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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MCMINN, DOUGLAS: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 2/25/2008

**File Folder** FRANCE-JAPAN (2)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 13

NOUZILLE

186

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
51190	CABLE	RE JAPAN'S TRADE PROBLEMS WITH US	6	3/15/1982	B1 B3
51179	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH SAKURAUCHI <i>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</i>	1	3/20/1982	B1
51181	TALKING POINTS	FOR PRESIDENT'S USE WITH SAKURAUCHI <i>R 6/7/2010 NLRRM07-081</i>	1	ND	B1
51180	MEMO	GREGG THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE SAKURAUCHI VISIT <i>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</i>	1	3/18/1982	B1
51182	MEMO	WALTER STOESSEL TO THE PRESIDENT RE VISIT OF SAKURAUCHI <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	2	3/17/1982	B1
51183	MEMO	GREGG TO CLARK RE SAKURAUCHI VISIT <i>PAR 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/20/1982	B1
51194	MEMO	GREGG THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE MEETING WITH SAKURAUCHI <i>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</i>	1	3/19/1982	B1
51184	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	1	3/17/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MCMINN, DOUGLAS: FILES

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NOUZILLE

186

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
51185	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE SOUTHEAST ASIA <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	1	3/16/1982	B1
51186	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE CHINA <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	1	3/18/1982	B1
51187	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	1	ND	B1
51188	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE STATUS OF POLISH SANCTIONS <i>R 4/20/2010 M2007-081</i>	1	3/18/1982	B1
51189	MEMO	GREGG TO CLARK RE SAKURAUCHI VISIT <i>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/24/1982	B1
51191	CABLE	RE JAPANESE PLANS FOR RESOLVING TRADE FRICTION WITH US AND EC	5	4/1/1982	B1 B3
51192	CABLE	REJAPAN-US TRADE FACILITATION COMMITTEE MEETING	3	4/2/1982	B1 B3
51193	CABLE	RE PM SUZUKI VIEWS ON WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION	5	4/7/1982	B1 B3

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

MCMINN, DOUGLAS: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 2/25/2008

*File Folder*

FRANCE-JAPAN (2)

*FOIA*

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

*Box Number*

13

186

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
51190	CABLE  RE JAPAN'S TRADE PROBLEMS WITH US	6	3/15/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

*File  
France  
summit  
Japan 7*

COUNTRY. ALSO DURING THIS TIME THE US ACTED AS AN INTERMEDIARY IN THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA, JAPAN AND CHINA FOR CONTROL OF KOREA. AFTER ACCEPTING THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN IN 1945, THE US ASSISTED ALL THE ASIAN NATIONS IN REBUILDING THEIR WAR TORN COUNTRIES. WHEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WAS ATTACKED BY NORTH KOREA ON JUNE 25, 1950, THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WAS IMMEDIATE. US FORCES ASSISTED ROK TROOPS IN HALTING THE NORTH KOREAN ADVANCE AT THE PUSAN PERIMETER AND GENERAL MACARTHUR'S BRILLIANT COUNTERSTROKE AT INCHON REVERSED THE TIDE OF WAR. AFTER THE WAR, THE US ASSISTED IN REBUILDING KOREA'S ECONOMY AND INSURING KOREA'S SECURITY.

FROM THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, THE BALANCE OF US TRADE HAS SHIFTED FROM EUROPE TO THE PACIFIC. FOR EXAMPLE, US TRADE WITH OUR ASIA PACIFIC NEIGHBORS NOW EXCEEDS \$120 BILLION A YEAR, AND THIS TRADE IS GROWING AT A FASTER RATE THAN OUR TRADE WITH WESTERN EUROPE. AS AN ILLUSTRATION, DURING THE LAST 10 YEARS, US TRADE WITH KOREA HAS GROWN BY OVER 600 PERCENT. TRADE WITH JAPAN HAS GROWN OVER 200 PERCENT AND NOW EXCEEDS OUR TRADE WITH WEST GERMANY. ASIA PACIFIC TRADE NOW ACCOUNTS FOR OVER ONE QUARTER OF ALL US TRADE, THE LARGEST SHARE AMONG ANY OF OUR WORLD REGIONAL TRADING PARTNERS.

PERSIAN GULF OIL, VALUED AT NEARLY \$200 BILLION A YEAR, CROSSES THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS TO REACH FREE WORLD INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES.

