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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/13/2007

File Folder FRANCE (1/27/81-2/27/81)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

20

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 46640 | CABLE | 271226Z JAN 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 4 | 1/27/1981 | B1 |
| 46641 | CABLE | 291325Z JAN 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 2 | 1/29/1981 | B1 |
| 46642 | CABLE | 311249Z JAN 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 1 | 1/31/1981 | B1 |
| 46643 | CABLE | 312131Z JAN 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 6 | 1/31/1981 | B1 |
| 46644 | CABLE | 031209Z FEB 81 PAR 5/26/2010 NLRRM2007-081 | 4 | 2/3/1981 | B1 |
| 46645 | CABLE | 041736Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 2 | 2/4/1981 | B1 |
| 46646 | CABLE | 120017Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 1 | 2/12/1981 | B1 |
| 46647 | CABLE | 131959Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 2 | 2/13/1981 | B1 |
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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| 46651 | CABLE | 232100Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 5 | 2/23/1981 | B1 |
| 46652 | CABLE | 251803Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 4 | 2/25/1981 | B1 |
| 46653 | CABLE | 261752Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 4 | 2/26/1981 | B1 |
| 46654 | CABLE | 272219Z FEB 81 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081 | 11 | 2/27/1981 | B1 |

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DATE 02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB:SEA, WEUR

46640

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NSR 107-081 #46640

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY CL NAF DATE 5/6/10

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 271226Z JAN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9952

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 02530
NDDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 120651 RDS-1 1/27/01 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR - M
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, FR, AF
SUBJECT: PROPOSAL BY GISCARD ON AFGHANISTAN

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. JACQUES WAHL CALLED ME TO THE ELYSEE AT NOON TODAY TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO INFORM US OF A PROPOSAL THAT HE WOULD MAKE ON THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION DURING THE COURSE OF HIS TELEVISION BROADCAST THIS EVENING AT 8:00 P.M. PARIS TIME ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WAHL REFERRED TO A LONG MEMORANDUM WHICH OBVIOUSLY CONTAINED THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL, BUT HE ASSURED ME THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY ONLY SKETCH IN THE OUTLINES OF THE PROPOSAL AND THE INFORMATION HE WAS ABOUT TO GIVE ME WOULD GO BEYOND WHAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ACTUALLY SAY THIS EVENING.

3. STARTING FROM SEVERAL PROPOSITIONS--FIRST THAT THE SOVIETS KEEP INSISTING THAT OTHERS ARE INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN; SECOND, THAT THE PAKISTANIS SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD A MUCH SOFTER POSITION; AND, THIRD, THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AT PAK URGING, SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN A SOFTER DIRECTION, GISCARD APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS TIME TO PLACE ANOTHER PROPOSAL BEFORE WORLD OPINION. THE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES. PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHOSEN ON TWO BASES--POWER AND PROXIMITY--PRESUMABLY POWER MEANING THE CAPACITY TO INTERVENE. HE IS THINKING THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PLUS PAKISTAN, IRAN AND INDIA, WITH AN OBSERVER FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THE OBJECTIVES OF SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD BE AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS RIGHT OF FREE SELF-DETERMINATION AND, PARTICULARLY, ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER INTERFERENCE AND NO TROOPS OF ANY OUTSIDE POWER. THE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE AGREED TO FOR SIMULTANEOUS AND RECIPROCAL IMPLEMENTATION.

4. THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION OBVIOUSLY, SAID WAHL, IS WHO SHOULD REPRESENT AFGHANISTAN, AND ON THAT THERE HAD BEEN MUCH THOUGHT GIVEN BY THE FRENCH IN PREPARING THIS PROPOSAL. THEY WILL TAKE THE POSITION THAT IF THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PARTICIPATE, THEN ALL GROUPS INTERESTED IN THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED TO THIS RATHER PRECIPITOUS TIMING AND DID NOT GET A MERY ESPONSIVE ANSWER. OBVIOUSLY THE FACT THAT GISCARD IS GIVING A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY INTERVIEW

PSN: 034989

TOR: 027/17:14Z

RTG: 271226Z JAN 81

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

3

DATE 02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 271226Z JAN 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9953

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 02530

NODIS

AT THE BEGINNING OF WHAT LOOKS LIKE HIS CAMPAIGN COULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOREIGN TO AT LEAST SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS. I SAID TO WAHL THAT I HAD READ IN THE NEWSPAPER YESTERDAY THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE SOVIETS. WAS THIS PLAN DISCUSSED WITH THEM? HE SAID NO. IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED, BUT THERE WAS A BRIEF "ALLUSION" TO THE PLAN IN THE LETTER TO BREZHNEV.

6. WAHL STRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN, TO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF THIS INFORMATION MIGHT NOT IN FACT BE DISCUSSED BY THE PRESIDENT THIS EVENING, AND, FINALLY, THE WILLINGNESS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO TALK IN DETAIL ABOUT THIS FRAMEWORK AND TO DEVELOP TOGETHER WITH OTHERS THE MORE DETAILED PROPOSAL.

7. I COMMENTED TO WAHL THAT OBVIOUSLY IT WAS NOT FOR ME TO GIVE A REACTION, BUT THAT THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE THE MOST FORTUITOUS WAY TO BEGIN A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. AFGHANISTAN, AFTER ALL, WAS AT THE CENTER OF ALL OUR PREOCCUPATIONS AND WHILE THIS MIGHT BE A VERY GOOD CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT, IT HAD AN ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WHICH WAS SOMETHING THAT HAD BEEN BOTHERING THE FRENCH FOR SOME TIME. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE THE REACTION AND WENT ON TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF LEAKS IF CONSULTATION HAD TAKEN PLACE.

8. COMMENT: MY CURRENT ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS LOOKING FOR SOME WAY TO MOVE FRENCH ATTENTION FROM HIS RELATIVELY UNSUCCESSFUL MOVES IN AFRICA TO ANOTHER AREA WHERE HE COULD BE SEEN TO BE "TAKING AN INITIATIVE." THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR OF THE

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

4

DATE 02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOREIGN OFFICE WAS IN MOSCOW THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS AND
I CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE COULD HAVE
DISCUSSED SOMETHING LIKE THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT
I OBVIOUSLY HAVE NO PROOF OF THAT.
HARTMAN

PSN: 035006

TOR: 027/17:23Z

RTG: 27:226Z JAN 81

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
ROB THOMSON, REUR, WEUR, DEPOL

466

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE#1

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFNPS #2829 0291327
O 291326Z JAN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0081

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 02829

NOIDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/29/11 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, PL, US, FR
SUBJECT: (R) POLAND: VIEWS OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION
REF: STATE 19313

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET HAS JUST GIVEN US HIS REPLY TO SECRETARY HAIG'S JANUARY 25 LETTER REGARDING U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ON POLAND. FRENCH TEXTS BEING POUCHED. EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS.
3. "DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 28.
I AM CONVINCED, AS YOU ARE, OF THE NECESSITY TO ESTABLISH BETWEEN US OPEN AND THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, I AM PLEASED THAT WE WILL SOON HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONCERT AND CONFRONT OUR ANALYSES OF THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.
WITH RESPECT IN PARTICULAR TO POLAND, WE ARE FOLLOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION WITH THE GREATEST INTEREST. THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU ADDRESSED TO MR. GROMYKO IS USEFUL AND IMPORTANT. IT CORRESPONDS TO THE LANGUAGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN USING WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE LAST SUMMER IN HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS AND MOST RECENTLY IN THE MESSAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC JUST SENT TO

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DECLASSIFIED

NER 007-081746641
BY AN DATE 5/6/0

02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 022

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MR. BREZHNEV, NO ONE DOUBTS NOW, AFTER THE POSITION TAKEN AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS MADE PUBLICLY, THAT THESE WARNINGS UNDERLINE THE DETERMINATION OF THE WESTERN POWERS.

I SHARE WITH YOU YOUR FEELING ON THE OPPORTUNITY OF CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE PRESENTLY UNDER WAY BY THE FOUR IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS AMONG US AS TO THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENTUALITY OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND. ON THIS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SUBJECT AS WELL AS ON OTHERS, THE FRAME WORK OF THE FOUR POWERS SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE ONLY APPROPRIATE ONE, SINCE DISCUSSIONS IN A LARGER GROUP WOULD ENTAIL REACHING A CONSENSUS AMONG ALL THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED. THIS IS, IF I HAVE UNDERSTOOD YOU, WHAT YOU TOO HAVE IN MIND.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS TO YOU AGAIN MY WARM WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR DUTIES.

JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET"

HARTMAN

PSN: 038727

TOR: 030/041072

5TGI 291325Z JAN 81

DATE 02/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL VP
EOB: THOMSON, REUR, WEUR, DEPOL

46642

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE 1

IMMEDIATE
DE RUPNPS #3176 0311251
O 311249Z JAN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0198

~~S E C R E T~~ PARIS 03176
NODIS
FOR VEST FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/31/11 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) DR=M
TAGS: PL, FR
SUBJ: POLAND: NATO CONSIDERATION OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
REF: STATE 24761

1. ~~S E C R E T~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ROBIN WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER SINCE THEY ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH DETERIORATING SITUATION. I ALSO GAVE HIM RUNDOWN ON GROMYKO REPLY TO SECRETARY'S LETTER. HE PROMISED TO HAVE REACTION TO YOU VIA FRENCH EMBASSY DURING THE DAY ON MONDAY. FRANCOIS-PONCET IS HAVING LUNCH WITH ME TOMORROW, AND I WILL GO OVER THESE POINTS DIRECTLY WITH HIM AS WELL. REGARDS.
HARTMAN

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 107-081 #46642
BY CA DATE 5/6/10

PSN: 041011

TOR: 031/13154Z

DTG: 311249Z JAN 81

DATE 02/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL, VP
EOB:SEA, PRC, EURE, FEUR, WEUR

4664

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #5767 031214Z
R 312151Z JAN 81 ZFF
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
AMEMBASSY BONN 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 025767
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 4 1/31/87 (COON, J. A.)

TAGS: PEPR, FR, AF, PK

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER TO
THE SECRETARY ON GISCARD'S AFGHAN PROPOSAL

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE JANUARY 30 DELIVERED TO UNDER
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE STOESEL THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
FRANCOIS-PONCET TO THE SECRETARY. IN PRESENTING THE
LETTER, DE LABOULAYE PARTICULARLY NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE
FIRST CASE IN WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT COULD START "CLOSE AND
SINCERE COOPERATION" WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. HE ALSO
STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH WERE OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THEIR AFGHAN PROPOSAL.

