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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 12/14/2007

**File Folder** FRANCE (4/23/81-5/14/81)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 13

NOUZILLE

23

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46795	MEMO	ALLEN TO MEESE RE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN	2	5/4/1981	B1
46796	REPORT	RE PRESIDENT GISCARD	9	4/17/1981	B1
46797	REPORT	RE MITTERRAND	10	4/17/1981	B1
46798	CABLE	081624Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	2	5/8/1981	B1
46803	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE FRANCE <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	5/11/1981	B1
46807	CABLE	081624Z MAY 81 <b>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</b>	2	5/8/1981	B1
46808	MEMO	ALLEN TO EDWARDS AND SCHNEIDER RE MEETING WITH JOELLE BOURGEOIS <b>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</b>	1	5/11/1981	B1
46809	MEMO	BAILEY TO ALLEN RE MEETING WITH BOURGEOIS <b>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</b>	1	4/30/1981	B1
46810	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE MITTERRAND <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	5/14/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46811	MEMO	RENTSCHLER TO ALLEN RE MITTERRAND <i>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</i>	1	5/11/1981	B1

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JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Jan 26/1839

Jan 29/1845

Mar 3/2330

Apr 4/8733

Jan 4/0836

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(I held this up - my fault!)  
jc  
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UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

April 28, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.*

SUBJECT: French Presidential Elections: The Moment of Truth on May 10

I believe that what happens at the French polls on May 10 will have enormous implications for Allied security policy over the next four years and more. With that in mind, you might find the attached material both timely and relevant. I am sending this analysis forward in the form of a memo from you to Ed Meese, which gives you the option of moving it readily upstairs if you want or retaining it in your own office; either way it will retain information value beyond May 10.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve ; As Amended

*5/4 81*

NB. For a really perceptive look at the French election scene, you should read the Walter Schwarz piece in a recent issue of The Manchester Guardian (Tab II). It convulsed Dennis and me....

*attached*

cc: Jim Lilley  
Bob Schweitzer  
Bill Stearman

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
46795	MEMO	2	5/4/1981	B1
	ALLEN TO MEESE RE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN			

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46796	REPORT  RE PRESIDENT GISCARD	9	4/17/1981	B1

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46797	REPORT  RE MITTERRAND	10	4/17/1981	B1

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Simon Hoggart sets the scene for next weekend's French elections. Walter Schwarz reports, opposite

# 'Il faut un President pour la France'

THE FRENCH presidential elections later this month look set for an exciting finish. Most people think that Valery Giscard d'Estaing will win another seven years in office, but that Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist candidate, will run him very close. The first round is on April 26, and the final ballot between the two most successful candidates will be on May 10.

Being presidential, the election is almost entirely about personalities. There is little time-wasting nonsense about politics and issues. Most of the posters show the candidate, generally in a nifty mohair suit of the sort that is shiny when you buy it, with Christian Dior spectacles, looking grave, responsible, visionary, yet somehow homely. The whole effect — roughly the image of an insurance salesman aims for — is topped off with some vague truism of the type which sound so resonant in French; for example, "Il faut un President Pour La France" which is, of course, why they are holding an election in the first place.

Mr Marchais, the Communist, is the ugliest candidate, so his posters tend to show young workers gazing adoringly into the middle distance, their faces bathed in light, like a socialist realist painting of a spaceship landing.

Fly-posting goes on all the time. At the dead of night, in the middle of Paris, I watched an efficient team of three men pasting Chirac posters on top of Mitterrand posters which were in turn stuck over Giscard posters. The first round was still nearly three weeks away.

Questioning of the candidates, in the papers and on TV, tends to be verbose and respectful. There are no Robin Days or Brian Waldens here, or, come to that, any Jimmy Youngs. In Britain a "press club" generally refers to some awful watering hole where men with red noses and dandruff drink gin at teatime. In France it refers to a radio programme on Sunday evenings when journalists in similar shiny suits ask polite questions of leading politicians. Last Sunday it was Mr Mitterrand. Some hack would make an elaborate little speech about the history of the Eastern block and ask him what he'd do about Poland. Mr Mitterrand would then reply at even greater length.

Actually, Mr Mitterrand is distinctly hawkish about Poland and the USSR generally. Some people even call his foreign policy Reaganite. It is perhaps for this reason that the Communists are directing the full force of their campaign against him.

It is, of course, the traditional role of all left-wing parties to conspire frantically against each other while the Right holds power, but the

French Communist Party, has carried this idea to extraordinary new lengths. Mr Marchais seems to be doing everything he can to get President Giscard re-elected. He has threatened a wave of strikes throughout France if Mitterrand wins, though as Mr Mitterrand points out, since the only way he can win is by the workers' votes, they are hardly likely to go on strike against the result they sought.

