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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>77</sup>

SUBJECT: CSCE: 18th Semiannual Report

I have reviewed and concur in the text submitted by the Department of State under memorandum of May 25, 1985 (Tab II), of the 18th Semiannual Report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission. As required by Public Law 94-304, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Secretary Shultz authorizing the transmission of the Report to the Commission on behalf of the President. Your authorization is needed by noon Friday, May 31, 1985.

At Tab II is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab III to the President.

Matlock, Wigg, Sommer, Kraemer and Steiner concur. <sup>(not available)</sup> <sup>54</sup> <sup>SES</sup>

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Secretary of State Shultz.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That you forward the summary memorandum at Tab II to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
- Tab II Summary memorandum to the President
- Tab III CSCE 18th Semiannual Report (October 1, 1984 - April 1, 1985)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Eighteenth Semiannual Report by the President to  
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in  
Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final  
Act: October 1, 1984 - April 1, 1985

The text submitted by the Department of State for review under memorandum of May 25, 1985, has been reviewed and approved for transmission over your signature to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE 18th Semiannual Report

We have received from the State Department the 18th Semiannual Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period October 1, 1984 - April 1, 1985. This is the third Semiannual Report to stress compliance with the provisions agreed upon at the Madrid follow-up meeting. Key highlights of the Report include:

1. During the review period, the Soviet/East European record of compliance with CSCE commitments remained unsatisfactory.
2. The Soviet Union continued to violate both the letter and spirit of Helsinki Final Act principles guiding relations between states (i.e., respect for territorial integrity of states, self-determination of peoples). They persisted in supporting Vietnam's war against Kampuchean resistance and in occupying Afghanistan.
3. Soviet human rights performance remained abysmal. A harsh campaign was instituted against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists; repression in Ukraine was severe with dissidents and Eastern Rite Catholics subjected to mounting harassment and persecution. One of the most dramatic confrontations over basic rights occurred in the Soviet Far East when a community of Pentecostals held a two-month long hunger strike to protest the denial of their right to worship freely and to obtain exit visas to join relatives in the FRG.
4. Some positive developments in Eastern Europe's implementation of the Final Act included: Bulgaria's resolution of 16 (out of 18) divided family cases; Czechoslovakia's willingness to permit Western diplomatic representatives to attend a trial of a human rights case; and the GDR's continued modest improvement in emigration.
5. However, these improvements were offset by continued repression and stricter controls in each East European country. This period marked the most significant and large-scale violations of human rights in Bulgaria's recent history. Bulgaria conducted an aggressive campaign to assimilate ethnic Turks by forcibly changing their Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. Those who resisted reportedly were tortured or killed.

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Eighteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE Commission

Public Law 94-304 requires the President to submit a report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission semiannually. The attached draft report, which covers the period October 1, 1984 - April 1, 1985, is due on June 3, 1985. The report provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Final Act: human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges. It concentrates on compliance with the Final Act and focuses particularly on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Department recommends that the Secretary of State be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President in accordance with the existing practice for this report.

The report has been cleared as appropriate by the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the U.S. Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been reviewed thoroughly within the Department of State and incorporates working level CSCE Commission comments.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

EIGHTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

OCTOBER 1, 1984 - APRIL 1, 1985

Chapter One  
General Assessment of the Helsinki Final Act  
And Madrid Concluding Document

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid followup meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid Concluding Document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference to be held in Vienna beginning in November 1986. The United States is participating actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems in implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 18th semiannual report submitted by the President to the CSCE Commission under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the period October 1, 1984 through April 1, 1985. This is the third semiannual report to assess compliance with the provisions agreed upon at the Madrid followup meeting. The purpose of the report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki accords. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in

achieving the CSCE goals to strengthen security, expand cooperation, build mutual confidence, and promote human rights.

### Review of Implementation

For most of the CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance by the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe with their CSCE commitments remained seriously flawed, although limited encouragement could be taken from some specific developments. The Bulgarian government, for example, promised to resolve 16 of the 18 divided family cases currently represented by the U.S. For the first time, the Czechoslovak government permitted Western diplomatic representatives to attend a trial of a case involving human rights. In the GDR, there appeared to be continued modest improvement in the handling of emigration for humanitarian reasons, in particular for certain family reunification and binational marriage cases. Despite deterioration in the human rights situation during the reporting period, Poland continued to offer its citizens a degree of personal freedom unusual in a Warsaw Pact country. Debate is allowed in the media on a wide range of subjects, although not on issues of fundamental importance to the government. In Hungary, the ruling Communist Party understands that the Western perception that the country seeks to improve its implementation record is key if Hungary is to receive economic assistance. These relatively bright spots must be seen, however, in the context of strict governmental control and limitations on political and religious expression.

Negative developments continued. This period marked the most significant and large scale violations of human rights in Bulgaria's recent history. Bulgarian officials conducted an aggressive campaign to assimilate ethnic Turks by forcibly changing their Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. Many who resisted were reportedly killed and wounded by security forces, and there were also reports of rape, physical abuse and torture. Throughout the period, the GDR has continued a policy of dissuading its citizens from contacts with foreign embassies or association to discuss emigration and other "sensitive" issues. Czechoslovakia has experienced a series of arrests and trials resulting from government attempts to restrict religious practice and expression. In Poland, the government's campaign to convince outsiders that the situation had returned to normal was abruptly interrupted when officers of the secret police abducted and murdered pro-Solidarity Father Jerzy Popieluszko. There was also a marked increase in the number of political



prisoners, including many former Solidarity activists who were rearrested. The Hungarian government imposed "police surveillance" against one prominent dissident, and extended police harassment of sellers and distributors of samizdat. The Romanian government continues to maintain almost total control over its populace, using intimidation and, occasionally, physical violence with little regard for constitutional guarantees of civil rights.

Soviet implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements has remained clearly unsatisfactory during the six-month review period. In the international arena, continued prosecution of war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. The Soviet Union also has undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Vietnam's war against the Kampuchean resistance.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves outside the framework of state-controlled institutions continued at an alarming rate during the six months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists were alike subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. In the Soviet Far East a community of Pentecostals which was denied the freedom of religion and emigration challenged the authorities. Across the Soviet Union a harsh campaign was instituted against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists, resulting in more than a dozen arrests. Repression in the Ukraine was particularly severe, with Ukrainian dissidents and Eastern Rite Catholics subjected to mounting harassment and persecution. In the Baltic states, arrests of religious believers and dissidents continued. A nationwide campaign against all religious denominations struck Hare Krishna disciples, Seventh Day Adventists, Russian Orthodox activists and Baptists alike.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner remained under virtual house arrest at their place of exile in the closed city of Gor'kiy. They were denied contact with friends and relatives. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, who was finally transferred from prison to labor camp, had to be hospitalized for two months before he was able to face the rigors of work in the camp. Yuriy Orlov remained exiled and isolated in the desolate regions of the province of Yakutia, while several human rights activists confined in labor camps were rearrested shortly before their scheduled release. Others faced a continual

deterioration in their conditions of confinement: no family visits, no letters, punishment cells, and beatings. Independent peace activists faced arrests, detentions and, in some cases, forced emigration from the Soviet Union. Finally, the continued Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes resulted in several premature deaths, as did conditions in labor camps.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union continued to decline below the disappointing figures of mid-1984. Some 327 Jews left the Soviet Union from October 1, 1984 to February 28, 1985. 273 ethnic Germans left in the same period, and 32 Armenians from October 1 to March 31. The extremely low level of Jewish emigration was accompanied by a continuation of official anti-Semitic propaganda.

The Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, with only 542 Soviet citizens allowed to make private visits to the United States during the past six months. Only 106 Soviet citizens (including spouses) received exit permission to join relatives in the United States.

The Soviet authorities have maintained their traditional strict control of information media, denying Soviet citizens access to all filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism/Leninism or the official line of the Communist Party. Jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty native language broadcasts continues.

#### The Stockholm CDE Continues

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, mandated by the Madrid CSCE review meeting, opened in Stockholm January 17, 1984. The mandate calls for it to negotiate measures which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to all of the CSCE area, including the European portion of the Soviet Union. Ambassador James E. Goodby heads the U.S. delegation.

