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FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY CJ NARA DATE 5/6/10

MESSAGE:

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NODIS
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK ONLY
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/87 (ABRAMS, E.)

TAGS: PORG, SF, WA

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PIK BOIHA
EVENING JUNE 11
FOR CLARK TO DEP 1129

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT]

2. AT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S REQUEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER BEGAN BY STATING THAT THE MEETING SHOULD FOCUS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS SUGGESTED BY THE U.S., AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RAISED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MAY 19, 1981 LETTER TO SECRETARY HAIG. THESE PROPOSALS WOULD ALSO BE AT THE CORE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN WINDHUEK WITH THE INTERNAL PARTIES. CROCKER NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT WHATEVER COMES OUT OF THE DISCUSSIONS, MUST IN TIME BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CONTACT GROUP, FRONT LINE AND SWAPO IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT. ON THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES AS RAISED IN PIK'S LETTER, CROCKER SAID THAT A SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND NON-INTER-

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REFERENCE MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE. IT WILL BE HIGHLY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND OBTAIN CONSENSUS IF SOUTH AFRICA WANTS UNILATERAL RIGHTS OF INTERVENTION IN NAMIBIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SOUTH AFRICA IS A SOVEREIGN STATE ADJACENT TO

NAMIBIA AND WILL PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AS OTHER STATES DO SHOULD A THREAT DEVELOP. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE IMPACT SUCH A PRECEDENT FOR THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE MIGHT HAVE IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CYPRUS. HOWEVER, THE U.S. MIGHT BE PREPARED TO COSIGN, WITH NEIGHBORING FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHERS, GUARANTEES OF NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS. ABRAMS PREFERRED THE TERM "NEUTRAL" WHICH WOULD INCLUDE NO MEMBERSHIP IN ANY BLOC OR ALLIANCE, AND NO BASES OR TROOPS IN NAMIBIA. BOTHA SAID THE SAG PREFERRED SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE AUSTRIAN SITUATION.

3. BOTHA THEN TURNED TO U.S. MOTIVATIONS REGARDING NAMIBIA. SECRETARY HAIG TOLD HIM IN DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE US COULD RATHER WITHDRAW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN GO THROUGH A USELESS CHARADE. BOTHA SAID U.S. WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE THE MOST DIRE CONSEQUENCES, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT POSITION AND WOULD NEVER PARADE PRESIDENT REAGAN THROUGH SUCH A CHARADE. THEREFORE, WHEN HAIG ASKED FOR SAG'S "BOTTOM LINE", IT WAS DONE. ON THE BASIS OF THAT BOTTOM LINE, THE U.S. WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE SAG'S MINIMUM POSITION PROVIDED ROOM FOR MOVEMENT. IF NOT, THEN WE ALL CAN CALL IT A DAY! THE U.S. TAKES THE BLOWS, THE CONTACT GROUP BLAMES THE U.S., AND THE LIBERALS IN WASHINGTON GO ON THE ATTACK. BUT SOUTH AFRICA NOW NEEDED A CLEAR INDICATION FROM THE U.S. ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OR UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE SAG POSITION. WHAT ARE THE U.S. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ON THE SAG LETTER? TURNING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LETTER, BOTHA SAID THAT POINTS 3 AND 9 HAD TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE U.S. WITH THE INTERNAL PARTIES. WHEN IN WINDHOEK LAST WEEK, BOTHA SAID HE TOLD MUDGE AND DU PLESSIS THAT THE SAG LETTER, WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE INTERNAL PARTIES, WAS ONLY THE SKELETON OF A POSITION. THE INTERNAL PARTIES WHEN THEY MET THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S PARTY, WOULD HAVE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO PUT MEAT ON THE BONES. SO SOUTH AFRICA IS IN A POSITION NOW WHERE IT IS BETTER TO DEFER DISCUSSION OF THESE POINTS TO U.S./INTERNAL PARTY TALKS. HOWEVER, TO BE MORE PRECISE, POINTS 7 AND 9 WERE SAU POINTS, WHILE 3 THROUGH 6 WERE PROPER AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE INTERNAL PARTIES MEETING. AKTUR, HOWEVER, WILL GIVE THE U.S. SEVERE DIFFICULTIES, BUT OIA MIGHT BE WILLING TO GO ALONG SOMEWHAT MORE READILY

IF THEIR CONCERNS ARE MET. POINT 8, HE AGREED, IS TAKEN CARE OF BY OUR TRIP TO WINDHOEK.

4. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED THAT IF WE READ SOUTH AFRICA CORRECTLY (PARA 7) THEY WOULD NEED EXPLICIT RIGHTS TO INTERVENE IN NAMIBIA. THERE IS A SERIOUS QUESTION AS TO WHAT WE CAN SELL TO THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. PIK RESPONDED THAT IF PROGRESS IS MADE ON OTHER ISSUES, THEN THE NECESSITY OF SPELLING OUT SPECIFIC SOUTH AFRICAN RIGHTS TO INTERVENE IN NAMIBIA WILL BE LESS IMPORTANT. IF GUARANTEES CAN ELIMINATE THE ANXIETIES OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE, THEN A SOLUTION WILL BE EASIER.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER RAISED THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY, AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 9 OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER. HE STATED THAT THE U.S. VIEW IS UNCHANGED: IT SHOULD BE DEFERRED AND REMOVED FROM THE AGENDA OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. ABRAMS CLARIFIED THIS POINT BY INDICATING THAT THE STATUS OF WALVIS BAY SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. PIK SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT INSIST ON EXPLICIT AGREEMENT ON WALVIS BAY IF NOT CONFRONTED BY THE FIVE. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN CANNOT MAKE LAW, AND THE SOUTH AFRICA MENTION OF WALVIS BAY PREEMPTS A UN LINE. TREATIES RESOLVE BORDER SITUATIONS, JUST AS THE TREATY THAT CREATED BORDERS FOR ANGOLA AND BOTSWANA WAS THE SAME WHICH MADE WALVIS BAY PART OF SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY. BOTHA SAID THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT FIND IT IN ITS BEST INTERESTS, IT WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE OVER WALVIS BAY, JUST AS THE U.S. WOULD NOT DO OVER ALASKA.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOUTH AFRICA HAD HOPED IT COULD RELY ON THE U.S. ON WALVIS BAY, AND THE ASSUMPTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT THE U.S. WOULD VOTE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN. UNFORTUNATELY, VANCE AND OWEN OF THE UK HAD MADE A SIMILAR COMMITMENT, AND THEN RENEGED. ABRAMS RESTATED THE U.S. POSITION: THE WALVIS BAY ISSUE SHOULD BE LEFT ASIDE FOR NOW AND AWAIT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA AND THE SAG. WHEN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, THE US WILL NOT STATE ANY POSITION ON THEM, AND WILL NOT SUPPORT EITHER PARTY.

6. CROCKER THEN RETURNED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION ON A CEASEFIRE AND EMPLACEMENT OF AN UNTAG MILITARY CONTINGENT, AND NOTED THAT IN THE EARLIER MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, STRESS HAD BEEN PLACED ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INVITING IN A LARGE ARMY WHOSE PRESENCE WOULD IMPLY A SWAPO TAKEOVER OF NAMIBIA. SO THE QUESTION REMAINED IF 435 CALLS FOR UNTAG, AND OTHER PARTIES ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO IT, WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATION ON THIS POINT? THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE SIZE, LOCATION, AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE COULD BE JUGGLED SO THAT THE SAG/INTERNAL PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED. ALTHOUGH THE SAG LETTER ON THIS POINT WAS CLEARLY AGAINST ANY UNTAG MILITARY, THE PRIME MINISTER TODAY HAD SAID SOMETHING COULD BE ARRANGED. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ADDED THAT SAG AMBASSADOR SOLE HAD LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO SOME COMPROMISE ON A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED MILITARY FORCE. CROCKER ADDED THAT UNTAG WAS INDEED THE GUTS OF 435, BUT THE U.S., IF SOUTH AFRICA MOVED FORWARD, WOULD TAKE SAG INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT.

7. BUTHA RETORTED THAT UNTAG WAS NOT THE GUTS OF 435. RATHER, THE MAJOR FOCUS OF THE UN PLAN WAS FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THE FIVE LED SOUTH AFRICA DOWN THE GARDEN PATH ON UNTAG DURING LATE 77 AND EARLY 78. SIR JAMES MURRAY TOLD THE SAG IN 77 THAT ONLY A FORCE OF 2 TO 3,000 MILITARY WOULD BE NEEDED TO ACCOMPANY THE SADF UN PATROL. WHEN SOUTH AFRICA CAPITULATED AND AGREED TO 1,000 IN NAMIBIA AND 1,000 IN ANGOLA, THE FIVE CAME BACK AND ASKED FOR 3,000 NAMIBIA ONLY.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS WAS NOT USUAL ON PRACTICE. THEN WALDHEIM, "WHO IS A LIAR", CALLED FOR 7,000. BUTHA SAID HE OWED IT TO THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER BE PUSHED INTO DEALS LIKE THIS. CRUCKER POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. APPROACH WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION ONE OF WORKING TOWARD A CONSENSUS THAT DOES NOT THREATEN OUR INTERESTS ON THE SAGIS.

8. BUTHA QUICKLY TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE CONCERNS HE EXPRESSED TO SECRETARY HAIG ON THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION. IN SHORT, THE SPEECH ENCOMPASSED FAMILIAR THEMES OF TOTAL COMMUNIST

ONSLAUGHT AND AFRICA IS DYING. BUTHA FELT THAT DUE TO THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNIST INROADS IN ONE STATE, SAY AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, OTHERS WOULD FALL PREY TO SOVIET AND CUBAN INCURSIONS. ZIMBABWE WAS ALREADY DYING, MUGABE IN THE BACK ROOMS WAS SEEING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY THERE. AT INDEPENDENCE, SOUTH AFRICA HAD SUPPORTED MUGABE, WHO WAS NO WORSE THAN THE MOSCOW STOUGE NKOMO, AND THE CABINET HAD ACTUALLY MADE A DECISION TO APPROVE AN R18 MILLION LOAN TO SALISBURY. SOUTH AFRICA QUIETLY COUNSELED THE WHITES TO STAY, BUT THE SITUATION DETERIORATED. HE WILL NOT SAY IT PUBLICLY, BUT MUGABE IS SETTING UP CENTRAL COMMITTEES TO CONTROL PRODUCTION. THAT IS COMMUNIST, AND ZIMBABWE WILL DIE IN A YEAR TO 18 MONTHS. THE U.S. AND SOUTH AFRICA MUST BE UNITED ON THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE AREA, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MUST KNOW THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL FIGHT AT THE CUNENE (IN NAMIBIA) RATHER THAN RISK A WAR ON ITS OWN ORANGE RIVER BORDER.