IN ADDITION TO OIL OF THE MIDDLE EAST, MANY CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS FROM ASIA AND FROM AFRICA ALSO TRAVEL THESE SAME VITAL SEA-LANES. FREE WORLD ECONOMIES DEPEND ON THIS TRADE AND ON FREE ACCESS TO THESE ESSENTIAL RAW MATERIALS.

US SECURITY INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE EAST-ASIAN WESTERN PACIFIC AREA ARE TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL STABILITY ON OUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Man*

901 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Your March 22 Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi

*File  
France  
Summit  
(Japan)*

Issue

What points should be stressed in the 20-minute meeting with Sakurauchi?

Facts

This will be the last top-level meeting between US and Japanese officials before the Versailles Summit. What is said to Sakurauchi will strongly influence what Japan does to prepare for that important meeting.

Discussion

The US-Japan trade imbalance has been the central topic of discussion during the recent visits of MITI Minister Abe and Special Envoy Esaki. Our dialogue on that topic has been strident at times. Sakurauchi's visit is the time to put the trade problem in a wider context, as one aspect of a broad US-Japan relationship, where the cooperative aspects far outweigh the competitive portions.

Preparations for the Versailles meetings are overshadowed by economic pessimism in Europe. If, before the Summit meeting, Japan developed a package of measures designed to open its market to all countries, it would be a major step forward, beneficial in terms of Japan's relations with many countries.

Sakurauchi should also be thanked for Japan's cooperation on a number of international issues, and urged to continue its expansion of its defense capabilities.

Recommendations

- |                                     |                          |  |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| <u>OK</u>                           | <u>No</u>                |  |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1. That you read State's 2-page memo on the visit (Tab A).                                 |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2. That you use the attached talking points during your meeting with the Foreign Minister. |

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO7-0811 #51179

BY fw NARA DATE 10/1/00

Attachments

Tab A State Memo dated 3/17/82

Prepared By:  
Donald Gregg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 18, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED TALKERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE

WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI ON MARCH 22, 1982

- Welcome to Mr. Sakurauchi in his first visit to Washington as Foreign Minister.
- Acknowledge that the trade problem has received much attention of late, but that the overall US-Japan relationship is far broader and in a basically healthy condition.
- Thank Japan for its strong support on a variety of international matters, including Iran, Afghanistan, the Olympic Boycott, sanctions against the USSR and expanded aid.
- Economic pessimism in Europe overshadows the preparations for Versailles. If, before Versailles, Japan could develop a package of measures opening its market to all countries, the chances of a successful Summit would be vastly enhanced.
- Japan's recent increase in its defense budget has been noted and appreciated. Extend personal thanks to Suzuki for what he has done, and ask that the upward trend be continued.
- Extend greetings to Mr. Suzuki whom you look forward to seeing at Versailles.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M67-081 #57181

BY CU NARA DATE 6/2/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10  
mw

0901 Add-on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 18, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
VIA: CHARLES TYSON *[initials]*  
FROM: DONALD GREGG *[initials]*  
SUBJECT: The Sakurauchi Visit

I have been in close touch with the State Department and a variety of Japanese officials on the Sakurauchi visit. Both sides are approaching the visit with similar objectives in mind.

- To put the abrasive trade issue in a broader context.
- To recognize the many cooperative aspects of the US-Japan relationship.
- To stress the need for constructive planning for the Versailles Summit.

The impression that Sakurauchi takes back with him will strongly influence Japan's preparations for Versailles. Trade and defense need to be stressed but in a basically positive and forward looking context.

Attached are a memorandum from you to the President (Tab I), State's very good 2-page memorandum (Tab A), and suggested talking points for the President to use with Sakurauchi.

RECOMMENDATION

OK    No

    That you forward this package of material to the President.

Henry Nau concurs.

Attachments

Tab I      Memorandum for Signature to the President with Talking Points  
A      State's Memorandum dated 3/17/82 & bio data on Sakurauchi

cc: Chuck Tyson  
Henry Nau

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 107-0811 #51180  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 18, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



901  
CONFIDENTIAL  
8207003

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting  
SUBJECT: Visit of Yoshio Sakurauchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 22, 1982

I. SETTING

This is Foreign Minister Sakurauchi's first visit to the United States since he assumed office last December. So far, he has demonstrated receptivity to and support for most of our positions. His visit assumes particular importance inasmuch as Prime Minister Suzuki does not plan to come to Washington in the near future. (He has, however, asked to meet with you at Versailles, and Sakurauchi is likely to mention that request.)

