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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/13/2007

File Folder FRANCE (3/1/81-4/1/81)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46655	CABLE	131529Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/13/1981	B1
46656	CABLE	131632Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/13/1981	B1
46657	CABLE	150149Z MAR 81 PAR 1/25/2011 M081/1	3	3/15/1981	B1
46658	CABLE	181709Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/18/1981	B1
46659	CABLE	181724Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/18/1981	B1
46660	CABLE	260307Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/26/1981	B1
46661	CABLE	261252Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	3/26/1981	B1
46662	CABLE	270306Z MAR 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	1	3/27/1981	B1
46663	CABLE	272041Z MAR 81 R 11/1/2010 M081/1	5	3/27/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/13/2007

File Folder FRANCE (3/1/81-4/1/81)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
46664	MEMO	BREMER TO ALLEN RE COMPUTERS TO FRANCE <i>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	2	3/24/1981	B1
46665	LETTER	DRAFT FOWLER TO MINISTER DEBRE <i>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	1	9/24/1986	B1
46670	LETTER	TRANSLATION DEBRE TO FOWLER RE COMPUTERS <i>R 5/24/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	9/24/1966	B1
46666	LETTER	TORRES TO ROOT RE NSAM 294 <i>R 5/4/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	2	12/12/1980	B1
46667	CABLE	011417Z APR 81 <i>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	6	4/1/1981	B1
46668	CABLE	011651Z APR 81 <i>R 11/1/2010 M081/1</i>	11	4/1/1981	B1
46669	CABLE	011714Z APR 81 <i>R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	5	4/1/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

46655

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: ECON,ARA,EEUR,WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR/MO7-081 *46655

BY CA NARA DATES 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #7648 0721529
O 131529Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2088

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5969
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7637
USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0094
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 07648
EXDIS
PASS TREASURY FOR LEDDY
EO 120651 RDS-1 3/13/81 (GORDON, EDGAR J.) OR-T
TAGS: EFIN, CU, FR
SUBJECT: CUBAN EUROLOAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE WAS INFORMED BY A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF CREDIT LYONNAIS THAT THE LOAN WILL NOT BE MADE AND THAT THE BANKS THAT MAKE UP THE SYNDICATE ARE BEING INFORMED. HE WOULD MAKE NO OTHER COMMENT.

3. (COMMENT) THIS REVERSAL IS MOST UNUSUAL AND MAY BE UNPRECEDENTED. IN THE INTERESTS OF CONTINUING COOPERATION THE WHOLE EPISODE SHOULD BE VERY CLOSELY HELD. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ANY FUTURE MESSAGE BE CLASSIFIED LIKE THIS ONE WITH THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF INFO ADDRESSES.
HARTMAN

PARIS 7648

DTG:131529Z MAR 81 SSN: 038666
TOR: 072/1719Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

2

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PARIS 7648

DTG:131529Z MAR 81 PSNI 038666
TOR: 072/1719Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

00

SIT135 R

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP
EOB: THOMSON, EURE, EEUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENT:

4665

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED
BY CV NARA DATE 5/6/10
#46656

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #7666 0721633
O 131632Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2095

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 07666

NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 3/13/2010 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, PL, CZ, UR, GE
SUBJECT: WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN AND AROUND POLAND
REF: STATE 063758

1. (~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WE DISCUSSED SITUATION POSED BY WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS AT LENGTH MARCH 13 WITH QUAI'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR, GABRIEL ROBIN, SHARING INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PARAS 1 AND 2 OF REFTTEL, AND MAKING ALL POINTS IN PARA 3.
3. AFTER NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING OUR APPROACH WITH OTHERS IN MFA, ROBIN GAVE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS HIS OWN VIEWS. IT IS NOT IN WEST'S INTEREST, HE SAID, TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD DRAMATIZE THE SITUATION IN POLAND. UNTIL NOW, WHAT HAVE THE SOVIETS DONE? THEY HAVE INTIMIDATED THE POLES, AND THEY HAVE NOT INTERVENED. THE MANEUVERS ARE DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE THE POLES FURTHER, AND IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO DRAMATIZE THEM. IF THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO MOVE, NOTHING WE SAY WOULD STOP THEM. IF ONLY INTIMIDATION IS INVOLVED, DEMARCHES BY US WOULD ADD TO THE INTIMIDATION, NOT DETRACT FROM IT. ROBIN THEN ADDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SOVIETS WILL INTERVENE IN POLAND AS THEY ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THEIR

PARIS 7666

DTG: 131632Z MAR 81 ESN: 038806
TOR: 072/18572

~~*****SECRET*****~~

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE SITUATION IN POLAND HAS ABRUPTLY BECOME INTOLERABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THE WEST HAS AN INTEREST IN KEEPING THE SITUATION "STABILIZED" AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AND TO DO NOTHING THAT COULD ADD TO THE UNREST. THE LONGER THE SITUATION REMAINS AS IT IS, THE HARDER IT WILL BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO REVERSE IT.

4. REGARDING OUR PROPOSAL FOR EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES AT NATO AND MADRID, ROBIN EXPRESSED A CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR MADRID. WE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS IN BRUSSELS, HE SAID, AND "OUR DELEGATE WILL PROBABLY SAY WHAT I AM SAYING." IT WOULD BE HARD TO SEE ON WHAT BASIS NATO COULD BASE A PUBLIC PROTEST; NATO, TOO, HOLDS MANEUVERS. THERE WOULD BE A MORE SOLID BASIS FOR PROTESTING AT MADRID, NAMELY IF MORE THAN 25,000 TROOPS ARE INVOLVED, BUT THIS WOULD BE HARD TO PROVE. DISCUSSION AT MADRID, HOWEVER, COULD SHOW THAT THE WEST IS ATTENTIVE TO THE SITUATION. QUESTIONS SHOULD BE POSED TO ALL WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE MANEUVERS, AND NOT JUST TO THE SOVIETS.

5. IN CONCLUSION, ROBIN SAID THAT FRANCE FAVORED MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE, AND WOULD NOT MAKE AN APPROACH TO SOVIETS EITHER IN MOSCOW OR PARIS. IF CONSULTATIONS ARE TO BE HELD IN BRUSSELS, THEY SHOULD BE PRIVATE IN NATURE. ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IN MADRID, BUT SHOULD BE BASED STRICTLY ON THE BASIS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS AND DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT THE WEST IS ATTENTIVE TO WARSAW PACT ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND POLAND. THE WEST, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO DRAMATIZE THEM.

6. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS MOSCOW, WARSAW, LONDON, BONN, USNATO AND WHITE HOUSE, AS DESIRED. HARTMAN

PARIS 7666

DTG:131032Z MAR 81 65N1 036806
TOR: 072/18572

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

SITREP R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

44657

DATE 03/17/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN, COL, VP
FOR: SPA, EA, NUCLIN, SCINI, BRUR, KOUR
MORR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6173 074020Z
O 150140Z MAR 01 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

13524
E.O. ~~12958~~
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0136
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3261
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3798
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0664
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0609
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4361

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 5979
AMEMBASSY TOLAMARAO IMMEDIATE 0684

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M081 #46657

BY KML NARA DATE 1/27/2011

WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 0658
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 066175
NODIS
E.O. 12958: RDS-2,3 3/14/01 (MATTHEWS, GARY)

TAGS: IN, PARM, MUNC, TNUC, PR, GW, JA, CA, AS, UK

SUBJECT: INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST ACTIVITIES

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON THE BASIS OF [REDACTED] WE
CAN CONFIRM ACTIVITY NEAR THE 1974 POKRAN TEST SITE
WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE INDIANS ARE IN THE EARLY
STAGES OF PREPARATION OF A NEW UNDERGROUND TEST SITE. THIS
ACTIVITY MAY REFLECT DECISIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 6175

DTG: 150140Z MAR 01 SSN: 040523
TOR: 074/0202Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 03/17/61

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING OR TO POSITION INDIA IN PREPARATION FOR A LATER DECISION IF PAKISTAN SETS OFF A DEVICE. INDIA MAY ALSO BE AWARE THAT ITS TEST SITE ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DETECTED, AND HIGH TO SIGNAL PAKISTAN OF THE RISKS OF PROCEEDING WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, WORK STARTED SOMETIME IN [REDACTED] AND WE BELIEVE THAT AT THE VERY EARLIEST IT WILL TAKE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN [REDACTED] BEFORE A DEVICE COULD BE DETONATED.

3. WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR CHARGE IN NEW DELHI TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN TO THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO SEEK AN EXPLANATION OF THEIR ACTIVITY.

4. THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN [REDACTED] WE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LEAK AT ANY TIME.

5. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME TAKE ANY ACTION ON THE FOREGOING. WHEN WORD OF THE INDIAN ACTIVITY BECOMES PUBLIC, OR UPON RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS DEPARTMENT, YOU SHOULD SHARE WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL THE INFORMATION IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN AT THAT TIME THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE DID WANT THEM TO BE AWARE OF ITS ACCURACY AND OF OUR APPROACH TO THE INDIANS.

