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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 12/14/2007

**File Folder** FRANCE (5/15/81-5/27/81)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 13

NOUZILLE

24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46849	BIO	BIO	1	8/6/1980	B1
46824	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 46803 <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	5/11/1981	B1
46826	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 46810 <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	ND	B1
46829	CABLE	172039Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	3	5/17/1981	B1
46830	CABLE	181455Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	2	5/18/1981	B1
46831	MEMO	ALLEN TO PRESIDENT RE MITTERRAND	1	5/20/1981	B1
46832	REPORT	MITTERRAND	3	5/14/1981	B1
46833	CABLE	210926Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	2	5/21/1981	B1
46834	CABLE	260955Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	2	5/26/1981	B1
46835	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	5/26/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46837	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT <i>R</i> <del>5/6/2010</del> / <i>4/29/2010</i> <b>NLRRM07-081</b>	1	5/26/1981	B1
46838	MEMO	RENTSCHLER TO ALLEN <i>R</i> <b>4/29/2010</b> <b>NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	5/27/1981	B1
46841	CABLE	172039Z MAY 81 <i>R</i> <b>5/6/2010</b> <b>NLRRM07-081</b>	3	5/17/1981	B1
46843	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH FORMER US AMBASSADORS <i>R</i> <b>4/29/2010</b> <b>NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	6/1/1981	B1
46845	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 46843 WITH NOTATIONS <i>R</i> <b>4/29/2010</b> <b>NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	6/1/1981	B1
46846	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH FORMER US AMBASSADORS <i>R</i> <b>5/6/2010</b> <b>NLRRM07-081</b>	1	5/27/1981	B1
46848	MEMO	STOESSEL FOR THE RECORD RE MEETING OF FORMER US AMBASSADORS <i>R</i> <b>5/6/2010</b> <b>NLRRM07-081</b>	3	5/18/1981	B1

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A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *J. Allen*

SUBJECT: Your Lunch Meeting with French Ambassador  
Francois de Laboulaye

For use during your luncheon meeting today with French Ambassador  
François de Laboulaye you might find the following materials  
relevant:

- A bio sheet on de Laboulaye (Tab A);
- Our initial analysis of Mitterrand's victory which  
we moved to the President immediately following last  
Sunday's results (Tab B);
- A summary of quotes from Mitterrand himself on key  
international issues (Tab C).

You might also find helpful, as an indication of the public stance  
we are taking on a Mitterrand Presidency, a quick skim of the  
backgrounder I provided for the press last Monday morning. It is  
at Tab D.

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5/15/81  
Hand carried to  
2726 The Truman  
1105 |

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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May 11, 1981

46824

5

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: A Socialist President in France (C)

In breaking with 23 years of center-right government and electing Francois Mitterrand as the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, yesterday's French performance at the polls ushers in a period of profound redefinition of French national priorities in which the only certainty at the moment is uncertainty. So far as U.S. interests are concerned, however, I think we must -- at the very least -- anticipate dealing with a French partner even more difficult than the one we have known in the recent past. These difficulties will be most apparent in the following areas:

--Trade policies. Everything in Mitterrand's public statements and what we know of Socialist Party doctrine suggests a resurgence of protectionist attitudes in France (which may be as much trouble for the European Community as for us). (C)

--Defense policies. Though Mitterrand will maintain an independent French nuclear force and continue support for the modernization of some strategic assets, he will decrease defense spending and will be far less willing and/or likely than Giscard to take tangible actions in trouble-spots such as Chad, Libya, the Indian Ocean basin, or even the Persian Gulf. (C)

--Third World issues. In line with broader Socialist International rhetoric in Europe, Mitterrand will oppose us on El Salvador and will resist placing Third World developments in an East-West context (it may be a long time before you hear a Francois-Poncet successor call on you in the Oval Office and express understanding for our moves in Central America). (C)

--The German Equation. Mitterrand's victory clearly strengthens the Brandt wing of the Socialist Party in the Federal Republic -- a fact which may prove to be the most critical so far as U.S.-European security interests are concerned and Schmidt's capacity to "deliver" on TNP. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REVIEW ON MAY 10, 1987  
CLASSIFIED BY NSC 13.1(1)

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 007-081-96624  
BY ON NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~SECRET~~

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

In the meantime, our own tone -- reflected in your congratulatory messages (Tab A) -- should be cordial and forthcoming but prepared to insist on French commitment to common Western values (and prepared as well to counter forcefully any derogation from our commitments). In that connection, I attach a cable from our Ambassador in Paris (Tab B), written three days before yesterday's elections; warning against any illusions about the probable difficulty of a Mitterrand Presidency, he recommends an essentially wary stance with which I concur. (S)

On the plus side is the fact that Mitterrand is a political pragmatist (it's worth remembering that he held 11 ministerial posts between 1946 and 1957, none of them as a Socialist). In addition, he as much as anyone will be affected by the uncertainty factor in France, and in ways which could bring pressure for moderation. Much will depend on (a) whatever results are produced by the legislative elections Mitterrand has promised to hold before the end of June; (b) the extent to which the Communists will figure in his cabinet selections; and (c) the length of the inevitably ill-defined transition period while he consolidates his leadership and his government -- during which France's internal economic situation could loom large. (S)

--The Middle East. A change in French policy toward the Middle East peace process seems imminent. Mitterrand supports the Camp David Accords. (S)

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SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

6



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

44826

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Mitterrand and the Campaign: Foreign  
Policy Vagueness (C)

While it may be some time before we see any precise contours to a Mitterrand Presidency in France, a sampling of his campaign rhetoric could be useful as a clue to probable foreign policy positions. With that in mind, I have put together the attachment, which provides a quick rundown of relevant direct and indirect quotes from Mitterrand himself. (U)

If these quotes strike you as vague, there is good reason: Mitterrand's political career has been built on pragmatism (some would say opportunism), and he was particularly careful in his most recent campaign to avoid definitive stands on foreign issues. Indeed, French commentators early on labeled him "an artist of ambiguity" - a characterization which Giscard tried and failed to exploit by pointing to his rival as a front for a Communist takeover. (C)

Mitterrand's very evasiveness on foreign issues in a campaign directed primarily toward internal discontent may be in our favor; it suggests a leader who is coming to power unencumbered by firm promises which he must now redeem at our expense. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL  
Review on May 11, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR 1007-081 #46826  
BY Q1 NARA DATE 4/29/10

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Mitterrand and the Presidential campaign:  
Foreign Policy Statements

-- On his approach to the Presidency: "If you are dreaming of a Socialist who would not practice socialism, then count me out."

-- On the possibility of a center-right legislature: "If the French find pleasure in not being logical with themselves, then I will govern accordingly."

-- On the Soviet military buildup: "Moscow seeks to neutralize Europe with its SS-20s, a move France will adamantly resist;" but "The Brezhnev proposal is worth studying as a possible initial negotiating position" and "The U.S. and its allies should consider abandoning the plan to install Pershing missiles in Europe."

