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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 8/28/2007

File Folder

EUROPE-GENERAL (08/08/1984-01/31/1985)

FOIA

F05-062

Box Number	13	SNYDER
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages
41321 MEMO	RE EUROPEAN TRIP	2 8/1/1984 B1
	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE, RE PRESIDENT TRIP	2 12/12/1984 B1
41323 E-MAIL	FROM POINDEXTER, RE TRIP TO EUROPE	
41324 CABLE	080045Z JAN 85	6 1/8/1985 B1
41325 MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE	1 1/24/1985 B1
41327 MEMO	SAME AS 41325	1 1/24/1985 B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM AFFOURTIT, R

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WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

8 AUG 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Trip Report (U)

Attached for your information is a report by General Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, USAF, on his recent trip to Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Morocco.

Executive Secretary

Attachment





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41321 MEMO 2 8/1/1984 B1

GENERAL CABRIEL TO MCFARLANE, RE EUROPEAN TRIP

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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KIMMITT

FROM POINDEXTER DOCDATE 24 DEC 84

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FOREIGN TRAVEL

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MCFARLANE TRIP TO EUROPE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 30 DEC 84 STATUS S FILES SII

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COMMENTS TO NSC/S - Brian Merchant

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National Security Council— The White House

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John Poindexter

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Tom Shull

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Bud McFarlane

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NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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FROM ROBERT KIMMITT	456-2224	Gfl/WW
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Date 29 JAN 198

JNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL Pres Monge Ltr Subject: CONFIDENTIAL **DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:** TOP SECRET SECRET 80 1 UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION - Amb. McFarlane Mr. R. Lehman Mr. Pollock Ms. Dornan Mr. Teicher Adm. Poindexter Cmdr. Dur Mr. Levine Mr. Raymond _ Cmdr. Thompson -- Col. Lilac - Ms. Reger — Mr. Tyson Mr. Fontaine Mr. Robinson Sit. Room _ Ltc. Linhard ... Mr. Wettering Mr. Fortier Mr. Beal - Mr. Heim — Mr. Martin — Gen. Russell Exec. Secretary Ltc. Childress _ Mr. Matiock _ Col. Rye NSC Secretariat _ Mr. Kemp -- NSC Registry Mr. Kraemer Cpt. Shull Ltc. Cox Mr. Menges __ NSC Admin. Mr. McMinn . Mr. De Graffenreid Mr. Laux _ Mr. Sigur NSC MSG Center Ms. Dobriansky Mr. C. Lehman Ltc. North Mr. Sommer Time Received/Signed For By: **EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:** #CYS Date THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE ORIG Exec sec/Room 7241 THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State **CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION** C/o ACDA, 5933 State CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept. THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851 THE SECRETARY OF, ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119 DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W. THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street, DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon

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0372

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

2/1/85

NICK PLATT:

We would appreciate receiving the Secretary's clearance on the attached Presidential statement, which would be rised next week. Would appreciate by noon 2/2.

Bob Kinnitt

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41325 MEMO 1 1/24/1985 B1

PLATT TO MCFARLANE

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DRAFT STATEMENT

Forty years ago, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed the historic Yalta Agreement. Under this agreement, the signatories pledged to restore full independence and to allow free and democratic elections in all countries liberated from the Nazis after World War II. From the beginning the Soviet Union has failed to honor its own pledges at Yalta, but the passage of forty years has not diminished the commitment of the United States to the objectives of the Yalta Agreement, nor weakened its resolve to work toward the goal of a free and harmonious Europe.