6. FOR LONDON AND CANBERRA. [REDACTED]

7. FOR TOKYO. IN PASSING THE INFORMATION IN PARA 2 SENTENCE 1 TO THE GOJ, YOU SHOULD USE THE PHRASE "WE HAVE INDICATIONS OF" RATHER THAN "WE CAN CONFIRM". HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 6173

DTG 115019Z MAR 61 58N1 040523
TDRI 074/0202Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 3/17/01

LINE NO OF SITUATION PAGE

PAGE 00

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

SECSTATE WASHDC 6173

DTG1150149Z MAR 01 SSNI 040503
TORI 074/0202Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

SIT379 R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

8

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

46658

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

DECLASSIFIED

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

BY CW DATE 5/6/10
M07-081 #46658

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #8080 0771710
O 181709Z MAR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2306

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 08080

NOIDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/18/11 (DE TARR, FRANCIS) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, CB
SUBJECT: (S) SIHANOUK'S SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO IN TAM
REF: PARIS 8079

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. IN ADDITION TO HIS ACCOUNT OF THE PYONGYANG CONFERENCE (REFTEL), IN TAM SAID THAT SIHANOUK HAD REQUESTED HIM TO MAKE A SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE U.S. WHEN HE GETS TO WASHINGTON, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: SIHANOUK ASKS THAT WASHINGTON UNDERSTAND HIS SITUATION. HE IS COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON THE CHINESE FOR ALL HIS MEANS. THIS MAKES HIM VERY UNCOMFORTABLE BECAUSE CHINA ALWAYS FAVORS THE KHMER ROUGE. HE IS "COUNTING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN."

3. IN TAM ASKED SIHANOUK IF HE HAD ANY PARTICULAR DETAILS OR CONDITIONS FOR HIM TO RELAY TO THE USG. SIHANOUK SAID NO, THAT HE SHOULD JUST ASK FOR THE ADVICE OF THE U.S.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NOT EXPLICITLY STATED, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT IN TAM WILL BE ASKING FOR FINANCIAL/MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ON BEHALF OF SIHANOUK. (WE NOTE THAT SIHANOUK DESCRIBED IN TAM'S MISSION EXACTLY THIS WAY TO THE AFP, ACCORDING TO AFP FRENCH SERVICE ITEM 091218 MAR 81.)

PARTS 8080

DTG:181709Z MAR 81 SSN: 045070
TOR: 077/1818Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

9

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHAPMAN

PARIS 0080

DTG:181709Z MAR 81 SSN: 045070
TOR: 077/1818Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 48

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

46659

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 1007 081 #46659
BY CN 5/6/10

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 181724Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6419
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2879

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 08085

LIMDIS
USEEC

E.O. 12065; RDS-1 3/18/90 (ELY, MICHAEL) DRZE

TAGS: EPAP, FR, USSR

SUBJECT: SALES OF FRENCH WHEAT TO THE USSR

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE AND ELYSEES
OFFICIAL ASKED U.S. ACQIESENCE IN SALE OF 600,000 TONS
FRENCH WHEAT TO USSR. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING CALL BY ASSISTANT USTR JOHN RAY AND ECONOMIC
MINISTER MARCH 16, FRENCH TRADE MINISTER COINTAT RAISED
FRENCH DESIRE TO MAKE "MODEST" WHEAT SALE TO USSR.
COINTAT SAID THAT FRENCH WILL BE REQUESTING THIS AUTHORI-
ZATION AT THE MARCH 17 EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING AND
ANTICIPATES PROBLEMS WITH ITS PARTNERS, NONE OF WHICH
HAS A SITUATION IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THAT OF FRANCE.
COINTAT MADE THE SAME POINT WE HAVE HEARD MANY TIMES
BEFORE THAT THE EEC HAS BEEN THE ONLY OTHER MAJOR EXPORTER
WHICH HAS FULLY COOPERATED IN THE GRAIN EMBARGO AND THAT
THE BURDEN OF THIS COOPERATION HAS FALLEN ALMOST ENTIRELY
ON FRENCH PRODUCERS. -----

4. THE SAME ARGUMENTS WERE REPEATED IN SIMILAR FORM IN
MARCH 17TH CONVERSATION WITH ELYSEE OFFICIAL. HE FREELY
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FARM UNREST DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION PERIOD IS IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION AND ASKED FOR
USG UNDERSTANDING OF THE KIND OF PRESSURE WHICH RESULTS.

***** USSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
ECON, ASIMET, EURE, WEUR

PSN:045104

DTG:181724

TR:0771804

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 49

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE REASONED (AS DID COINTAT) THAT THE QUANTITY IS NOT IN ITSELF SIGNIFICANT BUT THAT FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SOVIET IMPORT MARKET AS A TRADITIONAL SUPPLIER IS A MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO FRENCH PRODUCERS.
5. ECONOMIC MINISTER AGREED TO TRANSMIT THESE THOUGHTS TO WASHINGTON ADDING THAT USG STILL HAS THE EMBARGO ISSUE UNDER INTENSIVE STUDY. CHAPMAN

BT

SENSITIVE

SIT025 R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP
EOB: NUCUN, SCINU, WEUR
WHBR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6638 0850347
O 280307Z MAR 81 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9815

INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3087
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6378
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 076538
NODIS
E.O. 12065 IRDS-1, 3/25/88, (MARSHALL, HARRY) OES

TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PARM, FR, SF

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR ISSUE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FYI THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED THAT THE US WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO FRENCH SUPPLY OF THE INITIAL CORE-LOADS AND ONE RELOAD FOR EACH OF THE KOBBERG REACTORS ONCE SOUTH AFRICA ADHERES TO THE NPT AND BRINGS AN NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. WE PLAN TO GIVE FRENCH EMBASSY WRITTEN CO FIRMATION OF THIS DECISION LATER THIS WEEK. DEPARTMENT WILL BE CALLING IN DE LABOULAYE IN THIS CONNECTION AND WILL INFORM EMBASSY PARIS WHEN SUCH A MEETING IS SCHEDULED SO THAT YOU MAY FOLLOW UP THERE.
END FYI.

DECLASSIFIED
BY CV JARA DATE 5/6/10
46460

SECSTATE WASHDC 6638

DTG: 280307Z MAR 81 05N1 054609
TOR: 085/0349Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. TO WORK OUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PROPOSAL WILL REQUIRE OUR HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAG AND THE FRENCH DURING THIS VISIT; FRENCH-SAG DISCUSSIONS WILL LIKELY OCCUR AS WELL. TO FACILITATE THESE BILATERALS AND BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSITIVITY WE HAVE ARRANGED WITH SAG TO MEET WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS, RATHER THAN WASHINGTON, ON MARCH 30-31. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY FOURIE AND

INCLUDE DE VILLIERS, DU PLESSIS, SMITH AND AURET.

4. US TEAM WILL BE HEADED BY ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARSHALL (OES), AND WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATE REPRESENTATIVES: GUHIN (OES/NEP), BETTAUER (L/N), DLOUHY (AF/S); AND THE FOLLOWING DOE REPRESENTATIVES: BENJELSDORF (DOE/IA), (MS.) PESKE (DOE/NE), AND SILVERSTROM (DOE/GC). WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE DELEGATION IS VERY LARGE. HOWEVER, THE RANGE AND COMPLEXITY OF TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND CONTRACTUAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE IN THESE AREAS.

5. REQUEST EMBASSY ASSISTANCE IN RESERVING SINGLES WITH BATH FOR THE NIGHTS OF MARCH 29-31 IN THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE US GROUP. GROUP WILL ARRIVE VIA TWA 810 AT 9:45 AM ON SUNDAY, MARCH 29. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE CABLE CONFIRMATION OF RESERVATIONS AND PHONE NUMBER OF HOTEL.

6. FOR SCICOUNS: REQUEST THAT A SUITABLE EMBASSY ROOM BE AVAILABLE FOR THE US-SAG MEETINGS OF MARCH 30-31.

7. FOR PRETORIA: DEPARTMENT DEEPLY REGRETS FAILURE TO PROVIDE EMBASSY MORE TIMELY INFORMATION. BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN VENUE, US VISAS WILL NO LONGER BE REQUIRED FOR SAG GROUP. CLARK

SECSTATE WASHDC 6538

DTG:260307Z MAR 81 05NI 054609
TOR: 065/0349Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP
EOB: NUCUN, SCINU, WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

46461

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #41661
BY ON NARA DATE 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR #0966 0851253
O 261252Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2676

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 08966

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3 3/26/88 (FRIEDMAN, A.S.) OR-S
TAGS: PARM, TNUC, MNUC, ENRG, FR, SF
SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
REF: STATE 76534

1. (LNU) AS PER REFTEL REQUEST FOR SEVEN SWB'S HAVE BEEN RESERVED FOR NIGHTS MARCH 29-31 IN THE NAMES OF THE U.S. DEL MEMBERS AT THE HOTEL ETAP, 15 RUE BOISSY D'ANGLAS, PARIS 8, TEL. 266-9362.
2. (S) EMBASSY IS RESERVING PERSHING ROOM IN THE EMBASSY (A-202) FOR BOTH DAYS. SCIENCE COUNSELOR'S OFFICE WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE FOR USE OF U.S. DELEGATION.
3. (S) SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR DIETRICHSEN CALLED FRIEDMAN TO CONFIRM ARRANGEMENTS AND NAMES OF MEMBERS OF BOTH SOUTH AFRICAN AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS. SOUTH AFRICAN DEL WOULD LIKE TO HOST DINNER FOR U.S. DEL MONDAY EVENING AND, UNLESS U.S. DEL ADVISES TO THE CONTRARY, SCICOUNS WILL ACCEPT SOUTH AFRICAN INVITATION ON U.S. DEL BEHALF.
4. (S) SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY HERE HAS NOT/NOT ADVISED FRENCH OF FORTHCOMING MEETING. IT IS

PARIS 8966

DTG:261252Z MAR 81 SSN: 055061
TOR: 085/13562

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMPORTANT THAT EMBASSY BE INFORMED IMMEDIATELY WHEN
AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE IS ADVISED OF U.S. DECISION.
WHEN THIS IS DONE WE WOULD THEN PLAN TO TELL
DE COMMINES AND PECQUEUR THAT A MEETING WITH THE
SOUTH AFRICANS ON THIS SUBJECT IS PLANNED FOR THE
30TH AND 31ST AND THAT WE WILL ALSO WISH TO
SCHEDULE A BILATERAL WITH THE FRENCH ON THIS MATTER.
WE WOULD ALSO ASSUME THAT THE FRENCH WOULD THEN
PLAN TO HAVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SAG.