The Communists can expect up to around 20 per cent of the first ballot votes, and Mitterrand will need nearly all of them if he is to win the second round. Yet the Communists are pondering the idea of asking their supporters to "voter blanc" — to pop an unfilled paper into the box, or to abstain in person.

Nobody is quite sure why Marchais is trying to destroy his erstwhile colleague in this fashion. Perhaps he is jealous of the way the Socialists have become much more successful than the Communists. Perhaps he is under orders from Moscow to help Giscard, who has been an exceedingly pliant President from the Russian point of view. French politics being what it is, people prefer to believe the second, more damaging, theory.

Election fever has not yet taken over. Somewhat to my surprise I stumbled across a monster rally in front of the Georges Pompidou arts centre, which is built like a cross-section of the Lusitania. It was designed by an Englishman and is our revenge for the butter mountain. The French seem to quite like it.

The rally was full of chaps with handbags, chaps holding other chaps' hands, women smoking pipes — in short, a normal Parisian crowd — so it was startling to discover that it was a Gay Rights protest. As a guide to the mood of the average French voter it wasn't much use, since the speakers seemed to dislike all the candidates equally with the possible exception of a Trotskyite woman.

However, the gays did have more people than Giscard at a rally I attended in the suburbs. This was in a dingy township called Montreuil, and the President's visit was hailed as an act of great flair and courage by the press, since Montreuil voted 70 per cent Communist last time.

The locals did seem a shade grumpy, but they had little chance of complaining in person since they were kept at bay by squads of policemen and burly men with armbands. Though the meeting was in a community hall near the middle of the town, no one could get in except the press and the coachloads of loyal supporters who had come from hundreds of miles around.

The back of the stage was decorated with tricolours — and Young People of the type designed to

furnish the candidate with a modern, finger-clicking image. At first all the Young People were of the fleshy, self-satisfied type which marks young conservatives around the world; having forfeited their adolescence they bask complacently in the approval of their elders. But Giscard was very late, and the stage got more and more crowded with people who could only be described as yobs. Traditionally these are recruited by means of 100 franc notes and are meant to illustrate the candidate's popularity among hooligans, layabouts and yahoos as well as with trainee bank managers.

When the President de la Republique finally turned up, all hook-nosed and bald like a moulting parrot, they broke into a rhythmic chant of "Allez Giscard!" This turned out not to mean "clear off, Giscard", but "come on!" A local bigwig praised him as the "guardian of our constitution, which has made us uniquely stable and dynamic" — a contradiction in terms which went unproved. When Giscard stood up his voice was almost drowned in what sounded like hissing, but turned out to be the audience screaming "Assise!" the familiar noise of party faithful the world over telling the press photographers to sit down.

Giscard is without doubt a fascinating character. At the moment he appears to be in something of a schizoid state, wanting to hang on to the imposing trappings of the presidency, while plugging himself as the "citizen-candidate". He is an ordinary citizen in the same way as Marie-Antoinette was an ordinary shepherdess.

Chirac, the Gaullist candidate who is his chief rival on the Right, and who was his prime minister for two years, claims that he has a throne in the presidential house in the Midi. When he used to visit carefully-selected, typical French families for dinner, he would give them a box of chocolates by way of thanks, each chocolate individually wrapped with the presidential crest which Giscard has invented. At formal dinners he is served before his guests, a regal tradition which De Gaulle had dropped.

Even the d'Estaing part of his name is purloined from an old French admiral, one of those we never read about because he defeated the English. His family misappropriated it four years before Valery was born, though in some mysterious way it allows him to claim direct descent from Louis XV. When he was an infant his grandmother remarked that he had a Napoleonic nose, which in France is a compliment.

Contrary to general belief, Giscard speaks very good English. When he won office in 1974, he

decided to polish it further by employing a young British student to read and discuss with him each week the plays of George Bernard Shaw. From these he presumably learned that British society is largely filled with shrill, opinionated women who make interminable speeches. Recent events can have done little to alter this view.

In fact, it is striking that nobody mentions Mrs Thatcher except as a terrible warning of the perils of dogma. There was much admiration for the Prime Minister when she began the "Thatcher experiment" as they call it here, though this, has, not surprisingly, evaporated. Both Giscard and his Prime Minister, Mr Barre, are at pains to say that they would never make the same, obvious mistakes. This is perhaps the more cutting, since their free market economics are theoretically close to hers.

There is much else Mrs Thatcher would dislike about the campaign. For example, at round about the same time as Peter Walker was indignantly denying that the recent EEC farm price rise was designed to get Giscard re-elected, the same President was touring Alsace boasting about it as his personal victory.

