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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (2)
Box 91325 14

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	240702Z APR 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #76	4/24/81	P1/F1
2. cable	copy of item # 1, 1p R " " #77	4/24/81	P1/F1
3. cable	071154Z APR 81, 2p R " " #78	4/7/81	P1/F1
4. cable	041946Z APR 81, 3p R " " #79	4/4/81	P1/F1
5. cable	271128Z MAR 81, 8p D 7/28/00 " #80	3/27/81	P1/F1
6. cable	251813Z MAR 81, 5p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #81	3/25/81	P1/F1
7. cable	251407Z MAR 81, 1p D 7/28/00 " #82	3/25/81	P1/F1
8. cable	251117Z MAR 81, 5p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #83	3/25/81	P1/F1
9. cable	241710Z MAR 81, 3p R " " #84	3/24/81	P1/F1
10. cable	231709Z MAR 81, 4p R " " #85	3/24/81	P1/F1
11. cable	231241Z MAR 81, 2p R " " #86	3/23/81	P1/F1
12. cable	201809Z MAR 81, 5p R " " #87	3/20/81	P1/F1
13. cable	191726Z MAR 81, 8p R " " #88	3/19/81	P1/F1
14. cable	171508Z MAR 81, 2p R " " #89	3/17/81	P1/F1
15. cable	181624Z MAR 81, 5p D " " #90	3/18/81	P1/F1
16. cable	131646Z MAR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #91	3/13/81	P1/F1
17. cable	131636Z MAR 81, 12p R " " #92	3/13/81	P1/F1
17a. cable	641730Z MAR 81, 10p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #93	3/14/81	P1/F1
18. cable	041717Z MAR 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #94	3/4/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
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Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (2)
Box 91325 14

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
19. cable	041522Z MAR 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #95	3/4/81	P1/F1
20. cable	271757Z FEB 81, 5p R " #96	2/27/81	P1/F1
21. cable	271731Z FEB 81, 6p R " " #97	2/27/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHOL #8201 1140703

O 240702Z APR 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6660

~~SECRET~~ BONN 08201

NODIS

STADIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/24/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M

TAGS: ETRD, GW

SUBJECT: LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO

REF: STATE 103063

1. (~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT GENSCHER'S DINNER FOR CARRINGTON LAST EVENING, I TOOK BERNDT VON STADEN ASIDE AND ASKED WHAT THE REACTION HAD BEEN TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO GENSCHER REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO (REFTEL). HE REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE LETTER HAD HIT JUST THE RIGHT NOTE, I.E., IT HAD CANDIDLY DISCUSSED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES NECESSITATING THE DECISION AND THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, AND ANY OTHER POLITICIAN WOULD IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTAND. HE ALLOWED THAT WE MIGHT BE REMINDED OF OUR SHIFT ON THIS ISSUE THE NEXT TIME WE ASK OUR ALLIES TO SUPPORT US ON SOMETHING, BUT BELIEVED ON BALANCE THE MATTER WAS MANAGEABLE.

3. VON STADEN SINGLED OUT FOR PARTICULAR PRAISE THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCE THAT LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DID NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN US POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR OR US

BONN 8201

DTG: 240702Z APR 81 PSN: 037415
TOR: 114/1416Z

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #76BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT, HE STRESSED, THAT THE US ACTION NOT REPEAT NOT BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF SOVIET RESTRAINT ON POLAND, LEST PUBLIC OPINION CONCLUDE THAT AFGHANISTAN NO LONGER MATTERED. THE WEST, HE INSISTED, HAD TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW.

4. COMMENT. VON STADEN'S ADVICE ON HOW TO PRESENT THE DECISION MAY ALREADY BE TOO LATE. UNDER THE CAPTION, "THE REWARD," BONN'S LEADING NEWSPAPER THIS MORNING EDITURIALIZED THAT THE US HAD APPARENTLY GOTTEN USED TO THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN, AND HAD LIFTED THE GRAIN EMBARGO AS A REWARD TO MOSCOW FOR NOT INVADING POLAND. THE CONSERVATIVE NATIONAL PAPER, "DIE WELT," ALSO CARRIED A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL TAKING THE SAME LINE AND WARNING THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS AT STAKE. A FULLER REPORT ON THE PRESS PLAY IN GERMANY WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. WOESSNER

BONN 8201

DTG:240702Z APR 81 PSN: 037415
TOR: 114/1416Z

SIT424 R

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOR:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #8201 1140703
O 240702Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #77

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0600

~~SECRET~~ BONN 08201

NODIS
STADIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/24/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M
TAGS: ETRD, GW
SUBJECT: LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO
REF: STATE 103003

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT GENSCHER'S DINNER FOR CARRINGTON LAST EVENING, I TOOK BERNDT VON STADEN ASIDE AND ASKED WHAT THE REACTION HAD BEEN TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO GENSCHER REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO (REFTEL). HE REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE LETTER HAD HIT JUST THE RIGHT NOTE, I.E., IT HAD CANDIDLY DISCUSSED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES NECESSITATING THE DECISION AND THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, AND ANY OTHER POLITICIAN WOULD IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTAND. HE ALLOWED THAT WE MIGHT BE REMINDED OF OUR SHIFT ON THIS ISSUE THE NEXT TIME WE ASK OUR ALLIES TO SUPPORT US ON SOMETHING, BUT BELIEVED ON BALANCE THE MATTER WAS MANAGEABLE.

3. VON STADEN SINGLED OUT FOR PARTICULAR PRAISE THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCE THAT LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DID NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN US POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR OR US

BONN 8201

DTG:240702Z APR 81 PSNI 037415
TORI 114/1410Z

*****S E C R E T*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT, HE STRESSED, THAT THE US ACTION NOT REPEAT NOT BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF SOVIET RESTRAINT ON POLAND, LEST PUBLIC OPINION CONCLUDE THAT AFGHANISTAN NO LONGER MATTERED. THE WEST, HE INSISTED, HAD TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW.

4. COMMENT. VON STADEN'S ADVICE ON HOW TO PRESENT THE DECISION MAY ALREADY BE TOO LATE. UNDER THE CAPTION, "THE REWARD," BONN'S LEADING NEWSPAPER THIS MORNING EDITORIALIZED THAT THE US HAD APPARENTLY GOTTEN USED TO THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN, AND HAD LIFTED THE GRAIN EMBARGO AS A REWARD TO MOSCOW FOR NOT INVADING POLAND. THE CONSERVATIVE NATIONAL PAPER, "DIE WELT," ALSO CARRIED A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL TAKING THE SAME LINE AND WARNING THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS AT STAKE. A FULLER REPORT ON THE PRESS PLAY IN GERMANY WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. WOESSNER

BONN 8201

DTG:240702Z APR 81 PSN: 037415
TOR: 114/1416Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 63

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

0 081622Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6284

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0309
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 3560
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 1343
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USDCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4676
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 3701
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 1292

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 07246

USICA
USICA FOR PGM/PPE
SECDEF FOR ASD/PA
SECSTATE FOR PA AND PRESS/S, ALSO PASS NSC FOR MR. ALLEN
AND WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESS SECRETARY
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: OVID (WEINBERGER, CASPAR) SOPN, GW
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF APRIL 8, 1981, PRESS CONFERENCE
AT THE BONN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WITH NATO SECRETARY-
GENERAL JOSEPH LUNS, U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR
W. WEINBERGER, AND FRG MINISTER OF DEFENSE HANS APEL

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP SPEAKES
EURE, EUR, WEUR, KAMINSKY, DEPOL

PSN:016401

DTG:081622

TOR:0981645

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LUNS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE WORK OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP ON THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL HAS JUST ENDED AND I AM HERE WITH THE NEW UNITED STATES SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE AS WELL AS THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE HOST COUNTRY, HERR APEL, WHOM YOU MIGHT KNOW AND HERE TO MY LEFT MR. NOTT, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE HAVE FINALIZED A COMMUNIQUE AS USUAL. THAT COMMUNIQUE WILL BE HANDED TO YOU IN A FEW MOMENTS. I MAY ADD THAT IN VIEW OF THE VERY DANGEROUS SPECIAL EVENTS AROUND POLAND, MINISTERS OF DEFENSE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THEY HAD TO GIVE THEIR OPINION ON THESE EVENTS AND I WILL READ TO YOU NOW WHAT THE CONSENSUS OF THE MINISTERS WAS. THIS IS AN ORAL STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING AND THE STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS: (I REPEAT, IT IS ONLY ORAL SO I WILL DO IT VERY SLOWLY)

THE DEFENSE MINISTERS GATHERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE 29TH NPG MEETING ON THE 7TH AND 8TH OF APRIL, 1981 IN BONN NOTED WITH GREAT CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PAST WEEKS HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN INCREASINGLY MENACING TROOP MOVEMENTS AND OTHER THREATENING ACTIVITY AROUND POLAND. THE MINISTERS STATED THAT ACTUAL INTERVENTION INCLUDING THE USE OR THE THREAT OF USE OF MILITARY FORCE ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PROFESSED SOVIET DESIRE FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT, AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

RECALLING THE STATEMENTS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS IN DECEMBER 1980, THEY REAFFIRMED THAT ANY SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND WOULD HAVE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR ALL ASPECTS OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GRAVELY UNDERMINE THE BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IF THEY WERE TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND. POLAND SHOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE HER OWN FUTURE.

NOW, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE MUST BE, I THINK, BY NOW IN YOUR HANDS. IS MY ASSUMPTION RIGHT? NO. THAT MEANS THAT I HAVE TO READ IT.

LUNS SUMMARIZES NPG COMMUNIQUE (FULL TEXT OF WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL).

NOW I PROPOS TO YOU THAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS YOU CAN PUT THEM TO HERR APEL, MR. WEINBERGER, OR MR. NOTT AND MYSELF, IF YOU FEEL THE NEED.

2. QUESTION: MR. WEINBERGER, DO YOU FEEL CERTAIN THAT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

• THE POLISH CRISIS NOW IS OVER...?
3. WEINBERGER: I DON'T HAVE ANY FEELING THAT IT IS
OVER. WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE MANEUVERS HAVE ACTUALLY
ENDED. WE HAVE THE SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THEY HAVE,
BUT THAT RELATED ONLY TO ONE SET OF MANEUVERS. I WOULD
LIKE TO SAY, HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THIS MEETING
THAT I THINK WE HAVE AN EXTREMELY GOOD RESULT HERE.
THE UNITED STATES WAS VERY ANXIOUS THAT THE DEFENSE
MINISTERS NOTE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIETS AND ALSO
NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GRAVELY UNDERMINE THE BASIS

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

Q 081622Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6285

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0310
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 3561
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 1344
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE KAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4677
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 3702
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 1293

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 07246

USICA
FOR ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OF AN EFFECTIVE
NATURE IF THEY WERE TO INTERVENE OR TO CONTINUE THIS
KIND OF ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND POLAND. AND I FEEL VERY
PLEASED THAT THE MINISTERS HAVE AUTHORIZED THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF THE KIND
THAT HE JUST READ.
4. QUESTION: THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THERE WERE ...
DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT?
5. WEINBERGER: NO. NO, THE STATEMENT DOESN'T SAY THAT.
I BEG YOUR PARDON. THE STATEMENT SAYS: DEFENSE

PSN:016406

DTG:081622

TOR:0981650

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 67 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/91//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MINISTERS GATHERED AND VOTED WITH GREAT CONCERN AND SO
ON. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED
BY ALL THE MINISTERS TO READ THE STATEMENT WHICH HE
READ TO YOU.

6. LUNS: CONSENSUS MEANS UNANIMITY. WHEN WE TALK
NOW NATO TOWARDS "CONSENSUS" WE MEAN UNANIMITY. WHEN
WE SAY THERE IS NEAR CONSENSUS, IT MEANS ONE OR TWO
COUNTRIES FELL OUT OF THE BOAT, BUT NOBODY
WENT SWIMMING THIS TIME.