9. FOLLOWING DINNER, BUTHA RETURNED TO FURTHER PROBING ON THE U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SITUATION. BUTHA SAID HE BELIEVED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO ASSERT AMERICA'S POWER ONCE AGAIN. FOLLOWING THE ANGOLA DISASTER IN 1975, THE CONGRESS LIMITED THE ABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO EXECUTE FOREIGN POLICY. PRESIDENT REAGAN WANTED A FREE REIN TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA, THE U.S. AND SOUTH AFRICA WANT TO COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS. HOW SERIOUS IS THE U.S. ABOUT STOPPING A RUSSIAN TAKEOVER OF NAMIBIA? WILL THE U.S. RISK A SWAPO ELECTORAL VICTORY, OR ARE WE AT LEAST AGREED THAT WE WILL MAKE IT AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE FOR SWAPO TO PREVAIL? SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVES IN REAGAN AND MAIB -- BUT IT MUST BE KNOWN WHETHER THE U.S. WILL RISK A COMMUNIST REGIME IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA. THE PRIME MINISTER WANTS TO GET OUT OF THE U.S. A CLEAR POSITION ON THESE VITAL ISSUES -- BOTH COUNTRIES MUST SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE.

10. CROCKER REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL RESIST SOVIET INROADS IN AFRICA AND PLACE HIGH PRIORITY ON ELIMINATING SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE. IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DO SO IS A RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA AND THE

WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA, WHERE SWAPO MAY RUN FOR ELECTION. FOURIE ASKED WHETHER IT CAN BE ASSUMED THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT SOUTH AFRICA ON THE UNTAG MILITARY QUESTION SO THAT ALL PARTIES HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE TO WIN AN ELECTION? BOTHA ADDED THAT SWAPO KNEW UNTAG SERVED THEIR INTERESTS. SOUTH AFRICA HAD A MAN AT THE VERY MEETING WHEN THE FRONT LINE ASSURED SWAPO THAT THEY WOULD WIN AN ELECTORAL VICTORY WITH UNTAG.

11. ABRAMS ADDED THAT THE U.S. DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN PRE-INDEPENDENCE AND TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. GUARANTEES OF A CONSTITUTION ARE THE ROPES WHICH WILL TIE DOWN A SOMEWHAT MORE SECURE FUTURE FOR NAMIBIA. THE QUESTIONS OF UNTAG AND A CEASEFIRE WILL REQUIRE FRONT LINE, SWAPO, AND UN AGREEMENT. WE CAN WORK TO JUGGLE NUMBERS AND THE COMPOSITION OF UNTAG, BUT WE MUST BE ABLE TO SELL IT.

12. BOTH FOURIE AND BOTHA SAID THEIR QUESTION HAD BEEN SIDESTEPED. SOUTH AFRICA MUST KNOW WHETHER THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

U.S. IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SWAPO GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNIST CONTROL OF NAMIBIA. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THERE ARE MANY FACTORS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANSWERING SUCH A QUESTION. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER BOTHA AGREED THAT NAMIBIA CANNOT BE A SPRINGBOARD FOR COMMUNISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE U.S. WILL DO WHAT IT CAN, WITHIN REASON, TO MAKE SURE NAMIBIA IS NOT DOMINATED BY MARXISTS. BUT NAMIBIA IS LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF ANGOLA, THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS THERE. OUR POLICY ON CUBA DEALS WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MORE GLOBAL BASIS, OF WHICH ANGOLA WAS A PART. BUT TO PROJECT SO FAR INTO THE FUTURE ON A QUESTION WHICH ENCOMPASSES SO MANY FACTORS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE U.S. WILL DEAL WITH SOVIET INROADS AND THE CUBANS.

13. BOTHA SAID THIS WASN'T ENOUGH, UNCE AGAIN ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO RUN THE RISK OF A SOVIET NAMIBIA. IF SWAPO WINS, THAT WILL BE THE END OF SAVIMBI. SAVIMBI, WITH SAG ASSISTANCE, CAN WIN. BUT IF SOUTH AFRICA PULLS OUT, HE DIES, AND ALL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GOES COMMUNIST. IN AFRICA, THERE IS A CARDINAL RULE--ONLY ONE MAN RULES, THERE IS NO COALITION.

14. CRUCKEN RESPONDED THAT ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA WERE RELATED ISSUES. PROGRESS ON ONE WILL MEAN MOVEMENT ON THE OTHER. ON ANGOLA, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS WORKING TO REPEAL THE CLARK AMENDMENT TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE FREEDOM OF ACTION THAT IS REQUIRED. BUT THE U.S. IS A DEMOCRACY WHERE THESE CHANGES TAKE TIME. SAVIMBI IS A FORCE IN ANGOLA, BUT HE HAS TOLD US DIRECTLY THAT HE CANNOT MARCH INTO LUANDA AND TAKE OVER. THE BIGGER PLAN VIS A VIS 20,000 CUBANS MAY MAKE DISCUSSION OF SAVIMBI'S SUCCESS OR FAILURE ACADEMIC. WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CUBANS WILL GO HOME.

15. BOTHA RESPONDED THAT THE CUBANS ARE HATED BY THE MPLA. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHETHER THE CUBANS, WHO KEPT MPLA IN POWER, WERE HATED OR LOVED,

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE U.S. HAD OTHER PRESSURES TO BRING TO THE SITUATION. BUT THE U.S. MUST HAVE SOME ASSURANCES FROM SOUTH AFRICA. WE CANNOT GO BACK TO THE CONTACT GROUP WITH SUPPOSITIONS ON THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

16. FOURIE CAME BACK TO HIS PREVIOUS QUESTION WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF A SWAPO VICTORY. BOTHA ASSERTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT TAKE THE RISK. IF SOUTH AFRICA HAD TO PUT THE WHOLE REGION IN ASH AND FLAMES, IT WOULD DO SO.

17. CROCKER RESPONDED THAT U.S. INTERESTS DICTATED A MAXIMUM OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, OR OUR INTERESTS SUFFERED. FOR THE U.S., A PRINCIPAL REASON FOR CONCENTRATION ON NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA IS BECAUSE THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS MUST GO HOME. THEY WILL REMAIN AS LONG AS THE PESTERING SORE OF NAMIBIA CONTINUES.

18. BOTHA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. CONCERNS, BUT NO ONE HAD TOLD HIM WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO. CRUCKER RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. FOCUS WAS ON THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE, AND SOUTH AFRICA MUST BELIEVE WE ARE TAKING IT SERIOUSLY. AFTER BOTHA ONCE MORE ASKED FOR AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASSERTED CATEGORICALLY THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT WILLING TO TAKE A RISK, THE U.S. COULD GO NO FURTHER.

19. ABRAMS SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA MUST KNOW THE NEW POINT OF VIEW IN WASHINGTON. AS OPPOSED TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WHICH VIEWED THE WORLD IN A NORTH/SOUTH PRISM, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SEES AS ITS PRINCIPAL FOCUS THE EAST/WEST CONFLICT. THE U.S. WILL ROLL BACK COMMUNISM. THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES FOR A NAMIBIA POLICY. WE COULD ALL DO NOTHING. AND SAG WOULD RETAIN PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER NAMIBIA. THE RISKS WERE VERY HIGH HERE. OUR POLICY IS ONE OF ACTIVISM -- WE WILL DEAL WITH THE ANGULANS, AND ENLIST OTHER AFRICANS TO GET THE CUBANS OUT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL DEAL WITH NAMIBIA AND TRY THROUGH

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GUARANTEES OR AGREEMENTS TO CONTROL THE FUTURE AT LEAST IN PART. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY IS CONFIDENT HE CAN WORK ON BOTH QUESTIONS CONCURRENTLY, AND GAIN LEVERAGE PROGRESSIVELY AS WE GO DOWN THE ROAD. BOTHA SAID IT APPEARED THE U.S. THEN WOULD GET THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA AND THE SOVIETS WOULD INSTALL THEMSELVES IN NAMIBIA. CLARK SAID HE DETECTED NO SIGN THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS READY TO MOVE. SOUTH AFRICA HAD SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY ON UNTAG. THE U.S. NEEDS THAT FLEXIBILITY FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

20. BOTHA SAID IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY "ONE BLUE HELMET" IN NAMIBIA. THAT WAS THE POSITION GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON, AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO MISLEAD THE US. ABRAMS RESPONDED THAT THERE MUST BE A MIDDLE GROUND WHICH WILL BE SALEABLE TO OTHER PARTIES. DEFENSE MINISTER MALAN ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD STILL BE A GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN UNTAG.

21. BOTHA SAID HE FELT THE CONFUSION WAS BEGINNING TO BE RESOLVED. HE HAD BEEN LABORING UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE REAGAN TICKET HAD RUN ON A POLICY OF TOTAL UNSLAUGHT AGAINST THE SOVIETS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THE UNITED STATES WAS FAR AWAY FROM THAT POSITION. IT WAS CLEAR SOUTH WEST AFRICA WAS FAR FROM U.S. AND ESPECIALLY EUROPEAN CONCERNS. THE CONTACT GROUP WAS READY TO PULL OUT AND "LEAVE THE U.S. WITH THE BABY". HOWEVER, BOTHA SAID HE APPRECIATED THE U.S. APPROACH. THE U.S. HAD STRUCK OUT ITS NECK FOR SOUTH AFRICA. THE SURVIVAL OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN THE FACE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT DEPENDED ON THE

U.S. ABRAMS ASKED IF THE SAG POSITION ON NAMIBIA WOULD CHANGE, AND ITS ESTIMATE OF NAMIBIA'S FUTURE, IF THE CUBANS WERE OUT OF ANGOLA. BOTHA SAID THAT WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING. BOTHA THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE TALKS THE FOLLOWING DAY SHOULD CONSIDER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND GUARANTEES.

22. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS SO FAR.
IF THERE WAS NO SOUTH AFRICA FLEXIBILITY ON THE
CEASEFIRE AND UNTAG, THE U.S. WOULD "CLOSE THE BOOK" ON
FURTHER NEGOTIATION. STOESEL

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E.O. 12005: RDS-1 6/10/01, (BREMER, L. PAUL) S/S

TAGS: PGOV, FR, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CLAUDE CHEYSSON

1. SECRETARY HAIG MET WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, JUNE 6, 1981, AT 1000 A.M.

PARTICIPANTS

FRENCH
CLAUDE CHEYSSON, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FRANCOIS DE LABOULAYE, AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

US
SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUR

2. CHEYSSON REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT MITTERHAND WAS PRE-
PARED TO MEET WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT IN PARIS ON JUNE 24;
THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIM A SMALL WORKING LUNCH,

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOLLOWED BY A TELE-A-TELE. THE SECRETARY INSTRUCTED EAGLEBURGER TO CHECK OUT THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO SEE IF AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT COULD BE MADE WHEN CHEYSSON AND THE SECRETARY MET THE PRESS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING. EAGLEBURGER MADE

THE REQUISITE CHECKS AND REPORTED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE MADE. LATER, DURING THE MORE WIDELY ATTENDED SESSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND MINISTER CHEYSSON, AN ANNOUNCEMENT (LAST PARAGRAPH) WAS AGREED UPON.