The agreement which will raise the price of our food so much will have done wonders for his chances, since not only does France have an enormous agricultural population, but it has an even larger population of people indirectly dependent on food prices — rural shopkeepers, craftsmen, professionals, and so forth. From the rolling pastures of Touraine, the forests of Limousin, the vineyards of Bordeaux, to the drawing rooms of the Elysee Palace, the toast is Mr Peter Walker, in bumpers of champagne.

Giscard's greatest worry now is Chirac, once the protege of Pompidou. Since French right-wing politics follow people rather than parties and since the main personage, De Gaulle, is dead, there tend to be more splinterings than you get on the Trotskyite Left here. Though resented by the traditionalists (who have their own candidate, Michel Debre), Chirac is the chief Gaullist candidate. This means he would be more aggressive on foreign policy than Giscard is. He says Giscard is soft on foreigners. Currently Chirac's popularity is rising, and Giscard is scared that he will take so many of his votes on the first ballot, that he will ruin his chances on the second. Craftily he has decided not to attack him, saying that he doesn't want to harm the unity of the (right-wing) majority.

This wheeze serves two purposes: first, it will help him scoop up

Chirac's support in the deciding round, and second it implies that since there is not real difference between them, everyone might just as well vote for him, Giscard. Poor Chirac is left angrily protesting that there are stacks of differences between them, that they are totally incompatible, at daggers' drawn, and other such frothings.

In the meantime Chirac has been changing his image. Having long held the reputation as a ferocious political boot-boy — a Gallic Dennis Skinner — ("he somehow managed to be a very violent agriculture minister", someone told me) he is now sweet reasonableness. He has even declared against the guillotine, not because he is against it (he isn't) or because the French people oppose it (they are very much in favour of it) but because it suits the image.

Mitterrand, at 64 the most experienced failure in French politics, is running in his third and probably last presidential campaign. He has led the Socialists to defeat three times in the past eight years, in two parliamentary and one presidential election. He is a tough, secretive, authoritarian who is as interested in extending democratic control as Tony Benn is in getting drunk! He did not even become a Socialist until 1971.

Giscard claims, in effect, that a vote for Mitterrand is a vote for chaos, though an old-fashioned time-server like the Socialist leader is about as chaotic as a steamed pudding. Even if he did win, he would need a majority in the Assembly to get his bills through, and he would be unlikely to get near that. To give himself a smoother, more dignified image he has taken to drinking Earl Grey tea and has had his teeth capped.

If Mitterrand does win it might, paradoxically, be because of the issues, those neglected orphans of this campaign. Inflation is around 13 per cent, and the unemployment rate of 1,600,000, while good by British standards, is shocking in a country where the land has generally cushioned those who lack work in the cities.

Yet there is much on Giscard's side. Television and radio are hopelessly biased in favour of those who sit in the Elysee. The rural vote is well pleased with its price rises. Apart from the Irish, the French are perhaps the most conservative voters in Europe. And, of course, there is the usual utter confusion on the Left. I saw one poster which said in small type: "Attention, anti-Giscardians. Giscard said: 'If I had to choose between Mitterrand and Marchais, I'd vote for Mitterrand.' Therefore, vote Marchais!" Got all that? I doubt if it's much clearer to the average Parisian, either.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*amp*  
*12/14/07*

RECEIVED 28 APR 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 28 APR 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 30 APR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

SCHWEITZER

STEARMAN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8102054

NSCIFID DR810130 (C / )

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W/ATTCH FILE

*[Signature]* (C) *[Signature]*

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: RENT  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

44798

NLRR 007-081 #46798

BY AS NARA DATE 5/6/10

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O 081624Z MAY 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4801

~~S E C R E T~~ PARIS 13678

NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR  
E.O. 12005: RDS 4 - 5/8/01 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, FR, US  
SUBJECT: OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD MITTERRAND WIN  
REF: PARIS 12082

1. WITH THE FRENCH ELECTION LESS THAN THREE DAYS AWAY, THE LATEST PRIVATE POLLS INDICATE THAT SOCIALIST LEADER FRANCOIS MITTERRAND CONTINUES TO HAVE A CHANCE TO COME OUT AHEAD ON ELECTION NIGHT. WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS: A MITTERRAND PRESIDENCY WOULD INEVITABLY BRING ABOUT SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH. IN THE AREAS (TO NAME JUST A FEW) OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, TRADE POLICY, THIRD WORLD ISSUES, SO-CALLED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AND RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, A SOCIALIST-LED FRANCE WILL EVENTUALLY CONFRONT US INTERESTS ON A VARIETY OF FRONTS. MOST FRENCH SOCIALIST LEADERS ARE PROUD TO CALL THEMSELVES MEN OF THE LEFT AND ARE DRIVEN BY AN IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO RESTRUCTURE FRENCH -- AND WORLD -- SOCIETY. THEIR SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED RISE TO POWER IN A PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL FRANCE WOULD GIVE A STRONG IMPETUS TO OTHER LEFT-WING SOCIALISTS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE FRG, THE UK AND IN GREECE.