Sakurauchi fully expects us to follow up on the trade dialogue, although he is unlikely to be able to elaborate on Japan's next steps. Similarly, he will expect us to pursue our continuing exchange on defense. Yet, both he and his Prime Minister will want the visit to leave the impression of a broad pattern of common interests and common approaches to global issues, characteristic of what might be termed a "maturing partnership." Secretary Haig implied this larger perspective in a recent letter to Sakurauchi in which he asked that total Japanese contributions to foreign aid and defense over the next five years approach those of other Western allies relative to their respective economic strengths. It is very much in our interest to encourage such an effort in order to achieve greater Japanese participation in international undertakings supported by the industrial democracies.

II. ISSUES

1. International Cooperation

Japan has increasingly taken on an expanded international role. Our over-all record of cooperation in recent years has been excellent on Iran, on Afghanistan and Vietnam, on the Olympic boycott and Afghanistan sanctions against the USSR. Japan's expanded overseas aid especially in places of strategic interest like Egypt, Sudan and Turkey has been an important development, and the Japanese have been positive on the Caribbean Basin Initiative. We also appreciate Japan's efforts to support us in our responses to Soviet actions regarding Poland, and Japan's active participation in our endeavors to deal rationally with the granting of official Western credits to the Soviet Union is essential.

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS 3/15/88

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 007-081 5/5/82  
BY CAJ NARA DATE 4/20/00

2. Access to Japanese Markets

Our most pressing bilateral problem with Japan is trade. Japan has excellent markets here, and we welcome Japanese goods. Foreign Minister Sakurauchi, however, must understand that we do not feel that we have full and equal access to Japanese markets. To solve that problem, strong and sincere effort on both sides is necessary. It is true that in the early post-war period Japan could only afford vital imports, but today its industrialized trillion dollar economy can easily accept increases in imports of manufactures and farm products. As a great economic power, Japan has an obligation to open its markets and even to positively promote imports. Japan should liberalize import quotas and remove unnecessary regulations and product standards which keep our goods out. This will help alleviate protectionist pressures on Capitol Hill. Our businessmen should study the Japanese market and be more aggressive in taking advantage of it. We feel that we are competitive in petrochemicals, pulp and paper, cigarettes, and many other areas. We want the Foreign Minister to go home impressed with our concern about Japan's formal and informal trade barriers.

3. Japanese Defense Efforts

Japan agrees in principle that we must work out a more rational and appropriate division of labor to meet our common security concerns. The Japanese Government approved a 7.75 percent increase for its 1982 defense budget, even as social welfare and public works programs were cut back in keeping with its present austerity policy. We have expressed appreciation for Prime Minister Suzuki's leadership in overcoming entrenched opposition to achieve this increase. Nonetheless, both Secretary Haig and Weinberger have written to their Japanese counterparts urging that Japan move rapidly to assume primary responsibility over the next several years for its conventional defense and for support of US forces in Japan. We recognize that the Suzuki government is under criticism for its budget--a point Sakurauchi will undoubtedly stress. However, we have noted that the US and other allies face similar problems; it is vital that Japan accelerate its efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities if we are to cooperate effectively in coping with a growing Soviet threat.

PERSONAL HISTORY OF MR. YOSHIO SAKURAUCHI  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

May 8, 1912	Born in Tokyo
March, 1935	Graduated from Keio University
1947-48	Elected to the House of Representatives from Tokyo
1950-51	Elected to the House of Councillors
1952-Present	Elected to the House of Representatives from Shimane Prefecture
1954-55	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice
1958-59	Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
1961-63	Chairman, Education Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
1964	Minister of International Trade and Industry (Ikeda Cabinet)
1965-66	Minister of International Trade and Industry (Sato Cabinet)
1967-68	Chairman, Research Commission on the Tax System, Liberal Democratic Party
1968-70	Chairman, Research Commission on the Education System, Liberal Democratic Party
1971-72	Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
1972	Chairman, Policy Affairs Research Council, Liberal Democratic Party
1972-73	Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (Tanaka Cabinet)
1976	Chairman, Policy Affairs Research Council, Liberal Democratic Party
1977-78	Minister of Construction and concurrently, Director-General, National Land Agency (Fukuda Cabinet)
1979-Nov. '81	Secretary-General, Liberal Democratic Party

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20 March 1982

INFORMATION

TO: William Clark

FROM: Don Gregg *DG*

SUBJECT: The Sakaurauchi Visit--Final Thoughts

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M07-081 #51183

BY GN NARA 4/23/10

The basic problem facing us in this visit is one of having too little TIME to cover a number of important issues.