3. CHEYSSON THEN TURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF LIBYA, REMARKING THAT FRANCE MIGHT WELL BE USEFUL THERE, SINCE QADHAFI HAD SENT MITTERRAND AN 10-PAGE MESSAGE EXTOLLING FRENCH SOCIALISM, PROMISING OIL AND OTHER SUPPORT, ETC. IN ADDITION JALLUD HAD SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO CHEYSSON. THUS, SAID CHEYSSON, THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH QADHAFI AND OTHER SENIOR LIBYANS THROUGH FRANCE. CHEYSSON ADDED THAT BOTH GENSCHER AND THE ITALIANS HAD PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH QADHAFI. CHEYSSON INDICATED THAT, WHILE THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO CONDUCT DISCUSS WITH QADHAFI, IN PART ON OUR BEHALF, IT WAS STILL IMPORTANT TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. THE ANSWERS TO THOSE TWO QUESTIONS, FOR NOW, WERE STILL A "MYSTERY" SO FAR AS CHEYSSON WAS CONCERNED. A PREREQUISITE TO ANY SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE THAT WE MUST KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WE WANT TO DO WITH LIBYA AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACCOMPLISH WITH SUCH TALKS. WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS QADHAFI "UNBEARABLE." ACCORDING TO CHEYSSON A PARTIAL ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WOULD INCLUDE:

-- ASSISTANCE TO TERRORISM, WHICH IS A MAJOR, VIRTUALLY OVERRIDING, ISSUE.

-- LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA.

-- THE CHAD.

-- MALI, MAURITANIA, AND SUDAN.

4. CHEYSSON ASKED THAT WE TRY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HERE IN WASHINGTON TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF WHICH QADHAFI ACTIVITIES WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND TO PROVIDE A LIST TO THE FRENCH THEREAFTER. THE FRENCH, IN TURN, MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH QADHAFI OR PEOPLE NEXT TO HIM, THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS, THE LIST OF AMERICAN COMPLAINTS. PERHAPS SOMETHING COULD COME FROM THIS EFFORT; IF IT DID, THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH MORE NORMAL CONTACT WITH TRIPOLI. FRENCH EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF MIGHT PRODUCE SOMETHING, THEN AGAIN THEY MIGHT NOT.

5. SECRETARY HAIG REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE AN "EXCELLENT APPROACH," SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SQUARE THINGS AWAY WITH QADHAFI. HE REMARKED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED QADHAFI WITH THE SOVIETS A NUMBER OF TIMES AND THAT THEY HAD REPLIED THAT HE WAS A MADMAN AND BASICALLY "YOUR PROBLEM." IN AN ASIDE HAIG SAID HE HAD RECEIVED BASICALLY THE SAME ANSWER FROM THE SOVIETS ABOUT CASTRO, EXCEPT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ADDED IN THIS CASE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED "WHERE WE HAVE AGREEMENTS." AGREEMENTS, ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY, REFERRED TO ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTED IN 1962 (CUBA) WHICH REFER ONLY TO INVASION.

6. RETURNING TO QADHAFI, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT WE AND THE FRENCH LOOK, TOGETHER, FOR THE "BOTTOM LINE" AND THEN MAKE AN APPROACH TO QADHAFI. IF WE DO NOT, HE SAID, THERE IS A GREAT DANGER THAT SADAT WILL MOVE. CHEYSSON SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL NEVER TELL SADAT THAT HE SHOULD NOT DO SO. CHEYSSON REMARKED THAT A SADAT MOVE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND THAT WE SHOULD SOON DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH QADHAFI, ALTHOUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT ABLE TO OFFER ANY ASSURANCE THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LIBYAN LEADER WOULD LEAD TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME. CHEYSSON THEN REITERATED THE NEED TO EXAMINE WHAT LIBYAN CONDUCT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND WHAT CONDITIONS WE MIGHT DEMAND THAT QADHAFI MEET. "WE MUST KNOW WHAT WE WANT; IT IS HARD NOW TO KNOW WHAT OUR POLICY IS OR SHOULD BE."

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. WITH REGARD TO THE CHAD, MINISTER CHEYSSON REITERATED WHAT HE HAD SAID ON THURSDAY AFTERNOON WITH REGARD TO THE NEED TO CONSULT NEIGHBORS BEFORE DECIDING ON WHAT ACTION TO TAKE. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD ALREADY SENT MISSIONS TO A NUMBER OF AFRICAN STATES TO DISCUSS POLICY TOWARD THE CHAD, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT NOT COME BACK WITH CLEAR IDEAS, AT LEAST THE REPLIES WOULD ASSIST HIM IN DEFINING POLICY TOWARD THE CHAD.

8. SECRETARY HAIG EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT FRANCE REMAIN STEADY ON THE CHAD, OTHERWISE, QADHAFI WAS LIKELY TO ANNEX THOSE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH HIS TROOPS NOW OCCUPY. CHEYSSON REPLIED THAT THE CHAD AND THE WESTERN SAHARA WERE GOING TO BE PARTICULARLY TOUGH QUESTIONS BUT "WE WILL BE FIRM ON SOME BROAD PRINCIPLES OF LAW." THESE PRINCIPLES, ACCORDING TO CHEYSSON, WOULD INCLUDE "POPULARCONSULTATIONS" (CONSULTATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS OF THOSE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED) AND FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-

DETERMINATION.

9. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE GOM HAD ALREADY TOLD THE KING OF MOROCCO THAT IF IT WAS TO SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION ELSEWHERE IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO SUPPORT THAT PRINCIPLE WITH REGARD TO THE POLISARIO. "THE KING IS MODERATE," SAID CHEYSSON, "BUT WE NEVERTHELESS NEED TO PUSH HIM. HE CAN MOVE, BUT NO ONE ELSE WITHIN THE GOM CAN. CHEYSSON WENT ON TO SAY THAT ALGERIA IS ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF ITS CONFRONTATION WITH MOROCCO. QADHAFI HELPS IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE OF HIS ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT THE ISSUE OF SAHARAN UNITY WHICH HAS FRIGHTENED THE ALGERIANS. QADHAFI'S PUSH WITH REGARD TO THE TUAREGS HAS UPSET NOT ONLY ALGERIA, BUT MALI AND NIGER AS WELL.

10. SECRETARY HAIG SAID THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE KING OF MOROCCO AND WILL DO OUR BEST TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE APPRECIATED HIS STRONG POSITION EARLIER IN ZAIRE AND RECOGNIZE HE IS FACING EVER MORE SOPHISTICATED ARMS IN THE HANDS OF THE POLISARIO. WE WANT TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA, BUT WE HAD TO GO

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AHEAD WITH SOME "UNFULFILLED DEALS" WITH MOROCCO THAT WERE LEFT OVER FROM THE CARTER PERIOD. WITH REGARD TO THE POLISARIO, THERE IS, SAID SECRETARY HAIG, THE POTENTIAL FOR A SETTLEMENT AND SOME FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE CALENDAR IS AGAINST THE KING.

11. CHEYSSON AGREED AND REMARKED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND THAT MOROCCANS HAD BEEN INVOLVED RECENTLY IN MAURITANIA ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE KING KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON. IF THE MOROCCANS SUPPORTED COUP IN MAURITANIA HAD SUCCEEDED, THE KING WOULD BE IN AN EVEN "WORSE MESS" BECAUSE A GOODLY PART OF AFRICA WOULD HAVE TURNED AGAINST HIM.

12. THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT QADHAFI CONTINUES TO BE THE REAL PROBLEM IN NORTHERN AFRICA? OTHER PROBLEMS ARE MANAGEABLE. INDEED, QADHAFI'S ACTIVITIES HAD HAD SOME BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS TUNISIA, EGYPT, MOROCCO AND ALGERIA, SINCE THEY HAD ALL BEEN FRIGHTENED BY QADHAFI'S ADVENTURISM.

13. IN SAUDI ARABIA WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE A CHANGE IN DIRECTION. THEY ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH EGYPT -- AND ISRAEL -- TOWARD CREATING A NEW SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. "THEY KNOW THAT OTHERWISE THEY, TOO, WILL BE VICTIMS."

14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THAT QADHAFI IS NOT WHOLLY A SOVIET TOOL AND THAT IN MANY AREAS QADHAFI DOES NOT LIKE THE SOVIETS AND THE SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE BRIEF FOR QADHAFI. BUT, SAID THE SECRETARY, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO CUT OUT SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WHICH WOULD THEN BE AGREED WITH THE U.S. THAT, SAID THE SECRETARY, IS NOT A GAME WE INTEND TO PLAY. BUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL SINCE IT IS LIKELY THAT SHOULD THE SOVIETS DECIDE THE U.S. IS HELPING INSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN THEY WOULD MOVE AGAINST PAKISTAN OR IRAN.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

15. CHEYSSON THEN RAISED AGAIN THE QUESTION OF TERRORISM, INDICATING THAT IT WAS THE FIRST ISSUE THAT MUST BE PUT TO QADHAFI. GENSCHER SAID CHEYSSON HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THAT THE U.S. HAS THE FACTS ON QADHAFI'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND ASKED IF THIS WAS TRUE.

16. SECRETARY HAIG REPLIED YES, WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF QADHAFI'S SUPPORT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ABROAD. WE ALSO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS, TOO, ARE EXTREMELY ACTIVE -- EVEN TO INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE BASQUES.

17. CHEYSSON, EVIDENCING SUBSTANTIAL CONCERN AND SURPRISE, ASKED IF WE INDEED HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET CONNIVANCE WITH THE BASQUES. THE SECRETARY REPLIED "WE HAVE HARD EVIDENCE." HE ALSO SAID THAT WE HAVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT WING IN SPAIN AS WELL.

18. CHEYSSON ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE SOME OF THE EVIDENCE LINKING THE SOVIETS AND BASQUE TERRORISTS, REMARKING THAT THE BASQUES WERE GOING TO BE A "VERY TOUGH PROBLEM FOR US IN PARIS, WHERE SOME OF US ARE UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM THEM." HE FURTHER ASKED IF WE HAD EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN SUPPORT OF THE BASQUES. THE SECRETARY REPLIED NO, AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE MINISTER CHEYSSON WITH EVIDENCE OF SOVIET-BASQUE LINKAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

19. ANNOUNCEMENT: DURING MINISTER CHEYSSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN YESTERDAY, THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH VISIT PARIS SOON, EMPHASIZING HIS HOPE THAT WE COULD ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AT AN EARLY DATE.

MINISTER CHEYSSON TODAY EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE VICE PRESIDENT TO VISIT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ON JUNE 24. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION WITH PLEASURE. STOESEL

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SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CLAUDE CHEYSSON

1. SECRETARY HAIG MET WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, JUNE 6, 1981, AT 11:00.

PARTICIPANTS

FRENCH
CLAUDE CHEYSSON, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FRANCOIS DE LABOULAYE, AMB. TO THE US
PHILIPPE CUVILLIER, DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, MFA
JEAN-PIERRE CABOUAT, PRESS SPOKESMAN
YANNICK GERARD, COUNSELOR, FRENCH EMBASSY
M. FERRIN DE BRICHAMBAULT, MINISTER'S CABINET

US
SECRETARY HAIG
AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
JOHN J. MARESCA, DIRECTOR, EUR (NOTETAKER)

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. AFRICA

AFTER JOINING THE LARGER GROUP, CHEYSSON SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COVER SOME ADDITIONAL AFRICAN ISSUES, SUCH AS ZAIRE AND THE HORN, THE MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND CAMBODIA. BEGINNING WITH AFRICA, CHEYSSON SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID BEFORE--WHERE THERE ARE COMMITMENTS, THE NEW GUF WILL MEET THEM. THIS APPLIES IN ZAIRE AND ELSEWHERE, AND INCLUDES MILITARY COMMITMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, GABON HAD ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO ASKED FOR TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE, AND A TRANSALL WAS IMMEDIATELY SENT, JUST AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER THE PREVIOUS GUF. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WAS A MILITARY MANEUVER IN ZAIRE; FRENCH OFFICERS WERE PARTICIPATING JUST AS THEY WOULD HAVE DONE PREVIOUSLY. AS FOR THE FUTURE, CHEYSSON SAID THE GUF DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ITS POLICIES WILL BE; IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR THEM TO DECIDE. CHEYSSON INDICATED THE GUF INTENDED TO HAVE "SYMPATHETIC CONSULTATIONS" WITH THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. INDICATING THAT THIS POINT WAS CONFIDENTIAL, CHEYSSON SAID THAT JEAN-PIERRE COT HAD ALREADY SENT MESSAGES TO AHIDJO AND OTHER LEADERS TO ASK THEIR VIEWS ON CHAD.

