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Dobriansky (CSCE)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4191

INFORMATION

May 31, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*
SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE 20th Semiannual Report

The State Department has forwarded the 20th Semiannual Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period October 1, 1985 - April 1, 1986. Key highlights of the report include:

1. The Soviet/East European record of compliance with CSCE commitments continued to be seriously flawed.
2. Soviet persecution of dissidents, refuseniks and religious activists continued unabated, as did suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families. Andrei Sakharov remained in isolation, still confined to Gorky; Anatoliy Shcharansky was released, but several dozen other Helsinki monitors remain imprisoned; also, Soviet abuses of psychiatry for political purposes persisted.
3. Despite Helsinki Final Act commitments to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained low. During this period, only 554 Jews were granted exit visas. Travel outside the USSR also continued to be restricted, with only 688 Soviet citizens permitted to make private visits to the US.
4. Some positive developments in Eastern Europe's implementation of the Final Act included: Bulgaria's commitment to resolve 8 of 12 family reunification cases; Romania's release of 3 "activist" Baptist pastors; and Hungary's modified passport and exit permission guidelines which promote freer travel regardless of one's political orientation.
5. However, this period continued to be plagued by strict governmental control in each East European country. The number of political prisoners and fundamental human rights violations totalled more than 240 in Poland; Hungarian officials refused to permit the International Helsinki Federation to hold a seminar in a hotel during the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum; an upsurge in reports of persecution of religious activists, particularly Catholics, occurred in Czechoslovakia; and the Bulgarian government continued to force the assimilation of its ethnic Turkish minority.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

cc Vice President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4191


May 30, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Twentieth Semiannual Report by the President
to the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki
Final Act: October 1, 1985 - April 1, 1986
(SS8616223)

The text submitted by the Department of State for review under memorandum of May 27, 1986, has been reviewed and approved for transmission over your signature to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John M. Poindexter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

John M. Poindexter

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 28, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁷¹⁾

SUBJECT: CSCE: 20th Semiannual Report

SIGNED

I have reviewed and concur in the text submitted by the Department of State under memorandum of May 27, 1986 (Tab III), of the 20th Semiannual Report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission. As required by Public Law 94-304, attached at Tab II is a memorandum to Secretary Shultz authorizing the transmission of the Report to the Commission on behalf of the President. Your authorization is needed by noon on Saturday, May 31.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab III to the President.

Jack Matlock, ^{NIA} Ty Cobb, ^{PS} Peter Sommer, ^{How} Don Mahley and ^{SK} Sven Kraemer concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you forward the summary memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve 2/5-30 Disapprove _____

2. That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab II to Secretary of State Shultz.

Approve 6/5-30 Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary Memo to Pres
Tab II Memo to SecState
Tab III CSCE 20th Semiannual Rpt (Oct 1, 1985 - Apr 1, 1986)

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for Saturday
Monday
PO's took*



May 27, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM. JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Twentieth Semiannual Report to the CSCE Commission

Public Law 94-304 requires the President to submit a report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission semiannually. The attached draft report, which covers the period October 1, 1985 to April 1, 1986, is due to the Commission on June 3. The report provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document: human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges. It concentrates on compliance with the Final Act and the Concluding Document, focusing particularly on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Department recommends that the Secretary of State be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President in accordance with the existing practice for this report.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Nicholas Platt".

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

TWENTIETH SEMIANNUAL REPORT

IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT

OCTOBER 1, 1985 - APRIL 1, 1986

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that follow-up meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid Follow-up Meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid Concluding Document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference, which will begin on November 4, 1986, in Vienna. The United States is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 20th semiannual report submitted by the President to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the period October 1, 1985 through April 1, 1986. The purpose of the report is to assist the Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords and the Madrid Concluding Document. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance of the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE undertakings remained seriously flawed, although limited encouragement could be taken from a few positive developments. In Romania there has been less apparent harassment of the activities of "unauthorized" religious denominations; an increased number of seminarians for some of the allowed religions; and a slightly less confrontational stance by the government on construction and renovation of churches. Recently the government permitted the rapid emigration of 3 of Romania's best-known "activist" Baptist pastors, though their departure itself is a commentary on the state of religious freedom there. In Poland, the authorities implemented a limited release of political prisoners in November and December that resulted in the freeing of 218 prisoners and detainees, most of whom were first-time political offenders. The Hungarian Government lifted the one outstanding police surveillance order imposed against a political dissident. In addition, passports and exit permission became available for most Hungarians regardless of their political orientation. The current rate of emigration allowed by the G.D.R. is twice the 1980-83 norm, although the numbers are still well below those during the "emigration wave" of 1984. The emigration rate seems to have increased again since the beginning of 1986, though it is too early to tell whether this upswing will continue throughout the year. In Czechoslovakia, criminal charges, stemming from organization of informal youth groups, were dropped against Jan Keller, a former minister of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church, though he remains barred from returning to his clergyman's practice. During this period, on March 24, the Bulgarian Government promised to permit reunification in 8 of 12 cases on the latest representation list and stated that some of the 4 remaining cases might also be resolved. The government also pledged that it would resolve favorably 2 of 6 visitation cases on the Embassy representation list and hoped for prompt favorable resolution of several more. These relative bright spots must be viewed, however, in the context of strict governmental control and limitations on political and religious expression as well as violations of basic human rights in many of these states.

And there were continuing negative developments. In Romania during this period the government promulgated new rules extending restrictions on contacts by Romanians with foreigners, and increasing the penalties for infraction. Though its past record on emigration has been the best in Eastern Europe, over the past year the rate of passport approvals for the United States has not maintained its earlier

high levels. In Poland, such well-known political prisoners as Bogdan Lis, Adam Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyuniuk, as well as several other leading Solidarity activists and advisers, remained among the more than 200 imprisoned at the turn of the year. By mid-March, the number of political prisoners had reportedly passed the 240 mark. The Government of Hungary refused to allow the International Helsinki Federation to hold a seminar in a hotel during the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum (the seminar took place in private homes). In addition, 2 political gatherings held in February and March of 1986 were broken up by policemen wielding nightsticks and mace-like spray. Throughout the reporting period, the G.D.R. has continued a policy of dissuading its citizens from contacts with Western embassies, using techniques which include persuasion, threat of arrest and prosecution (inter alia, under a law requiring state permission to visit foreign missions), and inspecting identification cards of people exiting our Embassy. In Czechoslovakia, there has been an upsurge in reports of persecution of religious activists, especially Catholics. In addition, the authorities have continued to use numerous measures -- including threats, interrogations, short-term arrests, job dismissals, denial of passports and educational opportunities -- to stifle political, religious or cultural activities that have not been organized by the Communist Party or affiliated institutions. The Government of Bulgaria has continued to force the assimilation of its ethnic Turkish minority. There are credible reports about arrests and detention of ethnic Turks at the Belene Island prison camp and other facilities. Signs in public establishments forbidding the speaking of Turkish have been seen by travelers, and the Turkish language is also forbidden in schools.

Once again, the continued unsatisfactory Soviet implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid commitments during the 6 month review period gave cause for concern. In the international arena, continued Soviet prosecution of the war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. The Soviet Union also has undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves freely continued at an unabated rate during the 6 months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists alike were subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. Assertion of religious and cultural identity brought arrests to Jews, Ukrainians, Pentecostal Christians, Baptists, and others. An independent peace group was subjected to harassment, arrests, confinement to psychiatric hospitals and expulsions.

Andrey Sakharov remained in isolation, still confined to the closed city of Gor'kiy, although authorities permitted Yelena Bonner, his wife, to travel to the West for medical treatment on the condition that she not speak with reporters abroad. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy was released to the West after nearly 9 years in prison, but several dozen other Helsinki monitors remained in prison or internal exile. One of them, Yuriy Orlov, remained isolated in a remote village in the region of Yakutia. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, formerly active in monitoring abuses of psychiatric institutions, was reportedly given 2 more years in prison for resisting force-feeding to break his hunger strike.

Political prisoners often endured strict or solitary confinement and were often denied letters, packages or visits from their families. Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continued unabated as did inhumane conditions in labor camps and beatings.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained low. 554 Jews left the Soviet Union from October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986; 283 ethnic Germans left during the same period. A number of cases of divided spouses and families were resolved in conjunction with the November Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, but many more such cases remained unresolved.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, with only 788 Soviet citizens allowed to make private visits to the United States during the period October 1, 1985 through March 28, 1986. One hundred twenty-nine Soviet citizens received exit permission for permanent residence in the United States during this 6-month period. All were either spouses or immediate relatives of American citizens or permanent residents.

The Soviet authorities maintained their traditional strict control of information media, essentially denying Soviet citizens access to filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the communist party. Jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty broadcasts in languages native to the Soviet Union continued.

The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting opened in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. The Conference is scheduled to adjourn on September 19, 1986. The Madrid mandate calls for CDE to negotiate measures which

are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe- including the European portion of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Robert L. Barry is head of the U.S. delegation.

