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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File  
**Folder Title:** Germany FRG [Federal Republic of  
Germany] (01/20/1981-06/30/1981) (1 of 5)  
**Box Number:** RAC Box 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIATE, NSC: Records  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (1)  
Box 91325-14

**Date:** 12/16/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	291642Z JUN 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #58	6/29/81	P1/F1
2. cable	191334Z JUN 81, 5p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #59	6/19/81	P1/F1
3. cable	151501Z JUN 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #60	6/15/81	P1/F1
4. cable	101100Z JUN 81, 1p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #61	6/10/81	P1/F1
5. cable	080835Z JUN 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #62	6/8/81	P1/F1
6. cable	051709Z JUN 81, 4p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #63	6/5/81	P1/F1
7. cable	041714Z JUN 81, 6p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #64	6/4/81	P1/F1
8. cable	011455Z JUN 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #65	6/1/81	P1/F1
9. cable	271613Z MAY 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #66	5/27/81	P1/F1
10. cable	262103Z MAY 81, 7p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #67	5/26/81	P1/F1
11. cable	221652Z MAY 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #68	5/22/81	P1/F1
12. cable	221209Z MAY 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #69	5/22/81	P1/F1
13. cable	181628Z MAY 81, 2p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #70	5/18/81	P1/F1
14. cable	141630Z MAY 81, 6p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #71	5/14/81	P1/F1
15. cable	121451Z MAY 81, 3p D 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #72	5/12/81	P1/F1
16. cable	301322Z APR 81, 3p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #73	4/30/81	P1/F1
17. cable	241625Z APR 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #74	4/24/81	P1/F1
18. cable	241455Z APR 81, 1p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #75	4/24/81	P1/F1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP  
EOB: BERTA, PIPES  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #9162 1200554  
P 080512Z MAY 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5737

UNCLAS STATE 119162  
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, GW

SUBJECT: LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM CHAIRMAN KOHL - SPACE  
SHUTTLE (S/S 8112589)

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
HELMUT KOHL.

BEGIN TEXT: SEHR GEEHRTER HERR PRAESIDENT ZUR GLUECKLICHEN  
RUECKKEHR DER RAUMFAEHRE "COLUMBIA" BEGLUECKWUENSCHEN ICH  
SIE UND IHR LAND SEHR HERZLICHE DIESE GROSSARTIGE  
LEISTUNG IST DAS ERGEBNIS MENSCHLICHER KREATIVITAET UND  
TECHNISCHER PERFEKTION DAS AN DIE GROSSE TRADITION  
AMERIKANISCHER PIONIERTATEN IN WISSENSCHAFT UND TECHNIK  
ANKNUEPFT UND EIN NEUES KAPITEL IN DER ERSCHLIESSUNG DES  
WELTRAUMES. EROEFFENT UNSERE BEWUNDERUNG GILT DEM MUT DER  
ASTRONAUTEN EBENSO WIE DER PHANTASIE UND UNBEIRRBARKEIT  
DER WISSENSCHAFTLER UND TECHNIKER IN DER NASA MIT  
FREUNDLICHEN GRUESSEN, HELMUT KOHL, VORSITZENDER DER CDU  
DEUTSCHLANDS. END TEXT.

2. EMBASSY REQUESTED TO REPLY DIRECTLY TO THE CHAIRMAN

SECSTATE WASHDC 9162

DTG: 080512Z MAY 81 PSN: 054742  
TOR: 120/0556Z

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH FOLLOWING TEXT:

BEGIN TEXT: WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR MESSAGE OF

CONGRATULATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SUCCESSFUL  
COMPLETION OF THE COLUMBIA MISSION AND LOOK FORWARD TO  
CONTINUING COOPERATIVE EFFORTS BETWEEN THE UNITED  
STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON THIS  
IMPORTANT EFFORT. END TEXT. HAIG

SELSTATE WASHDC 9162

DTG:080512Z MAY 81 PSN: 054742  
TOR: 120/0550Z

SITZKI R

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 06/29/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTIONS:

SIT:  
EOB: PIPES, KENT, STEARMAN  
WHSR COMMENTS:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUPHOL #1788/01 1701937  
O 191334Z JUN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7998

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 11/88

NO DIS  
E.O. 120651 RDS-3 6/19/01 (HOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) UR-M  
TAGS: BGG, PGOV, NATO, UR, PL, BZ, GC  
SUBJ: ANNEX TO BONN GROUP POLISH CONTINGENCY STUDY  
REF: (A) BONN 6211, (B) STATE 79408

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE BONN GROUP AGREED AD REF JUNE 16 TO THE FRENCH-INSPIRED ANNEX TO THE BERLIN/POLAND CONTINGENCY STUDY (REF A). MINOR CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE TEXT AND A CLOSER COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH VERSIONS IS IN PROCESS. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE ON REVISED ANNEX TEXT. END SUMMARY.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#59

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/01

3. THE BERLIN/POLAND CONTINGENCY STUDY ANNEX INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES WAS AGREED AD REF BY THE BONN GROUP JUNE 16:

- I. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE
  - -- COLUMN 1 (TYPE OF SOVIET OR EAST GERMAN ACTIONS): NO CHANGES.
  - -- COLUMN 2 (TYPE OF RESPONSE BY WEST):
    - A) DELETE THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST PARA-

BUNN 1788

DTG: 191334Z JUN 81 PSNI 051854  
TOR: 17071418Z

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- GRAPH IN THE COLUMN ("THE PLANS MAKE...")
- AND MOVE THE REMAINING SENTENCE ("PROPOSED REACTIONS WOULD BE...") UP TO IA.
- B) INSERT IN COLUMN 2, IB, "SAME AS IA."
- COLUMN 3 (REFERENCE DOCUMENTS):
- A) FOR IA INSERT: "STANDARD LANGUAGE EXISTS FOR MUST EVENTUALITIES."
- B) FOR IB INSERT: "SAME AS IA."

II. ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE GERMANS:

- COLUMN 1:
  - A) J AND B: NO CHANGE.
  - B) C AMEND TO READ: "DELAYS IN HIGHWAY, RAIL OR CANAL TRANSIT MOVEMENTS."
  - C) D: NO CHANGE.
- COLUMN 2:
  - A) ADD A LAST SENTENCE TO FIRST PARAGRAPH ("PROTESTS, AS NECESSARY..."): "POSSIBLE LATER ALLIED PROTESTS IN SUPPORT."
  - B) DELETE THIRD PARAGRAPH IN COLUMN "INSTANCES BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION..." AND SUBSTITUTE: "COMPLAINT TO TRANSIT COMMISSION AS NECESSARY. POSSIBLE LATER ALLIED PROTESTS IN SUPPORT IF THE MEASURES ARE FURTHER INTENSIFIED."
  - C) AMEND FOURTH PARAGRAPH TO READ: "PROTESTS BY GERMANY, SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES."

III. ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ALLIES: NO CHANGES IN EXISTING PARAGRAPHS BUT ADD THE FOLLOWING FOOTNOTE AS A SEPARATE ITEM AT THE END OF THE SECTION: "QPPMM (QUIET PRELIMINARY AND PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY MEASURES, 22 FEBRUARY 1980) IS ALSO RELEVANT."

IV. ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH THE ALLIES AND THE GERMANS:

- COLUMN 1: NO CHANGE.
- COLUMN 2: IN BOTH PARAGRAPHS, "WEST GERMANY" SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ "THE GDR" TO CORRECT A TRANSLATIONAL ERROR.

4. AS CUSTOMARY ON THIS SUBJECT, DISCUSSION AT THE JUNE 16 BUNN GROUP MEETING TOOK PLACE IN RESTRICTED SESSION.

~~\*\*\*\*\* E C K E \*\*\*\*\*~~

DTG: 191304Z JUN 81 PSN: 001804  
UR: 1/0/1415Z

RUUN 1/88

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DATE 06/29/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

~~\*\*\*\*\* E C K E \*\*\*\*\*~~



SITZED H

~~\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 06/29/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUPHOL #1788/02 1701339  
O 191334Z JUN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7999

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 11788

NODIS  
AT PARIS' BEHEST, THE FRENCH REP HAD REQUESTED THE DISCUSSION, WHICH WENT QUICKLY AND WITHOUT DETAILED DEBATE. THE FRENCH REP REMINDED THAT THE ANNEX WAS AN EMBASSY DRAFT AND PARIS HAD NOT YET COMMENTED. THE U.S. REP MADE THE SAME OBSERVATION. IT WAS NOTED THAT SINCE THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH VERSIONS HAD NOT BEEN COMPARED, ADDITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE TO CORRECT LINGUISTIC DISCREPANCIES.

5. WE ARE POUCHING A CLEAN COPY OF THE ANNEX INCORPORATING THE CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH 5 TO THE DEPARTMENT (REGISTRATION NO. 8703830). ALSO ENCLOSED FOR INFORMATION IS A COPY OF THE GPPMM REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTE AT THE END OF SECTION III. THE REFERENCE IS INCLUDED AS A FOOTNOTE SINCE IT CONTAINS A BROAD VARIETY OF PRELIMINARY MEASURES TO BE CHOSEN AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE. AS SUCH, THE RESPONSES DO NOT CORRESPOND EXACTLY TO THE SPECIFIC MEASURES LISTED TO BE TAKEN BY THE EASTERN SIDE.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE ON REVISED TEXT.  
WOESSNER

BONN 1788

DTG: 191334Z JUN 81 PSN: 051850  
TOR: 17071410Z

~~\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*~~

~~\*\*\*\*\* E C R E \*\*\*\*\*~~

DTG: 191304Z JUN 81 PSN: 091800  
ORIG: 170/1419Z

BUNN 1/80

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PAGE 02

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DATE 06/29/81

~~\*\*\*\*\* E C R E \*\*\*\*\*~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3-4 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SIT/0 R

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 06/17/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP JP  
EOB: KEMP, PIPES  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #1100 1590000  
O 080000Z JUN 01 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE /741

~~SECRET~~ BONN 1100

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6-0-11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM) UR-M

TAGS: MUPS, MNUC, MILI, IS, IZ

SUBJECT: ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST IRAQI NUC FACILITIES

REF: STATE 148549

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SINCE THIS IS A GERMAN HOLIDAY, I CONTACTED STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN AT HOME AT ABOUT NINE A.M. LOCAL TIME AND PASSED TO HIM CONTENTS REPTEL. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR "EXTRAORDINARY ACTIONS". HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT THE IRAQIS WERE ON THE VERGE OF DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPON AT TUWAITHA.

3. I REPEATED THE CONTENTS OF REPTEL AND PROMISED TO KEEP HIM INFORMED IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED.  
WOESSNER

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#62

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

BUNN 1100

DTG: 080000Z JUN 01 PSN: 030307  
TOR: 15971003Z

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE577  
STU7602  
NO RUEHC  
OF RUFHNL #1018/01 1551716  
7NY CCCCC ZZH  
O 041714Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7681  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6161  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RHFAAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2019  
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7137  
7EN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART PDUCH  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 11018  
F.O. 12065: RDS-1 06/03/2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M  
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, GE  
SUBJECT: STOESSEL DEMARCHE: NEXT STEPS  
REF: (A) CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG DTG 021327Z JUNE 81 (NOTAL)  
(B) STATE 134224 DTG 221903Z MAY 81 (NOTAL)  
(C) BONN 9922 DTG 181631Z MAY 81 (NOTAL)  
(D) CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG DTG 081233Z MAY 81 (NOTAL)  
(E) BONN 9395 DTG 111651Z MAY 81 (NOTAL)  
(F) STATE 114823 DTG 050047Z APR 81 (NOTAL)  
(G) BONN 7485 DTG 101739Z APR 81 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. WE AGREE WITH THE DEPARTMENT THAT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO PROVIDE THE GERMANS WITH A PAPER SETTING FORTH OUR CURRENT APPROACH TO THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE. WE RECOMMEND THAT IT TAKE THE FORM OF A LETTER, EITHER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHANCELLOR OR FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.
3. IN OUR OPINION, THE LETTER SHOULD SUCCINCTLY SET FORTH A NUMBER OF MAJOR POINTS WHICH WE WOULD WANT THE GERMANS TO UNDERSTAND FULLY. WE BELIEVE THESE POINTS SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

SENSITIVE

NLS F97-030 #64

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(1) THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE IS NOT "OFFSET."