3. THE FRENCH WOULD TRY NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT DECISIONS ON ISSUES AFFECTING THESE COUNTRIES ARE SIMPLY TAKEN FOR THEM IN PARIS; THE GUF WILL PREFER TO BE CALLED ON FOR SUPPORT. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, THE GUF WILL TRY TO CONDUCT ITS POLICIES AS PART OF A LARGER FRAMEWORK. THIS IS THE GENERAL APPROACH CHEYSSON HAD WANTED TO REITERATE, AND IT DID NOT EXCLUDE THAT THE GUF WOULD ENTER ACTUAL OPERATIONS IN AFRICA.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENCES OF STYLE, THE FRENCH RULE HAS BEEN VERY IMPORTANT IN AFRICA. IT HAS BEEN ATTUNED TO STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS, AND MORE CONSIDERATION OF THE VIEWS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WILL BE A POSITIVE ADDITION. THE U.S. WANTS TO DO THE SAME. DESPITE ALL THE PITFALLS, THE SECRETARY SAW NO MAJOR DIFFICULTY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRENCH VIEWS ON THIS AREA.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. ZAIRE

THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD REPORTS THAT TROUBLE MAY BE BREWING AGAIN IN ZAIRE, POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY LIBYAN MONEY. IF FRANCE WERE TO WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE, THIS WOULD LEAVE A POWER VACUUM WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO FILL. MOBUTU HAD SENT A REPRESENTATIVE TO WASHINGTON THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT MOBUTU

IS NOT A DEMOCRATIC LEADER. THE U.S. HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HIM, BUT WE SEE NO VALID ALTERNATIVE. (CHEYSSON INTERJECTED THAT MOBUTU WOULD SEE THAT WE DUN'T FIND ONE). THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT WE HAD INCREASED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS HAVE HELPED MILITARILY. HE SAID HE WOULD HATE TO SEE A SUDDEN OPPORTUNITY DEVELOP WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO NEW TROUBLE IN KATANGA.

6. CHEYSSON AGREED THAT ZAIRE WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM-- "A SWAMP." WE NEED MOBUTU BUT CANNOT TRUST HIM; THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT SEPARATE POLITICAL FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED SEEMED TO BE TO PUSH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OUT FRONT. CHEYSSON RECALLED THAT HE HAD MADE THIS POINT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT. THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE IN A POSITION TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO THEIR ASSISTANCE. THE ZAIRIANS THEN HAD TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS. THE FRENCH WISHED TO CONSULT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WHO ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH ZAIRE. MUGABE COULD BE THREATENED BY EVENTS IN ZAIRE. ZAMBIA IS NON-EXISTENT, AND ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR KAUNDA, HE HAS NO CONTROL OVER HIS COUNTRY. THUS THE ONLY STATE CHEYSSON THOUGHT WAS "SOLID" IN THAT AREA IS ZIMBABWE. PERHAPS IN A NUMBER OF YEARS ANGOLA WOULD ALSO BE "SOLID." NETU WAS A GREAT MAN BUT IS DEAD NOW AND WE WILL MISS HIM. CHEYSSON NOTED THAT MANY PEOPLE THINK THE RUSSIANS KILLED NETU. CHEYSSON REPEATED THAT ZAIRE IS AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM WHICH WE MUST DEAL WITH "YEAR AFTER YEAR WITHOUT ILLUSIONS."

7. ZIMBABWE

THE SECRETARY SAID BOIHA WANTS ZIMBABWE TO SUCCEED BUT IS WORRIED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC REFORMS BEING PUT INTO PLACE.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BOTHA SEES THE COUNTRY SLIPPING INTO COMMUNAL ATTITUDES. COMMUNICATIONS ARE DETERIORATING. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD TOLD BOTHA WE WOULD WORK TO KEEP ZIMBABWE STRONG AND PROGRESSIVE. WE ARE SORRY MUGABE INVITED THE NORTH KOREANS IN. THE BRITISH ARE ALSO UPSET ABOUT THIS, AND PERHAPS MUGABE REGRETS THAT HE DID THIS.

8. CHEYSSON COMMENTED THAT THE BRITISH "ARE NOT THE BEST INTRODUCTION" IN ZIMBABWE. THE GERMANS ARE WELL RESPECTED AND HAVE A GOOD NAME. THE EC ALSO HAS A GOOD NAME, BUT LIMITED MEANS. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS THAT FRANCE ALSO HAVE A GOOD NAME IN ZIMBABWE. CHEYSSON CONTINUED THAT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA NAMIBIA IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT PRIORITY. A DISTANT SECOND WAS THE CONSOLIDATION

OF ZIMBABWE, THEN "SAVING" THE LANDLOCKED NATION

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9. NAMIBIA

THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A ROLE FOR ZIMBABWE AS A GUARANTOR FOR NAMIBIA IF THE NAMIBIA SOLUTION WAS FOLDED INTO THE UN. THE SECRETARY SAID WE UNDERSTOOD MUGABE WOULD RECEIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK, BUT WERE WAITING TO HAVE THIS CONFIRMED. THE CLARK TRIP WAS AIMED TO ELICIT GREATER FLEXIBILITY FROM SOUTH AFRICA, SO THAT THERE MIGHT NOT HAVE TO BE AN IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE, BUT RATHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD ACCEPT THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AND NOT LET THAT BE AN OBSTACLE TO GETTING SOME CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES. AS SOON AS WE HAVE THIS GREATER FLEXIBILITY WE CAN DECIDE WHERE TO GO FROM THERE. THE PROCESS COULD ALSO LEAD TO GETTING THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA.

10. CHEYSSON RECALLED THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED THAT, FOLLOWING THE CLARK MISSION, THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER FRENCH-U.S. DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. CHEYSSON STIPULATED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT PUT THEIR AUTHORITY BEHIND A SCHEME WHICH THEY DID NOT YET KNOW. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRANCE COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE IN DIFFERENT PLACES. FRENCH SUPPORT IS POSSIBLE, BUT DEPENDS ON DIRECT CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON. AS TO THE TIMETABLE,

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE SHOULD BE READY TO MOVE IN 2-3 MONTHS. (THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED "VERY GOOD").

11. CAR
MOVING NORTH, CHEYSSON REFERRED TO THE CAR. FRANCE HAS KEPT ITS FORCES THERE AND THE NEW GOP HOPES THAT IN A FEW WEEKS IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SEE FURTHER INTO THE FUTURE. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS. THE U.S. WAS PLEASED WITH THE FRENCH ACTION IN THE CAR. CHEYSSON SAID THE NEW GOP IS NOT PLEASED THAT FRANCE TOOK THAT ACTION ALONE, BUT HE REFLECTED IRONICALLY THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHO WOULD HAVE GONE IN WITH FRANCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS "VERY COMFORTABLE" WITH HIS DISCUSSION WITH CHEYSSON ON AFRICA.

12. THE HORN
CHEYSSON THEN TURNED TO THE HORN, NOTING THAT HE HAS AN OPENING TO MENGISTU WHICH HE COULD USE AT SOME TIME WHEN THE GULF COUNTRIES WERE READY, HE COULD STEP IN. CHEYSSON WAS VERY PLEASED THAT MENGISTU HAD AGREED THAT AID TO ETHIOPIA COULD BE ARRANGED ON A REGIONAL BASIS. CHEYSSON SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS ETHIOPIA WITH NIMEIRI. THEY MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS REFUGEES. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE

POSSIBILITIES FOR RESETTLING REFUGEES ACROSS THE BORDER IN ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA AND DJIBOUTI. THE UN MIGHT PLAY A ROLE AT SOME POINT. THIS IDEA SEEMED TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING SIAD BARRE. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET NIMEIRI TOGETHER WITH MENGISTU AND ALSO TO HAVE A DE FACTO RECOGNITION BY SIAD BARRE OF THE BORDER WITH ETHIOPIA. CHEYSSON REFLECTED THAT ETHIOPIA IS AN OLD COUNTRY WHERE NATIONALIST FEELING IS STRONG. THIS OF COURSE IS NOT ENOUGH TO GET THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS OUT, BUT IT MAY BE LESS HOPELESS THAN IT NOW LOOKS.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD A VISIT THE PREVIOUS WEEK FROM SIAD BARRE, (HE CAME FOR A MEDICAL EXAM SINCE HE RECEIVED NO INVITATION). THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD SPENT TWO HOURS WITH SIAD BARRE, AND HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS FOR HELP. WE HAD AGREED TO GIVE HIM A MODEST AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL MONEY. WE MAY ALSO POSSIBLY USE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE CASE THERE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD URGED SIAD BARRE TO WORK OUT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH MENGISTU. (CHEYSSON INTERJECTED "I'M PLEASED YOU DID.") THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT SIAD BARRE WOULD DO. THE SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT HE ALSO HAS A PROBLEM WITH KENYA, AND HE HAD URGED SIAD BARRE TO BE CAUTIOUS THERE. HE WOULD CONTINUE TO HELP KENYA, WHICH WAS A MODERATE FORCE IN THE REGION.

14. CHEYSSON SAID IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO RECALL THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE IMPORTANT TO ETHIOPIA BECAUSE THEY CONTROL INTERNAL SECURITY. IN A NUMBER OF PLACES, IN FACT, THIS IS THE KEY TO THE RUSSIAN FOOTHOLD: CONTROL OF INTERNAL SECURITY. CHEYSSON CITED MOZAMBIQUE, YEMEN, AND SYRIA AS EXAMPLES WHERE THIS WAS THE CASE. WHEN LEADERS ARE INSECURE AT HOME, THEY DEPEND ON THE RUSSIANS. WE SHOULD KEEP THIS IN MIND.

15. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH THIS POINT, WHICH HE SAID WAS CRUCIAL. THIS HAD BEEN THE FUNDAMENTAL FAILURE OF THE CARIER ADMINISTRATION. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE OUR ONLY INTEREST IN THEIR AREA WAS TO BE ABLE TO GET OUR OIL THROUGH THE HORMUZ STRAITS. THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF THESE REGIMES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, AND WE SHOULD, TOO.

16. MIDDLE EAST

CHEYSSON THEN TURNED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, STATING THAT THE POSITIONS THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS HAVE TAKEN PUBLICLY WOULD BE THE STARTING POINT FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES.