-- On East-West relations: "France will be firmly anchored in Western Europe and will build bridges to the other Europe."

-- On Europe: "France under Socialism will defend its interests inside the Community, notably in the agricultural sector."

-- On the Middle East: "I support Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers" and "I support the Palestinian people's right to a homeland; the Camp David accords offer a possible avenue to a settlement which should not be discarded."

-- On the Third World: "A Socialist-led France will be responsive to human rights and revolutionary struggles" and "U.S. interference in El Salvador is intolerable."

-- On the Atlantic Alliance: "Soviet threats against Poland make the Alliance increasingly necessary for a free Europe" and "As French President I would place our nuclear deterrent at the West's disposal in case of war;" but "There is a need to redefine French interests vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and vice versa."

-- On relations with the U.S.: "It's only by saying no to your friends that you merit their friendship and esteem" (He coupled this on a number of occasions with the assertion that "France will play an independent role vis-à-vis the superpowers and resist both U.S. and Soviet imperialism.")



*Draft*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

The Briefing Room

May 11, 1981

10:08 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: We will now begin the background briefing. It's on the reaction to the French elections. It's on background and it's an administration official.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President sent last night a letter of congratulation to Francois Mitterrand, and the Vice President did as well. You have copies of those letters. They are self-explanatory. In addition, the President sent a letter to President Giscard D'Estaing in which he indicated the respect and the admiration which he has and the American people have for President Giscard's service to the French nation.

The President was informed yesterday afternoon at about 3:00 the results of the election. Secretary Haig had called him and I had communicated with the President as well giving him the election results, notified him of the concession of President Giscard. The President directed that a congratulatory message be drafted. It was drafted. He had an opportunity to review it and change it accordingly. It was then coordinated with the various interested parties in the United States government and sent out last night.

It was not released last night based on the proposition or the supposition that it should have been received before it was released. There were some reports this morning indicating that the President -- or that we had not reacted, that we were withholding comment, but, of course, the fact that the President's message went out last night indicates that that was not the case.

The President discussed the results of the election this morning at the National Security briefing at which the Secretary of State was also present, and reaffirmed his anticipation and his desire to work with the new president of France, indicated that he would be seeing him at Ottawa, of course, at the time of the summit, and that desire to see President-elect Mitterrand is evident also in the letter of congratulations that the President sent to Monsieur Mitterrand.

There is obviously an analysis going on of the future course of Franco-American relations. It's anticipated that based on the long-standing warm relationship between our two countries that our relations will continue to develop with France, that we are not drawing any conclusions other than that we are standing prepared to work with the new French leadership in the protection of the interests of the West, and for the purpose of improving the bilateral relationship between France and the United States.

Q Do you have any initial feelings as to what it bodes for, let's say, the defense of Western Europe or the commonality of approach of, let's say, the Indian Ocean and that sort of thing?

MORE

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't and, of course, one should exercise a healthy caution and respect for a new administration without trying to prejudge it whatsoever. There are published positions of the new president and he, of course, also has indicated that he wishes to undertake a legislative election quite soon, and I think the interpretation of the full implications of his mandate will become clear at that point. We wouldn't anticipate any short-range changes. It is our understanding that the President-elect of France has a somewhat different point of view about the Middle East and I think that will play itself out --

Q That's more to our advantage, isn't it?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, without attempting to prejudge the full meaning of those policies, based on what we have seen so far, it would appear that the new President of France supports the Camp David process. So, if that could be considered to one's advantage -- I think that's a decision that we prudently must wait to make at a later date.

Q Could I follow up, because he supports Camp David, because he tends to be more

MORE



pro-Israel and less -- well, these are the reports I've read and seen. And because he tends to be somewhat less cozy with Brezhnev, isn't it possible that Mitterrand, even though he's a leftist Socialist, would have a better relationship in some aspects of foreign policy than we've had with Giscard.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's clearly possible. But, again, I want to emphasize that we're not calling or predicting that future course of relations. Based on preliminary indications, it's clear that Mr. Mitterrand will support the French national interest in his own perception and will obviously attempt to build a consensus and to gain political support on the basis of that perception. To the extent that his perception and ours should overlap, then I think that would only augur well for a fine relationship.

Q Does the prospect that he may eventually have to include Communists in his Cabinet give us any worry? Will it create any problems?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would -- certainly the role of the Communist Party in a Cabinet of a European ally would be something that would attract our attention and cause -- (laughter) -- us to examine the situation carefully. Although, we don't feel that it is a foregone conclusion whatsoever that there will be Communist participation in the new French government.

Q Well, is it our understanding that he can avoid that even if new elections are held and this coalition of Socialists, Communist voters wins the parliamentary elections?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's recall that the Communist Party, the PCF, was strident in its opposition of Mr. Mitterrand and it was only after the first round that the PCF decided to throw its support to him. So, Mr. Mitterrand is a Socialist in the European Socialist tradition. He has reaffirmed that on countless occasions. That does not mean that he understands Marxism-Leninism to be a guide for the present or for the future. Quite the contrary, he's had a number of running disputes with the Communist Party, as I've just indicated. I don't think that it is a foregone conclusion whatsoever that there would be an entry of the PCF into this new administration in France.

Q Is there some concern about the possible nationalization of multi-national companies that have an American interest such as ITT?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That matter would be studied very carefully but, as of right now, we have only the preliminary indications based on the rhetoric of the campaign. Whether that will be implemented in policy or whether, for example, a consensus could be built to effectuate those campaign discussions is something that remains to be seen. That is an internal French matter on which we would not comment until policies were to change.

Q Has he responded yet? I know it's very early but has there been any contact with French officials, since the message was sent?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it being the weekend and I'm sure they had a late night in France, there would be no reason to expect --

Q No word from him that all is well or not to --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but there are -- there had been informal lower-level contacts in which information or views have been exchanged and information passed which I wouldn't care to characterize.

Q In Washington here or with Paris?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here in Washington.

Q Is there any concern that this may be the start of a leftist trend in Western Europe?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. This is an individual result based on the perceptions of the French voters and we have no reason to believe that this would start such a trend.

We are in contact, as you well know, with all our alliance partners, and the Secretary of State's recent contact at the NATO ministerials and has had contact with the NATO ministerial and the Secretary of Defense is meeting tomorrow with our NATO partners.

We see no trend being set. Obviously, though, for a major European power to undertake or to undergo an election in which a significant change will be promised will probably have some radiating effects throughout the rest of Europe. But we think it's far too early to draw any conclusions about that.

We believe that the Franco-American Alliance, the relationship is one that has an enduring character to it. Through many years of turmoil in the Fourth Republic, the United States and France were able to carry on good relations. And we think that that reservoir of good will and feeling that cements our two peoples is something of which we will be able to draw for a long time to come. We see no marked deterioration of our relations with France nor do we see any signs that these would be any developments that would lead to a diminution of concerns for Western interests.

MORE

Q Since you know all these answers, why are you undergoing an analysis? You're so glibly telling us all these things that are happening in terms of what you think the future --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not clearly followed your question.