(2) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS MODIFIED ITS APPROACH TO THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE IN ORDER TO TAKE GERMAN CONCERNS AND BUDGETARY DIFFICULTIES INTO ACCOUNT. (PROVIDE HERE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S NEW APPROACH, WHICH INVOLVES MAJOR EMPHASIS ON THE USAREUR MASTER RESTATIONING PLAN (MRP) -- REFS C AND F). (FOR DEPARTMENT: ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD OF COURSE EMPHASIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN OFFSETTING OF MRP COSTS THROUGH REAL ESTATE EXCHANGES, WE SHOULD NOT MAKE THE FLAT STATEMENT, WHICH AMBASSADOR HERMES REQUESTED, THAT THE MRP -- AND SUBSEQUENT ITEMS OF THE DEMARCHE -- WILL COST THE GERMANS NOTHING. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE ENTIRE COST OF THE MRP WILL BE OFFSET BY REAL ESTATE EXCHANGES (REFS A AND D). SECOND, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT CERTAIN NEW GERMAN INFRASTRUCTURE (E.G., ACCESS ROADS) WILL BE REQUIRED AND THAT THE FUNDING WILL HAVE TO COME FROM GERMAN SOURCES. FINALLY, WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT ONE OF THE BASIC PURPOSES OF THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE IS TO OBTAIN AT LEAST SOME GERMAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ON U.S. FORCES ISSUES AS PART OF A NEW DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.)

(3) ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ADOPTED THIS MODIFIED APPROACH TO THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT REPLACED IT. THE ENTIRE STOESSEL DEMARCHE OF NOVEMBER 4, 1980 REMAINS VALID. EACH ITEM OF THE DEMARCHE REPRESENTS GENUINE AND IMPORTANT CONCERNS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON PROBLEMS WHICH WILL SIMPLY NOT GO AWAY. WE SEE THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ADDRESS U.S. FORCES ISSUES FOR YEARS TO COME.

(4) THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE MRP TO BE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE BECAUSE IT WOULD IMPROVE BOTH THE FORWARD DEFENSE OF GERMANY AND THE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF U.S. FORCES. IMPROVED FORWARD DEFENSE OF THE FRG HAS LONG BEEN, AFTER ALL, A SPECIFIC GERMAN DESIDERATUM. AS KEY U.S. LEGISLATORS HAVE MADE CLEAR, THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH OUR FORCES LIVE AND WORK IN GERMANY ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(5) SACFOR, GENERAL ALLEN, AND GENERAL KRÖESEN ALL  
CONSIDER THE MRP TO BE MILITARILY NECESSARY.  
(6) THE U.S. MRP IS NOT COMPARABLE TO THE NOW-SHELVED  
BT  
#1018  
NNNN



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE578  
STU7603  
NO RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #1018/02 1551718  
7NY CCCCC ZZH  
O 041714Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7682  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6162  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2020  
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7138  
7EN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH  
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 11018  
PLAN TO RESTATE THE BUNDESWEHR. U.S. FORCES  
ARE DEPLOYED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE OLD U.S.  
ZONE IN GERMANY, AND THIS PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT  
IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE MISSION OF U.S. FORCES  
TODAY.

(7) ONLY THE U.S. IS ENGAGED IN A CREATIVE  
REPOSITIONING PLAN FOR THE FORWARD DEFENSE OF  
GERMANY. THEREFORE, OUR REQUEST FOR GERMAN  
PARTICIPATION IN THE PRE-FINANCING OF THE MRP IS  
NOT COMPARABLE TO POSSIBLE REQUESTS FROM ANY OTHER  
SENDING STATES FOR THEIR FORCES IN GERMANY.

(8) WE WOULD NOT INTEND TO RENEGOTIATE THE NATO  
SOFA. (FOR DEPARTMENT: WE SHOULD NOT MAKE THE  
STATEMENT, SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR HERMES, THAT WE  
WILL ADHERE TO THE NATO SOFA. FIRST OF ALL, SUCH  
A STATEMENT IS UNNECESSARY, WOULD DO US NO GOOD,  
AND COULD BE CONSTRUED BY THE GERMANS AS TIGHTENING  
SOFA RESTRICTIONS UPON US AS REGARDS THE STOESSEL  
DEMARCHE. SECOND, IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT OUR  
REQUESTS UNDER THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE CAN BE MET  
WITHOUT SOME -- MUTUALLY AGREED UPON -- DEVIATION  
FROM THE SOFA. THE WORDING REGARDING THE SOFA IN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE LETTER TO THE GERMANS SHOULD BE VERY GENERAL; IT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW SOFA INTERPRETATIONS IN SPECIFIC INSTANCES OR THE "SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION OF PARLIAMENT TO USE MONEY FROM LAND SURRENDERED TO PAY FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION" TO WHICH HERR SODDEMANN OF THE FINANCE MINISTRY REFERRED DURING HIS MAY 6 CONVERSATION WITH LT. GEN. GROVES (REF C).)

(9) WE PROPOSE THAT A US-FRG INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HOLD INTENSIFIED DISCUSSIONS ON THE MRP. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD LEAD TO: (A) A CONCEPT FOR JOINT US-FRG PRE-FINANCING OF THE MRP WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS PRIOR TO THE NEXT BUDGET CYCLE; AND (B) THE ELABORATION OF AN MRP FUNCTIONAL MODEL WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO SENIOR POLITICAL LEVELS FOR APPROVAL.

COMMENT

4. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO PRESENT THE GERMANS WITH A "NEW DEMARCHE" OR WITH ANY DOCUMENT WHICH THE GERMANS MIGHT CONSTRUE AS REPLACING THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE OF NOVEMBER 4, 1980. A NEW DEMARCHE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR DISADVANTAGES:

-- IT WOULD LEAD TO GERMAN CONCERN ABOUT U.S. CONSISTENCY. THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE IS A PRIORITIZED, CONCEPTUAL PACKAGE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER A PERIOD OF MANY MONTHS, PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO GERMAN CONCERNS. WE HAVE BEEN TELLING THE GERMANS THAT WE SEE THE STOESSEL DEMARCHE AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ADDRESS U.S. FORCES ISSUES FOR YEARS TO COME.

-- SINCE THE "NEW DEMARCHE" WOULD PRESUMABLY BE PRESENTED TO GENSCHER, IT WOULD GIVE DEFENSE MINISTER APEL A NEW EXCUSE TO TAKE HIS DISTANCE FROM ALL ITFMS EXCEPT WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT. IF WE ARE TO MAKE HEADWAY WITH THE MRP, WE VERY MUCH NEED THE COOPERATION OF DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS, NOTABLY THOSE IN THE ACCOMMODATIONS DIVISION (EICHORN, KURTE, ET AL).