PARIS 3678

DTG:081624Z MAY 81 PSN: 055454  
TOR: 128/1816Z

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. SHOULD MITTERRAND WIN, HE WILL INITIALLY FEEL INSECURE AND UNCERTAIN REGARDING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE US. PARTLY TO ACHIEVE A MODICUM OF DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, PARTLY TO TRY TO GET RID OF THE COMMUNIST ALBATROSS, HE WOULD INITIALLY SEEK TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. THAT WOULD BE IN HIS OWN POLITICAL INTEREST -- AND IN OURS. BUT IF HE IS ELECTED, WE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM THROWING OUR ARMS AROUND HIM. (I AM SURE THIS ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY RESISTING THE TEMPTATION BUT I CAN NEVER BE SURE ABOUT ALL YOUR RESIDENT POLITICAL SCIENTISTS.) WE SHOULD NEITHER APPROVE NOR CONDEMN MITTERRAND AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A SKEPTICAL, SHOW-ME ATTITUDE IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, LETTING MITTERRAND PROVE TO US THAT HE IS IN FACT WILLING AND ABLE TO WORK WITH US. SIMILARLY, WE SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICLY CRITICAL UNTIL WE ARE SURE THAT HE HAS TAKEN STANDS ANTITHETICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THIS IS A PROUD PEOPLE AND WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING HIM AMMUNITION TO USE IN A SUPER-NATIONALIST CAMPAIGN. WE HAVE LEARNED THROUGH LONG EXPERIENCE -- MOST RECENTLY ON THE QUESTION OF EL SALVADOR -- THAT BUTTERING UP THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS OR EVEN TRYING TO REASON WITH THEM CAN BE A WASTE OF TIME. SHOULD MITTERRAND BE ELECTED, HE IS GOING TO NEED TO PROVE TO THE FRENCH THAT HE IS A WESTERN-ORIENTED PRESIDENT. AS HE GOES INTO THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS HE HAS PLEDGED TO CALL, HE WOULD NEED US MORE THAN WE NEED HIM. RATHER THAN LET HIM BELIEVE WE ARE AUTOMATICALLY HIS FRIENDS, WE SHOULD LET HIM COME TO US ON HIS OWN. HARTMAN

PARIS 3678

DTG:081624Z MAY 81 PSN: 055454  
TOR: 128/1816Z

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen <sup>\*</sup>

MEMORANDUM

27

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

May 11, 1981

46903

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: A Socialist President in France *(S)*

In breaking with 23 years of center-right government and electing Francois Mitterrand as the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, yesterday's French performance at the polls ushers in a period of profound redefinition of French national priorities in which the only certainty at the moment is uncertainty. So far as U.S. interests are concerned, however, I think we must -- at the very least -- anticipate dealing with a French partner even more difficult than the one we have known in the recent past. These difficulties will be most apparent in the following areas:

--Trade policies. Everything in Mitterrand's public statements and what we know of Socialist Party doctrine suggests a resurgence of protectionist attitudes in France (which may be as much trouble for the European Community as for us). *(S)*

--Defense policies. Though Mitterrand will maintain an independent French nuclear force and continue support for the modernization of some strategic assets, he will decrease defense spending and will be far less willing and/or likely than Giscard to take tangible actions in trouble-spots such as Chad, Libya, the Indian Ocean basin, or even the Persian Gulf. *(S)*

--Third World issues. In line with broader Socialist International rhetoric in Europe, Mitterrand will oppose us on El Salvador and will resist placing Third World developments in an East-West context (it may be a long time before you hear a Francois-Poncet successor call on you in the Oval Office and express understanding for our moves in Central America). *(S)*

--The German Equation. Mitterrand's victory clearly strengthens the Brandt wing of the Socialist Party in the Federal Republic -- a fact which may prove to be the most critical so far as U.S.-European security interests are concerned and Schmidt's capacity to "deliver" on TNF. *(S)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REVIEW ON MAY 10, 1987  
CLASSIFIED BY NSC 13.1(1)

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 107-081 # 46903

~~SECRET~~

CU - 4/29/10

~~SECRET~~

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

-2-

--The Middle East. A change in French policy toward the Middle East peace process seems imminent. Mitterrand supports the Camp David Accords. (C)

On the plus side is the fact that Mitterrand is a political pragmatist (it's worth remembering that he held 11 ministerial posts between 1946 and 1957, none of them as a Socialist). In addition, he as much as anyone will be affected by the uncertainty factor in France, and in ways which could bring pressure for moderation. Much will depend on a) whatever results are produced by the legislative elections Mitterrand has promised to hold before the end of June; b) the extent to which the Communists will figure in his Cabinet selections; and c) the length of the inevitably ill-defined transition period while he consolidates his leadership and his government -- during which France's internal economic situation could loom large.