#### The NATO Approach

During the period under review, the NATO countries have continued to focus discussion on the package of concrete measures they introduced in January 1984. It is designed to

increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of surprise attack. It fulfills the requirements of the mandate and builds upon the confidence-building measures adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It provides for:

- o Mutual exchanges of information about the organization and location of the significant military units of all participating states;

- o Exchanges of annual forecasts of planned military activities;

- o Mandatory notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison military activities involving 6,000 or more personnel (in the Final Act, only major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops must be notified, no more than 21 days in advance);

- o Mandatory invitation of observers of all participating states to all notifiable activities (in the Final Act, invitation of observers is voluntary);

- o Specific arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with these CSBMs; and

- o Improvement of the facilities for communication among the 35 participating states.

#### The Eastern Response

The East continued to focus on its set of declaratory measures, some of which fall outside the mandate for the CDE. It features:

- o A non-use of force treaty;

- o A no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge;

- o A ban on chemical weapons use in Europe;

- o Regional nuclear weapons free zones in Europe, including the Balkans and the Baltic;

- o Reduction in military spending; and

- o Unspecified improvements in the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act.

## Presidential Statement

Just before the beginning of the fifth round in January, the President met with Ambassador Goodby, and afterwards stated:

The Stockholm Conference has a unique role to play in East-West relations. Its resumption comes shortly after the agreement reached in Geneva between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko calling for renewed U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Complementing those arms control efforts which seek to reduce force levels, the Stockholm Conference addresses the proximate causes of war -- miscalculation and misinterpretation -- and seeks to ensure that those forces are never used.

One year ago, I said that, in dealing with the Soviet Union: "We are prepared to discuss the problems which divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise." We have brought this spirit of practicality, fairness and compromise to the Stockholm Conference. It was in this spirit that I addressed the Irish Parliament last June and offered to meet the Soviets' concerns in Stockholm halfway. We agreed to discuss their declared interest in the principle of renunciation of use of force if this would lead them to negotiate seriously on concrete measures to give effect to that principle.

## Rounds Four and Five

The fourth round began November 6 and ended December 14, 1984. Delegates this round completed protracted discussions on the procedural arrangements for negotiations and agreed to establish two working groups to discuss the proposals before the conference in detail. The working groups began meeting during the last two weeks of this round. The U.S. delegation expressed pleasure with the new procedural arrangements, noting that they seemed to produce more detailed discussions of the issues raised by proposals.

Round Five began January 29 and ended March 22, 1985. During the first four weeks of this round, NATO began to introduce detailed amplifications of its six measures. Eastern delegates continued to charge NATO with being primarily interested in "spying" on the East through the information provisions of the Alliance package. Soviet and other Eastern delegations repeated their calls for a non-use of force/no-first-use of nuclear weapons treaty. Neither NATO nor

neutral/non-aligned delegations have shown significant interest in these shopworn proposals.

### Prospects for the Future

The West continues to believe that serious negotiations in Stockholm should lead to implementation of confidence and security building measures which will make a significant contribution to European security. The sixth round was scheduled to take place between May 14 and July 6, 1985.

### Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean

The Seminar met in Venice October 16-26, mandated by the Madrid review meeting "to review initiatives undertaken or envisaged" by the 1979 Valletta meeting and to "stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors." The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador Raymond Ewing.

Representatives of all eight non-CSCE Mediterranean littoral states as well as representatives of five international organizations were invited to join the 35 CSCE states in the Venice discussions. While all five international organizations sent representatives, of the states invited, only Egypt and Israel attended. Only the 35 CSCE states participated in drafting the Report of the meeting.

The Report notes a wide range of areas in which economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean might be enhanced. Malta sought to add language which would have 1) cited the "current world recession" and called for extensive assistance to developing countries, 2) called on two UN regional commissions which exclude Israel to pursue cooperation, and 3) "noted" the September Valletta non-aligned meeting and called for more such ad hoc meetings. In the face of strong Western opposition, none of this language was included in the Report.

While the Report mentions a number of areas for potential cooperation, no commitments to undertake such cooperation were made. The Report does not call upon the 1986 Vienna review meeting to recognize or comment upon Venice, nor does it suggest the possibility of additional Mediterranean meetings within the CSCE process.

### Cultural Forum Preparatory Conference

The Cultural Forum Preparatory Conference met November 21-December 5, 1984 in Budapest. The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador John Scanlan. It adopted an agreed agenda, organizational framework and work program for the Cultural Forum, which will meet in Budapest for six weeks beginning October 15, 1985. The Forum is mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document to "discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture."

The agenda agreed to in Budapest by the 35 CSCE participating states ensures that the Cultural Forum will deal seriously with cultural values and problems which stand in the way of achieving the free flow of cultural expression envisioned by the Helsinki Final Act. There will be seven one-week working groups and one two-week working group covering different fields of culture. This will help facilitate participation in the Forum by leading cultural figures. Issues important to the West, including repression of cultural minorities, Soviet policies against the Baltic and Hebrew languages, and Eastern barriers to the free flow of information will be discussed thoroughly in Budapest.

#### Chapter Two Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe.

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is a declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another, as well as with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

#### DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

There are 10 principles in the declaration of principles guiding relations among states in the Final Act:

Principle One. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two. Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three. Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four. Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five. Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six. Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine. Cooperation among states;

Principle Ten. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid Concluding Document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; ensure the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of national minorities; ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLES

Although the Eastern countries gave considerable publicity to their signing of the Final Act and, more recently, the Madrid document, the Eastern record of compliance with the Helsinki principles has deteriorated in important respects, especially in the Soviet Union. The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries so far, particularly with regard to Principle Seven.

This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not indicate their absence.

### SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and spirit of principles guiding relations between states as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union persists in its occupation of Afghanistan and in its efforts to eradicate national opposition. In conducting its ruthless war against Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons, bombed civilian targets, used ground and air forces to destroy villages and crops, and employed weapons intended to cripple or maim non-combatants. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Vietnam's war against the Kampuchean resistance. These actions are in direct and willful violation of the general principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) showed no improvement since the last six-month review period despite the fact that preparations were underway in CSCE signatory states for the 1985 Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting. Mandated by the 1983 Madrid concluding document, this meeting addresses questions concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, "in all their aspects," as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. On the eve of this meeting the unsatisfactory record of Soviet compliance with the Madrid commitment to respect "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms" was fully evident. Not only was there no let-up in the persecution of dissidents, refuseniks and religious activists; but suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families continued unabated.

One of the most dramatic confrontations over basic rights occurred in the Soviet Far East. An entire ethnic-German Pentecostal community (more than twenty families) in the



village of Chuguevka banded together in two month-long hunger strikes protesting their inability to worship freely and to gain Soviet exit permission to join relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany.

After years of harassment, community members decided to forbid their children to attend local schools, where they were habitually taunted and beaten; they also renounced Soviet citizenship, an act which brought about persistent conflict with local authorities. On December 10, International Human Rights Day, authorities arrested the community's pastor, Viktor Val'ter for anti-Soviet activities. Three other community members were arrested two weeks later while demonstrating for Val'ter's release. On February 26 another three members (Nikolay Vins, Anatoliy Khokha and Gennadiy Maidanuk) were sentenced to one year in labor camp for living without internal passports (having sent them in when they renounced their citizenship). Pastor Val'ter remained incarcerated as the community completed its second month-long hunger strike (including more than 20 children) in February. All members of the community have lost their jobs, but have vowed to continue their struggle to depart the Soviet Union in search of religious freedom, even if all die in the struggle.