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- A "NEW DEMARCHE" WOULD GREATLY DECREASE THE  
LIKELIHOOD OF GERMAN ACTION ON THE LOWER PRIORITY  
ITEMS OF THE ORIGINAL STUESSEL DEMARCHE.  
END COMMENT.  
DRESSNER  
BT  
#1018  
FMNN

DATE 06/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

## WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIF: RVA NAN COL VP JP  
 EOB: PIPES, RENT  
 WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

## MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

## MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
 DE RUFHOL #0680 1521405  
 O 011450Z JUN 81 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE /509

~~SECRET~~ BONN 10680

NOVIS  
 FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE  
 E.O. 120651 RDS-4 6/17/81 (WUESSNER, WILLIAM M.) UK-M  
 TAGS: PEPN, PINT, PARM, NATO, GE, US  
 SUBJECT: GENSCHER CONCERNED ABOUT IMPACT OF MX DECISION  
 ON LRINF DEPLOYMENT

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER CALLED ME IN FIRST THING THIS MORNING (JUNE 1) TO DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS HE HAD HAD OVER THE TNF DEPLOYMENT QUESTION AT THE JUST-CONCLUDED FDP CONGRESS IN COLOGNE. GENSCHER SAID THE QUESTION OF LAND- VERSUS SEA-BASED TNF IN EUROPE HAD BEEN THE ONLY REALLY SERIOUS POINT AT ISSUE. A MOTION HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO "EXAMINE" THE QUESTION OF BASING TNF AT SEA. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION THE MX BASING CONTROVERSY IN THE U.S. PLAYED A BIG ROLE. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEFEAT THE MOTION ON GROUNDS THAT THE TNF BASING MODE HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY STUDIED WHEN THE NATO DECISION WAS MADE AND THAT AN EFFORT TO REOPEN IT NOW WOULD BRING INTO QUESTION THE WHOLE NATO "DOUBLE DECISION."

3. GENSCHER EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION ON MX BASING WOULD HAVE A "DEVASTATING" IMPACT IN THE FRG. IF ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS WERE VALID IN

BONN 0680

DTG: 011450Z JUN 81 PSN: 028131  
TOR: 152/1922Z

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\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*

NLS F97-030#65Y LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

DATE 06/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THINLY-POPULATED UTAH, HOW MUCH MORE VALID THEY WOULD BE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

4. I RESPONDED THAT THE MX WAS, OF COURSE, A DIFFERENT WEAPONS SYSTEM FROM INF, AND THE DISCUSSION ABOUT IT IN THE US WAS AN INTERNAL ONE. NONETHELESS, I ASSURED GENSCHER THAT YOU WERE WELL AWAKE OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE AND HAD MADE THEM CLEAR TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME OF THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT. I THANKED GENSCHER FOR HIS PRESENTATION, NOTING IT WAS GOOD TO KNOW HOW HE WAS HANDLING THE ISSUE WITH HIS OWN PARTY.

5. COMMENT. I REALIZE THAT SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER HAVE GONE OVER ALL THIS GROUND WITH YOU BEFORE. NONETHELESS BOTH MEN HAVE NOW PUBLICLY STAKED THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS ON SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO INF DECISION, AND BOTH REMAIN OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS THAT OUR HANDLING OF THE MX COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THEIR POSITIONS AT HOME. IT BEHOVES US TO KEEP THEM FULLY INFORMED AND IF POSSIBLE TO REASSURE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. DESPITE HIS HEAVY POLITICAL WEEKEND, GENSCHER WAS IN GOOD FORM AND REMARKABLY RELAXED AND CHEERFUL. HE ASKED ME TO GIVE YOU HIS WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. WUOSSNER

BUNN 0080

DTG: 011405Z JUN 81 PSN: 028101  
TOR: 152/1922Z

DATE 06/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB: PIPES, RENT, STEARMAN  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHUL #0400 1471013  
O 271013Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7400

~~SECRET~~ BONN 10400

NO13  
E.O. 12000: RDS-1 D-2/-91 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM) UR-M  
TAGS: NATO, PL, UR  
SUBJECT: (S) POLISH CONTINGENCY PLANNING: FURTHER  
ALLIED DISCUSSIONS  
REF: STATE 133499

1. (S) = ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND EXCHANGE VIEWS ON POLISH DEVELOPMENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A SPECIAL NAC DEVOTED TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING. A BROADER REVIEW OF ISSUES -- LESS CONTINGENCY PLANNING -- MIGHT BE INDICATED AS THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHES, BUT FOR NOW WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST TO STICK TO EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WITHIN THE REGULAR NATO VEHICLES FOR DISCUSSION. APART FROM THE REASONS CITED IN REFIL, PARAS 3 AND 4, WE BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE WELL KNOWN POSSIBILITIES OF LEAKS, CONVENING A NAC OR ANY SPECIAL MEETING COULD TEND TO HEAT UP THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE UNNECESSARILY. BECAUSE WE KNOW THE GERMANS ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ABOUT LEAKS AND SENDING THE WRONG SIGNALS, WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD NOT FAVOR A NAC AT THIS TIME. WE ALSO DOUBT THEY WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF HOLDING A SPECIAL MEETING FOR A BROADER REVIEW OF THE SITUATION EVEN IF CONTINGENCY PLANNING WERE NOT ON THE AGENDA. THIS RELUCTANCE COULD DISAPPEAR, HOWEVER, IF

BUNN 0460

DTG: 271013Z MAY 81 PSN: 022147  
TOR: 14771832Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE POLISH SITUATION BECOMES MORE CRITICAL.

3. THE SITUATION IN POLAND DOES SEEM TO BE GROWING MORE WORRISOME. WHILE FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAS ABATED, THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS TROUBLED BY THE DESPERATE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN POLAND AND BY INCREASING SIGNS OF PUBLIC DISORDER THERE. FRG OFFICIALS HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY SAID SO, BUT WE INFER FROM SEVERAL RECENT CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT A DISTURBANCE IN POLAND THAT COULD SET OFF A SERIOUS CRISIS. THEY SEEM TO FEEL SUCH A DANGER (WHICH COULD RESULT ALSO FROM A PROVOCATION) MAY NOW BE GREATER THAN THAT OF OUTRIGHT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION.