Q I see, you say that you were also going through some sort of soul-searching and analysis on what this all means. Is that correct? Didn't you say that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- at the outset?

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Is being analyzed at the present.

Q It would seem to be also having this very broad brush that everything's going to be fine and --

*cf white-out def*

~~ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that we can anticipate that, but obviously wants to interpret the full meaning of this and the subsequent developments such as the legislative elections that will be held sometime in June, if we understand the timetable correctly, to analyze all of those things very carefully.~~

What I'm talking about now is the broad, indeed, the broad sweep of Franco-American relations. And that, in the larger sense, that is all we have to go on now, but it's a very important factor that we have to keep under constant analysis.

It's not an attempt to be glib, it's just an attempt to try to foresee the future course of our relations, based on what we know this morning.

Q What about an ambassador to France? When are we going to name one?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That matter is under consideration has been for the last weeks and I would anticipate that within the next couple of months that we would have some information for you on that, but it's not --

Q Wouldn't it infer a new relationship when --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily. There's a world-class ambassador there now, Arthur Hartman, who is perfectly capable of assessing the situation. He's known as an outstanding diplomat and Ambassador Hartman has been there for a number of years, provides continuity for the United States and --

Q Why has it taken so long to name these top spots in Europe?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, that --

Q Ambassadors to --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That means, in the case of France, the decision to accept the resignation, for example, of Ambassador Hartman was not taken. He remains Ambassador.

All ambassadors remain until -- and serving at the pleasure of the President, until their resignations are accepted.

So --

Q When do you intend to name a new one?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is likely that a new ambassador to France will be named --

Q How about Moscow?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There, of course, you have a situation in which the Ambassador resigned and the Minister resigned at the same time and the Charge, a special Charge, has been in Moscow in place for some time.

That matter is under careful and immediate review.

Q As far as France, was there any feeling that you wanted to wait and see who was elected before you saw what type of person you wanted to plug in there?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really. We would have, I think, the President if he decided to replace that Ambassador would have made the choice regardless of the outcome of the election. It was not timed for that purpose.

Q What of the President-elect's published positions would be of most interest and concern to us?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really wouldn't really want to characterize them because we haven't finished our analysis and for me to list any of those would be a mistake. It's just premature, Bruce. It wouldn't be wise.

Q Want to say anything about the apparent determination of Schmidt's political base?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's difficult to assess as well. But in the question of Berlin, the election held yields results that are really, truly inconclusive.

It was a mayoral election. Hans Yokin Vogel was sent to Berlin for the express purpose of winning that election, I think you might say. A former mayor of Munich and Justice Minister in the Bonn cabinet, in the coalition cabinet.

The fact that there has been no clear cut majority, leaves that situation open to question.

Berlin has always been a stronghold of the SPD, the Socialist Party of Germany.. And we may recall that it was there that Mayor Willie Brandt made much of his early reputation as the stalwart mayor of that beleaguered city.

MORE

Bonus 10

The full implications of that are not yet known, although I have read press reports that indicate there's some considerable concern in SONN that there will be implications, obvious implications for the ruling coalition if a different type of coalition were established different from the one that exists in SONN were established in Berlin. The analysis is not yet complete. As you know, the CDU won 47.9 percent of the vote and the combined SPD and Free Democratic Coalition only got 44 percent. The balance of the percentage, of the outstanding percentage, represented the small and splinter parties such as the greens and others. So, how it will work out is not entirely certain. There will be some intense negotiations on both sides.

Q Wasn't the U.S. administration studying the French election all along and aren't you well versed now on Mitterand's various stands?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there have been a lot of studies and we know there have been a lot of forecasts of what would happen, but as in the case of any governmental decision, many points of view are collated and we've had analysis from various sectors from the Department of State and from other interested agencies. We've had from other embassies information coming in over the course of the last weeks from the National Security Council staff and the like, but we're not prepared to make a definitive statement yet because we don't know exactly how the President-elect will organize his Cabinet and precisely what policies he'll implement.

Q What is the policy of the U.S. going to be about the nationalization of some companies in France, some of which are part owned by U.S. concerns?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the policy of the United States government will be made clear if and when that policy is announced and adopted.

Q When you said that Haig was contacting allies, did you mean in reference to this? Or did I misunderstand?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not at all. What I referred to was the kinds of -- yes. The question that I was responding to had to do with the impact of that French election on the rest of Europe. And I just responded that the Secretary had recently returned from the NATO ministerial which automatically put him into contact with our allies and it was not meant specifically with respect to this election.

Q Would you like to help us out on how precarious you see the situation today in the Lebanon situation?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd hoped that we would confine this ~~this~~ morning to matters of the French election. The situation in Lebanon is one which is being monitored on a constant basis. As you know, Ambassador Habib will arrive in Israel this afternoon. He has been in constant contact with the Secretary of State over the weekend. The Secretary has reported to the President. The situation remains unchanged from what you know and what we know. Obviously, it is the expectation of the President and the Secretary of State that Ambassador Habib's mission should be allowed to run its full course --

Q What is its course?

MORE

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, . . . would require possibly additional travel while in the Middle East and an analytical summary report with recommendations from Ambassador Habib to the President and through the Secretary of State. All of these matters would be carefully analyzed. The situation is as -- I think if we were to have to characterize it as stable or as precarious, depending on which word one wanted to use, as it has been over the past days, there's been no marked change in the situation.

I'm not going to get into a Middle East briefing here.

Q Habib might make another circuit to the three capitals before coming back?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the request of the Secretary of State, he may in fact do that.

Q Go into Saudi Arabia?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I couldn't tell you about the rest of his travel schedule.

Q When will you decide when he will be returning?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not going to get into a Middle East briefing, if you don't mind.

Q He could be returning this afternoon?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q He could be returning after the meeting in Brazil?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that that would be his schedule. I really don't know. I just can't tell you about the precise travel schedule.

Q You said from what we know, it would appear that the new President plans to support the Camp David Process. Is that good?

MORE

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since the United States recognizes the Camp David process as the basic framework for the further development of peace in the Middle East, we think that that is a felicitous occurrence.

Q Could I ask one other question on that?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the last question.