5. (S) IN VIEW OF THE VERY SHORT TIME REMAINING,
EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE BY
IMMEDIATE CABLE OR BY SECURE TELEPHONE. HARTMAN

PARTS 8066

DTG: 261252Z MAR 81 PSN: 055061
TOR: 085/1356Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: *EOB: NUCUN, SCINU, WEUR

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

46662

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7934 0800318
O 270306Z MAR 81 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0805

INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3107
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 077934

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/28/88 (NOSENZO, LOUIS V.) DES/N

TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PARM, SF

SUBJECT: (S) SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: (A) STATE 76538; (B) PRETORIA 2048

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE GOF OFFICIALS OF US-SAG TALKS AND AR-
RANGE FOR US-GOF BILATERALS PER MARSHALL/FRIEDMAN TELCON.
HAIG

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 07-08-81 #46662
BY CK NARA DATE 5/6/10

SECSTATE WASHDC 7934

DTG: 270306Z MAR 81 05N: 050094
TOR: 000/0502Z

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DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

46663

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8624 0862055
O O 272041Z MAR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 078624

NDDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3/27/86 (NOSENZO, LOUIS) OES/N

TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PARM, FRSF

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: STATE 77934

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT 1600 HRS. WASHINGTON TIME ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESIGNATE MALONE WILL DELIVER THE LETTER AND NON-PAPER CONTAINED IN PARAS 3 & 4 TO AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE. EMBASSY SHOULD ARRANGE TO PASS LETTER AND POINTS TO APPROPRIATE GDF OFFICIALS ON SATURDAY MARCH 28. DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM BY TELEPHONE WITH SCIENCE COUNSELOR THAT MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE AS SCHEDULED.

SECSTATE WASHDC 8624

DTG: 272041Z MAR 81 ESN: 000283
TOR: 087/00072

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*****~~SECRET~~*****

NLRR #081 #46663

BY KML NARA DATE 11/2/10

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BEGIN TEXT - DEAR MISTER AMBASSADOR: IT IS MY PLEASURE TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO FRANCE SUPPLYING THE INITIAL CORE AND ONE RELOAD FOR EACH OF THE TWO KOEBERG POWER REACTORS, ONCE THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA ADHERES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BRINGS A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO THE TREATY INTO FORCE.

BASED ON OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, WE UNDERSTAND THIS ARRANGEMENT TO HAVE THREE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS:

1. BEFORE ANY REACTOR FUEL IS ACTUALLY SHIPPED, SOUTH AFRICA WILL HAVE ADHERED TO THE NPT AND HAVE BROUGHT INTO FORCE AN INFCIRC/153 SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

2. A SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WILL BE INSTITUTED AT THE VALINDABA ENRICHMENT FACILITY BETWEEN THE TIME WHEN SOUTH AFRICA ACCEPTS THE ARRANGEMENT AND THE TIME WHEN IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARE BEING APPLIED UNDER AN NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. PROVISION FOR A SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS INCLUDED IN OUR 1978 PROPOSAL TO SOUTH AFRICA IN ORDER TO HAVE AN EARLY SAFEGUARDS PRESENCE AT THE ENRICHMENT FACILITY. THIS PROVISION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH A SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IAEA.

3. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE UNITED NATIONS ACTION, OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE NOT TO PERMIT UN SANCTIONS TO UNDERMINE AN AGREEMENT CONTAINING THESE ELEMENTS. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS END.

I AM ALSO PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS, DIRECTLY WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE FINANCIAL BURDENS THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD INCUR UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SUPPLY CONTRACT.

SECSTATE WASHDC 8624

DTG: 272041Z MAR 81 SSN: 000283
TOR: 087/00072

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE HOPE THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENT AS OUTLINED ABOVE FULLY ACCORD WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED PROMPTLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA. WE, OF COURSE, STAND READY TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE PROVISIONS MENTIONED ABOVE AS WELL AS THE IMPLEMENTING DETAILS. SINCERELY, JAMES L. BUCKLEY. END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT. --I AM PLEASED TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A LETTER CONFIRMING THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO FRANCE'S MEETING THE INITIAL FUEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE KOEBERG REACTORS ONCE SOUTH AFRICA ADHERES TO THE NPT AND BRINGS THE NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. -- IF SOUTH AFRICA AGREES TO JOIN THE NPT AND ACCEPTS SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE

VALINDABA ENRICHMENT FACILITY, IT WILL BE A MAJOR STEP FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION AND FOR OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS AT PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- A US TEAM WILL BE IN PARIS ON MARCH 30 AND 31 TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR COOPERATION ISSUES WITH SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING BRAND FOURIE. THE TEAM WILL OF COURSE SEEK A MEETING WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN YOUR GOVERNMENT TO REVIEW THE SUBJECT.

-- OUR LETTER TO YOU OUTLINES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENT FOR FUEL SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO CONCLUSION OF AN ARRANGEMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICA. IT IS A COMMITMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA TO PRODUCE ONLY LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM.

-- SUCH A SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITMENT WOULD MAKE ITS NPT COMMITMENT NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES MORE CREDIBLE EVERYWHERE AND COULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT VALINDABA.

-- IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TO PRODUCE AND STOCKPILE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, EVEN UNDER SAFEGUARDS, IT WOULD THEN TAKE VERY LITTLE TIME FOR THEM TO CONSTRUCT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THEY CHOSE TO DO SO. THE PRESENCE OF HEU IN SOUTH AFRICA, THEREFORE, COULD LEAD TO

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DTG:272041Z MAR 81 58N1 000283
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DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY IN OTHER AFRICAN STATES, THAT SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE IRRELEVANT IF AND WHEN SOUTH AFRICA DECIDED TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- A COMMITMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO LIMIT PRODUCTION AT VALINDABA TO LEU WOULD ALSO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE TECHNICAL EFFICACY OF SAFEGUARDS. WE BELIEVE THAT ACHIEVING ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS ON A HIGH-INVENTORY ENRICHMENT PLANT (SUCH AS VALINDABA) IS VERY DIFFICULT IF THAT PLANT PRODUCES HEU. IF THE PLANT IS DEDICATED TO LEU PRODUCTION ONLY, THE IAEA WOULD HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF DETECTING CLANDESTINE HEU PRODUCTION.

-- WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE PLACED GREAT STOCK IN PERIMETER APPROACHES TO ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISKS OF THEIR COMMERCIAL SECRETS BEING COMPROMISED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT US AND FRENCH EXPERTS AGREE THAT TECHNICALLY EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS APPROACHES HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED THAT WOULD PROVIDE CONFIDENCE OF DETECTING DIVERSION FROM A PLANT PRODUCING HEU IF ONLY PERIMETER MEANS WERE EMPLOYED. GIVEN SOUTH AFRICAN SENSITIVITIES TO INTRUSIVE SAFEGUARDS MEASURES, A LIMITATION OF THE PLANT TO LEU WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE SIMPLER APPROACHES TO SAFEGUARDS.

-- FINALLY, IT IS POSSIBLE THE SOUTH AFRICANS ALREADY HAVE ENOUGH HEU TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THEIR SAFARI RESEARCH REACTOR. IF NOT, THEY MAY RAISE THE NEED FOR HEU FOR THAT PURPOSE.

-- US SUPPLY OF SAFARI FUEL NOW WOULD RUN INTO THE SAME PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON AS WOULD US SUPPLY OF FUEL FOR KOFBERG. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WOULD CHANGE OVER THE LONGER TERM.

-- THEREFORE, IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS RAISE A NEED FOR HEU FOR SAFARI, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FRANCE CONSIDER OFFERING TO PROVIDE SAFARI WITH REDUCED ENRICHMENT FUEL. WE WOULD NOTE THAT SAFARI IS A PRIME CANDIDATE FOR EARLY CONVERSION TO MEDIUM ENRICHMENT FUEL, OR POSSIBLY TO CARAMEL FUEL. IF NECESSARY, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FRANCE ALSO CONSIDER SOME INTERIM SUPPLY OF HEU FOR SAFARI. END TEXT. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 8624

DTG: 272041Z MAR 81 ESN: 200263
TOR: 087/0007Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

SECSTATE WASHDC 0624

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 24, 1981

46644

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Assurances of Non-Nuclear Uses for Export of
Computers to France

Based on National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294 of 1964 (copy at Tab A), which established a policy of not assisting French nuclear weapons development, the United States (Treasury Secretary Fowler) and France (Finance Minister Debre) exchanged letters in 1966 to allow the continued export of large scale U.S. computers for non-nuclear weapons uses (copy at Tab B).