It is therefore appropriate for the United States to reaffirm on this occasion its forty-year old pledge to the goal of a larger European community, composed of free nations exercising their right to self-determination and free to choose their own preferred social and political systems. The United States believes that such a larger European community, based on shared values derived from a common European civilization, would serve well the cause of peace and would be in keeping with the aspirations of all Europeans. Accordingly, it shall remain a major objective of American policy in Europe to work for the fulfillment of the pledges made at Yalta and thus also for greater East-West understanding and cooperation.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0372

February 2, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Commemoration of Yalta Anniversary

We have received the Department's memorandum of January 24, and agree that a public statement is necessary to mark the Yalta anniversary. (W)

As your memorandum notes, an Alliance-wide declaration would present many difficulties. Given the attention that this year's anniversaries are receiving, we believe a Presidential statement is appropriate and have discussed this informally with EUR.

A draft prepared by the NSC staff is attached. We expect the White House to release it on Monday, February 4. (%)

The NSC supports the Department's proposal to issue an updated review of Yalta by the Historian's office.

Executive Secretary

Attachment

Draft Presidential statement

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997 NARA, Date.

Presidential Statement on Yalta

Forty years ago today, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met at Yalta, to confer on the approaching end of World War II and on the outlines of the postwar world. The agreements they reached, including the Declaration on Liberated Europe, committed all three governments to the reconstruction of a democratic continent.

Since that time Yalta has had a double meaning. It recalls an episode of cooperation between the Soviet Union and free nations, in a great common cause. But it also recalls the reasons that this cooperation could not continue -- the Soviet promises that were not kept, the elections that were not held, the two halves of Europe that have remained apart.

Why is Yalta important today? Not because we in the West want to re-open old disputes over boundaries. Far from it. The reason Yalta remains important is that the freedom of Europe is unfinished business. Those who claim the issue is boundaries or territory are hoping that the real issues, democracy and independence, will somehow go away. They will not.

There is one boundary which Yalta symbolizes that can never be made legitimate, and that is the dividing line between freedom and repression. I do not hesitate to say that we wish to undo this boundary. In so doing, we seek no military advantage for ourselves or for the Western alliance. We do not deny any nation's legitimate interest in security. But protecting the security of one nation by robbing another of its national independence, and national traditions, is not legitimate. In the long run, it is not even secure.

Long after Yalta, this much remains clear: the most significant way of making all Europe more secure is to make it more free. Our forty-year pledge is to the goal of a restored community of free European nations. To this work we recommit ourselves today.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED w/SECRET Attachment

1 February 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT:

Presidential Statement on Yalta

Last month we asked State to comment on suggestions for observing the 40th anniversary of Yalta, including Zbig Brzezinski's idea of an alliance-wide declaration. The Department responded (Tab II) that this would be too hard to coordinate and proposed a statement to be issued by the Department spokesman.

State is probably right about Brzezinski's idea, but given the attention that the anniversaries are getting, we think a Presidential statement is appropriate. The meaning of Yalta has more to do with postwar history than with the celebration of the World War II victory. As such, it's an occasion to show the FRG that this year's observances won't be directed simply against them.

The Yalta dates are February 4-11. If the President reads the statement, any day is fine. If he does not read it, we should shoot for the 4th. (Another possibility would be to have the Vice President read the statement for the President.)

The draft statement is at Tab I. Speechwriters have cleared the text. A memo to the Department is at Tab III. EUR has had an informal look at the draft and endorses it.

Don Fortier, Jack Matlock, Walt Raymond, Peter Sommer and Paula Dobriansky concur.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached draft statement on Yalta.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

That you State. > That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign the attached memo to


Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Draft Presidential statement

Tab II Tab II Platt-McFarlane memo with State draft
Tab III Kimmitt-Platt memo

JNC ASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

January 17, 1985

LIMITED OPPICIAL USE

NEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT:

Commemoration of Yalta Anniversary

By separate memo we are asking the Department to take the lead in communicating inter-agency views on observance of this year's World War II (and related) anniversaries. Because of the early date of the Yalta anniversary, however, we will need to settle more quickly on the proper approach to this event and would like the Department's recommendations by January 22.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has aired a proposal for a joint statement by Western heads of government. Although time for coordinating such a statement is short, this suggestion should be considered along with others. We are working on inclusion of references to Yalta in appropriate Presidential remarks.