DATE 02/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. BEGIN TEXT OF INFORMAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

DEAR AL:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND I ATTACH, AS YOU KNOW, THE GREATEST VALUE TO INSTALLING BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS A STYLE OF RELATIONS WHICH IS AS DIRECT, OPEN AND CONFIDING

AS POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMS TO US PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE FACE OF THE MANY DANGEROUS CHALLENGES WHICH THE WEST WILL WITHOUT DOUBT HAVE TO CONFRONT IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

SINCE THE PROPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON AFGHANISTAN GIVES ME THE OCCASION, I WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT TO INITIATE A PRACTICE OF EXCHANGES WHICH I HOPE TO SEE BECOME A HABIT BETWEEN US. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS MESSAGE IS IN FACT LESS TO ENLIGHTEN YOU ON THE TENOR OF THAT PROPOSITION OF WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED YOU THAN TO ENLIGHTEN YOU ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL REASONING WHICH LED THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE FIRST OF ALL IS THAT THE PHILOSOPHY WHICH UNDERLIES THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT NEW. IT HAS PROGRESSIVELY MATURED AND TAKEN FORM IN THE DEBATES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE AMONG THE NINE DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF LAST YEAR.

THE DAY AFTER THE ENTRY OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED VERY QUICKLY ON THE IDEA THAT THE OBJECTIVE TO REACH WAS THE EVACUATION OF THE SOVIET TROOPS AND THE RESTORATION OF AN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WAS SOVEREIGN AND OUTSIDE OF THE COMPETITION OF THE POWERS.

AS TO THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, ONE THOUGHT FIRST OF A NEUTRALITY STATUS WHICH AFGHANISTAN SHOULD TAKE ON, MORE OR LESS ON THE AUSTRIAN MODEL. A CLOSER EXAMINATION SHOWED THAT THIS FORMULA CARRIED DANGERS. IT POSED FIRST THE QUESTION OF KNOWING WHO, IN THE NAME OF AFGHANISTAN, SHOULD SUBSCRIBE TO THIS NEUTRAL STATUS. IF IT WAS THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME, THIS BROUGHT, IP SO FACTO, LEGITIMIZATION, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CASTING DOUBT ON THE VALUE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS UNDERTAKEN. IF IT WERE NOT THAT REGIME, THIS MEANT A PRIOR DISCUSSION OF THE INTERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE FORMULA WAS WIDE OPEN TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA, WHICH WOULD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT HESITATE -- AND WHICH IN FACT HAS NOT HESITATED -- TO SHOW THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN CONTRADICTION WITH THEMSELVES INsofar AS, ON THE ONE HAND, THEY CONCEIVED OF THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND THEY PROPOSED IMPOSING IN ADVANCE AND FROM THE OUTSIDE A PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL STATUS ON AFGHANISTAN. FINALLY, SUPPOSING EVEN THAT ONE FOUND AN AFGHAN AUTHORITY

CAPABLE OF TAKING A VALID ENGAGEMENT FOR THE COUNTRY, AND THAT THIS AUTHORITY WERE TO ACCEPT TAKING ON A NEUTRALITY STATUS, WOULDN'T IT BE NECESSARY TO SURROUND THIS STATUS WITH GUARANTEES? WOULDN'T THE USSR INEVITABLY BE AMONG THE GUARANTORS? WOULDN'T ONE THUS RECOGNIZE FOR IT A PERMANENT RIGHT OF OVERSIGHT, WHICH BY THE FACT OF ITS NEARNESS AND POWER IT WOULD HAVE ALL THE MEANS TO MAKE USE OF, WHICH IN PRACTICE WOULD NOT BE THE CASE OF THE OTHER EVENTUAL GUARANTORS?

IT IS PRECISELY TO AVOID THESE REEFS THAT WE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO ENGAGE OURSELVES IN ANOTHER DIRECTION. IT IS A MATTER OF CONCLUDING THAT AFGHANISTAN, TO RECOVER COMMAND OF ITS DESTINY, SHOULD BE DELIVERED FROM EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS, WHETHER THEY ARE REAL AND CLEAR, AS WAS THE CASE OF THE USSR, OR WHETHER THEY ARE ALLEGED OR POSSIBLE, AS IS THE CASE OF THE "INTERFERENCES" OF WHICH MOSCOW ACCUSES A WHOLE SERIES OF COUNTRIES. IN OTHER WORDS, SINCE THE PROBLEM WAS BORN OUTSIDE (THE COUNTRY), IT IS OUTSIDE THAT THE SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THIS MEANT, AS THE NINE AFFIRMED AT THE LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT AND RECALLED AT THE VENICE SUMMIT, THAT "THE GREAT POWERS AND THE NEIGHBORING STATES OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE ENGAGEMENT NOT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY FORM OF MILITARY PRESENCE OR ASSOCIATION WITH IT."

THE IDEAL WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT THIS FORMULA BE PROPOSED BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. IN FACT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE (THE CONFERENCE) ENGAGED ITSELF IN THE CHATTI-GHOTBZADEH-AGA SHAHI PROCEDURE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NEVER CEASED TO CONSIDER THAT THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE ON NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS THE BEST. AND I HAVE RECALLED THIS IN CLEAR TERMS, AS MUCH IN MY STATEMENTS BEFORE THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT (SENATE SPEECH OF JUNE 27) AS IN MY SPEECH TO THE UN.

IN FACT, IT APPEARS TO US TO PRESENT BROAD ADVANTAGES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 004

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1.) IT CIRCLES THE REEF OF THE INTERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION, WHICH IS AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT AREA SINCE MOST WESTERN STATES HAVE KEPT A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KABUL AND SINCE THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAS NO INTERNATIONALY RECOGNIZED UNIFIED ORGAN.

2.) SUPPOSING THAT IT SHOULD BE PUT INTO OPERATION, IT PERMITS REACHING THE OBJECTIVE. IF THE SOVIET UNION

ENGAGED ITSELF NOT TO STATION TROOPS ON AFGHAN SOIL, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED TO WITHDRAW THOSE WHICH IT HAS SENT THERE. AS TO THE TYPE OF AUTHORITY WHICH WOULD IMPOSE ITSELF IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RED ARMY, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO THINK THAT IT WOULD NOT MAKE ITSELF MOSCOW'S INSTRUMENT, TO SAY THE LEAST.

3.) IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF NOT LEAVING THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO MOSCOW, WHICH WOULD BE THE CASE IF THE SOVIETS COULD MAKE BELIEVABLE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ONLY CONCRETE PROPOSAL IS THAT WHICH THEY MADE MAY 14, 1980, AND WHICH THEY CAN PRETEND IS NOW BEGINNING TO BE CARRIED OUT. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, BY THE FACT OF ITS EXISTENCE ALONE, PUTS THE AFGHANISTAN AFFAIR BACK IN THE FRONT ROW OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS AT A MOMENT WHEN IT RISKED BEING FORGOTTEN IN THE WEST. FINALLY, IT RECALLS THAT ANY REAL SOLUTION SHOULD IMPLY ENGAGEMENTS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH (THE USSR) IS TRYING TO MAKE EVERYONE FORGET BY FOCUSING ATTENTION ON A BILATERAL AFGHAN-PAKISTANI FORMULA.

4.) AS IT IS, OUR PROPOSAL SHOULD PERMIT PLACING MOSCOW ON THE DEFENSIVE SINCE IT COMES DOWN TO TAKING THE SOVIETS AT THEIR WORD. NATURALLY, WE ARE NOT NAIVE TO THE POINT OF BELIEVING THAT THEY ARE GOING TO GREET OUR PROPOSAL WITH SATISFACTION. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THEY WILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN FORMULATING A COHERENT AND CONVINCING RESPONSE. ONE CANNOT ACCUSE A SERIES OF COUNTRIES OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AFGHAN CRISIS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED INTERFERENCES, AND FORGET THESE COUNTRIES WHEN IT IS A QUESTION OF FINDING A SOLUTION. ALSO, HOW CAN ONE BLAME COUNTRIES WHICH DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO RESPECT AFGHANISTAN'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY INTERFERENCE IF THE USSR DOES THE SAME THING, WHILE IT IS PRECISELY THESE "INTERFERENCES" WHICH ARE IN QUESTION?

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 005

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO TELL YOU WHY THE MOMENT SEEMED TO US TIMELY FOR PUBLICLY RECALLING THIS FORMULA AND DRAWING FROM IT A CONCRETE PROPOSAL.

1) THE AFGHANISTAN AFFAIR IS NOW MORE THAN A YEAR OLD. CONTRARY TO SOVIET HOPES, IT HAS NOT BEEN FILED AWAY. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, THE PROTEST OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, THE VOTES OF THE UN SHOW THAT THE RULE OF THE

FAIT ACCOMPLI HAS NOT YET PLAYED. BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIETS ARE STILL IN AFGHANISTAN. PROPOSING A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS OF INTEREST FIRST TO RECALL THAT THE PROBLEM HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED. THIS IS IMPORTANT AT A MOMENT WHEN WEARINESS COULD BE FELT.

2) THE EVOLUTION OF THE PAKISTANI POSITION UNDERLINES THE DANGERS OF LEAVING THE DIPLOMATIC MONOPOLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE DO NOT QUESTION THE INTENTIONS OR THE FIRMNESS OF THE PAKISTANIS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE, ALONE AND WITH OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS, CAUTIONED ISLAMABAD AGAINST THE RISKS OF SLIDING, WHICH INCLUDES THE ENTERPRISE IN WHICH PAKISTAN ENVISAGES ENGAGING ITSELF. IT SEEMS TO US NEITHER SUFFICIENT NOR DESIRABLE TO REMAIN IN A NEGATIVE STANCE. THIS IS WHY WE THOUGHT THE MOMENT HAD COME TO SKETCH THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF AN AUTHENTIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PUT THE PAKISTANI APPROACH BACK IN PROPER OVERALL PERSPECTIVE, AN APPROACH WHICH, BY PUTTING THINGS IN THE MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT, COULD ONLY BE PARTIAL.

3) I ADD FINALLY THAT THE ENTRY INTO OFFICE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN CONSTITUTES FOR US A DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE CHOICE OF THE MOMENT. WE CONSIDER THAT NOW THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS ASSURED OF DURATION AND HAS A FIRM ORIENTATION, IT IS POSSIBLE AND TIMELY FOR THE WEST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN ITS TURN. IT SEEMS TO US ESSENTIAL THAT IN THE REDEFINITION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE, THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM OCCUPIES THE IMPORTANT PLACE WHICH IT MERITS, AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU SHARE THIS CONVICTION. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE STATE OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, WASHINGTON WAS NOT, HOWEVER, THE BEST PLACED TO LAUNCH THIS INITIATIVE. WE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT ONE OR SEVERAL ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WOULD TAKE IT ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. IT SEEMED TO US THAT, BY DEFAULT,

DATE 02/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 006

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRANCE WAS PROBABLY THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

WE STRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THIS REGARD THE FAVORABLE OPINION WHICH YOU HAVE IMMEDIATELY SHOWN TOWARD OUR PROPOSAL, AND WE THINK THAT AFTER HAVING EXAMINED IT IN GREATER DETAIL, YOU WILL JUDGE IT POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT IT IN THE WAYS WHICH SEEM BEST TO YOU. I ADD THAT, WHILE THE PROPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IS FIRMLY FIXED IN ITS BROAD LINES, WE ARE OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS, AS WE ARE READY TO RESPOND TO THE QUESTIONS IT MAY RAISE.