The NATO Approach. During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) they introduced 2 weeks after the conference opened. This package is designed to foster greater transparency in European military activities and to increase the political cost for using military force for political intimidation. The NATO package fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence-building measures (CBMs) adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for the following CSBMs:

- o Mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;

- o Exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military activities;

- o Mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, notification is required 21 days in advance only for major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops);

- o Mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all activities requiring notification (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);

- o On-site inspection to verify compliance with these CSBMs; and

- o Improvement of the communications facilities among the 35 participating states.

The Eastern Response. The East has not formally withdrawn its long list of declaratory measures introduced in 1984. But in recent months, the only declaratory proposal it has chosen to pursue has been its proposed treaty on non-use of force. Moreover, during recent rounds Soviet efforts have focused on the confidence and security-building proposals introduced by the East in 1985 and early 1986. While adoption of Eastern proposals would not represent a substantial improvement over the confidence building measures in the Helsinki Final Act and in some cases would harm Western security interests, the East's move away from empty declaratory measures and toward confidence-building proposals represents a positive change in the Eastern posture toward CDE.

And in recent rounds the East has begun to consider more seriously the proposals introduced by the West as well as the neutral and non-aligned states. In Paris on October 3, Gorbachev stated that the Soviets were prepared to accept "mutual exchanges of annual plans of military activities subject to notification." While this was far short of accepting the Western approach to CDE, it did signal a more serious approach to the CSBMs proposed by the West and the NNA.

Rounds Seven, Eight, and Nine. The seventh round was already in session at the beginning of the reporting period; it concluded on October 18. Although there were few substantive achievements during the round, the participating states did agree on October 14 to move to a more informal working structure to prepare for drafting. This structure was based on the working groups created in 1985 and preserved the integrity of all of the Western proposals. And late in round eight, on December 13, the Conference agreed to the appointment of NNA coordinators to head these groups, setting the stage to begin drafting in round nine.

On November 15, 1985, the long-awaited detailed NNA proposal was tabled. Even though the NNA proposal features an unbalanced constraint measure which is unacceptable to the West and has inadequate verification features, it has served to keep the focus on concrete CSBMs and away from hortatory declaratory proposals.

Also in round eight, the Conference was given a boost by the Geneva Summit where the President and General Secretary Gorbachev declared:

"Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference. . . and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable (CSBMs) and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of nonuse of force."

Round nine was disappointing. It began with General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 statement on arms control. And although the statement offered to defer inclusion of independent naval activities to a later stage of CDE, the Soviets insisted that this deferral be "registered" in Stockholm. Because these activities are outside the Madrid mandate for CDE and only a review conference can change that mandate, the West has rejected this condition. The January 15 statement also insisted that independent air activities be included in the notification regime negotiated in Stockholm, even though the U.S. has made clear this is not acceptable.

And while round nine witnessed the beginning of drafting, that process was slow and halting. By the end of the round, only anodyne language, mostly drawn directly from the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document, had been provisionally agreed. As the round closed, it was clear that Soviet intransigence was limiting progress on drafting in Stockholm. The U.S. and its NATO allies were prepared to make substantial progress on the confidence and security-building measures at the heart of the Stockholm Conference, but the Soviets continued to hold back, in an apparent attempt to build pressures for the endgame.

With Stockholm scheduled to adjourn on September 19, at the end of the reporting period there were only a few months left to draft a concluding document before CDE had to report to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. While hope remained that compromises could be made and a substantive, verifiable concluding document could be crafted before CDE adjourned, there was little time left.

The Budapest Cultural Forum

Delegates from the 35 CSCE participating states met in Budapest on October 15 to November 25, as mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document, to "discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture." This was the first CSCE experts' meeting devoted to the cultural content of the Helsinki Final Act and the first to be held in a Warsaw Pact state. Delegations included prominent personalities in the field of culture.

The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., sought at Budapest to ensure attention to all three themes of the mandate, to focus attention on specific problems and on possible solutions, and to promote productive discussions among the cultural figures. The U.S. delegation, in close coordination with our friends and allies, engaged in an extensive, serious review of the Soviet and East European implementation records, raising such issues as: censorship, jamming, cultural repression, and the rights of national minorities and religious groups to preserve and develop their cultures. We reinforced our public stance in private bilateral meetings with the Soviet, Polish and Romanian delegations. The U.S. Delegation also took occasions to meet with and thereby show support for dissident cultural figures in Hungary. The U.S. Delegation also received representatives from a number of non-governmental organizations who travelled to Budapest in connection with the Forum.

Western delegates at the Forum chafed under formal CSCE procedures that regulated discussion through use of a set

speakers' list. Although the West pressed for more flexible procedures to promote free debate among the cultural figures, the East rigidly refused, except on two brief occasions. Nonetheless, cultural personalities from 35 countries met, conversed, exchanged ideas and opened new horizons for each other -- demonstrating the value of direct contact among people. They made many unofficial proposals for improving and expanding East-West cultural relations.

Due to Eastern intransigence, the participating States were unable to reach consensus on a concluding document. None was mandated, although the demand and efforts for a written result ran high among most delegations. The lack of consensus represents the reality of the gap between East and West on matters concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, pertaining in this instance to the conditions for unhindered cultural activity within and among states.

The United States received enthusiastic support from our NATO allies for proposals intended to strengthen observance of cultural rights and freedoms. Common Western cultural values and a joint determination that the Cultural Forum produce meaningful conclusions are reflected in the draft final document (BCF. 116) that the West tabled when negotiations with the East stalemated. This document identified Western goals for Budapest and the future.

The Eastern approach to the Cultural Forum involved procedural inflexibility, a preference for long speeches listing cultural accomplishments, emphasis on the "historic responsibility" of artists for peace, opposition to Western defense policy, and avoidance of the numerous aspects of the Forum's mandate where Eastern performance fell short. The Soviets and some of their allies sought to drive wedges in the Western position by referring to a European cultural unity, implicitly excluding North America. This theme found little support from Western or neutral delegations.

One event outside the Forum had an impact on those within. The U.S. delegation strongly protested publicly and privately, the Hungarian Government's decision to prevent the International Helsinki Federation from conducting a public, by-invitation-only cultural symposium at a Budapest hotel during the first week of the Forum. This decision violated Hungary's commitment as host to follow the precedent of the Madrid Meeting concerning treatment of non-governmental organizations. The Federation eventually conducted the symposium at a private location, without further interference or harassment from Hungarian authorities, and with Western media representatives in attendance.

Although the Forum could have accomplished much more, overall it was worthwhile and served Western interests in a

number of important ways:

-- The cultural figures from the 35 participating states built bridges among themselves that promote mutual understanding across borders;

-- Soviet and Eastern European delegations had no choice but to hear about their shortcomings in the cultural field from exceptionally articulate private citizens from the West, whose opinion carried irrefutable moral authority;

-- Western attention to the problems and cases of cultural repression and insistence on compliance with the provisions of the Final Act give sustenance to the victims of such repression and others in the East who want their governments to uphold Helsinki commitments; and

-- Although no consensus document was reached (because a good one was not possible), the West has an agreed text that can serve our common interests at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference.

The issues discussed in Budapest and the Western proposals advanced on cultural issues will be returned to when the Vienna CSCE followup meeting convenes in November 1986.

goods to an American firm -- reportedly \$10 million -- as a result.

However, U.S. officials have recently been successful in touring 4 of 6 production facilities they had requested. Still, foreign inspectors are being denied access for safety and quality control checks required by contract to commercial transport aircraft being produced under license in Romania. Safety inspectors for a foreign firm building a large nuclear reactor there have been denied access to local sub-assembly production facilities since December but, we understand, may be given limited access starting in April.

During the review period, one U.S. firm closed its Bucharest office. Consequently, 30 U.S. firms with separate offices are now represented in Romania. Authorities continue to take 6 to 8 months or longer to process Western firms' applications to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels in Bucharest is commonly offered to Western firms. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian government agency "Argus". Romanian employees of foreign businesses must be hired through "Argus." The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. The extremely high cost of telecommunications services is an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available for transient businessmen at rates comparable to world commercial centers. Resident businessmen are referred to the national tourist office to locate housing, but the search for adequate housing is difficult and time-consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable to those in Western Europe, though furnishing and fixtures are often inferior. Rental and utility charges have remained constant over the past few years. Visa restrictions are minimal and business travel is not impeded.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information.
Businessmen seeking Romanian commercial contacts find information readily available. Romania continues to distribute, in several languages, a range of information on doing business in the country. Romanian performance on publication of statistical data, however, is very poor, and is noteworthy for the omission of basic statistical information common to government reporting elsewhere. Organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12 to 14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable from year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. As a result of debt rescheduling negotiations, Romania continues to provide more financial information to foreign banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions than it

provided in the past.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. As a policy, the Romanian government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration. There is one U.S.-Romanian joint venture which operates in Romania. There has been no further legislation or progress in expanding cooperative projects in Romania. Romania remains interested in cooperation with American companies in Third country markets, particularly in the development of natural resources and large construction projects, although no such projects have come to our Embassy's attention.