WOESSNER

BUNN 0460

DTG: 271013Z MAY 81 PSN: 022147  
TOR: 14771832Z

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE:

HCE828  
STU7229  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0384/01 1462107  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
Q 262103Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7442  
BT

NLS F95-030#67

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 10384

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/26/08 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M

TAGS: GE, FR, OVIP

SUBJ: SCHMIDT CONVERSATION WITH MITTERRAND MAY 24

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: VAN WELL TOLD THE CHARGE THAT MITTERRAND HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH SCHMIDT VISIT TO PARIS AND APPRECIATED THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE. MITTERRAND AND HIS ASSISTANTS EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND WERE ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS OVER THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUING HIGH US INTEREST RATES; MITTERRAND SAID HE DID NOT INTEND TO DEVALUE THE FRANC. FONMIN CHEYSSON SAID HE WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY VISIT BY THE SECRETARY TO PARIS. HE ADVISED ANYONE WANTING TO UNDERSTAND MITTERRAND'S POLICIES TO READ A RECENT SPEECH LATTER HAD MADE IN NEW YORK. END SUMMARY.

3. FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL BRIEFED THE CHARGE MAY 26 ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH MITTERRAND HELD DURING PARIS STOP-OVER ON SCHMIDT'S RETURN JOURNEY FROM HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. VAN WELL EMPHASIZED AT THE OUTSET THE CHANCELLOR'S DESIRE TO GIVE USG A FULL AND PROMPT BRIEFING, AND NOTED THAT CHANCELLOR WISHED TO REITERATE HOW PLEASED HE HAD BEEN BY HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. CHANCELLOR WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED BY THOROUGH TALKS HE HAD HAD WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, WITH THE SECRETARY AND OTHER CABINET MEMBERS. SCHMIDT FEELS THAT THE FRG NOW HAS SOLID BASIS FOR COMPLETE RAPPORT WITH THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION.

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. VAN WELL SAID THAT IN PARIS THE GERMAN DELEGATION HAD SOME 3 1/2 HOURS OF TALKS WITH THEIR FRENCH COLLEAGUES; SCHMIDT AND MITTERRAND TALKED FOR TWO HOURS ALONE, SPEAKING IN FRENCH THROUGH AN INTERPRETER. WHILE THEY TALKED ALONE VAN WELL SAID THE REST OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION MET WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE, WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NEW FRENCH TEAM. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR TRANSMITTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WARM GREETINGS TO MITTERRAND AND TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE CLOSEST OF RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES BASED ON ACTIVE CONSULTATIONS. THE PRESIDENT HOPED TO AVOID ANY POLICY SURPRISES AND LOOKED FORWARD TO THE CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH THE NEW FRENCH PRESIDENT. MITTERRAND LISTENED CAREFULLY, VAN WELL SAID, AND TOLD SCHMIDT THAT HE CONSIDERED THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE.

5. VAN WELL THEN RECALLED CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S SUGGESTION TO THE SECRETARY THAT HE SHOULD ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE NEW FRENCH AUTHORITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS AGREED, THE CHANCELLOR RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHEYSSON, PERHAPS AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS TRIP TO THE FAR EAST. CHEYSSON RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED IF THE SECRETARY COULD VISIT HIM SOON IN PARIS. CHEYSSON ALSO EMPHASIZED HOW PLEASED THE FRENCH WERE BY THE CHANCELLOR'S STOP-OVER IN PARIS. THE INFORMALITY OF THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT APPEALED PARTICULARLY TO THE NEW FRENCH AUTHORITIES.

6. VAN WELL THEN DESCRIBED HOW THE CHANCELLOR REPORTED HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS WASHINGTON VISIT TO MITTERRAND. SCHMIDT AND MITTERRAND SPOKE ABOUT ALLIANCE QUESTIONS AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE FRENCH ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE ALLIANCE. THE FRENCH SAID THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN FRANCE'S ATTITUDE. MITTERRAND ENDORSED THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION CONCERNING LRTPF; HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. MITTERRAND ALSO SAID HE WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS PREVIOUS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NECESSITY FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES. TWO OF HIS CABINET APPOINTMENTS, CHEYSSON AND JOBERT, HAD IN FACT BEEN MADE WITH THE ARAB NATIONS IN MIND, HE NOTED. MITTERRAND PLANNED

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO THE ARABS SOON. VAN WELT NOTED  
THE GERMAN IMPRESSION THAT THE GDF WOULD HAVE A MORE  
ACTIVE APPROACH IN THE THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL,  
GROWING OUT OF MITTERRAND'S VERY SPECIFIC AND EXPRESSED  
CONCERNS ABOUT THE POOR NATIONS IN THE WORLD.

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE830  
STU7231  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #0384/02 1462109  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 262103Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7443  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 10384  
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7. VAN WELL SAID THAT MITTERRAND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE US INTEREST RATE POLICIES AND HOPED THAT US ECONOMIC POLICY WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS OWN HOPES FOR A RESURGENCY OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY. MITTERRAND TOLD THE CHANCELLOR THAT HE WOULD DEFEND THE VALUE OF THE FRANC, AND IN THE FACE OF ADVICE TO THE CONTRARY, WAS NOT CONSIDERING DEVALUATION. FRANCE WOULD STAY IN THE EMS, MITTERRAND SAID. THE CHANCELLOR PROMISED MITTERRAND THAT THE FRG WOULD BE HELPFUL AND ENVISAGED TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT. VAN WELL OBSERVED TO THE CHARGE THAT THE GDF HAD OBVIOUSLY INTERVENED IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS RECENTLY. VAN WELL EMPHASIZED THAT MITTERRAND SHARES THE CHANCELLOR'S CONCERN ABOUT THE INTEREST RATE QUESTION, AND OBSERVED THAT THE FRENCH WERE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED THAT THE FRG WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE GDF EXAMPLE OF ARTIFICIALLY RAISING THEIR INTEREST RATES. HAD THE FRG DONE SO, VAN WELL SAID, THE FRENCH RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE NEGATED GDF ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE FRANC.