NOR DO WE PRETEND THAT IT EXHAUSTS THE SUBJECT. IN REALITY, IT TREATS ONLY THE MOST GENERAL DIPLOMATIC ASPECT OF THE AFGHAN AFFAIR. WE MUST BUSY OURSELVES IN PARALLEL WITH THE OTHER ASPECTS, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE ATTITUDE TO TAKE TOWARD THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

FINALLY, WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS A QUESTION OF AN AFFAIR OF LONG DURATION, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE RESULTS. THE ESSENTIAL THING IS TO HAVE POSED THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN AFFAIR IN TERMS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT EASILY IGNORE OR CHALLENGE.

THESE ARE THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH I HOPED TO BRING YOU, WHILE SAYING AGAIN HOW MUCH I AM PERSONALLY DESIROUS OF STAYING IN CLOSE AND CONFIDING CONTACT WITH YOU ON THE WHOLE OF THIS SUBJECT.

BEST REGARDS, JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET

END TEXT. HAIG

PSN: 041733

TOR: 032/051102

BTG: 3121312 JAN 81

DATE 02/06/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RUBS FILE
EOB:NUCUN, SCINU, NEA, WEUR

46644

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFNPS #3369/01 0341211
R 031200Z FEB 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0262

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 03369

NO DIS
E.O. 12065; RDS 2/3/01 (FRIEDMAN, A.S.) OR-8
TAGS: PARM, TNUC, (C. 71), SOSA, FR, IZ
SUBJ: (C) IRAQ NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1. (C) THIS CABLE REPORTS ON A NUMBER OF RECENT ITEMS OF INTEREST CONCERNING IRAQ NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

2. (S) JEAN-BERNARD OUVRIEU (CEA) HAS TOLD SCICOUNS THAT NOW THAT IAEA INSPECTORS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO VISIT IRAQ NUCLEAR CENTER, FRENCH ARE IN PROCESS OF SENDING SOME OF THEIR TECHNICATOME STAFF BACK TO RESEARCH REACTOR SITE IN IRAQ.

3. (S) ACCORDING TO SENIOR FRENCH CEA SAFETY AND SECURITY OFFICIAL, CAMPAIGN OF THREATS AGAINST FRENCH INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ HAS RESUMED AND NUMBER OF CNIM AND TECHNICATOME ENGINEERS HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED THREATENING LETTERS.

4. (S) [REDACTED]

3.3(8)(1)

[REDACTED] GAVE EMBASSY SCICOUNS COPIES OF CNIM (CONSTRUCTIONS NAVALES ET INDUSTRIELLES DE LA MEDITERRANEE) DRAWINGS OF HEAVY WATER TANK AND NUCLEAR BEAM LAYOUT FOR OSIRAK (TAMMUZ II) REACTOR. (IN THIS RESPECT, OSIRAK SEEMS TO DIFFER FROM OSTRIK AT SACLAY WHICH HAS NO HEAVY WATER TANK)

DATE 02/06/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):



3.3 (S)(1)

5. (S) [REDACTED] TOLD US THAT ITALIANS ARE SELLING IRAQ THREE HOT CELLS, EACH 2 METERS BY 1.5M BY 1.4M IN SIZE. (PARA 4, 180 STATE 328190 STATES THAT "WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON CELL SIZES").

6. (U) FRENCH ACTIVIST JEWISH ORGANIZATION CALLED "RENOUVEAU JUIF" HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTING HANDBILLS AND POSTERS SHOWING MUSHROOM CLOUD WITH HEADLINES "IRAQ: LA BOMBE GISCARD RESPONSABLE". INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF HANDBILL SAYS: QUOTE WHO HAS OFFERED THE ATOMIC BOMB TO IRAQ? THE FACTS:

NOV. 1958: FRANCE AND IRAQ SIGNED IN PARIS A CONTRACT FOR THE SUPPLY OF TA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS (SIC) WITH ENRICHED URANIUM.

SEPT. 1961: THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DELIVERS 12 KG. HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TO CONSTRUCT 3 TO 4 ATOMIC BOMBS (SIC)

OF THE HIROSHIMA TYPE.

NOV. 1961: IRAQ REFUSES IAEA INSPECTION (SIC).

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW:

THE POSSIBLE MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF THE REACTORS AND THEIR FUELS.

FRANCE HAS REFUSED TO HONOR ITS PROMISE (SIC)

TO FURNISH IRAQ A FUEL NOT MILITARILY USEABLE

AND HAS GIVEN IN TO BAGDAD PRESSURES WHICH

THREATENED TO RECONSIDER ITS ARMS CONTRACTS.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER WANTED TO

RELEASE THE CONTENTS OF THE CONTRACT.

THE PROJECT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED IN THE

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT GAVE IN TO THE IRAQI

DEMAND TO EXCLUDE ALL "PERSONS OF THE JEWISH

RACE AND OF THE RELIGION OF MOSES" FROM

PARTICIPATION IN THE PROJECT.

EVEN THE USSR AND CHINA HAVE REFUSED TO

FURNISH IRAQ WITH A NUCLEAR POWER STATION

USING ENRICHED URANIUM.

~~*****SECRET*****~~

15

DATE 02/06/81

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PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PSNI 049002

TOR: 037/11147Z

BTG: 031209Z FEB 81

~~*****SECRET*****~~

6

*****~~SECRET~~*****

15A

DATE 02/06/81

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PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE

DE RUFNPS #3369/02 0341211

R 031209Z FEB 81 ZFR-4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0263

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 03369

NODIS

GISCARD IS RESPONSIBLE:

HE OFFERS AN ATOMIC BOMB ON A SILVER PLATTER TO A COUNTRY RICH IN OIL WHICH HAS NO NEED FOR A NUCLEAR POWER STATION FOR CIVIL APPLICATIONS.

HE PROPOSES THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TO AN AGGRESSIVE, EXTREMIST AND EXPANSIONIST (WAR WITH IRAN) COUNTRY AND WHICH IS OPPOSED TO ANY PEACEFUL COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL.

HE ENCOURAGES NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN AN EXPLOSIVE REGION.

HE IS OPPOSED TO THE EFFORTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO CREATE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN THE NEAR EAST.

HE CONTRADICTS HIS DECLARATION OF JUNE 26, 1980, IN WHICH HE OPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NEAR EAST.

HE IS CONTENT WITH ORAL ASSURANCES AND WITH

THE SO-CALLED GUARANTEES OF THE IAEA.

IN THE FACE OF THIS UNRESPONSIBLE AND INCOHERENT POLICY:

THE RENOUVEAU JUIF CALLS ON THE NATION'S ELECTED OFFICIALS, SCIENTISTS AND FRENCH CITIZENS OF ALL SIDES TO ENERGETICALLY CONDEMN THIS DANGEROUS AND SUICIDAL PROJECT WHICH THREATENS NOT ONLY THE EXISTANCE OF THE JEWISH STATE AND PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST BUT ALL HUMANITY. END QUOTE.

HARTMAN

PSN: 049003

TOR: 037/11:48Z

BTG: 031209Z FEB 81

*****~~SECRET~~*****

312

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIWEUR

4645

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

HLRR 007-081-4645

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY CN NARA DATE 5/6/10

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUFNPS #3640 0351738

P 041738Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 03640

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: OTRA (VIVIEN, ROBERT-ANDRE)

SUBJECT: VISIT BY FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FINANCE,
ECONOMY AND PLANNING COMMITTEE; REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT
WITH THE PRESIDENT

REF: PARIS 2394

1. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN ASKED TO TRANSMIT TO WASHINGTON
TEXT OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM ROBERT-ANDRE
VIVIEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE FINANCE, ECONOMY AND PLANNING
COMMITTEE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ORIGINAL
LETTER BEING POUCHED EUR/WE; SUMMARY FOLLOWS.

2. VIVIEN CONFIRMS HE WILL LEAD A LEGISLATIVE MISSION
TO THE US DURING THE PERIOD FEB 18 TO MARCH 5 TO STUDY
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS. HE REQUESTS
AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN HIS, VIVIEN'S,
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF AN ASSOCIATION OF FRENCH
VETERANS WHO FOUGHT ALONG SIDE AMERICAN FORCES IN KOREA.
HE RECOUNTS HIS MILITARY HISTORY: THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
FOR WHICH HE WAS DECORATED WITH THE BRONZE STAR BY
GEN. CLARK; THE NORMANDY LANDING AND THE CAMPAIGN IN
SOUTHERN FRANCE. FOR 36 YEARS VIVIEN STATES HE HAS
WORKED FOR FRANCO-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP SINCE THAT IS HIS
ONLY MEANS TO PAY BACK HIS DEBT TO THE US. WOUNDED FIVE
TIMES DURING HIS MILITARY SERVICE, HE SAYS IT IS ONLY
THANKS TO AMERICAN BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS AND THE CARE OF
THE US ARMY MEDICAL CORPS THAT HE IS ALIVE TODAY. HE

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/25/81

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PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASKS, IN THE NAME OF HIS FRENCH WAR VETERAN COLLEAGUES, TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HOW THE REAGAN VICTORY HAS GIVEN BIRTH TO RENEWED HOPE FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF WORLD PEACE.

3. EMBASSY RECOMMENDATIONS: VIVIEN SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. UNDER MOST CRITERIA WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND A PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT AND WE HAVE TOLD VIVIEN THAT WHILE WE WOULD OF COURSE FORWARD HIS LETTER, GIVEN ALL THE DEMANDS ON THE PRESIDENT AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GRANT HIS REQUEST. HOWEVER, WE NOTE FOR THE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE CONSIDERATION THAT VIVIEN IS A STAUNCH FRIEND OF THE US AND PROUD OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE AMERICAN MILITARY IN WORLD WAR II AND KOREA. IF THE ADMINISTRATION IS LOOKING FOR A VISUAL WAY TO CONVEY A MESSAGE ON ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY TO THE FRENCH (VIA SOMEONE NOT A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN FRANCE), A PHOTO OPPORTUNITY FOR VIVIEN WITH THE PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT WOULD PROVIDE A MEANS TO THIS END.

HARTMAN

PSN: 040881

TOR: 036/01133Z

RTG: 041736Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

46646

NAN COL VP
EOBIAFRECON, NEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5975 0430022
O 120017Z FEB 81 ZPP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4015

~~SECRET~~ STATE 035975
NDDIS
E.O. 120651 RDSMS 2/11/01 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)

TAGS: PINS, LY, GR, US

SUBJECT: (S) LIBYAN MIO

REF: STATE 35651

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE APPROACH YOU MADE TO THE GOG,
DAS HOLMES AT 1350 FEB 11 TELEPHONED GREEKEMBASSY CHARGE
PARADOPOULOS AND REITERATED THRUST OF REFTEL.