We would also appreciate information on how the anniversary is likely to be observed by the Congress, by private groups and others.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

cc: Col. Affourtit, DOD C. William LaSalle, USIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs



May 21, 1982

THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Summary

The imposition of martial law in Poland has precipitated the most recent crisis in Eastern Europe to evoke the legend and legacy of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met at Yalta in February 1945 and forged a complex set of agreements and understandings concerning the prosecution of the war and postwar arrangements in both Europe and East Asia. Some of the longstanding arrangements reached at Yalta still govern aspects of present-day European relationships. Policies and perceptions also continue to be influenced by tenaciously-held myths about the conference and its consequences. The controversy and misunderstanding that surrounded the Yalta Conference from the beginning have scarcely diminished over 37 years. The current Polish tragedy underlines one lasting historical ambiguity of Yalta. The Big Three established enduring borders in Eastern Europe which did not prevent the peoples living within them from coming under repressive, non-democratic regimes.

The Conference

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin and their principal military and diplomatic advisers met at the old Tsarist resort of Yalta from February 4 to 11, 1945. The conference was held in Yalta, despite Roosevelt's failing health, because Stalin declined to leave Russian soil during the winter battles in Europe.

The Issues

At the Yalta Conference the leaders formulated the strategy to bring the war against Germany to a victorious conclusion and decided on main aspects of the postwar settlement. Although the Big Three had met at Tehran in 1943 and had corresponded regularly, the United States had sought to postpone decisions on postwar issues, particularly territorial settlements, until the war's end. The U.S.S.R. had, however, asserted its war aims resolutely. At the Yalta Conference the Soviet territorial claims from as early as 1941 were merged with the mechanisms for postwar cooperation. Five main topics were discussed: Soviet entry into the Far East war and



Soviet eastern territorial claims; Soviet territorial and control expectations in Poland; the pattern of postwar government in Eastern Europe; the occupation, control, and extraction of economic reparations from Germany; and the structure of the new United Nations organization.

The Far East

In exchange for the Soviet Union's promise to enter the war against Japan, all Russian territory lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was to be regained, Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was to be recognized, and the Kurile Islands would be yielded by Japan to the U.S.S.R. For its part the Soviet Union agreed to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance with Nationalist China. The undertakings were between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and effectively excluded Great Britain from any significant role in the final defeat of Japan or the territorial settlement in the Far East. The "Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan" was secret as befitted the wartime situation. It was made public by the Department of State only in February 1946.

Germany

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin reaffirmed the principle of unconditional surrender for Germany, and concluded terms for postwar control (including zones of occupation), and the punishment of the Nazi leadership. The principle of reparations from Germany was agreed to, but a mechanism remained to be developed. Tentative agreement was also reached on dismembering Germany and assigning major segments of its territory (Prussia and Silesia) to the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

Poland

Poland was to be reestablished in accordance with three major principles:

1) Its prewar boundaries would be drastically changed with the loss of its eastern provinces to the U.S.S.R. which would be compensated for by the assignment of a comparable slice of eastern Germany. 2) The new Polish Government would be friendly and cooperative with the Soviet Union.

3) Finally, the new Polish Government was to be democratic; the three allies agreed to a mechanism to assure the organization of a democratic regime. The key stipulation of the Declaration on Poland specified that the existing pro-Soviet Government installed by the Red Army would be reorganized to include Polish leaders from within Poland and from the western-supported Polish Government in exile in London.

Eastern Europe

Roosevelt and Churchill tacitly accepted the existing boundaries and occupation regimes of the other Eastern European nations from which the Germans had been driven, thus conceding an upper hand to the occupying Russians. However, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, developed by the United States, pledged the three powers to joint action in enabling the liberated peoples to create democratic institutions of their own choice and to determine the form of government under which they would live. The powers would assist the Eastern European peoples "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements...pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." The implementation of the declaration was left to a Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Three which was to meet periodically.

