticipate this and seek to cope with it in advance.

Concerning foreign policy positions of the new French government, he indicated that Mitterrand would likely pursue a stiffer policy vis-a-vis the USSR than Giscard had followed. He hastened to add, however, that Giscard was nonetheless the most pro-American French leader since World War II, something that we in the United States had failed to recognize. With Mitterrand's election, this will change.

He emphasized that Mitterrand will likely keep France's NATO commitments and all commitments to the European Community. He indicated that the close cooperation with the FRG may continue, and that, "I will strive to maintain this close cooperation." However, he stressed that it is difficult to assess the present situation, if only because "none of these people has had any experience in office for the last twenty years." He said that there was a chance that Jobert may get a post, but that he, Schmidt, hoped that it would not be the European portfolio (the importance of this remark escaped me).

Concerning the Middle East, he indicated that French policy would "seem" to differ from Giscard's. He questioned whether Mitterrand could afford to pursue a substantially different policy, if only because the French oil debt to the Arabs is in "double-digit billion figures." On balance, however, he stressed that Mitterrand would probably be more pro-Israeli and more anti-Arab than Giscard.

Concerning Africa, since "equilibrium in Africa" was one of Giscard's policies, one cannot come to a conclusion as to what Mitterrand would do. It remained to be seen. In any case, "all of this is said with a background of pieces of information." At this moment the Chancellor recalled a meeting he had with Mitterrand about 6 years ago in Copenhagen, where he had a fierce argument with Mitterrand, who advanced the notion at that time that communists should be included in the French government. Nonetheless, after Mitterrand takes office, the Chancellor feels that "many attitudes will change," but that "he will remain pro-Atlantic and will stay in the treaty organization." Basically, with respect to foreign policy, the Chancellor believes that Mitterrand will pursue a policy of continuity.

At this point, the Chancellor conveyed the greetings of Margaret Thatcher and President Figueiredo to the President. He had met with both recently.

He noted that it was important that the Western Allies "step forward to Mitterrand with open arms," to which The President responded that we intend to try to establish a good relationship with France.

The President remarked that it will be the United States policy to continue close cooperation with Germany.

The Chancellor responded that "we are satisfied with the depth and the volume of contact" between the two countries. He indicated that the two times he had met with Haig, the two times with Weinberger and the meeting with Secretary Regan's official representative were all helpful.

The Chancellor remarked that the attempt on the President's life would certainly have had a slowing effect on his programs in the United States, to which

The President responded that our economic problems are substantial and we are now trying to implement a course of recovery. He recognized that the Chancellor is concerned about high interest rates, and said that "we're all concerned, but we expect interest rates will be going down in a few months." However, he noted that interest rates really won't go down permanently until we get a handle on inflation. To effect this, it would be necessary to balance the budget, at which time interest rates will follow.

The Chancellor indicated that he had been fighting inflation for many years, and it now stands at 5-1/2 percent mark. "I'm not criticizing anyone, but I want to emphasize that American economic behavior has enormous impact on Europe," he said. He noted that "high interest rates suck into New York City all the liquidity in the world." It is necessary, he said, to retain some of the liquidity for the purpose of providing capital expenditures which in turn will create jobs. He noted that in the United States there is a notion of "upswing and optimism," whereas in Europe -- particularly in Denmark, France, Belgium, and Germany -- pessimism reigns. He noted England's unemployment level of 2-1/2 million (the highest since 1936), and in Germany the rate was about half that but remained the highest since 1955. He noted further that it has become impossible to borrow in Europe and that "people are not building houses in Europe."

The President responded that neither are they building houses in the United States.

The Chancellor stated, "I have a feeling that you will succeed, but please remember that what you do has consequences. There can be political destabilization as a result. You don't read much about stability in Thatcher's government, but I can assure you that it is not all that stable." He said that Mitterrand had campaigned on a promise to do away with unemployment, "but he can't. There will be deep disappointment about Mitterrand soon. This can spread to Italy." Then, changing the subject

slightly, he noted that if this should lead to inclusion of communists in the government of France, Italy may be infected and there may be pressure to include communists there. If this should happen in France and Italy, it can become an "example" for the rest of Europe, and therefore have serious destabilizing effects.

Secretary Haig said that financial matters could be pursued in greater detail when Chancellor Schmidt meets with Secretary Regan. He believed it would be very helpful as a forum for conveying our concerns and theirs. The Secretary noted that in his discussion with the Chancellor East-West relations had been brought up, and that Chancellor Schmidt had made some "interesting comments on Brezhnev."

Taking this invitation to comment on East-West relations, the Chancellor said that he knew that contact was being maintained with Dobrynin, but to rely on the Dobrynin channel is in itself dangerous. He said "Dobrynin can't talk to Brezhnev, that he must report to Gromyko." Therefore, in his view, a directive to Dobrynin doesn't mean very much. He said "We can count on Brezhnev to come to grips with the problems of maintaining peace, and Brezhnev must form coalitions in order to maintain power." He explained that Brezhnev's basic coalition is presently with the military, which he has allowed to rearm, in exchange for which they support him on his American policy. He noted particularly Podgorny belonging to this group. He said that if this coalition were not maintained, then we might have Suslov and others coming to power. He said that Brezhnev, "like a Russian after reading Dostoyevsky and Pushkin," is "cruel, abrupt, a great host, and emotional." "I've seen him weeping -- when he greeted me at Vnukovo, (the airport in Moscow) and particularly when they played the German national anthem, he was deeply moved, and I saw him weeping. He is given to thinking about peace and war, and is fed up with war, having seen too much in his life."

The Chancellor noted that the President "did the right thing by writing to him."

The President responded "I had met him some years before, and it seemed to me that it was time to communicate directly." The President continued, "I campaigned on a theme that the time has come not for chess games, but for us to sit down and look at numbers of weapons and get some meaningful reduction." Thereupon the President reaffirmed the American intention to move forward on the double track of TNF negotiations. "So far, they haven't

shown any interest, and we're going to have to give them another chance."

The Chancellor observed that "talk of such discussions is necessary for Europeans, who require reassurance." He said that there is some opposition to TNF in Europe, "but not too much." It was particularly difficult in Holland and Scandinavia where they are confronted with the twin realities of 1) recognizing that Soviet power is overwhelming in the region, and 2) that the West must make serious attempts to negotiate with the Soviet Union. "If," he said, "Europeans understand this, they will agree to your doing something on your side." He reemphasized that "reassurances are required for Europeans, not so much for England and Federal Republic of Germany, but for others." He said that Scandinavia is "lost," that they will "never agree and they have become too far left." He said that the situation in Holland is "very, very difficult," and that in Belgium even worse because "Belgium doesn't function as a State." He suggested that one solution might be to have Flemish missiles in one part of Belgium and French missiles in another part: this remark excited considerable amusement in the room.

The President noted, "For us to be successful in arms control the Russians have to see that the alternative is a buildup to match theirs."

The Chancellor said "I completely agree." He then went into a detailed description of how he had been "rebuked by your predecessors," noting that shortly after the Vladivostok Conference, he demanded that no SALT agreement which would leave out Europe and the Mediterranean or which would leave out SS-20s be achieved. He said, "No one would listen, and now we have this result." He then said he had made a speech in October 1977, "going public," which the United States government criticized. He indicated that by 1978 the administration decided to do something, and this led to the January 1979 meeting in Guadeloupe. At that point, he said President Carter had decided to do something about the SS-20s in Europe. He noted that Callaghan at that point was demanding that we negotiate with the Russians first and then do something, but that Giscard and Schmidt had remained firm. "I have tried in the meantime to convince the Dutch, but I haven't even been able to convince the Christian Democrats in Holland," he concluded.

The Chancellor then paused before addressing the next subject, that of the perception of the President in Europe. He told the President, "There is a wrong perception of you, and it would be worth your while to analyze -- in anticipation of the Ottawa meeting -- whether a Presidential visit to Europe would be advisable." He said, "We would be glad to have you, perhaps you should visit some other countries also." He

said that it is advisable "that you appear in person in Europe to let people understand you are not the sort of fellow who is depicted, namely, a cowboy or one who appears only in cowboy films." The Chancellor said: "Am I too blunt?"

The President responded that he knew that there is such an image, but that it is completely false.

The Chancellor immediately responded in loud voice, "I know it is, and I am contending against this. In fact, I did on the plane on the way over."