Another major development during the current review period has been the concerted crackdown on Jewish (primarily refusenik) cultural activists and teachers of Hebrew. Moscow observers cannot remember a recent period in which there have been so many unfounded political arrests of Jewish activists. Moscow Hebrew teacher Aleksandr Kholmianskiy was sentenced in Estonia on February 1 to labor camp on the contrived charge of possession of pistol cartridges. Another Moscow Hebrew teacher, Yuliy Edelstein, was sentenced on December 19 to three years in a labor camp for alleged possession of drugs. Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro was arrested on January 22 and faces charges of anti-Soviet slander. The campaign was not limited to Moscow, however, and took on especial vehemence in the Ukraine. Kiev Hebrew teacher Iosif Berenshtein was sentenced on December 10 (human rights day) to four years in a labor camp for allegedly resisting militia. After his trial, Berenshtein was savagely beaten and stabbed while in detention, which resulted in his losing 99.4 percent of his vision in both eyes. On February 19 Moscow religious Jew Natan Vershobskiy was arrested in Kiev on the false charge of stealing books from the synagogue. In Odessa, Hebrew teacher Mark Nepomnyashchiy was sentenced to three years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander after he made appeals for the release of his would-be son-in-law Yakov Levin. Levin, himself a cultural activist,

was sentenced on November 19 to three years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Another Odessa cultural activist, Yakov Mesh, was arrested in October, only to be released in December when he nearly died from liver deficiency caused by lack of proper medical attention. In the western Ukraine, in the town of Chernovtsiy, the crackdown continued. Cultural activists Leonid Schreier and Yakov Rosenberg were sentenced to three years and two and a half years respectively in labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Jewish dissident Iosif Zisels, who was arrested on October 19 in the same town, is still awaiting trial on the same charge.

In the Baltics, Jewish cultural activist Vladimir Frankel was arrested on January 15 on charges of slandering the Soviet system after helping with a samizdat journal on Jewish affairs. Other cultural activists, such as Boris Shtimel'man and Bronislav Tutel'man, were detained by Ukrainian authorities for several days without charge. Donetsk Hebrew teacher Aleksandr Stupnikov was forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for three weeks for no apparent reason.

In response to this accelerating campaign against Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists, the Department of State issued a report on January 29 calling on the Soviet Union to end its harassment of these individuals and live up to its commitments as defined in the Helsinki Final Act. However, on March 19 Ukrainian authorities arrested another Jew (and student of Hebrew), Evgeniy Eisenberg, in Khar'kov on charges of anti-Soviet slander.

Soviet persecution of Jews was not limited to Hebrew teachers and cultural activists. Nadezhda Fradkova, a Leningrad refusenik seeking nothing more than emigration, was sentenced on December 19 to two years in a labor camp for failing to find a job. Prior to her trial she had been held in Leningrad psychiatric hospitals for five months. Another Leningrad refusenik, Mikhail Tsivin, was jailed twice during the review period for fifteen day periods on the grounds that he had disobeyed authorities.

Even Jewish activists already in labor camp were not immune to further maltreatment. Iosif Begun completed a term of six months punishment in labor camp prison, after which he required hospitalization due to his broken health. In February he was denounced as a Zionist criminal on national television in a "documentary" film about plotters against the U.S.S.R.. Another Jewish prisoner, Zakhar Zunshayn, was placed in the punishment cell at his labor camp on two occasions, after which

he was sentenced to a six month period in the labor camp prison, apparently for not weaving his quota of mesh baskets.

Numerous other groups have similarly been subjected to systematic efforts on the part of the Soviet authorities to stifle if not eradicate expression of independent views and beliefs. These include religious believers of all denominations, independent peace activists, proponents of greater regional autonomy, and those who simply want to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

In the Ukraine, a campaign was also launched against defenders of the independent Ukrainian (Uniate or Eastern Rite) Catholic church. Vasiliy Kobrin, chairman of an unofficial "Initiative Group of the Committee for the Defense of Believers of the Catholic Church," was arrested on November 12 and sentenced to three years in labor camp on March 22 on charges of anti-Soviet slander. He was still languishing incommunicado in prison at the close of the review period. Another group member, Iosif Terelya, was also arrested on February 8 on charges of anti-Soviet activity. Both of these men circulated samizdat appeals in defense of an independent Ukrainian Catholic church and a sovereign Ukraine. They brought to the attention of westerners the fact that hundreds of Ukrainian Catholics had renounced their citizenship in protest of religious persecution and Soviet subjugation of the Ukraine. Another group supporter, eighty-year-old Uniate priest Grigory Budzynskiy, was kidnapped by local authorities in late October and forcibly held incommunicado in a local hospital for more than six weeks.

Furthermore, Ukrainian activists have suffered particularly severe treatment while in Soviet detention. Ukrainian dissident poet Valeriy Marchenko, who was sentenced in 1984 to a lengthy term in labor camp, died after being denied proper medical treatment, one of several Ukrainians, including Helsinki Monitor Yury Lytvyn, to die in detention in 1984.

Attempts to further "Russify" the Ukraine continued during the review period. Although 75% of the Ukrainian SSR is Ukrainian, only 25% of available books are in Ukrainian. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and Uniate churches burned. Ukrainians account for 20% of the Soviet population, but 40% of all Soviet political prisoners.

The Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have traditionally been a locus of national and religious

opposition to the Soviet regime. Forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II, the Baltic peoples had never developed firm cultural ties with the Slavs despite having once been part of the Russian empire. The Soviet authorities have over the years undertaken a deliberate effort to "Russianize" the population, moving numerous ethnic Russians into the Baltic states and forcibly evicting many ethnic Balts. Knowledge of the Russian language is becoming ever more necessary for educational and professional success in the Baltic republics.

The Soviet regime is especially sensitive to any form of independent expression in the Baltic states. On January 18 Lithuanian Catholic priest Ionas Matulionis was sentenced to three years in a labor camp for allegedly disrupting public order while he was leading prayers in a cemetery on All-Saints Day. A co-believer at the prayers, Romas Zhemaitis, was also sentenced at the same trial to two years in a labor camp for allegedly striking a militiaman. Another Lithuanian religious activist, 79-year-old Vladas Lapienis, was arrested on January 4 and sentenced March 29 to four years in labor camp plus two years internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda after he circulated to some friends copies of a draft of his memoirs. In Latvia, religious dissidents also came under attack. Zofiya Belyarchuk and a colleague named Sanderos were arrested in December after they tried to form a Franciscan church group. Another Latvian, Mikhail Bombin, was threatened with arrest for reportedly engaging in unsanctioned activities in support of peace and detente.

During the review period Soviet authorities persisted with an anti-religious campaign that to some degree affected all denominations. Even Hare Krishna disciples, about whom information in the past was scanty, came under the KGB spotlight. In the village of Kurdzhinovo, where many disciples moved during the past three years in order to escape persecution, authorities conducted numerous searches and arrests. On October 31 disciples Aleksey Bayda and Yuriy Fedchenko were arrested and subsequently beaten. Disciples Vladimir Kustrya and Sergey Priborov were arrested on November 12 and December 28 respectively. In all four cases authorities continued to hold the individuals incommunicado through the end of the review period, not even specifying the charges on which the Krishna followers were being held. Spouses were told the investigations were secret. Meetings with those arrested were forbidden.

Seventh Day Adventists also felt the heavy hand of oppression. In October the Soviet daily newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" announced the arrest in Central Asia of at least seven Seventh Day Adventists, charging that they led parasitic lifestyles and engaged in a variety of illegal activities. While details remain scanty, it is known that the authorities arrested (and tried) Gennadiy Bedarev, Vladimir Vasilchenko, Aleksey Murkin and his brother M. Murkin on charges of anti-Soviet slander. Two other Adventist activists, R. Chernolikova and Ivan Cheremisov, were sentenced for violation of internal passport regulations. The son of Adventist leader Vladimir Shelkov, who died in 1980 in labor camp, was also sentenced to labor camp and denounced in the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" article.

Members of the Baptist faith did not escape the anti-religious crackdown, as numerous arrests and trials took place during the reporting period. While certain details remain unclear, it is known that many Baptists were charged with religious crimes (e.g., conducting "illegal" religious services) and political crimes (often for possessing religious literature), while others were sentenced on trumped-up criminal charges. Moscow Baptist Veniamin Napriyenko was sentenced on October 11 to two years in a labor camp. Ivan Timchuk, a Baptist from Donetsk, received three years on November 24. Vladimir Baklzhanskiy and Ivan Kara were each sentenced in Moldavia on November 27 to two and a half years in labor camp for violation of the laws of separation of church and state. In Belgorod, Baptist Mikhail Azarov was sentenced in late 1984 to five years in a labor camp. Baptists Eduard Ewert, Nikolay Loeven (a minister) and Ivan Tkachenko, whose arrests were reported in the 17th Semiannual CSCE Implementation Report, were all convicted of anti-Soviet slander during the fall and sentenced to several years in labor camp. Mikhail Khorev, a Baptist due to complete a term of labor camp on January 28, was rearrested and sentenced in January to an additional two years. The number of Baptists who have been arrested and are still awaiting trial is also long. It includes David Thiessen, Veniamin Abashin, Aleksey Kurkin, Vladimir Pilipchuk, Vitaliy Bozhko, Vasiliy Slyusar, Vladimir Romanyuk, Mikhail Yurkevich, Vladimir Okhotin, Vladimir Korov and Viktor Pikalov. All were arrested during the autumn. Boris Artyushenko, a Baptist from Kursk, died on December 12 after four months in an investigative prison.