Q I'd like to know do the statements in the campaign by Mitterrand bode well or ill for the United States' hope that Europe will take a greater part in paying for its own defense?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just really would prefer not to answer that question because to do so would give you a headline and would also be premature. I'll let others make that analysis for you at a later date.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For those who came in late, this is a background briefing with attribution to a senior administration official.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU  
END

10:35 A.M. EDT

#2726

JANET COLSON  
 BUD NANCE  
 DICK ALLEN  
 IRENE DERUS  
 JANET COLSON  
 BUD NANCE  
 KAY  
 CY TO VP  
 CY TO MEESE  
 CY TO BAKER  
 CY TO DEEVER  
 CY TO BRADY

*J* 15/10556  
 5/11/30  
 RWA  
 We sent this straight up  
 J  
 (5/15/81)

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_  
 SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

May 15, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *Jim*

SUBJECT: Ed Meese's Meeting with de Laboulaye

Janet briefed me on the lunch meeting Ed Meese is scheduled to have today with Francois de Laboulaye. Your memo to Ed Meese at Tab I provides appropriate materials which he may want to skim preceding the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Jim Lilley  
Norman Bailey

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Ed Meese
- A Bio sheet on de Laboulaye
- B Analysis of Mitterrand's Victory
- C Summary of Quotes from Mitterrand
- D Backgrounder to Press

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CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*smf*  
*12/14/07*

RECEIVED 15 MAY 81 13

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 15 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

DE LABOULAYE, FRANCO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPERS FOR MEESE MTG W/ FRENCH AMB ON MAY 15

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 15 MAY 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C / **B**)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 5/15</i>	<i>Colson ref memo to These, for RVA</i>		<i>RE</i>

DISPATCH *et - Janet C. handcarried at 1105 hrs* W/ATTCH FILE

**PA**

(CYMDS)

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP  
EOB: RENT  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8449 1372049  
O 172039Z MAY 81 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 128449

NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 5/1 /01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.) EUR

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR, US

SUBJECT: INITIAL CONTACTS WITH MITTERRAND

REF: PAKIS 14388 (NOUIS)

1. ~~W~~ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE AGREE WITH THE GENERAL APPROACH YOU OUTLINED REFTEL. ACCORDINGLY YOU SHOULD, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SEEK A "COURTESY CALL" ON PRESIDENT-ELECT MITTERRAND. WE RECOGNIZE THAT HE MAY NOT WISH TO RECEIVE FOREIGN AMBASSADORS UNTIL HE HAS BEEN INAUGURATED, BUT BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO HAVE YOUR REQUEST FOR A MEETING ON THE RECORD IMMEDIATELY. YOUR MEETING SHOULD SERVE AS AN INITIAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND MITTERRAND IN HIS NEW CAPACITY. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH HIM. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD GUIDE YOU DURING THE MEETING.

SECSTATE WASHDC 8449

DTG:172039Z MAY 81 PSN: 010430  
TOR: 138/1223Z

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 107-081 #46829  
BY CW ES/6/10  
44829

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- YOU SHOULD LINK THE WARM CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO YOUR CALL TO ESTABLISH THAT ALL THREE REFLECT OUR RESPECT AND APPRECIATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN FRANCE, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS IN OUR OWN INTEREST.

-- WE WISH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH MITTERRAND. TO DO THIS WE NEED TO KNOW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT HIS PLANS AND OBJECTIVES. DRAW MITTERRAND OUT ON HIS THINKING ABOUT MAJOR ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

-- WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO PRESS US VIEWS ON MITTERRAND IF HE IS EVIDENTLY UNWILLING TO LISTEN, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, ON WHICH WE HOPE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE NEW GOF.

-- SHOULD MITTERRAND GIVE YOU AN OPENING, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THE MAIN ISSUES ON WHICH WE CONSIDER COOPERATION WITH FRANCE A HIGH PRIORITY:

A. EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- WE NEED A BROAD WESTERN CONSENSUS ON HOW TO MEET WORLDWIDE SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

B. POLAND -- WE NEED TO RECONFIRM WESTERN AGREEMENT ON CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR REACTION TO POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

C. CUE -- WE WISH TO MAINTAIN WESTERN SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE.

D. SOUTHERN AFRICA -- WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP TO ACHIEVE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.

E. LEBANON -- WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED, RECOGNIZE SPECIAL FRENCH ROLE, AND WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY. OFFER TO BRIEF FRENCH ON RESULTS OF HABIB MISSION WHEN IT HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

F. PERSIAN GULF SECURITY -- WE VALUE AND WISH TO CONTINUE THE INFORMAL COORDINATION BETWEEN OUR MILITARY UNITS IN THE AREA.

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DTG:172039Z MAY 81 PSN: 010430  
TOR: 138/1223Z

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO OPENING A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL DIALOGUE ON THESE AND OTHER SUBJECTS WITH THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS HE TAKES OFFICE.

-- WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH MITTERRAND HIMSELF. TRY TO OBTAIN A COMMITMENT FOR A FURTHER MEETING. IF MITTERRAND GIVES YOU AN OPENING YOU SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT U.S. POLICIES, AND TO COME BACK TO SEE HIM TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE.

-- WE DO NOT WISH TO PRESS, BUT IF THE ATMOSPHERE IS RIGHT AND AN OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, YOU MAY OFFER TO TRY TO ARRANGE A CALL ON HIM BY AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON THE FIRST OCCASION WHEN SUCH AN OFFICIAL MAY BE IN EUROPE ON OTHER BUSINESS.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE POINT IN PARENTHESES IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL, WE PREFER THAT MITTERRAND LEARN THE "QUALITY AND SENSITIVITY" OF THE U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP INITIALLY FROM FRENCHMEN, AND THAT YOUR DISCUSSION NOT, ON YOUR INITIATION, RAISE WITH MITTERRAND OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOF IF RASHISH HAS ALREADY DONE SO WITH ATTALI AND DELORS. IF RASHISH HAS NOT DONE SO, THEN YOU SHOULD MAKE POINTS YOU SUGGEST REFTEL. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU SHOULD USE YOUR POINTS IF MITTERRAND ASKS YOU ABOUT U.S. REACTIONS TO INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN GOF.

4. FYI: THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN ASKED TO COORDINATE VISITS TO PARIS DURING THE COMING ELECTORAL PERIOD BY U.S. OFFICIALS SEEKING CONTACTS WITH THEIR FRENCH COUNTERPARTS. WE WILL BE DISCOURAGING UNNECESSARY VISITS (EXCEPT THOSE FOR EXCLUSIVELY MULTILATERAL BUSINESS OR THE AIRSHOW), AND WILL TRY TO ENSURE THAT VISITORS WHOSE CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH ARE APPROVED ARE OPERATING FROM THE SAME GUIDANCE. END FYI. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 8449

DTG:172039Z MAY 81 PSN: 010430  
TOR: 138/1223Z

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PAGE 1 - 465

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

HCE110  
STU0752  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHFR #4814 1381456  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 181455Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5328  
BT