THE GUF WOULD BE BOUND BY THESE DECLARATIONS. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MANY GOVERNMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOCIALISTS BELIEVE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HAS PRODUCED THE ONLY PROGRESS IN THE SITUATION, AND THERE IS ROOM FOR MORE PROGRESS IN CAMP DAVID. WITH REGARD TO OTHER INITIATIVES, CHEYSSON SAID THE GUF WANTS MORE TIME TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES. ALSO, THEY WOULD AWAIT THE RESULTS OF THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. IF LABOR IS ELECTED, THE FRENCH DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE CHANGES IN ISRAELI POLICY. BUT THE LABOR PARTY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WANTS TO LIVE WITH OPEN BORDERS. THIS WOULD BE A DIFFERENCE FROM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THERE WOULD BE A BETTER CHANCE TO DISCUSS IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. THE NEW GOP WOULD BRING NOTHING NEW TO THE PROBLEM BUT WOULD APPROACH IT WITH AN OPEN MIND AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING IT WITH BOTH SIDES. CHEYSSON SAID THERE WAS NOTHING MORE HE COULD SAY AT THIS TIME.

17. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD HAD RATHER INTENSE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE WITH CHEYSSON'S PREDECESSOR. THERE WAS DEEP SKEPTICISM ON THE ISRAELI SIDE REGARDING THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE--A BELIEF THAT IT IS DRIVEN BY A DESIRE FOR ARAB OIL. BUT ALL THE SECRETARY HAD FOUND WITH REGARD TO THE EC INITIATIVE WAS EXPLORATORY EFFORTS. THERE WERE ALSO OTHER EFFORTS USING THIRD PARTIES WHICH HAD COME UP WITH CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE NOT WELCOME. THE U.S. BELIEVES CAMP DAVID CAN BE RE-INVIGORATED AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS; THAT THE PROCESS CAN BRING FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND POSSIBLY GET AUTONOMY TALKS STARTED. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HELP SADAT, WHO THINKS THAT THE OTHER ARABAS WILL BEGIN TO COME TO HIM. THE QUESTION IS WHERE WE GO FROM THERE--WHAT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE ADDRESSED NEXT. SOME OF THE MODERATE ARABAS BELIEVE WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TACKLE THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM. SADAT'S JUDGEMENT MIGHT BE THE SAME. BEGIN HAS SOME CONCESSIONS HE CAN MAKE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS WHOEVER IS ELECTED WILL KNOW HE HAS TO MOVE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD URGED THE EUROPEANS TO DO NOTHING UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS WHEN WE WILL SEE WHETHER WE CAN MOVE CAMP DAVID FORWARD.

18. CHEYSSON SAID THAT MEANWHILE WE HAVE TO AVOID DRAMATIC EVENTS. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE HABIB MISSION WHICH DEFUSES A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT HABIB WOULD BRIEF FRENCH OFFICIALS IN PARIS ENROUTE BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST. CHEYSSON SAID FRANCE HAD A DUTY TO THE LEBANESE AND WILL

TRY TO GIVE ASSISTANCE, MAINLY MORE FOOD AID AND SPARE PART SUPPLIES. THE FRENCH WOULD INSIST THAT WHENEVER THE MIDDLE EAST IS DISCUSSED, LEBANON SHOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

19. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT TOTALLY OPTIMISTIC. IN A WAY WE ARE OPERATING WITH MIRRORS. WHETHER THE SAUDIS CAN PUT SOMETHING TOGETHER IS A REAL QUESTION. THEY COULD EXPEND THEIR PRESTIGE TO NO AVAIL. IF THERE IS NO SOLUTION, AND NO PROSPECT OF PROGRESS THE ISRAELIS COULD MOVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THE PLO IS AN UNKNOWN FACTOR. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN URGING A REAFFIRMATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE AS A FORM OF EARLY SUCCESS, IN ORDER TO DEPOSE THE SITUATION AND TO DEVELOP MOMENTUM.

20. CHEYSSON ASKED IF IT WAS REALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE BEGIN. IF OPEN FIGHTING BROKE OUT IT WOULD BE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS. BEGIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN HELPFUL IN ANY WAY. CHEYSSON AGREED AND ASKED WHY THEY SHOULD BE, SINCE IT WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO MAINTAIN THE UNCERTAINTY AND TENSION. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD KEEP THE FRENCH INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS. CHEYSSON SAID THE FRENCH WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL, RECOGNIZING THEIR LIMITATIONS. FRANCE COULD DISCUSS THE ISSUES WITH BOTH SIDES, AND THAT WAS IMPORTANT.

21. CHEYSSON CONTINUED THAT MITTERRAND HAD SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE GULF COUNTRIES AND IRAQ AND JORDAN. NO PERSONAL MESSENGERS WERE SENT TO THE THREE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY SHOOTING, BUT A LETTER WAS SENT TO BEGIN WHICH SAYS JUST ABOUT THE SAME THING. THIS IS THE FIRST LETTER SENT BY A FRENCH PRESIDENT TO AN ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER IN SEVEN YEARS (NOTE: GISCARD'S TERM OF OFFICE).

22. THE CONTENT OF THE LETTER IS THE SAME AS LETIERS WHICH WENT TO LEBANON AND SYRIA. IT INSISTS ON THE NEED FOR SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL, AND ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS, TO HAVE A HOMELAND. THERE WAS NOT ONE WORD BEYOND THE EC POSITION. SADAT WAS VERY PLEASED, AND IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS VERY PLEASED. THIS EFFORT WAS SYSTEMATIC. THE FRENCH WERE TRYING TO RE-

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONFIRM THEIR POSITION. THERE WAS NO LETTER TO ARAFAT. A PROTOCOLAIRE REPLY WAS SENT IN RESPONSE TO ARAFAT'S CONGRATULATIONS FOR MITTERRAND'S ELECTION. MITTERRAND

WAS PREPARED TO VISIT ISRAEL "WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT." EXACTLY THE SAME PHRASEOLOGY WAS USED IN THE MESSAGE TO KING KHALID REGARDING A POSSIBLE VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. MITTERRAND COULD VISIT BOTH COUNTRIES, AND ANNOUNCE THE VISITS SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE WOULD GO WHEN THE VISITS WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE, AND THIS WAS NOT YET THE CASE. THE ARABS SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THIS VERY WELL. HASSAN APPROVED THE FRENCH APPROACH.

23. ON IRAQ, CHEYSSON SAID THAT WHERE A CONTRACT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE GOF, THE NEW GOF WOULD EXECUTE IT. THIS APPLIED TO THE OSIRAK REACTOR, BUT THE FRENCH HAD INDICATED TO THE IRAQIS THAT THEY MAY WANT TO HAVE ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS, SO THAT THERE CAN BE NO STOCKPILING, AND TO PREVENT UNAPPROVED REPROCESSING. THE MESSENGER WHO WENT TO IRAQ CONFIRMED THAT FRANCE WOULD CARRY OUT THE CONTRACT IF ALL ITS PROVISIONS WERE FULFILLED, BUT THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT HAVE NEW CONDITIONS. THE FRENCH WOULD NEGOTIATE ON THIS MATTER. THE FRENCH HAD ALSO TOLD THE ISRAELIS THEY HAD TAKEN THIS LINE.

24. CHEYSSON SAID THE GOF WOULD ALSO EXECUTE ARMS CONTRACTS, EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT HAVE TO "SWALLOW HARD." THEY WOULD CARRY OUT CONTRACTS WITH ARGENTINA. THERE WERE NO CONTRACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND THERE WOULD BE NO NEW ONES. THERE WOULD BE NO NEW CONTRACTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE TIME BEING, AND THE FRENCH WOULD SEE WHAT DEVELOPS LATER.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. POSITION REMAINS THE SAME. OVER THE LONG TERM WE WANT TO KEEP IRAN AT LEAST COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN INTERESTS. CHEYSSON ASKED IF THE U.S. WOULD SUPPLY AWACS TO THE SAUDIS. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD DO SO. THE DISCUSSIONS GO BACK TO 1976. IT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT FIGHT IN CONGRESS, BUT IF WE CAN GET SOME ASSURANCES (E.G., SHARING OF THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERED, ETC.), IT MAY BE POSSIBLE. THIS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD BE AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND WHEN WE HAVE SORTED OUT THE OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR THE AIRCRAFT.

26. PERSIAN GULF.

CHEYSSON SAID THAT NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD "NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS" ON THE NAVAL FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA OR DJIBOUTI. THE DJIBOUTIANS HAD NOT ASKED THE FRENCH TO LEAVE AND THE FRENCH DO NOT INTEND TO DO SO.

27. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS GRATEFUL THAT THE FRENCH ARE THERE. HE REMARKED THAT THE OMANIS APPRECIATE THE SECURITY GUARANTEES WHICH THE PRESENCE OF WESTERN

FORCES PROVIDES, AND THIS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE GULF STATES ORGANIZATION.

28. CHEYSSON SAID THE GUF INTENDED TO BE VERY ACTIVE COMMERCIALY IN THAT AREA, AND THE RESULT WOULD BE MORE COMPETITION. HE ANTICIPATED THAT FRANCE WOULD HAVE A BETTER PLACE IN THE MARKET THAN BEFORE. CHEYSSON WOULD MEET THE THREE GULF STATE FINANCE MINISTERS SOON. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE FRENCH INTENTION TO COMPETE.

29. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WOULD ALSO COMPETE HARD. HE NOTED IT WAS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD DO ANYTHING TO WEAKEN THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA. CHEYSSON SAID FRANCE ALSO DID NOT WANT THE ARABS TO WITHDRAW THEIR DEPOSITS IN FRENCH BANKS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH PROBLEM.

30. AFGHANISTAN.

ON AFGHANISTAN, CHEYSSON SAID FRANCE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LAUNCHING A CONFERENCE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS AND OTHERS.

31. KAMPUCHEA.

CHEYSSON REMARKED THAT A CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA MAY BE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEVOID OF MUCH MEANING.

32. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE GOING TO THAT AREA AND WOULD DISCUSS IT. THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT ASEAN, AND THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD GO TO A CONFERENCE IF IT TAKES PLACE, THOUGH HE WAS SKEPTICAL. THE U.S. WANTS TO BE HELPFUL, BUT TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. WE WON'T ACCEPT A POL POT SOLUTION, AND THE SECRETARY WOULD MAKE THAT CLEAR IN PEKING. WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE A UNITED FRONT REPRESENTING ALL PARTIES.

33. CHEYSSON SAID THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA WAS BLOCKED, AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE AN INTEREST IN KEEPING IT THAT WAY. IT IS CHEAP FOR THEM, AND IT KEEPS VIETNAM ISOLATED. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO HAVE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WHILE THE VIETNAMESE ARE IN CAMBODIA. FRANCE COULD NOT INCREASE FOOD AID, SINCE THAT WOULD SEND A WRONG SIGNAL, THOUGH CHEYSSON SAID HE REGRETTED THAT FOOD AID HAD BEEN CUT OFF.

34. THE SECRETARY SAID HANOI WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN CAMBODIA -- THEY WILL JUST BLEED. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS "HEAVEN" FOR THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY DEMURRED, SAYING THAT IF ONE ADDS THIS BURDEN TO WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING IN AFGHANISTAN, ETHIOPIA, ETC., IT IS VERY COSTLY FOR THEM.

35. PLO OBSERVERS AT IMF/IBRD. THE SECRETARY NOTED THERE WOULD BE A VOTE ON THIS ISSUE JUNE 27. WE HOPE FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THE PLO, AND WILL HELP TO KEEP THE UK IN LINE.