(C)

In the meantime, our own tone -- reflected in your congratulatory messages (Tab A) -- should be cordial and forthcoming but prepared to insist on French commitment to common Western values (and prepared as well to counter forcefully any derogation from those commitments). In that connection, I attach a cable from our Ambassador in Paris (Tab B), written three days before yesterday's elections; warning against any illusions about the probable difficulty of a Mitterrand Presidency, he recommends an essentially wary stance with which I concur. (C)

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~





OP IMMED  
DE YEKADS #2341 1310217  
O 110319Z MAY 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

INFO ZEN/SECSTATE

UNCLAS WH02341

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
THE PRESIDENT TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. MITTERRAND

I SPEAK FOR MYSELF AND FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN EXTENDING TO YOU MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE. IN PERSONAL TERMS, I AM ESPECIALLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR VICTORY. ONLY THOSE WHO HAVE DEVOTED THE HARD WORK AND YEARS-LONG DEDICATION TO WINNING THE PRESIDENCY CAN FULLY APPRECIATE WHAT TODAY'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN FRANCE REPRESENTS.

TOGETHER WE FACE SERIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLES AND TO THE CAUSE OF PEACEFUL PROGRESS WORLD-WIDE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE CENTURIES-OLD TRADITION OF FRANCO-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP, TOGETHER WITH THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES OUR TWO NATIONS DEEPLY SHARE, WILL ENABLE US TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES AND PRESERVE THE SPIRIT OF WESTERN COOPERATION ON WHICH THE CONSTRUCTIVE FUTURE OF THE WORLD INCREASINGLY DEPENDS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU AND TO THE PLEASURE OF MEETING YOU IN PERSON.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

\*\*\*\*\*

SIT: RA NAN COL VP MEESE BAKER DEEVER  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

THE WHITE HOUSE 2341  
RECALLED

DTG:110319Z MAY 81 PSN:1000729  
TOR: 131/0217Z

HIS EXCELLENCY  
MR. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND  
PARIS, FRANCE  
267

PAGE 02 OF 02

THE WHITE HOUSE 2341  
RECALLED

DTG:110310Z MAY 81  
TOR: 131/0217Z

PSN:000720

OP IMMRO  
DE YEKADS #2345 1310305  
O 110301Z MAY 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

INFO ZEN/SECSTATE

UNCLAS WH02345

SUBJECT: VALEDICTORY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO  
VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE  
PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

I JOIN MANY MILLIONS OF AMERICANS IN VOICING THE RESPECT AND  
ADMIRATION WHICH YOUR LEADERSHIP OF FRANCE HAS INSPIRED. YOU HELPED  
BRING UNPRECEDENTED STABILITY TO THE FRENCH NATION, AND IN THE PRO-  
CESS YOU SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED THE WESTERN ALLIANCE - ACCOMP-  
LISHMENTS FOR WHICH HISTORY WILL LONG AND FAVORABLY REMEMBER YOUR  
SEVEN-YEAR PRESIDENCY.

I PERSONALLY APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH THESE PAST FEW  
MONTHS HAVE PROVIDED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU. IN OR OUT OF PUBLIC  
LIFE IT IS CLEAR THAT YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LINKS WHICH BIND  
OUR TWO NATIONS AND FREE PEOPLE EVERYWHERE CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO  
ADVANCE OUR COMMON INTERESTS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT FRANCE WILL  
CONTINUE TO BE THE BENEFICIARY OF YOUR ENORMOUS TALENTS. I WISH  
YOU WELL.