The Chancellor returned to the subject of France, noting that "we'll all have trouble with Mitterrand."

The Vice President recalled the Bohemian Grove meeting at which the President and the Chancellor were present, as was the Vice President, and wondered if it would not be a good idea to go to an informal setting to have discussions with Mitterrand, and perhaps other leaders of Europe.

The Chancellor indicated that there are "places in Europe which lend themselves to this sort of thing."

The Chancellor repeated that President Giscard sent his best wishes to President Reagan, and that also President Karstens "would like to be invited to the United States in the next year or so." He then noted that Brezhnev would be coming to visit Germany in October, and reminded the President that he had mentioned this in an earlier telephone conversation.

The Chancellor then turned to the subject of the Middle East, asking the President to brief him on the situation there.

The President noted that we had sent Ambassador Habib to the Middle East, "not with a plan, but to try to persuade all parties to avoid war." The President said that he was optimistic and noted that we had been successful in "buying time." The President observed that we had been on the verge of conflict, but the shuttle diplomacy of Amb. Habib seemed to be working. The President also noted that we intend to pursue the Camp David peace process, and that "if the Arabs will just pass over that one line, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, we might have success. How can you negotiate when some say, 'No, we do not recognize your right to exist?'"

Chancellor Schmidt said that in his opinion, Saudi Arabia is ready to acknowledge Israel's right to exist. He recalled that Prince Fahd had said to him, "Israel's role as a normal part of the landscape of the Middle East is assured." He felt that this was very reassuring. He said that the Saudis want to be

friends with Egypt, and this will occur in May of next year when the remainder of the Sinai reverts to Egypt.

Regarding the PLO, he noted that all Arabs are for the recognition of the PLO and for the creation of a PLO state, primarily because it helps the Arab cause to make such declarations and, he noted, it is also useful "to get rid of Palestinians."

The President responded by saying that "the notion that a Palestinian state has to be located in Israel is somewhat confusing, especially since when the land of Palestine was divided, 80 percent of it was in Jordan and 20 percent in Israel. Where could such a nation be established?" he asked.

The Chancellor replied that "the non-arid space of the region is too small to accommodate them."

The Chancellor indicated that he wanted to make a few remarks about the PLO because of Begin's "abuses against me." He said, "I don't want to pour oil on the fire. I have been a friend of Israel as Defense Minister and Finance Minister and George Schultz and others can tell you how we found ways to channel money to Israel. I recognize the historical necessity of the state of Israel, but I will not answer Begin." "In any event," he noted, "the U.S. should know what I did say in Riyadh recently." He said that in a press conference in the presence of Prince Fahd he had said, "Germany's attitude vis-a-vis the PLO depends on the PLO's stand regarding Israel's right to exist within acknowledged and secure boundaries." He said, "Begin simply couldn't take this," noting further that Begin wants to win the campaign, and the campaign apparently motivates him to say such things. He noted that Giscard had been attacked by Begin, and that Kreisky had too. With some bitterness the Chancellor noted that Begin had practically called him a Nazi, but that he couldn't say that about Giscard because Jews didn't die in French concentration camps and about Kreisky because "Kreisky is himself a Jew."

The President agreed that matters are complicated by the election campaign in Israel, and the Secretary of State noted, "Begin didn't help yesterday by adding two conditions to our negotiations."

The President remarked "We are trying to keep everyone quiet while Habib is there. With people making statements from which it is difficult to retreat, the situation becomes even more complicated."

Chancellor Schmidt said that he understands the Saudis have been very helpful with the Syrians, to which the President replied in the affirmative and said that we brought the Saudis in for that express purpose.

Chancellor Schmidt said that it helps to cultivate the Saudi connection. He noted that the Saudis want weapons from the Germans, Leopard tanks, but "We have a rule that there should be no export of weapons outside NATO countries, and if there is to be an exception, those weapons shall not be sent to an area of tension." He said that Saudi Arabia must have weapons, and stressed that Saudi Arabia's enemy is not Israel. He said that in this connection he had asked Prince Fahd to give a Saudi Arabian perspective of the world and the dangers in the region. In response, Prince Fahd had talked about the Soviet grip on Yemen and the Soviet attempt to "roll up the Arabian peninsula from the South." After 3/4 of an hour on this subject, Fahd then spent about a 1/4 hour on the Soviets, Cubans and East Germans extending their influence in the region to places like Libya and Yemen. "Israel was never mentioned," he observed. "Thus it should be clear that Israel is not considered Saudi Arabia's main enemy."

He said that the US image in Saudi Arabia has suffered substantially as a result of the handling of the Taiwan episode and the way in which the United States was perceived to have allowed the Shah's regime to fall.

The President agreed, noting that he had said the same thing at the time of both events, and that not only had we betrayed our friends, but "we cast doubt on our ability to be anyone's ally." The President explained his policy toward Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, noting that "Carter did not have to do what he did to get any agreement that we presently have with the PRC."

Chancellor Schmidt indicated his agreement with the President's observation, but pointed out that there may need to be further clarification of US policy toward the Middle East. He was particularly critical of the Carter Doctrine, which "met with mixed feelings in the Middle East." He said, "What they want is impossible -- if needs be, the Americans should be there, but otherwise not." With respect to basing arrangements, the Chancellor said that Prince Fahd told him, "We left the bases matter to the Omanis." The Saudis do want to maintain their non-alignment status, and to take the lead among Islamic countries. They want to be perceived as somewhat independent. The Chancellor noted that in terms of instilling realism in the Saudi mind, the Russians have done us a favor by going into Afghanistan. However, he stressed, we must respect the Saudi wish for autonomy. They do need a military buildup in the Gulf, and we should take appropriate steps to strengthen the six-nation Gulf alliance recently created. This group needs military hardware. Although Germany cannot give it to the new alliance grouping, if only because of moral reasons, France and the United States can.

The Chancellor indicated that in his opinion the Soviet Union would attempt further thrusts into the Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and would come even as far west as the Western Sahara to interfere in the Polisario movement. He said that it is important that the Soviet Union will continue its attempts to spread influence, but that as long as conflict between Israel and its neighbors is not settled, this problem of Soviet penetration will remain, too.

The President observed that it dangerous situation, particularly in light of increased Soviet penetration as long as we are so dependent upon Middle East oil.

The President then observed that it was quite strange that the anti-nuclear demonstrators whom we see today are the same as those who demonstrated against the Vietnam war and against El Salvador. In Europe we see the same thing, he noted, yet nowhere is nuclear power construction progressing so rapidly as in the Eastern countries.

The conversation turned somewhat philosophical at this point with the Chancellor observing the horrible effects of television and the mass media of communication. He said, "Television is the opposite of education. It is flooding the world with disinformation and violence. We may have seen the peak of the anti-nuclear power movement," he said, but "Preachers who cannot pray will invent something else against which to demonstrate."

After a brief exchange on the proposed joint communique, the Chancellor said it would be important that there be no changes; that the public perception be that there are no changes in the things we have already agreed upon. He noted again that there is a wrong conception of the President in Europe, and that the reaffirmation of the things on which we have already agreed will help dispel that conception.

The President thanked the Chancellor and indicated that the next meeting of the two would begin with the Chancellor's agenda. The meeting terminated at 12:00 noon.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: President's Second Meeting with Schmidt:
Quick Summary

*Jim
Thanks
Hold outside
System*

Dick, main items you need to know about in this morning's meeting with Schmidt are these:

-- Schmidt stopover in Paris. Not yet officially announced, but he will spend Saturday night in Paris, see Mitterrand for an hour Sunday morning. He will convey President's warm greetings and appreciation for "encouraging" message Mitterrand sent.

-- Negotiations with Soviets. Schmidt said the main question he will get back home is whether or not President is willing to sit down and negotiate with the Soviets. Said he wants to have the freedom to tell the Bundestag and his public opinion that the President is willing to do so. The President assured Schmidt he could tell them that.

-- Central American/Caribbean: Schmidt said he was very enthusiastic about what the President had told him concerning the NSC meeting that morning and the U.S. plan to address not only military subversion in the region but the underlying social-economic conditions (Schmidt said his only worry was that he had expressed similar suggestions for U.S. action yesterday on the Hill and now he could be accused of leaking the President's policy).

-- Mexico/Canada. Schmidt also said he was enthusiastic about the President's approach to our own hemisphere, said this will greatly enhance U.S. credibility in dealing with the rest of the world.

-- Poland. Both agreed that any Soviet intervention would spell the end of any prospects for East-West detente.