7. QUESTION: INAUDIBLE

8. WEINBERGER: THE STATEMENT SAYS THEY WOULD GRAVELY
UNDERMINE THE BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS.

9. QUESTION: IS THE SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN
POLAND CONTINUING?

10. WEINBERGER: I HAVE NOT HAD ANY LATER
INFORMATION ABOUT THAT THEN WE GAVE I BELIEVE IT WAS
YESTERDAY. SO I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY FURTHER ACTIVITY.
THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THE PARTICULAR MANEUVERS
CALLED "SOVIET 81" HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. WE ARE NOT
AWARE OF ANYTHING TO INDICATE THAT IT ISN'T SO, OR
ANYTHING TO INDICATE THAT IT IS CORRECT. WE DON'T
KNOW YET.

11. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, MR. APEL, ARE YOU
SATISFIED, MR. APEL, THAT THE ASSURANCE ... ON
RESUMING OR RE-ENTERING THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ...
WILL YOU BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE A BEGINNING DATE...?

12. WEINBERGER: WELL, FOR MY PART THAT WOULD DEPEND
ENTIRELY ON SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND
MONTHS.

13. APEL: I AM SATISFIED. YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ALREADY
MET IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. AND ALREADY
IN WASHINGTON WE AGREED IN OUR MUTUAL COMMUNIQUE THAT
THIS IS A TWO-TRACK DECISION AND THAT WE WILL STICK
TO THE TWO TRACKS OF THE DECISION.

14. LUNS: MAY I POINT OUT THAT IF YOU READ THE
COMMUNIQUE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ... FURTHER AMERICAN-
SOVIET EXCHANGES ON THE LRTMF ... IT IS EXPLICITLY
MENTIONED.

15. QUESTION: ... NO DATE SET ...

16. LUNS: NO, BUT MAY I POINT OUT THAT A DATE DOES
NOT DEPEND ON THE UNITED STATES. IT DOES DEPEND ALSO
ON THE SOVIET UNION. ... I THINK MR. NOTT WILL AGREE
TO THAT.

17. MR. NOTT: CERTAINLY.

18. QUESTION: INAUDIBLE

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 68

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

19. WEINBERGER: I SEE THE SITUATION REMAINING
ESSENTIALLY THE WAY IT WAS ON MONDAY, AND THAT WE
WOULD REGARD IMPROVEMENT AS THE TROOPS GOING BACK

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 69 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

0 081622Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6286

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0311
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 3562
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 1345
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USDDCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4678
USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 3703
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 1294

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 07246

USICA
TO THEIR BARRACKS AND MOVING OUT OF POLAND - THE
RUSSIAN TROOPS THAT MOVED IN, AND RESTORING THE
SITUATION TO WHAT IT WAS SEVERAL WEEKS AGO.
20. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY... IS POLAND THE ONLY
PLACE YOU'RE GOING TO BE WATCHING SOVIET CONDUCT
OR WHAT ABOUT OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD?
21. WEINBERGER: I THINK WE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED
IN KNOWING WHETHER THERE IS ANY BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE
ARMS CONTROL, ARMS LIMITATIONS DISCUSSIONS, AND
OBVIOUSLY THAT WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS IN

PSN:016408

DTG:081622

TOR:0981652

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 70

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WHEREVER IT MAY HAPPEN.
22. LUNS: MAY I POINT OUT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME
MINISTERS OF DEFENSE DEALT WITH A SPECIFIC ISSUE NOT
ON THE AGENDA OF THE NPG, BECAUSE OF ITS GREAT IMPORTANCE
AND BECAUSE OF ITS IMPACT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND
I MAY PERHAPS WITH HERR APEL'S PERMISSION QUOTE WHAT THE
GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING SAID
AT THEIR LAST MEETING THAT A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
POLAND WOULD PUT AN END TO DETENTE AS IT IS NOW. THAT
IS MORE OR LESS WHAT IT IS, ISN'T IT, HERR APEL?
23. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, ARE THERE ...INAUDIBLE
24. WEINBERGER: WELL, IT IS NOT SO MUCH A MATTER OF
CONDITIONS, IT'S A MATTER OF HAVING AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH
INDICATES THE TALKS CAN BE EFFECTIVE. AND IF THAT
ATMOSPHERE EXISTS, WHY WE HAVE NO HESITANCY ABOUT
STARTING THE TALKS. WE FULLY AGREE WITH THE TWO-TRACK
NATURE OF THE DECEMBER 79 SOLUTION AND WE ARE VERY
PLEASED THAT THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING, BECAUSE THE
MEETING RE-AFFIRMED BOTH OF THOSE TRACKS, SPECIFICALLY
INCLUDED THE DEPLOYMENT ON SCHEDULE OF ALL OF THE
FORCES NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN THE THEATER NUCLEAR
FORCES.
25. LUNS: WELL, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU VERY
MUCH FOR YOUR SUSTAINED ATTENTION. SEE YOU IN AUTUMN
SOMEWHERE. TUCH

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
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O 071154Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6196

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4007
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 2928
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0290

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NLS F97-030 #78

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BONN 07082

EXDIS
E.O. 12065 RDS-1 4-7-01 (WDESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, UR, PO, GW
SUBJECT: POLISH SITUATION; FRG VIEWS
REFS: A) STATE 085981 B) STATE 086429

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE BELIEVES ATTENDANCE BY ROMANIAN LEADER CEAUSESCU AT ANY EAST BLOC SUMMIT WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE THAT INTERVENTION IN POLAND WAS NOT ON THE AGENDA, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPE TOLD US APRIL 6. CEAUSESCU WOULD ONLY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MEETING IF HE HAD RECEIVED CLEAR ASSURANCES THAT INTERVENTION WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED, THE OFFICIAL SAID.
3. IN RESPONSE TO A BRIEFING BASED ON REFTELS, THE OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS "INCREASINGLY DISTURBED" BY DEVELOPMENTS IN AND AROUND POLAND, HOWEVER, HE ADDED, IT WAS STILL FELT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT YET DECIDED TO INTERVENE BECAUSE "THE PRICE IS SO HIGH" FOR THEM. THE OFFICIAL CITED THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF A BANKRUPT POLAND AND THE EFFECT INTERVENTION WOULD HAVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS PART OF THAT PRICE.
4. FOR THE SOVIETS, THE OFFICIAL SAID, THE BOTTOM LINE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIME LOOKS LIKE IT IS TOTALLY LOSING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION, OR IS UNDERGOING CHANGES WHICH

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
EURE, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WILL MAKE POLAND "NO LONGER A SOCIALIST STATE ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET DEFINITION." THE OFFICIAL SAID IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE "EXTREMELY IMPORTANT". HE SAID THE SOVIETS CAN "HARDLY BE PLEASED" WITH THE PLANNED MODALITIES OF ELECTION, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER THESE MODALITIES ARE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. WOESSNER

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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NLS F97-030# 79

0 041946Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6155
USMISSION USBERLIN NIACT IMMEDIATE 3652

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 06966

EXDIS--MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO THE SECRETARY AND PASS TO
WHITE HOUSE AND DEFENSE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/4/2001 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M

TAGS: PGOV, MPOL, GW, PL

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ GENSCHER'S MOSCOW VISIT; POLISH ASPECTS

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FONOFF STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL, WHO ACCOMPANIED
GENSCHER ON HIS JUST-COMPLETED TRIP TO MOSCOW, HAS PRO-
VIDED US WITH AN INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY READ-OUT ON
POLAND-RELATED ASPECTS OF THAT VISIT. (VAN WELL WILL BE
IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY, APRIL 6, AND AT THAT TIME WILL
GIVE WASHINGTON OFFICIALS A FORMAL AND DETAILED BRIEFING
ON GENSCHER'S MOSCOW VISIT.)

3. VAN WELL TOLD US THAT, JUST PRIOR TO GENSCHER'S DE-
PARTURE FROM MOSCOW THIS MORNING, GENSCHER TOOK GROMYKO
ASIDE AT THE AIRPORT AND EXPRESSED THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S
DEEP CONCERN OVER REPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED WITHIN
THE LAST DAY OR SO REGARDING A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTER-
VENTION IN POLAND. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE "FUNDAMENTAL CON-
SEQUENCES" WHICH SUCH AN INTERVENTION WOULD HAVE.

4. GROMYKO RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT GENSCHER HAD BEEN
"CONSIDERATE" NOT TO RAISE THE SPECIFIC REPORTS ABOUT A
POSSIBLE INTERVENTION DURING THE FORMAL REPEAT FORMAL
TALKS WHICH HE HAD JUST HELD WITH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO.
GROMYKO SAID: "I CAN STATE TO YOU THAT THE WAY YOU

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
EURE,EEUR,WEUR,DEPOL

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HANDLED THIS QUESTION (IN THE FORMAL TALKS) WILL NOT MEET WITH DISAPPOINTMENT (WIRD NICHT ENTTAEUSCHT WERDEN)."

5. GROMYKO THEN SPOKE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES (NOT EXACT QUOTE): WE ARE BOTHERED BY THE FACT THAT A PUBLIC FUSS (REGARDING A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION) KEEPS COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON AND ALSO OUT OF BONN. THIS IS NOT RIGHT. WE KNOW YOU WELL; YOU ARE A STATESMAN WHO TREATS THIS ENTIRE QUESTION WITH RESPONSIBILITY AND TACT.

6. VAN WELL SAID THE STATEMENT BY GROMYKO IN PARA 4, ABOVE, WAS ADMITTEDLY VAGUE AND THAT ONE SHOULD PERHAPS NOT READ TOO MUCH INTO IT. IT WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO DEFLATE REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, VAN WELL SAID THE FRG CONSIDERED THE STATEMENT TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY POSITIVE AND WANTED TO SHARE IT WITH THE US GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. VAN WELL EMPHASIZED THAT, ALTHOUGH GENSCHER DID NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISE THE RECENT REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION DURING THE FORMAL TALKS, HE OF COURSE STRESSED DURING THOSE TALKS WITH BOTH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH A SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD HAVE.

8. VAN WELL SAID THAT, JUST PRIOR TO GENSCHER'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW, GENSCHER HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT. A POLISH JOURNALIST ASKED WHETHER POLAND HAD BEEN ADDRESSED DURING GENSCHER'S TALKS WITH HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS. GENSCHER RESPONDED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES (NOT EXACT QUOTE):

I GAVE BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO IMPRESSIONS OF MY RECENT WARSAW VISIT AND TOLD THEM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLISH WISHES AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GERMAN POSSIBILITIES, THE FRG IS READY TO JOIN WITH OTHERS IN A COMMON ECONOMIC AID EFFORT FOR POLAND. SUCH AID WOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF ECONOMIC STABILITY IN POLAND AND THEREBY POLITICAL STABILITY IN EUROPE. THIS STABILITY, IN TURN, WOULD ENABLE THE POLES TO SOLVE THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS THEMSELVES. THE FRG PURSUES A POLICY OF THE STRICTEST NON-INTERVENTION, AND THE FRG EXPECTS THAT ALL OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WILL CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN A CORRESPONDING MANNER.

9. VAN WELL SAID AN NBC CORRESPONDENT ASKED GENSCHER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: DID YOU RECEIVE ANY ASSURANCES FROM GROMYKO OR BREZHNEV THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT INTER-

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

Q 041946Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6156
USMISSION USBERLIN NIACT IMMEDIATE 3653

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 06966

EXDIS--MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO THE SECRETARY AND PASS TO
WHITE HOUSE AND DEFENSE
VENE IN POLAND?