Major computer sales were made in the early 1970's, when the United States approved three Control Data Corporation (CDC) Model 6600 computers for French nuclear weapons research centers, and again in 1976, when a CDC Cyber 76 was approved for such a center. The Department of Energy considers that these systems provide the computing power to do advanced nuclear weapons calculations similar to those being done by U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories (DOE December 12, 1980, opinion at Tab C). DOE believes that these past exports to France, together with the increasing availability of comparable technology from non-U.S. sources, render NSAM 294 and the Fowler-Debre agreement substantially ineffective.

Meanwhile the French Government has been using U.S. requirements for their end-use assurances as a means to promote purchases from French sources. In short, they have delayed providing assurances in cases where French firms may be competitive. IBM has reported that six firm contracts for sale of 3033 systems, valued at \$18 million, have been lost recently for this reason and that more such losses are anticipated unless the procedure is changed.

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RDS-1, 3/13/2011 (COCOM-DERIVED)

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The Fowler-Debre agreement envisaged the procedure of French assurances but does not commit either party to its use in every case. There is nothing in either French or U.S. regulations (nor in NSAM 294) which requires that all U.S. advanced computer sales to France be preconditioned upon such assurances. If the assurance procedure were discontinued as a requirement for every U.S. sale to France of advanced computers, U.S. controls and case-by-case review would continue and assurances could be sought for any individual future license application for which there might be a particular concern. Sales of advanced computers to France would then be subject to the same procedures which apply to such sales to many other countries.

Accordingly, based on concurrences received from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the procedure for pre-conditioning the issuance of U.S. licenses for each export to France of advanced computers upon French Government assurances of non-nuclear weapons use is being quietly discontinued. We will advise the computer companies and the French Government of the change in procedure.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab A - NSAM 294 of 1964.
- Tab B - Fowler and Debre letters of 1966.
- Tab C - DOE opinion of December 12, 1980.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

1498

WJK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Assurances of Non-Nuclear Uses for Export of Computers to France

I do not recommend reading the attached package from State. In summary it informs you that the U.S. will no longer require assurances from the government of France that each advanced computer sold there will not be used in nuclear weapons research. *DB*

The previous policy, dating from the mid-60's, had no particular effect except making it difficult for U.S. firms to sell their computers to France. Even under this new policy the U.S. will still have the same case-by-case controls we use to license every foreign advanced computer sale. State has obtained concurrences from the Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Energy Departments, ACDA and the Office of the United States Trade Representative in discontinuing the old policy.

This is a good, productive step.

*DB
4/9/81*

Downgraded
to SECRET per
WH-memo of 4-28-64
see 8/5/6302
Dist. Made

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Levy to Weinstein 9/30/05 & List 4/15/05
BY AMJ NARA, Date 12/13/07

April 20, 1964

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System
Assistance to France

It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance.

Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.

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1/24/64
Callahan
12/21/64

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MC - 4/24 - #1B

cc to 7239
12/28/66
copy to G/P/M - Thompson
12/8/64

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GER/PENBERTH

F/MCD - 5/19/64 0.1
copy to G/P/M - Thompson
12/19/64

EUR - 5/4

copy to SCI - Col. Miller on 12/11/65
S/S-EX
S/R BUEFIS 9/15/64
A/Bowden 9/17
A/Bowden 9/28
SMI Reports 11/13
INR - 8/1/64

~~SECRET~~

Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally.

To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1966

Dear Mr. Minister:

Since my return to Washington, I have reviewed the computer question we discussed on July 28. In view of your assurance that the computer you mentioned is to be used for purely civilian scientific research and not for the French nuclear testing or weapons program, our licensing authorities have reviewed the matter.

46665

As I explained to you, United States policies as well as our obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty are such as to preclude the export of United States computers to France for use in devising, carrying out, or evaluating nuclear explosions, or in nuclear weapons development work.

On the other hand, my Government has no wish to interfere with the export to France of advanced computers to be employed exclusively for non-military scientific research or for other purposes not connected with nuclear explosions or nuclear weapons development.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States is prepared to approve for export to the Government of France or to any Agency thereof advanced computers ordered from the United States on the understanding that such computers will not be installed in nuclear weapons laboratories and will be used, wherever installed, exclusively for non-military scientific research or other purposes not connected with nuclear explosions or weapons development. We will, of course, seek comparable assurances from French companies that are not governmental agencies with respect to sales of certain advanced computers.

I hope that our exchange on this subject will not only dispose of the particular case for Saclay but also provide continuing arrangements for the export of computers from the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Henry H. Fowler

His Excellency
Michel Debre
Minister of Economy
and Finance
Paris, France

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A66665
DATE 5/16/10
BY CN

TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM MINISTER DEBRE TO SECRETARY FOWLER

September 24, 1966

Dear Mister Fowler:

I have received your letter dated September 24, 1966, in which, pursuant to the conversation we had at Paris on July 28, you set forth the policy which the American government intends to follow concerning the export of large computers to France.

In this respect, you distinguish, on the one hand, between the advanced computers which French authorities would like to use for purposes such as the preparation and carrying out of nuclear explosions or the development of nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, the advanced computers which French authorities would use in purely scientific research.

I confirm that, during our conversation on July 28, I first of all called your attention to the problems which the French authorities were having in obtaining export licenses for advanced computers intended for scientific research, particularly an IBM 360-92 machine intended for the Saclay Center. I note with satisfaction that you are in a position to assure me that your Government has no desire to oppose the export of that machine, or any other machine which might be ordered either by the French Government itself, or by other bodies or entities, provided that its intended use would be for peaceful purposes.

As far as this aspect is concerned, then, there is no difficulty to resolve, and I acknowledge the assurance which you were so good as to give me in this respect. For my part, I confirm that it is not the present intention of the French Government to place any order in the United States, or to allow other French bodies or entities to place any order, for advanced computers which would be intended for the preparation or the carrying out of nuclear explosions or the development of nuclear weapons.

Of course, there remains the question of the advanced computers which would be used in connection with carrying out the French military nuclear program, concerning which you write that, owing, on the one hand, to the policy adopted by your Government and, on the other hand, to the obligations assumed by the United States of America under the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, signed at Moscow on July 25, 1963, the exportation of these computers would run into difficulties.

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NLRR/M07-081 # 46670
BY CN NARA DATE 5/24/10

In this connection, I would observe that, for the time being, the question does not in fact arise. It is, then, in my opinion, unnecessary for us to deal with it now. Moreover, you know that from a legal as well as from a political standpoint, the views of our two Governments would, at least for the moment, be difficult to reconcile.

We have, then, I think, succeeded through this exchange of letters in partially solving the problem which I referred to in our conversation of July 28. In the future, exports of advanced computers intended for peaceful uses can take place with no other formality than a written declaration by the French Government, or the purchasing body, to the effect that the acquisition of the computer is taking place within the framework of this exchange of letters, with the assurances given by both sides being taken into account.

I consider it advisable to preserve the confidential nature of this exchange of letters.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ M. Debré



SECRET

This document consists of 2 pages
No. 1 of 8 Copies, Series A

29

T A B C

44666

Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585

DEC 12 1980

Mr. William A. Root
Director
Office of East-West Trade
Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs
U.S. Department of State Room 3819
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Root:

Based on National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294 of 1964, which prohibited U.S. assistance to French nuclear weapons research and development, in 1966 the United States and France concluded a "Fowler-Debre Agreement" in order to allow the continued export of large scale U.S. computers for non-nuclear weapons uses. The Fowler-Debre Agreement provided the U.S. Government with French assurance that large scale computers exported to France for peaceful end-uses would not be used for nuclear weapons research and development. Thus, because the U.S. was the only supplier of large computer systems at that time, the Fowler-Debre Agreement provided the necessary assurances to export these computers to bona fide civil end-uses while minimizing the adverse impact on U.S. computer exports. (S)

We understand that despite the existence of NSAM 294 and the Fowler-Debre Agreement, the National Security Council did approve a high level French Government request for three Control Data Corporation (CDC) Model 6600 computers for the Limeil and Vaujours Research Centers of the French Atomic Energy Commission and the Gramat Research Center of the Ministry of Defense during the early 1970's. Again in 1976, the National Security Council made an additional exception, and approved a CDC Cyber 76 to the Limeil Research Center (the Cyber 76 has been considered the work-horse of the U.S. nuclear weapons program since 1972). (S)

It is the opinion of the Department of Energy that the above computer systems provide French nuclear weapons installations with the computing power to do advanced nuclear weapons calculations similar to those being done by U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Furthermore, the U.S. no longer has monopoly control over the supply of large computer systems and French needs can now be met by foreign sources (notably the Japanese). (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #46666

BY CN NARA DATE 5/4/10

NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure subject to
Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.