-- Southern Africa/Namibia. Schmidt disagreed with the President's characterization of Angola as a Soviet puppet, said there were many different currents there, strongly recommended that the President get the views of Eanes in Portugal and Figureiro in Brazil, who know Angola better than anyone else and who cannot be accused of having leftist sympathies. President said he would. (TS)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS #97-030 #129

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review on May 22, 2010

Extended by R.Allen

Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

BY MJN, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

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2

~~TOP SECRET~~

-- Nuclear release. Schmidt wants an exchange of letters with the President on this subject (there are actually two letters in question, one covering release for use against countries beyond German borders, one covering release for use within FRG; Schmidt is particularly interested in the second category, for which they never had a letter agreement with Carter). The President said he would take this up with you.

-- Visit invitation. Schmidt said it would be enormously helpful to him if he could go back saying the President had accepted an invitation to visit Germany. President said fine in principle, so long as it is understood that timing, etc. would have to be agreed upon later. Schmidt agreed.

-- Begin. Schmidt said he is very hurt by Begin's accusations; expressed a good deal of personal angst which he asked me not to make notes about, including his actual genealogy (which had been falsified during the war to protect his family - he left the impression that he was at least partially of Jewish origin). ~~(TS)~~

You should also know that the President brought up the bad-connection phone call which he and Schmidt had had, on which cue Schmidt reconstructed (accurately) the part of the conversation dealing with Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. Schmidt said it would now be in October if it happens at all (he hinted that if a meeting before or during the October timeframe between the President and Brezhnev should occur, Germany would be scrubbed). ~~(TS)~~

The full verbatim is in preparation, but the above reflects the essential points. ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 19, 1981

The President today announced his intention to nominate Arthur F. Burns to be Ambassador of the United States of America to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Burns has been distinguished scholar-in-residence, American Enterprise Institute, since 1978 and distinguished professorial lecturer at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Since 1969 he has been John Bates Clark professor of economics emeritus at Columbia University in New York. In 1970-78 he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He served as Counsellor to the President in 1969-70 and was Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors in 1953-56. Mr. Burns was associated with the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1930-69 and currently serves as honorary chairman. He was previously a professor of economics with Rutgers University.

Mr. Burns graduated from Columbia University (A.B., 1925; A.M., 1925; Ph.D., 1934) and Lehigh University (LL.D., 1952). He has received many other degrees from Brown University, Dartmouth College, Oberlin College, Wesleyan University and others.

Mr. Burns is married, has two children, and resides in Washington, D.C. He was born April 27, 1904 in Stanislau, Austria.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK ALLEN

FROM:

BUD NANCE

Bud

SUBJECT:

U.S. Ambassador to Germany

Ambassador Peter Hermes called to say a reporter told him a new U.S. Ambassador to Germany had been named. He said he was surprised if this was true because he met with you yesterday and you told him nothing. He asked if you would call and let him know if it were true because he was in a dilemma with Bonn if the newspapers reported it before he did.

*ACTION
TAKEN*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2710

May 13, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt --
Second Meeting with the President

The German Embassy has approached us informally to inquire about the possibility of a second meeting with the President during the Chancellor's visit, similar to that granted to Prime Minister Suzuki. The President is now only scheduled to meet with the Chancellor following the arrival ceremony at 10:00 a.m. on May 21st.

We believe strongly that a second meeting would be useful and recommend that the President agree to meet again following the Chancellor's meeting with the Vice President on May 22, now scheduled to end at 11:00 a.m.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 5/12/87

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By MSJ NARA, Date 12/17/98

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RECEIVED 08 MAY 81 13

TO ALLEN

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 07 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SAUDI ARABIA

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

UAE

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT RPT ON ARABIAN TRIP

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

~~STEARMAN~~

Allen

RENTSCHLER x ✓

NAU x ✓

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COMMENTS

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May 7, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Schmidt's Report on His Arabian Trip

Today Helmut Schmidt reported to the Bundestag on his controversial trip to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. (Text of report attached.) Schmidt made the following points:

-- The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has "greatly affected the thoughts and actions of the Gulf countries."

-- The host countries were told why the FRG could not consider sending German soldiers to the Gulf region.

-- The principles of FRG arms export policy was explained (Such sales must be examined "very carefully."). The Saudis did not express any "official wish" for FRG arms deliveries.

-- Begin's attacks on Schmidt have been answered by the FRG spokesman and there is nothing to add -- except to stress the good ties existing between the FRG and Israel and to express the wish that Israelis and Arabs "may soon be living with each other in a just and comprehensive peace."

-- Western unfriendliness towards the Palestinians and the PLO will push them toward the Soviet Union.

-- The FRG position on the PLO "will be determined by the position which the PLO adopts toward the right also due Israel to live within secure and recognized borders."

-- If the (Camp David) autonomy negotiations are to be discontinued, ways must be sought to include additional Arab states and the Palestinian people in the peace process."... "any potential European contribution... can only be rendered in harmony with the US."

-- It was agreed that continued aid to Turkey and Pakistan "as best we could were important factors of stability in the entire region."

-- It was explained to the Saudis that the high balance of payment deficits in industrial countries caused by oil and

other factors aggravate the world-wide danger of protectionism." This entails a special responsibility of...Saudi Arabia in particular ...vis-a-vis the developing countries."

-- The Saudis were told "that linking the oil price to a general index of industrial products would burden in an unjustified way countries with a low price increase rate, such as the FRG."

cc: Geoffrey Kemp
Henry Nau
Jim Rentschler

57 APR 27 1971

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FBI 34

FRG: SCHMIDT DELIVERS GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO BUNDESTAG

TAKE 1--SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

DUC70825 COLOGNE WESTDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK NETWORK IN GERMAN
0700 GMT 7 MAY 81

(GOVERNMENT STATEMENT DELIVERED BY CHANCELLOR ELMUT SCHMIDT TO
THE BUNDESTAG IN BONN--LIVE)

(TEXT) MR PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I WOULD LIKE
TO REPORT TO YOU ON THE VISIT OF MYSELF AND GRAF LAMBSDORFF TO SAUDI
ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. THEN I WANT TO TALK
ABOUT THE MEETINGS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN ROME.
THE FEDERAL FOREIGN MINISTER WILL TAKE THE FLOOR IN THE
COURSE OF THE DEBATE AND DISCUSS THE MATTER MORE THOROUGHLY.

IT HAS BECOME PARTICULARLY CLEAR IN PAST DAYS HOW COMPLEX
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS AND HOW MUCH OUR COUNTRY IS
INVOLVED IN CONFLICTS WHICH ARE NOT OURS. WE MUST THEREFORE
TAKE CARE NOT TO BECOME EXCITED, NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN
EXCESSIVE POLEMICS AND DANGEROUS SIMPLIFICATIONS. I SAY THIS TO
THOSE IN OUR COUNTRY WHO HAVE DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON CURRENT ISSUES,
AND I WOULD WELCOME IT IF MY REQUEST FOR MODERATION WOULD BE
LISTENED TO OUTSIDE OUR BORDERS AS WELL. (APPLAUSE)

MODERATION AND AWARENESS OF RESPONSIBILITY ARE KEY WORDS FOR
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN THE WORLD. THESE TWO KEY WORDS ARE
STRESSED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S
ROME SESSION EARLY THIS WEEK. AND THE TWO KEY WORDS
"MODERATION AND AWARENESS OF RESPONSIBILITY" ARE VALID NOT ONLY
IN THE SPHERE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS WITHOUT A
BREACH; IT IS A CONTINUOUS POLICY, IT IS PREDICTABLE. THE POLICY
SERVES PEACE, AND WE WILL NOT BE CONFUSED IN PURSUING THIS POLICY.

I VISITED SAUDI ARABIA LAST WEEK TOGETHER WITH THE FEDERAL
MINISTER OF ECONOMICS, AND WE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY FOUR PROMINENT
SCIENTISTS. ON 29 AND 30 APRIL, I VISITED THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES. THIS REGION IS OF EXTRAORDINARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS ALSO OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE FRG. MY
VISIT THERE SHOULD, THEREFORE, NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A NARROW
PERSPECTIVE REGARDING THIS OR THAT INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM OF MUTUAL
RELATIONS, REGARDLESS HOW IMPORTANT IT MAY BE. SUCH A NARROW
VIEW COULD EASILY LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISCORD. I
WOULD, THEREFORE, LIKE TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MUTUAL RELATIONS.