Official Visits. The Bucharest International Fair (BIF) '85 took place October 19-27. Participants totalled 1,200 firms, including Romanian enterprises and representatives from 35 foreign countries. The U.S. Pavilion included 25 firms, of which 9 occupied 14 booths and 16 were catalog participants. In addition, 70 U.S. firms exhibited promotion material as part of the U.S. process control equipment catalog exhibition. The U.S. Pavilion was visited by President and Mrs. Ceausescu, as well as by over 380,000 Romanians. U.S. participation in BIF received wide coverage in the Romanian media. U.S. firms made outright cash sales of \$5.9 million and concluded contracts involving countertrade totalling \$92.7.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Romania employs a strict system of countertrade aimed at reducing its foreign debt. Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Romanian Enterprises routinely ask Western firms seeking to sell goods here to take payment in counter-purchases of Romanian-manufactured goods from the machine building and machine tools industry. In those few cases where U.S. firms buying Romanian goods have sought to pay through "barter" arrangements of their own products, Romanian organizations have refused, insisting on hard-currency payment.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which helps reduce the cost of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counter-purchases, which might otherwise force smaller firms out of the market.

POLAND

General Assessment. During the past 6 months there has been a significant increase in economic cooperation by Poland with Western partners -- both governmental and non-governmental. Economic mixed commission meetings between Poland and several Western governments have been re-established during this

period, and modest Western credit guarantees have been pledged by two of those governments. In addition, a Polish joint venture law recently received its first reading in the Polish SEJM, and Polish sources have predicted that it will be approved by mid-year.

However, as in past periods, difficult internal Polish economic conditions have continued to restrain Western commercial interest in Poland. Meanwhile, official debts owed by Poland to Western governments have been rescheduled for maturities due in 1981, 1982-1984 and 1985. An agreement to reschedule maturities due in 1986 was initialed recently. While these developments have led to the restoration of some short-term trade-related credit facilities, Poland's financial outlook is still sufficiently troubled to further limit Western business interest for at least the near term. There has been full cooperation in permitting travel of U.S. business, commercial, and agricultural representatives to Poland. U.S. business travel continues to increase.

Business Working Conditions. Access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials remains easy, with both private U.S. business representatives and U.S. government officials able to arrange meetings directly with their counterparts, without brokering by protocol or foreign relations departments of the Polish organization. Factory visits are more difficult to arrange, depending on the sensitivity of the installation.

One new American office opened in Poland during the reporting period. "American Travel Abroad", a tourist agency that will cater especially to the needs of Polish-Americans visiting Poland, was granted a 5-year license (instead of the usual 2) by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. No office closed. Polish policy toward these offices remains largely unchanged, except that a few companies with technical information offices (as opposed to Branch offices, which are required to pay a higher registration fee as well as 2.5% of invoiced sales to the GOP) report some government pressure to convert to full branch status.

U.S. owners continue to operate "Polonia" businesses with varying degrees of success, depending on their rates of income taxation. Over 700 such companies are currently in operation, of which about 70 are owned by U.S. citizens.

Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives remain readily available. Permanent housing is generally available but expensive. There are no restrictions on business travel within Poland, and business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The

Western business community has full access to organizational information, although the accounting methodology is different from that of the West and, as such, is sometimes of little use to the business visitor. The government publishes regular economic statistics, which include foreign trade and industrial production data, although recent monthly publications have deleted the nominal trade surplus/deficit amount. Most of the disaggregated data are not current and do not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. There were no changes in Poland's policies and attitudes concerning economic and commercial cooperation during the reporting period. Poland continues to seek foreign investment in underutilized or idle industrial capacity, and the reading (in the Polish Parliament) of a joint venture bill to attract such foreign investors indicates an additional emphasis on this goal. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as is joint production in and for third markets, in goods and especially in services. There have been no major cooperative arrangements involving U.S. firms during the reporting period, although U.S. firms continue to be active in Poland.

Official Visits. There were no official visits during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Poland neither encourages nor discourages countertrade, and no new legislation relating to countertrade was passed during the reporting period. The frequency and nature of countertrade requests vary, and generally are possible only in products of which Poland possesses an oversupply.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the "Polonia" law. The Polish government levies up to 85% income tax on earnings by these firms, thus making it difficult for many of them to operate profitably. Despite these obstacles, most Polonian firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill Polish government economic aims. (Firms which would compete directly with a Polish enterprise or exporting agency are usually denied permission to operate.) During the reporting period there has been no new legislation affecting these small and medium-sized enterprises' participation in trade and industrial opportunities.

Science and Technology Cooperation. The Polish government has not interfered with visits by U.S. scientists to Poland. Many Polish scientists have received permission for short and

long-term (6 months to one year) visits to the West. However, many others who have invitations for long-term visits are not being allowed to accept them, especially if they work in institutions from which significant numbers of scientists have chosen to remain abroad indefinitely after having received approval for such visits.

HUNGARY

General Assessment. Hungary borrowed heavily in short and medium term markets in 1985, bringing gross external debt to about \$13 billion at year end. All but about \$1.2 billion of this was in convertible currencies. While almost one-third of the annual \$3 billion borrowing was used to augment reserves to the point where they now cover Hungary's short term obligations twice over, another sizeable chunk had to cover the unexpected \$460 million hard currency current account deficit.

The Hungarian Government can expect some improvement in at least the trade element of its balance of payments picture as a relatively mild winter has reduced supplemental energy purchases below their 1984-85 peak. Nonetheless, the prospects for improved markets/prices for traditional agricultural and light industrial exports are not good. The delay in further restructuring of Hungary's productive base, the dominance of consumer goods in the 1985 hard currency import picture, the over centralization of investment expenditure in energy, and the lack of a coherent development focus in the new 5-Year Plan all point to rough sledding for Hungary.

A side effect of the economic down-turn could well be further popular distrust of the government and its policies. But as yet this is unlikely to translate into action stronger than louder grumbling. More worrisome is the fact that the Government of Hungary does not seem to have a clear plan for dealing with the causes of the dissatisfaction.

Business Working Conditions. Working conditions for Western businessmen remained satisfactory during the reporting period. Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travellers, as well as for convention and tourist purposes, are still expanding. The availability of medium-level, medium-priced hotel rooms has increased with the completion of several hotel projects.

Business access remains generally satisfactory. Access to end-users has improved. End-users are exercising new autonomy with recently-gained foreign trading rights, and are actively seeking Western business partners without governmental or foreign trading organization interference. The total number of Hungarian firms permitted such full foreign trading rights is approximately 250 and expected to increase, primarily in the agricultural sector.

In January of this year, Citibank joined Pan Am and Dow Chemical on the list of accredited U.S. business offices in Hungary. The National Bank of Minneapolis, formerly on the list, closed its Budapest Office because of commercial reasons. Opening of the Budapest World Trade Center as well as a small apartment complex housing Western business representatives has mollified marginal difficulties in identifying suitable housing and office space. Business reps, however, continue to be hampered by the need to work through a Hungarian Government "facilitative" office which remains highly bureaucratic and ineffective. Costs of operations remain high and delays continue to plague requests for telephone and telex services, both of which remain below Western standards.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Business and commercial information, while only sporadically available in forms such as Western-style annual reports, is disseminated fairly freely in newspapers, journals, and specialized economic publications. Enterprise and plant visits continue to provide detailed information, since Hungarian commercial representatives and managers have shown a disposition to discuss matters freely when specific questions are posed. Government economic indicators and other data are widely available and reasonably accurate.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The number of active cooperation agreements between U.S. and Hungarian firms remains about sixty. Western companies are encouraged to explore new ways of doing business beyond traditional buying and selling and one-time-only commission work. Industrial cooperation arrangements continue to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. The Hungarian government has increased its commitment to promote joint ventures by issuing an amended joint venture law in January 1986, which provides greater tax incentives and more flexible operating rules. The law reduced profit tax on joint ventures, and for the first time codified the prior practice of providing tax holidays for new joint companies. The number of joint ventures registered in Hungary doubled between 1983 and 1985 and now stands at 50. Given the new joint venture law, this number is expected to grow further, particularly in the industrial sectors designated for expansion.

Official Visits. Secretary of State George Shultz's December 1985 visit to Budapest was the high point of our bilateral relationship in the reporting period. The Secretary's successful visit included meetings with Party General Secretary Janos Kadar and other top Hungarian officials.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Hungarian enterprises continue to require substantial countertrade arrangements for almost all new business, although banking and

official government sources downplay strict countertrade arrangements as true business enhancers.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Official Hungarian policies toward small and medium-sized enterprises do not differ significantly from the general pattern of commerce described above. The preference of Hungarian enterprises, however, continues to be toward working with large multinationals which can provide opportunities for cooperation in production and marketing.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

General Assessment. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment have shown slight improvement over the past year though not specifically during the last 6 months.