10. GENSCHER ANSWERED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: AFTER
NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON THIS QUESTION AND
ALSO AFTER MY TALKS HERE IN MOSCOW, NO ONE CAN HAVE ANY
DOUBT ABOUT WHAT CONSEQUENCES SUCH A SOVIET INTERVENTION
WOULD HAVE FOR THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

11. VAN WELL SAID THAT, IN THE FORMAL TALKS WITH BREZHNEV
AND GROMYKO, GENSCHER HAD MADE POINTS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL
TO THOSE IN PARAS 8 AND 10, ABOVE. BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO
DID NOT OBJECT TO GENSCHER'S STATEMENTS AND OF COURSE
GAVE NO ASSURANCES THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN
POLAND. IN FACT, EVERY TIME GENSCHER REFERRED TO POLAND,
THE SOVIETS MADE NO REPLY WHATSOEVER, BUT SIMPLY MOVED
ON TO A DIFFERENT SUBJECT.

12. (NOTE: THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS INFORMED US THAT VAN
WELL WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON AT 1825 ON SUNDAY, APRIL 6,
AND LEAVE WASHINGTON AT 1845 ON MONDAY.) HOESSNER

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DTG:041946

TOR:0942120

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DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
ROUTINE

R 251813Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5872

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3571
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4603
USMISSION USBERLIN 3557
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 2407
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 2919
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3731
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1447
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0250
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6683
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 3053
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 2007
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6272
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3983

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NLS F97-030 #81

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 06068

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/25/91 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, EFIN
SUBJ: GENSCHER VISIT TO WARSAW
REFS: A) BONN 5929, B) BONN 5954
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S MARCH 19-20 VISIT TO POLAND FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS REGARD THE POLISH CRISIS AS MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER. EMPHASIS DURING THE TALKS IN WARSAW FOCUSED ON POLAND'S INTERNAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND THE POLES

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
ECON, EURE, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL

PSN:054568

DTG:251813

TOR:0850319

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SPOKE OPENLY ABOUT THEIR PROBLEMS. POLISH PLEAS FOR HELP ON THE ECONOMIC SCORE HAVE BEEN SEPARATELY REPORTED (REFTELS). GENSCHER ASSURED HIS HOSTS THE FRG WILL DO ALL IT CAN, BUT HE ALSO POINTED OUT ITS OWN ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS. GENSCHER AGREED TO ENCOURAGE GREATER ASSISTANCE FROM THE EC. REGARDING POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION, POLISH OFFICIALS GAVE CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS. WHILE KANIA MINIMIZED THE DANGER, ANOTHER HIGH OFFICIAL TOLD THE GERMANS IN A DINNER CONVERSATION THAT IT IS IMMINENT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND EXCHANGES ON INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES REFLECTED A NEED TO AVOID OR DOWNPLAY CONTENTIOUS ISSUES.

END SUMMARY

3. A FOREIGN OFFICE POLISH AFFAIRS EXPERT BRIEFED US MARCH 24 ON GENSCHER'S VISIT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD LONGER-THAN-EXPECTED CONVERSATIONS WITH JARUZELSKI (THREE HOURS), KANIA (TWO HOURS), JABLONSKI (ONE HOUR), AND MET SEVERAL TIMES WITH HIS HOST FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK. HE ALSO SAW DEPUTY PREMIER RAKOWSKI AT DINNER. GENSCHER IS SENDING THE SECRETARY A REPORT OF HIS VISIT.

4. INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE POLES MADE NO BONES ABOUT THE GRAVITY OF THEIR INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. THEY PRESENTED A WISH LIST FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, ASKING IN PARTICULAR FOR ANOTHER DM 250 MILLION IN FOOD AID WHICH REQUEST GENSCHER PROMISED TO PRESENT TO THE EC COUNCIL IN MAASTRICHT. GENSCHER PROMISED THAT THE FRG WOULD DO ALL IT CAN, BUT HE ALSO OUTLINED GERMANY'S OWN ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS. (COMMENT: OUR BRIEFER VOLUNTEERED SHEEPISHLY TO US THAT, OF COURSE, THE FRG'S AILMENTS PALE BESIDE THOSE OF POLAND. END COMMENT)

5. THE POLISH LEADERS EMPHASIZED THEIR CONFIDENCE AND DETERMINATION TO FIND PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, JARUZELSKI MENTIONED THE POSSIBLE NEED TO DECLARE A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT A SITUATION COULD DEVELOP IN WHICH ALL MEANS WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED TO "PRESERVE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE," BY WHICH THE GERMANS TOOK HIM TO MEAN THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF THE PARTY.

6. THE POLES ALSO MADE A POINT ABOUT THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF POLAND'S FATE AND THAT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. THEY COMMENTED THAT A WORSENING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT
OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND NOTED THAT THE
REVERSE IS ALSO TRUE. KANIA EMPHASIZED THE GOOD
STATE OF WARSAW-MOSCOW RELATIONS AND DECLARED THERE
IS "NO QUESTION" OF SOVIET INTERVENTION. ON THE
OTHER HAND, ANOTHER "HIGH POLISH OFFICIAL" TOLD
GENSCHER IN A CONVERSATION AT DINNER THAT THE
DANGER IS ALREADY IMMINENT ("IST SCHON

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
ROUTINE

R 251813Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5879

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3572
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4604
USMISSION USBERLIN 3558
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 2408
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 2920
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3732
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1448
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0251
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6684
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 3054
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 2008
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6273
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3984

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 06068

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
DANGER OF "FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE IS CLOSER THAN EVER."

7. INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION CENTERED ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CZYREK ASKED GENSCHER'S INTERPRETATION OF U.S. POSITIONS AND GENSCHER DREW ON THE AGREED BACKGROUND SUMMARY OF HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS, IN WHICH GENSCHER EMPHASIZED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, OPPOSITION TO THE MORATORIUM IDEA. GENSCHER DEFENDED WESTERN AND U.S. POSITIONS BY POINTING TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP REPRESENTED BY THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND THE SS-20. HE

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ALSO CRITICIZED SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. IN CONTRAST TO THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP OF THE PAST DECADE, GENSCHER POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IN RECENT YEARS HAD ABOLISHED THE DRAFT, DECIDED AGAINST DEPLOYING ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS, AND RESTRAINED ITS MILITARY BUDGET.

8. BILATERAL TOPICS INVOLVED MAINLY POLISH PERFORMANCE UNDER THE EMIGRATION AGREEMENT AND WARSAW'S CRITICISMS OF FAILURE OF CERTAIN FRG LAENDERTO IMPLEMENT THE AGREED SCHOOL TEXT BOOK PRINCIPLES. THE GERMANS ARE QUITE SATISFIED AT ETHNIC EMIGRATION, SOME 160,000 ETHNIC GERMANS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO COME TO THE FRG, WHICH ACTUALLY EXCEEDS THE POLISH COMMITMENT UNDER THE 1975 ACCORD. BONN REGARDS THE TERMS AS OPEN-ENDED, HOWEVER, AND THE POLES EVIDENTLY INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE ALLOWING EMIGRATION AS BEFORE, EVEN THOUGH THE ORIGINAL TIME PERIOD HAS EXPIRED.

9. COMMENT: BOTH SIDES EVIDENTLY SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE ANY BILATERAL FRICTIONS. THEIR ATTENTION FOCUSSED ON POLAND'S INTERNAL PLIGHT. GENSCHER HAS NOW HAD A FIRST-HAND LOOK AT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH THE FOREIGN OFFICE CURRENTLY REGARDS AS EXTREMELY SERIOUS. OUR BRIEFER REMARKED THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IS NOW PROBABLY GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE. THE GERMANS MAY FEEL THEY HAVE EXTENDED ALL THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE THEY CAN OFFER FOR NOW (REFTELS). WE BELIEVE THEIR CONCERN IS GENUINE AND DEEP, HOWEVER, AND WE EXPECT BONN TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO RALLY SUPPORT AMONG THE NATO ALLIES AND WITHIN THE EC, AS GENSCHER JUST DID AT MAASTRICHT. WOESSNER

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 251117Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5836

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4599
USMISSION USBERLIN 3545
USINT HAVANA 0143
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8433
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0247
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5196
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9602
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4127
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0733

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NLS F97-030 #83

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05967

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/25/91 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, GW, XJ
SUBJ: NAMIBIA: FOREIGN OFFICE BRIEFS FIVE ON
GENSCHER LETTER TO SECRETARY
REF: STATE 73284 (NOTAL)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY URGING THAT SIGNALS BE MADE TO DEMONSTRATE WESTERN INTEREST IN MAKING FURTHER EFFORTS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIA CONFLICT. IT IS TO BE DELIVERED BY THE FRG EMBASSY. IN A SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL MOVE, THE FOREIGN OFFICE BRIEFED US ON THE LETTER AND ITS PURPOSE TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER CONTACT FIVE NATIONS MARCH 23. WE BELIEVE THIS INITIATIVE BY GENSCHER AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOLLOW-UP REFLECT A DEEP CONCERN THAT THE WESTERN FIVE MAY LOSE THE INITIATIVE TO RADICAL AFRICANS

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
SEA, AF, ARA, EURE, EEUR, WEUR

PSN:053750

DTG:251117

TOR:0841250

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SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE SOON, THE FOREIGN OFFICE WANTS AT LEAST TO SEND SOME POSITIVE SIGNALS DURING THE INTERIM BEFORE THE U.S. REVIEW OF POLICY TOWARD AFRICA IS COMPLETED. ALTHOUGH THE FRG SEEMS TO BE TAKING THE LEAD, THE UK, FRENCH, AND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE INDICATED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS SHARE ITS CONCERN. END SUMMARY.

3. FOREIGN OFFICE SOUTHERN AFRICA DIRECTOR VERGAU ON MARCH 24 CONVENED A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONTACT FIVE. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO BRIEF OFFICERS FROM THE FOUR EMBASSIES ON THE MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER TO THE SECRETARY THAT VERGAU SAID HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON THE DAY BEFORE. VERGAU HAD NO REPORT OF DISCUSSION THAT MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE DELIVERY OF THE MESSAGE. EMPHASIZING THE FRG'S CONCERN TO SEND SIGNALS TO THE AFRICANS, TO REVIVE ACTIVITY OF THE CONTACT FIVE, AND TO REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING THROUGH THE UN FRAMEWORK, VERGAU ELABORATED THE MAIN PROPOSALS IN GENSCHER'S MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:

4. U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO AFRICAN CAPITALS. THIS COULD BE IN THE NATURE OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION THAT WOULD NOT TREAT SUBSTANCE. ITS AIM WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE AFRICANS THAT THE U.S. CARES.

5. FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. THE MAIN POINT IS TO GIVE THE SIGNAL DISCUSSED IN GENSCHER'S LETTER (WHICH WE ASSUME THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOW.) HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS AS ARRANGING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING CONTACTS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES AND FRONT-LINE STATE POLITICIANS. HE ALSO SUGGESTED ENCOURAGEMENT OF A MEETING OF A GROUP FROM NAMIBIA WITH SWAPO REPRESENTATIVES.

6. CONTACT FIVE EXPERTS MEETING. THIS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK (UNLESS IT IS DECIDED NOT TO CONTINUE WORKING IN THE UN CONTEXT.) AT A MINIMUM, THE EXPERTS MEETING SHOULD TRY TO COMMIT ITSELF TO A PLAN OF ACTION AND SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE UN IS ADVISABLE.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. VERGAU SAID THESE PRINCIPLES COULD ALSO INCLUDE GUARANTEES THAT COULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE CONTACT FIVE AND THEN SOLD TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE GUARANTEES MIGHT COVER SUCH QUESTIONS AS UN IMPARTIALITY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM.