THE GULF STATES AND PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE AWARE OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SIGNIFICANCE OF CLOSE AND TRUSTING RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA,
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE FRG. THIS AWARENESS HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY
STRENGTHENED THROUGH THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.
SEEN FROM THERE, AFGHANISTAN IS VERY CLOSE BY.

THE REASON FOR MY VISIT WAS THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GULF REGION, WHICH HAS GROWN CONSIDERABLY IN THE PAST 10 YEARS, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, WITH REGARD TO THE WEST AS A WHOLE AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY. IT WAS MY SECOND VISIT TO THE REGION. THE FIRST WAS IN 1976 TO RIYADH. AT THAT TIME THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP ATTRIBUTED GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO A FAR-REACHING POLITICALLY BASED DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS. ON THE BASIS OF A FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT ESTABLISHED IN 1976 BETWEEN THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP AND OURSELVES, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN CROWN PRINCE FAHD--WHO PLAYS THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT CHIEF, OF PRIME MINISTER THERE--AND MYSELF, BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE PURPOSEFULLY INTENSIFIED CONTACTS TO DEVELOP THEIR COOPERATION POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. I POINT OUT ESPECIALLY THE VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE FAHD TO BOMBY IN 1978 AND THE STATE VISIT OF KING KHALID OF SAUDI ARABIA IN 1980.

PARALLEL TO DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AS WELL AS KUWAIT, QATAR AND OTHER STATES OF THE REGION, A NETWORK OF MUTUAL REPRESENTATION WAS DEVELOPED. THE EXCHANGE OF VISITORS AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN PARTICULAR WERE CONSIDERABLY INTENSIFIED.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE FIGHTING THAT IS CONTINUING THERE HAS GREATLY AFFECTED THE THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS OF THE GULF COUNTRIES. AS A RESULT OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL ADVANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE GULF REGION FINDS ITSELF EXPOSED TO A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE OF A NEW DIMENSION. IN VIEW OF THE BUILDUP OF MILITARY POSITIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, ETHIOPIA, AND NOW IN AFGHANISTAN, SUPPORTED BY THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE RED SEA, THE AWARENESS OF BEING THREATENED HAS INCREASED IN THE STATES OF THE GULF REGION.

THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES WHICH THE TWO GREAT POWERS HAVE PROMULGATED WITH RESPECT TO THE GULF REGION HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THERE WITH RESERVE. THE SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN NEW DELHI IN 1980 WAS INTERPRETED AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A MILITARY-POLITICAL CLAIM TO A SAY IN THE GULF REGION. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO YEMENI STATES, THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN, AND THE DESTABILIZATION AS A RESULT OF THE IRANIAN-IRAQI CONFLICT HAVE INTENSIFIED THE NEED OF THE GULF STATES FOR AN ACTIVE SECURITY POLICY.

THIS IS THE INTERCONNECTION IN WHICH THE LATEST TRIP TO THE GULF REGION MUST BE VIEWED. THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS, SUCH AS OIL POLICY AND ARMS EXPORTS, DO NOT PROPERLY REFLECT THE DIMENSION OF WHAT HAD BEEN THE POINT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS VISIT TO BROADEN AND IMPROVE THE BASES OF A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION OVER THE LONG RUN. I REALIZE THAT THE INTEREST OF THE GULF STATES IN THIS IS NOT TEMPORARY. IT IS OF LONGER-TERM SIGNIFICANCE. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY OUR TALKS IN RIYADH AND ABU DHABI, AND IT EXTENDS BEYOND THE OIL ERA, THE ERA IN WHICH OIL IS PRECIOUS.

(MORE)

7 MAY 1447Z 89/844

FBIS 45

TAKE 2--34 (SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT STATEMENT)

/// OIL IS PROMINENT.

(TEXT) MORE CLEARLY THAN EVER BEFORE IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THESE COUNTRIES HAVE RECOGNIZED THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THEIR OWN VITAL INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THEIR WEALTH HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY INVESTED IN THE WESTERN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. THEIR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, NOT ONLY FOR AS LONG AS THEY PRODUCE OIL BUT ALSO BEYOND THE OIL ERA, WILL DEPEND ON THE VIABILITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY.

THESE STATES VIEW OUR RELATIONS NOT ONLY FROM THE ANGLE OF MUTUAL TRADE POLICY BUT ALSO OF LONGER-TERM, COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES. THEY WANT TO INFORM US BETTER ABOUT THEIR POLITICAL CONCERNS AND DANGERS AND THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES IN THE GULF REGION. THEY HAVE AN INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE-- IN WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CROWN PRINCE FAHD SAW QUITE CLEARLY THAT A CRISIS OVER POLAND, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT ESSENTIALLY CHANGE THE WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION AND THUS HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON SAUDI INTERESTS AND ON THE SITUATION ON THE GULF.

WE WERE REPEATEDLY ASKED WHETHER EUROPE, IN VIEW OF THESE INTERCONNECTIONS, SHOULD NOT MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ITS OWN TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE GULF REGION IN WHICH EUROPE IS, AFTER ALL VITALLY INTERESTED. WHAT ALSO BELONGS TO THIS BROADER INTERRELATION IS THE DESIRE TO ESTABLISH COOPERATION IN SECURITY POLICY. THE GULF STATES FEEL ALL THE MORE ENTITLED TO RAISE THIS QUESTION SINCE THEY DISPLAY A READINESS, AND HAVE BEEN EVEN TAKEN CONCRETE ACTION, TO MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY THROUGH A MODERATE AND MODERATING OIL POLICY. THEY ALSO FEEL THIS WAY BECAUSE THEY ARE ENDEAVORING POLITICALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING TENSIONS.

WHAT IMPRESSED ME WAS HOW MY HOSTS--THE GOVERNMENT OF A THIRD WORLD NONALIGNED COUNTRY-- CONSIDER THEMSELVES PART OF THE FREE WORLD AND HOW MUCH THEY UNDERSCORE THE COMMON INTEREST IN REPELling COMMUNISM. THE NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SIX GULF STATES, WHOSE CHARTER IS SUPPOSED TO BE PUT INTO FORCE BY THE SIGNATURE OF THE SIX HEADS OF STATES IN ABU DHABI ON 25 MAY, IS AIMED, I BELIEVE, AT MAINTAINING A MARKET-ECONOMY SYSTEM AND STRENGTHENING THE POWER TO RESIST EXTERNAL THREATS AND CAPABILITY; THEY WANT TO IMPROVE THEIR ARMED FORCES WITH THE HELP OF THEIR FRIENDS, AS MY HOSTS STRONGLY EMPHASIZED.

IN VIEW OF THEIR BASIC ATTITUDE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO EXPECT THEIR WESTERN PARTNERS TO HELP THEM IN SECURITY MATTERS AND IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THEIR OWN DEFENSE, AND THEY SEE NATURAL PARTNERS FOR SUCH COOPERATION ESPECIALLY IN THE EUROPEAN STATES. I CAN APPRECIATE THIS INTEREST. CONVERSELY, WE ALSO FOUND UNDERSTANDING, A SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN PARTNERSHIP, FOR OUR SITUATION AND FOR THE LIMITATION OF OUR GERMAN POSSIBILITIES.

I EXPLAINED WHY WE WOULD NOT CONSIDER SENDING GERMAN SOLDIERS TO THE GULF REGION. I ALSO EXPLAINED THE LEGAL SITUATION AND THE PRINCIPLES OF OUR ARMS EXPORT POLICY. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE CURRENT REVIEW OF THESE PRINCIPLES WHICH IN THEIR PRESENT FORM ARE ESSENTIALLY 10 YEARS OLD AND WHICH IN PART HAVE BASES WHICH GO BACK EVEN FURTHER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IN ALL THREE PARTIES IN THE BUNDESTAG AN OPINION-FORMING PROCESS IS UNDERWAY WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING IS STILL VERY CONTROVERSIAL, AND THAT ARMS EXPORTS TO THAT REGION ARE NOT POSSIBLE, AT ANY RATE NOT AT THIS TIME.