3. PARADOPOULOS, WHO HAD NOT HEARD OF DEFECTION OF LIBYAN
PILOT, UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT OUR APPEAL TO THE GOG IMME-
DIATELY. HAID

PSNI 056513

TORI 043/04119Z

BTGI 120017Z FEB 81

DECLASSIFIED

~~*****SECRET*****~~

NLRRM07-081 #46646

BY CH NARA DATE 5/6/10

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL VP
EODIEUNE, EURN, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7958 0442046
O 131000Z FEB 81 ZFPA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7858

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 037050
KODIS
E.O. 12958: GDS 02/18/87 (HOLMES, H.A.)

TAGS: GCE
SUBJECT: GCE: DECISION ON GCE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS TELEPHONED GISCARD TO CONVEY HIS DECISION IN FAVOR OF SUPPORTING THE FRENCH GCE PROPOSAL AT THE MADRID GCE MEETING. THE LETTER AT PARA 3 FOLLOWS UP ON THAT CALL AND SHOULD BE DELIVERED THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO SPEAK WITH YOU AND PERSONALLY CONVEY MY DECISION SUPPORTING YOUR INITIATIVE FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. AS I SAID THEN, YOU CAN COUNT ON OUR WHOLEHEARTED ASSISTANCE IN YOUR EFFORT TO HAVE THE GCE MANDATE ADOPTED AT THE MADRID MEETING.

WE ARE ALL KEENLY AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE PRESSURES AT MADRID TO DILUTE SOME OF THE KEY CRITERIA YOU HAVE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 007081 #46647
BY CN NARA DATE 5/6/10

44447

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

ESTABLISHED FOR CDE, ESPECIALLY THE REQUIREMENT THAT CBMS

BE APPLICABLE TO ALL OF THE EUROPEAN AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THESE PRESSURES WILL COME NOT ONLY FROM THE EAST, BUT ALSO FROM NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN INTERESTS REQUIRES THAT THESE PRESSURES BE RESISTED. I WAS DECISIVELY INFLUENCED IN MY CONSIDERATION OF THE CDE BY THE ASSURANCES YOUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GIVEN US THAT FRANCE WILL NOT COMPROMISE ON THE CRITERIA EMBODIED IN THE CDE MANDATE. CERTAINLY THIS IS THE RIGHT POLICY. BE ASSURED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL STAND WITH YOU IN REFUSING TO ATTEND ANY POST MADRID SECURITY MEETING UNLESS THESE CRITERIA ARE ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THE FLEXIBILITY AND GOOD WILL YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN IN OUR PAST DISCUSSIONS OF CDE, AND IN OUR COLLABORATION AT MADRID, AUGUR WELL FOR WESTERN SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

I ALSO WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE RECENT LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS FONDRET TO SECRETARY HAIG WHICH PROVIDED AN ELABORATION OF THE THINKING BEHIND YOUR RECENT PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE VIEW THAT WE MUST KEEP THE OBJECTIVE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF A SOVEREIGN AFGHANISTAN FREE OF EXTERNAL DOMINATION FOREMOST IN OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I SUGGEST THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS CONDUCT A FULL REVIEW OF THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION WHEN THEY MEET LATER THIS MONTH.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT. YY

HAIG

PSNI 000000

TONI 000/001102

BT01 131002Z FEB 81

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHOR COMMENT:

ROBIEUR:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4655 0451125
O 141125Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0796

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 04655

NODIS
E. O. 12065: GDS 2/14/87 (DE TARR, FRANCIS) OR-P
TAGS: CSCE
SUBJECT: CSCE: DECISION ON CDE
REF: STATE 37938

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE DELIVERED LETTER ON CDE AND AFGHANISTAN TO PATRICK LECLERCQ ON ELYSEE STAFF AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 14. LECLERCQ SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING IMMEDIATELY AFTER GISCARD'S TELEPHONE TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. GISCARD HAD WELCOMED US DECISION TO SUPPORT CDE AND WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TAKEN THE TROUBLE TO PHONE HIM TO CONVEY THE DECISION. LECLERCQ NOTED THAT THE ACTION WILL NOW TRANSFER TO MADRID. HE SAID FRENCH HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON A POST-MADRID SECURITY CONFERENCE BUT THAT, IN ANY CASE, THERE WILL NOW BE WESTERN SOLIDARITY ON THE ISSUE.

3. COMMENT: THE FACT OF A REAGAN-GISCARD TELEPHONE CALL, BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CALL, WAS A NEWS ITEM ON FRENCH EVENING TELEVISION FEB 13. END COMMENT.
HARTMAN

PSN: 0 2950

TOR: 045/15102Z

RTG: 141125Z FEB 81

46648

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081*96648
BY CA NARS DATE 5/6/10

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIWEUR

46649

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

DECLASSIFIED

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

NLRF: ~~1707-081~~ *46649

MESSAGE:

BY CU NARA DATE 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4683 0481345
O 171345Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0802

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8222
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 04683
DEPT FOR WEST AND BRUSSELS FOR EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 120651 GDS 2/17/87 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP, PEPR, FR, UR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF FRANCOIS-PONCET TO WASHINGTON

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING EAGLEBURGER'S CONVERSATIONS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY WITH ROBIN AND GERGORIN, THEY MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET WILL WISH TO DISCUSS IN SOME DETAIL LONG-TERM U.S. AND FRENCH VIEWS ABOUT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN COMPARING OUR VIEW OF THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE 1972 U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION AND THE FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION INCORPORATING THE NEW FRENCH VIEW OF STABILIZATION AND RESTRAINT. THEY CONSIDER THESE CONCEPTS TO BE RATHER CLOSE. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WERE AS LONG AS THE FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION INCLUDES THE ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY. GERGORIN, PARTICULARLY, POINTED OUT THAT THE FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN MOVING EUROPEAN LEADERS AWAY FROM THEIR PREVIOUS UNHELPFUL LINE OF DECLARING THAT "THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTE."
HARTMAN

PSN: 005625

TOR: 048/13152Z

RTG: 171345Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/25/81

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WHSR COMMENT:

RA. NAN COL VP
EOBIARA, WEUR

44450

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

NLRR MJ7-8T #44450

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR #5086 0501848
O 191844Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

BY CN

DATE 5/6/10

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0948

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5821
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 7867
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5025
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7430
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 6632
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0163
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9016
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 6858
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 7994
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0148
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2103
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5323
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7811
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7211
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 05086
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 02/19/11 (DE TARR, FRANCIS) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, ES
SUBJECT: (C) BRIEFINGS ON EL SALVADOR; TEAM COHEN VISIT

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: BRIEFINGS ON EL SALVADOR BY TEAM COHEN ARE CONVINCING GOP OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THAT LARGE-SCALE CUBAN/COMMUNIST BLOC ARMS SHIPMENT TO EL SALVADOR HAS TAKEN PLACE. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET TOLD AMERICAN REPORTERS THAT HE BELIEVED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY EAGLEBURGER AND COHEN VISITS ON THIS QUESTION. END SUMMARY.

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/25/61

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. TEAM COHEN HAS THREE MORE BRIEFINGS TO GIVE TODAY. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, ARE THAT FRENCH LISTENERS ARE BEING CONVINCED THAT LARGE-SCALE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO EL SALVADORIAN GUERRILLAS HAS INDEED TAKEN PLACE. IN A BACKGROUND MEETING WITH AMERICAN REPORTERS FEB. 18, WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER BRIEFING BY TEAM COHEN AT FOREIGN MINISTRY, FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE EAGLEBURGER AND COHEN VISITS ON THIS QUESTION, ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE AMERICAN REPORTERS AT THE BACKGROUNDER.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET TELEPHONED AMBASSADOR HARTMAN EVENING FEBRUARY 18 TO SAY THAT HE WAS UNHAPPY THAT THE STORY BY NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER RICHARD EDER (IHT, FEB 18) DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT FRANCE WAS RESPONDING COOLY TO OUR APPROACHES ON EL SALVADOR. THE FM SAID THAT IT WAS INCORRECT TO CHARACTERIZE THE FRENCH RESPONSE THUS.

5. WE THOUGHT THE COHEN BRIEFING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD GONE WELL, BUT HAD NOT GOTTEN TOO MUCH FEEDBACK FROM THE FRENCH SIDE AT THE BRIEFING ITSELF. THEY LISTENED AND ASKED QUESTIONS AND SAID THEY WOULD STUDY THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. HOWEVER AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR PHILIPPE CUVILLIER MUST HAVE GIVEN A POSITIVE REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. THERE WAS LITTLE TIME BETWEEN THE COHEN BRIEFING AND THE PRESS BACKGROUNDER.

6. WE DID GET POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR BRIEFED THIS MORNING (FEB 19) ON THE QUESTION OF COMMUNIST BLOC INTERFERENCE. HE CAUTIONED US HOWEVER THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO MAKE STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT. HE EXPLAINED THAT TO DO SO WOULD PROVOKE A REACTION ON THE FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE, WHEREAS SO FAR FORTUNATELY IT HAD NOT BEEN A BIG ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THE GOF REALIZED THAT THE SALVADOR QUESTION WAS SHAPING UP AS A TEST OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THAT THE GOF HOPED WE WOULD NOT LOSE THIS TEST. HE SAID WE COULD BE SURE THAT GOF WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE USG FROM MEASURES IT CONSIDERS NECESSARY IN EL SALVADOR.

7. SOCIALIST PARTY FIGURE MICHEL ROCARD SAID AT THE END OF A MEETING WITH TEAM COHEN THAT HE BELIEVED OUR CASE ON THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS. (THIS WAS A HARD ADMISSION FOR HIM TO MAKE, BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SANDANISTAS.) MEETING WITH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC DEPUTIES
EVOKED GOOD VIBRATIONS AND SENTIMENT OF SUPPORT. THEY
EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OF
THE WORLD SHOULD WORK HARDER TO COUNTER THE EFFECTIVE
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BEING WAGED BY THE SOCIALIST INTERNA-
TIONALS.