36. CHEYSSON REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH "WOULD NOT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR YOU." FRANCE NEEDS U.S. HELP TO BUILD UP THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO HELP ON THIS ISSUE.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

37. SPAIN/NATO.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD SPENT 2 HOURS WITH FELIPE GONZALEZ IN MADRID. THE SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD WILLY BRANTZ HAD ENCOURAGED THE SPANISH SOCIALISTS TO OPPOSE NATO MEMBERSHIP. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT ONLY NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD GET THE SPANISH MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS SO THEY WOULD NOT BE A THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PROCEED TOWARD MEMBERSHIP. THE EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS ARE THE KEY ON THIS ISSUE, AND MOST, E.G., SCHMIDT, SUPPORT SPANISH MEMBERSHIP.

38. CHEYSSON INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS UP TO SPAIN TO MOVE. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS WOULD HAVE INFLUENCE ON THIS MATTER IN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL. HIS NIGHTMARE, HE SAID, WAS A RIGHT-WING UPRISING. REGARDLESS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDES, THE SECRETARY SAID, WE MUST BRING SPAIN INTO THE DEMOCRATIC FAMILY.

39. CHEYSSON SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH MITTERRAND MAY HAVE GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE SPANISH KING, FRANCE IS NOT IN THE BEST POSITION TO INFLUENCE SPAIN. THE GOP WILL HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE SPANISH. (CHEYSSON THEN ASKED DE LABOULAYE IN FRENCH WHAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS ON THE SPAIN/NATO ISSUE. DE LABOULAYE MUMBLED SOMETHING UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CHEYSSON CHANGED THE SUBJECT.)

40. CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH VIEWS WERE "INSPIRED" BY THE POSITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL. WHEN THERE IS A HUMANITARIAN NEED, FRANCE WANTS TO HELP. THE VERY SMALL AID FROM THE EC WAS SEEN IN THE U.S. AS INTERFERENCE; IT WAS NOT, SINCE IT WENT THROUGH THE RED CROSS. MR. EAGLEBURGER HAD HAD TO COMMENT ON IT. WHEN THERE IS A CHANCE FOR POLITICAL LEADERS IN A COUNTRY TO GET TOGETHER, WE SHOULD SUPPORT IT. THE FRENCH LIKE THE IDEA OF A REGIONAL ACTION, WHICH THEY BELIEVE COULD FACILITATE

MATTERS, AND IS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LOME CONVENTION. ON THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PROPOSAL, THE FRENCH MAY HAVE SOME COMMENTS. PERHAPS THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION SHOULD DECIDE WHAT CONSTITUTES THE REGION, AND WHAT SUCH

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A PROGRAM SHOULD COVER.

41. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS LESS DISTURBED BY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THAN BY OTHER TYPES OF ASSISTANCE. IN EL SALVADOR, IT IS A QUESTION OF COALITION VERSUS EARLY SELF-DETERMINATION. MR. UNGO WAS DISCREDITED, A MARXIST, AND NOT UP TO THE JOB. HE WAS SIMPLY NOT THE RIGHT MAN. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FORCING A COALITION WOULD BE A RIGHT-WING COUP. WE FEEL OUR BEST BET IS TO MOVE TO EARLY ELECTIONS. WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR THIS. THE GUERRILLAS ARE DISCREDITED, AND ARE MOVING INCREASINGLY TOWARD VIOLENCE. WE ARE NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE EXCESSES OF THE RIGHT, EITHER, NOR WITH THE ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT THE SITUATION LOOKS A LITTLE BETTER. OUR REAL CONCERN IS NOT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WILL PROVOKE A RIGHT-WING COUP.

42. CHEYSSON SAID THE GUF DID NOT YET HAVE A POSITION, ESPECIALLY SINCE FRANCE IS ON ANOTHER CONTINENT. THE FRENCH WANT TO CONSULT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION BEFORE DEVELOPING THEIR OWN POSITION. IN THAT CONNECTION, GUATEMALA IS A PROBLEM, BUT THE FRENCH WILL LISTEN CAREFULLY TO THE MEXICANS AND COSTA RICA.

43. THE SECRETARY SAID THESE COUNTRIES HAD BEEN HELPFUL ON EL SALVADOR. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THEM. VENEZUELA WAS ALSO SUGGESTED AS A WORTHWHILE INTERMEDIATOR IN THE AREA. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE NO FIXED SOLUTION FOR EL SALVADOR, EXCEPT THAT WE WANT TO SEE A STABLE REGIME WITH A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE A SECOND VIETNAM.

44. CHEYSSON SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE SUSPICIOUS OF "EVERY YOUNG MAN WITH A BEARD." THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED.

45. THE SECRETARY AND CHEYSSON THEN REVIEWED THE TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS ON JUNE 24, AND THE REMARKS THEY WOULD MAKE TO THE PRESS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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MESSAGE:

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PRIORITY
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P 171401Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6939

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NOVIS
E.O. 12060: RDS-1 6/1/88 (FRIEDMAN, A.S.) UN-S
TAGS: MNUC, TNUC, PARM, ENRG, SCSA, PK, CH, AK, GW
SUBJ: (S) PRC SALE OF HEAVY WATER TO ARGENTINA
REF: PARIS 17637

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WILL BE ADVISING DEPARTMENT OF CHINESE RESPONSE TO FRENCH DEMARCHE IN BEIJING ON MATTER OF PRC SHIPMENT OF UNSAFEGUARDED HEAVY WATER TO BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL).
3. FRENCH SOURCE REPORTS THAT PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS SURPRISED AND VERY EMBARRASSED TO LEARN THAT THE HEAVY WATER WAS DESTINED FOR ARGENTINA. THE CHINESE BELIEVED THAT THE HEAVY WATER WAS TO BE USED IN FRG AND THEREFORE ASKED FOR A PEACEFUL USES GUARANTEE FROM THE GERMAN PURCHASER. THE GERMAN COMPANY READILY GAVE THE PRC THE REQUESTED GUARANTEE. APPARENTLY ALL THESE EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRC SUPPLIER AND THE GERMAN COMPANY WERE HANDLED BY LOW LEVEL BUREAUCRATS. THE CHINESE HAVE NOW ASSURED THE FRENCH THAT NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS SUCH AS THIS WILL BE HANDLED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS (SENIOR VICE MINISTER). HARTMAN

PARIS 0012

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7126

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 18392

NOOIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12065: RUS-4 6/19/2011 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, FR

SUBJECT: (U) PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AFTER OUR LUNCH ON THURSDAY, JUNE 18 (REPORTED SEPTEL), PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ASKED ME TO JOIN HIM ALONE IN HIS OFFICE. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE VERY MUCH LOOKED FORWARD TO ESTABLISHING GOOD RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE SAID THAT WHILE WE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES, HE WAS SURE THAT SINCE OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES WERE CLOSE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK THESE DIFFICULTIES OUT. WE WENT ON TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING TNF, GENERAL ZORN, PARTICIPATION OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE PROSPECT FOR COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT, AND ANOTHER SUBJECT WHICH I AM COMMUNICATING SEPARATELY.

A. TNF: I RAISED THE QUESTION OF TNF AND THE EUROPEAN MISSILE BALANCE. I THOUGHT IT BETTER TO DO THAT IN THIS PRIVATE SESSION RATHER THAN IN FRONT OF HIS ADVISERS SINCE I WAS, IN EFFECT, TRYING TO CORRECT SOMETHING HE HAD SAID PUBLICLY. I URGED MITTERRAND TO HAVE A LONG TALK WITH SCHMIDT ON THIS SUBJECT AND HE INTERJECTED

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD A SHORT DISCUSSION, BUT NOT IN ANY GREAT DETAIL. I SAID ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS, MITTERRAND'S, PUBLIC POSITION WAS THAT HE SEEMED TO BE RECOGNIZING THE MENACE OF THE SOVIET SS-20'S, BUT PUTTING RATHER LESS EMPHASIS ON THE MEANS TO DEAL WITH THEM. I SAID THAT HE WOULD FIND IN A DISCUSSION WITH SCHMIDT THAT SCHMIDT HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE IN THE ALLIANCE FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, EVEN BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF SS-20'S, THERE WAS A GROWING GAP IN THAT SS-4'S AND 5'S WERE TARGETED ON ALL OF WESTERN EUROPE AND YET WESTERN EUROPE HAD NO ABILITY TO HIT BACK

AT THE SOVIET UNION. CURRENTLY, WITH THE SS-20'S AT ROUGHLY 2207 IF YOU ADDED ON ALSO THE WARHEADS ON SS-4'S AND 5'S, THERE WERE 1,040 WARHEADS MUSTLY TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE, WHILE THE GLCM'S AND MODERNIZED PERSHING'S, WHICH DUNIT EVEN GO AS FAR AS MOSCOW, WOULD AMOUNT TO ONLY 572 WARHEADS. SCHMIDT SAW THIS IMBALANCE PERHAPS GROWING OVER THE YEARS. HIS SECOND REASON FOR RAISING THIS PROBLEM, AND WE AGREE WITH BOTH THESE REASONS, IS THAT IF THERE IS NO INF CAPABILITY IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE CHANCES OF DECOUPLING ARE RAISED AND THIS CANNOT BE IN EUROPEAN INTERESTS. MITTERRAND RESPONDED THAT HE HAD HEARD SOME OF THESE ARGUMENTS AND WAS GOING TO EXAMINE THEM MORE CLOSELY.

HE THEN, HOWEVER, SKIPPED TO ANOTHER POINT, WHICH WAS THAT HE WILL WISH TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT HE IS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE NECESSITY OF THE UNITED STATES BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY FORCES BOTH FOR GREATER SECURITY AND ALSO TO ENHANCE ITS BARGAINING POSITION. BUT HE SAID THERE WILL COME A POINT BEYOND WHICH THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT HOLD OFF TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THIS WAS A CONCERN OF SCHMIDT'S AND HIS OWN AND HE WOULD WISH TO TAKE THIS UP WITH THE PRESIDENT.

B. GENERAL ZORN: I THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT TO GENERAL ZORN. I SAID THAT WE HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE WAS THIS POSSIBILITY OF HIS BEING RELEASED. I URGED THE PRESIDENT NOT TO TAKE A HASTY DECISION ON THIS MATTER, BUT TO WAIT UNTIL WE AND THE GERMANS COULD INFORM HIS SERVICES OF THE POSSIBILITY OF USING GENERAL ZORN AS AN EXCHANGE FOR SOMEONE WE MIGHT NEGOTIATE OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE OR THE SOVIET UNION. HE AGREED TO GO VERY SLOWLY AND TO BE IN TOUCH BOTH WITH US

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND THE GERMANS BEFORE TAKING ANY FINAL DECISION. IN PRINCIPLE, HE SAID, IT SOUNDED LIKE A GOOD IDEA.