THE DISCUSSION ON CURRENTLY VALID PRINCIPLES FOR ARMS EXPORTS SHOWS, BY THE WAY, THAT THIS DOES NOT INVOLVE A TACTICAL DISPUTE BETWEEN BUNDESTAG PARTIES BUT A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION CONCERNING GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, A QUESTION WHICH NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED VERY CAREFULLY WITH AN AWARENESS OF THE INTERESTS OF OUR FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THIS REGARD. IF POSSIBLE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE WITHOUT POLEMICS. WHEN A DETERMINATION IS MADE, IT WILL THEN REQUIRE THE PROPER SUPPORT BY ALL POLITICAL FORCES IN THE BUNDESTAG.

CROWN PRINCE FAHD SUMMARIZED THIS SUBJECT AS FOLLOWS: THE SAUDI ARABIAN SIDE HAS NOT EXPRESSED ANY OFFICIAL WISH FOR ARMS DELIVERIES FROM THE FRG. HOWEVER, IF THE FRG, AS A FRIENDLY STATE, HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT SAUDI ARABIA IN THE DEFENSE AREA, THIS WOULD BE WELCOMED AS A FRIENDLY ACT. THE CROWN PRINCE AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT LEFT NO DOUBT THAT SAUDI ARABIA DESIRES MORE CONCRETE SECURITY COOPERATION WITH US AND THAT IT WOULD REGARD THIS AS A CORNERSTONE FOR AN EVEN BROADER PARTNERSHIP.

AFTER HEARING THE IMPRESSIONS AND EXPLANATION OF MY HOSTS--WHICH WERE MADE IN THE SPIRIT OF A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY, AWARENESS AND PARTNERSHIP-- I TOLD THEM THAT I WOULD EXPLAIN TO THE BUNDESTAG THEIR PROPOSALS FOR COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION, INCLUDING SECURITY COOPERATION. I AM DOING THIS NOW, HAVING HAD AN OPPORTUNITY YESTERDAY TO INFORM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE BUNDESTAG MUST ALSO BE AWARE THAT THIS ENTIRE NEW SECURITY-POLICY AWARENESS, AS PART OF A SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY POLICY IN COOPERATION WITH WESTERN PARTNERS, WAS NOT AT ANY POINT CONNECTED BY THE SAUDIS WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT. WHAT MATTERS IS THAT THE GULF STATES HAVE BECOME AWARE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT AND THAT THEY DEVELOP THEIR OWN SECURITY CONCEPT ACCORDINGLY.

AT THIS POINT I HAVE TO INSERT SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. WITH GREAT EMPHASIS MY HOSTS URGED EARLY HEADWAY IN THE SOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT. THEY ALSO STRESSED THAT THE SMOLDERING ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT OFFER SOVIET POLICY ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR EXERTING INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

AS FOR THE REPEATED ATTACKS BY THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER IN CONNECTION WITH MY MIDDLE EAST TOUR, THE SPOKESMAN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY COME OUT WITH A STATEMENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I WILL NOT ADD ANYTHING TO IT AT THIS TIME, ESPECIALLY SINCE I AM, HAVE BEEN, AND ALWAYS WILL BE AWARE OF THE MORAL AND HISTORICAL QUALITY OF THE GERMAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. (APPLAUSE)

(MORE)

7 MAY 1724Z B0LJ

TAKE 3--34 (SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT STATEMENT)

/// GERMAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. (APPLAUSE)

(TEXT) THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMANS AND ISRAELIS ARE GOOD AS A RESULT OF THE MANIFOLD PRIVATE TIES AND PRIVATE CONTACTS. THEY ARE ALSO UNUSUALLY CLOSE RELATIONS. TODAY, ON THE 33D ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, ON THE DAY WHEN ISRAEL COMMEMORATES ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS STATUS AS A STATE, THE DAY WHICH IS BEING OBSERVED IN ISRAEL TODAY AS A NATIONAL HOLIDAY, I REPEAT MY WISH THAT ISRAELIS AND ARABS MAY SOON BE LIVING WITH EACH OTHER IN A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. (APPLAUSE)

ON BEHALF OF ALL GERMANS I ADD IN DEEP EARNEST--AND IN SO DOING I DO NOT MAKE ANY TACTICAL RESERVATION--THE RENEWED PLEA: LET US BE GUIDED BY MODERATION AND COMMONSENSE AS BEFORE AND BY THE READINESS FOR RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION. I, IN ANY EVENT, SHALL NOT CEASE DOING THIS. (APPLAUSE)

MY ARAB INTERLOCUTORS ADVOCATED A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN WHICH ALL STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE REGION WILL LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE. IN THAT RESPECT ISRAEL WAS NOT EXCEPTED. ON MY PART I EXPLAINED THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. BOTH SIDES UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN BRINGING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MET WITH A FAVORABLE RESPONSE BY THE SAUDI SIDE.

MY INTERLOCUTORS AND I FURTHER AGREED THAT THE MORE UNFRIENDLINESS THE WEST DISPLAYS TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO, THE MORE STRONGLY WILL THEY BE PUSHED TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. AS FAR AS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO IS CONCERNED, I SAID PUBLICLY IN RIYADH, AND I QUOTE VERBATIM MY OWN UTTERANCES AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN RIYADH: OUR GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE POSITION WHICH THE PLO ADOPTS TOWARD THE RIGHT ALSO DUE ISRAEL TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS. (APPLAUSE)

MY INTERLOCUTORS FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AFTER THE CAMP DAVID MODEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED AND CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED. I SAID THAT IF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE DISCONTINUED, WAYS MUST BE SOUGHT TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN MY OPINION, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S STATEMENT OF VENICE LAST SPRING WOULD OFFER A GOOD STARTING BASIS FOR THIS. YET, I POINTED OUT THAT ANY POTENTIAL EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CAN BE RENDERED ONLY IN HARMONY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

LET ME REVERT TO THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE TALKS IN RIYADH AND ABU DHABI. IN RIYADH WE AGREED THAT CONTINUED AID TO TURKEY AND PAKISTAN AS BEST WE COULD WERE IMPORTANT FACTORS OF STABILITY IN THE ENTIRE REGION. AT THE SAME TIME WE ADVOCATE THE CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF OTHER FRIENDLY STATES IN THIS EFFORT. I PAID CONSIDERABLE TRIBUTE TO THE INCREASING WEIGHT OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS OF THE WHOLE REGION, AND ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THE IRANIAN-IRAQI CONFLICT. AND IN SO DOING I

ANOTHER KEY SUBJECT OF OUR TALKS WAS WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE ENERGY AND CURRENCY ISSUES. I AM VERY MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE READINESS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED EMIRATES TO COOPERATE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE INTENSIFIED FEELING OF INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG THE OIL-RICH STATES, THE FEELING OF MUTUAL DEPENDENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AMONG THEIR COUNTRIES, THE INDUSTRIAL STATES AND THE THIRD AND FOURTH WORLDS, AS IT IS GENERALLY PUT NOW. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERRATE WHAT THIS CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE MEANS FOR OUR OWN NATIONAL, ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY INTERESTS AS WELL.

THE FEDERAL ECONOMICS MINISTER, WHO CANNOT BE HERE TODAY, AND I EXPLAINED THAT THE HIGH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, TO THE EXTENT THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON OIL IMPORTS, AND THE WORLD-ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HAVE CONSIDERABLY AGGRAVATED THE WORLD-WIDE DANGER OF PROTECTIONISM IN MANIFOLD FORMS. THIS ENTAILS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OIL STATES IN GENERAL AND SAUDI ARABIA IN PARTICULAR ABOVE ALL VIS-A-VIS THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE DISCUSSED THIS AT LENGTH.

THE CROWN PRINCE AND MINISTER YAMANI POINTED OUT THAT THE SAUDI IS PASS ON A HIGHER SHARE OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AS DEVELOPMENT AID THAN ANY INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY. THIS IS TRUE. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EMIRATES IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE.

I CONTESTED THE ARGUMENT THAT PRICE INCREASES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS HAVE CONSIDERABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, POINTING OUT THE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER AND FASTER OIL AND ENERGY PRICE INCREASES. I STATED IN ADDITION THAT LINKING THE OIL PRICE TO A GENERAL INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS WOULD BURDEN IN AN UNJUSTIFIED WAY COUNTRIES WITH A LOW PRICE INCREASE RATE, SUCH AS THE FRG.