Japanese are aware of this problem, and that they are urging Sakaurauchi to move quickly to make his points in the short time allotted.

I think the President should be alert to this, and in his opening remarks cover the three key issues of the meeting

- the fact that Japan is acting supportively and helpfully on a number of global issues
- the need for Japan to open its markets more fully to all of its trading partners, and to send powerful signals to this effect before Versailles
- recognition of Japan's progress in expanding its defense role, and the need to do more.

*These are consistent with talking points attached.*

State has also urged that the President refer to the fact that our Civil Air negotiations with Japan have broken off, just short of agreement, and that a final effort should be made to reach a settlement. This would be good to mention at the end of the meeting.

I understand that you will be briefing the President on this meeting on Monday at 9:30. I would be happy to participate, if that might be helpful.

ONE FINAL THOUGHT: I fully agree with Chuck Tyson's memo of yesterday, suggesting that, if possible, the President mention that he is looking forward to meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki at Versailles. This would be a positive signal to send, from a meeting which may be focused on a number of other contentious issues.

*The main point here is that once President starts speaking he should cover all the points without stopping. Otherwise it will be a repeat of earlier Japanese meeting when they did all the talking.*

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 19, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

SIGNED

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi  
Monday, March 22, 11:00 a.m.

State has forwarded a suggested list of participants for the President's meeting with Sakurauchi, and suggests that a briefing of the President be held prior to his meeting, which time does not now permit.

COMMENTS

State's list of participants looks all right to me and is incorporated in the listing attached at Tab A. White House invitees should include the Vice President, and Meese, Baker, and Deaver, at their discretion. I also suggest Secretary Weinberger.

The impression Sakurauchi carries back with him will determine in large part what the Japanese do prior to the Versailles Summit in terms of opening their market to foreign goods. There are indications that the Japanese have strongly resented some of the things that were said during the Esaki visit by American officials. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the President's message is clearly established, clearly delivered, and strongly supported by what other officials say to Sakurauchi.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Mike Deaver making several recommendations about the briefing of the President and the meeting with Sakurauchi, and forwarding a Scenario and Meeting Participants.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Deaver at Tab I.

Approve                     Disapprove                     

## Attachments

Tab I - Memo to Deaver

A - Scenario /Meeting Participants

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M07-0811 #51194  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

URGENT

MEMORANDUM

0901 add-on

16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi  
Monday, March 22, 11:00 a.m.

Due to the President's tight schedule, I understand that any pre-briefing of the President for the visit of Sakurauchi should be included in the 15-minute national security briefing at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, March 22. The message to be given to Sakurauchi is an important one and needs to be established and coordinated.

I concur with State's recommended list of participants as modified as far as State and the Japanese are concerned. The Vice President should be invited, and it is understood that you, Ed Meese, and Jim Baker may attend, at your/their discretion. Because of the large number of recommended participants, it is recommended that the meeting be moved from the Oval Office to the Cabinet Room.

It is also recommended that in order to maximize the time for discussion, that there be no formal photo opportunity. The Japanese can bring an official photographer, and pictures can be released after the meeting.

Attached at Tab A is recommended scenario and meeting participants.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the recommended Scenario.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A - Scenario/Meeting Participants

SCENARIO -- Visit of Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi of Japan  
Monday, March 22, 1982

---

- 9:30 a.m. - Briefing of the President  
(use portion of National Security Briefing Time  
for short briefing of the President)
- 10:55 a.m. - Arrival of Foreign Minister Sakurauchi  
●Northwest Gate
- 11:00 a.m. - Meeting with the President  
●Cabinet Room
- 11:15 a.m. - Conclude Meeting and Departure

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS: White House Photo

Participants

- U.S. - The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary Haig  
William P. Clark  
William Clark, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission,  
Embassy Tokyo  
Donald Gregg, NSC  
  
At their discretion, Ed Meese, Jim Baker, and  
Mike Deaver may attend.
- Japan - Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi  
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kensuke Yanagiya  
Ambassador Yoshio Okawara  
Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau,  
Shinichiro Asao  
Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau,  
Hiromu Fukada

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi  
Monday, March 22, 11:00 a.m.

Due to the President's tight schedule, I understand that any pre-briefing of the President for the visit of Sakurauchi should be included in the 15-minute national security briefing at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, March 22. The message to be given to Sakurauchi is an important one and needs to be established and coordinated.