Pentecostal followers suffered not only in the Far Eastern village of Chuguevka, as mentioned earlier. In

Rostov-on-the-Don, Pentecostal activist Valentina Golikova was sentenced on January 27 to three years in a labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. Her husband, who was arrested in 1982 for anti-Soviet activity, is not due for release until 1989. Pentecostal Bishop Ivan Fedotov, who was sentenced to five years in labor camp in 1981, was placed in the punishment cell of his labor camp for a period of three months starting in December after he was found in possession of a three ruble note that was planted on him by another inmate. Pentecostal pastor Afanasi Melnik was arrested on November 14 in Vinnitsa. Another Ukrainian Pentecostal, Vladimir Franchuk, was arrested around the same time in Zhdanov on charges of anti-Soviet slander. Franchuk was reportedly the leader of an interdenominational youth camp.

Religious persecution also extended to adherents of Russian Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodox priest Pyotr Lysak was sentenced on December 4 to ten months in a labor camp on the charge of spending too much time in Moscow, where he had no residence permit. Russian Orthodox activist Vladimir Poresh became the first person to be convicted under the new article 188-3 of the RSFSR criminal code, described in the 16th Report on CSCE Implementation, to an additional three years in labor camp for "malicious" violation of labor camp rules. And religious dissident Feliks Svetov was arrested on January 23 on the charge of circulating religious literature. His wife is presently in labor camp for editing a religious journal in 1982. Finally, Boris Razveev, a Russian Orthodox activist in Ufa, was arrested in January for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. He was arrested after he sent a manuscript on theology to the West for publication.

Other religious activists were swept up as the regime intensified its efforts to counter growing interest in religion among Soviet youth. Baptist rock musicians Valeriy Barinov and Sergey Timokhin were both sentenced to several years in labor camp in November on trumped-up charges of trying to leave the country illegally. Religious activist Andrey Vasil'yev was sentenced in Leningrad to four years in a labor camp. Finally, Catholic priest Iosif Svidnitskiy was arrested in December in Novosibirsk.

Many Soviet citizens have sought to focus attention on the general problem of abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union and have suffered persecution as a consequence. Such people are often involved in religious activities or in defense of minority rights, but their prime focus is on the broader effort

to expose and alleviate human rights abuses. Within this category three figures are particularly well-known in the West: Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner remained in exile in the closed city of Gor'kiy throughout the review period. Soviet authorities have held the couple under virtual house arrest during this time. Neither friends nor relatives have been permitted to visit them, and they are even prohibited from meeting with friends who reside in Gor'kiy. Telephone contact with the couple is not allowed, and they are allowed to send only censored telegrams and postcards. Only scientific colleagues of Sakharov have succeeded, on two separate occasions, in gaining permission to travel from Moscow to Gor'kiy to visit with the couple for the purpose of conducting scientific talks.

Attempts by the Soviet authorities to portray the Nobel Prize laureate as leading a normal, working life assume an unreal dimension in view of the extensive efforts to isolate him and Bonner in Gor'kiy. In view of their past record of medical problems, observers believe that the couple's health must be deteriorating, particularly as advanced medical care is not available in Gor'kiy. The efforts to isolate Sakharov and Bonner provide vivid evidence of the Soviet authorities' complete disrespect for the most elementary of human rights and human dignity. Toward the end of the review period there were reports that Sakharov had informed the Soviet Academy of Sciences that he would resign by May 10 if the Academy did not intervene to ease his isolation.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, was transferred during the review period from Chistopol' prison to a labor camp in Perm. Because his health had deteriorated so severely while in prison, Shcharanskiy was hospitalized for two months prior to his release into the labor camp. During this period his relatives were unable to ascertain his exact whereabouts until, in early January, they were permitted a 48-hour meeting with him--the first such meeting since Shcharanskiy's arrest in 1977. Despite repeated appeals for clemency for Shcharanskiy, now that he has served more than half of his thirteen-year sentence, Soviet authorities continue to subject him to punishment for a crime he never committed. In February, he was again denounced in a film shown on national television as an enemy of the U.S.S.R.

Yuriy Orlov, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, continues to serve a five-year term of exile in a remote area of the province of Yakutia. He is permitted visits from his wife, but is subjected to harassment by local inhabitants. The food rations available to him are barely sufficient to sustain life in the harsh climatic conditions of Yakutia. Despite some illness during the review period, Orlov is reported to be in stable condition. Appeals on his behalf continue to go unheard by Soviet authorities.

Another former member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, Naum Meiman, continued to encounter obdurate resistance as he persistently sought permission for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment not available in the U.S.S.R. Inna Meiman, who underwent several dangerous operations during this period, has been flatly denied exit permission.

Soviet defenders of human rights believe it essential to work for a freer flow of information within Soviet society. To this end activists have produced for many years samizdat manuscripts covering literary, ethnic, religious, social, economic and political topics. Soviet persecution of individuals allegedly affiliated with such samizdat production has continued during the review period, despite the fact that the amount of samizdat material in circulation has reportedly declined significantly in recent years in the wake of numerous arrests. On October 10 Moscow authorities sentenced Yelena Sannikova to labor camp and exile for just such activity. Lithuanian chemist Lyudas Dambrauskas was sentenced October 3 to five and a half years in labor camp for samizdat memoirs on the 25 years he had spent in Stalinist camps. In late March, Lev Timofeev, an economist, was arrested for his samizdat writings calling for economic reform.

While most human rights activists, for various reasons, do not campaign against the Soviet government per se, occasionally certain groups do surface that secretly advocate radical change in the political structure. The Soviet authorities continue relentlessly to persecute such groups. On December 18 Moscow authorities arrested Vyacheslav Demin, a self-proclaimed social democrat who led a small group of like-minded colleagues, on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Other individual dissidents were also targeted by Soviet authorities during the review period. Leningrad worker Boris Mityashin was sentenced to five years in a labor camp and three in internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.



65-year-old blind historian Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko was arrested in November also on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. His arrest was apparently the result of a recent book he authored on Lavrenti Beria. And Vladimir Sytinskiy, a member of the council of representatives of Smot (an independent trade union group) was put on trial in early December and subsequently was sent for extensive psychiatric examination.

Persecution of dissidents does not relent even when they are in labor camp. Not only are they subjected to insufficient nourishment, excessive work, improper medical attention, denial of family visits, confiscation of letters and beatings; but they are often rearrested at the end of their terms on newly-fabricated charges if their reentry into Soviet society is considered undesirable. In violation of Soviet law, the husband of Irina Ratushinskaya, a talented young poet, has not been permitted to see her in camp since 1983. On October 23, the wife of Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group member Nykola Horbal arrived at the labor camp from which her husband was to be released that day after serving five years. She was informed that her husband had been rearrested the previous day on charges of anti-Soviet slander, later changed to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Another political prisoner, Viktor Grinev, who was due for release in April 1985, was rearrested in camp in December and sentenced to an additional year and a half camp term for "malicious disobedience of camp authorities." His wife is presently serving three years in exile for her open support of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Other Soviet champions of human rights continue to suffer at the hands of the Soviet state. Anatoliy Marchenko, a member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, has been permitted no correspondence with his family for more than one year. Ivan Kovalyov, also a member of the group, has not been permitted a visit by a relative since 1982. There has been no news of Victoras Petkus, a Lithuanian Helsinki Monitor, since August 1983. His health is reportedly very bad after he was held in the labor camp prison from 1983-84. Anatoliy Koryagin, of the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, went on a four-month hunger strike in late 1984. He has been repeatedly beaten by wardens in Chistopol prison where he is being held. Vyacheslav Bakhmin, also of the working commission, is restricted to the city of Kalinin, where he was detained by authorities twice in early 1984 for allegedly striking different individuals. On March 29, Bakhmin was sentenced to three years in labor camp on the charge of

hooliganism, but on April 18 this sentence was overturned on approval. The appeals court reduced the charge and imposed a sentence of 80% reduction in salary for a period of 6 months, to be served at his regular place of work (i.e., without confinement). The reason for this unprecedented action remains unknown.