Business Working Conditions. During the 1986 Leipzig Spring Fair, access to G.D.R. officials was about the same as the 1985 Spring Fair and better than in previous years. The G.D.R. continues to require prior approval for U.S.-G.D.R. business and social contacts. The requirement that foreign businesses deal through a limited number of G.D.R. service organizations is one factor which keeps access below the level desired by foreign business representatives.

Operating conditions for establishing business offices in East Berlin remain unchanged. Five U.S. companies have offices there; three are staffed by G.D.R. citizens, one by a West German national, and one by a Swiss national. Western firms wishing to establish an office in East Berlin are requested to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access controls, or in a building which is only for the use of the firm.

Visiting business representatives must normally stay in expensive hotel accommodations which require payment in convertible currencies. In cities without such hotels, accommodations are less expensive and payment may be made with G.D.R. marks. Subject to these conditions, however, travel is otherwise virtually unrestricted. No U.S. business representatives have complained to the Embassy about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are allowed to rent, but not buy, housing in the G.D.R. Available housing is usually expensive and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

Restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business

representatives have not caused problems, to our knowledge. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at border-crossing points. In addition, visas for day visits to Berlin (East) are obtainable at designated Berlin sector-sector crossing points with little delay. Western business representatives residing in, or maintaining offices in, the G.D.R. are often issued multiple-entry visas valid for one year. Non-resident business representatives generally receive one-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by a G.D.R. trading partner.

As is the case for virtually all visitors to the G.D.R., non-resident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately \$10 per day into G.D.R. marks during their visits to the GDR. Of this sum, any unspent G.D.R. marks cannot be converted back into Western currency upon departure, but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

G.D.R. customs regulations prohibit the importation of printed material with the word "German" in the text or in the address. This has continued to inhibit dissemination of marketing literature printed in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information The type, quality and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by the G.D.R. is unsatisfactory for Western business use. The main source of G.D.R. economic data is the annual statistical yearbook published by the G.D.R. State Central Administration for Statistics. The yearbook is not published on a timely basis; it appears about 10 months after year's end. The small portion of the report devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Thus the user normally knows only the total amount of trade between two countries, not how much the G.D.R. purchased or how much it sold. Furthermore, Western business representatives and economists often question the reliability of the figures given.

The G.D.R. Foreign Trade Bank's (Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank) annual report offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of G.D.R. imports and exports, and provides no specifics on G.D.R. foreign debt. In general, it does not serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. Moreover, the G.D.R. does not provide information on total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, cash flow projections and statements of sources and uses of funds.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Joint ventures in the sense of joint ownership within the G.D.R. and foreign ownership of business

undertakings are not permitted under G.D.R. law. The G.D.R. is, however, interested in joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements in third countries, and in the past a few French and Austrian firms have been involved with the G.D.R. in cooperative ventures in third markets. In general, the G.D.R. prefers to pay for Western technology investment at least in part by shipping products back to the Western partners.

Official Visits. There were two significant visits of an economic/commercial nature: Under Secretary of Commerce Smart and a congressional delegation headed by Congressman Lantos of California both travelled to East Berlin and the G.D.R. during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Often the G.D.R. will purchase goods from abroad only on the condition that it will pay for at least part of the imported goods with G.D.R. goods rather than with hard currency. Also, cooperation agreements for production within the G.D.R. are often coupled with countertrade or "buy-back" features. Aside from opposing countertrade as a matter of principle, most U.S. firms are also inhibited from such arrangements by difficulties in obtaining the quantity and quality of goods desired, limitations on what the G.D.R. can or is willing to supply, and the unmarketability of some G.D.R. products offered. In any case, G.D.R. pressure for countertrade seems to have eased with improvements in the G.D.R.'s hard currency situation.

Policies Affecting Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In general, small- and medium-sized enterprises do not encounter problems different from those faced by larger enterprises.

Science and Technology. The trend in the GDR which started during the previous reporting period to acknowledge serious pollution problems continues. GDR officials at various levels have told Embassy officers that sulphur dioxide and other pollutants will be controlled. The GDR has plans to import certain control equipment, but has not yet carried them out.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

General Assessment. The 8th five-year plan (1986-90) began during this 6-month period and certain details about it were made public by Czechoslovak leaders. The plan calls for economic growth at a modest rate somewhat above that of recent years and foresees a restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy away from high energy and raw material use and toward traditional consumer and light industrial products in which this country specialized before World War II.

The plan as it has been revealed makes clear that the Czechoslovak government continues to put emphasis on its political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and its

CEMA partners, and does comparatively little to foster expanded trade with the U.S. and other Western countries. In 1986, however, imports from the West should increase by 13%, which is the largest in many years and which will put Western imports at their highest level yet, assuming this growth rate is achieved.

The trend of increasing trade with the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CMEA) continued. In 1985, trade with these countries accounted for a record 79 percent of overall trade turnover, with the Soviet Union alone accounting for 45% of Czechoslovak foreign trade.

Czechoslovakia remained conservative on the financial markets and continued to draw down its already small hard currency debt. There was no significant hard currency borrowing during the past 6 months, though there have been reports recently that Czechoslovakia may re-enter the financial markets soon.

Czechoslovakia's strained political relations with the U.S. during this period continued to have a negative effect on bilateral trade. Bilateral trade in 1985 totalled \$147 million, which was down slightly from the average in recent years. However, despite the low level of direct trade, the U.S. and Czechoslovakia continued to conduct a small, but significant amount of trade through Austria, West Germany, Switzerland and other Western countries. Czechoslovak officials periodically raise with U.S. officials the question of most-favored nation tariff status.

Contacts between foreign businessmen and their counterparts in Czechoslovakia remained under the control of the central authorities. Foreign businessmen often find it frustrating and time-consuming to attempt to do business. Many businessmen report considerable difficulty in making initial contact with end-user enterprises, though such contacts are generally possible after relations have been established with an appropriate foreign trade organization (FTO). To a certain extent, the difficulties foreign businessmen encounter arise from the cumbersome and bureaucratic nature of the Czechoslovak economic system rather than from deliberate discrimination against foreign businessmen.

Business Working Conditions. No new American business offices were established during this period, nor were any existing ones closed. However, as this period was ending, Pan American airways was preparing to resume services to Prague for the first time since 1978 and to expand its modest presence. U.S. firms with representation in Prague appear to have adequate space, and there were no significant problems during the past 6 months in this area. There are no resident American businessmen in Czechoslovakia. Foreign businessmen in Prague

appear to have suitable housing obtained through official channels or arranged privately.

Within the context of a general shortage of tourist/visitor facilities in Prague and other major Czechoslovak cities, foreign businessmen report relatively few problems with hotel accommodations or other impediments to visits there.

Visas for foreign businessmen are generally not a problem and are rarely denied. The only exceptions usually involve individuals born in this country and who were once recognized as Czechoslovak citizens, but subsequently left. Some foreign businessmen complain about the fact that they cannot obtain multiple entry visas and must apply each time they plan to enter Czechoslovakia.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Many foreign businessmen and government analysts regard as inadequate the extent and timeliness of economic/commercial information available in this country. Monthly statistical reports provide little useful information and even subsequent reports have limited utility, especially for businessmen. Information in the foreign trade area is particularly insufficient for market research purposes, and many observers believe the data published by the Czechoslovak authorities are unreliable.

BULGARIA

General Assessment. The published document on 1985 economic performance reports that national income grew by 1.8% compared with 1984. Western observers agree that, considering the dislocations suffered by industry because of power shortages, it is dubious that the economy reached even that low level of growth. Agricultural production reportedly fell by 9%. Similarly, most observers speculate that production shortfalls were greater, considering that Bulgaria experienced severe drought during 1985. An examination of the trade statistics for 1985 indicates that Soviet pressure on Bulgaria to narrow the bilateral trade deficit was successful. As a result, however, the Bulgarians had fewer goods to export to hard currency markets. Accordingly, Bulgaria closed its 1985 account with a shrinking hard currency reserve.

To insure that Bulgarian production in key industries such as robotics, computers, and electronics maintains high growth and produces equipment of "world technical level," the Soviet Union has established two major joint enterprises with Bulgaria. While these new firms will produce equipment designed for the Soviet market, export potential to traditional markets in the Middle East, where Bulgaria receives barter payment in oil, will be seriously hampered. (Despite their other hardships, the Bulgarians continue to pour money and

manpower into the transfer of Western technology. Both legal and illegal methods are used, as Bulgaria remains one of CEMA's most important sources of high technology, either purchased or illegally diverted from the West.)