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

8. CONCLUDING, VERGAU OBSERVED THAT THE OVERALL APPROACH HE HAD OUTLINED PROBABLY PRESUPPOSES CONTINUED WORKING WITH THE UN. HE DECLARED THAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CANADA REGARD THIS AS INDISPENSIBLE, TO WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES ASSENTED. HE FURTHER OBSERVED THAT A CONTACT FIVE EXPERTS MEETING IN NEW YORK WOULD EMPHASIZE THE CONTINUED INTEREST OF THE FIVE IN WORKING WITH THE UN.

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

□ 251117Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5837

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4600
USMISSION USBERLIN 3546
USINT HAVANA 0144
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8434
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0248
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5197
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9603
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4128
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0734

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 05967

EXDIS

9. WE PROMISED TO CONVEY VERGAU'S ELABORATION OF THESE POINTS TO THE DEPARTMENT. WE POINTED OUT THAT THESE QUESTIONS ARE PART OF THE GENERAL REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. WE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERNS AMONG THE AFRICAN STATES AND THOSE VERGAU HAD EXPRESSED. DRAWING ON REFTEL, WE POINTED OUT THAT THE DIRK MUDGE VISIT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND THAT, WHATEVER PUBLICITY THE DTA SOUGHT TO MAKE OF IT, THERE IS NOTHING THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PREJUDGING THE APPROACH THAT WILL EMERGE FROM OUR POLICY REVIEW. VERGAU CONCURRED, OBSERVING THAT HE BELIEVED MUDGE HAD PUSHED TOO FAR, PROBABLY TO HIS OWN DISADVANTAGE. VERGAU ENDED BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE, PRESUMABLY SHARED BY THE OTHERS, THAT THE U.S. WILL SOON BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA.

10. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THE LETTER OF FOREIGN MINISTER

PSN:053756

DTG:251117

TOR:0841251

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GENSCHER TO THE SECRETARY ON THE SUBJECT OF NAMIBIA (SEPTTEL) REFLECTS STRONG FRG CONCERN THAT IF THE U.S. DOES NOT QUICKLY MOVE TO REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN NAMIBIA ON THE BASIS OF SC 435, THE EFFORTS OF THE CONTACT FIVE WILL LOSE CREDIBILITY IN MODERATE AFRICAN EYES. THE FRG, WE FEEL, BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH A REAFFIRMATION, THE MODERATE AFRICAN STATES WILL REGARD THEMSELVES BETRAYED AND EXPOSED. THE RESULT, IN THE FRG'S VIEW, WOULD BE FOR COOPERATION WITH THE WEST TO APPEAR A LESS ATTRACTIVE OPTION FOR AFRICA.

11. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE FRG, WHICH TENDS TO ESCHEW LEADERSHIP ROLES ON THESE ISSUES, IS NOW COMING FORWARD TO URGE US ACTION. WE BELIEVE THIS REFLECTS A DEEP CONCERN THAT FAILURE OF THE WESTERN FIVE TO RESUME THE INITIATIVE NOW ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS COULD UNDO YEARS OF EFFORT AND DIPLOMACY AIMED AT MODERATING THE AFRICAN POSITIONS, COAXING THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND, IN GENERAL, PREPARING THE GROUND FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIA QUESTION. WOEISSNER

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING DEBATE AND POLEMICS IN US OVER CONTENTS OF OUR PACKAGE. AT THE SAME TIME HE STRESSED FRANKNESS WITH WHICH TOP POLISH LEADERSHIP HAD BRIEFED GENSCHER ON CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN POLAND. JARUZELSKI HAD EMPHASIZED IN PARTICULAR THE DESPERATE SHORTAGE OF MEAT AND OTHER FOODSTUFFS AND HAD MADE A "CRY FOR HELP" FOR GERMAN ASSISTANCE IN MEETING SOME OF THESE IMMEDIATE SHORTAGES. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT GENSCHER WAS SIGNING OFF ON A LETTER TO SECRETARY HAIG ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WARSAW WHICH, INTER ALIA, WOULD STRESS CREDENCE FRG GAVE TO THIS PRESENTATION.

3. WESSELKOCK IN FINANCE MINISTRY SAID THAT WHILE GERMANS FULLY SHARE US CONCERN ABOUT AN ADEQUATE SOVIET BLOC CONTRIBUTION, THEY HAVE NO SUGGESTIONS AT THIS TIME HOW TO BRING THIS ABOUT. HIS QUESTIONS CONCENTRATED ON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GERMAN POSITION OF "GENERAL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING" OF A LONGER TERM PROGRAM OF RESCHEDULING WITH ACTUAL RESCHEDULING DONE IN 6 MONTH SLICES AND US POSITION REFTEL. IN CONNECTION WITH NEW EXPORT CREDITS HE FELT BURDENSARING SHOULD NOT PENALIZE THOSE WHO MADE MORE CREDITS AVAILABLE IN PAST.

4. WE PLAN BRIEF STEEG LATER TODAY, SINCE WE UNDERSTAND SHE WILL REPRESENT FRG AT PARIS MEETING.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION FONMIN POLISH DESK OFFICER TOLD ECONCOUNSELOR THAT POLES HAD URGENTLY REQUESTED GENSCHER THAT FRG PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL DM 10 MILLION CREDITS FOR EMERGENCY MEAT PURCHASES. POLES REPORTEDLY INDICATED THAT MEAT RATIONING WILL BE INSTITUTED APRIL 1, AND ADDITIONAL CREDITS WOULD BE NEEDED TO INSURE THERE WAS ENOUGH MEAT TO RATION. FONMIN SOURCE INDICATED FRG CABINET WILL CONSIDER THIS NEW REQUEST TOMORROW. HE EXPRESSED SOME SCEPTICISM WHETHER REQUEST WOULD BE HONORED, INDICATING THAT FRG HAD JUST ABOUT REACHED ITS LIMITS OF EXPOSURE IN POLAND WITH THE DM 150 MILLION CREDIT ANNOUNCED EARLIER THIS WEEK BEFORE THE GENSCHER VISIT TO WARSAW. SOURCE ALSO SAID THE POLES TOLD GENSCHER THAT 1.5 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT WAS NEEDED TO AVOID BREAD RATIONING, WHICH WOULD BE A SEVERE POLITICAL SETBACK. SOURCE STATED FRG CONSIDERS HIS REQUEST MULTI-LATERAL RATHER THAN BI-LATERAL, NOTING THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AT MAASTRICHT.
WOESSNER

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SENSITIVE

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AS OF MARCH 23, ONLY THE FRENCH DO NOT YET HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PAPER BUT THESE ARE EXPECTED SHORTLY. THE BONN GROUP IS NEXT SCHEDULED TO MEET MARCH 26 TO CONSIDER THE PAPER AGAIN, THE DELAY BEING CAUSED BY ATTENDANCE AT THE LIVE OAK CRITIQUE. THE BRITISH HAVE APPROVAL OF THE TEXT IN REF B, REPORTEDLY WITH A MINOR CHANGE FOR PURPOSES OF CLARITY, AND THE FRG HAS APPROVED THE TEXT AS IT STANDS.

4. WE ASK THE DEPARTMENT TO RECONSIDER ONE OF ITS TWO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE PAPER AND DECRET OUR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MORE FULLY THE REFERENCE TO "DAY VISITS FACILITIES." AN EFFORT WAS MADE AT THE MARCH 16 MEETING TO INCLUDE A MORE DESCRIPTIVE PHRASING IN THE PAPER BUT THE MATTER IS SO COMPLEX THAT IT DID NOT FIT EASILY INTO A LIST FORMAT.

5. THE INCLUSION OF THIS REFERENCE WAS AT FRG REQUEST AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GDR MIGHT CHANGE THE CURRENT PROCEDURE IS A CONCERN TO WHICH THE FRG ATTACHES A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANCE. UNDER PRESENT PROCEDURES, THE GDR PERMITS GERMAN RESIDENTS OF THE FRG (BUT NOT OF WEST BERLIN) AND ALL FOREIGNERS (INCLUDING THOSE RESIDENT IN WEST BERLIN) TO OBTAIN PERMISSION ON THE SPOT FOR ENTRY INTO EAST BERLIN. THIS IS NOT SET OUT IN ANY AGREEMENT, UNLIKE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEST BERLINERS, AND THE GDR COULD CHANGE THE PROCEDURE WITHOUT VIOLATING THE SPECIFIC TERMS OF ANY AGREEMENT. SUCH A CHANGE, HOWEVER, WOULD BE OF GREAT POLITICAL IMPORTANCE IN THE FRG BOTH BECAUSE OF THE INCONVENIENCE AND PRE-PLANNING REQUIRED IF WEST GERMANS WANTED TO GO TO EAST BERLIN AND BECAUSE IT WOULD ENABLE THE GDR TO HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF SUCH VISITS. AS IT IS, WEST GERMANS WHO MIGHT WISH TO AVOID CLOSE GDR SURVEILLANCE IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH FRIENDS OR RELATIVES FROM THE GDR OR EAST BERLIN CAN DO SO RELATIVELY UNNOTICED SINCE MEETINGS CAN TAKE PLACE IN EAST BERLIN. AN EXPLANATION OF THE IMPORTANCE THE FRG ATTACHES TO THIS

BONN 5818

DTG: 231700Z MAR 81 ESN: 051254
TOR: 082/1918Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRACTICE IS REPORTED IN REF C.

6. THERE IS ALSO A STATUS QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS THE ALLIES. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT IN 1977 THE GDR IMPOSED A VISA REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGNERS TO VISIT EAST BERLIN AS PART OF A PACKAGE OF MEASURES TO ELIMINATE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND THE GDR. THE ALLIES PROTESTED THESE MEASURES, INCLUDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND THE MATTER RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION. AT THE TIME, THE QUESTION WAS RAISED AS TO WHAT REMAINING DISTINCTIONS THERE WERE, THAT OF SEPARATE VISAS FOR THE "CAPITAL OF THE GDR" WAS ONE OF THOSE LISTED (REF D). BRAEUTIGAM OF THE FRG HAS ALSO DESCRIBED THE "DAY VISIT" PROCEDURES AS SOMETHING WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, IS A STATUS POINT BECAUSE ITS EXISTENCE PRECEDED THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE GA (REF C).

7. ON MARCH 21 WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THE

SONN 5818

DTG: 031700Z MAR 81 58N: 051254
TOR: 082/1918Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOR:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #5818/02 0821714
O 231709Z MAR 81 ZPF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5772

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 05818

NOOIS
DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTED CHANGES TO BOTH BRAEUTIGAM
AND KASTRUP ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS. BOTH CONFIRMED
THAT A GDR CHANGE IN THE DAY VISIT PROCEDURE IS
SOMETHING WHICH THE FRG WOULD CONSIDER VERY SERIOUS
FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE.

8. WITH REGARD TO ANY FURTHER INCREASE IN MINIMUM CUR-
RENCY EXCHANGE, THIS WOULD ALSO BE SEEN AS A SERIOUS
MOVE BY THE GDR AS WAS THE INCREASE OF LAST
OCTOBER (THEN DESCRIBED AS THE MOST SERIOUS BLOW TO
INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS IN A DECADE).

9. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE BE
AUTHORIZED TO LEAVE THE REFERENCE TO DAY VISITS AND
CURRENCY EXCHANGE AT THE MORE IMPORTANT END OF THE
SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE EASTERN MOVES.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE.
WOESSNER

BONN 5818

DTG:231709Z MAR 81 5818 051255
TOR: 082/1919Z

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DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 231241Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5763
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

NLS F97-030 #86

INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5873
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 05755

E.O. 12065: RDS 3 (03/18/01) (WDESSNER, WILLIAM) DR-M
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, GW
SUBJECT: ~~TEL~~ APEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON: DEFENSE PRIORITIES
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED THAT MOD APEL SHOULD BE GIVEN A FIRM AND UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON THAT GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES NEED TO BE VERY SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED, IN REAL TERMS, OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE U.S. SIDE TO HAVE A SENSE OF ITS PRIORITIES CONCERNING THOSE AREAS IN WHICH WE WISH TO SEE THE FRG SPEND ITS MONEY. SINCE IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE GERMANS -- ASSUMING THEY AGREE TO SPEND MORE -- WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO DO EVERYTHING WE WOULD WISH, WE SHOULD HAVE AN IDEA, AT LEAST IN OUR OWN MINDS, OF WHICH AREAS ARE MOST IMPORTANT.