WE ATTRIBUTED SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF ALL SUCH FIELDS AS THE INTERNATIONAL HANDLING OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN OVERCOMING WORLD ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, MONETARY POLICY PROBLEMS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT PRODUCE OIL. I WANT TO MENTION HERE THAT DUE TO CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE BY US, THIS GREATER ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAS BEEN GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NOT JUST DE FACTO BUT ALSO FORMALLY; IT WAS EXPRESSED BY A CHANGE OF THE QUOTA SYSTEM.

(MORE)

7 MAY 1805 Z SG SAH

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TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 01 MAY 81

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MCH
12/16/98

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SUBJECT: CHURCH & STATE IN GERMANY DEBATE PACIFICISM

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM

2425

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

May 1, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *Jim*

SUBJECT: Pacifism in the FRG ~~(U)~~

You may not have seen the long read-out on growing Church and State internal debates on pacifism in the FRG. If that is the case, you are bound to be amused/bemused by the yeast which is now fermenting on that subject and to which I am convinced your Mayflower remarks gave at least indirect (and welcome) impetus. (C)

No need to read the whole text, but do cover the up-front summary paragraph. Is it too far-fetched to believe that the present electoral situation and the predicted defeat of the SPD/FDP coalition there are psychologically related to this emotive issue???? ~~(C)~~

cc: Jim Lilley
Bill Stearman

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FG7-030 #138
BY MDH, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

*Jim -
A very interesting
table. Let's watch
this closely. Sure
Signs of political
impact here.
JMR
5/14/81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~
Review on May 1, 1987

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DE RUFHOL #8297/01 1141636
D 241631Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #131

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6676

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4733
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1709
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6875
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0365
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION USBERLIN 3856
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH

Interesting Dialogue

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08297

E.O. 12065: GDS 04-24-87 (LISSFELT, MARK C.) DR-P
TAGS: PINT, GW PACIFISM
SUBJECT: CHURCH AND STATE IN GERMANY DEBATE PACIFISM

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. IN RECENT MONTHS, CHURCH VOICES IN GERMANY, PARTICULARLY IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH, ADVOCATING WHAT AMOUNTS TO UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT HAVE BECOME LOUDER AND MORE INSISTENT. ON EASTER SUNDAY, FEDERAL PRESIDENT KARL CARSTENS CAUTIOUSLY CRITICIZED CHURCHMEN WHO ARE INCLINED TO APPLY THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT DIRECTLY TO MORAL JUDGEMENT OF MODERN MILITARY STRATEGY, AND SUGGESTED THAT SOME CHURCHMEN WERE ABUSING THE POWERS OF THEIR OFFICES. REACTIONS FROM POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN PREDICTABLY MIXED, WITH CDU SPOKESMEN IN PARTICULAR ENDORSING CARSTENS' VIEW. DEFENSE MINISTER APEL HAS ALSO

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WHSR COMMENTS:

CRITICIZED "PACIFIST TENDENCIES". RESENTMENT IN POLITICAL CIRCLES AGAINST WHAT IS REGARDED AS CHURCH MEDDLING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN RECENT MONTHS HAS ALSO TOUCHED ON OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE PUBLIC DEBT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS. CARSTENS' STATEMENT HAS BROUGHT THIS ANCIENT ISSUE TO THE FRONT PAGES. END SUMMARY.

3. ON EASTER SUNDAY, FEDERAL PRESIDENT KARL CARSTENS SPOKE AT THE REOPENING OF THE SANKT-PETRI-DOM IN BREMEN, AN 800-YEAR OLD CHURCH, NOW LUTHERAN, WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CARSTENS, HIMSELF A PRACTICING LUTHERAN, TOOK TO TASK THOSE CHURCHMEN PRIMARILY IN HIS OWN CHURCH WHO ARE ATTACKING THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO NATO AND, IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT, TO THE NATO TWO-PART DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979. IT IS UNUSUAL, BUT NOT UNKNOWN, FOR PRESIDENTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO SPEAK OUT ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. SOME KEY STATEMENTS:

-- "WE HAVE READ WITH CONCERN STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL CHURCH OFFICE HOLDERS, WHO REFLECT CERTAIN SUBJECTIVE POLITICAL OPINIONS, BUT WHO PRESENT THEM WITH A CLAIM TO CHRISTIAN TRUTH."

-- "I RESPECT SUCH STATEMENTS, EVEN WHEN I AM OF ANOTHER OPINION, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN VOICES IN THE CHURCH DEMAND UNILATERAL GESTURES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, OR WHEN THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY BALANCE IS REJECTED, WHICH IN MY VIEW AND AS HISTORY SHOWS GUARANTEE FOR SECURITY AND PEACE. I CONSIDER THESE PROPOSITIONS FALSE AND I CONSIDER IT ESPECIALLY DOUBTFUL WHEN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT IS CITED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEM."

-- "THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT IS A PROFOUND CALL FOR NON-VIOLENCE ("GEWALTLOSIGKEIT"), AND THE CHRISTIAN WHO DECIDES FOR HIMSELF TO ACCEPT VIOLENCE AND TO ENDURE INJUSTICE PEACEFULLY CAN CERTAINLY CITE THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. HOWEVER, IT IS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT QUESTION, WHETHER ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR OTHERS MAY LEAVE THEM DEFENSELESS IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE, OR WHETHER IT IS RATHER HIS CHRISTIAN DUTY TO PROTECT THEM FROM DANGER, FROM INJUSTICE, FROM VIOLENCE OR FROM AGGRESSION."

-- "SHOULD A FATHER WITHOUT RESISTANCE DELIVER HIS FAMILY MEMBERS TO VIOLENCE?"

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

4. REACTIONS TO WHAT THE PRESS HAS CALLED CARSTENS' "WARNING TO THE CHURCH" HAVE BEEN IN CHARACTER:

• -- CDU DEPUTY AND PARTY SPOKESMAN ON CHURCH AFFAIRS WILLI WEISKIRSCH PRAISED CARSTENS' "CLEAR STATEMENT", AND ENDORSED CARSTENS' ALLEGATION OF ABUSE OF POWERS OF OFFICE BY CHURCHMEN.

• -- FDP VICE CHAIRMAN LISELOTTE FUNCKE, AN ACTIVE LEADER IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH, TOOK A MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD POSITION: "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHURCH HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS
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IN

OP IMMED
STU0913
DE RUFHOL #8297/02 1141638
O 241631Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6677

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4734
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1710
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6876
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0366
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION USBERLIN 3857
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 08297

THEMSELVES ON THE SECURING OF PEACE." AT THE SAME TIME,
SHE SAID CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID
JUSTIFYING THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS BY CITING THE GOSPEL.
SHE NOTED THAT THE LUTHERAN CHURCH AT THE PRESENT TIME
IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN DEBATING THE QUESTION OF PEACE,
AND THAT CHURCHMEN HAVE VARYING OPINIONS.

-- THE STRONGEST DEFENSE OF PACIFIST VIEWS CAME FROM
THE LEADERSHIP OF A LUTHERAN CHURCH GROUP IN THE
RHINELAND, IN A LETTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT: IT SAID
THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHANCELLOR WAS INCOMPREHENSIBLE
WHEN HE WAS PREPARED "TO SUPPORT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS
EVEN WHEN HE MUST KNOW THAT THEIR USE WITH HIGH PROBABILITY
WOULD RESULT IN THE TOTAL EXTERMINATION AT LEAST
OF CENTRAL EUROPE".

-- IN A MOST UN-CHRISTIAN REACTION, THE FORMER PRESIDENT
OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH IN HESSE, MARTIN NIMOELLER, TOLD
THE PRESS THAT HE WOULD WRITE A LETTER TO PRESIDENT

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WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

BONN 8297

DTG:241631Z APR 81
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CARSTENS ASKING HIM ABOUT HIS "PAST" DURING THE NAZI ERA.

5. DEFENSE MINISTER HANS APEL, WHOSE FATHER WAS A COMMITTED PACIFIST, DEBATED THE PEACE QUESTION WITH PROMINENT LIBERAL LUTHERAN THEOLOGIAN HEINRICH ALBERTZ ON NATIONAL TELEVISION APRIL 19:

-- ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, APEL SAID THAT ANYONE CAN TAKE A POSITION, NOT ON THE BASIS OF CHRISTIANITY BUT RATHER ON THE BASIS OF TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING. THE OBJECTIVE OF DEFENSE POLICY WAS NOT TO DESTROY HUMAN LIFE, BUT TO MAINTAIN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR MILITARY BALANCE, TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM MILITARY ACTION. "I HOPE THAT WE WILL COME TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IF NOT, THEN AS A CHRISTIAN I MUST ALSO SUPPORT THE MILITARY BALANCE, AND PRECISELY BECAUSE I WANT TO PREVENT WAR. I KNOW OF NO OTHER WAY TO SECURE THE PEACE."