Business Working Conditions. The situation has changed little during the period. Housing remains inadequate by Western standards, and because of the deteriorating economic situation exacerbated by an unresponsive bureaucracy, Bulgaria has become a more difficult assignment for resident businessmen. Visiting businessmen now have to pay higher hotel fees as the GOB seeks to bolster hard currency earnings. On March 17, the GOB officially opened its "World Trade Center" designed to house most foreign businesses resident in Bulgaria. Western businessmen who had spent considerable funds renovating offices in Sofia resented being officially "requested" to move. The GOB offered them no option; existing leases were broken arbitrarily. The new facility is expensive, with hard-currency rents ranging from \$18-22 per square meter of office space. Moreover, the GOB can now even more easily keep a watchful eye on the movements of the businessmen and their contacts. A number of Western firms considered pulling their offices out of Bulgaria, and, while two have done so, most have nonetheless moved into the Center. In some instances the resistance and complaints of the businessmen yielded profitable results. In early March, the GOB gave more concessions on leasing terms and services rendered.

No U.S. firms opened business offices in Bulgaria during the period. With the deteriorating economic situation and hard currency shortage, businessmen with a long-established record of trade with the GOB are given more access to end-user corporations. Presumably, the GOB attempts to make certain that hard-currency allocations are used appropriately and efficiently. New economic decrees call for increasing end-user contact with Western suppliers, as the GOB seeks to limit unnecessary hard currency expenditures. The GOB continues its courting of Western firms with the hope of establishing joint venture projects. These Western representatives, have been accorded access to the highest levels of the Bulgarian government, including discussions with Todor Zhivkov. While all of the Western businessmen are keenly interested in securing new markets and increasing their profits, they seem skeptical of GOB ability to provide a positive working environment.

Western airlines receive cramped space at Sofia Airport, but are required to pay fees similar to those charged at large, modern Western airports.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of specific, reliable statistical and commercial information remains limited. The published document on 1985

economic performance is a prime example of the vague and skewed information the GOB releases. As the economic situation has deteriorated, official reports here have become increasingly unreliable as commercial tools. Officials are reluctant to share their opinions and are prone to hide negative information, especially from Western businessmen with whom they want to establish a joint venture project. With the reshuffling of government personnel and the dismantling of ministries, some mid-level officials appear confused by the restructuring. There is definitely a "wait-and-see" atmosphere permeating the bureaucracy as the GOB attempts to clarify the "party line".

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The Government of Bulgaria has been actively courting Western firms to establish joint venture projects in Bulgaria. Such arrangements would provide Bulgaria with modern equipment and technology, trained management and Western expertise with minimal hard currency outlay. Most U.S. businessmen complain that the Bulgarians provide only vague information on how hard-currency earnings will be allocated. A Western business is likely to have more success and fewer problems in negotiating a licensing agreement with the Bulgarians.

Policies Toward Countertrade Agreements. Pressure for countertrade has continued as the GOB seeks to acquire new technologies with minimal hard-currency expenditure. The Bulgarians have little to offer by way of countertrade, although Western businessmen will accept the often inferior merchandise as a way to establish a niche in the Bulgarian market (one Western firm accepted the Bulgarian version of the toy "Lego" as payment. The ersatz Lego was so poor in quality that it had to be sent to a Bulgarian home for the handicapped where the residents scooped out the excess plastic clogging up the holes). As hard currency reserves deteriorate further and as GOB requirements for expensive Western technology increase, especially in priority sectors, even more countertrade demands are expected.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III: COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

Basket III is intended to promote the free flow of information, ideas, and people among the participating states.

This section of the Final Act contains specific measures which the participating states resolve to undertake to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges. Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, wider travel for business or professional reasons, improvement in the conditions of tourism, meetings among young people, sports contacts, and the expansion of contacts in general.

In addition, the Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees; to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

Family Visits

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals in this field. In general, Eastern countries maintain a policy of stringently limiting and controlling their citizens' movement abroad. It should be noted that the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries have ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is enumerated. But in practice, the Soviet Government denies its citizens this right. Travel outside the U.S.S.R. is prohibited

except for the departure of limited numbers of authorized personnel. Even in those cases, travel is restricted primarily to Eastern countries and is under strict government control.

Restrictive practices in the countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably. Some countries are nearly as restrictive as the Soviet Union. Others have been relatively lenient in allowing their citizens to travel abroad.

Soviet Union Soviet practices with regard to family meetings remain as described in previous semiannual reports. In general, few Soviet citizens are granted exit permission to visit relatives in the United States; those who are allowed to leave on visits have close family members in the United States. In a few exceptional cases, however, Soviet citizens have been granted exit permission to visit American friends. It is rare for an entire Soviet family to receive permission to travel to the United States at the same time. Typically, a father/son, mother/daughter, or husband/wife combination visits a U.S. relative. Also husbands and wives may alternate visits several years apart. The few Soviet citizens allowed to make multiple trips to the U.S may do so only at 2 or 3 year intervals.

We have no access to Soviet statistics on the number of people granted exit permission to visit the United States. During the period October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986 the U.S. issued visas to 724 Soviet citizens for private visits to the United States. Soviet authorities often arbitrarily refuse visas to U.S. citizens seeking to visit relatives in the USSR. During the period covered by this report, several Americans were denied the opportunity to visit their Soviet spouses and fiances.

Romania There was a decrease in the number of exit permits issued for visits to family members in the U.S. during this reporting period. Travel to the West remains a privilege difficult to obtain. Visits by American relatives to family in Romania are generally encouraged, although former Romanian citizens have encountered difficulties if their citizenship status is unresolved.

During the reporting period 1,248 tourist visas were issued to Romanians, most of which were for visits to relatives in the United States.

Opportunities for travel abroad for most Romanians remain strictly limited. Passport issuance procedures are arbitrary, unpredictable and expensive, and only those persons approved by the Communist Party are assured of receiving tourist passports. Many Romanians who would appear to qualify under Romanian law are refused without explanation. Others may receive tourist passports only after months, or sometimes

years, of waiting. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad. Usually at least one member of the immediate family must remain behind to ensure that his relatives return. Should travellers not return to Romania, it is often years before their families are permitted to leave the country. Family members remaining in Romania often endure considerable pressure to divorce or renounce those who have left, and are harassed if they refuse.

Americans generally encountered no problems in obtaining visas to visit relatives in Romania, unless they themselves are former Romanians who left the country illegally or are considered "undesirable" for other reasons. Most Americans arrive at Bucharest International Airport, or at land borders, without visas. Entry permission is generally granted on the spot. Entry fees at the airport or at the land borders are currently \$19.50. First degree relatives of Romanian citizens are exempt from the prohibition against staying at other than government-run facilities, as well as from the requirement to purchase \$10 of local currency for every day of the anticipated stay.

Poland The liberalization of passport issuance, announced at the end of martial law in July 1983 and enacted into law during the spring of 1984, has continued. For travel to the U.S., a notarized letter of invitation signed by a friend or relative and verified by a Polish Consulate in the United States is still required in order to obtain a tourist passport. The letter is considered valid for 6 months from the date of verification.

The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw estimates that over 25,000 exit permits were issued for visits to family members in the U.S. in the reporting period. The Embassy and constituent posts at Krakow and Poznan issued 21,630 visas for this purpose during this period.

Despite the liberalized issuance policy, certain Poles, including prominent dissidents and professionals, occasionally still experience problems in obtaining passports. There are two difficulties in obtaining passports for travel to the U.S.:

- o Applicants must obtain an invitation verified by a Polish Consulate in the U.S. and these invitations are valid for only 6 months from the date of verification. Because these invitations often expire before the passport has been issued, a second invitation is required in many cases.

- o Trained professionals such as engineers, doctors, and skilled artisans are considered essential personnel and sometimes cannot obtain passports for unofficial travel.

To our Embassy's knowledge, there are no restrictions or

difficulties for Americans visiting their relatives in Poland.

Hungary Hungary continues to follow a relatively liberal travel policy for its citizens. Hungarian citizens enjoy the legal possibility of visiting the West at least once each year if financial support is available from friends or relatives for hard currency expenses. Hungarians can purchase hard currency for one private tourist trip in 3 years. The length of exit permission reflects the amount of leave time authorized by the place of employment; permission is usually issued in increments of 30 days with 30 and 90 days being the most common.

The 2,342 visas issued for family visits to the U.S. is a decrease from the previous 6-month period, reflecting a normal seasonal adjustment. The figure is up slightly from 2,060 in the equivalent period a year ago. The figure indicates a continued liberal approach by the Hungarian Government with respect to family visitation.

In addition to seldom-applied reasons involving public interest and state security, the two most frequent reasons for which exit permits are denied Hungarians who wish to visit the U.S. are insufficient time (less than a year) since the last visit to the West or insufficient proof of the ability of the U.S. sponsor to provide support. Also, a Hungarian usually may not visit a person who has remained away from Hungary under circumstances considered illegal under Hungarian law until 5 years have elapsed. An exit permit may also be denied if the potential visitor is considered to be responsible for a close relative having remained abroad illegally.