SINCERELY

RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY

\*\*\*\*\*

BIT: RA NAN COL VP MEESE BAKER DEAYER

ROB:  
WHRR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

THE WHITE HOUSE 2345  
RECALLED

DTG: 110301Z MAY 81 PSN: 000733  
TOR: 131/0305Z

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING  
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC  
ELYSEE PALACE  
PARIS, FRANCE  
249

OP IMMED  
DE YEKAD8 #2343 1310231  
O 110320Z MAY 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

INFO ZFN/SECSTATE

UNCLAS WH02343

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FROM VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO  
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE  
VICE PRESIDENT TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. MITTERRAND

IT IS A PLEASURE TO EXPRESS MY HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS ON  
YOUR ELECTORAL TRIUMPH TODAY AND TO APPLAUD ONCE AGAIN THE EXERCISE  
OF DEMOCRATIC CHOICE WHICH HAS SO LONG AND HONORABLY DISTINGUISHED  
THE FRENCH PEOPLE. MY COUNTRY, LIKE YOURS, FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST  
AND EXCITEMENT THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE, AND I FULLY  
SHARE THE SENTIMENT OF MY FELLOW CITIZENS WHO WISH YOU WELL AS  
YOU ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF A FREE NATION WITH WHICH AMERICANS  
ARE PROUD TO BE ALLIED.

WITH BEST WISHES

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY  
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND  
PARIS, FRANCE  
189

\*\*\*\*\*

SITI RA NAN COL VP MEESE BAKER DEEVER  
EOB:  
WHOR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 OF 01 THE WHITE HOUSE 2343 DTG:110320Z MAY 81 PSN:000731  
RECALLED TOR: 131/0231Z



OP IMMED  
STU1039  
DE RUFHFR #3678 1281624  
O 081624Z MAY 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 007-081 #46807 46807

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4801

BY ON NARA DATE 5/6/10

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 13678

NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR  
E.O. 12065: RDS 4 - 5/8/01 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, FR, US  
SUBJECT: OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD MITTERRAND WIN  
REF: PARIS 12682

1. WITH THE FRENCH ELECTION LESS THAN THREE DA' AWAY, THE LATEST PRIVATE POLLS INDICATE THAT SOCIALIST LEADER FRANCOIS MITTERRAND CONTINUES TO HAVE A CHANCE TO COME OUT AHEAD ON ELECTION NIGHT. WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLU- SIONS: A MITTERRAND PRESIDENCY WOULD INEVITABLY BRING ABOUT SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH. IN THE AREAS (TO NAME JUST A FEW) OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, TRADE POLICY, THIRD WORLD ISSUES, SO-CALLED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AND RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, A SOCIALIST-LED FRANCE WILL EVEN- TUALY CONFRONT US INTERESTS ON A VARIETY OF FRONTS. MOST FRENCH SOCIALIST LEADERS ARE PROUD TO CALL THEMSEL- VES MEN OF THE LEFT AND ARE DRIVEN BY AN IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO RESTRUCTURE FRENCH -- AND WORLD -- SOCIETY. THEIR SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED RISE TO POWER IN A PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL FRANCE WOULD GIVE A STRONG IMPETUS TO OTHER LEFT-WING SOCIALISTS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE FRG, THE UK AND IN GREECE.

2. SHOULD MITTERRAND WIN, HE WILL INITIALLY FEEL INSECURE AND UNCERTAIN REGARDING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH AND ACCEPT- TANCE BY THE US. PARTLY TO ACHIEVE A MODICUM OF DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, PARTLY TO TRY TO GET RID OF THE COMMUNIST ALBATROSS, HE WOULD INITIALLY SEEK TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. THAT WOULD BE IN HIS OWN POLITICAL INTEREST -- AND IN OURS. BUT IF HE IS ELECTED, WE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM THROWING OUR ARMS AROUND HIM. (I AM SURE THIS ADMIN-

\*\*\*\*\*

SIT: RVA NAN COL VP  
EOB: RENT  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

PARIS 3678  
RECALLED

DTG:081624Z MAY 81 PSN:055454  
TOR: 128/1816Z

37

ISTRATION SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY RESISTING THE TEMPTATION BUT I CAN NEVER BE SURE ABOUT ALL YOUR RESIDENT POLITICAL SCIENTISTS.) WE SHOULD NEITHER APPROVE NOR CONDEMN MITTERRAND AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A SKEPTICAL, SHOW-ME ATTITUDE IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, LETTING MITTERRAND PROVE TO US THAT HE IS IN FACT WILLING AND ABLE TO WORK WITH US. SIMILARLY, WE SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICLY CRITICAL UNTIL WE ARE SURE THAT HE HAS TAKEN STANDS ANTITHETICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THIS IS A PROUD PEOPLE AND WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING HIM AMMUNITION TO USE IN A SUPER-NATIONALIST CAMPAIGN. WE HAVE LEARNED THROUGH LONG EXPERIENCE -- MOST RECENTLY ON THE QUESTION OF EL SALVADOR -- THAT BUTTERING UP THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS OR EVEN TRYING TO REASON WITH THEM CAN BE A WASTE OF TIME. SHOULD MITTERRAND BE ELECTED, HE IS GOING TO NEED TO PROVE TO THE FRENCH THAT HE IS A WESTERN-ORIENTED PRESIDENT. AS HE GOES INTO THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS HE HAS PLEDGED TO CALL, HE WOULD NEED US MORE THAN WE NEED HIM. RATHER THAN LET HIM BELIEVE WE ARE AUTOMATICALLY HIS FRIENDS, WE SHOULD LET HIM COME TO US ON HIS OWN. HARTMAN  
BT



THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

---

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 11, 1981

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

Dear Mr. Mitterrand:

I speak for myself and for the American people in extending to you my warmest congratulations on your election as President of France. In personal terms, I am especially impressed by your victory; only those who have devoted the hard work and years-long dedication to winning the presidency can fully appreciate what today's reaffirmation of the democratic process in France represents.

Together we face serious challenges to the security and well-being of our peoples and to the cause of peaceful progress worldwide. I am confident that the centuries-old tradition of Franco-American friendship, together with the democratic values our two nations deeply share, will enable us to meet these challenges and preserve the spirit of Western cooperation on which the constructive future of the world increasingly depends.

I look forward to working closely with you and to the pleasure of meeting you in person.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1981

46 808

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES B. EDWARDS  
The Secretary of Energy

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM SCHNEIDER  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget


SUBJECT: Meeting with Joelle Bourgeois (U)

On April 30, 1981, two members of my staff had an interesting meeting with Mme. Joelle Bourgeois, Head of the International Relations Office in the Department of Hydrocarbons in the Ministry of Industries of France. (U)

Mme. Bourgeois asked a number of questions concerning American oil and gas policy. She indicated that France will again suggest a Western petroleum reserve but indicated the French government's willingness to reconsider the Soviet gas deal if we would stop bidding up the price of Algerian, Nigeria, etc. gas. (C)

Mme. Bourgeois seemed to be giving a signal which holds the possibility of aiding us in some of our goals, such as the joint financing of a reserve which we would physically control and a way out of the dilemma of increased Western European dependence on Soviet energy sources. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review 4/30/87

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
James Baker

5/11/81 [Handwritten initials]

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M07-081 #4688  
BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*ap*

May 5, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED with  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Joelle Bourgeois

You requested that Secretary Edwards and Bill Schneider of OMB be informed of my meeting with Joelle Bourgeois of the French Ministry of Industries on April 30 (Tab B). A memorandum to them for your signature is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to Secretary Edwards and Bill Schneider.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*RVA  
5/11*

**SIGNED**  
*7052  
5/11/81*

UNCLASSIFIED with  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

*AVA HAS SEEN*

#2418

41

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*AF*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 30, 1981

INFORMATION

*44809*

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Joelle Bourgeois

1. On April 30, 1981, Jim Rentschler and I met with Mme. Joelle Bourgeois, Head of the International Relations Office in the Department of Hydrocarbons in the Ministry of Industries of France. (U)
2. We explained to Mme. Bourgeois the structure and function of the National Security Council and its staff. (U)
3. Mme. Bourgeois asked a number of questions concerning American oil and gas policy. She indicated that France will again suggest a Western petroleum reserve but indicated that storage space was a problem. She also indicated the French government's willingness to reconsider the Soviet gas deal if we would stop bidding up the price of Algerian, Nigerian, etc. gas. (C)
4. Mme. Bourgeois seemed to be giving us a signal which holds the possibility of aiding us in some of our goals, to wit:
  - (a) Joint financing of a reserve which we would physically control.
  - (b) A way out of the dilemma of increased Western European dependence on Soviet energy sources. (C)

cc: Jim Rentschler  
Rud Poats  
Carnes Lord  
Henry Nau

*This ought to be shared w/ OMB (Schneider?) and w/ DOE / Sec. Edwards*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 4/30/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #46809

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*sent 11/14/11*

RECEIVED 30 APR 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM BAILEY

DOC DATE 30 APR 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE OIL BOURGEOIS, JOELLE ENERGY

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION W/ HEAD OF INTL RELATIONS OFC IN DEPT OF HYDROCARBONS IN MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES OF FRANCE ON 30 APR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

RENTSCHLER

NAU

BAILEY

POATS

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( D / *B* )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*5/4 noted by RVA w/comment*

*NB 5/4 Justice Petros 5/5*

*Allen X 5/05 for decision / signat*

*C 5/11 ORVA Ref memo*

DISPATCH

*NR 5/11 7:30 PM*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA (C) NB*

*Index NB / RB / PO  
CO / KN VP / EM / JB*

5/14  
1915  
2620  
43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1981

46810

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Mitterrand and the Campaign: Foreign Policy Vagueness *(c)*