8. COMMENTS: A FULLER REPORT WILL BE SENT ON THE TEAM
COHEN VISIT WHEN MORE RETURNS ARE IN. AT THIS POINT WE
WE CAN SAY, THOUGH, THAT THE TEAM IS ACCOMPLISHING ITS
MISSION OF CONVINCING INFLUENTIAL FRENCH SECTORS THAT
MASSIVE CUBAN/COMMUNIST BLOC INTERVENTION HAS INDEED
TAKEN PLACE. TO MOVE FROM CONDEMNING THIS INTERFERENCE,
HOWEVER, TO JOINING A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN SUPPORTING THE GOES
WOULD BE A STEP THE GOP WOULD FIND MORE DIFFICULT TO MAKE.
HARTMAN

PSNI 008968

TORI 050/22150Z

RTGI 191844Z FEB 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 02/25/81

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PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VPEOB,ECON,EURE,EURW,EEUR,WEUR

446

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 07-081 #46651

BY Ad NARA DATE 5/16/10

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR #5485/01 0542102
O 232100Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1132
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3297
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2827
ALL OECD CAPITALS
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 05485
EO 12065: GDS 1/23/87 (MEISSNER, CHARLES F.) OR-T
TAGS: EFIN, FR, PL
SUBJECT: POLISH DEBT MEETING IN PARIS: FIRST DAY
SUMMARY: US, UK, FRG AND FRANCE MET UNDER THE CHAIR
OF FRENCH DIRECTOR OF THE TREASURY, JEAN YVES HABERER,
FOR A CLOSED MORNING SESSION TO REVIEW THE SCHEDULE
OF THE NEXT TWO DAYS, NEW INFORMATION AND COUNTRY
POSITIONS. HABERER THEN CHAIRED A CREDITOR CAUCUS
IN THE AFTERNOON WITH SOME 15 COUNTRIES. TWENTY-
SIX PAGE POLISH ECONOMIC DOCUMENT WAS DISTRIBUTED
WHICH HAS ONLY ONE CHART, THE EXTERNAL ACCOUNT CHART
DISTRIBUTED AT THE DECEMBER MEETING. THE REPORT
ITSELF IS DESCRIPTIVE AND VERY THIN ON
ECONOMICS. DISCUSSIONS IN MORNING AND AFTERNOON
CENTERED ON THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM,
CONDITIONALITY AND TERMS. DELEGATION HAD
DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS AND JAPANESE. FEB 24
MEETING WILL BE THE FIRST THAT THE POLES WILL ATTEND.
END SUMMARY.

1. ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, 1981 MEETING WITH
US, UK, FRG AND FRANCE TOOK PLACE IN THE FRENCH
TREASURY UNDER THE CHAIR OF TREASURY DIRECTOR JEAN
YVES HABERER. HABERER REVIEWED HIS DISCUSSION

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

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PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH THE POLES. HE SAID THEY ACCEPTED IDEA OF CONDITIONALITY, A WRITTEN PROPOSAL THAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED, AND THE MONITORING OF THE AGREEMENT EVERY SIX MONTHS. HE ALSO PROVIDED THEM WITH A NOTE VERBAL ON IMF PROCEDURES AND LEARNED THEY HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE YUGOSLAVS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE SAID THE POLES WERE INTERESTED IN THE IMF, PRIMARILY FOR THE NEW MONEY. THEY ARE EXPLORING WHAT MEMBERSHIP MIGHT MEAN VIS-A-VIS THEIR COMECON OBLIGATIONS AND WILL CONSULT WITH THE USSR.

2. DISCUSSION WENT ON TO COVER THE NECESSITY OF A GOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM, CONDITIONALITY AND POSSIBLE TERMS. ALL AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A SOUND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM IN POLAND. THE GENERAL FOCUS IN CONDITIONALITY WAS TO DEVELOP PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR LINE ITEMS IN POLISH EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS. US ALSO SUGGESTED EXTERNAL CREDIT LIMITS AND FRG A REVIEW OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS. THE POLES HAVE SUGGESTED A COMMISSION TO WORK WITH THEM AND MONITOR THEIR ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND PROVIDE STATISTICS. CONSENSUS WAS THAT WISEMEN WERE OK IF YOU COULD CONTROL THEM BUT COMMISSION MIGHT BE A BETTER IDEA. ON TERMS HABERER MENTIONED THE POLES WANTED A THREE-YEAR CONSOLIDATION PERIOD WITH MAXIMUM PERCENTAGES OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST TO BE RESCHEDULED. BOTH FRG AND FRENCH WANTED ONLY TO CONSIDER PRINCIPAL AT ABOUT 75 PERCENT, FOUR YEARS GRACE AND FOUR YEAR REPAYMENT. US SAID IT WAS NOT THE TIME TO DISCUSS TERMS. CONSENSUS IN THE GROUP WAS FOR AN 18-MONTH CONSOLIDATION PERIOD FOR THE DEBT RESCHEDULING JULY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1982. US OBJECTED, WANTING TWO CONSOLIDATION PERIODS; FIRST FOR SIX MONTHS AND SECOND FOR ONE YEAR COVERING THE SAME PERIOD. FRG RAISED ISSUE OF NEW MONEY SAYING IT WOULD BE NECESSARY AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RESCHEDULING. US DEL NOTED THAT WE WERE NOT CONSIDERING ANY ADDITIONAL FUNDS.

3. THE AFTERNOON SESSION COVERED APPROXIMATELY THE SAME ISSUES. HABERER STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT A PARIS CLUB AND WOULD OPERATE UNDER DIFFERENT PROCEDURES. HE PROVIDED BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO THE NEW PARTICIPANTS AND COVERED VERY SIMILAR INFORMATION FROM MORNING SESSIONS. THE POLISH PAPER

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE STABILIZATION OF THEIR ECONOMY WAS DISTRIBUTED AND DISCUSSED. MOST DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THE PAPER TO BE DESCRIPTIVE AND LACKING IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. THE ONLY CHART DEALT WITH POLISH EXTERNAL ACCOUNT. THIS CHART IS A DUPLICATE OF THAT PRESENTED BY POLAND AT THE DECEMBER MEETING. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE GROUP ON THE NECESSITY FOR A GOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND CONDITIONALITY. PERFORMANCE CRITERIA WERE NOT SELECTED BUT EMPHASIS WAS SIMILAR TO MORNING SESSIONS. MONITORING THROUGH A COMMISSION WAS ACCEPTED AND AN 18-MONTH CONSOLIDATION PERIOD, JULY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1982 WAS THOUGHT TO BE ADEQUATE. THE POLES ARE ASKING THREE YEARS. THE US HAS OBJECTED DESIRING A SIX-MONTH PERIOD FOLLOWED BY ONE YEAR. THE US EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW AN EARLY CHECK-POINT ON THE PRIVATE BANK AGREEMENT AND CEMA ASSISTANCE. ONLY THE CANADIAN FAVORED THIS POSITION. ALL DELEGATIONS ACCEPTED SIX-MONTH REVIEWS AND A CLAUSE TERMINATING THE AGREEMENT IF "UNFORESEEN EVENTS OCCUR." TERMS WERE DISCUSSED BUT IT WAS DECIDED

PSNI 014055

TORI 054/21124Z

HTG: 232100Z FEB 81

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DATE 02/25/81

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PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #5485/02 0542104

O 232100Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1133
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATEINFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3298
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2808
ALL OECD CAPITALS
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 05485
NOT TO MENTION THEM TO THE POLES. IT WAS NOTED
BY UK THAT POSSIBLY BOTH INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL
BE INCLUDED FOR REASONS OF BURDEN SHARING. THEY
AND THE PRG HAVE RELATIVELY FEW PRINCIPAL
PAYMENTS AND HEAVY INTEREST PAYMENTS OVER THE
NEXT 18 MONTHS.

4. CREDITORS WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 24,
AT 9:15 TO PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO THE CHAIR WHICH
WILL THEN BE ASKED OF THE POLISH DELEGATION. THESE
QUESTIONS WILL FOCUS ON THE POLISH PAPER. POLES
WILL JOIN THE MEETING AT 10:30 AM. CREDITORS
PLAN TO MEET WEDNESDAY MORNING TO SUM UP WORK.
THERE IS A CONSENSUS THAT ONE OR POSSIBLY TWO MORE
MEETINGS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PUT IN PLACE A
GENERAL FRAMEWORK. THE OUTLINE OF THE FRAMEWORK
IS AS FOLLOWS: AN ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
PROGRAM DEVELOPED BY THE POLES, PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
DEVELOPED BY POLES AND WESTERN CREDITORS, A MULTILATERAL
DEBT RESCHEDULING MINUTE WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND A COMMISSION TO MONIOR
ECONOMIC PROGRESS. THE UK HAS SUGGESTED THAT AN
IMP OBSERVER SERVE ON THE COMMISSION.

5. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CANADIANS AND
JAPANESE AMOUNTED TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON WHAT
WAS GOING TO HAPPEN OVER THE TWO AND ONE-HALF DAYS
AND WHAT NATIONAL POSITIONS WERE ON KEY ISSUES.

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

US DEL USED MATERIAL IN INSTRUCTION CABLE SENT
SATURDAY FEBRUARY 21 FROM WASHINGTON. CHAPMAN

PSN1 014083

TOR: 054/21125Z

DTG: 232100Z FEB 81

DATE 02/25/81

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PAGE 001

WHOR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIECON, EURE

46652

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR M07-091 #46652

BY AL NADA DATE 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6781/01 0561807
O 251803Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1244
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3302
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2816
ALL OECD CAPITALS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 05781

PASS USDA
EO 120651 GDS 2/25/87 (GORDON, EDGAR J.) OR-T
TAGS: EFIN, FR, PL
SUBJECT: POLISH DEBT MEETING IN PARIS: THIRD DAY

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY.

THE 15 CREDITOR NATIONS MET THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 25 TO DISCUSS BRIDGE FINANCING, THE CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE AND THE PRESS RELEASE. IN A LATER SESSION THE POLES JOINED THE GROUP AND GAVE THEIR REACTION TO THE MEETINGS AND PRESSED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PREVENT A POLISH DEFAULT. THE POLES AGREED TO PROVIDE THE CREDITOR ANY INFORMATION THEY REQUIRE ON THE POLISH ECONOMY AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. THE POLES PRIVATELY TOLD HABERER THAT THEY ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING JOINING THE IMF BUT CREDITOR PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. NEXT MEETING OF THE CREDITORS GROUP WILL BE APRIL 9-10.
END SUMMARY

3. BRIDGE FINANCING. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 15

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NATIONS GAVE A ROUND-ROBIN DESCRIPTION OF BRIDGE FINANCING EFFORTS. BELGIUM, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN AND THE US ANNOUNCED NEW CREDITS OR NEW BRIDGING FINANCE. FRANCE, ITALY AND THE UK EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND CURRENT BRIDGING EFFORTS INTO THE SECOND QUARTER. AFTER A POORLY VEILED THREAT BY THE POLISH CHIEF OF DELEGATION THAT POLAND WILL BE FORCED TO DECLARE A MORATORIUM UNLESS SHORT-TERM FINANCE IS AVAILABLE (SEE BELOW), THE REPRESENTATIVES OF DENMARK, NORWAY, SWITZERLAND, CANADA AND GERMANY PROMISED TO RECOMMEND TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS EITHER NEW EFFORTS OR THE EXTENSION UNTIL JULY OF FIRST QUARTER FINANCING. ALL GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY ON BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF BRIDGING PLEDGES.