3. IN SUMMARY, THE FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR AREAS, NOT NECESSARILY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, IN WHICH THE USG HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN SEEING ADDITIONAL FRG EFFORTS:

- AN INCREASED NATO INFRASTRUCTURE CEILING.
- RESPONSE TO THE STOESSSEL DEMARCHE, INCLUDING

***** WWSR COMMENTS *****

RA, NAN, COL, VP
ASIMET, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL

PSN:050834

DTG:231241

TOR:0821302

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DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- WARTIME HNS.
 - IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE PLANS AND OBJECTIVES FOR
 - THE BUNDESWEHR.
 - CONTINUED, IF NOT INCREASED, SECURITY ASSISTANCE
 - FOR NATO SOUTHERN FLANK COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY
 - TURKEY.
4. ALL OF THE ABOVE AREAS ARE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, WE MUST OF COURSE RECOGNIZE THAT, AS WE PRESS FOR INCREASED GERMAN ACTION IN ANY ONE OF THESE AREAS, WE MAY LESSEN THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FRG WILL BE ABLE TO WILLING TO INCREASE ITS EFFORTS IN OTHERS. WDESSNER

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OP IMMED
STU4622
DE RUFHOL #5732/01 0791612
O 201809Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #87

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5753

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCPUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05732

LIMDIS
E.O. 12065; RDS-3 03/13/2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, GW
SUBJECT: (C) APEL'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON; HIS POLITICAL
DIFFICULTIES
REF: (A) BONN 5684 DTG 200022Z MAR 81
(B) BONN 5591 DTG 191726Z MAR 81
(C) BONN 5092 DTG 131724Z MAR 81

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, DEFENSE MINISTER APEL IS UNDER STRONG ATTACK FROM THE OPPOSITION OVER ALLEGEDLY INSUFFICIENT GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS, OVER HIS HANDLING OF THE TORNADO AFFAIR, AND FOR ALLEGED INACTION ON THE STRESSER DEMARCHE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE SERIOUS TALK AT THE MOMENT OF APEL'S RESIGNATION, HIS POLITICAL STANDING HAS BEEN VERY SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERMINED BY THE EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS. APEL WILL HOPE THAT HIS WASHINGTON TRIP WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HIS BADLY TARNISHED IMAGE AND NOT SIMPLY ADD TO HIS PROBLEMS (SEE THE CHARGE'S COMMENTS IN REF A). END SUMMARY.

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: EURW, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 BONN 5732

DTG: 201809Z MAR 81 PSN: 048035
TOR: 079/1849Z

3. IN RECENT DAYS, DEFENSE MINISTER APEL HAS COME UNDER INCREASINGLY STRONG ATTACK FROM THE OPPOSITION ON THE SUBJECT OF GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS. DURING TESTIMONY BEFORE THE BUNDESTAG DEFENSE COMMITTEE ON THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT FMOD BEHIND-CLOSED-DOORS ARMAMENTS REVIEW, KEY OPPOSITION DEPUTIES HAVE ALLEGED THAT THE CUTBACKS ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING THAT REVIEW WILL IMPORTANTLY REDUCE THE BUNDESWEHR'S COMBAT CAPABILITY AND MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FRG TO PARTICIPATE MEANINGFULLY IN THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR MADE NECESSARY BY THE SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

4. CDU DEPUTY WOERNER CHARGED THAT THERE WOULD BE A 2 BILLION DM SHORTFALL IN THE 1991 FRG DEFENSE BUDGET ALONE, THUS CHALLENGING APEL'S FINDING THAT THE 1991 BUDGET WOULD CONTAIN NO SERIOUS SHORTFALLS. (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE TRUTH ON THIS MATTER IS PROBABLY SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE. END COMMENT.)

5. KEY OPPOSITION DEPUTIES HAVE ALSO CHARGED THAT THE CHIEFS OF THE GERMAN ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE BELIEVE THAT THE CUTBACKS, DELAYS, AND CANCELLATIONS ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING THE FMOD REVIEW WILL UNDERMINE THEIR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THEIR DEFENSE MISSIONS. (WE SHOULD NOTE THAT OUR MILITARY ATTACHES HAVE ALSO HEARD SIMILAR CHARGES FROM THEIR MILITARY COLLEAGUES.)

6. OPPOSITION DEPUTIES SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT THE THREE ARMED SERVICE CHIEFS BE ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ON THE FMOD REVIEW BEFORE THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE, BUT APEL REJECTED THIS REQUEST. WOERNER SAID IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE BUNDESTAG THAT A DEFENSE MINISTER HAD TURNED DOWN A BUNDESTAG REQUEST FOR TESTIMONY FROM SPECIFIC MEMBERS OF HIS MINISTRY. WOERNER CHARGED THAT A MINISTER WHO BEHAVES IN THIS MANNER "HAS SOMETHING TO HIDE."

7. THE OPPOSITION IS OF COURSE ALSO CONTINUING ITS ATTACK ON APEL OVER HIS GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE, ESPECIALLY HIS HANDLING OF THE TORNADO FUNDING GAP. IT CONTINUES TO REJECT HIS STATEMENT THAT HE FIRST LEARNED OF THE TORNADO PROBLEM IN NOVEMBER, 1980; CDU/CSU DEPUTIES INSIST THAT HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF IT FAR SOONER AND THAT HE AND HIS MINISTRY ARE GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISMANAGEMENT IN THIS CASE. IN APEL'S MOST RECENT TESTIMONY (MARCH 19)

TO THE BUNDESTAG ON THIS MATTER, HE PERFORMED RATHER WELL AND CONVINCINGLY, BUT THE OPPOSITION ATTACK SHOWS FEW SIGNS OF WANING.

8. IN ADDITION, THE OPPOSITION IS BEGINNING TO CRITICIZE APEL FOR ALLEGED INACTION ON AMBASSADOR STOESEL'S NOVEMBER 4, 1980 DEMARCHE ON U.S. FORCES ISSUES. OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG BT

OP IMMED
STU4623
DE RUFHOL #5732/02 0791814
O 201809Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5754

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCPUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 05732

LIMDIS
DEFENSE COMMITTEE PLAN TO INSIST THAT, IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING APEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HE REPORT
PERSONALLY TO THE COMMITTEE ON WHAT POSITIVE
ACTIONS THE FRG INTENDS TO TAKE ON THE STOESSEL
DEMARCHE. THE OPPOSITION CLEARLY SEES THE DEMARCHE
AS YET ANOTHER SERIOUS REASON TO CONTINUE TO PRESS
APEL TO THE WALL.

9. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE SERIOUS TALK AT THE
MOMENT OF APEL'S RESIGNATION, IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS
POLITICAL STANDING HAS BEEN VERY SIGNIFICANTLY
UNDERMINED, FIRST IN 1980 WITH HIS SUPPORT OF PUBLIC
SWEARING-IN CEREMONIES FOR BUNDESWEHR RECRUITS
(WHICH ALIENATED HIM FROM THE LEFT), AND THEN BY
THE TORNADO AFFAIR AND OTHER DEFENSE RELATED
ISSUES (WHICH HAVE ALIENATED HIM FROM THE RIGHT).
FOR A WHILE HE WILL NEED TO WORK HARD SIMPLY TO
KEEP HIS HEAD ABOVE WATER, AND IT MAY NOT BE
POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RECOVER HIS PREVIOUS IMAGE AS
ONE OF THE HEIRS APPARENT TO SCHMIDT.

10. APEL WILL OF COURSE HOPE THAT HIS TRIP TO
WASHINGTON WILL BE PERCEIVED AS A SUCCESS SO THAT

SIT:
EOB:
WH8R COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

BONN 5732

DTG:201809Z MAR 81 PSN:048037
TOR: 079/1850Z

HIS BADLY TARNISHED IMAGE CAN BE GIVEN A BOOST.
AS WE NOTED IN REF B, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON
URGE APEL, ALBEIT IN A NONCONFRONTATIONAL, COLLEGIAL
MANNER, TO MAKE A VERY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FRG
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. IN THIS CONNECTION, WASHINGTON
WILL WISH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMENTS OF THE
CHARGE IN REF A.

11. THIS CABLE ADDRESSES ONLY THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
ON THE EVE OF APEL'S DEPARTURE. THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON
THE ISSUES ON WHICH THE OPPOSITION IS ATTACKING APEL ARE
CONTAINED IN SEPTELS. WOESSNER
BT

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 191726Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5710
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #88

BY Loj, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 05591

E.D. 12065: RDS-3 03/18/2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, GW
SUBJECT: (C) APEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON: FRG DEFENSE
- BUDGET PROBLEMS

REF: (A) BONN 5396 DTG 181149Z MAR 81
(B) STATE 067653 DTG 171841Z MAR 81 (NOTAL)
(C) STATE 066224 DTG 161451Z MAR 81 (NOTAL)
(D) BONN 5092 DTG 131724Z MAR 81
(E) BONN 4255 DTG 031702Z MAR 81 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE ADMINISTRATION'S STATEMENTS TO DEFENSE MINISTER APEL NEXT WEEK ON THE QUESTION OF FRG DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS WILL BE SEEN BY THE CHANCELLOR AND OTHERS AS A FUNDAMENTAL SIGN OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE U.S. WILL PRESS FOR INCREASES IN GERMAN DEFENSE SPENDING.
3. WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON CLEARLY STATE TO APEL THAT GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE VERY SIGNIFICANTLY AUGMENTED. ALTHOUGH APEL'S

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
ASIMET,EEUR,WEUR,DEPOL

PSN:046569

DTG:191726

TOR:0781758

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RECENT REVIEW OF THE FMOD ARMAMENTS EFFORT HAD ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS, IT ALSO REVEALED CUTBACKS WHICH WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE BUNDESWEHR, AND IT SIGNALLED THAT REAL GROWTH IN FRG DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IS LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CONSTRAINED FOR SOME YEARS TO COME. WE BELIEVE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD IMPRESS UPON APEL THE NEED TO REVERSE THIS TREND.

4. AS REGARDS U.S. FORCES ISSUES, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON OFFICIALS, IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH APEL, CONFIRM AMBASSADOR STOESEL'S NOVEMBER 1980 DEMARCHE, PRESS FOR EARLY FRG BUDGETING FOR ITEM 1 OF THE DEMARCHE -- WARTIME HNS, AND UNDERSCORE THE NEED OR A POSITIVE GERMAN DECISION ON SUBSEQUENT ITEMS OF THE DEMARCHE AS WELL (SEE REF A). END SUMMARY.

5. WHEN APEL VISITS WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, HE AND U.S. OFFICIALS WILL NEED TO ADDRESS A STARK AND SIMPLE FACT WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE AN ISSUE IN OUR RELATIONS FOR SOME TIME: GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS, AS CURRENTLY PLANNED, LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED. IT IS TRUE THAT APEL'S RECENT REVIEW OF THE FMOD ARMAMENTS EFFORT REAFFIRMED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJOR WEAPON PROGRAMS, BUT THE REVIEW ALSO SIGNALLED RETRENCHMENT AND CUTBACK (REF D). EVEN THE FMOD'S ABILITY TO GO FORWARD WITH MAJOR PROGRAMS DEPENDS ON THE FINANCE MINISTER'S AGREEMENT TO FULL COMPENSATION FOR INFLATION. LESSER PROGRAMS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ALLIANCE DEFENSE HAVE BEEN EITHER DELAYED OR CANCELLED.