Some Hungarian male applicants of military age are receiving exit permits for tourist (although not immigration), travel to the West which, experience indicates, would have been denied several years ago. The Hungarian authorities have published regulations that for the first time provide prospective travelers with military obligations an indication of their rights. They indicate that normally an applicant in this category may not be denied permission to travel because of pending military obligations unless service is scheduled to begin within 6 months. This is apparently a step to increase predictability and reduce the arbitrariness of the travel system as applied to military age applicants.

Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the five to six such refusals annually of which we are aware, but will consider our Embassy's request for review, sometimes with positive results. Favorable reconsideration is often granted to such applicants for demonstrable humanitarian concerns such as the illness of a close relative.

German Democratic Republic The G.D.R. continues to limit severely travel by its citizens to the United States or other non-communist countries for family visits. Approval or denial of applications to travel for such visits is a political decision made by G.D.R. authorities, and the criteria for these decisions are not made public. As an exception, pensioners (age 60 for women and 65 for men) are generally permitted to travel to the West. Whereas in the past, visits had only been permitted to first-degree relatives (parents, children, and spouses), applications from non-pensioners to visit second-degree relatives (aunts, uncles and grandparents) reportedly will now be considered. According to some reports, non-pensioners may even apply to visit friends in the West on important family occasions. The family events which may be considered occasions for visits to the West have also reportedly been expanded. For example, a visit may now take place on other than major birthdays of people over 65. This reported easing of travel limitations has not been officially confirmed by the G.D.R. Government, which has merely stated it would be "generous". Only careful monitoring of travel by East Germans will tell whether an improvement has been made. So far the evidence is inconclusive.

In all cases, the applicant wishing to travel in the West must provide documentation confirming both the relationship and the purpose of travel. The total number of applications submitted and denied is not publicly available, but there are many cases of applicants in the "permitted" categories who are refused permission to travel.

During this reporting period, our Embassy issued 389 visas for family visits to the United States. Of these 97 were issued to non-pensioners. This is considerably less than the 790 visas issued during the last reporting period, but is not itself indicative of any trend because the vast majority of East Germans wish to travel in milder seasons.

G.D.R. citizens in positions deemed "sensitive" by their government may not be visited by or even maintain contacts with close relatives who live in the West. Emigrants from the G.D.R. must generally wait 5 years before they can return to the G.D.R. to visit relatives.

Czechoslovakia Travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West continues to be severely restricted. The number of exit permits issued for visits to family members in U.S. and the number of U.S. visas issued for such visits was 858. This represents a decrease of 18% over the same period a year ago. The majority of Czechoslovak citizens who are allowed to travel to the U.S. to visit relatives are the retired and the elderly. Persons in the work force are not usually allowed to travel abroad with all members of their immediately family.

Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czechoslovakia

without difficulty, often in one day. However, some are refused visas with no explanation given, sometimes after having received several visas in the past. Our Embassy in Prague has made representations on behalf of 11 such citizens during this reporting period. Since the replies received are often equivocal (e.g., the person should reapply at the Embassy in Washington, D.C.), the success rate is difficult to determine, although we estimate it at around 30%. The U.S. has been told by the Czechoslovak Government that citing special humanitarian considerations -- extreme age or serious illness of family members -- may be helpful and in a few such cases, our Embassy's representations seem to have been successful. In other cases, however, applicants have been refused visas to visit dying parents and our representations have been to no avail.

Bulgaria During the reporting period the Bulgarian Government agreed to allow visits by 2 of the 6 divided family visitation cases represented by our Embassy in Sofia, holding out the possibility of additional later approvals for travel. This was the first movement of new visitation cases represented since early 1985.

Overall, however, visa applicants still report that they encounter numerous bureaucratic problems when they apply for passports and exit visas. The passport/exit visa system remains heavily bureaucratized, and travel documentation often is issued on an arbitrary basis by local officials after applicants have waited months or years. The average wait for those few who succeed appears to be about 2 months. Bulgarians who apply for permission to visit relatives in the West have experienced official harassment during the process and sometimes after the visit. Because of this, some decide it is not worth the trouble to apply for an exit visa.

For travelers (whether or not former Bulgarian citizens) wishing to visit relatives in Bulgaria, the record has been mixed at best in this reviewing period. Many experienced difficulties, unpleasantness with the multiple layers of authority, or outright harassment. The Bulgarian Government sometimes fails to inform visitors to Bulgaria that a special visa is required for visitors wishing to stay with a relative or friend and avoid spending hard currency in a Bulgarian hotel. As a result, significant numbers of visitors run afoul of the authorities. During this period, a number of American citizens of Bulgarian ancestry, some of whom had previously visited Bulgaria, were denied visas to do so again. No reasons were given.

Divided Family Cases

	<u>Nuclear Families</u>		<u>Non-Nuclear Families</u>	
	Cases	Individuals	Cases	Individuals
Soviet Union	132	463	4	16
Romania	76	109	702	1518
Poland	179	368	170	871
Hungary	1	2	0	0
GDR	0	0	10	26
Czechoslovakia	4	5	2	8
Bulgaria	12	19	0	0

Family Reunification

Practice in the family reunification area varies among the countries of Eastern Europe. Some are nearly as restrictive as the Soviet Union, while others pose fewer obstacles to allowing their citizens to emigrate to join family members abroad. The reunification of divided families is the only officially recognized basis for emigration from the Soviet Union, but the actual Soviet record of compliance even in this regard is poor.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern Governments on behalf of relatives of American citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to join their families in the United States. U.S. Embassies abroad submit periodic lists of these people to local governments. The accompanying table shows the number of these cases being monitored officially by the United States as of April 1, 1986.

Soviet Union Overall Soviet performance in assisting family reunification during the reporting period continued to be unsatisfactory despite the resolution of several longstanding divided spouse and family cases just before the November 1985 meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Two American citizen-dual national cases were resolved but two others on which Soviet officials promised action remained stalled by bureaucratic obstacles.

Family reunification was the only basis the Soviets recognized for emigration but the Soviet definition of family remained so

narrow that only immediate family members received exit permission. Soviet authorities have also refused exit permission if an applicant in a family has more relatives in the Soviet Union than in the United States. In one recent case, an American citizen dual national whose only living blood relatives are a mother and sister in the United States was refused exit permission on the basis that his application did not constitute family reunification, because his wife's relatives were in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities continued to deny applications for exit permission on the grounds that the applicants had access to "state secrets" -- a broad and undefined concept. In many other cases applicants were denied exit permission with no reason given, or with only the vague comment that emigration was not feasible or not warranted by the international situation.

During the reporting period persons who received exit permission to emigrate to the United States reported that the process took from one month to one year. The authorities responded to applications for exit permission in an average of 3 months. Emigration officials continued to refuse to accept certain applications for emigration to join family members in the United States. In some of these cases the relative left the USSR with temporary exit permission and then remained in the U.S. In other cases, the relative in the USSR obtained exit permission to Israel, but then went to the U.S. The Soviet authorities in Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian Republic, have recently begun asking roughly two thirds of the individuals to whom they grant exit permission to sign pledges that once they are abroad they will not forward invitations for permanent residence to relatives in the USSR.

Persons applying for Soviet exit permission continued to experience reprisals in the form of loss of employment or harassment by employers or the police. Persons seeking to emigrate often experienced difficulty in getting past the Soviet guards in front of our Embassy in Moscow. In some cases persons seeking access to the Embassy were arrested by Soviet authorities.

From October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986, 50 Soviet nationals applied for and were issued U.S. immigrant visas for family reunification. In addition, 79 Soviet citizens applied for reunification with relatives in the United States and were processed under the Accelerated Third Country Processing Program (ATCP).

It is difficult to estimate the numbers of Soviet citizens who are refused exit permission, since many refusals are not reported to U.S. authorities. We now have on file 311 immigrant and fiance(e) visa petitions. In addition, approximately 1,000 other families or 3000 persons have expressed interest in being reunited with relatives in the U.S. Some individuals have been seeking Soviet exit permission for more than a decade.

Our Embassy in Moscow also has a list of individuals who have repeatedly been denied Soviet exit permission to Israel, but continue to apply. From October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986, a total of 554 Jews departed the Soviet Union via Vienna, the primary exit point, compared to 549 for the previous review period. A large number of approximately 2 million ethnic-German Soviet citizens continue to apply for emigration to West Germany, although only 283 were successful from October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986. It remains clear that each year several thousand Soviet citizens apply for and are denied exit permission to join relatives abroad.

While the United States continues to intervene in support of Soviet citizens applying for exit permission, Soviet authorities have been generally unresponsive to these representations during the reporting period. The U.S. Government maintains a representation list of names of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join relatives in the U.S. In conjunction with the November meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the cases of 15 spouses and 23 individuals from our Embassy's divided spouses and families list were resolved. Subsequently, however, many more individuals from these lists continue to receive refusals.