The United Nations

Yalta resolved the outstanding issue on the organization of the United Nations. The veto principle in the Security Council was agreed upon together with an American voting formula under which the veto could not prevent the Council from at least considering an issue. An arrangement was arrived at to allow the U.S.S.R. two extra votes (White Russia and the Ukraine) in the General Assembly of the new United Nations.

France and Yalta

France was not represented at Yalta. General De Gaulle, the head of government, was outraged by the exclusion. Efforts were made at the conference by Roosevelt and Churchill to incorporate a revived France into the new European system. Stalin finally agreed that France was to have a role in the occupation and control of Germany and would join the Council of Foreign Ministers. A French occupation zone was eventually whittled out of the U.S. and British zones in western Germany. De Gaulle and France nevertheless never felt bound by the Yalta Agreements.

After Yalta

The Big Three were not able to reach a complete settlement of all postwar issues at Yalta. Western and Soviet diplomats met in the spring of 1945 to agree on a new Polish provisional government, and Presidential adviser Harry Hopkins haggled with Stalin on the makeup of a government agreeable to the Big Three. Heads of government met again at Potsdam in

late July 1945 to work out details of the occupation of Germany and the defeat of Japan. Truman succeeded Roosevelt, who died in April, and Attlee succeeded Churchill, whose party lost the election in July. The Polish frontier was also finally settled, and Stalin raised the new issues of the Dardanelles and the disposition of the Italian colonies. The Allied Foreign Ministers met frequently through 1945, 1946, and 1947 to work out the Italian and Eastern European peace settlements.

The Soviet Union gained essential hegemony over Eastern Europe by virtue of its military presence resulting from the war, rather than from agreements reached at Yalta. The establishment of democratic governments remained a Western objective and a source of acrimony with the Soviet Union until the matter was settled by full Communist takeovers between 1946 and 1948. France under De Gaulle accepted the U.S.-British offer of partnership in Europe and kept open its lines to the Soviet Union by virtue of a treaty in Moscow in 1945. The Communists in China surprised Stalin by carrying out a successful revolution that upset the basic premises of the Yalta Far Eastern settlement.

Fate of the Yalta Agreements

Important territorial agreements reached at Yalta have endured to this day. The frontiers in Eastern Europe agreed upon at Yalta were essentially confirmed in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties. The Japanese-Soviet ettlement was confirmed by the Japanese Peace Treaty concluded in 1951 in San Francisco. The effort by the U.S.S.R. in 1948 to force the Western Allies out of West Berlin and absorb that enclave into East Germany failed in the face of the Berlin airlift. The German territorial arrangements and all other Yalta boundaries were confirmed and their integrity pledged by the 1975 Helsinki Agreements.

The political settlements negotiated at Yalta proved far less lasting—all except those defining the United Nations organization which remain in force. The Soviet undertakings with Nationalist China failed by 1946, and the later alliance with the People's Republic of China also came undone by 1960. No formal, comprehensive German peace settlement was ever agreed upon by the Allies, and the four-power occupation was transformed, after the Berlin crises, into the German Democratic Republic and a Federal Republic of Germany which assumed authority for governing from the Western Allies in 1955. The Soviet Union assiduously pursued reparations from Germany in the early postwar years and also took important industrial equipment from Eastern Europe as alleged German war booty.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe could not prevent the obliteration in 1946 of Bulgarian democratic opposition or the suppression by the Communists of the Rumanian opposition the same year, the Hungarian anti-Soviet center in 1947, and the Czechoslovak democratic parties in 1948. A Soviet sponsored

takeover of power failed in Yugoslavia in 1948 and gave rise to nationalist communism. The elaborate Allied arrangements to provide Poland with a democratic government also quickly failed and a final Communist takeover occurred in 1947.