"C. VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT" I SAID TO THE PRESIDENT THAT I HAD SUGGESTED TO WASHINGTON THAT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO CHANGE OUR METHOD OF OPERATION HERE IN FRANCE AND INVITE OPPOSITION LEADERS AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY ME FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT. I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS MIGHT SPOIL THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. HE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED TO THE CONTRARY, SAYING THAT IT WAS LONG OVERDUE IN FRANCE TO HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL DISCUSSION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION. HE, THEREFORE, WELCOMED THIS IDEA AND HOPED THAT WE WOULD IN FACT INVITE THE OPPOSITION. TO UNDERLINE HIS POINT, HE TOLD ME THAT

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7127

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 02 PARIS 18392

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
HE HAS ALREADY INSTRUCTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO DIVIDE UP
CHAIRMANSHIPS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE BASIS OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, EVEN THOUGH IT LOOKS AS
THOUGH THE SOCIALISTS WILL HAVE AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY,
PERHAPS EVEN WITHOUT THE MRG. HE SAID FOR YEARS THE
SOCIALISTS NEVER WERE ABLE TO HAVE CHAIRMANSHIPS, NOR
WERE THEIR AMENDMENTS EVEN CONSIDERED BY THE MAJORITY.
HE SAID THIS MUST STOP.
- U. COMMUNIST MINISTERS: THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY
TO SAY THAT I HOPED THAT IF THERE WERE AN ABSOLUTE
MAJORITY, HE WOULD NOT FIND IT NECESSARY TO BRING THE
COMMUNISTS INTO THE GOVERNMENT. HE IMMEDIATELY REJOINED
BY SAYING THAT PERHAPS IT WAS EVEN MORE NECESSARY BECAUSE
IN THAT WAY HE COULD CARRY OUT HIS SCHEME TO REDUCE THEM
TO THE SMALLEST POSSIBLE SIZE WITH THE LEAST INFLUENCE.
I SAID THAT THIS WOULD GIVE US GREAT DIFFICULTIES, NOT SO
MUCH BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION IN FRANCE, WHERE I WAS SURE
HE WOULD KEEP THEM UNDER CONTROL, BUT FOR THE EXAMPLE
THIS WOULD GIVE IN OTHER PLACES WHERE THE SOCIALIST PARTY
DID NOT HAVE THE SAME STRENGTH AND CONTROL. I CITED ITALY
AS A GOOD EXAMPLE. HE THEN WENT BACK TO HIS EARLIER
COMMENTS THAT AMERICAN POLICY WAS TOO PRE-OCCUPIED WITH
COMMUNISM AND NOT ENOUGH ABOUT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
THAT GAVE COMMUNISTS THEIR CHANCE TO TAKE OVER OPPOSITION

PARIS 8392

DTG:191008Z JUN 81 PSN: 052102
TOR: 176/1741Z

DATE 06/20/51

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GROUPS. I REMINDED HIM OF WHAT I HAD SAID EARLIER ABOUT THE DANGERS FOR EUROPE IF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE BEING ASKED TO MAKE SACRIFICES IN DEFENSE OF AN AREA THAT DOES NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHAT THE RISKS ARE IN OUR CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND NOTABLY THOSE POSED BY POLITICAL PARTIES BASED ON THE SAME AUTHORITARIAN PRINCIPLES. HE WAS IN NO MOOD TO ARGUE, HOWEVER, AND MERELY SAID THAT WE SHOULD ALREADY SEE THAT HIS TACTIC WAS WORKING. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE DEEP ROOTS IN FRANCE, BUT THEY ARE A VERY SMALL MINORITY. THE REST OF THE PEOPLE WHO VOTED COMMUNIST DID SO ONLY BECAUSE THEY FELT THERE WAS NO OTHER PLACE TO GO. (COMMENT: HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY HAVING THEM ACTUALLY IN THE GOVERNMENT IN MINOR POSITIONS WOULD MAKE THE TASK OF CONTROL EASIER. BUT I JUDGE FROM THIS CONVERSATION THAT HIS MIND IS PRETTY WELL MADE UP TO OFFER TO INCLUDE COMMUNISTS IN SOME MINOR POSTS, WHICH PROBABLY HE HAS ALREADY CREATED OR THOUGHT ABOUT CREATING. ANY GROUP WITH A FERTILE ENOUGH IMAGINATION TO HAVE CREATED A MINISTRY OF LEISURE TIME CAN CERTAINLY THINK UP SOME NON-TASKS FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO DO. OUR ONLY HOPE MAY BE THAT THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES REFUSE TO JOIN. THIS MAY BE THE VIEW OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP UNDER MARCHAIS, WHICH WILL SEE THIS AS ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION OF ITS LACK OF POWER, BUT I AM TOLD THAT THE COMMUNIST WORKERS--THE BASE--ARE PUSHING THE LEADERSHIP FOR PARTICIPATION AS A FINAL JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR EFFORTS OVER THE YEARS AND ALSO AN EFFORT TO HIDE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN SUCH A BEATING.) HARTMAN

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TOR: 170/1741Z

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE920
STU0885
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHFR #8460/01 1701754
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191750Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7172
BT

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 0017-081-46963
BY Cal NARA DATE 5/6/10

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 18460
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 6/19/81 (ARTHUR A HARTMAN) DR-M
TAGS: PGOV, FR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY THE DCM HAD LUNCH AT THE ELYSEE JUNE 18 WITH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR JACQUES ATTALI; GENERAL SAULNIER, CHIEF OF ELYSEE MILITARY STAFF; AND HUBERT VEDRINE, OF THE ELYSEE INTERNATIONAL STAFF. THE CONVERSATION BEGAN WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND REMINISCING ON THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP. HE OFFERED A NUMBER OF ANECDOTES DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE NEED TO AVOID FORMING DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENTS ON PEOPLE. IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL QUESTION THE AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND FRENCH CONSERVATISM AND HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER A GROWING SENSE IN THE U.S. THAT THERE IS AN UNWILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF EUROPE TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE. THE AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN DISTURBED OVER PUBLIC COMMENTS DURING THE GISCARD ADMINISTRATION WHICH IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET POLICY. MITTERRAND ARGUED THAT FRANCE HAD TO PROTECT ITSELF FROM SOVIET MILITARY POWER BUT ALSO FROM AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POWER. MITTERRAND RAISED THE QUESTION OF U.S. INTEREST RATES, SAYING THAT THEY WERE DAMAGING TO EUROPE. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE HIGH RATES WERE A RESULT, NOT THE CAUSE, OF HIGH INFLATION, AND THAT A RESTORED AMERICAN ECONOMY WOULD HELP EUROPE. IN DISCUSSING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MITTERRAND SAID THEY REPRESENTED "LE GRAND CAPITAL" WHICH DOMINATES SOCIETIES AND PERPETUATES A CLASS. MITTERRAND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT AMERICANS HAVE A NAIVE FEAR OF COMMUNISM WHICH FORCES POPULAR MOVEMENTS TO LOOK TO THE SOVIETS.

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THE AMBASSADOR TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS, NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS FREQUENTLY SUPPLY ARMS THROUGH CUBA AND LIBYA. TWICE MITTERRAND EXPRESSED REGRET OVER THE LOSS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM. IN PASSING, HE ALSO NOTED THAT QHADAFI MAY NOT BE AS DANGEROUS AS THE U.S. BELIEVED. MITTERRAND SAID HE WOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN FRIENDHSIP WITH RUSSIA, A FRENCH TRADITION. END SUMMARY.

3. AS THE PRESIDENT ENTERED THE "SALON DES PORTRAITS" AND WELCOMED US, THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED THE PRESIDENT WITH THE BOOK "JEFFERSON'S PARIS," WHICH HE HAD DEDICATED TO THE PRFIDENT. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED IT WITH APPRECIATION, NOTING THAT JEFFERSON WAS A VERY GREAT MAN INDEED AND RECALLING THAT RECENTLY HE HAD READ "THE VIRGINIAN." THE PRESIDENT LED THE CONVERSATION AND RECALLED PERSONAL REMINISCENCES WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP. HE FIRST RECOUNTED THE STORY OF AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KREISKY WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN JAIL WITH A NAZI IN THE EARLY THIRTIES. LATER, AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF DOLLFUSS IN 1938 AND THE ENSUING CHANGES IN AUSTRIA, THE NAZI HAD BEEN FREED AND WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING KREISKY OUT OF JAIL. AS KREISKY LATER PUT IT, HE HAD BEEN LIBERATED BY THE NAZIS.

4. MITTERRAND ALSO RECALLED THAT HIS BROTHER, GENERAL JACQUES MITTERRAND, HAD BEEN ON THE NATO STANDING GROUP IN WASHINGTON DURING THE GENERALS' REVOLT IN ALGERIA. "FOR PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL REASONS, HE WOULD NOT HAVE JOINED THE REVOLT IN ANY EVENT." HOWEVER, WHEN JACQUES MITTERRAND RETURNED TO FRANCE, HE SENT PACKAGES OF PERSONAL ITEMS TO GENERAL CHALLE, UNDER WHOM HE HAD SERVED AND WHO WAS THEN IN PRISON. AS A RESULT, HIS BROTHER'S NAME WAS STRUCK OFF THE PROMOTION LIST WHEN IT CAME UP IN DEGAULLE'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

5. THESE STORIES REMINDED THE PRESIDENT ALSO OF HIS OWN EXPERIENCE DURING THE WAR, WHEN IN FEBRUARY 1944 HE HAD BEEN LANDED BY SEA IN FRANCE WITH A BRITISH OFFICER. THEY ARRIVED IN PARIS AT THE MONTPARNASSE RAILROAD STATION, WHERE THEY WERE STOPPED BY THE FRENCH POLICE. THEIR BAGS WERE SEARCHED. MITTERRAND HAD IN HIS BAG A RAINCOAT BOUGHT IN LONDON ("BETEMENT"), SOME PERSONAL EFFECTS AND A REVOLVER. AS SOON AS THE POLICE SAW THIS, THEY RELEASED BOTH MEN. MANY IN THE FRENCH POLICE, MITTERRAND CONTINUED, WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE RESISTANCE. HE HAD, FOR INSTANCE, A COUPLE OF FRIENDS WHO WERE IN THE RESISTANCE AND HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE POLICE. IMMEDIATELY UPON THEIR ARREST, MEDRIC (FOR WHOM A STREET OF PARIS IS NAMED) HAD KILLED HIMSELF WITH A CYANIDE PILL.