The Group to Establish Trust between the U.S.S.R. and the USA is an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose non-partisan, non-polemical approach to the discussion of arms control and confidence-building stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially sanctioned Soviet peace committee. Members of this group continued to be subjected to harassment and persecution during the six months under review. Group member Nikolay Khramov was abducted on October 24 and taken to the Soviet Far East where he was ordered to join the army. Upon his refusal, Khramov was placed in prisons and psychiatric hospitals, and was told that a criminal case was being opened against him for resisting military service. After almost four months of detention, Khramov was unexpectedly set free in February, given a military deferment on medical grounds, and permitted to return to Moscow. However, another group member, Aleksandr Shatravka, who is presently serving a three-year sentence for anti-Soviet slander, was sentenced in January to an additional two and a half years in labor camp for alleged possession of narcotics. Group members Vladimir and Maria Fleischgaker and Mark Reytman were permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. during the review period, thus depriving the group of several of its more active members. Other members, such as Aleksey Lusnikov, Yuriy Medvedkov, Vladimir Brodskiy and Aleksandr Rubchenko, were subjected to detention by militia at various times.

Incarceration in psychiatric hospitals is frequently utilized by the Soviet authorities as a punitive measure against individuals whose activities are considered to run counter to the interests of the party and government. The Soviet Union has, in fact, amassed such a deplorable record of abuses of psychiatry that it withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association in 1983 rather than face near-certain censure or expulsion. Far from chastened by the experience, the Soviet authorities continued this inhumane practice during the current review period. Valentin Sokolov, a dissident poet, died in the Chernyakhovskiy special psychiatric hospital in October. Rozalia Kiikbaeva, who was forcibly committed to a Kazakhstan psychiatric hospital in May 1983 for refusing to give up her emigration efforts, died on January 8 at the age of 29 after she was not provided proper medical attention. Her

brother Taksyn, who was also forcibly committed to the same institution for his efforts at emigration, was released after he developed serious undiagnosed medical problems. Aleksandr Riga, who was sentenced to indefinite psychiatric treatment during the previous review period,--was sent in November to the Far Eastern special psychiatric hospital in Blagoveshchensk.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the Soviet Union continues to deny exit permission to thousands of its citizens who wish to join relatives living abroad. Jewish emigration continued its dramatic decline since the peak year of 1979, when over 50,000 left the country. In the period October 1 - February 28, 327 Jews left the Soviet Union. This compares with approximately 423 Jews who left the Soviet Union in the first five months of the previous review period. The Soviet authorities continue to maintain, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, that the vast majority of Jews who wanted to leave the country have already left, and that the rate of emigration is declining naturally as fewer and fewer families remain to be reunited. The authorities have also stated that family reunification refers only to those families divided by World War II.

The current review period has also witnessed a continuation of anti-semitic rhetoric thinly veiled as "anti-Zionism". Soviet propaganda maintains that Israeli and Western intelligence encourages emigration "in order to obtain state secrets from Soviet citizens. It further alleges that "Zionists" collaborated with fascists during World War II to send many innocent Jews to their death. These "Zionist elements," so the argument goes, now comprise the ruling circles of Israel, which has inherited Hitler's fascist mantle. The "anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public", an officially-sanctioned group, continues to lead the propaganda attack against Jewish refuseniks and "Zionists", though it has staged fewer public appearances than during the previous review period.

Individual Jewish "refuseniks" (Jews who have been refused when they apply to emigrate) have responded in various ways to official intransigence on emigration. Some have reacted with despair and for the time being have stopped applying to leave, while others apply as frequently as possible -- once every six months.

Ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union remained at low levels throughout the reporting period. From October 1 through February 28, 273 ethnic Germans left the Soviet Union.

This compares with 523 during the first five months of the previous reporting period.

Armenian emigration to the United States remained very low, with only 32 leaving. 46 left in the previous review period.

## ROMANIA

### Developments Concerning Observance of the Helsinki Act Principles:

The Government of Romania complies with the first six Helsinki Principles, and advocates them in international forums. Romania does not support the notion that armed forces of ruling Communist Parties have the right to intervene to support another Communist Party faced with domestic or foreign threat to its monopoly of power.

Despite Romania's active role at the Madrid Review Conference and its statements of support for the conference's concluding document, observance of the provisions of that document has been mixed, at best.

The regime's performance in observing basic human rights (Principle Seven) continues to deteriorate. Though the Romanian constitution contains guarantees of these human rights and fundamental freedoms, it and Romanian law in many cases either explicitly limit these guarantees, or set a standard of state control so vague as to make the guarantees meaningless. The constitution enshrines the Romanian Communist Party as the supreme, guiding authority in the country. Under this mandate the Party, the government and its internal security apparatus tolerate no opposition. All forms of mass media are state-owned and tightly controlled. Freedom of speech is effectively restricted by well-founded fear of what may happen even to reasonable critics.

Romanian citizens must obtain official permission to organize or assemble; this permission is forthcoming only when the activity is seen by the authorities to be in the interest of the state and does not, for example, extend to small prayer meetings in private homes. Romanian government policy officially discourages emigration by its citizens except for the purpose of family reunification. Many of those who seek to leave face harrassment designed to dissuade them.

To avoid significant "passport denial" figures, the Romanian government refuses to accept an "official" passport

application (popularly called the "long form") until a decision to issue a passport has been made, a process which may take from one to five years from the time of initial inquiry. Once the decision to grant emigration permits has been made, the applicant typically is required to show that he has divested himself of all real property (at confiscatory, state-set rates), and then must rent what he previously owned. Those in employer-supplied apartments typically face eviction. With current housing shortages, the usual result is accommodation in already-crowded homes of family or friends -- often for several years. Almost without exception, potential emigrants are demoted or fired from their jobs although (as the government correctly claims) most are offered other employment -- typically, digging ditches in a distant city, cutting wood in the forests or farm labor positions in the provinces, with no provision for family at the proffered job site.

Though officially denied by the government, our experience is that many of those granted exit permits are "given the opportunity" to renounce their Romanian citizenship -- for a hefty additional fee -- so that they automatically become stateless persons and remain in that status, as well as without employment or schooling for their children, often for many years while attempting to emigrate. However, many of those who are permitted to emigrate for close family reunification are granted regular Romanian emigration passports and do not suffer as harshly. In response to the strong interest of other nations, however, the Romanian government in the current reporting period has permitted some emigration to continue.

In discussing human rights, Romanian officials in the past have tended to emphasize economic, "quality-of-life" benefits as among the most significant of human rights. By implication, lesser standards of performance should be tolerated, for example, in the area of human freedoms in order to achieve rapid progress toward the primary goal: "The housewife doesn't care about freedom of speech if her cupboard is bare." They have cited housing, dietary and other statistics (often questionable) as evidence of rapid progress in this area and as a defense against charges of human rights abuses in their country. Recent actual performance by the regime in maintaining the quality of life for its citizens has been abysmal. This winter was especially harsh and highlighted the regime's incapacity to provide essentials such as sufficient heat and energy to its people. Over the years, rigid policies of heavy industrial development have gradually brought Romania, once a primary agricultural supplier for Central Europe to the point where basic foodstuffs are rationed and often unavailable

even in the amounts allowed, and where the standard of living is probably the lowest in Eastern Europe.

Although it recognizes, supports and closely controls the activities of the 14 separate church organizations, the expression of religious belief is carefully monitored and discouraged by the government. Communist Party members -- virtually all persons with positions of responsibility are members of the party -- cannot practice a religious faith. Religious practitioners who go beyond the narrow limits defined by the government are sometimes sharply and brutally rebuffed. The government, many times acting directly through its "Department of Cults" (the state organ responsible for the activities of the officially recognized faiths), continues to harass activist pastors and congregations. There were, during this period, for example, eight qualified Baptist pastors who had been recognized by the Baptist Union, some as long as one year, who had not been granted licenses by the Department of Cults. In at least three of these cases, this denial has resulted in the withholding of residence permits for the cities where they preach. (One of these pastors was fined in January 1985 for remaining in the city overnight without permission.)