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on: Dec 1986
(date or event)

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Related to the above, on October 22, 1980, IBM Corporation requested the Department of Energy to re-examine the justification of need for continuation of the Fowler-Debre Agreement. In its presentation, IBM argued that contrary to its original intent to protect against unauthorized use by France of advanced computer systems for nuclear weapons R&D (a situation which we believe has been overtaken by events), the Fowler-Debre Agreement is presently being utilized by the French Ministry of Industry to pressure French firms to shift their purchases from U.S. computer manufacturers to other suppliers. Thus, because U.S. computer manufacturers are the only firms subject to the Fowler-Debre Agreement, IBM contends that the Fowler-Debre Agreement is being used as a barrier to U.S. exports to French companies. (C)

In summary, DOE believes that approval of the advanced computers to French defense facilities contradicted the original intent of NSAM 294 and has drastically limited the effectiveness of the Fowler-Debre Agreement. Furthermore, we have reason to believe that French authorities are purposely misdirecting their use of the Fowler-Debre Agreement to create a commercial disincentive to French purchases of U.S. computers. We, therefore, recommend that the Department of State take immediate action to correct this situation by discontinuing its requirement of formal Fowler-Debre assurances by the French Government as a precondition for approval of U.S. computer export licenses to France. As a longer term objective, we recommend that NSAM 294 and the Fowler-Debre Agreement be rescinded. (C)

Sincerely,

Julio L. Torres

Julio L. Torres

Director

International Security Affairs

cc: Shelia Buckley, Dept of Defense
Gerard Helfrich, Dept of State
Richard Williamson, ACDA

~~SECRET~~

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JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 MAR 81 10

only 12/13/07

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 24 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE COCOM
EXPORT CONTROLS COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: ASSURANCES OF NON-NUCLEAR USES FOR EXPORT OF COMPUTERS TO FRANCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 27 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

~~RENTSCHLER~~

HUBERMAN

DEAL

Blair

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COMMENTS

REF# 8108344

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 4/3</i>	<i>For Info</i>		<i>same</i>
	<i>4/9</i>	<i>noted by RVA w/comment</i>		<i>DB, TD, BHT, LZ</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

SENSITIVE

PAGE 404

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

44467

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 1007-081 #44467
BY CIS NARA DATE 5/6/10

P 011417Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2985

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6120
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2903
AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 6936

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 09675

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DEPARTMENT PASS DOE/IA
E.G. 12065: XDS-1 4/1/11 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-A
TAGS: ENRG, FR, GR, NO
SUBJECT: (S) FRANCOIS-PONCET ASKS HIGH-LEVEL US APPROACH
TO NORWAY ON NATURAL GAS
REF: A. PARIS 9533 (NOTAL), B. PARIS 9535 (NOTAL)
1. SUMMARY: IN A MARCH 30 MEETING WITH ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF ENERGY BORRE, FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-
PONCET REQUESTED A HIGH-LEVEL US POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE
NORWEGIANS TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXCESSIVE EUROPEAN
DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET NATURAL GAS. FRANCOIS-PONCET REFERR-
ED TO THE PREVIOUS FRANCO-AMERICAN TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS
ON FRENCH NATURAL GAS POLICY (RETELS) AND NOTED THAT THE
PRESENTLY PROJECTED LEVEL OF FRENCH GAS IMPORTS FROM THE
SOVIET UNION WILL GREATLY EXCEED THE FRENCH ABILITY TO
DEAL WITH A SUPPLY DISRUPTION. HE IS NOT SO MUCH WORRIED
ABOUT SOVIET USE OF GAS AS A DIRECT POLITICAL LEVER BUT
RATHER BELIEVES THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF DEPENDENCE WOULD
HAMPER EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC INDEPENDENCE AND ELIMINATE THE
POSSIBILITY OF THREATENING THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AS IN THE PRESENT CASE OF POLAND.
FRANCOIS-PONCET SEES TREMENDOUS COMMERCIAL PRESSURE IN
FAVOR OF THE PROJECT THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND BELIEVES IT WILL
GO FORWARD IN ITS DANGEROUS FORM UNLESS AN ALTERNATIVE

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SOURCE OF SUPPLY IS FOUND. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS ACCELERATED COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORWEGIAN GAS. FRANCOIS-PONCET BELIEVES THE NORWEGIANS WILL LISTEN TO A HIGH-LEVEL US POLITICAL APPROACH BY SECRETARY HAIG. END SUMMARY.

2. AT HIS INITIATIVE, FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET MET WITH ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ENERGY BORRE ON MARCH 30 TO DISCUSS FRENCH IMPORTS OF SOVIET GAS. OTHER FRENCH PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED QUAI ECONOMIC DIRECTOR PAYE, PHILLIPE LECOURTIER OF INDUSTRY MINISTER GIRAUD'S CABINET, AND FRANCOIS-PONCET'S ENERGY ADVISOR DE FONT-REAUXX. FRENCH ENERGY DIRECTOR GENERAL DE WISSOCQ HAD ALSO BEEN INVITED BUT WAS UNABLE TO ATTEND. OTHER US PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED ECON MIN ELY, JOHN FERRITER, DIRECTOR, EB/IEP/EEC, AND EMBOFF DUNCAN.

3. FRANCOIS-PONCET REFERRED TO THE MEETING AS A FOLLOW-UP TO HIS FEBRUARY 23 CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY HAIG IN WASHINGTON AND THE PRIOR US BILATERAL TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH INDUSTRY MINISTRY (REFTELS). NOTING THAT FRANCE HAS ONLY A LIMITED CHOICE OF SUPPLIERS FOR ITS REQUIRED GAS IMPORTS, FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT HIS INDUSTRY MINISTRY COLLEAGUES WERE CORRECT IN ARGUING THAT THE USSR WOULD BE BOTH A RELIABLE GAS SUPPLIER AND AN ATTRACTIVE MARKET FOR FRENCH EXPORTS, PARTICULARLY COMPARED WITH ALGERIA. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ORDERED THE FRENCH TECHNICAL OFFICIALS TO HOLD BACK ON AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION WITH THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, STRESSING THE SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE OF NOT DEVELOPING NORWEGIAN GAS RESOURCES MORE RAPIDLY. HE SUMMARIZED THE PROBLEM BY STATING THAT AS THE PRESENT POLISH SITUATION HAS DEMONSTRATED, ALTERNATIVE GAS SOURCES OUTSIDE THE USSR MUST BE FOUND AND THAT A COORDINATED APPROACH TO THE NORWEGIANS IS ESSENTIAL.

4. BORRE REPLIED BY REFERRING TO THE EXCELLENT BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND FRANCE ON ALGERIAN GAS AND SAID IT CONSTITUTED A GOOD BASIS FOR A CLOSE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE ISSUE. BORRE ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH ENVISAGED A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THE NORWEGIANS AND NOTED THAT THE LATTER-- PERHAPS OF THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE YAMAL PROJECT --MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE. IN ADDITION, BORRE WONDERED WHETHER THE FRENCH SOUGHT ACCELERATED COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORWEGIAN GAS OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHUT-IN CAPACITY TO BE ACTIVATED DURING EMERGENCIES. LECOURTIER

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RESPONDED THAT THE FRENCH ENVISAGE ACCELERATED COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A INVESTMENT OF THAT MAGNITUDE WITHOUT AN ON-GOING RETURN.
5. FRANCOIS-PONCET VIEWED A HIGH LEVEL OF GAS IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EXCESS OF FRENCH CAPACITY TO COPE WITH A CUTOFF AS DANGEROUS. HE SAW THE LEVEL OF FRENCH STOCKS AND INTERRUPTIBLE CONTRACTS AS A GOOD WORKING FIGURE BUT STRESSED THAT FRENCH TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOW LOOKING AT A LEVEL OF SOVIET IMPORTS DOUBLE THAT LEVEL. IF THIS LEVEL OF GAS IMPORTS WERE CUT

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OFF, THERE WOULD BE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS UNEMPLOYED. THE FRENCH WOULD, THEREFORE, BE SUBJECTED TO SELF-IMPOSED LEVERAGE BY THE SOVIETS. THE FRENCH OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO LOWER THE PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO A REASONABLE LEVEL--TO A LEVEL WHICH WOULD NOT IMPEDE THE CREDIBILITY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN THE CASE OF NEED SUCH AS POLAND. HE REASONED THAT IF FRANCE CANNOT REDUCE IMPORTS OF SOVIET GAS TO THIS LEVEL, THEN FRANCE MIGHT AS WELL BUY AS MUCH SOVIET GAS AS POSSIBLE. AN IMPORT LEVEL OF 20 PERCENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE REASONABLE, BUT THE CURRENT FRENCH PLAN IS FAR ABOVE THAT FIGURE. WE MUST FIND AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE, HE SAID, AND THE ONLY PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE IS NORWAY.