6. EVEN BEFORE THE FINDINGS OF THE RECENT FMOD REVIEW WERE MADE PUBLIC, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE 1981 DEFENSE BUDGET PROVIDED FOR A REAL INCREASE OF AT MOST CIRCA 1.5 PERCENT, DEPENDING ON WHICH DEFLATOR IS USED AND HOW INFLATION DEVELOPS. THIS OUTLOOK WAS NOT IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT FMOD REVIEW. THE REVIEW SERVED TO CONFIRM THAT REAL GROWTH IN THE FRG DEFENSE BUDGET IS LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CONSTRAINED NOT JUST IN 1981, BUT IN THE IMMEDIATELY SUBSEQUENT YEARS AS WELL.

7. THIS NEGATIVE SITUATION EXISTS AT A TIME WHEN: (A) THE ALLIES HAVE ALL AGREED THAT THE WEST'S RELATIVE POWER VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS HAS BEEN DECLINING AND NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED;

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(B) THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING MAJOR INCREASES
IN ITS DEFENSE BUDGET AT CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICE
AND CLEARLY STATING THAT THREE PERCENT REAL
GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING BY OUR ALLIES IS A
MINIMUM;

(C) THERE IS A PRESSING NEED FOR A NEW DIVISION
OF LABOR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND FOR GREATER
ALLIED EFFORTS AS A RESULT OF THE SITUATION IN
SOUTHWEST ASIA; AND

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 191726Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5711
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN C5591

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 03/18/2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: MARR, MPOL, GW

SUBJECT: (C) APEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON? FRG DEFENSE
BUDGET PROBLEMS

(D THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS FOLLOWING UP
ON THE DEMARCHE ON U.S. FORCES ISSUES WHICH
AMBASSADOR STOESSSEL MADE TO APEL ON NOVEMBER 4,
1980.

8. DURING GENSCHER'S RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON,
THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES WAS NOT
COVERED IN DEPTH. GENSCHER WAS APPARENTLY
RATHER GENERAL AND IMPRESSIONISTIC WHEN HE TOLD
SECRETARY WEINBERGER (REFS B AND C) THAT THE FRG
DEFENSE BUDGET WOULD "GO UP" AND THAT THE INCREASE
WAS DEMONSTRATED BY GERMAN SUPPORT FOR WARTIME
HNS. THE FACT IS THAT NO MAJOR REAL INCREASE IN FRG
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES APPEARS IN THE OFFING AND
NO MONEY HAS YET BEEN BUDGETED FOR WARTIME HNS.
EVEN WHEN WARTIME HNS FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED, THEY
WILL BE SPREAD OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS AND, ALTHOUGH

PSN:046571

DTG:191726

TOR:0781800

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 74

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

VERY WELCOME, ARE NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN A MAJOR INCREASE IN FRG DEFENSE SPENDING.

9. AS ONE FRG OPPOSITION FIGURE STATED FOLLOWING GENSCHER'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON, GENSCHER LEFT TO APEL THE UNPLEASANT TASK OF ADDRESSING WITH THE U.S. SIDE THE "CENTRAL PROBLEM" OF THE SIZE OF GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS.

10. WHAT WASHINGTON SAYS TO APEL ON DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT WILL BE A FUNDAMENTAL SIGNAL TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN MAY. BECAUSE OF THE VERY REAL BUDGETARY STRINGENCIES IN THE FRG AND THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH APEL HAS PERSONALLY BEEN IN OVER TORNADO, AN EXTREMELY TOUGH U.S. APPROACH MIGHT NOT BE IN ORDER. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE THAT APEL SHOULD BE GIVEN THE FIRM AND UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE THAT GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE VERY SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. AT A MINIMUM, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON OFFICIALS:

(A) STRESS AGAIN THAT THREE PERCENT REAL GROWTH IS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF SO IMPORTANT AND AFFLUENT AN ALLY AS THE FRG.

(B) POINT OUT THAT IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE PERCEIVE OF THE GERMANS AS NOT CARRYING THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN THERE COULD BE A BACKLASH EFFECT WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT MAJOR INCREASES IN THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET.

(C) EMPHASIZE THAT EXCESSIVELY CONSTRAINED INCREASES IN THE FRG DEFENSE BUDGET WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SMALLER AND LESS AFFLUENT ALLIES TO MAKE ADEQUATE INCREASES IN THEIR DEFENSE BUDGETS.

(D) STRESS THAT INCREASES IN GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR A NEW DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. IT MIGHT BE WELL TO POINT OUT THAT SOME OF THE DELAYS AND CUTBACKS WHICH APEL RECENTLY ANNOUNCED SPECIFICALLY DETRACT FROM AN EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO THE SOUTHWEST ASIAN SITUATION.

(E) CONFIRM AGAIN AMBASSADOR STOESEL'S NOVEMBER 4, 1980 DEMARCHE TO APEL ON U.S. FORCES ISSUES, PRESS FOR EARLY FRG BUDGETING FOR ITEM 1 OF THE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DEMARCHE -- WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT, AND
UNDERScore THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE GERMAN DECISION
NOT JUST ON THIS ITEM OF THE DEMARCHE BUT ON
SUBSEQUENT ITEMS AS WELL.

11. APEL MAY REPEAT HIS OFTEN MADE STATEMENT
THAT ITEMS 2 THROUGH 8 OF THE DEMARCHE ARE NOT
ESSENTIALLY THE BUSINESS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY.
WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW SUCH A STATEMENT TO GO UNCHALLENGED.
IT IS TRUE THAT THE FINANCE MINISTRY WOULD HAVE
A PARTICULARLY LARGE ROLE IN DECIDING ON ANY

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 191726Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5712
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 05591

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 03/18/2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, GW
SUBJECT: (S) APEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON: FRG DEFENSE
- BUDGET PROBLEMS

FUNDING FOR THESE ITEMS. HOWEVER, ALL ITEMS OF
AMBASSADOR STOESEL'S DEMARCHE SUPPORT THE COMMON
DEFENSE AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE
AMBASSADOR -- QUITE APPROPRIATELY -- PRESENTED
HIS DEMARCHE TO DEFENSE MINISTER APEL. WE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO LOOK TO APEL TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE
IN ENSURING THAT CONCRETE ACTION IS TAKEN ON
THE DEMARCHE AS A WHOLE.

12. APEL MAY RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR INCREASED
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY POINTING TO THE VERY
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE
WHICH THE FRG ALREADY MAKES. HE IS LIKELY TO POINT
OUT THAT THE FRG MAKES A GREATER CONTRIBUTION THAN
ANY OTHER ALLY OF THE U.S., THAT A HIGH PERCENTAGE
OF GERMAN DEFENSE SPENDING GOES FOR PROCUREMENT
OF MILITARY HARDWARE, AND THAT THE BUNDESWEHR IS
A FIGHTING FORCE OF EXCEPTIONAL QUALITY.

PSN:046603

DTG:191726

TOR:0781757

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

13. WE SHOULD OF COURSE GIVE THE GERMANS FULL CREDIT FOR THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH THEY MAKE, AND WE WILL WISH TO AVOID A CONFRONTATIONAL ATMOSPHERE WITH THE GERMANS ON THE ISSUE OF DEFENSE SPENDING. HOWEVER, IF WASHINGTON IS TO PRESS IMPORTANTLY FOR AN INCREASED GERMAN DEFENSE EFFORT, WE BELIEVE THE TIME TO START DOING SO IS NOW -- DURING APEL'S FIRST VISIT TO WASHINGTON FOLLOWING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE.
WOESSNER

BT

SENSITIVE

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: THOMSON, EURE, EURW, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #89

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

IMMEDIATE
DE RUPHOL #5328 0761509
O 171508Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5626

~~S E C R E T~~ BONN 05328

NOPIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 03/17/01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, PL, UR, CSCE, GW
SUBJECT: WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN AND AROUND POLAND --
- DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS
REFS: (A) STATE 66167
(B) MOSCOW 3572 AND 3609
(C) BONN 5069

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DRAWING ON MOSCOW 3572, ON MARCH 18 WE CALLED ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIRECTOR BRAEUTIGAM TO FOLLOW UP OUR INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH HIM (REF C). BRAEUTIGAM SAID THAT IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S VIEW THE WARSAW PACT NORMALLY PLANS MILITARY STAFF EXERCISES WHICH INVOLVE FEWER THAN 25 THOUSAND TROOPS. BECAUSE OF ITS DOUBTS THAT THE INVOLVEMENT WILL EXCEED THAT NUMBER, STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL HAS DECIDED THE FRG SHOULD WAIT FOR THE TIME BEING TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPS.

3. BRAEUTIGAM STRESSED THAT THE FRG DOES NOT RULE OUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE LETTER OR SPIRIT OF CSCE, BUT HE SAID BONN WANTS FURTHER EVIDENCE BEFORE

BONN 5328

DTG: 171508Z MAR 81 SSN: 043458
TOR: 076/1713Z

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACTING. COMMENTING ON THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE U.S. DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW (REF B), BRAEUTIGAM OBSERVED THAT AS FAR AS CSCE REQUIREMENTS ARE CONCERNED THE KEY QUESTION IS NOT THE TYPE OF EXERCISE BUT THE NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED.

4. ON NEXT STEPS, BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FRG SUPPORTS THE SUGGESTION OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN NATO, PREFERABLY BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL WHICH MEETS WEDNESDAY. BRAEUTIGAM SAID THIS MIGHT BE TOO EARLY FOR A FULLY INFORMED DISCUSSION, BUT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO BEGIN EXCHANGING VIEWS THEN.

5. ACTION AT MADRID MUST DEPEND ON ADDITIONAL FACTS. IN PARTICULAR, BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD ADVOCATE A CLOSE STUDY OF THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT BEFORE THE ISSUE IS RAISED AT THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE.

6. COMMENT: BRAEUTIGAM'S STATEMENT REPRESENTS AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO OUR INITIAL DEMARCHE (REF C). HE DID NOT EVINCE ANY LACK OF CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPENDING WARSAW PACT EXERCISES. NOR DID HE SUGGEST FRG RELUCTANCE TO ACT IF NECESSARY. HE NEVERTHELESS MADE CLEAR THAT BONN FEELS A NEED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE EXERCISES BEFORE MAKING AN ISSUE OF THE MATTER, PARTICULARLY IN THE CSCE CONTEXT. WOESSNER

BONN 6328

DTG:171508Z MAR 81 NSN: 043458
TOR: 076/1713Z

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB: ASIMET, FEUR, WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #5075/01 0721653
O 131646Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS K97-030#91

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/27/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5502

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0600
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 0230
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0408
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0246
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY 0186
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0352
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 1106
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 0380
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 0200
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0515
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0725
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0179
AMEMBASSY SALISBURY PRIORITY 0065
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4119
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05075
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 03/13/01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, SF, WA, GW
SUBJECT: FRG VIEWS ON SOUTH AFRICA
REFS: (A) USUN 641, (B) USUN 763

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA FEELS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

BONN 5075

DTG: 131646Z MAR 81 58N: 030775
TOR: 072/1709Z

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD FIND IT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO RESIST U.S. PRESSURE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SC 435. ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION, THE OFFICIAL SAID IT WOULD BE A "DISASTER" IF MUDGE WAS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON AS HEAD OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THE FRONT-LINE STATES ARE "DESPERATELY" LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF ACTIVITY FROM THE CONTACT FIVE, AND AGREED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO AVOID AN ALGIERS MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (REF B). THE OFFICIAL SAID HE FELT THE U.S. SHOULD DEVELOP "PRAGMATIC" LINKS TO SWAPO. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD PROTESTED TO THE FRG SG VON WECHMAR'S HANDLING OF THE CREDENTIALS VOTE (REF A). END SUMMARY.