The congregations also continue to suffer long delays in receiving permission to undertake renovations or extend their churches. In November 1984, the city authorities in Bistrita demolished a Baptist church, which was under construction and near completion, for infractions of local building codes. In Oradea, the second Baptist church congregation has received assurances that a new church will be completed before demolition of the present structure due to an urban redevelopment plan, and after considerable negotiation the congregation has accepted a new site offered by local authorities.

Government practices with respect to other denominations are less restrictive: the Romanian Orthodox church, long established as Romania's major religious body, actively supports the government and is at pains to avoid any open conflict with the regime, although reliable reports indicate some friction, for example, over the continuing destruction of historic churches in the name of "urban renewal." The Roman Catholic church, long at odds with the regime over the latter's insistence that links with Rome be severed and for other reasons, in this reporting period arrived at informal accommodations which have permitted significant progress toward church goals. The Jewish community, is now some 28,000 out of a prewar population estimated at over 900,000, due to a large

extent to emigration to Israel and the US, may be relatively better off than some of their co-religionists in Eastern Europe. Romania remains the sole Warsaw Pact state to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Madrid Concluding Document states that the participating states "will favorably consider application by religious communities of believers practicing or prepared to practice their faith within the constitutional framework of their states, to be granted the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions, and organizations." Soon after Romania agreed to implement the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, Romania rejected attempts by the Church of the Latter-Day Saints to gain official recognition because "Romania already has enough churches." The Eastern-Rite Catholic, or Uniate Church, banned in 1948, remains illegal. Church leaders petitioned the Madrid conference for reinstatement by the government of Romania, but there has been no discernible progress toward recognition.

As noted in our previous report, a significant gesture was made by the Romanian government in releasing Father Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa from prison in August 1984. However, during the past six months it has become clear that the gesture was little more than a change of location. Since his release, Father Calciu has been under virtual house arrest; armed, uniformed militiamen restrict entrance to his apartment building entrance, while plain-clothes security agents are permanently stationed in the hallway in front of his door and surrounding his building. No contact is allowed with foreigners, either in person or over the telephone, and few, if any, Romanian friends are allowed access. While attending church services or shopping, he is surrounded by security agents who prevent any contact with other people. Father Calciu applied for emigration in September 1984. The GOR has consistently denied this fact, and forbids him access to any of the consular officials located in Bucharest.

Self-determination of peoples is given much emphasis in official government pronouncements. Faced with a Hungarian-speaking population some estimate at almost three million (out of a total of 23 million) as well as substantial German and numerous other smaller minority groups, the government has adopted measures the effect of which is to discourage cultural and ethnic differentiation.

Terrorist acts, in the past generally held to be less of a threat in Romania because of the GOR's pervasive internal

security apparatus, nevertheless occurred here last December with the assassination of a senior Jordanian embassy official by a member of a Palestinian terrorist organization. The shooting, which occurred at a major (and well-guarded) downtown hotel past which the President drives each day, clearly caught the local security apparatus unaware; the Romanian authorities apparently still have not concluded their investigation of the matter. There were reports in the same period of another Palestinian terrorist plot which was frustrated by local security action and more recently of other planned terrorist activity. Romania lends extensive support to a number of "national liberation movements" (the P.L.O., SWAPO, the Anc, all of which have diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic missions in Bucharest). The government has publicly admitted to material support for such groups, and supplies arms, training and other support either openly or clandestinely to "national liberation movements" in a number of countries. There also have been other reports that Romania provides sanctuary to terrorists.

Through a number of state and party structures, Romania maintains tight control over the nation's labor force. As in other Soviet Bloc states, trade unions are merely an extension of the party and the state. The last attempt to organize a free trade union here was brutally suppressed in 1979. Despite continued reports of labor unrest, the government security apparatus appears to be successful in stifling further attempts to organize similar new movements. A study by the International Labor Organization officially cites Romania as being in violation of its Helsinki commitments by laws prohibiting free trade unions.,<sup>h</sup>

#### POLAND

The Polish government continues to express concern about what it claims are Western attempts to encroach on Polish sovereignty. The Poles insist that economic sanctions introduced by the USG after the imposition of martial law constitute an interference in Polish internal affairs. The government views Polish-language broadcasts by RFE, VOA and other Western radio stations in the same light as publication of this report. The Polish government is quick to attack unfavorable reporting by Western journalists on such sensitive subjects as human rights conditions as "provocations" and thus intolerable interference.

During the past six months Poland was not involved in any situation which could entail the threat or use of force against another state. In this sphere Poland has publicly supported



Soviet positions on such issues as the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The Polish government is extraordinarily sensitive about the permanence of the country's western frontier. Over the last six months the government-controlled media continued its campaign against alleged revanchist forces in West Germany, on several occasions suggesting that such forces are at least tacitly encouraged by U.S. policy, and that the U.S. questions the validity of the Yalta and Potsdam accords and the territorial status quo in Europe.

In addition to expressing special sensitivity about its own borders, GOP statements on territorial issues normally parallel Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. Polish statements supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes and deploring the use of force are in line with Soviet foreign policy positions.

The major development in the field of human rights in Poland over the last six months was the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a popular, outspoken supporter of Solidarity, and the arrest, trial, and conviction of the four security service (SB) officers who were responsible for the crime. The trial was unique in that security officers were put on public trial for illegal actions against a member of the opposition. In addition to Father Popieluszko, between January 1984 and January 1985 sixteen Solidarity activists have been deprived of life as a result of the use of force by SB personnel or as a result of involuntary or mysterious disappearances.

Polish authorities allowed a limited number of Western correspondents to attend the trial, and extensive coverage was provided in all Polish mass media. Polish coverage was censored, especially regarding testimony on the possibility that high-level figures were involved in planning the crime. Nevertheless, the trial did provide the country and the world with an inside view of how the Polish security apparatus works, and of the atmosphere that prevails in the SB. Toward the end, however, the trial deteriorated as the prosecutor and the judge began to spend more time attacking Father Popieluszko and the church, or defending the government's right to make such attacks, than they spent on discussing the guilt of the accused. However, all four defendants were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms. The two principal defendants received the maximum term short of the death sentence - 25 years - permitted by Polish law, although the government prosecutor, has demanded execution for the ringleader. Although the defendant's appeal of the sentence has been rejected, their crime has been classified as "political" to

enable them to benefit from any amnesty in the future.

On August 31, 1984, the government convicted two Solidarity leaders in the south-western city of Wroclaw of incitement to riot under summary procedures in a misdemeanor court. Under these procedures trials are often completed and sentences imposed on the day of arrest, with sentences ranging up to three months in jail plus a fine. During the last six months this procedure has also been used twice against Solidarity activist Andrezej Gwiazda, who received sentences for participating in a demonstration on December 16, and for failing to show his identity card to a militia (police) officer. In addition, Solidarity activist Jozef Pinior was sued before a civilian court and ordered to turn over 150 million zloties in Solidarity funds which he, as Solidarity treasurer in Silesia, had withdrawn from the bank a few days before martial law was declared.

The number of political prisoners has gradually increased during the reporting period. Of the twenty-two prisoners not freed under the July 1984 amnesty, eight, including Bogdan Lis and Piotr Mierzejewski, were later released (although Lis is back in jail). According to official Polish sources and confirmed by human rights activists there are now approximately 163 persons incarcerated for political offenses as opposed to 40 six months ago. In mid-February the authorities broke up a meeting of several Solidarity leaders in Gdansk and arrested three persons: Lis, and Adam Michnik of KOR, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk of Solidarity. (Frasyniuk was one of the two men sentenced to two-month jail terms in Wroclaw on August 31.) Three others were charged and released, and Lech Waleša was let go with a warning and ordered not to leave Gdansk without permission.

The Polish government allows significant religious freedom. Churches are free to preach, to publish and to proselytize. The Catholic church is allowed to broadcast Sunday mass over state radio, as are the small Protestant denominations on a rotating basis. After a long hiatus the government began to issue building permits for churches in 1980. Since then, construction has begun on approximately 1,000 new churches. However, persons who openly profess their religious beliefs still find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government or industry.