NLRR 1007-081 \*46830  
BY CN NA DATE 5/10/10

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 14814  
E.O. 12065: GDS 05/18/87 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR  
SUBJECT: INITIAL MEETING WITH MITTERRAND'S TRANSITION TEAM  
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)  
2. DCM AND CHIEF OF INTERNAL UNIT CALLED ON PIERRE BEREGOVY, HEAD OF MITTERRAND'S TRANSITION TEAM, ON EVENING OF MAY 15. BEREGOVY IS A LONG-TIME EMBASSY CONTACT.  
3. DCM OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY CONGRATULATING HIM ON FRANCOIS MITTERRAND'S VICTORY MAY 10. BEREGOVY REPLIED THAT THEY HAD GREATLY APPRECIATED THE WARM TERMS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CONGRATULATORY LETTER AND SO HAD MITTERRAND HIMSELF WHO WOULD BE SENDING THE PRESIDENT A PERSONAL REPLY.  
4. BEREGOVY GOOD HUMBLEDLY NOTED THAT NOW "WE WOULD BE DEALING WITH THE DEVIL" BUT HE EMPHASIZED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT ONE AREA WHERE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE NECESSARY WAS IN THE ALLIANCE; WE WOULD NEED TO KNOW JUST WHAT EACH OTHER'S RESPONSIBILITIES WERE. IN THE ENSUING EXCHANGE, BEREGOVY SEEMED TO INDICATE THEY HAD IN MIND COORDINATION OF POLICY OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA, AS HE CITED THE SINGLE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.  
5. DCM SAID THAT WE WOULD KEEP THIS MEETING BRIEF, AS WE FULLY APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULTIES AND CONFUSION INVOLVED IN A TRANSITION PERIOD; WE IN THE U. S. ARE ONLY TOO ACCUSTOMED TO THIS KIND OF EXPERIENCE. BEREGOVY LAUGHED AND SAID THAT SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE IN FRANCE, WHERE NEITHER CONSTITUTIONAL NOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR A SMOOTH TRANSITION; THEY WERE CONFRONTED BY SERIOUS LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. FOR INSTANCE, HE NOTED IN A RATHER IRRITATED TONE, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM THE ELYSEE THAT MITTERRAND'S PROPOSAL TO TAKE OVER POWER ON THE 20TH HAD BEEN REJECTED BY GISCARD. THIS WAS UNFORTUNATE, AS DECISIVE ACTION NEEDS TO BE TAKEN ON MANY PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY THE FRANC. (THE TRANSFER IS

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PAGE 1 - 466

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NOW SET FOR THE 21ST.)

6. DCM SAID THAT WE WANTED TO AVOID CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFUSION AND ABOVE ALL AVOIDING MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THIS PERIOD. WE WANTED, THEREFORE, TO ESTABLISH CLEAR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. FOR THIS REASON, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE HOW BUSY THE NEW PRESIDENT WAS, THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A COURTESY CALL ON HIM AT THE PRESIDENT'S EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. BEREGOVDOY ASKED DID THE AMBASSADOR WANT TO SEE MITTERRAND BEFORE THE TURNOVER OF POWER? DCM REPLIED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD NO SPECIAL OR URGENT MESSAGE BUT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM AT AN EARLY DATE. BEREGOVDOY SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE NO PROBLEM.

7. DCM WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AMERICAN LEADERS FROM BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES INCLUDING SENIOR SENATORS/CONGRESSMEN TRAVELING THROUGH PARIS IN THE COMING WEEKS, MANY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PARIS AIR SHOW. SOME HAD ALREADY REQUESTED MAKING CALLS ON PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. BEREGOVDOY INTERRUPTED, SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOVERNMENT VERY SOON, AND THAT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COULD RECEIVE SUCH VISITORS (WE TOOK THIS TO BE AN IMPLICIT STATEMENT THAT MITTERRAND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO SEE THEM.)

8. FINALLY, THE MINISTER ASKED IF FOREIGN DELEGATIONS WOULD BE INVITED OR EXPECTED TO ATTEND ANY CEREMONY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSFER OF POWER. BEREGOVDOY'S REPLY WAS AN UNEQUIVOCAL NO. HARTMAN

BT

#4814

NNNN

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Withdrawer*

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FRANCE (5/15/81-5/27/81)

*FOIA*

S2007-081  
NOUZILLE

*Box Number*

13

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
46831	MEMO  ALLEN TO PRESIDENT RE MITTERRAND	1	5/20/1981	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FRANCE (5/15/81-5/27/81)

*FOIA*

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

*Box Number*

13

24

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
46832	REPORT	3	5/14/1981	B1
	MITTERRAND			

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*AK*

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

May 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.R.*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Mitterrand and the Middle East

Through Don Gregg, the Agency was tasked with the analysis at Tab A on Mitterrand's likely approach to Middle East matters. As Don points out, it is not the most decisive paper ever to emerge from the analytical process, but then again it is still rather early for definitive calls.

Your memo to the President at Tab I conveys the essential points of the Agency's analysis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve            *✓ BNA 5/20* Disapprove           

cc: Jim Lilley  
Don Gregg  
Dennis Blair  
Geoff Kemp

Tab I Memo to the President  
A - CIA Analysis on Mitterrand

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM RENTSCHLER

*2nd  
12/14/07*

RECEIVED 18 MAY 81 19

DOCDATE 18 MAY 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MIDDLE EAST

SUBJECT: FRANCE POLICY TWDS THE MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 20 MAY 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

BAILEY ✓

BLAIR ✓

KEMP ✓

GREGG ✓

LILLEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 5/20</i>	<i>for info</i>		<i>EM, JB ✓</i>
	<i>5/22</i>	<i>trated by Pres</i>		<i>re ✓</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA*

(C)

*HA*

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 302

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE077  
UTS6170  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHR #5256 1410854  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 210852Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5522  
BT  
UNCLAS PARIS 15256  
E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: PGDV, FR  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND  
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OFFICIALLY ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY  
OF FRANCE MAY 21 AT 10:30 LOCAL TIME. HARTMAN  
BT  
#5256  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 298

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

44833

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE269  
STU8664  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUFHFR #5268 1410927  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 210926Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5526  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07081-46833

BY CN NARA DATE 5/16/10

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 15268

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 5/20/91 (ELY, MICHAEL E.C.) DR-E

TAGS: FR, US, EIND, ESTC

SUBJECT: FRENCH STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS

REF: PARIS 12659

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING A MAY 18 MEETING WITH QUAI EAST-WEST TRADE OFFICER MOUTON AND FRENCH COCOM DELEGATE POURCHEL, EMBASSY ECONOMIC MINISTER INQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS.
3. MOUTON REPLIED THAT PRIME MINISTER BARRE DECIDED THAT A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT COULD NOT APPROVE THE NEW SYSTEM AS A ROUTINE MATTER, AND ACTION HAS BEEN DEFERRED TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. MOUTON CLAIMED THAT THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE VIRTUALLY HAVE INTERMINISTERIAL APPROVAL. HE CHARACTERIZED THE REMAINING PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES TO BE "NOT OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE" AND SUGGESTED THEY INVOLVED BUREAUCRATIC INTEREST IN ASSURING WIDE INTERMINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW PROCESS. IN CONTRAST, HE SAID INTERMINISTERIAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN OVER THE CONTENT OF THE LIST SUBJECT TO THE NEW SYSTEMS AND INTERMINISTERIAL AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF "HARD-CORE" TECHNOLOGY HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED.
4. MOUTON VIEWED THE ISSUE AS ONE REQUIRING POLITICAL DECISIONS AT THE CABINET LEVEL. HE SAID THE DEFINITION OF "HARD-CORE" TECHNOLOGY IN THE PRESENT PROPOSAL WAS EITHER "TOO WIDE OR TOO NARROW" DEPENDING ON YOUR PERSPECTIVE. HE SAID THE VIEW OF THE FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTRY ON THE LIST WOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEIR US COLLEAGUES. ACCORDING TO MOUTON, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BELIEVES THE HARD-CORE LIST MUST TRULY ENCOMPASS HARD-CORE TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRESENT PROPOSAL DOES NOT DO THAT. THE MINISTRY BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE STRICT CONTROL OF

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 299

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A LITTLE RATHER THAN SOFT CONTROL OF A LOT AND WILL STICK WITH THIS POSITION IF THE NEW MINISTER SUPPORTS IT.