3. BECAUSE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S. HAS BECOME SUCH AN IMPORTANT THEME IN SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR PRETORIA TO RESIST U.S. PRESSURE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SC 435. THE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA TOLD EMBOFF MARCH 12.

4. THE OFFICIAL SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND SECRETARY HAIG HAD DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO THE DISCUSSION OF AFRICAN QUESTIONS. HE THEN SAID HE HOPED WASHINGTON UNDERSTOOD THE "DISASTROUS" EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON U.S. CREDIBILITY WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES IF MUDGE WERE TO BE RECEIVED THERE IN HIS CAPACITY OF CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -- SOMETHING HE MIGHT WELL PRESS FOR. (THE OFFICIAL DID NOT SEE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IF MUDGE WAS RECEIVED AS HEAD OF THE DTA. HE REMINDED EMBOFF THAT GENSCHER HAD BEEN WILLING TO RECEIVE MUDGE IN THAT CAPACITY WHEN MUDGE WAS IN BONN, BUT MUDGE'S INSISTENCE ON BEING RECEIVED AS HEAD OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WAS ONE REASON WHY NO MEETING TOOK PLACE.)

5. THE OFFICIAL SAID HE BELIEVED THE FRONT-LINE STATES ARE STILL EAGER TO PREVENT SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. BUT, HE ADDED, THEY ARE "DESPERATELY" LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF ACTIVITY BY THE CONTACT FIVE.

BONN 5075

DTG:131646Z MAR 81 58NI 030775
TOR: 072/1709Z

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITHOUT SUCH SIGNS, HE SAID, IT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO OPPOSE SANCTIONS. THE OFFICIAL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE AFRICANS SAW ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN CONTINUING THEIR OWN TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AND CALLING FOR A WESTERN BOYCOTT, AS THEY CANNOT DO WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE, BUT KNOW THE WEST COULD.

6. THE OFFICIAL AGREED THAT ANY ALGIERS SC MEETING (REF B) WOULD BE VERY HARMFUL, AND THAT THE FIVE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HEAD IT OFF. THE INEVITABLE VOTING AND VETOING AT SUCH A MEETING OF RADICAL RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA COULD ONLY POISON THE CLIMATE FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

7. THE OFFICIAL ADDED THAT HE FELT IT WAS TIME FOR THE U.S. TO DEVELOP "PRAGMATIC" LINKS TO SWAPO. SINCE SWAPO IS GOING TO REMAIN AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN NAMIBIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD TRY TO MODERATE IT AND WORK WITH IT.

8. FINALLY, THE OFFICIAL CONFIRMED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD PROTESTED TO THE FRG THE WAY IN WHICH VON WECHMAR HAD HANDLED THE VOTE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S

BONN 5075

DTG:131646Z MAR 81
TOR: 072/1709Z

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~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: THOMSON, EURE, EEUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #5069 0721637
O 131636Z MAR 81 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6559

~~S E C R E T~~ BONN 05069

NODIS
E.O. 12065; RDS-1 3/13/10 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, PL, CZ, UR, GW, GE
SUBJ: WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN AND AROUND POLAND
REF: STATE 63758

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BECAUSE POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH WAS UNAVAILABLE (HE IS CLEARING HIS DESK FOR IMMINENT DEPARTURE AS AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO), EMBASSY OFFICER (ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR) ON MARCH 13 MADE DEMARCHE PER REFTEL TO BLECH'S DEPUTY FOR SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BRAEUTIGAM. BESIDES REHEARSING POINTS IN REFTEL, EMBOFF OBSERVED THAT CONDUCTING TROOP MANEUVERS IN VIOLATION OF CSCE WOULD CAST DOUBT ON SOVIET VERACITY AND RELIABILITY AT A TIME WHEN THE WHOLE QUESTION OF SOVIET TRUSTWORTHINESS IN ADHERING TO AGREEMENTS LIKE BALT IS A SERIOUS ISSUE IN THE U.S.

3. BRAEUTIGAM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPENDING MANEUVERS WAS THE SAME HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THE UNKNOWN'S STILL EXTANT AND SUGGESTED THE WEST SHOULD HAVE CLARIFICATION BEFORE IT ACTS. BRAEUTIGAM NEVERTHELESS PROMISED TO CONSIDER OUR SUGGESTION THAT THE FRG ALSO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO

BONN 05069

DTG: 131636Z MAR 81 ESN: 038808
TOR: 072/1658Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

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NLS F97-030 #92

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SOVIETS TO REINFORCE THE ONE THE U.S. INTENDS TO MAKE. HE SUGGESTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER COULD RAISE THE ISSUE BOTH IN WARSAW AND MOSCOW WHEN HE VISITS THESE CAPITALS IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. IN ANY CASE, BRAEUTIGAM PROMISED TO RAISE OUR PROPOSAL WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.

4. BRAEUTIGAM SAID IT WOULD BE "PREMATURE" TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION NOW IN NATO OR TO RAISE IT AT MADRID. IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID THE FOLLOWING DETAILS WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THE WEST COULD DECIDE HOW TO REACT:

- THE ACTUAL NUMBERS OF WARSAW PACT TROOPS THAT WILL TAKE PART,
- THEIR ALLOCATION BY COUNTRY AND BY AREA OF MANEUVER, AND
- THE WAY THE SOVIETS WOULD PORTRAY THE EXERCISES PUBLICLY, IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THEY WOULD USE THEM TO PRESSURE THE POLES. (BRAEUTIGAM OBSERVED THAT EVEN "NORMAL EXERCISES" MIGHT BE USED IN A THREATENING WAY, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE VERY DISTURBING.)

5. ONCE THE SITUATION IS CLARIFIED, BRAEUTIGAM SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AMONG THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AT NATO. THIS COULD BE DONE DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE MANEUVERS. IF EVIDENCE OF A CSCE VIOLATION EMERGED, THEN THERE WOULD BE STRONG GROUNDS FOR RAISING THE ISSUE AT MADRID.

6. BRAEUTIGAM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSULTATION AND PROMISED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.
WOESSNER

BONN 5069

DTG:131636Z MAR 81 SSN: 038808
TOR: 072/1858Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/06/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL: VP FILE
EOB: ARÄ, EUR, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUPHOL #4375 0631718
O 041717Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECRETATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5289

~~SECRET~~ BONN 04375NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER FROM CHARGE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 03/04/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, GW, ES
SUBJECT: WISCHNEWSKI PROPOSAL ON EL SALVADOR
REF: STATE 54414

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. CHARGE WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT WISCHNEWSKI WHO IS OUT OF TOWN. EMBASSY OFFICER THEREFORE CALLED ON SPD FOREIGN DIRECTOR, DINGELS ON MARCH 4 AND CONVEYED MESSAGE IN REFTEL. OFFICER LEFT NON-PAPER AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE MESSAGE CAME FROM AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER WHO HAD CONSULTED WITH THE SECRETARY ON WISCHNEWSKI'S PROPOSAL FOR A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN UNGO AND A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE.

3. DINGELS RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS GENERALLY WHAT HE PERSONALLY EXPECTED BUT THAT HE HAD "HOPED FOR MORE." DINGELS PROMISED TO GET THE MESSAGE TO WISCHNEWSKI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
WOESSNER

PSN: 025920

TOR: 063/19101Z

BTGI 041717Z MAR 81

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #94BY WJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

DATE 03/06/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

FILE
EOB:ZEUR,WEUR,DEPOL

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHOL #4327 0631525
R 041522Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5278

~~SECRET~~ BONN 04327

NOPI
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/4/87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, GW
SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO SEEK FUNDING FOR CW
- MODERNIZATION

REF: STATE 53593
IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, WHO IS IN INDIA,
LETTER CONTAINED REPTEL WAS DELIVERED TO THEODOR WALLAU,
CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE. WALLAU MADE NO
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT BUT DID EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE
TIMELY INFORMATION. WOESSNER

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

PSN: 025946

TOR: 063/19122Z

RTG: 041522Z MAR 81

~~***** F I D E N T I A L *****~~

PN: 019758

TOP: 68/1619Z

RTG: 271757Z FEB 81

MESSAGE

MESSAGE (CONTI UFG):

DATE 03/02/91

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
ROBIEURE, EUR, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUPHOL #4120/01 0501759
O 271707Z FEB 81
PM AMEMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E97-030#96

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0214

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN 3342
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4537
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1225
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6510
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 04120
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/27/01 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, EENT, XH, UR, GW, US
SUBJ: GENSCHER VISIT: POSSIBLE FRG-U.S. DIFFERENCES
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
REF: A) BONN 2022

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BACKGROUND. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE FRG WOULD SUBORDINATE ITS LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN DETENTE WITH THE EAST TO ITS PRIMARY SECURITY CONCERNS IF A CRUNCH COMES. SHORT OF AN OBVIOUS HOSTILE POSTURE BY THE SOVIETS TOWARD EUROPE AND THE FRG, HOWEVER (AND PERCEPTIONS MAY VARY AS TO WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE SUCH A TURN), IT IS IN THE FRG'S INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MANEUVERING ROOM IN EUROPE AS POSSIBLE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CONTRIBUTING WHERE IT CAN TO CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM ELSEWHERE. ONLY WITH SUFFICIENT MANEUVERING ROOM CAN BONN PURSUE SUCCESSFULLY ITS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OTHER INTERESTS IN EUROPE, BOTH EAST AND WEST, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. KNOWING THIS, THE SOVIETS TRY TO EMPHASIZE WHERE POSSIBLE AN OSTENSIBLE POLICY OF CONCILIATION, ESPECIALLY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS REFLECTED SUCH A TENDENCY. THE FRG LEADERSHIP GENERALLY SEEKS TO RESIST OBVIOUS SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING EFFORTS, BUT THERE ARE POLITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE FRG THAT ARE SUSCEPTIBLE. MOREOVER, BONN'S OBJECTIVE NEED FOR MANEUVERABILITY CAN PROMPT IT TOWARD PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY NUANCES IN RELATIONS WITH THE EAST THAT DIFFER FROM U.S. AND WESTERN INTERESTS AS WE PERCEIVE THEM. AREAS WHERE DIFFERENCES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PAST YEAR INCLUDE:

- THE INITIAL ARGUMENT OF SOME FRG POLITICIANS AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THAT DETENTE IS "DIVISIBLE" AND A CONFLICT ELSEWHERE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO JEOPARDIZE EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE. THE CONCEPT FELL SHORT OF OFFICIAL SANCTION, BUT IT SERVED FOR A TIME -- PERHAPS UNTIL POLAND -- TO RALLY SOME LEFT-WING CRITICS OF THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT.
- BONN'S DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE WHILE WE SEE A COOLING OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AFTER AFGHANISTAN AS INEVITABLE,
- OUR INSISTENCE ON REDUCTION OF TRADE RELATIONS, WHILE BONN SEEKS TO PRESERVE A MODICUM OF TRADE, ARGUING THAT "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA", I.E., THAT COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE FULFILLED,
- BONN'S DESIRE TO KEEP EAST-WEST FRICTIONS OUT OF THE WEST'S APPROACH TO THE THIRD WORLD.

3. ---FRG POSITION

THE FRG DESIRES CLEAR, CALCULABLE, AND FIRM U.S. LEADERSHIP IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT IT ALSO EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BILATERALLY AND WITHIN NATO, TO ENSURE THAT FRG AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS GET DUE CONSIDERATION. BONN WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS ITS OWN SUPPORT OF NATO AND ITS OWN HISTORY OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS TO SHOW THAT IT IS WILLING TO "DO ITS SHARE." OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, IT WILL INSIST ON MAKING ONLY A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC (NON-MILITARY) CONTRIBUTION, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HELP

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

BOLSTER KEY STATES LIKE PAKISTAN OR THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES.