Romania The Government of Romania's performance on family reunification remains largely unchanged since the last reporting period. A large number of family reunification cases brought to the Romanian Government's attention by our Embassy in Bucharest are still unresolved. The average waiting period from initial application for emigration to final approval continues to be well in excess of the 6 months envisaged in the Madrid Concluding Document. The Embassy's experience is that one to one and a half years are required in the average case.

Political and economic factors have contributed to great pressure among Romanians for emigration, despite the harassment and other hardships attendant on the emigration process. The Romanian Government officially opposes emigration. It allows a substantial number of departures under the rubric of family reunification, although it seeks to hinder these departures in order to reduce overall interest in emigration. It also allows relatively large numbers of departures of ethnic Germans to West Germany and of Romanian Jews to Israel.

During the reporting period, the U.S. and Romanian governments began implementation of new procedures for emigration to the U.S. aimed at alleviating hardships encountered by individuals who have received emigration approval but are awaiting U.S. entry documentation. Under the old procedures, once the intending emigrants were approved for emigration by the Government of Romania they immediately received their passports, whether or not they were qualified for U.S. documentation. Frequently, issuance of an emigration passport involved renunciation of citizenship,

and loss of all citizenship rights.

Under the new procedures, until our Embassy is ready to issue U.S. travel documentation, the Romanian Government gives the intending applicant only a certificate of passport approval. Once the Embassy is ready to document the applicant for immediate processing, it issues a letter to that effect. It is only at this time that the emigrant receives a Romanian passport and that disposition of personal and real property takes place. These new procedures should substantially reduce the hardships faced by Romanians seeking to emigrate to the United States. They also represent progress by Romania toward fulfilling commitments, under the Madrid Concluding Document, regarding treatment of applicants for emigration.

During the reporting period the number of Romanians qualified for immigration making initial application for U.S. entry documents in order to be reunited with their families was 695. Immigrant visas and third country processing (TCP) cases completed during the reporting period represented 220 and 320 persons respectively. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest also issued 6 humanitarian paroles for family reunification, and 304 visas to unite persons previously granted refugee or asylum status with their spouses and children.

Our Embassy in Bucharest currently has 555 cases on its representation list for periodic presentation to the Romanian authorities. Approximately 351 cases involving spouses and minor children of persons granted refugee status in the U.S. are pending Romanian passport approval. Ninety-four such cases and 57 active dual national cases are also pending. Of the roughly 4,000 persons registered in the TCP program, some 30% are seeking reunification with close relatives. Ninety-eight cases of qualified immigrant visa applicants (197 persons) are currently pending because they have not received Romanian emigration approval.

Romanian authorities have been reasonably responsive to our Embassy's representation lists, with a few notable exceptions. Of the 87 cases (173 persons) on our Embassy's April 1985 representation lists, 50 cases (108 persons) remain unresolved.

The cost of Romanian exit documents is high in relation to the Romanian worker's average monthly income. A Romanian passport with citizenship costs 250 lei, and an exit visa valid for 2 months costs 900 lei. The cost of a stateless passport and exit visa is also a total of 1,150 lei, but renunciation of Romanian citizenship adds an additional 3,000 lei to this figure. Each 2-month extension of an exit visa costs 965 lei. (One dollar equals 12.4 lei)

Poland Our Embassy's list of divided families continues to grow. During the reporting period, approximately 1,000

individuals applied for immigrant visas to join family members. 842 immigrant visas were issued for the purpose of family reunification. The Embassy further facilitated the travel of 345 spouses and children of asylees and refugees to the United States for family reunification. Our Embassy in Warsaw processed more immigrant visas than any U.S Embassy in Eastern Europe. The large majority of applicants received passports for immigration, although a waiting period of a few months was often necessary.

The Embassy's divided families list contains the names of persons who have been denied permission to emigrate to rejoin their family members in the United States. As not all such individuals inform the Embassy of their problems, the list is not comprehensive. On March 31, 1986, the list contained the names of 349 families consisting of 1239 individuals.

Embassy representation appears to be helpful in many cases on the divided list. We are unable to measure precisely the impact of these interventions, however, since the Polish Government does not indicate whether issuance of an emigration passport is linked with U.S. representations. Many recent issuances appear to be based on the provisions of the new passport law.

Hungary Hungarian performance continues to be good. Although the laws and regulations regarding emigration are restrictive on their face, Hungarian authorities take a flexible and practical approach to resolution of emigration cases. Forty-three Hungarians applied for U.S. immigrant visas for family reunification, including refugees, in this reporting period, and the same number of immigrant visas for family reunification were issued. Presently there is one divided family case on our Embassy's list which has had a delayed resolution. We understand, however, that this individual's application for an exit permit will be given favorable consideration upon its resubmission.

There are several official reasons for refusing emigration permission:

- o Requesting emigration to a relative remaining abroad illegally for a period of less than 5 years (or for whose illegal absence one is responsible).
- o Not having attained the legal minimum age for emigration (55).
- o Requesting emigration to a relative not prescribed by law.
- o Lack of permission from the Hungarian Ministry of Defense -- in the case of males of military age who have not fulfilled their military obligation.

o Emigration would be contrary to the public interest or a combination of the above.

Hungary's performance in this field is liberal for a Warsaw Pact country. For example, in many recent cases the Government has granted emigration permission for family reunification at the first application, even though the applicant may have been ineligible under strict application of Hungarian law, such as in the case of infants whose parents remained in the U.S. in violation of the terms of their exit permits.

An emigration passport costs 1,000 forints (approximately \$20). Minors under 14 are included at no extra charge. In addition there is a passport application fee of 250 forints (approximately \$5). If the passport application is refused, the cost of the passport is refunded, but the application fee is forfeited.

German Democratic Republic The G.D.R. issued approximately 10,000 emigration visas during this reporting period. This rate is higher than the norm of 600-1000 visas a month that prevailed in recent years, excepting 1984, when the G.D.R. allowed an exceptional number of citizens to emigrate (over 40,000). Many of these people left for family reunification, others for economic and political reasons. Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. have been allowed to do so; reliable Western sources estimate that as many as 300,000 to 500,000 applications are still pending.

An October 1983 G.D.R. law on emigration addresses only emigration for the purpose of reunification with "first-degree" relatives (parents and children) or joining a spouse. However, some applicants with no first-degree relatives in the West have been allowed to emigrate, and there are indications that this number is increasing. It is still too early to tell whether a true, sustained trend towards liberalization has developed.

The experiences of exit visa applicants vary. In some cases, applicants wait at least a year for exit permission from the G.D.R., but some cases have taken 3 or more years. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subject to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. West German human rights groups believe that half of the estimated 7,000-10,000 political prisoners in the G.D.R. were imprisoned after filing for exit permission or attempting to leave the G.D.R. illegally. Applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. G.D.R. authorities sometimes visit the homes of exit applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their applications. Occasionally children face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and accept a stateless

passport (G.D.R. citizens in any case can readily obtain F.R.G. passports once they reach the West).

G.D.R. officials commonly tell applicants that it is "not possible" to submit an exit application, but if applicants persist with submission of a written statement, it will generally be accepted by G.D.R. authorities as a de facto application. Applicants are usually not informed of the status of their case until a final decision is made. Denial of the application is given orally without explanation. Some people thus refused are advised that any future applications could lead to difficulties with the police or worse.

A few G.D.R. citizens who have applied for emigration to the F.R.G. or West Berlin intend eventually to join relatives in the U.S., though they initially remain in the F.R.G. or West Berlin. It is therefore difficult to know the exact number of persons allowed to leave the G.D.R. for family reunification in the U.S.

The continued G.D.R. practice of severely limiting access to Western diplomatic missions has inhibited potential emigrants from inquiring about emigration procedures. Virtually all non-official visitors to the U.S. Embassy can expect to be stopped by G.D.R. police, have identification cards checked, and possibly be detained following their visit to the Embassy. Many East Germans have been warned to have no contact with Western missions under threat to their well-being, and some people have been required to sign a document acknowledging that visiting a foreign mission without permission is a violation of G.D.R. law which makes them subject to prosecution.

The Embassy makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting a list of cases of direct interest to U.S. citizens. Lists given to the Foreign Ministry during the last reporting period included 12 cases involving 32 people who wished to go to the U.S. for family reunification. Three of these cases (involving 8 people) were resolved by the end of this reporting period, in addition to one additional case of 4 persons previously unknown to the Embassy. The current list contains 10 cases (26 persons) as yet unresolved.

Emigration fees are not burdensome. A passport costs about \$4, and a single exit visa about \$2.

Czechoslovakia Generally, the Czechoslovaks have been relatively forthcoming on family reunification cases involving immediate relatives -- spouses, minor children and parents -- of U.S. citizens. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as needing reunification since, in its view, their basic family units are with them in Czechoslovakia.