8. CONCERNING CSCE VAN WELL SAID THE FRENCH INQUIRED ABOUT FRG POLICY. THE GERMAN DELEGATION ENCOURAGED THE FRENCH TO CONTINUE THEIR CDE INITIATIVE WHICH THE FRG WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT.  
9. TURNING TO POLAND, VAN WELL NOTED THAT CHEYSSON'S FIRST QUESTION RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS THERE AND REFLECTED CONVERSATIONS HE HAD ALREADY HAD WITH FONMIN GENSCHER. FRENCH CONCERN WAS NOT SO MUCH NOW WITH SOVIET INTERVENTION BUT RATHER WITH THE INTERNAL SITUATION: E.G. STAGNATION OF PRODUCTION, LOSS OF GROWTH AND A GENERAL ECONOMIC SLUMP WHICH WOULD BE

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BLAMED ON SOLIDARITY. THE GERMAN DELEGATION RESPONDED TO FRENCH CONCERNS BY NOTING THAT THE WORKERS' BASIC MOTIVATION SEEMED TO BE IMPROVED AND THAT LOSS OF PRODUCTIVITY SEEMED MAINLY RELATED TO CONFUSION AMONG THOSE TRYING TO DIRECT THE ECONOMY.

10. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE PERSIAN GULF, AFGHANISTAN AND THE NEW SUGGESTION OF A KIND OF MARSHALL PLAN IN THE CARRIBEAN AREA WERE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE FRENCH. THE FRENCH FOUND THE LATTER IDEA PARTICULARLY INTERESTING; CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE LIKED THE IDEA OF INITIATIVES COMING FROM THE AREA ITSELF WITH SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED BY THE POWERS IN THE AREA.

11. ON NAMIBIA VAN WELL REPORTED TO THE FRENCH ON THE STATE OF THE NAMIBIA INITIATIVE AND NOTED THE FRG HOPE THAT IT WOULD STAY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIVE. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THE FIVE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER BUT WERE DISTRESSED THAT FOLLOWING THE BOTHA VISIT TO WASHINGTON, MOVEMENT SEEMED TO BE AWAY FROM THAT ENVISAGED BY UNSCRES 435.

12. CHEYSSON ASKED HIS VISITORS ABOUT US ATTITUDES TOWARD A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE. VAN WELL SAID THAT HE RESPONDED THAT THE USG WAS UNSURE OF POSSIBLE NEW POLICIES IN PARIS. CHEYSSON SAID THE BEST ADVICE HE COULD GIVE WAS THAT THE AMERICANS READ A RECENT SPEECH BY MITTERRAND IN NEW YORK (VAN WELL THOUGHT IT MAY HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS) WHICH CONTAINED HIS POLICY. VAN WELL TOLD THE CHARGE THAT THE CHANCELLOR RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION MITTERRAND WANTED GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE US.

13. CONCERNING THE MEXICO SUMMIT IN OCTOBER MITTERRAND TOLD THE CHANCELLOR THAT HE WOULD PARTICIPATE, VAN WELL SAID.

14. TURNING TO JAPAN, VAN WELL SAID THAT MITTERRAND SHARED THE CHANCELLOR'S SORROW OVER THE RECENT ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT TO LIMIT JAPAN'S EXPORTS OF AUTOS TO THE US.

15. TURNING TO THE EC-10 VAN WELL SAID THE FRENCH WERE NOT REQUESTING A POSTPONEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING AT THE END OF JUNE BUT WOULD ASK

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR UNDERSTANDING THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE  
DISCUSSIONS THEN MIGHT BE LIMITED AND SUBJECT TO RE-  
VIEW. VAN WEL RECALLED THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE  
FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER HAD BEEN  
ADVANCED TO JULY AND WOULD THEREFORE TAKE PLACE BEFORE  
THE OTTAWA SUMMIT JULY 19-21. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S  
QUESTION WHETHER MITTERRAND HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE831  
STU7232  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0384/03 1462111  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 262103Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7444  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 10384

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THE CHANCELLOR CONVEYED THE FIRST MESSAGE FROM THE US PRESIDENT, VAN WELL NOTED ON THE CONTRARY MITTERRAND HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED AND THOUGHT THIS WAS A FINE GESTURE IN THE EC-10 CONTEXT. VAN WELL SAID THAT MITTERRAND WANTS SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS WHICH CHEYSSON EMPHASIZED MUST BE WITHIN THE EC-10 SETTING.

16. THE CHARGE INQUIRED WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR HAD RAISED THE CONCERNS, EXPRESSED TO HIM BY THE SECRETARY, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NAMING COMMUNIST MINISTERS TO THE GOP. VAN WELL REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR HAD RAISED THIS SUBJECT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE FRENCH WOULD BE COMFORTABLE ALLIES, VAN WELL TOLD THE CHARGE THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION; WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS ON EAST-WEST OR NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, HE THOUGHT. VAN WELL RECALLED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID THAT, IF THE US INTEREST RATES CONTINUE HIGH TWO MONTHS LONGER, THEN THIS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE EUROPEANS AND THE POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED AGAIN.

WOESSNER

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11-15 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE046  
STU3792  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #9694/01 1341533  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 141630Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7197  
INFO RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3765  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0461  
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4819  
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4063  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3605  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4058  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4176  
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1867  
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7006  
RUFHOLB/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 2000  
RUFHOLC/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 4253  
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART 1459  
BT

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NLS F99-030#71

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 09694

EXDIS

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5-14-01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, GE, US

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT WILL SING WORRIED SONG IN WASHINGTON

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WILL VISIT WASHINGTON MAY 20-23 UNDER HEAVY POLITICAL PRESSURE AT HOME ON BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES. THOUGH HEARTENED BY THE RESULTS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN ROME, HE STILL HAS QUESTIONS ABOUT US INTENTIONS REGARDING ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENERAL. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF HIS VISIT IS TO ESTABLISH A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER US LEADERS, BUT SCHMIDT WILL ALSO BE TRYING TO GET A FEEL FOR US FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS AND TO STEER THEM IN DIRECTIONS CONSONANT WITH HIS POLITICAL NEEDS AND WITH BONN'S OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. END SUMMARY.

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3. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON MAY 20

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DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ENCOURAGED ABOUT US POLICY BY THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN ROME BUT BUFFETTED ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT BY THE UNEXPECTED DEFEAT OF HIS FRIEND GISCARD AND DOMESTICALLY BY THE CDU ELECTION VICTORY IN BERLIN AND THE BURGEONING POLITICAL ATTACKS ON DEFENSE MINISTER APEL. THESE EVENTS PLUS CONTINUING DOMESTIC PRESSURES OVER SUCH ISSUES AS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS, IMPLEMENTING THE NATO "DOUBLE DECISION" ON LRTRF, ARMS SALES ABROAD, AND A HOST OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AT HOME CAST A LONG SHADOW OVER THE CHANCELLOR'S PATH TO THE SPD NATIONAL CONVENTION NEXT SPRING IN MUNICH.