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HOWEVER, WHEN THE POLICE DISCOVERED WHO THEY WERE, THEY IMMEDIATELY RELEASED THE PARTNER. THE POINT OF THESE ANECDOTES SEEMED TO BE THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP AND AVOIDING DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIUNS AND JUDGMENTS ON PEOPLE.
6. THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AT THE TABLE BEGAN BY

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #8460/02 1701756
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7173
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 18460
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ASKING THE AMBASSADOR: "AND NOW, WHAT ABOUT AMERICA?"
THE AMBASSADOR HAD A NUMBER OF POINTS.
- HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT FOR FOREIGNERS TO UNDERSTAND THAT CONSERVATISM IN THE UNITED STATES IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN FRANCE. IT STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE; IT IS AGAINST BIG GOVERNMENT; AND IT IS FOR GIVING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE REGIONS. IN THIS LAST RESPECT, THE AMBASSADOR SAID, IT MAY BE CLOSER TO MITTERRAND'S PROGRAM. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE POINT WITH INTEREST.
- THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS RECENT VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES, HIS IMPRESSION IS CONFIRMED THAT THE DANGER IN THE UNITED STATES IS NOT OVER-INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE, BUT THE CHANCE OF WITHDRAWAL IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SENSE A LACK OF DESIRE IN EUROPE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE. HE SAID THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ISOLATIONISM, SINCE THE UNITED STATES, AS THE STRONGEST POWER IN THE WORLD, WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN WORLD AFFAIRS, BUT IT WOULD DO SO--OR AT LEAST THERE WERE IMPORTANT CURRENTS OF OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH THOUGHT IT COULD--FROM BASES OUTSIDE OF EUROPE AND FREE FROM ANY ALLIANCE RESTRAINTS.
- THE AMBASSADOR THEN SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED, ON THE PART OF THE PREVIOUS GISCARD ADMINISTRATION, REFERENCES TO THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AS IF, AS FAR AS FRANCE WAS CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF CHOICE. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THIS KIND OF THINKING WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE SENTIMENT OF NEUTRALISM IN EUROPE WHICH MINISTER CHEYSSON HAD RIGHTLY REGRETTED IN HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON. THE PRESIDENT ANSWERED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS WERE A FACT. THE SUVIETS HAD MILITARY POWER, THE UNITED STATES HAD ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POWER. IT WAS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO PROTECT FRANCE FROM THE

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SOVIETS THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE, BUT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO PROTECT FRANCE FROM US ECONOMIC DOMINATION. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED, THE SOVIETS HAD TO BE OPPOSED VIGOROUSLY, FOR INSTANCE, WHEN THEY DEPLOYED THEIR SS-20S OR WHEN THEY INVADED AFGHANISTAN. MITTERRAND THOUGHT AS A RESULT OF THE LATTER, THE SOVIETS HAD LOST ALL CREDIBILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHY THIS REALIZATION SHOULD HAVE COME SO LATE. MITTERRAND SAID THE USE OF FULL SOVIET MILITARY UNITS FOR THE FIRST TIME OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE MADE THE DIFFERENCE.

- AS REGARDS THE OTTAWA SUMMIT, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT DURING MINISTER CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE LEFT AS UNSTRUCTURED AS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW THE LEADERS TO HAVE A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY CONCURRED WITH THIS APPROACH.

7. THE PRESIDENT THEN COMMENTED THAT THE QUESTION OF INTEREST RATES WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED BECAUSE THEY WERE VERY DAMAGING TO EUROPE. THIS COMMENT EVOKED LIVELY SUPPORTING NOISES FROM ATTALI AND VEDRINE, WHO PRESSED THE AMBASSADOR ON HOW LONG THESE RATES WOULD REMAIN SO HIGH. THE AMBASSADOR ANSWERED THAT THESE RATES WERE THE RESULT OF OUR INFLATION--NOT ITS CAUSE-- AND OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO BREAK THE INFLATION PSYCHOLOGY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DRASTICALLY CUTTING THE BUDGET AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SEEKING LOWER TAXES TO INSURE THAT AS REVENUES INCREASED, THE CONGRESS WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED TO LET THE BUDGET AGAIN INCREASE OUT OF CONTROL. IT WAS NECESSARY ALSO TO ENCOURAGE SAVING AND INVESTMENT. HE SAID THAT A RESTORED AMERICAN ECONOMY WOULD BE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO EUROPE.

8. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE DESIRE TO NATIONALIZE WHEN IN HIS OPINION THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ALL THE POWER IT NEEDED TO CONTROL INDUSTRY. HE THEN SAID THAT DURING THE GISCARD ADMINISTRATION WE HAD HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES REGARDING AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN FRANCE. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF ONE AMERICAN FIRM WHICH WAS KEPT FROM SELLING ONE OF ITS SUBSIDIARIES TO A BRITISH COMPANY, BUT WAS "INSTRUCTED" HOW TO DISPOSE OF ITS SUBSIDIARY TO A FAVORED FRENCH PARTNER. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS WERE CLEARLY SURPRISED BY THIS STORY.

9. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT MULTI-NATIONALS HAD OFTEN BEEN THE TARGET OF ATTACKS BY THE SOCIALISTS, BUT HE THOUGHT THEY HAD BEEN GOOD CORPORATE CITIZENS AND THAT

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THEY HAD OBEYED THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY. HE NOTED THAT
THERE WERE FRENCH MULTI-NATIONALS THAT OPERATED IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE. AS IF TO SAY "SOME OF MY
BEST FRIENDS ARE MULTI-NATIONAL PRESIDENTS," MITTERRAND

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE923
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DE RUEHFR #8460/03 1701758
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7174
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 18460
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ANSWERED THAT HE HAD A GOOD FRIEND, RIBOUX, WHO WAS HEAD OF SCHLUMBERGER, WHICH WAS A MULTI-NATIONAL WITH LARGE INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE THEN OSTENTATIVELY ASKED AFTER HIS HEALTH SINCE RIBOUX IS RECOVERING FROM A SERIOUS OPERATION IN NEW YORK. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT, WHILE MULTI-NATIONALS MIGHT HAVE MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION, THEY DID REPRESENT "LE GRAND CAPITAL" WHICH DOMINATES SOCIETIES, CREATES A WAY OF LIFE AND PERPETUATES A CLASS. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT TO CHANGE THIS WAY OF LIFE. FOLLOWING ON THIS POINT, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE SOCIALISTS NOW HAD A STABLE MAJORITY AND COULD ENVISAGE CARRYING OUT A PROGRAM OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

10. THE CONVERSATION THEN SHIFTED TO COMMUNISM AND THE THIRD WORLD. THE PRESIDENT REGRETTED THAT AMERICA HAD AN ALMOST "NAIVE FEAR" OF COMMUNISM. IN THE THIRD WORLD THIS FEAR HAS TENDED TO THROW POPULAR MOVEMENTS TO THE SOVIETS BECAUSE WE HAD SUPPORTED THE ESTABLISHED, USUALLY RIGHT-WING, OFTEN MILITARY DICTATORS. HE RECALLED THAT IN 1946 HE HAD MET HO CHI MINH, WHO HAD COME TO FRANCE AND WHO WAS CLEARLY PREPARED FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN THE "WISDOM OF CARTER" WHICH HAD ALLOWED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO HOLD DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WHICH HAD RESULTED FROM A CHANGE OF THE "DICTATOR BALAGUER, WHO NOW LIVES IN A SPLENDID HOUSE." HE THOUGHT THAT IF WASHINGTON HAD NOT PERMITTED THIS PROCESS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WOULD BE TODAY ANOTHER CUBA. HE SAID THAT HE FEARED WE WERE MAKING ANOTHER ERROR OF APPRECIATION IN EL SALVADOR. DUARTE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY THE OLIGARCHY. HE KNEW THE SOCIALIST LEADER UNGO, WHO WAS NO COMMUNIST BUT WAS FORCED INTO THE OPPOSITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

11. THE AMBASSADOR DISPUTED THIS VIEW OF HISTORY. THE SOVIETS MAY NOT BE EVERYWHERE, BUT THEY ARE, IN ADDITION

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TO THREATENING THE SECURITY OF EUROPE, SUPPLYING ARMS DIRECTLY OR THROUGH CUBA OR LIBYA. HE POINTED OUT THAT DUARTE WAS ELECTED IN A FREE ELECTION. HE WAS ARRESTED AND TORTURED BY THE RIGHT WING. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SHIPPED NO ARMS TO EL SALVADOR FOR FOUR YEARS UNTIL HE WAS PRESENTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT WEAPONS WERE COMING IN FROM CUBA VIA NICARAGUA.

12. MITTERRAND NONETHELESS REGRETTED THE AMERICAN LOSS OF LIBERALISM AND ANTI-AUTHORITARIANISM FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAD LONG BEEN NOTED. HE JUDGED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN ABLE TO IMPLANT THEMSELVES IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEY HAD LOST EGYPT AND GUINEA, FOR INSTANCE. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD LONG KNOWN SEKOU TOURE. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MAINTAINING THEMSELVES IN ETHIOPIA SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE WAS A MILITARY REGIME THERE. THEY HAD LOST IRAQ AND HE PREDICTED THEY WOULD LOSE SYRIA. IN THIS REGARD, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT ISLAM WAS AN INSUPERABLE BARRIER TO COMMUNISM. THIS WAS ONE REASON HE CONSIDERED THAT QADHAFI WAS NOT QUITE AS DANGEROUS AS WE FELT EVEN THOUGH HE HIMSELF CONSIDERED THE LIBYAN SLIGHTLY CRAZY.

13. ON LIBYA, THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT WE WERE CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF LIBYA BECOMING THE OAU SUMMIT CHAIRMAN. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT EVIDENTLY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THAT ISSUE, DESPITE THE AMBASSADOR'S RECALL OF CASTRO'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE NAM. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED THAT FRANCE GIVE A PUSH TO THE PRESIDENT OF TOGO IF IT COULD.

14. MITTERRAND REPEATED THAT THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF LIBERALISM SHOULD NOT BE LOST ON A PERSONAL BASIS. HE RECALLED THAT HIS OWN MOTHER WAS EXTREMELY PRO-AMERICAN AND FELT THAT ALL TRUTHS AND GOOD THINGS EMANATED FROM THE UNITED STATES--ALMOST IN A BIBLICAL SENSE.

15. AS REGARDS RUSSIA, HE SAID HE WOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN FRIENDSHIP WITH THE COUNTRY BECAUSE HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THERE WAS A NEED FOR A FACTUAL BALANCING ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND FRANCE. HE NOTED THAT REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE ALLIED ITSELF WITH THE CZAR AND REPUBLICAN FRANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. THIS ALLIANCE SERVED AS A BALANCE AT DIFFERENT TIMES FOR PRUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

16. WITH A SMILE, HE COMMENTED THAT HE TOOK GREAT SOLACE THAT THE RUSSIANS, GERMANS AND AMERICANS HAD ALL BEEN DISCOMFORTED BY HIS ELECTION.

17. FYI: THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION WAS TETE-A-TETE AND IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL. HARTMAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHATS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

ATTN: COL VP
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUEHC #1793 170194Z
 O 191906Z JUN 81
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5348

UNCLAS STATE 161793
 P.O. 120651 N/A

TAGS: OVIP, FR

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FROM
 MAYOR OF NICE JACQUES MEDECIN

REF: BELLINGER MAY 12 MEMO TO DEPARTMENT

1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO EXPRESS PRESIDENT'S APPRECIATION AS APPROPRIATE TO MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON SON'S MARRIAGE.

2. FYI - TEXT OF MEDECIN'S MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: MR. PRESIDENT: I LEARNED WITH GREATEST PLEASURE OF YOUR SON RONNIE'S MARRIAGE TO MISS DORIA PALMTERI.

MRS. MEDECIN AND I JOIN WITH THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF NICE IN SHARING YOUR FAMILY'S JOY.

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU AND TO MRS. REAGAN OUR WARMEST AND MOST SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND ASK YOU TO

LTR FM MAYOR OF NIC 1793

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

CONVY THEM TO YOUR CHILDREN, TO WHOM WE SEND OUR BEST WISHES FOR HAPPINESS, HEALTH, AND PROSPERITY.

ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY VERY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

SINCERELY YOURS,

JACQUES MEDECIN
MAYOR OF NICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE ALPES-MARITIME
GENERAL COUNCIL END QUOTE. STORSEL

LTR FM MAYOR OF NIC 1793 DTG:191906Z JUN 81 PSNI 052301
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