While it may be some time before we see any precise contours to a Mitterrand Presidency in France, a sampling of his campaign rhetoric could be useful as a clue to probable foreign policy positions. With that in mind, I have put together the attachment, which provides a quick rundown of relevant direct and indirect quotes from Mitterrand himself. *(S)*

If these quotes strike you as vague, there is good reason: Mitterrand's political career has been built on pragmatism (some would say opportunism), and he was particularly careful in his most recent campaign to avoid definitive stands on foreign issues. Indeed, French commentators early on labeled him "an artist of ambiguity" - a characterization which Giscard tried and failed to exploit by pointing to his rival as a front for a Communist takeover. *(c)*

Mitterrand's very evasiveness on foreign issues in a campaign directed primarily toward internal discontent may be in our favor; it suggests a leader who is coming to power unencumbered by firm promises which he must now redeem at our expense. *(c)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on May 11, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRRM07-081 #46810  
BY CA NA DATE 4/23/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mitterrand and the Presidential campaign:  
Foreign Policy Statements

-- On his approach to the Presidency: "If you are dreaming of a Socialist who would not practice socialism, then count me out."

-- On the possibility of a center-right legislature: "If the French find pleasure in not being logical with themselves, then I will govern accordingly."

-- On the Soviet military buildup: "Moscow seeks to neutralize Europe with its SS-20s, a move France will adamantly resist;" but "The Brezhnev proposal is worth studying as a possible initial negotiating position" and "The U.S. and its allies should consider abandoning the plan to install Pershing missiles in Europe."

-- On East-West relations: "France will be firmly anchored in Western Europe and will build bridges to the other Europe."

-- On Europe: "France under Socialism will defend its interests inside the Community, notably in the agricultural sector."

-- On the Middle East: "I support Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers" and "I support the Palestinian people's right to a homeland; the Camp David accords offer a possible avenue to a settlement which should not be discarded."

-- On the Third World: "A Socialist-led France will be responsive to human rights and revolutionary struggles" and "U.S. interference in El Salvador is intolerable."

-- On the Atlantic Alliance: "Soviet threats against Poland make the Alliance increasingly necessary for a free Europe" and "As French President I would place our nuclear deterrent at the West's disposal in case of war;" but "There is a need to redefine French interests vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and vice versa."

-- On relations with the U.S.: "It's only by saying no to your friends that you merit their friendship and esteem" (He coupled this on a number of occasions with the assertion that "France will play an independent role vis-à-vis the superpowers and resist both U.S. and Soviet imperialism.")

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

May 11, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Mitterrand and Rhetoric: His Foreign Policy "Stands" (C)

The French campaign excerpts and other materials which I researched on a crash basis today turned up one interesting (to me) conclusion: few people have ever spoken more vaguely on foreign policy issues than François Mitterrand! (C)

The quotes do provide a portrait of a guy who may really be a pragmatist in his conduct of international affairs and who in any case carefully kept most of his options open. Time will tell how long he can keep them that way. Meanwhile, I hope that the sampler at Tab A, which I recommend you move to the President under the memo at Tab I, is what you had in mind. (The bottom-line remains: there is about as much "pungency" in this guy's statements as there is "philosophy" in Jimmy Carter arms control...). (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I. (U)

Approve ✓ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

- cc: Jim Lilley
- Dennis Blair
- Dick Pipes
- Bill Stearman
- Bob Schweitzer
- Phyllis Kaminsky

*Thanks — just what's needed for now.*

Tab I Memo to the President  
A Mitterrand's Foreign Policy Stands

*[Signature]*  
5/14

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~  
Review on May 11, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR MD7-0811 #46811  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10



#2620

47

9: 12 A/ .

JANET COLSON

*J* 12/1043

BUD NANCE

*B* 12/1302

DICK ALLEN

*for* 12/1859

IRENE DERUS

*Ird* 1915

JANET COLSON

*J* 12/1950

BUD NANCE

*B*

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

*Should have gone via Allen key - even tho red tap.*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*sent 12/14/07*

RECEIVED 12 MAY 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOC DATE 11 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY STANDS OF MITTERRAND

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

~~RENTSCHLER~~ *Allen*

LILLEY ✓

BLAIR ✓

PIPES ✓

STEARMAN ✓

SCHWEITZER ✓

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 5/14</i>	<i>for information</i>		
	<i>C 5/14</i>	<i>Allen by memo to Pres etc</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PH*

(C)

*A*