4. THE PRESSURES FACING SCHMIDT ARE REAL BUT, EVEN MORE, WIDESPREAD DISENCHANTMENT WITH HIS OVERALL LEADERSHIP IS BECOMING MORE APPARENT. A LATE APRIL ALLENSBACH POLL REVEALED HIS APPROVAL RATING HAD SLIPPED TO 42.9 PERCENT COMPARED TO 44.5 PERCENT AT THE OCTOBER 1980 ELECTIONS. ACCORDING TO THE SAME POLL, THE SPD'S STANDING SINCE THE ELECTIONS FELL FROM 42.9 PERCENT TO 36.4 PERCENT. AN EMNID POLL JUST OUT REPORTS THE POPULARITY OF THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT AT ONLY 34 PERCENT, BELOW THAT OF THE BRANDT GOVERNMENT BEFORE ITS FALL. MEANWHILE, THE CDU/CSU HAS CLIMBED FROM 44.5 (AT THE ELECTIONS) TO 49.4 PERCENT, ACCORDING TO THE ALLENSBACH POLL. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ONE CANNOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE A BREAK IN THE COALITION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAILED VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND NEW ELECTIONS (PERHAPS FOLLOWING BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON SOME DIVISIVE ISSUE, ON WHICH THE SPD LEFT AND THE CDU/CSU MAKE AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE).

5. SCHMIDT HAS RETURNED TO POLITICAL CENTER STAGE FOLLOWING HIS SAUDI ARABIA VISIT AND IS CURRENTLY ENJOYING A SURGE OF PUBLIC SYMPATHY IN REACTION TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S REPEATED VERBAL ATTACKS ON HIM. NEVERTHELESS, HIS RULING COALITION HAS BEEN FOR MONTHS AND STILL IS SEEN IN GERMANY AS WEARY AND INEPT. NOT ONLY ARE GERMANS QUESTIONING WHETHER SCHMIDT'S OWN PARTY IS CAPABLE OF GETTING DONE WHAT IT WANTS, BUT THE APPARENT DISARRAY WITHIN SPD RANKS CAUSES SOME TO WONDER IF THE SPD IS STILL CAPABLE OF DECIDING WHAT COURSE IT WANTS TO TAKE ON VARIOUS ISSUES. THIS PERCEIVED DISARRAY HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE CDU LEADER KOHL IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE LAST WEEK COULD REASONABLY ASK IF SCHMIDT EVEN HAS A MAJORITY IN HIS OWN PARTY. THE STALEMATE RESULTS OF THE MAY 10 ELECTIONS

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IN BERLIN HAVE PROMPTED WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT THE FDP, DESPITE EARLIER DISCLAIMERS, MIGHT AT LEAST TACITLY SUPPORT A CDU GOVERNMENT THERE, THUS POSSIBLY FORESHADOWING A NATIONAL TREND.

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE047  
STU3802  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #9694/02 1341635  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 141630Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7198  
INFO RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3766  
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RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4177  
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RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7007  
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RUFHOLC/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 4254  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 09694  
EXDIS

6. THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE, PARTICULARLY THE LOSS OF GISCARD WHOM SCHMIDT HAD OSTENTATIOUSLY CULTIVATED, POSES QUESTIONS FOR BONN'S EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS. BONN HAS LONG WANTED TO CLEAR AWAY THE CHRONICALLY CONTENTIOUS ECONOMIC ISSUES WITHIN THE EC AND MOVE TOWARD MORE STREAMLINED POLITICAL COOPERATION. SCHMIDT NOW FACES THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER DELAY IN RESOLVING THESE ISSUES AND MAY WONDER WHETHER THEY CAN BE RESOLVED TO HIS LIKING AT ALL. MOREOVER, MITTERAND'S PROGRAM OF NATIONALIZATIONS, GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND GALLIC POPULISM WOULD NOT APPEAL TO SCHMIDT AS THE RIGHT MEDICINE FOR FRANCE'S ECONOMIC ILLS AND COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR FUTURE FRANCO-GERMAN ECONOMIC COLLABORATION. HOWEVER, THESE ARE POTENTIAL FUTURE AND NOT IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS.

7. FOR THE MOMENT, SCHMIDT AND OTHER FRG LEADERS ARE EMPHASIZING THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP, AND THEY MAY SEE IN THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE IN PARIS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVERSIFY AND STRENGTHEN OTHER FRG TIES IN EUROPE BY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEKING IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS WITH THE UK. SIMILARLY, SOME FRG COMMENTATORS

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HAVE SPECULATED THAT THE CHANGE TO A MORE LEFT-LEANING GOVERNMENT IN PARIS WILL ENHANCE THE FRG'S POSITION AS A BALANCE AND MEDIATOR BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US.

8. SCHMIDT UNDOUBTEDLY HOPES TO USE HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON TO CEMENT HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE WILL WANT TO REINFORCE WHAT THE FRG SEES AS THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF US POLICY SIGNALLED AT ROME AND TO IMPRESS ON US LEADERS THE NEED FOR RENEWAL OF AN ACTIVIST DETENTE POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS, A NEED FELT NOT ONLY WITHIN THE SPD BUT BY MOST GERMANS OF ALL POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. SCHMIDT WILL NOT OVERSTATE HIS DOMESTIC CONCERNS BUT HE WILL CERTAINLY POINT OUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT WHICH A US ATTITUDE SEEN TO BE OVERLY TOUGH TOWARD THE SOVIETS AND US RELUCTANCE ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD HAVE IN GERMANY.