During this period, our Embassy received 20 new immigrant visa cases (the same as in this period last year). It also received 7 new cases involving 17 spouses and children seeking to join family members already granted refugee status in the U.S. The Embassy issued 15 immigrant visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent alien residents during this period (a decrease of 3 from a year ago). Also, 3 family members of refugees were processed. Our divided families list for Czechoslovakia includes 6 cases (11 persons): 3 adult sons of U.S. citizens; one minor son and minor daughter of a U.S. citizen; 2 married daughters of U.S. citizens, and their children.

Generally, immediate families of U.S. citizens are allowed to emigrate expeditiously. However, since Czechoslovak policy is to discourage emigration of the work force, adult sons and daughters, married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years, reapplying repeatedly before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and as dependent on where the applicant lives and applies for permission to emigrate as on the merits of his or her case. Our Embassy in Prague has on file approved petitions for over 100 immigrant visas, but has had no word from most of those concerned since they were sent notification of their petition approval, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation. Families of refugees usually must wait until the refugee is naturalized as a U.S. citizen before they can obtain exit permission. In two cases, families of refugees renounced Czechoslovak citizenship in order to receive exit documentation - which was granted almost immediately. Families of non-Czechoslovak refugees, i.e., third country, in the U.S. are usually granted exit documentation without difficulty.

Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. Processing of an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted; the average time is 3 months. If the application is refused, it is possible to file an appeal with 15 days; but if it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before submitting a new application. Often people are told it is useless to reapply, but is rare that a new application is not accepted.

An emigrating Czechoslovak's heaviest expense is often the education payment levied, in theory, to reimburse the government for university and post-graduate education. Some applicants have had to pay up to the Czechoslovak koruna equivalent of \$1,000 -- 6 months' wages for the average wage earner.

Bulgaria The Government of Bulgaria has taken positive steps in a number of cases to resolve family reunification cases presented by the United States. Bulgarian practice on family reunification appears to reflect bilateral concerns rather than a general commitment to reunify families. In late March 1986, the government promised to allow reunification of 8 of the 12 divided families cases represented by the Embassy and stated that some of the remaining 4 might also be resolved. In almost all cases, the recipients of the Embassy's humanitarian support were the wives and/or minor children of former Bulgarians now resident in the United States. This was the first movement of new reunification cases represented since early 1985.

The Bulgarian Government has requested that it be permitted to investigate the financial means of the sponsors of Bulgarian children in divided families cases, before it allows such children to be reunited with their parents. The U.S. has maintained that sponsors are required under U.S. law to provide the satisfactory assurances that the minor children be properly supported when reunited with their families.

Binational Marriages

In accordance with the Final Act, the participating states pledged to consider favorably applications for entry or exit permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating state. There is a mixed record of implementation of this commitment by the Soviet Union and East European countries. In the Madrid Concluding Document, the participating states committed themselves further to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications normally within 6 months. The following chart indicates the cases the United States was monitoring as of April 1, 1986.

Soviet Union	49
Romania	40
Poland	3
Hungary	0
German Democratic Republic	12
Czechoslovakia	0
Bulgaria	5

Soviet Union During the review period 21 American citizens married Soviet citizens and filed immigrant visa petitions on their behalf. Of the 70 spouses of American citizens and permanent resident aliens whose applications were processed by the Embassy during the reporting period, 45 received exit permission on the first application. 25 had been previously refused at least once, and in one case, the Soviet citizen had been applying to leave for 11 years.

Americans who marry Soviet citizens are not required to register with our Embassy in Moscow or Consulate General in Leningrad. We generally learn of binational marriages when an American files an immigration petition for a Soviet spouse or asks our Embassy to notarize a statement required by Soviet authorities to register the marriage. Between October 1, 1985 and March 30, 1986, 32 American citizens and 3 permanent resident aliens requested a "marriage statement" at our Embassy, and 24 at our Consulate General in Leningrad.

During the review period, 35 persons were issued immigrant visas to join American spouses. In addition, 35 Soviets were documented for entry into the U.S. to join their non-American-citizen spouses residing in the U.S. Several finance(e)s have sought, unsuccessfully, the opportunity to marry. During the review period, however, one of these couples managed to marry in Moscow. It was their fourth try. They achieved success 21 months after submitting their original application to marry.

The United States maintains a representation list of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join their American citizen spouses. Our Embassy in Moscow makes frequent representations on their behalf. During the reporting period, the Soviet authorities resolved 9 cases, more than during any recent review period. In spite of this positive development, numerous longstanding cases remained. Repeated refusals have also prompted the addition of new names to the lists.

Romania Marriage to foreigners is officially discouraged, and obtaining approval is difficult. Although most applicants are eventually successful, securing official approval is a trying and time consuming undertaking which typically requires a wait of 8 to 16 months. There has been no appreciable change in Romanian performance on binational marriages during the reporting period. Romanian authorities approved 19 binational marriages during the reporting period. The total number of exit permits issued Romanian spouses for family reunification after binational marriages was 17. Our Embassy's list of cases for periodic presentation to the Romanian government includes binational marriages where the Romanian spouse is unable to obtain exit permission. Of the 42 cases currently on the Embassy's list, 30 have been listed for more than 6 months.

Poland Marriage of American citizens to Polish citizens is much easier to accomplish in the United States than in Poland. Permission of a Polish court must be sought to marry in Poland, with the average length of court proceedings about 4 months. Complications arise from the fact that the U.S. Government does not issue documents stating that an American citizen is free to marry, so the United States citizen must convince the court

that he or she is unmarried. However, we understand changes are in progress to simplify this procedure. Also, as the Polish Government does not recognize U.S. divorces involving Polish nationals; an American divorce must be repeated in the Polish courts. This process generally takes 6 months.

The number of binational marriages is uncertain, as no official statistics are compiled on the subject. During the review period, the Embassy issued 91 visas to Polish citizens for the purpose of binational marriage. During the same period, Polish authorities issued 91 exit permits to Polish nationals for the same purpose. No exit permits were delayed for more than 6 months.

Hungary Binational marriages continue to present no problem in Hungary. During the reporting period, our Embassy in Budapest received or approved 33 petitions for binational marriage immigrant visas. The Embassy issued 29 immigrant visas to Hungarian spouses of American citizens and 6 to legal residents of the U.S.

German Democratic Republic The G.D.R. appears to be following the letter of its October 1983 law which provided that applications for binational marriage cases would be settled within 6 months of a completed application. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented, and assembly of documentation in requisite formats can cause significant delay. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is generally granted within 6 months, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R.

Before mid-1983, applicants were permitted to emigrate to marry a foreigner in his home country. With the law of October 1983, this permission was generally restricted, forcing applicants to apply first for permission to marry in the G.D.R. Now emigration is normally granted only after marriage in the G.D.R.

Of the 7 binational marriage cases on our Embassy's list as of November 1, 1985, one case was resolved in the reporting period. Five additional cases came to the Embassy's attention during this period, none as yet have been resolved.

Czechoslovakia Although the processing of the average application is lengthy (approximately 3 months), the Czechoslovak record is generally good on binational marriages. However, there have in the past been cases of U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth being refused entry visas for the purpose of marriage. One such case was resolved during this period. The Czechoslovak Government does not recognize U.S. fiance(e) visas, so the marriages have to take place in Czechoslovakia. This is sometimes a considerable financial burden on the U.S.

citizen fiance(e).

During this reporting period, 10 binational marriages came to the attention of our Embassy.

Our Embassy in Prague estimates that 10 entry permits were issued to U.S. citizens for the purpose of binational marriage and that 7 exit permits were issued to spouses of U.S. citizens.

Bulgaria There were 5 binational marriages during the period. This is 3 less than during the previous 6-month period. There has been no significant change in the Bulgarian Government's attitude toward such marriages. While the authorities do not officially discourage binational marriages, obtaining the necessary approval is a cumbersome process, and some applicants are forbidden to marry foreigners.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and most other East European countries basically do not permit personal or professional travel abroad by their citizens except under conditions of strict government control and monitoring. They generally encourage visitors from the West. However, visitors who attempt to see refuseniks or dissidents or who bring in forbidden religious articles or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union As a general matter, the Soviet Union encourages tourism by Westerners as a source of hard currency and to promote the Soviet system. Relatively inexpensive rates are offered to large groups, which are less troublesome to program and easier to control than individual tourists, who pay premium prices for comparative liberty. Soviet authorities seek to define tourism in an increasingly narrow way which rules out contact with Soviet citizens other than in meetings arranged by official Soviet hosts. As in previous reporting periods, American and other Western tourists were occasionally detained or even expelled for contacting Soviet citizens who had been denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Soviet laws providing administrative penalties for unauthorized contacts with foreigners continue to make it difficult for tourists to meet and get to know Soviet citizens.

Our Embassy in Moscow has no means of estimating the total number of tourist and other visitor visas issued to Americans by Soviet embassies and consulates. It appears however, that the number of American tourists during the reporting period increased by approximately 20% over the previous low season reporting period, October 1, 1984 to April 1, 1985, when tourism by Americans was still affected by the downing of a Korean airliner by Soviet fighters in September 1983.