5. MOUTON COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE COMPLETED A GREAT DEAL OF HARD INTERMINISTERIAL WORK AND INTEND TO "CLEAN UP" THEIR CONTROL SYSTEM. MOUTON SEES NO PROBLEM AS CONCERNS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY OR ARMAMENTS. (THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY THE PUBLICATION, BEING REPORTED SEPTEL, OF A MAY 11 DECREE IN THE JOURNAL OFFICIEL EXPANDING THE ITEMS COVERED BY THE FRENCH MUNITION CONTROL SYSTEM TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR AND LASER EQUIPMENT). MOUTON SAID THE FRENCH SEEK A TRULY STRATEGIC APPROACH BEYOND TRANSITORY CONSIDERATIONS. IN HIS VIEW, THIS MEANS AN EFFECTIVE EMBARGO ADDING CERTAIN ITEMS TO THE COCOM LIST AND SUBTRACTING OTHERS. MOUTON STRESSED THAT THE OPTIONS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN CLEAR TERMS; EITHER MAINTAIN THE EXISTING SYSTEM OR STRENGTHEN IT. MOUTON CONCLUDED THAT HE SAW LITTLE POSSIBILITY FOR A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION ON THE MATTER UNTIL AFTER THE VACATION PERIOD.

6. EMBASSY COMMENT: ALTHOUGH MOUTON DID NOT AT ANY POINT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO THE INDUSTRY MINISTRY IN HIS DISCUSSION OF FRENCH POLICY DIFFERENCES OVER THE DEFINITION OF "HARD-CORE TECHNOLOGY", WE BELIEVE THE INDUSTRY MINISTRY IS, IN FACT, A MAJOR PLAYER. WE INTERPRET MOUTON'S INTENTIONALLY VAGUE COMMENTS TO MEAN THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, IF THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER APPROVES, WILL SEEK TO OBTAIN INTERMINISTERIAL AGREEMENT ON TIGHTER CONTROL OVER A LIST SHORTER THAN THE TOUGH POSITION OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, AS REPORTED BY MOUTON, BUT LONGER THAN THE LIKELY MORE RELAXED APPROACH OF THE INDUSTRY MINISTRY. HARTMAN

BT  
#5268  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

DATE 06/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIF: COL,VP  
EOB: FONTAINE, KIMMITT, GUMIN, HUBERMAN  
WHSR COMMENT:

44834

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 007-081 #46834

BY CA NARA DATE 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFK #0645 1400905  
O 260905Z MAY 81  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0701

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 10045  
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/20/88 (FRIEDMAN, A.S.) UR-S  
TAGS: TNUC, MNUC, PARM, ENRG, CH, SF, AR, FR  
SUBJ: PRC NUCLEAR SALES TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ARGENTINA  
REF: A) STATE 104593; B) STATE 103820, C) STATE 12/443

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUBSTANCE OF REFTELS WAS PASSED ON TO NICULLAUD (MFA) (WHO IS ACTING FOR LOUEI SINCE LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK TO TAKE UP ASSIGNMENT AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF FRENCH UN MISSION).
3. NICULLAUD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO SCICOUNSELOR FOR KEEPING GOF INFORMED AND NOTED WITH RELIEF THAT "U.S. IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION". HE SAID THAT IMPRESSION THAT HAD BEEN PASSED ON TO FOREIGN OFFICE BY AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE, FOLLOWING RECENT CHANGE IN U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY VIS-A-VIS SOUTH AFRICA, WAS THAT U.S. WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THIS PROBLEM.
4. NICULLAUD ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO KEEP GOF INFORMED OF STATUS OF SUBJECT SHIPMENTS. HANIMAN

PARIS 0640

DTG: 260905Z MAY 81 PSN: 020209  
IUR: 140/1117Z



~~\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*~~

39

DATE 06/17/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PARIS 0640

DTG: 260900Z MAY 01 PSN: 020209  
IUR: 146/1117Z

~~\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*~~

0

~~SECRET~~

40

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*RJ*

46835

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Contacts with the French

Attached is a memorandum from Al Haig to you recommending the Vice President not go to France at this time. Further, he recommends he invite the French Foreign Minister, Cheysson, to Washington on June 4 - 8.

If you concur with Al's recommendations, I will so notify him.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_

CC: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
James Baker ✓  
Michael Deaver

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Review on May 26, 1987

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRRM17-081 #46835  
BY CN TE 9/29/10

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

46837

May 26, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *(Signature)*  
SUBJECT: Contacts with the French

On Saturday, May 23, I learned of the Vice President's desire to visit Paris as soon as possible to initiate high-level contacts with the new Government of France. Meanwhile, we had asked Chancellor Schmidt when he was here last week to sound out the French on this subject during his visit to Paris over the weekend.

After Schmidt returned to Bonn, the Germans gave our Charge, Bill Woessner, a debriefing on Schmidt's conversations with Mitterrand. The upshot of this debrief was that the French are very eager to begin their contacts with us, but prefer to do it in Washington and at a level somewhat lower than the Mitterrand-Bush level. The French Foreign Minister, Cheysson, called our Ambassador in Paris yesterday, May 25, to convey the same message.

Most recently, the French Ambassador in Washington, Francois de Laboulaye, called on Larry Eagleburger at noon today to convey Paris' desire for an invitation for Cheysson to visit Washington within the next ten days to meet with me and with senior economic officials. I suspect that their desire to meet with economic officials stems from two concerns: (a) the French are getting more than a little bit nervous about capital flight, the stock market, and the weakening franc; and (b) Cheysson does not want to be accused by the French Right of taking instructions from Washington.