4. TAXK FORCE. FOLLOWING UP ON THE GERMAN SUGGESTION YESTERDAY THAT A SMALL GROUP MEET WITH THE POLES TO CLARIFY STATISTICAL DATA AND POLISH STABILIZATION EFFORTS, HABERER SUGGESTED THE BIG FOUR CREDITOR COUNTRIES PLUS AUSTRIA. HE SAID THAT THE POLES HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF A SMALL GROUP IN PARIS AND WARSAW. THE US MADE A STRONG EFFORT TO GET ANOTHER NEUTRAL ON THE TASK FORCE (SWEDEN, FINLAND OR SWITZERLAND), BUT THERE WERE NO VOLUNTEERS. THE US DELEGATE STRESSED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WASHINGTON BEFORE ACCEPTING PLACE ON THE GROUP. MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WILL DRAW UP AGENDA AND SCHEDULE FOR TASK FORCE MEETINGS IN MARCH.

5. SCHEDULE. HABERER PUSHED HARD FOR A FINAL MEETING AT THE END OF MARCH TO WRAP UP DETAILS OF A RESCHEDULING. THE US, SUPPORTED BY THE UK, THE NETHERLANDS AND CANADA, STATED THAT THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT TO FINISH THE WORK IN A SINGLE MEETING AND WHETHER THE POLES ARE GOING TO COME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STABILIZATION PROGRAM REMAINS LESS THAN CLEAR. THE GERMAN DELEGATE STRESSED THAT WORK WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF APRIL IF BILATERALS WERE TO BE FINISHED BY THE BEGINNING OF JULY. THE GROUP AGREED TO MEET APRIL 9-10 TO RECEIVE A REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE AND TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION ON RESTRUCTURING. A FOLLOW-UP MEETING HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 27-28.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. PRESS RELEASE. THE POLES HAD BEEN PRIVATELY PUSHING HABERER FOR A PRESS RELEASE INDICATING AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR DEBT RELIEF. THE POLES DESPERATELY NEED A PRIVATE ROLL-OVER TO PREVENT A RAPID DEFAULT BECAUSE THE PRIVATE CREDITORS HAVE BEEN HOLDING BACK ON REFINANCING UNTIL THEY HAVE A CLEAR SIGNAL ON WHAT OFFICIAL CREDITORS PLAN TO DO. THE POLES APPARENTLY PROMISED SOME PROGRESS ON AN OFFICIAL RESCHEDULING BEFORE UPCOMING LONDON TALKS WITH THE BANKERS. THE US STRESSED THAT WE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE ANY COMMITMENT ON RESCHEDULING AT THE PRESENT TIME AND THAT WITH POLISH STABILIZATION EFFORTS STILL UNCLEAR, WE COULD NOT EVEN ACCEPT WORDING THAT WE "ENVISION" DEBT RELIEF IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1981. COMPROMISE WORDING THAT "SUFFICIENT PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THE MEETING TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING

PSN: 018774

TOR: 056/18141Z

DTG: 251803Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #0781/02 0561810

O 251803Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1245
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3303

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2817

ALL DEED CAPITALS

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 05781
TALKS" WAS ACCEPTED.

7. POLISH REACTION. CHIEF OF POLISH DELEGATION KARCZ CAME IN WITH A STRONG STATEMENT AT A SEPARATE LATER SESSION. KARCZ PROMISED CREDITORS CAN HAVE ACCESS TO ANY INFORMATION THEY FEEL THEY NEED FOR A DECISION. HE ALSO SAID THAT POLAND IS WILLING TO TAKE THE WEST'S "ADVICE." HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS POLAND RECEIVED IMMEDIATE BRIDGE FINANCING IT WOULD BE "FORCED TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE POLAND'S TRADE WITH THE WEST AND PERHAPS TRADE BETWEEN OTHER CEMA NATIONS AND THE WEST." CREDITORS, BEGINNING WITH THE GERMANS, PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THEIR BRIDGING EFFORTS. HE FINISHED BY THANKING THE CREDITORS FOR THEIR BRIDGING EFFORTS AND URGED THAT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO FIRM UP THE OFFERS.

8. THE TASK FORCE WILL MEET IN WARSAW MARCH 9, 10, 11 AND IN PARIS MARCH 25, 26, 27. IT WILL HAVE FINAL MEETING ON MARCH 7 AND 8 FOR FINAL DOCUMENTATION BEFORE PRESENTATION TO CREDITORS GROUP MARCH 9 AND 10.
CHAPMAN

P8N: 016775

TOR: 056/18147Z

RTG: 251803Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

ALLEN NANCE COLSON VP
ROBIECON, BURE, FEUR, WEUR

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

4665

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

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MESSAGE:

NLRRM 7-81-4665

BY CA NARA DATE 5/12/10

IMMEDIATE

DE RUPHFR #5920/01 0571754
O 201752Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1319

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3305
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2020
AMEMBASSY LONDON 7506
AMEMBASSY BONN 5878
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 7827
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 05920

LINDIS GREENBACK
PASS DAS BARRY

EO 12065: RDS-1 2/26/91 (GORDON, EDGAR J) OR-T

TAGS: EFIN, FR, PL

SUBJECT: POLISH DEBT MEETING - BILATERAL WITH
POLISH DELEGATION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. AFTER THE REGULAR MEETING ENDED ON FEBRUARY 25, MEISSNER, ACCOMPANIED BY ERB AND TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE MET WITOLD BIEN, VICE MINISTER OF FINANCE AT THE POLISH AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. BIEN, WHO HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETINGS, HAD WITH HIM KARZ, KROLAK, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BANK HANDLOVY AND OTHER ADVISERS. THE KEY POINT WAS THAT POLAND HAD A VERY SERIOUS AND IMMEDIATE SHORTAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. THE \$60 MILLION DOLLARS BRIDGE FINANCING PROPOSED BY THE US WAS INADEQUATE AND WE SHOULD RECONSIDER WHAT ELSE WE WOULD DO. MEISSNER POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO MORE BUT WOULD PASS ON THIS REQUEST

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS SOON AS HE RETURNED. THIS AND OTHER POINTS ARE SUMMARIZED BY TOPIC.
(END SUMMARY.)

3. BRIDGE FINANCING.

BIEN STRESSED THAT POLAND'S MOST IMMEDIATE EXTERNAL PROBLEM WAS HOW TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS UNTIL A MORE DEFINITIVE RESTRUCTURING OF THE DEBT TOOK PLACE LATER THIS YEAR. THE US OFFER OF \$88 MILLION WAS INADEQUATE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACT THAT POLAND WOULD REPAY OVER \$300 MILLION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1981. IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR A "HALF A BILLION DOLLAR" DRAWING ON A SOVIET CREDIT, AND THE FRENCH AND GERMAN'S REFINANCING THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MEET PAYMENTS AS THEY FELL DUE. HE ALSO FEARED THAT THIS US POSITION WOULD ADVERSELY EFFECT WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO DO. FOR BOTH REASONS HE URGED US TO RECONSIDER AND INCREASE OUR ASSISTANCE.

4. MEISSNER REPLIED THAT THE SUM WAS ALL WE COULD LEGALLY PROVIDE IN THE ABSENCE OF DEBT RESCHEDULING. HE POINTED THAT IT, IN COMBINATION WITH DRAWINGS ON THE EXISTING CCC CREDIT, WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE ABOUT \$300 MILLION BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE. BUT HE PROMISED TO RELAY THEIR REQUEST TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES AS SOON AS HE RETURNED.

5. \$88 MILLION - HOW DOES ONE GET IT?

THE POLES WERE CLEARLY CONFUSED ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF OUR PROPOSAL ON BRIDGE FINANCING AND WHAT THEY HAD TO DO TO BENEFIT FROM IT. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MOST EFFICIENT PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR THE BANK HANDLOVY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE US TO TELEPHONE MEISSNER WHO WOULD PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.

6. THE ORGANIZATION OF A RESCHEDULING.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS MEISSNER EXPLAINED THAT THE TERMS THAT COULD BE OFFERED FOR A RESCHEDULING WERE LIMITED BY PARIS CLUB PRACTICE. THE RANGES WERE: 60-90 PERCENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF DEBT SERVICE THAT COULD BE CONSOLIDATED, A MAXIMUM REPAYMENT PERIOD OF 10 YEARS, INCLUDING A MAXIMUM OF FOUR YEARS OF GRACE.

7. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS OUTLOOK.

MEISSNER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT POLAND'S EXTERNAL

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACCOUNTS COULD REALLY BE BALANCED IN THREE YEARS AND SUGGESTED THAT FIVE WAS MORE REALISTIC. KARZ REPLIED THAT THEY WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC BUT HAD ASKED FOR FIVE YEARS OF GRACE TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE. WHAT THEY NEEDED NOW WAS A GUARANTEE OF LONG TERM ASSISTANCE SO THEY COULD PLAN. MEISSNER POINTED OUT WE ALSO NEED GUARANTEES, I.E., A GOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM. THAT WAS WHY THE MEETINGS OF THE TASK FORCE WERE SO IMPORTANT. GIVEN OUR BUDGETING CYCLE WE COULD NOT MAKE A COMMITMENT VERY FAR INTO THE FUTURE.

6. PRIVATE BANK CREDITS.

THE INTER GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ALSO CONTAINED A CLAUSE CALLING FOR A COMPARABLE RESCHEDULING BY THE PRIVATE BANKS WHO USUALLY WAITED UNTIL AFTER GOVERNMENTS HAD INCLUDED. RESPONDING TO BIEN'S QUESTION, MEISSNER NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT INFLUENCE THE BANKS BUT WE WOULD BRIEF THEM ON THE PARIS MEETING AND WOULD TELL THEM THAT WE EXPECTED AN AGREEMENT BY MAY 1. THE POLES SAID THAT THEIR MAJOR US BANKS WERE THE BANK OF AMERICA, CITY BANK CHASE, MANUFACTURERS HANOVER, BANKERS TRUST, CHEMICAL AND IRVING TRUST.

PSNI 018215

TORI 057/18140Z

RTG: 261752Z FEB 81

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUFHFR #5920/02 0571756
 O 261752Z FEB 81
 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1320

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3306
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2821
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 7507
 AMEMBASSY BONN 5879
 AMEMBASSY VIENNA 7828
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 05920

9. NEW EXPORT CREDITS.
 IN A SOMEWHAT CONFUSED PRESENTATION, KROLAK SEEMED
 TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
 A) CCC CREDITS HAD SHORT (THREE YEARS) MATURITIES
 IN COMPARISON WITH EXPORT CREDITS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES,
 B) OUR INTEREST RATES WERE VERY HIGH, AND
 C) PERHAPS THE BEST WAY WE COULD HELP WAS BY A MORE
 GENEROUS "DEBT RESTRUCTURING". CHAPMAN

PSN: 018216

TOR: 057/18141Z

RTG: 261752Z FEB 81

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DATE 03/02/81

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WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOB:EEIR,WEUR

46654

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 007-091 #46654

BY CN NARA DATE 5/6/10

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #1076 0562267
O R 272219Z FEB 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000

AMEMBASSY BONN 0000

USMISSION USNATO 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 051076

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2/24/11 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE) EUR

TAGS:OVIP, PGOV

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRANCOIS PONCET

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY HELD EXTREMELY USEFUL CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET FEBRUARY 23 ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. BOTH SIDES AGREED FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS ON POLAND HAD BEEN VERY PRODUCTIVE. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE FRENCH WERE CAREFULLY CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO GO FORWARD WITH GISCARD'S VISIT TO POLAND; FRANCOIS-PONCET MAY GO INSTEAD. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT SOVIET EXPANSIONIST POLICIES. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WERE DISCUSSED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT STUDY AND ALLIED CONSULTATION WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE SECRETARY SAID ANY SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD BE WELL PREPARED AND SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED DETERMINATION

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO MEET THE CUBAN/SOVIET CHALLENGE IN EL SALVADOR, AND SAID WE COULD SUPPORT THE GISCARD CONFERENCE PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN. THE SECRETARY SAID THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTS THE TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO TNF, AND THAT WE ARE REVIEWING ALL ASPECTS OF SALT BUT COULD NOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO A TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER STEPS. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO REASSERT LINKAGE. FRANCOIS-PONCET AGREED THAT A GENERAL LINKAGE WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN WAS APPROPRIATE.

3. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE EUROPEANS WOULD KEEP UP THEIR GRAIN EMBARGO ON THE USSR AS LONG AS THE U.S. DOES, BUT WISHED TO KNOW IF THE U.S. IS GOING TO CHANGE THAT POLICY. THE SECRETARY AGREED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSIONS TO FIND ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF GROWING WEST EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET NATURAL GAS. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON TIGHTENING THE RULES FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIETS. FRANCOIS-PONCET EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR U.S. SUPPORT ON CNE. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS THE EUROPEANS WOULD NEED TO MOVE AHEAD ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE; THE SECRETARY URGED THAT NOTHING BE DONE TO COMPLICATE THE SITUATION AND SAID HE WOULD VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST SOON. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT WE WOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS UNTIL LATE SUMMER. FRANCOIS-PONCET URGED THAT THE PRESIDENT ATTEND THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT IN MEXICO CITY; THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER THIS THOUGH WE HAD SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS. END SUMMARY.

4. FOLLOWING A LENGTHY TETE-A-TETE SESSION THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FRANCOIS-PONCET WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ROBIN, DE LABOULAYE, UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL, AND AMBASSADORS HARTMAN AND EAGLEBURGER.

5. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS DEDICATED TO A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS; THE PEOPLE ELECTED A NEW PRESIDENT FOR THIS REASON. HE SAID THE USG HAS TALKED FIRMLY ABOUT SOVIET AND SOVIET PROXY INTERVENTION, MOST RECENTLY WITH EMPHASIS ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BUT THE USG FEELS EQUALLY STRONGLY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABOUT SOVIET INTERVENTION ACTIVITIES EVERYWHERE, PARTICULARLY AFRICA. OUR IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN EVENTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE SHOULD NOT SUGGEST LESSENING CONCERN ELSEWHERE. IN A DISCUSSION OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AMBASSADOR STOESEL SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TIME TO STUDY IT BUT THAT SOVIET CONDUCT IN VARIOUS AREAS WOULD AFFECT OUR JUDGMENT ON BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS SHOULD BE WELL PREPARED AND HAVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. WE WILL WANT TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES BEFORE REACTING. ON AFGHANISTAN THE SECRETARY SAID WE SUPPORT THE GISCARD CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. FRANCOIS-PONCET NOTED THAT EL SALVADOR HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL DURING THE TETE-A-TETE, AND THERE WAS NO GREAT PROBLEM BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE.

6. POLAND: THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE DISCUSSIONS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE QUAD GROUP AND WITH THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON. FRANCOIS-PONCET AGREED BUT NOTED THAT TAILORING MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO MEET SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G. AN INTERNAL POLISH CRACKDOWN WITH NO SOVIET INTERVENTION. THE U.S. PAPER ON VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES WAS A GOOD START BUT DISCUSSION AMONG THE FOUR ON WHAT SANCTIONS MIGHT BE APPLIED WAS REQUIRED. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT AT THIS STAGE THERE IS NO OTHER SOLUTION THAN TO PROVIDE AID TO THE POLES. FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND WILL ROLL OVER DEBT PAYMENTS BUT WILL AVOID LONG OR MEDIUM-TERM OBLIGATIONS IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAIN SITUATION. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT A PAPER IS UNDER PREPARATION WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR ABOUT 80 MILLION DOLLARS ROLL-OVER. OTHERWISE U.S. POLICY PARALLELED WHAT FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD DESCRIBED. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE POLES HAD BEEN PUSHING FOR A VISIT BY GISCARD BUT GISCARD PROBABLY WOULD NOT GO BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS TOO UNCERTAIN; PERHAPS FRANCOIS-PONCET WOULD GO IN PLACE OF GISCARD. THE SECRETARY SAID HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS THAT ANY VISIT NOT GIVE THE SOVIETS A BASIS TO CLAIM WESTERN INTERVENTION. (AT THIS POINT THE DISCUSSION WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE FULL DELEGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES.)

7. ARMS CONTROL: FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THE SECRETARY SAY PUBLICLY THAT THE SALT PROCESS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD CONTINUE. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE WERE REVIEWING SALT INTENSELY. WITH REGARD TO THE ABM TREATY, WE WERE REVIEWING SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES WITH REGARD TO THEIR COST EFFECTIVENESS. MORE GENERALLY, BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS LINKAGE AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE DEFENSES NEED TO BE RESOLVED; THEN WE CAN FOCUS ON THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF SALT II AND THE PERCEIVED IMBALANCE IN IT. THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD SEEK LOWER LEVELS OF WEAPONS THAN ARE PERMITTED IN SALT II. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO SEEK LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS OR TO TRY TO RENEGOTIATE THE TREATY. NO TIMETABLE HAS BEEN SET FOR FURTHER STEPS. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE LINKAGE WITH SOVIET CONDUCT GLOBALLY. FRANCOIS-PONCET AGREED THAT A GENERAL LINKAGE WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN WAS APPROPRIATE. ON THE ABM TREATY FRANCOIS-PONCET

SUGGESTED THAT IN ADDITION TO COST-EFFECTIVENESS THE USG SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBLE IMPRESSION IN EUROPE THAT THE U.S. WAS BEING BUILT INTO A SANCTUARY. THIS COULD BE DESTABILIZING IN THE LONG RUN EVEN IF IT SOLVES IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH THIS POINT AND NOTED OTHER ASPECTS WHICH NEED TO BE CONSIDERED SUCH AS THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.

8. TNF: THE SECRETARY SAID THE USG WISHES TO CONTINUE THE TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO TNF, THOUGH WE ARE NOT OVERJOYED BY IT. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT "REJOICE" IN THIS DECISION EITHER, SINCE IT BELIEVES ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH ISOLATE EUROPE ARE UNDESIRABLE.

9. BILATERAL POL/MIL ISSUES: FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE WISHED TO "JUST MENTION" THREE ISSUES RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TWO-WAY STREET: THE REFIT OF KC-135 AIRCRAFT WITH GE-SNECMA ENGINES, THE FRENCH DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISION-MAKING ON THE NATO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SINCE FRANCE PARTICIPATES IN FINANCING, AND THE ROLAND MISSILE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE ROLAND ISSUE; THERE IS INTEREST IN CONGRESS BUT THE USG IS PURSUING THE MATTER WITH GOOD WILL. ON THE KC-135 REFIT THE SECRETARY NOTED HIS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PERSONAL FEELING THAT PRIVATE COMPETITION SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN BUT RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO PURSUE THE TWO-WAY STREET. THE SECRETARY WAS ALSO AWARE OF THE NATO AIR DEFENSE ISSUE AND SAID HE THOUGHT WE COULD BE HELPFUL TO THE FRENCH ON THAT IN NATO.

10. GRAIN EMBARGO: THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPPOSED IN GENERAL TO GRAIN EMBARGOS BUT REALIZES WE CANNOT MOVE QUICKLY TO REMOVE THE PRESENT EMBARGO. OUR PRESENT BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON GRAIN SUPPLIES EXPIRES IN SEPTEMBER. IF SOMETHING SHOULD HAPPEN IN POLAND THERE WOULD BE NO PRESSURE TO RE-NEGOTIATE THE AGREEMENT AND IN ANY EVENT THE U.S. WILL DO NOTHING WITHOUT CONSULTING THE ALLIES, PROBABLY BEGINNING IN EARLY SPRING. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE EC HAS FOLLOWED U.S. POLICY ON THE GRAIN EMBARGO AND WILL NOT CHANGE AS LONG AS THE U.S. DOES NOT. THE EC VIEW IS THAT U.S. GRAIN EXPORTS SHOULD REMAIN AT 8 MILLION TONS. FRANCOIS-PONCET THOUGHT A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT ON GRAIN MAY NOT BE THE BEST APPROACH BECAUSE BREAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS MAY NOT BE A GOOD IDEA. IF THE U.S. IS GOING TO RENEGOTIATE ANOTHER LONG-TERM AGREEMENT THE EUROPEANS WILL WANT TO KNOW. THE SECRETARY REPLIED

THAT OUR FARMERS PREFER A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT BUT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE FRENCH VIEW AND WOULD KEEP THE FRENCH APPRISED OF OUR THINKING.

11. GAS PIPELINE: FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THIS WAS A REAL PROBLEM FOR EUROPE. NOTHING HAD BEEN CONCLUDED, BUT THE FRENCH GAS PEOPLE WANT TO OBTAIN 30% OF FRENCH GAS CONSUMPTION FROM THE PROJECTED SOVIET PIPELINE. FRANCOIS-PONCET NOTED IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE EUROPE WOULD IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED POST-POLAND MEASURES IF IT WERE THAT DEPENDENT ON SOVIET GAS. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT BECAUSE OF HIS OBJECTION THE PROJECT WAS TEMPORARILY STOPPED, BUT THE FRENCH GAS INDUSTRY IS PRESSING. IN FRANCOIS-PONCET'S VIEW THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF GAS WHICH THE FRENCH SHOULD TAKE WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE AMOUNT OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION WHICH COULD BE SWITCHED TO ANOTHER ENERGY SOURCE IN A CRISIS. THIS MIGHT BE UP TO 10-15 PERCENT, BUT CERTAINLY NOT 30. IF THE U.S. IS CONCERNED ABOUT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS ISSUE FRANCOIS-PONCET PROPOSED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ALTERNATE WAYS OF MEETING EUROPEAN ENERGY NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING ADDITIONAL NORWEGIAN SUPPLIES. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET'S CRITERIA SOUNDED GOOD, AND THOUGHT THE PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL TALKS WAS A GOOD SUGGESTION. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE WOULD SEND SOMEONE FROM THE MFA TO SUPERVISE THESE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE COULD NOT PROMISE NEW ENERGY SOURCES SINCE WE ALL HAVE THE SAME PROBLEMS BUT WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH, VERY QUICKLY ABOUT SETTING UP BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.