The efforts by the wartime Allies to coordinate postwar policies by meetings of a Council of Foreign Ministers carried through the negotiation of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 but did not survive the Berlin airlift crisis.

The Yalta Controversy

Franklin Roosevelt said that "the Conference in the Crimea was a turning point -- I hope in our history and therefore in the history of the world." The disillusionment over the Yalta Agreements began to grow soon after his death. The President's critics argued that the agreements appeased Stalin, betrayed the people of Eastern Europe, and opened the door to Soviet expansion in the Far East. To those who defend the diplomacy at Yalta, the United States and Roosevelt gave away nothing in Eastern Europe or Asia that the Communist forces would not have held or seized in any circumstance short of a new major American war against the U.S.S.R. Yalta reflected the great strength of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia and foreshadowed a new balance of power in the world.

Some of the secret portions of the Yalta Agreements were first made known by the U.S. Government in 1946. Questions about Yalta and the other wartime heads of government conferences became involved in partisan politics. Following the election of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles directed the publication of the full records of all these conferences, starting with Yalta. The full 1500-page printed record was released by the Department in 1955 as a volume of the official Foreign Relations series — after a premature release of the text to the New York Times. The Soviet Government published the carefully sanitized text of its own stenographic record of the Yalta meetings in 1965.

Yalta Viewed Today

The political controversy in the United States did not lead to a repudiation of the Yalta Agreements, but it did cause successive generations of policy makers to avoid citing those agreements as the fundamental basis for postwar settlements. The U.S.S.R. has for its part unwaveringly sought to justify its position on postwar issues on the basis of Yalta. The decline of British power came into dramatic view at the conference and was confirmed in subsequent years. In the small nations of Europe, numerous political, territorial, and economic problems are sweepingly attributed to Yalta.

At the heart of Europe, France still blames the conference from which it was excluded for Europe's postwar weakness. East and West Germans continue to accept its logic with stern discipline.



Center for Strategic & International Studies Georgetown University • Washington DC

January 8, 1985

Mr. Charles Z. Wick Director U. S. Information Agency Washington, D. C. 20547

Dear Charles:

I am writing to alert you that on February 5, 1985, will occur the 40th anniversary of the Yalta agreement -- and that is bound to generate a great deal of public comment here and in Europe. Moreover, most Europeans associate that anniversary with the division of Europe, which they increasingly resent. That resentment is the underlying cause of the growing attraction of the "eastern option" for some West Europeans, and it is also the root cause of the continued instability in Eastern Europe.

In light of the foregoing, the anniversary provides the West with a special opportunity to reaffirm its dedication to the larger good of the restoration of Europe as a broader community, bound by the same historical and cultural experience. Indeed, I believe that the anniversary should be marked by the issuance of a joint European-American statement, rededicating our countries to the objective of the peaceful undoing of that division, in keeping with the legitimate aspirations of all the European peoples.

Such a joint statement would also help to consolidate Atlantic ties, and would provide a worthy framework for the promotion of a stable East-West accommodation. The enclosed article is designed to help develop such an approach, and it contains some specific recommendations on pages 294-302. Please note especially the recommendation that the occasion also be used to reaffirm the West's commitment to the Helsinki Final Act, and thereby repudiate not the Yalta agreement as such, but its legacy -- the division of Europe.

I hope you will give this matter your serious attention, because much of the current drift in Atlantic relations, as well as the continued stalemate in the East-West relationship, is related to Yalta's historical legacy.

Sincerely,

Zbigniew Brzezinski

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 17, 1985

LIMITED OFFICIAL USB

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Commemoration of Yalta Anniversary

By separate memo we are asking the Department to take the lead in communicating inter-agency views on observance of this year's World War II (and related) anniversaries. Because of the early date of the Yalta anniversary, however, we will need to settle more quickly on the proper approach to this event and would like the Department's recommendations by January 22.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has aired a proposal for a joint statement by Western heads of government. Although time for coordinating such a statement is short, this suggestion should be considered along with others. We are working on inclusion of references to Yalta in appropriate Presidential remarks.