I concur with State's recommended list of participants, *as modified* as far as State and the Japanese are concerned. The Vice President should be invited, and it is understood that you, Ed Meese, and Jim Baker may attend, at your/their discretion. ~~I recommend~~ *you* that Secretary Weinberger be invited to the meeting. Because of the large number of recommended participants, it is recommended that the meeting be moved from the Oval Office to the Cabinet Room.

It is also recommended that in order to maximize the time for discussion, that there be no formal photo opportunity. The Japanese can bring an official photographer, and pictures can be released after the meeting.

Attached at Tab A is recommended scenario and meeting participants.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the recommended Scenario.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A - Scenario/Meeting Participants



SCENARIO -- Visit of Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi of Japan  
Monday, March 22, 1982

---

- 9:30 a.m. - Briefing of the President  
(use portion of National Security Briefing Time  
for short briefing of the President)
- 10:55 a.m. - Arrival of Foreign Minister Sakurauchi  
°Northwest Gate
- 11:00 a.m. - Meeting with the President  
°Cabinet Room
- 11:15 a.m. - Conclude Meeting and Departure

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS: White House Photo

Participants

- U.S.
  - The President
  - The Vice President
  - Secretary Haig
  - ~~Secretary Weinberger~~
  - William P. Clark
  - ~~Deputy Secretary Stoessel~~
  - ~~John Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asian  
and Pacific Affairs~~
  - William Clark, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission,  
Embassy Tokyo
  - Donald Gregg, NSC

At their discretion, Ed Meese, Jim Baker, and  
Mike Deaver may attend.
  
- Japan
  - Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi
  - Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kensuke Yanagiya
  - Ambassador Yoshio Okawara
  - Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau,  
Shinichiro Asao
  - Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau,  
Hiromu Fukada

20  
MW

MEMORANDUM

901 add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

March 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

SUBJECT: Issue Papers for Visit of Japanese  
Foreign Minister Sakurauchi on  
Monday, March 22, 11:00 a.m.

On Thursday, March 18, your briefing memorandum for the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Sakurauchi was forwarded to you for signature. Attached was Deputy Secretary Stoessel's memorandum.

Last evening at 7:05 the attached issue papers arrived from State. No indication was received beforehand of their pending arrival.

I recommend that they be forwarded to Dick Darman to hold for the President's use if deemed necessary. However, given the fact that the meeting is scheduled for only 20 minutes, extensive substantive discussions do not seem likely. Don Gregg concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the issue papers at Tab I to Dick Darman.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ *[Signature]*

Attachment  
Tab I - Issue Papers

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS *smf 2/25/08*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

901  
addon  
21  
8207410

~~SECRET~~


March 19, 1982

201 19 7 05

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi

Attached are background papers for the President's  
use in connection with the visit of Japanese Foreign  
Minister Sakurauchi, March 20-24, 1982.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

*inf 3/25/82*

(Unclassified upon removal of attachments)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL

22

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Japanese and U.S. views toward the region are for the most part parallel. Japan is sensitive to our security concerns, believing that a strong U.S. is critical for the defense of the West. We agree on the need for rapid economic progress to avoid instability.

Japan concentrates the bulk of its resources closer to home in Asia. While maintaining a low political profile, Japan traditionally has devoted 10% of its total aid budget to Latin America, but last year allotted only 8% to the region. Japan participated in the March 10 multilateral donors' meeting on the Caribbean Basin Initiative in Paris.

In 1981, Japan provided \$10 million in assistance to Jamaica, but has not yet committed itself to matching that contribution this year, given Jamaica's slowness to propose new projects and absorb last year's contribution. Jamaica still needs significant external aid if Seaga is to succeed. We have earmarked for Jamaica at least \$50 million of the \$350 million CBI supplemental.

Japan may send a diplomat to follow El Salvador's election (but declined the GOES invitation to send official observers) and is considering resuming economic assistance. To offset potential domestic criticism of aid to Duarte, a small aid program to Nicaragua may also be initiated.

Japan is Cuba's second largest non-communist trading partner (after Canada). Japan has not acceded to our urging that they reduce purchases of Cuban sugar.

Trends in Nicaragua are negative. The Mexican peace proposal has merit, but Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran guerrillas must end for our relations to improve.

Neither side in El Salvador can win militarily in the near term. The electoral process still offers a useful, first step toward a peaceful, political solution. The March 28 election is on track despite increased guerrilla violence.