I have since talked with the Vice President, in light of the above, who has decided to forego his plans to go to Paris in the immediate future. If you agree, I would suggest that we invite Cheysson to come to Washington to meet with me, Treasury Secretary Regan, and others on June 4-8. While he is here, we could propose that the Vice President go to Paris after the second round of French Parliamentary elections in late June for conversations with Mitterrand on the future of US-French bilateral relations. If your schedule permits, I would recommend that you give Cheysson a few minutes of your time as well while he is in Washington.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
GDS 5/26/87

107-081 # 46837  
BY *CU* NA DATE 4/29/10

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42

3052  
AJT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 27, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~  
  
INFORMATION

46838

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Laxalt Meeting with Mitterrand? (C)

I took a call this morning from Don Agger, of DGA, a lobbyist group which does work for both the Moroccan and the French governments. Agger has good contacts in Paris (Jacques Wahl was among them) and wanted me to pass along an idea that I think may be worth your consideration. (C)

Agger's firm has contacts with Sen. Laxalt. Laxalt, according to Agger, will be going to the Paris Air Show, and Agger, by way of "personal suggestion", wonders if Laxalt might not be a good Presidential intermediary with Mitterrand. Agger reasons that given Laxalt's closeness to the President, he would be a good choice for making an initial contact with Mitterrand on the President's behalf, taking the measure of the man, providing Mitterrand with the President's views, etc. Mitterrand would be impressed by the President's gesture of sending him a personal friend; at the same time, the choice of Laxalt would give an unofficial, out-of-channels cast to the contact, thereby minimizing risks from a policy point of view. (C)

I pass this idea on to you for any use you think it might have. You might want to suggest it to Haig (in that connection, see the last paragraph of the attached State guidance cable on U.S. contacts with Mitterrand & Co.). (U)

cc: Dennis Blair  
Jim Lilley

Attachment:

Tab A State Cable

No.  
Agger should not  
be an intermediary.  
But Laxalt needs to  
have a discussion before  
going to Paris.  
-----  
from - of the just  
Laxalt or my  
call shut.  
Done 6/1/81

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~  
Review on May 27, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 107-081 #46838  
BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

EOB699

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

IN

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #8449 1372049  
O 172039Z MAY 81 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

46841

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 128449

NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 5/1 /01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.) EUR

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR, US

SUBJECT: INITIAL CONTACTS WITH MITTERRAND

REF: PARIS 14388 (NODIS)

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 707-081-96841  
BY *[Signature]* NARA DATE 5/6/11

1. ~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE AGREE WITH THE GENERAL APPROACH YOU OUTLINED REFTEL. ACCORDINGLY YOU SHOULD, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SEEK A "COURTESY CALL" ON PRESIDENT-ELECT MITTERRAND. WE RECOGNIZE THAT HE MAY NOT WISH TO RECEIVE FOREIGN AMBASSADORS UNTIL HE HAS BEEN INAUGURATED, BUT BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO HAVE YOUR REQUEST FOR A MEETING ON THE RECORD IMMEDIATELY. YOUR MEETING SHOULD SERVE AS AN INITIAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND MITTERRAND IN HIS NEW CAPACITY. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH HIM. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD GUIDE YOU DURING THE MEETING.

-- YOU SHOULD LINK THE WARM CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO YOUR CALL TO ESTABLISH THAT ALL THREE REFLECT OUR RESPECT AND APPRECIATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN FRANCE, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS IN OUR OWN INTEREST.

-- WE WISH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH MITTERRAND. TO DO THIS WE NEED TO KNOW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT HIS PLANS AND OBJECTIVES. DRAW MITTERRAND OUT ON HIS THINKING ABOUT

\*\*\*\*\*

SIT: NAN COL VP  
EOB: RENT  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 8449

DTG:172039Z MAY 81  
TOR: 138/1223Z

PSN:010430  
CSN:HCE069

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

\*\*\*\*\*C O N F I D E N T I A L\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

MAJOR ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

-- WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO PRESS US VIEWS ON MITTERRAND IF HE IS EVIDENTLY UNWILLING TO LISTEN, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, ON WHICH WE HOPE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE NEW GOF.

-- SHOULD MITTERRAND GIVE YOU AN OPENING, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THE MAIN ISSUES ON WHICH WE CONSIDER COOPERATION WITH FRANCE A HIGH PRIORITY:

A. EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- WE NEED A BROAD WESTERN CONSENSUS ON HOW TO MEET WORLDWIDE SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

B. POLAND -- WE NEED TO RECONFIRM WESTERN AGREEMENT ON CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR REACTION TO POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

C. CDE -- WE WISH TO MAINTAIN WESTERN SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE.

D. SOUTHERN AFRICA -- WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP TO ACHIEVE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.

E. LEBANON -- WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED, RECOGNIZE SPECIAL FRENCH ROLE, AND WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY. OFFER TO BRIEF FRENCH ON RESULTS OF HABIB MISSION WHEN IT HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

F. PERSIAN GULF SECURITY -- WE VALUE AND WISH TO CONTINUE THE INFORMAL COORDINATION BETWEEN OUR MILITARY UNITS IN THE AREA.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO OPENING A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL DIALOGUE ON THESE AND OTHER SUBJECTS WITH THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS HE TAKES OFFICE.

-- W- WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH MITTERRAND HIMSELF. TRY TO OBTAIN A COMMITMENT FOR A FURTHER MEETING. IF MITTERRAND GIVES YOU AN OPENING YOU SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT U.S. POLICIES, AND TO COME BACK TO SEE HIM TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE.

-- WE DO NOT WISH TO PRESS, BUT IF THE ATMOSPHERE IS RIGHT AND AN OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, YOU MAY OFFER TO TRY TO ARRANGE A CALL ON HIM BY AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR

PAGE 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 8449

DTG:172039Z MAY 81  
TOR: 138/1223Z

PSN:010430  
CSN:HCE069

\*\*\*\*\*C O N F I D E N T I A L\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

MEMBER OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON THE FIRST OCCASION WHEN SUCH AN OFFICIAL MAY BE IN EUROPE ON OTHER BUSINESS.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE POINT IN PARENTHESES IN PARA 4 OF REFTTEL, WE PREFER THAT MITTERRAND LEARN THE "QUALITY AND SENSITIVITY" OF THE U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP INITIALLY FROM FRENCHMEN, AND THAT YOUR DISCUSSION NOT, ON YOUR INITIATION, RAISE WITH MITTERRAND OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOF IF RASHISH HAS ALREADY DONE SO WITH ATTALI AND DELORS. IF RASHISH HAS NOT DONE SO, THEN YOU SHOULD MAKE POINTS YOU SUGGEST REFTTEL. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU SHOULD USE YOUR POINTS IF MITTERRAND ASKS YOU ABOUT U.S. REACTIONS TO INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN GOF.