12. COCOM: AT FRANCOIS-PONCET'S SUGGESTION PAYE SAID THAT AFTER MARCH 3RD THE FRENCH WOULD BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. ON COCOM CRITERIA. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO MAKE THE CRITERIA STRICTER BUT WANTED THEM DEFINED IN A COHERENT WAY. HE PROPOSED U.S.-FRENCH TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON ONE PENDING ISSUE (THE THOMSON-CSF TELEPHONE SWITCHING EQUIPMENT CONTRACT), SINCE U.S. AND FRENCH EXPERTS DO NOT SEEM TO AGREE ON HOW SENSITIVE THE TECHNOLOGY IS. THE SECRETARY AGREED TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS AND IT WAS AGREED THAT UNDER SECRETARY RABISH WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH PAYE.

13. UN DISARMAMENT INSTITUTE: FRANCOIS-PONCET APPEALED FOR U.S. SUPPORT TO THE UN DISARMAMENT INSTITUTE IN GENEVA, URGING THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD IN ORDER NOT TO LEAVE IT OPEN TO THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC BUT SAID HE WOULD REVIEW THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTE. FRANCOIS-PONCET EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT ON THE CDE.

14. SOUTHERN AFRICA: FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT THOUGH FRANCE HAS PARTICIPATED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON NAMIBIA THE FRENCH ARE NOT PARTICULARLY COMMITTED AND HAVE ONLY MARGINAL INTERESTS. FRANCE REGARDS NAMIBIA, ALONG WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AS THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD. IN BALANCE FRANCE BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO PROCEED ON NAMIBIA. IN MANY WAYS THE AFRICANS SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD REJECTION OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE, BUT IF

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NAMIBIA IS NOT RESOLVED THIS MOVEMENT COULD BE STIFLED. THE SECRETARY SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO FOLLOW FORMULAS UNDER WHICH A MARXIST-LENINIST REGIME MIGHT BE INSTALLED UNDER UN AUSPICES; THAT WOULD BE FOOLISH. WE ARE REVIEWING THE MATTER BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO GIVE A FIRM U.S. POSITION. FRANCOIS-PONCET REITERATED THAT THE FRENCH DO NOT WANT A MARXIST NAMIBIA ANY MORE THAN THE U.S. DOES, BUT CONSIDER THE PRESENT COURSE ON NAMIBIA TO BE THE CORRECT ONE.

15. URANIUM SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA: FRANCOIS-PONCET EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF THE QUESTION OF ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIES FOR THE TWO FRENCH POWER STATIONS IN AFRICA. HE SAID FRANCE HAS NOT EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLYING THE FIRST AND POSSIBLY THE SECOND REFIT BUT DOES NOT WANT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE U.S. FRANCOIS-PONCET THOUGHT, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION MAY BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE A DETERMINATION ON THIS VERY SOON.

16. OTHER AFRICAN ISSUES: FRANCOIS-PONCET NOTED THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WILL THINK THEY NEED THE CUBANS AS LONG AS THERE IS A THREAT FROM SOMALIA. IN ANGOLA THE SITUATION IS SIMILAR RE SOUTH AFRICA. IF THE ANGOLANS AND ETHIOPIANS NO LONGER HAD AN EXCUSE FOR KEEPING THE CUBANS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD REJECT THEM. FRANCOIS-PONCET URGED SETTING AS AN OBJECTIVE THE REMOVAL OF THE CUBANS WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD HEARD REPORTS OF POSSIBLE RENEWED TROUBLE IN ZAIRE AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO THE FRENCH.

17. IRAN-IRAQ: THE SECRETARY SAID IT SEEMED THAT IRAQ HAD ACCOMPLISHED WHAT IT SET OUT TO DO, BUT THAT IRAN WAS INCAPABLE OF TAKING A DECISION TO RESOLVE THE MATTER. THE U.S. IS IMPARTIAL AND WILL SUPPLY NO ARMS TO EITHER SIDE. WE HAVE ASKED OTHER COUNTRIES NOT TO SUPPLY ARMS AS WELL. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID FRANCE HAD DECIDED TO SELL PLANES TO IRAQ BECAUSE IRAQ IS ONE OF THE KEY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, TO WITHHOLD ARMS WOULD HAVE PUSHED IRAQ BACK TOWARD THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIETS, AND BECAUSE THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS, PRESSED THE FRENCH TO SUPPLY ARMS TO IRAQ. FRANCE WILL CONTINUE SUPPLYING PLANES; ANOTHER TWO WOULD BE DELIVERED IN THE COMING WEEKS. THIS WILL LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES WITH IRAN, BUT THE GOF HAD TO CHOOSE AND FELT THAT NOT MUCH COULD BE EXPECTED FROM IRAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BY MAINTAINING TIES WITH IRAQ THE FRENCH THINK THEY CAN HELP TO BRING IRAQ TO ACCEPT A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR CONCERN WAS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INSTALL THEIR OWN REGIME IN IRAN. IRAQ IS MOVING AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS, BUT IF THE SITUATION DRAGS ON THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MISCHIEF.

18. MIDDLE EAST: THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO LAUNCH A HYPERACTIVE SERIES OF TALKS UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT FLEXIBILITY A NEW ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MAY HAVE. THE USG HAS THUS DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS BEFORE PUSHING FORWARD ON THE AUTONOMY DISCUSSIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD TAKE A TRIP TO THE AREA TO SOUND OUT THE PARTIES. HE ADDED HE WOULD TALK TO CARRINGTON AND URGE AVOIDING ANY INITIATIVES WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE THE PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN PASSING THAT THE PLO WAS INVOLVED IN TRAINING GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. HE FORESAW NO MOVES IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS UNTIL LATER THIS SUMMER BUT CONSIDERED SOME PROGRESS IMPORTANT FOR SADAT. FRANCOIS-PONCET REFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR A SET OF PRINCIPLES, AND SAID NOT MUCH CAN HAPPEN BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. AFTER THAT, HOWEVER, THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WILL GO FORWARD IN SOME WAY. SADAT THINKS IT CAN HELP HIM. FRANCOIS-PONCET ARGUED THAT THE ARAB WORLD SHOULD NOT BE FACED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR. EVEN IF IT IS IRRITATING WE MUST ACCEPT A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN VIEW. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID NO SETTLEMENT COULD BE FOUND WITHOUT INVOLVING THE PLO, WHICH WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ARAB STATES. FRANCOIS-PONCET STATED THAT AT SOME POINT THE PROBLEM OF ISRAELI SECURITY WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN A VERY FIRM WAY. AT THAT TIME FRANCE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE COMMITMENTS. ISRAELI SECURITY MUST BE GUARANTEED ABSOLUTELY AND THE PLO MUST

ACCEPT ISRAELI BORDERS. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUROPEAN INITIATIVE NOT COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. FRANCOIS-PONCET MENTIONED THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WHICH FRANCE FELT TOWARD LEBANON.

19. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES (RDF): IN RESPONSE TO FRANCOIS-PONCET'S QUESTION THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT HE WOULD EXPRESS PERSONAL OPINIONS ONLY SINCE THE ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED IN THE USG.

AS FOR THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS PREFERABLE TO COME INTO THE AREA ONLY WHEN THERE IS A CRISIS OR TO HAVE A PRESENCE THERE WHICH WE CAN BUILD ON, THE SECRETARY THOUGHT WE NEED A GREATER PRESENCE IN THE AREA PROVIDED WE DO NOT OFFEND THE ARAB STATES. THE SECRETARY SAID FRANCE HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION; HE PLANNED TO TELL THE BRITISH THAT THEY SHOULD DO MORE IN THE AREA.

20. NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT: FRANCOIS-PONCET URGED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN ATTEND THE SUMMIT IN MEXICO. GISCARD WOULD ATTEND, BUT THE FRONT OF REASONABLE STATES WOULD BE WEAKENED IF THE U.S. IS ABSENT. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE NO DOCUMENT OR NO PRECISE AGENDA, BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD ONLY POST-PONE FACING THE PROBLEM IF PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT ATTEND. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THERE WERE PROS AND CONS. ON THE CON SIDE WE DO NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF THE PRESIDENT ATTENDING A MEETING WITH CASTRO, ETC. PRESENT. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF RAISING HOPES WHICH MAY NOT BE FULFILLED. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD REVIEW THE ISSUE AND STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH.

21. INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE: THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE NOT HAPPY WITH THIS PROPOSAL AND HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISES ON IT. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THE WEST HAD TO BE CAREFUL HOW IT REACTS. FRANCE HAS NOT SAID NO, AND HAS EVEN PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

22. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID GISCARD IS COMMITTED TO NON-PROLIFERATION. SOME FRENCH SUPPLIERS HAVE SENT ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN BUT THIS HAS NOW BEEN STOPPED. THE

PAKISTANIS DERIVED THEIR REPROCESSING FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND FRENCH EXPERTS THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT BUT DIFFERENT SENSITIVITIES. THE FRENCH DO NOT BELIEVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CAN BE DENIED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BUT THERE MUST BE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MILITARY USES. NOT LIKING IRAQ IS NOT A VALID BASIS FOR OBJECTING TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAQ. FRANCE INTENDS TO TAKE A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE AND WILL NOT "MAKE SMALL MONEY" OUT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. AT THE SAME TIME THE FRENCH NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR OWN ENERGY NEEDS AND WILL DEVELOP THE FAST BREEDER. FRANCE WISHES TO BUILD A CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE BARRIERS WHICH WOULD PREVENT COUNTRIES FROM GOING BEYOND THIS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS FROM THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ON THIS. THE ADMINISTRATION REGARDS THE PROBLEM AS ONE OF GENERAL STABILITY. IF COUNTRIES DO NOT FEEL THREATENED THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE ATTITUDE ON IRAQ.

23. TERRORISM: THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF NOT CARING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WHAT HE HAD REALLY SAID WAS THAT TERRORISM IS THE WORST VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN TERRORISM IS DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOVIET SUPPORT. HUMAN RIGHTS HAS NOT BEEN HANDLED CORRECTLY. IT SHOULD BE HANDLED BY EACH BUREAU IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND SHOULD NOT BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A SPECIAL ENVOY. THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL PLACE ITS EMPHASIS ON TERRORISM AND ON EACH COUNTRY'S FEARS OF THREATS FROM ITS NEIGHBORS. AT PRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE IS BEING DRIVEN BY THE SITUATION IN OUR OWN HEMISPHERE WHICH IS MORE URGENT FOR US. THE SECRETARY SAID THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM BELIZE COULD LEAVE A PLUM FOR THE CUBANS. HE SAID HE WOULD ASK THE BRITISH TO LEAVE A FORCE THERE. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WOULD NOT RENEGE ON ITS COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DESPITE BUDGETARY CUTS.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO EXPAND THE U.S.-FRENCH NAVAL COORDINATION, AS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

24. FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS; FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE THOUGHT THAT ON MAJOR ITEMS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS THE FRENCH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS "HAVE THE SAME VIEW." BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE DISCUSSIONS. HAIG

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