The Roman Catholic church is overwhelmingly the predominant religious force in Poland. A substantial majority of Poles of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic

religious services. The only other religious community with a significant number of followers is the Orthodox church, with about 5,000,000 members. Approximately a dozen other denominations exist in Poland, and the GOP allows them to practice their faith freely as long as they avoid activities construed by the government as political.

Church-state relations have cooled appreciably over the last six months. The mixed-church-state commission has met less frequently, and in September and February rumored meetings between Primate Glemp and Prime Minister Jaruzelski failed to take place. The church aid plan for private agriculture has stalled. Another round of the "war of the crosses" has been fought, with high school students in the town of Wloszczowa occupying their school for nearly two weeks. Bad feelings have been raised by government attempts to prosecute two priests who were involved in the sit-in after promising that no one would be punished.

The Popieluszko affair was the single most important cause of the downturn in church-state relations. Particularly offensive to the church was the government's attempts to turn the later stages of the trial into a "trial" of the priest and of the church. Since that point relations have cooled markedly, with a sometimes heated public debate being conducted on the alleged extra-religious activities of some priests. In mid-February Cardinal Glemp held a press conference at which he rejected government charges that priests are carrying out "illegal" activities. Even Pope John Paul II came in for an attack in the Polish press.

Solidarity and all other unions were delegalized with the passage of a new trade union law in October, 1982. Under this law Polish workers are allowed to join only newly established official unions. Since 1983 some 20,000 enterprise unions and nearly 130 union federations (which group together enterprise unions from factories performing similar kinds of work) have been formed. In November 1984 the "All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions" (OPZZ) was founded to serve as an umbrella group for most of these unions and federations. According to government statistics published in late February, the new unions have about five million members, some thirteen percent of whom are pensioners. (Solidarity maintains that the percentage of pensioners is around thirty percent, and that many workers have been forced to join or have joined in order to secure fringe benefits the unions distribute.) The total of five million members represents slightly over half of Solidarity's peak membership.

As presently constituted, the official unions are not an effective substitute for Solidarity. During the fifteen months of Solidarity's legal existence Poles were free to join the union of their choice. The government has ruled out a return to such union pluralism, saying that "pluralism" is merely the code word for those who wish to create a new anti-socialist political organization. The government has kept up its attacks on Solidarity leaders, attempting to discredit them as anti-socialist extremists and tools of such "enemy centers" as RFE and the CIA. This campaign has intensified since the end of the trial of Father Popieluszko's murderers, with propaganda attacks on Solidarity leaders at home and abroad, the arrests in Gdansk, and the government's refusal to allow Seweryn Blumsztajn, Solidarity representative in Paris, to return to Poland.

The OPZZ faced its first major test in January and February when the government sponsored "consultations" on the issue of food price increases. Shortly after the OPZZ rejected all three alternative versions of the government's pricing proposals, the government agreed to "stretch out" the price hikes over time. A few days later, however, the first increases were suddenly implemented, giving the impression that the government had made plans for such a "compromise" well in advance. The results of the "consultations" are likely to increase the deep skepticism with which most Poles regard the OPZZ's claim to be the independent, effective voice of the working class.

A commission of inquiry<sup>1</sup> of the International Labor Organization reported in June 1984 that several Polish government actions since the imposition of martial law are in conflict with Poland's obligations under ILO Conventions, particularly the conventions on freedom of association and the convention on the right to organize and bargain collectively. When the ILO governing body officially took note of this report in late 1984, Poland announced that it would withdraw from the organization.

Poland officially subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age or sex. Byelorussians and Ukrainians differ linguistically from the majority, and many are members of the Orthodox or Uniate churches. While they have somewhat greater difficulty building churches, training clergy and maintaining their languages, there is no legal discrimination against them. While there are allegations that these minorities encounter persecution, this appears to occur in the context of their

small numbers and the region's history. There are small Protestant communities in Poland, as well as a very small group of Muslims. At present only a few thousand Jews, most of them elderly, remain in the country.

Women have equal rights under the law, and there is no evidence that discrimination based on sex is a serious problem. Traditional views of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers remain strong. A large majority of working-age Polish women, including almost all those who live in rural areas, are employed. Many women have reached positions of responsibility in their professions, but relatively few have high government or Party posts.

Poland engages in many bilateral and multilateral cultural, scientific, economic, consular, military, educational, labor and recreational agreements which involve exchanges, participation in conferences, and fulfillment of obligations. Poland is a member of the United Nations and related organizations, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The government adopts a carefully legalistic approach to the question of international obligations, and in that context generally fulfills the letter of the obligations it assumes -- as it interprets those obligations. However, as noted above, certain Polish government actions have been found to be in conflict with ILO Conventions, and Poland has, on occasion, failed to carry out its obligations under the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. In public statements the GOP condemns terrorism. However, its pronouncements on this issue, as on territorial integrity, tend to be selective. Domestically, Poland has a select anti-terrorist unit, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has been used to help protect important visitors such as the Pope.

#### HUNGARY

Notwithstanding the imposition of police surveillance upon a prominent dissident economist, and a further accretion of power by the police, Hungary continued to maintain a comparatively good record concerning human rights issues. The most notable exception to this positive assessment was the authorities' decision to impose "police surveillance" upon Gyorgy Krasso, a dissident and economist who was imprisoned for about seven years following the aborted 1956 revolution. "Police surveillance" orders, completely extrajudicial proceedings which no court can overturn, are the Hungarian

variant of limited house arrest. The recipient of the order must remain home at night, is prohibited from visiting certain public places, must report to the local police station every week, and has restricted use of his telephone.

Reaction to this action taken against Krasso was swift and pointed. Taking advantage of the gathering in Budapest of international delegates for the CSCE Cultural Forum Prepccon, 12 prominent dissidents submitted a petition to the delegations protesting the house arrest order. During the following month, 300 people, including some leading cultural figures, submitted a petition to the authorities demanding that the order be rescinded. In early January, Krasso lost an appeal which cited a regulation that police surveillance cannot be imposed on a legally handicapped person (he suffered a partial loss of hearing during his incarceration during the early Kadar years). After losing the appeal, he suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. Since Krasso's release from the hospital, he has decided not to comply with the order and the police have not enforced it to date.

There have been no reports of any other police surveillance order imposed upon anyone for political reasons during the reporting period. Another dissident whose situation has deteriorated during the past six months is Romanian-born philosopher Gaspar Miklos Tamas. As in the previous period the government refused to grant him permission to leave Hungary to study or teach abroad unless he agreed not to return to Hungary. In recent months, he has been unable to support himself by translating articles because the three leading publishing houses claim they have no work for him. Furthermore, an invitation to visit Columbia University was withdrawn, reportedly at the government's behest, and Tamas is experiencing bureaucratic difficulties with the local authorities concerning his apartment. In addition to Tamas, at least 30 persons remain unable to secure passports at the present time for political reasons.

The appearance of samizdat continued, although the authorities raised the cost of getting caught in the process of its distribution. In October alone approximately 54,000 forints of fines were levied upon persons caught selling or otherwise handling it. The most damaging action taken against samizdat was a mid-January police raid on a "safehouse" outside Budapest in which about 1,000 copies of "Beszelo" were seized, about 50 percent of the edition's run. Increased police activity was marked by a slight increase in the the number of house searches, for samizdat and other undesirable publications

such as Koestler's "Darkness at Noon."

A new legal provision granted the police authority to search a car or person without cause (previously they were permitted to ask for identity documents only). It was the police attempt to examine some papers carried by dissident Gabor Demszky in 1983 which resulted in a nasty scuffle and Demszky's consequent hospitalization. Another development which underscored the limit of freedom of expression was a clash between the Hungarian Writers Union and the authorities following the publication of a poem addressing the fate of the leader of the ill-fated uprising of 1956, Imre Nagy, and drawing attention to those involved in his execution. The government and Party, caught between the hard choices of drawing more attention to the very subject matter they found extremely sensitive, and allowing the poet and the Writers Union official to go unpunished, imposed sanctions on the association until satisfied by the poet's resignation as deputy chairman of the Writer's Union. The normally settled relations between the Roman Catholic church and the state were seemingly affected by the Vatican's 1984 pronouncements against "liberation theology." Some Hungarian officials felt those pronouncements contained implicit criticism of existing East Bloc states like Hungary.