4. FYI: THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN ASKED TO COORDINATE VISITS TO PARIS DURING THE COMING ELECTORAL PERIOD BY U.S. OFFICIALS SEEKING CONTACTS WITH THEIR FRENCH COUNTERPARTS. WE WILL BE DISCOURAGING UNNECESSARY VISITS (EXCEPT THOSE FOR EXCLUSIVELY MULTILATERAL BUSINESS OR THE AIRSHOW), AND WILL TRY TO ENSURE THAT VISITORS WHOSE CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH ARE APPROVED ARE OPERATING FROM THE SAME GUIDANCE. END FYI. HAIG BT

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM HAIG, A

*amp*  
*12/14/07*

RECEIVED 27 MAY 81 16

DOC DATE 27 MAY 81

TO PRES

STOESSEL, W

18 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

SALT

MARCY, CARL

ARMS CONTROL

CM

TOON, MAC

WATSON, TOM

SUBJECT: MTG OF FORMER US AMBASSADORS TO SOVIET UNION RE DETENTE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 27 MAY 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN *nd*

SCHWEITZER

COLSON

LORD

LENZ

COMMENTS \*\*\* 3 HOUR TURNAROUND RESPONSE FOR CABINET LEVEL MEMO \*\*\*

**URGENT**

REF# 8116526

LOG

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 5/27</i>	<i>forward to CIA (found)</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 6/02</i>	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>C 6/03</i>	<i>noted by the Pres.</i>		<i>BD</i>

DISPATCH

*CP*

W/ATTCH FILE

*RA* (C) *[Signature]*



MEMORANDUM

47

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1981

46843

INFORMATION

OK  
RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Al Haig forwarded an interesting memorandum of conversation (Tab A) between Walt Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon and Tom Watson. Their views on U.S.-Soviet relations center on the importance of revitalizing arms control negotiations (specifically facilitating a new round of SALT talks) and seeking meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership. As Al Haig aptly points out, these views clearly manifest those "detente" perceptions which have characterized and guided U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union previously. (C)

cc: Ed Meese  
Michael Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 107-081 #46843  
BY            NARA DATE 4/29/10

6/2 to *in Harriman*  
3051  
0955  
48

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1981

46845

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Al Haig forwarded an interesting memorandum of conversation (Tab A) between Walt Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon and Tom Watson. Their views on U.S.-Soviet relations center on the importance of revitalizing arms control negotiations (specifically facilitating a new round of SALT talks) and seeking meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership. As Al Haig aptly points out, these views clearly manifest those "detente" perceptions which have characterized and guided U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union previously. (C)

cc: Ed Meese  
Michael Deaver

+ Jim Baker *6/2 sent / JEP*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR ~~107-081~~ #16845  
BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

CONFIDENTIAL

Review May 27, 1987.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

46846

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*  
Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors  
to the Soviet Union

Walt Stoessel recently attended a get-together of former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. He has prepared the attached memorandum of conversation on the views of some of the participants. I believe you will find these views interesting as a reflection of the legacy of "detente" perceptions which have surrounded the US-Soviet relationship in the past, and which will still prevail in certain circles, including these former representatives.

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 746846

BY CN DATE 5/6/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46848

May 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors to the  
Soviet Union

At the initiative of the Committee on East/West Accord, chaired by Carl Marcy, a dinner meeting was held May 13 of former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. Present were Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Mac Toon, Tom Watson and myself. Foy Kohler was unable to attend; Toon participated in initial discussions over drinks but could not stay for dinner.

Watson presented a draft letter which he proposed should be sent to the President from the Ambassadors stressing the importance of arms control negotiations and urging prompt initiation of a new round of SALT talks. The others present were not sure that such a letter would be appropriate; I pointed out that the Administration's review of SALT matters was still underway and that a recommendation of the kind proposed by Watson appeared premature. I also noted that his letter did not include the concept of linkage regarding other aspects of Soviet behavior. Toon strongly supported this position and it was agreed by all that the letter should not be sent.

Discussion at dinner was general in nature and covered a number of topics. A recurrent theme, however, voiced in particular by Kennan, was that the Administration seemed to be overdoing the rhetoric concerning the Soviet threat. Kennan noted that, for example, the Soviets -- and the czarist regime before them -- always maintained large military forces and frequently engaged in activities which were not regarded with approval by Western states. He did not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 5/20/86

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081746848

BY AL NA DATE 5/6/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

feel that we should be so upset by what the Administration refers to as "Soviet adventurism." He noted that the Soviets have many vulnerabilities and, in fact, have suffered a number of defeats in Africa and elsewhere. He also thought that there were some things in our own record which could be criticized.

Kennan said he felt it was important for the United States to seek a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership, despite problems we have with Soviet behavior.

Kennan was supported in his remarks by Harriman and Watson. Beam was in general accord with Kennan although with less emphasis than Harriman and Watson.

I presented counter arguments to Kennan's thesis and feel sure I would have been supported by Mac Toon if he had been able to stay for the dinner discussion. In general, however, it seemed clear that Kennan, Harriman and Watson were not particularly sympathetic to Administration views on US-Soviet relations.

Kennan spoke with some emotion about his concern regarding the accumulation on both sides of nuclear weaponry. He said he would be making a speech next week in Washington on the occasion of his receiving the Einstein Peace Award in which he would speak about the dangers of the present situation and would recommend urgent actions toward a reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Another meeting of this group is scheduled to be held in October. As a member of this Administration, and given the views of the others, I am not entirely comfortable with my participation but it would be awkward to refuse to join the meetings. I believe the views will be better balanced if it is possible

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

for Kohler and Toon to take part.

Walter J. <sup>53</sup>Stoessel, Jr.

cc: S/S - Mr. Bremer  
EUR - Ambassador Eagleburger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

3051

*At*

53

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President commenting on a memorandum of conversation between Walter Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, which was forwarded by Secretary of State Haig (Tab A). *for*

Stearman had no comment; Pipes was unavailable; Lord and Schweitzer gave no response. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove ✓

*What's the difference between no comment & no response?*

*I do not think this needs to go to President.*

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum dated May 27, 1981 (with attachment)

*let Jim Baker decide. Send copies to Miller & Power 6/2/81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *At* NARA, Date 12/14/07

81 MAY 28 A 8:55

JANET COLSON

Jc 28/1053

BUD NANCE

Jc 28/1255

DICK ALLEN

MD 30/2313

IRENE DERUS

ije 1/6 808

JANET COLSON

Jc 1/0935

BUD NANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2 JUNE

#3051

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

#3051

NOTE FOR FILE:

RVA signed memo to the Pres., however, he had noted on covering memo after doing so, "I do not think this needs to go to President. Let Jim Baker decide. Send copies to Meese & Deaver." However, pkg had already been taken to darman's office & jcp was unable to retrieve. As a result, jcp dispatched cc's to Meese/Deaver and Baker.

JCP

27 May  
Tubed upon  
receipt 2005 27 May  
to Kayserwick LD



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>PD</sup>

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President commenting on a memorandum of conversation between Walter Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, which was forwarded by Secretary of State Haig (Tab A). (C)

Stearman had no comment; Pipes was unavailable; Lord and Schweitzer gave no response. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum dated May 27, 1981 (with attachment)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review May 27, 1987.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 12/14/07

#3052

81 MAY 28 P 4: 0

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*gc 28/1657*

*gc 28/1749*  
*WA 31/0026*

*gc 1/0944*

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

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SHOW CC

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM RENTSCHLER

*smk*  
*12/14/07*

RECEIVED 28 MAY 81 13

DOCDATE 27 MAY 81

*56*

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MOROCCO

MITTERRAND, F

LAXALT, PAUL

SUBJECT: SEN LAXALT MTG W/ MITTERRAND

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

WETTERING

BLAIR

LILLEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( G / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*d 6/02 notes by LVA w/comment*

*re JB, JL*

*Don't put "Done" note*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*(PA)*

(c) *HA*