Notwithstanding charges of fraud in Guatemala's election, the Guatemalan Congress chose official party candidate General Guevara as the next president. We hope that we can work with the new government to help end the violence afflicting Guatemala and the Cuban-backed insurgency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 17, 1982

(GDS 3/17/88)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 0007-081 #51184  
BY CS NARA DATE 4/20/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER  
SOUTHEAST ASIA

Japan has maintained strong support for the ASEAN strategy on the Kampuchean issue in the United Nations and in sustaining pressures on Hanoi to negotiate a settlement on Kampuchea. Despite this strong support, some Japanese officials have doubts about the likelihood of long term success of the ASEAN strategy and believe that a more accommodating stance toward Vietnam might be more effective. Foreign Minister Sakurauchi has been personally involved in deliberations on Indochina as Chairman of the Japan-Vietnam Parliamentary Friendship Association, and he may have been sympathetic to Japanese token humanitarian aid to a hospital in Saigon which occurred just before he assumed the foreign ministerial position. Despite this assistance, the GOJ has insisted that the 14B yen aid promised Vietnam in 1976 will remain frozen until there is a solution to the Kampuchean problem.

Some Japanese have also questioned whether the recent U.S. POW/MIA mission to Hanoi represented a shift in U.S. policy toward Vietnam, despite our insistence that the visit was related only to the humanitarian POW/MIA issue and did not relate to any other issues.

Japan is the major provider of economic assistance to the ASEAN nations, their major trading partner, except for the Philippines, and has also provided funds generously for supporting refugee and relief programs for Indochinese.

Our discussions with Sakurauchi should stress our conviction that the ASEAN strategy of pressure on Vietnam to induce Hanoi to negotiate a settlement is the correct strategy, and that we intend to continue to provide steadfast support to ASEAN on Kampuchea. We believe that accommodation of Vietnam on its terms or provision of aid so long as Vietnamese troops occupy Kampuchea will only convince Hanoi that the consensus supporting ASEAN is unravelling and prolong the conflict by convincing Hanoi that time is on its side. We view the ASEAN dialogue in June as an opportunity to demonstrate that ASEAN, its friends and the international community continue to insist that Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea is unacceptable, and that only a solution which ends Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea can alter its isolation. Both the U.S. and Japan share concern over rising tension on the Thai-Kampuchean border.

March 16, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M67-081 \*51185

BY CU NARA DATE 4/20/10

SECRET

RDS-1/3-3/16/02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

CHINA

The Japanese are deeply concerned about the impact that a US-China falling out over Taiwan would have on the diplomatic and strategic balance in East Asia. They expressed their concern to us when, early in 1981, it appeared that we might be seeking a major adjustment in the delicately balanced normalization understanding over Taiwan. Now it is Beijing, not us, that seeks to change the status quo vis-a-vis the Taiwan issue. The Japanese have reflected their concern on this issue in recent discussions with the Chinese. However, given the gravity of the present situation, they may be willing to do more. It would certainly be in Japan's interest to make such an effort.

Among all our allies, we have kept Japan most closely informed concerning our impasse with the Chinese. Nevertheless, it would be well to alert Sakurachi that time is running out as we face the necessity of proceeding with the spare parts notification to avoid gaps in supply and impress on him that we have made a good faith effort to meet the Chinese at least half way. You might add that we are deeply disturbed by Chinese unresponsiveness and tendentious public and private comments questioning our good faith.

Japan's own relations with China are in good shape. Last December the two governments agreed on restructuring of Japan's economic assistance package to Beijing, thereby removing the only significant irritant in that relationship.

March 18, 1982

~~SECRET~~

(RDS 1,3; 3/18/82)

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NLRR M07-081 #51186

BY ON NARA DATE 4/20/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA RELATIONS

Despite the fact that a good deal of Japanese culture was transmitted through ancient Korea, the Japanese still tend to look down on Koreans and on their own sizeable (600,000), but politically divided, Korean community. They have little interest in the Korean language and culture and believe there is little to be learned from Korea. Matters are complicated on the Korean side by the ascent to leadership in Seoul of a generation raised during the virulently anti-Japanese Syngman Rhee years.