We would also appreciate information on how the anniversary is likely to be observed by the Congress, by private groups and others.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

cc: Col. Affourtit, DOD C. William LaSalle, USIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NO NO

January 15, 1985

IMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT:

Yalta Anniversary

The first of the World War II anniversaries -- that of Yalta -occurs early next month. Bud has received a letter from Zbig Brzezinski on the subject, and today Al Mazewski (head of the Polish-American Congress) called to ask how the President intends to mark the occasion.

As you know, we have proposed references to Yalta in the State of the Union address, which will fall within the anniversary (the Yalta conference lasted about a week). Within the staff we have also discussed a White House statement.

To get additional thinking and to assure coordination on the subject, a tasker to State is attached. It follows up on yesterday's broader tasker, which asked for an approach to the entire series of anniversaries. (NSC Log 0291)

Don, Portier, Peter Sommer, and Paula Dobriansky concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached Kimmitt-Platt memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove ____

Attachment

Tab I Kimmitt/Platt

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 17, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Commemoration of Yalta Anniversary

By separate memo we are asking the Department to take the lead in communicating inter-agency views on observance of this year's World War II (and related) anniversaries. Because of the early date of the Yalta anniversary, however, we will need to settle more quickly on the proper approach to this event and would like the Department's recommendations by January 22.

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We would also appreciate information on how the anniversary is likely to be observed by the Congress, by private groups and others.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

cc: Col. Affourtit, DOD C. William LaSalle, USIA

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM RAYMOND

DOCDATE 31 JAN 85

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

SUBJECT: YALTA STATEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

> FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

> > RAYMOND

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



January 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND, JR. W

SUBJECT:

Yalta Statement

On 30 January I saw Zbig Brzezinski privately to discuss his support for our Friends of Afghanistan Committee initiative. He has been very helpful in this area. He raised the question of the Yalta Agreement, expressing appreciation for your note on that subject. He asked me how things were going and I said I had seen a proposed draft statement from State which seemed to be close to the general direction that he had suggested. He asked how it would be publicized and I said that there was some thinking at State about having the statement issued by the Departmental Spokesman. He made a strong pitch to me to have the President personally read the statement with the TV/press in attendance against the backdrop of the map of Europe. He urged that the statement be made at the beginning of the Yalta time (5 February). He speculated that French President Mitterrand might try to get out front on this one but a Presidential statement on 5 February should preempt that.

Attachments (2)

nother to

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 25, 1985

(0222) Raymord

Dear Zbig:

Many thanks for sharing your interesting thoughts on the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Yalta Agreement. Your suggestion that the anniversary should be marked by the issuance of a joint U.S.-European statement is a good one and will be given careful consideration. We are currently reviewing our plans for commemorating Yalta and will let you know what we decide.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Røbert C. McFarlane

P.S.: I enjoyed reading your excellent article in Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DRAFT STATEMENT

Forty years ago, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed the historic Yalta Agreement. Under this agreement, the signatories pledged to restore full independence and to allow free and democratic elections in all countries liberated from the Nazis after World War II. From the beginning the Soviet Union has failed to honor its own pledges at Yalta, but the passage of forty years has not diminished the commitment of the United States to the objectives of the Yalta Agreement, nor weakened its resolve to work toward the goal of a free and harmonious Europe.

It is therefore appropriate for the United States to reaffirm on this occasion its forty-year old pledge to the goal of a larger European community, composed of free nations exercising their right to self-determination and free to choose their own preferred social and political systems. The United States believes that such a larger European community, based on shared values derived from a common European civilization, would serve well the cause of peace and would be in keeping with the aspirations of all Europeans. Accordingly, it shall remain a major objective of American policy in Europe to work for the fulfillment of the pledges made at Yalta and thus also for greater East-West understanding and cooperation.