9. SCHMIDT RECOGNIZES THAT THE WEST CAN ONLY DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE SOVIETS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, BUT HE BELIEVES DETENTE MUST BE PURSUED DILIGENTLY. THE WEST MUST THEREFORE PRESS AHEAD TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES -- HOWEVER UNPROMISING -- OF ARMS CONTROL AND TO REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSIONS. IN ANOTHER IMPORTANT POLICY AREA, SCHMIDT ADVOCATES GREATER SENSITIVITY TO "LEGITIMATE" THIRD WORLD ASPIRATIONS SO THE WEST CAN LIMIT IF NOT BLOCK SOVIET INROADS AND ENCOURAGE "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT". WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHANCELLOR IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RESULTS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT EITHER THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE OR THE NOW-STALLED GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. SCHMIDT COMES TO WASHINGTON AS A MAN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE AT HOME AND BESET BY AN ARRAY OF QUESTIONS IN HIS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THOUGH PRESSED, HE IS NOT BELEAGUERED. MOREOVER, HE REMAINS A PROUD AND SENSITIVE MAN, GIVEN TO TESTINESS AND PEDANTRY. HE IS LOOKING FOR FRIENDS AND SUPPORT -- AND FOR WAYS TO NARROW POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES IN US AND FRG POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS. FOR THIS REASON, WE ANTICIPATE SCHMIDT WILL SOFT-PEDAL CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN ORDER TO FURTHER HIS BASIC OBJECTIVE OF FOSTERING RAPPORT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER US LEADERS AND TO SOLICIT EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT AND AGREEMENT ON POLICY ISSUES WHICH HE CAN USE TO BOLSTER HIS POSITION AT HOME AND AS A STATESMAN IN EUROPE.

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DATE 06/01/81//152

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

September 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR/JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Weiszacker Call on President

FYI: Our State moles inform us that Judge Clark called Mike Deaver to put in a strong pitch in favor of a Presidential meeting with the Governing Mayor of Berlin but was told there was no way this could be scheduled.

We fit the good fight, but unless you see any other cracks in the door, it looks as though this meeting will not happen. Haig, of course, has been alerted so he can lay it on extra thick during his meeting this Sunday with Weiszacker in Berlin.

*it's done!  
you take  
place  
9/15/81*

cc: Chuck Tyson

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NLS F97-036 #73

BY NOI, NARA, DATE 8/22/00

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE CHARGE

F.O. 120451 RDS-4 4-30-81 (WIDESSNER, WILLIAM) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PARM, NATO, GE  
SUBJECT: GENSCHER URGES MOVEMENT ON LRTNF TALKS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER CALLED ME TN FOR AN URGENT APPOINTMENT AT 1100 P.M. TODAY TO ASK THAT I CONVEY TO YOU HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF DELAY ON THE TNF QUESTION. HE SAID HE COULD NOT OVERSTATE THE IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING ON A DATE AT THE ROME NATO MINISTERIAL FOR RENEWING LRTNF ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. HE SAID THE DATE SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT ROME AND THAT IT SHOULD PROPOSE TALKS "IN THE NEAR FUTURE." WHILE GENSCHER EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING DOWN TO SUBSTANCE EARLY IN THE TALKS, HE SAID THE IMPORTANT POINT IS FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE TO ANNOUNCE ITS READINESS TO RESUME THE TALKS SOON.

3. GENSCHER EXPLAINED HIS CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MONOPOLIZING THE PEACE ISSUE, NOT WITHOUT SOME EFFECT IN THE FRG AND ELSEWHERE. THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE ON THE

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BONN 09669 3013287

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FROM GERMANS WHO QUESTION, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WHETHER THE US TAKES SERIOUSLY THE NEGOTIATIONS SIDE OF NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 "DOUBLE DECISION." GENSCHER ARGUED THAT WE MUST PUT THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. HE ALSO STRESSED VIGOROUSLY HIS CONCERN THAT FAILURE OF THE ROME MEETING TO ANNOUNCE A DECISION ON DATES FOR THE TALKS WOULD UNDERMINE NATO'S CREDIBILITY AND RENDER THE DEPLOYMENT ASPECT IMPOSSIBLE. MOREOVER, IT WOULD OVERSHADOW OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MINISTERIAL BECAUSE PUBLIC ATTENTION IS SO FIXED ON THE LRNF ISSUE. GENSCHER SEVERAL TIMES RETERATED THAT HE HAD STAKED HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE ON THE NATO "DOUBLE-DECISION." FINALLY, HE SAID THAT FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE NATO DECISION WOULD ULTIMATELY CALL INTO QUESTION THE WESTERN OFFENSE CAPABILITY. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, HE CONCLUDED, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATO MINISTERS TO BEGIN THE PROCESS BY ANNOUNCING AT ROME A READINESS TO START THE TALKS AT A SPECIFIED DATE "IN THE NEAR FUTURE."

4. COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN MY NEARLY FOUR MONTHS AS CHARGE THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS CALLED ME IN ON SHORT NOTICE. THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE GENUINENESS OF HIS PLEA. HIS URGENCY AND THE DEPTH OF HIS ANXIETY CLEARLY REFLECT NOT ONLY GEOPOLITICAL CALCULATIONS BUT GROWING CONCERNS IN THE SPD AND ALSO AT THE GRASS ROOTS IN GENSCHER'S OWN FDP, WHICH HOLDS ITS NATIONAL CONVENTION THE END OF MAY. IN EFFECT, GENSCHER IS CALLING ON THE ALLIANCE TO ANSWER THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE WITH A COUNTERMOVE TO PUT MOSCOW ON THE DEFENSIVE AND BLUNT THE GROWING DOMESTIC CRITICISM IN THE FRG.

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BONN 09609 301328Z

5. IN CLOSING, GENSCHER ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS WARM REGARDS AND TO TELL YOU HE LOOKS FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MEETING WITH YOU IN ROME ON SUNDAY. WOPSSNER

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DATE 05/03/81

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PAGE 01

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/24/01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, EPAP, EAGR, EEWT, ETRD, UR, US

SUBJECT: GRAINS EMBARGO

REF: STATE 105465

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PER INSTRUCTION REFTEL, I INFORMED STATE SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER, HIGHEST RANKING FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL AVAILABLE LATE THIS AFTERNOON, OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ANNOUNCE LIFTING OF GRAINS EMBARGO LATER TODAY. I GAVE HIM NON-PAPER WITH TALKING POINTS.

3. LAUTENSCHLAGER EXPRESSED FULL UNDERSTANDING THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES HAD OUT-WEIGHED FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CASE. HE STRESSED NECESSITY IN HANDLING PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT US ACTION WAS NOT RELATED TO SOVIEI RESTRAINT IN PULAND. I ASSURED HIM THAT USG WAS WELL AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT. WOESSNER

BONN 8295

DTG:241625Z APR 81 PSN: 038099  
TOR: 114/2327Z