Although the security of Japan and Korea are closely interrelated, each views its problems from a different perspective. The South Koreans feel directly threatened by North Korean forces poised just north of the demilitarized zone. The Japanese sense no similar threat, but are concerned that a conflict on the Korean peninsula could in some way harm Japanese interests. Neither has been willing to become directly involved with the other in planning for regional defense contingencies and there has been little contact between Japanese and Korean military planners. U.S. bases in Japan are essential to the support of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

Japan is a major foreign influence in the South Korean economy, accounting for nearly 40% of its foreign trade and for some 56% of foreign capital investment. It is by far Korea's largest source of imports, but is a poor second to the U.S. as a market. The ROK views its trade problems with Japan in much the same way we do, and believes the economic relationship to be lopsided in favor of Japan.

In negotiations that began last year to develop an economic assistance package, the Koreans insisted that the Japanese explicitly acknowledge Korea's role in the defense of Japan, and set a target of \$6 billion over five years, plus \$4 billion in Japanese EXIM bank loans. The Japanese were not politically able to swallow the Korean line and found the amount of the Korean demand excessive, as it amounted to 60% of all Japanese aid slated for Asia. Following a sometimes unpleasant exchange of public remarks, both sides have settled down to serious negotiation and will probably reach agreement on a compromise aid package later in the spring.

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NLRR M07-081 #5187  
BY CN NARA DATE 4/20/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

CURRENT STATUS OF POLISH SANCTIONS

The U.S. sanctions were announced December 23 and 29. For Poland, they include suspension of credits, aviation, fishing rights, and rescheduling of the 1982 official debt. For the USSR, they include suspension of licensing action for high technology, other sensitive items, and an expanded list of oil and gas equipment, suspension of grain negotiations, and cuts in the Soviet purchasing commission in New York.

The Japanese will support measures taken by NATO or by the European community and have been kept informed of the progress of the Buckley mission. On February 23, the Japanese announced their own parallel measures. These include no new credit or debt rescheduling for Poland, restrictions on travel by Polish embassy personnel, and, for the Soviets, suspension of science and trade meetings, and review of trade representation. The Japanese will also maintain case-by-case review of credit for the USSR, a policy established after the invasion of Afghanistan.

The Japanese firm, Komatsu, is the principal alternate supplier of heavy equipment which the U.S. has stopped selling to the Soviets. Our sanctions suspend sales of Caterpillar pipelayers, for both future and past contracts, and have prevented Fiat-Allis from supplying bulldozer technology to the Soviets via Fiat, Italy. We have asked the Japanese not to replace us in these two areas. On pipelayers, Komatsu will refrain from future sales which may undermine the U.S. measures, and the Government will explore the possibilities of delay of deliveries under a contract signed last fall for 495 pipelayers. They say that it would be difficult to delay shipments because the equipment was contracted before martial law in Poland. As regards bulldozer technology, the Japanese indicated that Komatsu will not replace the U.S. firm.

Our measures also affect Japanese exploration for oil and gas in Eastern Siberia. In order to complete its final year of exploratory drilling, the Japanese firm needs some \$2 million of U.S. equipment. They claim that without this equipment they may be forced to forfeit an 8 year, \$170 million investment, and rights to develop oil and gas deposits. The Japanese may ask for an exception for this project. However, in most respects the impact in this case is similar to the impact of U.S. sanctions on the West Siberian pipeline.

March 18, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(RDS-1, 3/18/02)

NLRR MD7-081 #57188  
BY CLS NARA DATE 9/20/10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

Economic Issues

Trade: This year's projected \$20-25 billion trade deficit with Japan is partly explained by the freer access Japan's exports have in the U.S. market than our goods have in Japan. Competitive agricultural and manufactured exports are often hampered by high tariffs, quotas, government monopolies, customs procedures, product standards, complex distribution systems, and a business bias against imports. The Japanese say the imbalance is largely caused by high U.S. interest rates which have cheapened the yen and increased Japan's export competitiveness. They also believe U.S. firms fail to "try hard enough" to penetrate Japan's market. The deficit and a widespread perception that Japan does not play according to international trade rules have stimulated a number of Congressional proposals. There is no USG position on these yet. Senior officials, including the President, have urged Japan to take bold steps to open its market or face possible damage to its exports here as a result of restrictions. The Japanese response thus far, a faster implementation of previously negotiated tariff cuts and amelioration of some non tariff barriers, is helpful but too modest to rectify our market access problems. Japan is expected to unveil added measures before the Versailles summit.