6. NOTING FRENCH OPPOSITION TO INCREASED PURCHASES FROM ALGERIA AND LIBYA, BORRE AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND NORWAY ARE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL GAS FOR FRANCE IN THE MID-80'S. BORRE ASKED WHAT DID THE FRENCH VIEW TO BE THE BEST APPROACH IN LIGHT OF NORWEGIAN SENSITIVITIES. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SOMETHING CAN BE AND MUST BE DONE AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE NORWEGIANS COULD IGNORE THE PROPER LANGUAGE. A BILATERAL US/NORWEGIAN DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO START BECAUSE IT WOULD

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BE IN A CLEARLY POLITICAL CONTEXT (BY IMPLICATION NOT IN A COMMERCIAL CONTEXT--FRANCOIS-PONCET CHECKED HIMSELF IN USING THE WORD "COMMERCIAL"). FRANCOIS-PONCET RECOMMENDED AN APPROACH BY SECRETARY HAIG OR AT LEAST THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

7. FRANCOIS-PONCET STRESSED THAT THE USSR HAS BEEN AND WILL REMAIN A GOOD SUPPLIER AND THE FRENCH INDUSTRY MINISTRY, GAZ DE FRANCE, AND FRENCH INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS WANT FRANCE TO BUY SOVIET GAS. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD USE GAS AS A "POSITIVE POLITICAL TOOL." DEPENDENCY ON SOVIET GAS HOWEVER, CAN SERIOUSLY HAMPER EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC INDEPENDENCE. ACCORDING TO FRANCOIS-PONCET'S ANALYSIS, THE FRENCH WOULD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE ABLE TO TAKE THE 4-POWER TALKS ON POLAND SERIOUSLY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BEHAVE WONDERFULLY UNTIL THE CRITICAL DAY WHEN THEIR VITAL INTERESTS WERE PERCEIVED TO BE IN JEOPARDY. BORRE NOTED, IN THIS REGARD, THAT FOR TECHNICAL AND SEASONAL REASONS SOVIET GAS DELIVERIES TO WEST GERMANY HAD DECLINED THIS WINTER EVEN WITHOUT AN EXTREME POLITICAL CONTEXT.

8. BORRE ASKED IF EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON THE WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE PROJECT HAD BEEN GOOD. FRANCOIS-PONCET REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN TOO GOOD. "ALL THE TECHNICAL INTERESTS AGREE THAT THE MORE SOVIET GAS THE BETTER." THE EUROPEAN GAS COMPANIES ALL SUPPORT THE PROJECT. FRANCOIS-PONCET CONCLUDED THAT THE PROJECT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE QUICKLY. THE US ROLE IS VITAL.

9. IN RESPONSE TO FERRITER'S REFERENCE TO THE POSITIVE FRG ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PROJECT, FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PROJECT WAS JUST NOW BEGINNING TO BE DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY AS A MAJOR ISSUE. THESE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WILL NOT CONTINUE IF NO ALTERNATIVE IS FOUND. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHY THE GERMAN REACTION DIFFERED FROM THAT OF THE FRENCH. THE GERMANS WERE ENTRANCED BY THE GOOD ECONOMICS OF THE PROJECT, THE EQUIPMENT ORDERS, AND THE DIVERSIFICATION AWAY FROM OPEC, AND, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, WAS JUST ONE ADDITIONAL MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE FRG.

10. BORRE CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD TRANSMIT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON AND REVIEW THE ANALYTICAL FIGURES ON DEMAND, PROVIDED IN THE TECHNICAL BILATERALS; HE NOTED THAT THE US WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS THE RESULTS OF THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE US ANALYSIS.

11. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET ORGANIZED

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THIS MEETING WITH BORRE TO ADD THE FLYSEE'S AND QUAI'S
POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE PREVIOUS TECHNICAL BILATERALS.
THE MESSAGE WAS AIMED AT THE FRENCH INDUSTRY MINISTRY
AS WELL AS THE USG. HARTMAN

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DEPT PLS PASS ODE AND REPEAT FOR AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AND
- USTARA VIENNA
E.O. 12065: RDS 4/1/80 (MARSHALL, HARRY) OR-S
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TNUC, SCSA, SF, FR
SUBJ: U.S.-SAG NUCLEAR DISCUSSTONS

1. ~~/~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN TWO BRIEF GENERAL SESSIONS AND ONE PRIVATE SESSION ISROEL INFORMED SAGDEL THAT U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO FRANCE SUPPLYING THE INITIAL CORE AND ONE RELOAD FOR EACH OF THE TWO KOEBERG REACTORS, ONCE THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA ADHERES TO THE NPT AND BRINGS A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO THE TREATY INTO FORCE AND INSTITUTES A SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AT VALINDABA PENDING CONCLUSION OF AN NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. SAGDEL RESPONDED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS NO DIFFERENT THAN THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S AND ASKED HOW THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO APPROACH THE MATTER OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, FOURIE ADVISED MARSHALL THAT, BECAUSE THE "SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT", SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WANT TO ADHERE TO THE NPT OR ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDS AT VALINDABA. SAGDEL STATED THAT THEY BELIEVED U.S. WILL NOT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DELIVER FUEL AND SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY INTERFERE IN A SEPARATE SAG-FRENCH UNDERTAKING TO SUPPLY KOEBERG FUEL. IN ANOTHER PRIVATE CONVERSATION, SAGDEL INFORMED USDEL THAT U.S. REFUSAL TO PROVIDE SAFARI FUEL HAD FORCED THEM TO PRODUCE MIDDLE ENRICHED PRODUCT (45 PERCENT) AT VALINDABA AND THEY WOULD BE LOADING SOME MIDDLE ENRICHED FUEL UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND ANNOUNCING THIS DEVELOPMENT EARLY IN APRIL. AT SUBSEQUENT USDEL MEETING WITH FRENCH, AMB. DE COMMINES REAFFIRMED FRENCH REQUIREMENT FOR NPT AND SAFEGUARDS AS CONDITION OF FRENCH SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA AND SO ADVISED SAGDEL IN FRENCH BILATERAL WITH THEM ON APRIL 1. END SUMMARY.

3. SAGDEL WAS HEADED BY BRAND FOURIE, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INCLUDED J.W.L. DEVILLIERS, PRESIDENT, SOUTH AFRICAN ATOMIC ENERGY BOARD; S.J.P. DU PLESSIS, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF MINERAL AND ENERGY AFFAIRS; J.H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF ESCOM; DEREK AURET, COUNSELOR DFA; DONALD SOLE, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.

4. USDEL WAS LED BY HARRY MARSHALL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OFS AND INCLUDING MICHAEL GUHIN, OES/NEP; DAVID DLOUHY, DESK OFFICER FOR SOUTH AFRICA; RON BETTAUER, L/N; SHERRY PESKE, DOE/OURE; LEON SILVERSTROM, DOE/GC; AND EMBASSY PARIS COUNSELOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ABE FRIEDMAN.

5. MARSHALL INFORMED SAGDEL OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DECISION THAT U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO FRANCE SUPPLYING THE INITIAL CORE AND ONE RELOAD FOR EACH OF THE TWO REACTORS ONCE THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA ADHERES TO THE NPT AND BRINGS A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO THE TREATY INTO FORCE. MARSHALL NOTED THAT THE BASIC SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED THE ELEMENTS OUTLINED TO THE SAG IN 1978. HOWEVER, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH ON THIS PROPOSAL, WOULD NOT ADD NEW CONDITIONS LATER, AND VIEWED TEMPORARY FRENCH SUPPLY AS A MECHANISM TO OVERCOME CURRENT SAG SCHEDULING PROBLEMS AND OTHER POTENTIAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

6. FOURIE ASKED HOW THE U.S. WOULD HONOR THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1974 DOE-ESCOM CONTRACT; WOULD THE U.S. INTERPOSE ANY OBJECTIONS TO OR INTERFERE WITH A SEPARATE GDF-SAG FUEL SUPPLY AGREEMENT; AND HOW WAS THE PROPOSAL DIFFERENT FROM THAT PROPOSED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. FOURIE STATED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS NEVER ACTED CONTRARY TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS. HE SAID THERE WERE ALREADY ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS IF FRANCE WERE TO ACT AS FUEL SUPPLIER. HE SOUGHT CLARIFICATION THAT NPT ADHERENCE IS A POLICY AND NOT LEGAL REQUIREMENT, AND ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD INTERPOSE ANY "VETO" ON THE CONDITIONS OF A SEPARATE GDF-SAG FUEL SUPPLY AGREEMENT. USDEL UNDERLINED THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH U.S. "NO OBJECTION" TO FRENCH TEMPORARY SUPPLY IS PREMISED.

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7. U.S. SIDE OUTLINED A PROPOSAL WHEREBY THE SAG COULD ADHERE TO ITS DELIVERY SCHEDULE UNDER THE EXISTING DOE CONTRACT BUT MANAGE ITS COSTS BY CONVERTING TO THE MORE FLEXIBLE AFC TYPE CONTRACT. FURTHER ELABORATIONS WERE GIVEN IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION.

8. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MARSHALL, FOURIE REITERATED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL WAS NO DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE FROM THAT PRESENTED IN 1978. MARSHALL NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE NPT AND SAFEGUARDS ELEMENTS WERE THE SAME, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS PREPARED TO STAND BEHIND ITS PROPOSAL AND NOT TO ADD ANY ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS. FURTHERMORE, IF SAG ACCEPTED IT, WE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT SUPPLY FOR THE KOEBERG REACTORS WAS ASSURED. FOURIE CONFIRMED THAT SAG WENT TO THE FRENCH AND ASKED FOR SUBSTITUTION OF SUPPLY FROM FRANCE IF SOUTH AFRICA ADHERED TO THE NPT. HE SAID THAT THE SAG POSITION WAS DIFFERENT NOW, AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT WANT TO ADHERE TO THE NPT. THEREFORE, FOURIE ASKED IF THE USG WOULD BE NEUTRAL WITH THE FRENCH SO THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD WORK OUT A SEPARATE SUPPLY AGREEMENT. FOURIE FURTHER STATED THAT THE SAG DID NOT WANT SAFEGUARDS AT VALINDABA

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT PREFERRED TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES ASSURANCES REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THAT FACILITY.