-- ALBERTZ SAID HE WOULD NOT ARGUE WITH APEL ON THOSE TERMS, BUT THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF FIRST PRINCIPLES: HE ENDORSED A STATEMENT OF THE CATHOLIC VATICAN II COUNCIL WHICH HAD DECLARED THAT "ANY CONDUCT OF WAR BASED ON THE INDISCRIMINATE DESTRUCTION OF ENTIRE CITIES OR OF VAST AREAS AND THEIR POPULATION IS A CRIME AGAINST GOD AND HUMANITY."

6. COMMENT. THERE ARE TWO ISSUES:

-- THE DEBATE ABOUT THE PROPER ROLE OF THE CHURCH ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS IS OF COURSE AS OLD AS CHRISTIANITY ITSELF. IN SEPTEMBER 1980, A PASTORAL LETTER ISSUED BY THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS CRITICIZED THE GROWING PUBLIC DEBT UNDER THE SPD/FDP GOVERNMENT AS A THREAT TO THE WELFARE OF COMING GENERATIONS; CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT RESPONDED WITH THE COMMENT THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THAT THERE WERE PROFESSORIAL CHAIRS IN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES COMPETENT IN MATTERS OF STATE FINANCE. SOME CHURCHMEN HAVE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES. (FOR EXAMPLE, FRANKFURT A-20, APRIL 14, 1981, REPORTS ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHURCH ON LAND ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED BY SQUATTERS SEEKING TO PREVENT CONSTRUCTION OF A THIRD RUNWAY AT THE FRANKFURT AIRPORT.) SOME LEFTIST STUDENTS ARE SAID TO ENROLL IN THEOLOGY FACULTIES, BECAUSE THEY OFFER A COMFORTABLE AND INDEPENDENT LIFE WITH ABUNDANT

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LEISURE TIME TO PURSUE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS. THERE ARE SOME CLERICAL "MARXISTS".

-- THE DEBATE ABOUT PACIFISM IS LIKEWISE NOT NEW. THERE HAS BEEN A PACIFIST STRAIN IN GERMAN PROTESTANTISM AT LEAST SINCE THE QUAKERS. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A MINORITY VIEW, BUT THE CURRENT DWINDLING OF OSTPOLITIK, THE UNTHINKABILITY OF NUCLEAR WARFARE AND IMMEDIACY OF THE TNF DEBATE HAVE BROUGHT SOMETHING OF A RESURGENCE.

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IN

OP IMMED
STU0914
DE RUFHOL #8297/03 1141640
O 241631Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6678

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4735
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1711
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6877
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0367
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION USBERLIN 3858
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08297

WE DO NOT THINK IT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON
POLICY, OTHER THAN TO STIMULATE POLITICAL LEADERS OF
ALL PARTIES TO EMPHASIZE BOTH DIPLOMATICALLY AND
PUBLICLY THEIR COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
BUT WE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY. END COMMENT.
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WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 OF 01 BONN 8297

DTG:241631Z APR 81 PSN:037642
TOR: 114/1718Z CSN:HCE372

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STU0914
DE RUFHOL #8297/03 1141640
O 241631Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6678

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4735
NATO COLLECTIVE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08297

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PAGE 01 OF 01 BONN 8297

DTG:241631Z APR 81 PSN:037642
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TO ALLEN

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 28 APR 81

UNCL. CLASSIFIED BY REMOVAL OF MARKS
12/16/98

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

USSR

STAUFFENBERG, GRAF F

TNF

GAS

SUBJECT: MTG W/ BUNDESTAG MEMBER STAFFENBERG RE USSR GAS PIPE LINE & TNF

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

ALLEN

RENTSCHLER

NAU

SCHWEITZER

KRAEMER

PIPES

Bailey

COMMENTS

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PA (C)

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JANET COLSON

OC 29/1310

BUD NANCE

BN 29/1400

DICK ALLEN

WA 3/2244

IRENE DERUS

ID 4/0739

JANET COLSON

JC 4/0833

BUD NANCE

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KAY

CY TO VP

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CY TO DEAVER

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CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

April 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Meeting with Bundestag Member Graf Stauffenberg

I had a long talk Friday afternoon with Graf Franz Stauffenberg (son of the ill-fated 20 July plotter). Stauffenberg is the third ranking member of the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee and the leading foreign policy official of the CSU. I have known him for several years and have a high regard for him.

Soviet Gas Pipeline

To my surprise, he supported the gas pipeline deal on the grounds that the FRG needed the energy source diversification and that the Soviets would have a hard time using it to apply pressure selectively since so many countries would be affected simultaneously; moreover, the FRG would have enough in reserve to resist such pressure. I told him I was not convinced by his arguments and that I was concerned about the general increased dependency of Western Europe on the East. He did share my general concern.

TNF

Like other Germans I have talked to, he stressed the political necessity of assuring NATO Allies in general, and the Germans in particular, that we are ready to enter serious TNF negotiations. Stauffenberg is no soft liner, and he wants TNF modernization to proceed as rapidly as possible. He fears that U.S. attempts to back off from or to delay talks could set back our deployment efforts.

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at Rom*

Impact of Perceived Leadership Differences

Stauffenberg said reports of high level rivalries and differences among U.S. leaders create a feeling of uneasiness among Europeans and erodes confidence in U.S. leadership. He was actually quite upset about this phenomenon.

cc: James Rentschler
Henry Nau
Robert Schweitzer
Sven Kraemer

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030#132
BY MJD, NARA, DATE 5/15/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on April 28, 1987

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Meeting held
4 pages

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81 APR 17 AM 11:33

JANET COLSON

Jan 17/1430

BUD NANCE

Jan 17/1500

DICK ALLEN

Nov 23/2330

IRENE DERUS

Jan 22/0715

JANET COLSON

Jan 22/0950

BUD NANCE

Jan

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

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RECEIVED 17 APR 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 17 APR 81

UNCLASSIFIED

REMOVAL OF
RE(S) M5D
12/16/98

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

MEDIA

GEIST, MANFORD

AA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MITG W/ GERMAN EDITOR GEIST

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 20 APR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

KAMINSKY

DERIUS

RENTSCHLER

*KEEP
PK fully
informed. She will
want to meet & talk
with Geist before RVA
see him.*

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Gregg

X 4/22 EVA apud recom w/ comment

S 4/22 Any further action required 4/24

PK, RF

DISPATCH

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FILE

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A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

April 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT:

Request for Meeting with German Editor

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APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Possible Date _____

7

*but for an interview on the record?
Ok, I guess.*

Make sure press is aware

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 17, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS #A7-0307133
By , NARA, Date 5/18/06

Alv
4-22-81

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL,VP
EOB: PIPES
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9536 1390309
O 190256Z MAY 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6186

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7737
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5615
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0688
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 6801
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6492
BT~~SECRET~~ STATE 129536
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 5/18/01 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, GW

SUBJECT: FRG DEMARCHE IN DAMASCUS

REF: STATE 128448 (NOTAL)

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GERMAN EMBASSY CALLED DAS CONSTABLE MAY 16 TO REPORT THAT FRG AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR HERMES CONVERSATION WITH CONSTABLE MAY 17, HAD MADE A DEMARCHE SAME DAY WITH KHADDAM. GERMAN AMBASSADOR URGED MODERATION ON PART OF THE SYRIANS, SUPPORTED HABIB'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE,

SECSTATE WASHDC 9536

DTG:190256Z MAY 81 PSN: 011408
TOR: 139/0309Z

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#134BY LJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOTED FRG UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SHOWING THE REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY, AND HOPED SYRIA WOULD RECIPRO-
CATE. KHADDAM REPLIED THAT IT WAS ISRAEL WHICH HAD VIOLATED THE STATUS QUO BY SHOOTING DOWN SYRIAN HELI-
COPTERS AND FIRING ON SYRIAN TROOPS. KHADDAM SAID THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT LEAVE THEIR TROOPS, WHICH WERE IN LEBANON ON INVITATION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, DEFENSELESS AGAINST ISRAELI ATTACKS AND CONCLUDED THAT THE MISSILES WOULD REMAIN.

HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9536

DTG:190256Z MAY 81 PSN: 011408
TOR: 139/0309Z

SIT079 R

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN, COL, VP
EOB: KEMP, PIPES
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8448 1372101
O O 172034Z MAY 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 6150

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7683
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 128448

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 5/17/01 (CONSTABLE, P.D.)

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, GW

SUBJECT: FRG MESSAGE ON LEBANON
REF: STATE 127121; B) STATE 128433

1. (A - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AMBASSADOR HERMES SPOKE WITH DAS CONSTABLE BY PHONE SUNDAY, MAY 17 TO CONVEY ORALLY RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S MESSAGE ON LEBANON. HERMES SAID FRG UNDERSTANDS CARRINGTON HAS URGED THAT HABIB CONTINUE HIS MEDIATION MISSION AND ASSOCIATES ITSELF WITH CARRINGTON VIEWS. FRG REGARDS SITUATION AS EXTREMELY SERIOUS AND BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HABIB MISSION CONTINUE IN ORDER TO GAIN TIME TO LET FORCES OF MODERATION WORK IN THE AREA.

3. CONSTABLE EXPLAINED THAT USG OF COURSE WANTED HABIB MISSION TO SUCCEED AND TO PREVENT ARMED ESCALATION,

SECSTATE WASHDC 8448

DTG: 172034Z MAY 81 PSN: 010015
TOR: 138/0133Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

REF: 100-100000
F97-030#135
L2I
5/30/00

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT THAT MISSION COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITHOUT FLEXIBILITY IN SYRIAN POSITION. HABIB HAD FOUND FLEXIBILITY ON ISRAELI SIDE, BUT TO DATE NO GIVE IN ASSAD'S POSITION.



HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 8448

DTG: 172034Z MAY 81 PSN: 010015
TOR: 138/0133Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

♡♡

INCOMING MESSAGE

O 090850Z APR 81

FM SECDEF (AIRCRAFT)

TO WHITE HOUSE (FOR THE PRESIDENT)

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I SAT NEXT TO MRS HELMUT SCHMIDT, WIFE OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, AT THE CLOSING DINNER OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. SHE IS FAR MORE GENTLE AND PLEASANT THAN HER HUSBAND, AND GENUINELY FRIENDLY.

SHE EXPRESSED THE VERY GREATEST INTEREST IN YOUR HEALTH AND CONVALESCENCE. SHE SAID THAT IT BOTHERED HER WHEN PEOPLE TENDED TO BE SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF YOU BECAUSE YOU HAD BEEN AN ACTOR. SHE SAID TO ME, "YOU SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT HE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT BEFORE THE POPE BECAME POPE; HE WAS AN ACTOR".

BT

#0001

NNNN

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NLS F97-030 #136
BY MSH, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

RECEIVED 07 APR 81 14

TO RA DB

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 31 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
POLAND

GERMANY F R

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

SUBJECT: BRITISH CONCERN W/ PRES CONVERSATION W/ FRG CHANCELLOR

ACTION: NOTED BY ALLEN W/ COMMENT DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER /E.C.

PIPES

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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NSC # 1922

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/31/81

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: British Concern with President's Conversation with
Chancellor Schmidt

I took a call from a staffer at the British Embassy. He had received an anxious call from 10 Downing Street asking whether the President had talked with Giscard yesterday in addition to Schmidt. I told him not. Then he asked whether there had been any discussion between the President and the Chancellor about Secretary Haig visiting Bonn, and I told him that the President and the Chancellor had discussed only Poland.



Dick - As you remember, the President and Schmidt did discuss HAIG going to Bonn. From this question, I believe the Brits must have known it. I wonder how?

DB

Inclusion!
4/7/81

UNCLASSIFIED U
CLASSIFIED ENC

REMOVAL OF

MSP
12/16/68

RECEIVED 27 MAR 81 10

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 26 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

INTL TRADE

VETTER, HEINZ OSCAR

WIEDENBAUM, MURRAY

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR VETTER W/ CHAIRMAN OF CEA WIEDENBAUM ON 30 MAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 28 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

DEAL

COMMENTS

REF# 8109585

LOG

NSCIFID

(H / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

BLAIR C 3/30 OBE - Too late 3/30/81 JCS

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FILE _____

(C)

PA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8109585

NSC 1625

March 26, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Unclassified upon Removal of Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment: Heinz Oscar Vetter
with the Chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisers Murray Wiedenbaum

Heinz Oscar Vetter, the Chairman of the German Labor Federation, will be in Washington for a Trilateral Commission meeting this weekend and would like to have an appointment with Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers Murray Wiedenbaum on March 30. Vetter is Germany's top labor leader and a crucial interlocutor in Germany's social policy development. We recommend very highly that Mr. Wiedenbaum meet with Mr. Vetter on March 30.

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Biographic sketch of Vetter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Unclassified upon Removal of Attachment)

GDS 3/25/87

MSP
12/16/98

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 18 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SENSITIVE

March 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*
SUBJECT: Apel's Political Difficulties

According to Charge Woessner, German Defense Minister Apel is under strong attack on the eve of his Washington visit over allegedly insufficient German defense contribution, his handling of the Tornado funding affair, and alleged inaction on Ambassador Stoessel's November demarche on U.S. forces issues. Although there is little serious talk of Apel's resignation at the moment. Woessner states that his political standing has been significantly undermined and he will undoubtedly arrive in the U.S. with hopes of improving his tarnished image. Despite the defense minister's problems, Woessner continues to recommend that he be urged during his visit to significantly increase Bonn's defense expenditures.
(C)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F72030 #138
BY MSH, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REVIEW ON MARCH 23, 1991
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN'S MEETING WITH
GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER LAMBSDORFF
(5:00 p.m., March 18, 1981)

East-West Trade and Siberian Pipeline: Lambsdorff believes that East-West trade is mutually beneficial and can be conducted without damage to Western interests. He has come out publicly for the Siberian pipeline deal and has told the press that he will be discussing his views with the Americans. We recognize the decision as Germany's to make, however, we are concerned with the implications of the deal for Alliance security and we would like to review these with the Germans. In addition, we regard the timing of the deal as crucial, especially in the context of events in Poland.

Minister Lambsdorff should have some interesting ideas about a unified Western approach to trade with the East. He is predisposed to favor a minimal government role since he believes the private sector needs flexibility. How would he guard against technology transfer? How would he ensure the Soviets do not play Western companies and countries off against each other? (C)

Energy: At the Tokyo and Venice economic summits, both the U.S. and Germany endorsed numerical targets, including oil import reductions, reduction in energy-to-GNP growth ratios and others. Lambsdorff has consistently opposed numerical targets as too inflexible. This Administration, like Lambsdorff, believes in the superiority of private enterprise to government goals in the area of energy policy. However, we do not want to send the wrong signal by wholesale repudiation of energy conservation targets. In any event, the latest projections show both the U.S. and FRG meeting the Tokyo and Venice goals, driven by high prices. (C)

World Trade and Economic Development: Lambsdorff consistently opposes trade barriers among the developed nations. He is therefore vitally interested in the U.S. decision on restrictions of Japanese auto imports. The decision to be taken at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow will have reverberations throughout Europe and in Germany in particular, one of the few European countries without automobile trade restrictions. Lambsdorff will be interested in the positions we will be taking in the Ottawa summit regarding trade among developed countries. (C)

Concerning economic development of LDC's, Lambsdorff favors approaches like the Energy Facility of the World Bank. The Energy Facility uses Western and OPEC funds to capitalize energy projects in lesser developed countries. This type of project is in line with Lambsdorff's view of self-help projects for LDC's. It is the sort of approach he will push for the North-South summit. The U.S. has not yet taken a position on the Energy Facility. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 18, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 497-030 #135
BY M487 NARA, DATE 5/18/00

Aid to Turkey: Lambsdorff is one of the key officials making decisions on German aid to Turkey. For example, last week he was in London talking to the British about their contributions to support Turkey. We and Germany contribute roughly equal amounts of economic assistance to Turkey, with other countries making smaller contributions. We are emphasizing to the Germans the importance of continuing support of Turkey, that the Turks are making the hard choices necessary to get their economy back in shape, that the Turkish army is committed to a return to a democratic form of government, and that we would expect Germany to continue to play a leading role in these efforts. Germany is doing well in this area and Lambsdorff deserves personal kudos for his efforts. (C)