4. DURING TIMES OF TENSION, THE FRG WILL INSIST THAT THE "SUPERPOWERS" CONTINUE TO "JAW, JAW," AND IT WILL LOOK FOR WAYS TO HELP MAINTAIN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AS A MIDDLE POWER BUT WITHOUT APPEARING TO ACT AS "BROKER" OR TO UNDERCUT THE U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP POSITION. MOREOVER, IT WILL CONTINUALLY STRESS THE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A UNITED STATES AND WESTERN "GENERAL CONCEPT" OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND IN DEVELOPING

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AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4538

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AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH

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A SYSTEM OF WESTERN BURDEN-SHARING. IT WILL RESIST ANY
NOTION OF "PUNISHING" THE SOVIETS.

5. SUGGESTED U.S. POSITION

WE SHOULD BE OPEN TO FRG VIEWS AND SENSITIVE TO BONN'S PARTICULAR CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY ITS SENSE OF SPECIAL VULNERABILITY TO THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF BERLIN AND THE DIVISION OF GERMANY. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN WE MUST INSIST ON OUR PARAMOUNT INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GLOBAL POWER. WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT IN TIMES OF TENSION TO PERSUADE THE FRG AND THE GERMAN POPULACE THAT TOO NARROW A VIEW OF WESTERN INTERESTS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE COULD ULTIMATELY IMPINGE DIRECTLY ON GERMAN SECURITY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN EUROPE BY UNDERMINING THE OVERALL U.S. POSITION. ON THE SAME GROUNDS WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A STRONG FRG CONTRIBUTION TO A COMMON WESTERN EFFORT VIS-A-VIS THE USSR, WHETHER IN NATO OR IN POLITICAL-ECONOMIC POLICIES ELSEWHERE. TO UNDERPIN THIS APPROACH, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO ESTABLISH THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH THE FRG AND OUR OTHER ALLIES A COMMON SET OF PRINCIPLES IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND A SYSTEM OF EFFECTIVE CONSULTATIONS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 04107
E.O. 12065: GDS 02-27-87 (VAN HEUVEN, MARTEN) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, GW
SUBJECT: GENSCHER VISIT; FRG INTERNAL SITUATION
REF: BONN 2822

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. THE OCTOBER 1980 BUNDESTAG ELECTION REAFFIRMED THE SCHMIDT-GENSCHER COALITION, BUT ALSO STRENGTHENED ITS OUTER WINGS - THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD) LEFT WING AND THE FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (FDP) RIGHT WING. EXTERNAL FACTORS HAVE UNDERMINED OSTPOLITIK. ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES ARE FRUSTRATING SOCIAL REFORM HOPES, THUS WEAKENING THE SPD'S CLAIM TO POWER. THE PRINCIPAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES ARE ENERGY POLICY, LABOR-MANAGEMENT CODETERMINATION AND THOSE ISSUES DERIVING FROM THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. DISSENTION HAS GROWN WITHIN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY - ON THE LEFT WING, BUT ALSO IN OTHER SECTORS, SUCH AS LABOR. THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF THE

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BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BERLIN SPD/FDP GOVERNMENT IN JANUARY, WITH NEW ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR MAY, HAS SHAKEN THE SPD/FDP COALITION IN BONN. IN RECENT WEEKS, HOWEVER, THE SPD HAS MADE MAJOR EFFORTS WITH SOME SUCCESS TO PULL ITSELF TOGETHER. AS BEFORE THE OCTOBER 1980 ELECTIONS, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IS STILL MORE POPULAR WITH THE GERMAN POPULATION AT LARGE THAN WITH ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN PARTY. HIS POSITION REMAINS STRONG. THE FDP, LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNING COALITION. THE REGROUPING OF SPD RANKS IN RECENT WEEKS HAS BROUGHT A REAFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS TO POLICIES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES, NOTABLY THE NATO DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL.
END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND FDP CHAIRMAN HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER PREPARES TO VISIT WASHINGTON.

4. THE OCTOBER 1980 BUNDESTAG GENERAL ELECTION PITTED THE SCHMIDT-GENSCHER GOVERNING TEAM AGAINST THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION LED BY FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS. DESPITE THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE OPPOSITION CHANCELLOR CANDIDATE IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY, THE ELECTION RESULT LEFT THE SPD ALMOST EXACTLY WHERE IT HAD BEEN, BUT SHARPLY STRENGTHENED THE FDP. GENSCHER'S STRATEGY OF OPPOSING BOTH "AN SPD STATE" AND FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS RESULTED IN THE BEST FDP SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE (10.6 PERCENT) SINCE 1961. THE RIGHT WING OF GENSCHER'S PARTY, LED BY ECONOMICS MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF, WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG. THE ELECTION ALSO RESULTED IN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SPD "LEFTISTS". WHILE THE COALITION WAS THUS ABLE TO ACHIEVE A VERY COMFORTABLE MARGIN IN THE BUNDESTAG, THE STAGE WAS SET FOR GREATER INTERNAL DISSENSION.

5. EXTERNAL STRESSES. FOLLOWING AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET THREAT TO POLAND AND EAST GERMAN "DELIMITATION"

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MEASURES, FRG OSTPOLITIK - THE GREAT OVERARCHING AND UNIFYING INTEREST OF THE SPD/FDP COALITION EVER SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN 1969 - HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY FROZEN. THE SECOND GREAT UNIFYING THEME FOR THE SPD, DOMESTIC SOCIAL REFORM, IS RUNNING INTO DIFFICULTIES OF SAPPING PRODUCTIVITY AND EVER RISING EXPENDITURES, PARTICULARLY IN THE CURRENT ECONOMY WITH RISING UNEMPLOYMENT AND SLIGHTLY RISING INFLATION.

6. THE DOMESTIC ISSUES. THE DIFFICULT STATE OF THE WEST GERMAN ECONOMY HAS ITSELF SPAWNED DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION. CLASSICAL PUMP-PRIMING, HOWEVER, IS REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CURRENT SITUATION AS NOT APPROPRIATE. AS UNEMPLOYMENT HAS RISEN ABOVE ONE MILLION, THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS UNWILLING TO ACCEDE TO DEMANDS FOR JOB PROGRAMS. A SECOND ISSUE DIVIDING THE GOVERNING SPD FROM ITS TRADITIONAL LABOR UNION SUPPORT HAS BEEN LABOR-MANAGEMENT CO-DETERMINATION. BECAUSE OF DETERMINED FDP HOSTILITY TO MEASURES DESIGNED TO REVISE CODETERMINATION LAWS

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IN THE COAL-STEEL INDUSTRY, THE SPD LEADERSHIP, TO PRESERVE THE COALITION, HAS NOT PUSHED ITS OWN PREFERENCES FOR A STRONGER LAW, THUS FURTHER ALIENATING LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP. UNDERLYING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION GENERALLY IS A LACK OF IDEAS FOR FURTHER DOMESTIC REFORM.

7. ENERGY POLICY. ALL SEGMENTS OF THE SPD FAVOR FULL UTILIZATION OF DOMESTIC COAL AND IMPROVED ENERGY CONSERVATION AND AT THE SAME TIME DECREASING DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL. DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF ENERGY IS ALSO DESIRED BUT IS VERY MUCH A MATTER FOR THE DISTANT FUTURE. THE PARTY IS BADLY SPLIT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE OFFICIAL POLICY CALLS FOR ITS USE AS A "BRIDGE" TO TIDE GERMANY OVER UNTIL ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES BECOME AVAILABLE, BUT THIS AMBIGUOUS FORMULA HAS CONCEALED SHARP DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE PARTY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO TEMPORIZE ON THIS ISSUE MAY NOW BE ERODING. THE CONFRONTATION OVER THE NUCLEAR PLANT AT BROKDORF, NEAR HAMBURG, HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SPLIT IN THE PARTY, PITTING AS IT HAS THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MAJORITY IN THE NORTHERN STATE PARTIES AGAINST THE SPD LEADERSHIP IN BONN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. THE BERLIN CRISIS. IN JANUARY, BECAUSE OF A FINANCIAL SCANDAL INVOLVING SPD (AND FDP) CITY OFFICIALS AND A CONSULTING FIRM (THE "GARSKI AFFAIR"), MAYOR STOBBE SUDDENLY FOUND THAT HE HAD LOST MAJORITY SUPPORT IN THE CITY PARLIAMENT. BERLIN IS ONE OF ONLY TWO STATES PRESENTLY GOVERNED BY AN SPD/FDP COALITION (THE OTHER BEING HESSE). THE BERLIN SITUATION COULD THEREFORE HAVE MAJOR REPERCUSSIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THE BONN SPD DEPLOYED ONE OF ITS ABLEST LEADING FIGURES, MINISTER OF JUSTICE HANS-JOACHIM VOGEL, TO TAKE OVER IN BERLIN AND LEAD THE SPD THROUGH A NEW CITY ELECTION, SCHEDULED FOR MAY 10. ALTHOUGH THE BERLIN ELECTION WILL TURN MOSTLY ON LOCAL ISSUES, IT WILL BE READ AS A MAJOR OFF-YEAR INDICATION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC MOOD THROUGHOUT THE FRG. AS OF THIS TIME, THE ODDS ARE AGAINST A RETURN TO POWER IN BERLIN OF THE SPD/FDP COALITION.

9. THE SPD ERUPTED IN A SPATE OF VITRIOLIC INTERNAL DISSENSION AS THE NEW BUNDESTAG GOT DOWN TO WORK IN JANUARY. A GROUP OF TWENTY-FOUR LEFTIST DEPUTIES PROPOSED THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET BE REDUCED BY ONE BILLION MARKS. THE SPD LEFT ALSO CRITICIZED A PERCEIVED LACK OF INTEREST IN WASHINGTON IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE LEFT HAS BEEN DECISIVELY REBUFFED ON BOTH ISSUES: IN A PARTY BUNDESTAG CAUCUS VOTE, ONLY 37 OF THE 218 SPD DEPUTIES SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE DEFENSE BUDGET. TWO WEEKS LATER, ON FEBRUARY 10, THE PARTY CAUCUS STRONGLY ENDORSED A STATEMENT BY THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE REAFFIRMING THE SPD COMMITMENT TO THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO TNF DECISION, WITH OVER 200 VOTES IN FAVOR, ELEVEN ABSTENTIONS, AND NONE OPPOSED. (SOVIET STATEMENTS AND OTHER TACTICS WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT LEFT WING SENTIMENTS IN THE SPD IN A LONG RANGE EFFORT TO CREATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON.)

10. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND THE SPD PARTY LEADERSHIP HAVE THUS IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN ABLE TO REASSERT THEIR LEADERSHIP AND SNAP THE DISSIDENTS INTO LINE. OTHER ISSUES DIVIDING THE PARTY ESTABLISHMENT, HOWEVER,

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REMAIN OPEN, SUCH AS PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA.

11. IN THIS SITUATION, HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER AND THE FDP HAVE BEEN PLAYING A CAUTIOUS GAME. GENSCHER IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE SPD/FDP COALITION, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT ALLOWS HIM AND HIS PARTY TO EXERCISE FAR MORE INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY THAN THE FDP HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN CAPABLE OF EXERTING WHEN ALLIED WITH THE CDU/CSU. OBSERVERS GENERALLY BELIEVE THAT GENSCHER WOULD CONSIDER LEAVING THE COALITION, THUS BRINGING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT, ONLY IF AND WHEN IT APPEARS THAT SCHMIDT HAS LOST CONTROL OF THE SPD. FOR NOW, THAT IS NOT IMMINENT AND DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY. WDESSNER

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