9. IN BRIEF AFTERNOON SESSION OF TWO DELEGATIONS, MARCH 30, FOURIE SAID THAT IN VIEW OF PASSAGE OF THE NNPA AND U.S. NPT POLICY REQUIREMENTS, IT APPEARED THE CHOICES WERE TO TERMINATE THE DOE CONTRACT AND INITIATE A DIRECT GOF-SAG SUPPLY AGREEMENT, OR IMPLEMENT THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON THE CONTRACT (CONCERNING FRENCH SUPPLY FOR THE INITIAL CORE AND ONE RELOAD) AND LATER RESUME SUPPLY UNDER DOE CONTRACT. FOURIE SUGGESTED THAT INABILITY OF U.S. TO ISSUE AN EXPORT LICENSE CONSTITUTED FORCE MAJEURE AND INDICATED THAT LITIGATION MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY IF AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IS NOT FOUND. USDEL NOTED THAT FORCE MAJEURE WAS NOT AN ISSUE HERE AND THAT U.S. DELIVERY OF THE ENRICHED MATERIAL FOB AT DOE PLANT WAS WHAT THE CONTRACT REQUIRED.

10. FOURIE ALSO STATED THAT IN VIEW OF NEED TO WORK OUT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOF, SAG MAY NEED TO SHIFT THE MAY 1 CUTOFF DATE FOR DELIVERY TO DOE OF ESCOM FEEDSTOCK. USDEL INDICATED THAT WE ARE NOT NOW ENTERTAINING SUCH A PROPOSAL ALTHOUGH SOME SLIPPAGE IN THE SUPPLY DATE WAS POSSIBLE ASSUMING THAT AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WAS CLEARLY IN SIGHT.

11. SAGDEL ALSO NOTED DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING VISAS FOR SAG NUCLEAR PERSONNEL. WHILE NO RECENT PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED, THE APPLICANTS WERE EMPLOYEES OF THE LICENSING BRANCH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATOMIC ENERGY BOARD INVOLVED WITH SAFETY AND HEALTH QUESTIONS. THE SAGDEL WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD ISSUE VISAS TO OTHER SCIENTISTS OR EXPERTS IN THE NUCLEAR AREA. USDEL INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE QUESTION OF VISAS FOR NUCLEAR PERSONNEL IS NOT AT ISSUE.

12. FOURIE AND DEVILLIERS, IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MARSHALL, FRIEDMAN AND GUHIN (MAY 31) ADVISED THAT THEY HAVE PRODUCED SOME 45 PERCENT ENRICHED URANIUM AND FABRICATED 3-4 FUEL ELEMENTS WHICH THEY INTEND TO LOAD INTO SAFARY AND SUBJECT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS WITHIN

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A FEW WEEKS. THEY HAVE ENOUGH 45 PERCENT ENRICHED URANIUM FOR TEN ELEMENTS WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO OPERATE SAFARI AT REDUCED POWER (5 MEGAWATTS) FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. EACH ELEMENT INCLUDES 2000 OF CONTAINED U-235. THEY ALSO SAID PRODUCTION WAS DIFFICULT AND UNECONOMICAL. DEVILLIERS SAID THAT THEY HAD INTENTIONALLY DELAYED THIS LOADING AND THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF IT UNTIL AFTER THEY COULD ADVISE US. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SAID THEY HAVE NO PLANS NOR FACILITIES FOR REPROCESSING AND WILL STORE THE ELEMENTS AFTER USE UNDER SAFEGUARDS. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, DEVILLIERS SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD STILL PREFER TO GET MEDIUM ENRICHED FUEL ELEMENTS FROM THE U.S. FOR FULL

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OPERATIONS AT SAFARI BUT REPEATED THAT THEY
HAD NO CHOICE AT PRESENT BUT TO PROCEED ON
THEIR OWN. WE POINTED OUT THE CONCERNS
ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCTION.
FOURIE AND DEVILLIERS AGREED AND SAID THIS HAD
BEEN A HARD STEP FOR THEM AND WOULD OPEN THEM
TO FURTHER PRESS CRITICISM.

13. IN MEETING WITH GOF (DE COMMINES, OUVRIEU,
PETIT, NICALLAUD, DE GALASSUS AND SMESSOW)
AFTERNOON OF MARCH 31, MARSHALL REVIEWED WHAT
WE HAD TOLD THE SAGDEL. HE ALSO ADVISED THEM
OF US - SAG CONVERSATION CONCERNING SAFARI
MIDDLE ENRICHED FUEL. DE COMMINES REVIEWED
HIS BRIEF PRE-LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH FOURIE,
EMPHASIZING THAT GOF HAS HAD NO NORMAL
DISCUSSIONS YET AND WOULD NOT MEET WITH SAGDEL
UNTIL THE MORNING OF APRIL 1. DE COMMINES
SAID THAT FOURIE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE SAG
WAS RELUCTANT TO ADHERE TO THE NPPT BECAUSE OF
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. IT WAS DE COMMINES'
CONCLUSION THAT SAG POSITION HAD HARDENED SINCE
LAST YEAR. THE SAG REMAINS VERY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE IDEA OF SAFEGUARDS ON VALINDABA.
DE COMMINES ALSO SAID THAT FOURIE MENTIONED

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT THE PROPOSED VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESIGNATE CROCKER TO PRETORIA REPRESENTED A CHANGE IN U.S. - SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS. (USDEL CAUTIONED THAT THE TRIP WAS AN EFFORT TO REACH A CONSENSUS AMONG THE INTERESTED PARTIES OR POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IN THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PROCESS.) DE COMMINES REMARKED THAT THE ISSUE OF A GUARANTEE AGAINST POSSIBLE UN SANCTIONS WHICH PIK BOTHA STRESSED LAST YEAR DOES NOT SEEM TO BE AN ISSUE THIS YEAR. (USDEL NOTED THAT THE SAG MAY BELIEVE THAT THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDE THAT ASSURANCE FOR THE TIME BEING.) DE COMMINES STATED THAT, WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW THE CURRENT SAG POSITION IN DETAIL, THE GOF POSITION ON NPT ADHERENCE AND FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS ON ANY INTERIM FRENCH SUPPLY TO KOEBERG WAS WELL KNOWN BY THE SAG. WHILE HE DID NOT ELABORATE, DE COMMINES INDICATED THAT THE GOF WOULD MAINTAIN THESE REQUIREMENTS AND MAKE THIS POSITION CLEAR TO THE SAG IN SCHEDULED MEETINGS WITH THE SAGDEL ON APRIL 1. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT FOURIE HAD SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS, BUT FRENCH DEL INDICATED TO USDEL THAT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

14. IN RESPONSE TO GOF QUERY, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SAG HAD NOT EARLIER SCHEDULED MEETINGS WITH THE GOF. DE COMMINES SAID THAT WORD OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE USDEL WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD HEARD OF TALKS WITH THE SAG.

15. DURING BRIEF MEETING WITH SAGDEL ON MORNING OF APRIL 1, US AND SAG DELS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND HOPEFULLY BE IN A POSITION TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS IN NEAR FUTURE. AT OPENING AND CLOSING MARSHALL CLARIFIED THAT HE HOPED SAG WOULD REVIEW ITS POSITION SO THAT THESE NUCLEAR ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED SOON. FOURIE EMPHASIZED THAT OPTION OF AGREING TO END ENRICHMENT CONTRACT (WITHOUT TERMINATION CHARGES) HAD TO BE CONSIDERED IF BROADER QUESTIONS COULD NOT BE RESOLVED. USDEL NOTED DIFFICULTY OF THIS OPTION

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND DID NOT HOLD OUT MUCH HOPE FOR IT. SMITH (ESCOM) INDICATED THAT HE HAD STRICT INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BREACH THE CONTRACT. HE THEN ASKED IF IN REALITY USG POSITION MEANT USG WOULD BREACH THE CONTRACT. HE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED ESCOM'S PLIGHT. USDEL STRESSED THAT THERE WAS PROBLEM THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED AT POLITICAL LEVELS. USDEL ALSO NOTED THAT FROM TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE EACH PARTY (DOE AND ESCOM) COULD PERFORM ITS CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS.

16. IN BRIEF PRIVATE CONVERSATION AT END OF LAST DELEGATION MEETING WITH MARSHALL, FOURIE INDICATED THAT SAG HAD NOT MADE FINAL DECISION ON NPT ADHERENCE YET. HOWEVER, IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH DLOUHY, WHILE WAITING TO BE PICKED UP, FOURIE INDICATED THAT IF THE FRENCH DID NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENRICHMENT PLANT, THE SAG WOULD CONSIDER INTERNALLY THE OPTION OF AN AMICABLE TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT. FOURIE SAID THAT THE NUCLEAR POWER OPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS A MISTAKE FROM THE BEGINNING SINCE IT NEEDED OUTSIDE

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MESSAGE:

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O 011051Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECRETATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0018

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SUPPLY.