Autos: Despite rebates, U.S. auto sales in early March were down 32% from 1981's depressed rate. Imports and sales of Japanese cars are also somewhat lower, partly as a result of the voluntary restraints Japan started last May. We understand Japan may soon announce continuation of its 1.68 million car export limitation for a second year. The USG opposes as protectionist the Ottinger bill which would impose strict local content requirements on vehicles sold in the U.S.

Aid: We want Japan to expand its aid, particularly in non-traditional areas such as the horn of Africa and the Caribbean. The Japanese are disappointed with our proposed contribution to the next replenishment of the Asian Development Bank and hope we will reconsider its size. They have strongly implied our position would affect their response to U.S. requests for added Japanese economic aid to strategically important countries.

Civil Aviation: The seventh round of U.S.-Japan civil aviation talks ended March 19 without agreement. We asked for more competition on trans-Pacific routes while the Japanese insisted on tight government controls on the industry. Secretary Haig sent a letter to Foreign Minister Sakurauchi just before the recent talks asking him to take a personal interest in the matter. We should now tell him of our disappointment at not reaching agreement and ask his further assistance.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 13, 1982

031 11 22 16

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

ST

Subject: Participants in Japanese Foreign Minister's White  
House Appointments

During his official visit to Washington, D. C., March 20-24, Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi will meet with the President and the Vice President. I have attached for your consideration a list of participants at the briefing of the President, March 22, 10:30-11:00 a.m., prior to his meeting with Foreign Minister Sakurauchi; a list of participants for the Foreign Minister's appointment with the President, March 22, 11:00-11:20 a.m.; and a list of participants for his meeting with the Vice President, March 23, 4:30-5:00 p.m.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer III", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

a/s

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

IN THE BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT  
PRIOR TO HIS MEETING WITH  
JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI  
MONDAY, MARCH 22

UNITED STATES

The President  
Secretary Haig  
Deputy Secretary Stoessel  
John Holdridge, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and  
Pacific Affairs  
William Clark Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Tokyo  
White House Participants  
Members of the President's Staff

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI  
MONDAY, MARCH 22

UNITED STATES

The President  
Secretary Haig  
Deputy Secretary Stoessel  
John Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific  
Affairs  
William Clark Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Tokyo  
White House Participants  
Members of the President's Staff

*Clark*  
*Gray*

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi  
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kensuke Yanagiya  
Ambassador Yoshio Okawara  
Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau,  
Shinichiro Asao  
Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Hiromu Fukada

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI  
TUESDAY, MARCH 23

UNITED STATES

The Vice President  
Deputy Secretary Stoessel  
John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and  
Pacific Affairs  
William Clark Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Tokyo  
White House Participants  
Members of the Vice President's Staff

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi  
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kensuke Yanagiya  
Ambassador Yoshio Okawara  
Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau,  
Shinichiro Asao  
Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Hiromu Fukada

81

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 901

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>OK</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____

Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*Bud,  
I don't believe these are  
necessary. CC, etc.*

78

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 901

**URGENT**

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

*That's a very large group. Recommend deleting Winters, Hessell, Holdridge.*

*AYFL*

National Security Council  
The White House

*orig. hand. carried to  
President*

Package # 901

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[checkmark]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

*For President's meeting on  
Monday at 1100.*

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 901

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____
Other	_____		

COMMENTS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

901 Add-on

*Nau*  
35

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 24, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *PR*

SUBJECT: The Sakurauchi Visit

*File  
France  
Summit  
(Japan)*

The Sakurauchi visit went very well. I sat in on four meetings-- those with the President, the Vice President and Frank Carlucci, and was invited to Secretary Haig's lunch on Tuesday. The messages given to Sakurauchi were consistent and well orchestrated. The Vice President, whose meeting came last, asked the Foreign Minister to sum up his impressions, and it was clear from what came in response that the Japanese have gotten the essential points.

- That we appreciate what they are doing on global issues.
- That there is a need, before Versailles, to open up their markets on a multilateral basis.
- That the defense spending pattern is improving and needs to continue.

State is also pleased with the visit, and I think that all the work that went into preparing for it was effort well spent.

cc: *✓* Henry Nau

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07081-51189

BY CU NARA DATE 4/23/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 24, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
51191	CABLE	5	4/1/1982	B1
	RE JAPANESE PLANS FOR RESOLVING TRADE FRICTION WITH US AND EC			B3

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### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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51192	CABLE  REJAPAN-US TRADE FACILITATION COMMITTEE MEETING	3	4/2/1982	B1 B3

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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51193	CABLE  RE PM SUZUKI VIEWS ON WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION	5	4/7/1982	B1 B3

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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