17. AFTER LAST MEETING ON MORNING OF APRIL 1 BETWEEN U.S. AND SAG DELS, SAG DEL AGAIN MET WITH FRENCH. FOLLOWING THE FINAL FRENCH-SAG BILATERAL ON APRIL 1, AMB. DE COMMINES BRIEFED SCICOUNS ON THEIR DISCUSSION. DE COMMINES SAID THAT SAG DEL ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NPT AND FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS (FSS). HE SAID HE FELT THAT SAG DELS' QUESTIONS WERE EXPLORATORY AND THAT SAG WAS NOT IN POSITION TO MAKE ANY DECISIONS PRIOR TO FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. DE COMMINES SAID HE TOLD BRAND FOURIE THAT IF PROPOSAL, THAT U.S. AND FRENCH CONCURRED IN, TO HAVE FRENCH SUPPLY INITIAL CORES AND RELOAD ON CONDITION THAT SAG BECOME PARTY TO NPT AND PLACE THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS, WAS NOT ACCEPTED, HE COULD SEE NO SOLUTION FOR KOEBERG. DE COMMINES SAID THAT HE TOLD FOURIE THAT SAG ADHERENCE TO NPT WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON THE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IN RESPONSE TO SCICOUNS' QUESTION AS TO WHETHER SAG DEL WAS EXPLICITLY TOLD BY FRENCH THAT FRENCH

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUPPLY OF FIRST CORES AND RELOAD EQUIRED SAG
ADHERENCE TO NPT, DE COMMINES SAID, YES,
SEVERAL TIMES. HE THEN TOLD SCICQUNS THAT,
ALTHOUGH QUESTION DID NOT COME UP, IF SAG WERE
TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT FSS BUT
NOT NPT, HE THOUGHT FRENCH WOULD HAVE TO
REVIEW THE ENTIRE MATTER AGAIN. HARTMAN

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NLRR 007-081 #4/1/89
BY CV NARA DATE 5/6/10

O 011714Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 3339
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2906
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7827
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6124

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 09757

E.O. 12065: RUS, 4/01/00 (FRANCIS DE TARR) DRIP
TAGS: OVIP, PL, US, PEPR, EFIN
SUBJECT: POLISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JAGIELSKI'S
PARIS VISIT MARCH 30 - APRIL 1.

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: POLISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JAGIELSKI MET WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING, FONMIN FRANCOIS-PONCET, ECONOMIC MINISTER MONORY AND FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER COINTAT DURING HIS MARCH 30-APRIL 1 VISIT. TALKS CENTERED ON FRENCH FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, WHICH AMOUNTS TO FOUR BILLION FRANCS. THIS SUM APPEARS TO BE A COMBINATION OF NEW CREDITS, PLUS REFINANCING OF OLD DEBTS IN 1980/81. JAGIELSKI SAID THAT RECENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM'S ACTIONS RE-AFFIRMED THE PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO SOCIALIST RENEWAL AND THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT FOOD AND OTHER SHORTAGES WERE HAVING MAJOR POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. JAGIELSKI WAS VAGUE ON THE EXTENT OF ASSISTANCE FROM SOCIALIST-BLOC COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.
3. QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPE, JEAN PIERRE MASSET (PROTECT), BRIEFED US TODAY (APRIL 1) AS FOLLOWS ON JAGIELSKI'S TWO-HOUR MEETING, MARCH 30 WITH FONMIN FRANCOIS-PONCET. (JAGIELSKI ALSO MET WITH GISCARD D'ESTAING, RENE MONORY, ECONOMICS MINISTER; AND MICHEL

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

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COINTAT, MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.),

4. JAGIELSKI EXPRESSED OPTIMISM WITH THE RESULTS OF THE MARCH 29 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, WHICH HE SAID CONFIRMED THE PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS OF "RENEWAL," WITH NO INTENTION OF TURNING BACK, AND COMMITTED THE PARTY (BOTH HARDLINERS AND MODERATES) TO A POLITICAL SITUATION FOR ALL CONFLICTS. JAGIELSKI ADDED THAT WHILE SOLIDARITY HAS MANY AUTHENTIC LABOR LEADERS, IT IS ALSO UNDER PRESSURE FROM YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED EXTREMISTS WHO ARE BRINGING IT CLOSE TO ANARCHY, AND THEREIN LIES THE DANGER.

5. THE ECONOMY: A. JAGIELSKI SAID THAT CURRENT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES REFLECT POLAND'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, TO WIT: FOOD SCARCITIES AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPORTING RAW MATERIALS AND SEMI-FINISHED GOODS TO KEEP POLAND'S INDUSTRIAL PLANTS GOING. JAGIELSKI SAID THAT THIS SITUATION, IN TERMS OF POLAND'S CREDIT REQUIREMENTS, HAS LED TO A "VICIOUS CIRCLE."

B. FRANCOIS-PONCET PROMISED TO DISCUSS NEW CREDITS WITH MONDORY AND COINTAT FOR THE PURCHASE OF SEMI-FINISHED GOODS AND GRAINS, AND SAID THAT FRANCE WILL FOLLOW POLISH DEVELOPMENTS WITH "ATTENTION, EMOTION AND HOPE."

FRANCOIS-PONCET ADDED THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE PLENUM AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL, AND PROMISED THAT FRANCE WOULD DO ALL THAT IT CAN TO HELP.

FRANCOIS-PONCET INFORMED JAGIELSKI THAT SEVERAL WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE BANKS ARE RETICENT TO OFFER POLAND NEW CREDITS, AND THAT MANY BANKS THAT MIGHT CONSIDER NEW CREDITS WOULD INSIST ON SHORT-TERM LOANS AND A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE. (ACCORDING TO MASSET, JAGIELSKI WOULD OPPOSE SUCH A CLAUSE, AND WOULD SEEK THE LONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS.) JAGIELSKI SAID THAT ALL CREDITS WOULD BE PAID IN THREE YEARS. RESPONDING TO OUR QUESTION AS TO WHY JAGIELSKI SEEMED SO CONFIDENT ON THIS POINT, MASSET SAID THAT JAGIELSKI WAS ASSUMING A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S AUSTERITY PLAN.

C. FRANCOIS-PONCET ASKED JAGIELSKI ABOUT POLISH INDEBTEDNESS TO THE SOCIALIST BLOC, AS WELL AS THE BLOC'S PLANS FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT. ACCORDING TO MASSET, JAGIELSKI WAS EVASIVE AND GAVE NO PRECISE ANSWERS.

D. MASSET MADE A POINT OF CLARIFYING AN ERRONEOUS MARCH 31 AFP ITEM THAT SAID "FRANCE WOULD EXTEND TO POLAND IN 1981 A FOUR BILLION FRANC CREDIT AS IT HAD DONE IN 1980." MASSET SAID THAT PRESS ACCOUNTS, ABOUT WHICH THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD CALLED YESTERDAY (MARCH 31), IMPLIED THAT FRANCE WOULD PROVIDE FOUR

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BILLION IN NEW CREDITS. MASSET SAID THAT THIS AMOUNT IS THE GLOBAL FIGURE FOR ALL FORMS OF FRENCH AID INCLUDING DEBT REFINANCING, COMMERCIAL LOANS, ETC. E. JAGIELSKI SAID THAT USSR HAD NO CRITICISM OF POLAND'S ECONOMIC REFORMS, NOR OF ITS AGRICULTURAL POLICY. HE, HOWEVER, WAS "VERY NEGATIVE" ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF CREATING A TRUE AGRICULTURAL UNION SINCE FARMER ORGANIZA-

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MESSAGE:
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O 011714Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3026

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 3340
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2907
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7828
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6125

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 09757

TIONS ALREADY EXIST. JAGIELSKI WAS FIRM IN STATING THAT AN INDEPENDENT, SUPPLEMENTARY FARMERS' ORGANIZATION WAS NOT NECESSARY.

COMMENT: WITH RESPECT TO REPAYMENT PROSPECTS, JAGIELSKI IS FAR MORE CONFIDENT THAN THE POLISH FINANCE NEGOTIATORS WHO ARE ASKING FOR TEN YEARS TO REPAY, INCLUDING FIVE YEARS GRACE. THE FOUR BILLION FRANC FIGURE CORRESPONDS ROUGHLY WITH THE TOTAL OF VARIOUS CREDITS OUTLINED IN PARIS 7057 WHICH INCLUDES 1.2 BILLION FRANCS ADVANCED IN 1980. END COMMENT.

6. AFTER OUR DISCUSSION OF THE JAGIELSKI VISIT, MASSET PROVIDED US WITH THE FOLLOWING RUNDOWN OF CURRENT QUAI VIEWS OF THE POLISH SITUATION:

- THE POLES NEED A CALM ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS, FREE OF DECLARATIONS AND POLEMICS.
- A CERTAIN EQUILIBRIUM NOW EXISTS BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND BETWEEN THE MODERATES AND EXTREMISTS WITHIN EACH CAMP.
- THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY BASE FAVORS RENEWAL SINCE 1-2 MILLION PARTY MEMBERS ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF SOLIDARITY.
- SCHEDULING THE PARTY CONGRESS FOR JULY FAVORS THE MODERATES TO WHOM AGREEMENT ON A SECRET BALLOT WAS A VERY IMPORTANT CONCESSION.
- THE USSR IS OBVIOUSLY "NOT VERY HAPPY" WITH RECENT

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POLISH DEVELOPMENTS, BUT THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF IMMINENT SOVIET ARMY INTERVENTION.

-- THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO WOULD BE FOR THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO CRACK DOWN IF EVENTS GOT COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND, RATHER THAN DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION.

-- EVENTS IN POLAND TODAY ARE MOVING CLOSER TO THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, SINCE THE PCP IS ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE PUSHED INTO A DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. HARTMAN

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