Government officials reportedly reduced the circulation of the leading Catholic weekly by ten percent and rescinded an earlier understanding with the church hierarchy that trained laymen could teach catechism in Hungarian schools and private homes. The Vatican and the government have reportedly failed to agree yet on the appointment of several new bishops to replace those who have reached retirement age. The specialized form of dissent in the Catholic Church, centering around the "basic community" movement, continued during the reporting period. The hierarchy supports the government in Hungary, so the authorities have seen little need to take action against these groups.

The Embassy has learned that Roman Catholic conscientious objectors to military service continue to be tried and sentenced. The hierarchy of the Hungarian church reportedly considers these individuals as both anti-Hungarian and anti-Christian. The Vatican has also allegedly withdrawn its support. Roman Catholic conscientious objectors have consequently been receiving increasingly severe prison sentences while members of two smaller churches that also support the right to conscientious objection have been offered the alternative of unarmed service.

Hungary's record of cooperation with overseas organizations interested in affairs affecting the tiny Jewish community (less than 1 per cent of the population) continued during the reporting period. Numerous delegations visited Hungary to examine and discuss with officials schemes for preserving Jewish culture. Domestic opposition within the small Jewish community continued with the publication of another (second) open letter by a person or group called "Shalom" which advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel and protested against alleged collusion between the official national Jewish office and Soviet propaganda.

#### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

There have been no changes in GDR practices regarding the first six principles. The GDR has respected the rights inherent in sovereignty; not used or threatened force; not violated frontiers; respected territorial integrity of states; not settled disputes by other than peaceful means; and there is no clear proof of GDR intervention in internal affairs of other countries, although the GDR continues strong support for Soviet activities in developing countries.

The GDR continues to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose. The West-German based International Society for Human Rights (IGFM) estimates that there are 7,000 political prisoners in the GDR (up 1,000 from last year's estimate), while the 13th of August working group, a West Berlin human rights group, puts this figure at 10,000 (versus 9,500 last year).

With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Participants in some meetings on church grounds have encountered difficulties with GDR authorities.

Following is a summary of reported examples of GDR violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms during this reporting period.

Shortly before Christmas, state security police (STASI) guards in the small city of Guestrow shot three youths who were



apparently creating a disturbance outside the local STASI headquarters. Two died, the third was reportedly hospitalized with leg injuries. Popular resentment was said to have run high in the Guestrów area, but the event was not reported in the East German media.

Church newspapers, which unlike other media are not directly controlled by the state, have been delayed, withdrawn from circulation, or self-censored under government pressure because they tried to publish letters or reports dealing with sensitive questions such as the peace movement and environmental policies.

There have been repeated reports of official discrimination against Christians, including against Christian children in public schools. Practicing Christians are regularly denied advanced education or training in many fields at the university level.

There were also some positive developments to note. After some 30 years of being officially prohibited from practicing their religion, Christian Scientists were able to meet with GDR state officials in December 1984 and arrange the import of limited amounts of church literature. Since then, some limited importation of religious materials necessary for workshop has been allowed. (Christian Scientists and Jehovahs Witnesses are still both under court orders restricting their religious practice, however.) The government has granted permission for some new churches to be built, and a Mormon temple is under construction in Freiberg, near Dresden. State pensions have been granted to Deaconesses (similar to nuns) working in Evangelical (Lutheran) church welfare institutions, thereby giving tangible recognition to their considerable contribution to care for the handicapped in the GDR.

State and party chief Erich Honecker met in February in Dresden with the senior Evangelical Bishop, Johannes Hempel, to reaffirm a 1978 agreement on the role and status of Christians in the GDR, including the principle of equal treatment. Hempel later complimented the official press on its fair and balanced coverage of the meeting.

There has been no evident punishment of GDR peace activists who collaborated with Czech dissidents in an independent peace manifesto, and later sent an open letter to Honecker (published in Western newspapers) criticizing GDR youth policies.

Self determination by means of democratic elections is not

possible in the GDR. Every five years GDR citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the "People's Chamber" (Volkskammer) and various local assemblies (Volksvertretungen). Though a 1976 election law states that voting will be secret, it is not in fact always so, and East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

Foreign diplomats in the GDR are effectively protected by GDR security forces. However, the GDR reportedly provides military training to members of groups which have been associated with terrorism in the past.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted in the GDR, and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the state. GDR unions are a captive political arm of the government and are used to carry out official and party policy.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia's compliance with Principle VII, concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, remains fundamentally flawed, and has not improved significantly during the last six months. The government's implementation of the Helsinki Final Act continues to be monitored by a small group of private Czechoslovak citizens who are signatories of "Charter 77" and/or members of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). The government, by means of short-term (i.e., 48 hours) detentions, interrogations, searches, intrusive surveillance, seizure of material and other forms of harassment, does its best to hamper these citizen efforts to monitor CSCE compliance. But we are not aware of any new trials of Charter 77 or VONS activists during the reporting period.

A document released by VONS on November 8, 1984, gives details on the cases of twenty-two individuals who are in prison because of their activities in the field of human rights; and another fifty-four who face criminal prosecution although they are not now in prison. (Several of these persons, including Rudolf Battek and Jiri Wolf, are serving sentences of five years or more.) However, VONS believes that these seventy-six individuals do not represent the total number of Czechoslovak citizens who are being prosecuted by the authorities because of their activities in the field of human rights.

The 17th Semiannual Report noted the plight of Jiri Gruntorad who, while serving a four-year prison term for "subversion," was given an additional fourteen-month term for filing a complaint against a prison guard who had allegedly beaten him ("false testimony," article 174/1). In a positive development, Mr. Gruntorad, who completed his four-year term in December 1984, was acquitted of the second charge in January 1985, and has been released from prison. He is currently under a regime of "protective supervision" for three years.

Another positive development during the reporting period was the fact that Western diplomatic representatives were permitted, for the first time in memory, to attend a Czechoslovak trial of a case involving human rights. If this practice continues, we would consider it a significant step forward in Czechoslovakia's compliance with the spirit of CSCE.

Previous reports have noted that in March 1984, the Czechoslovak government had for the first time imposed a regime of "protective supervision" against two individuals (Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky) who had served prison terms for political dissidence. Since then, Mr. Gruntorad and two other recently-released political prisoners -- Frantisek Starek and Vaclav Soukup -- have also been subjected to such a regime for terms of two to three years. The conditions that they must abide by differ in each case, but they include travel restrictions, curfews, and the necessity to report to the police on a regular basis -- in Mr. Lis' case, for instance, more than seven times a week. The imposition of such a regime (intended for habitual violent offenders) against persons who have never committed a violent crime, is clearly a form of harassment and an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

A continuing violation of Principles Seven and Eight has been the detention without trial of Miklos Duray, a leading spokesman for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Duray, who was campaigning to ensure the maintenance of the educational rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, has now spent ten-and-a-half months (since May 1984) in prison without a trial. In 1982, he was detained on similar charges and released four months later, again without a trial.

Another area where the Czechoslovak government is in serious violation of its obligations under Principle VII concerns the freedom of individuals to profess or practice their religious beliefs. The government makes considerable efforts to discourage religious practice, especially among the

young. One frequently-practiced method is to deny higher education to those who engage in religious activity, or to their children (such discrimination in education is also commonly practiced against the children of political activists, particularly those affiliated with Charter '77 or VONS.) Individuals who are employed in education, health, and certain other professions are frequently subjected to sanctions at work or loss of their jobs if they openly go to church or perform other religious ceremonies.

Although the Czechoslovak constitution states that there is freedom of religious practice, in reality this right is strictly limited by a variety of regulations.

One such regulation forcibly dissolved all male religious orders in 1950, and barred female orders from accepting new members. In November 1984, seven people, believed to be members of the Franciscan order, were detained and later charged with "obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies" (para 178). This case is reminiscent of, and apparently related to, a case involving a larger number of individuals who were arrested in March 1983 and also accused of being Franciscans.

An additional restriction on religious liberty is the requirement that priests and ministers must be licensed by the state, and the licenses may be withdrawn at any time. Priests and ministers who continue following their calling despite revocation of their licenses are liable to criminal prosecution. Religious education of children and intending clergy remains strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden.

The printing and distribution of unauthorized religious materials is treated even more harshly, and those apprehended are liable to criminal prosecution. On October 3, 1984, an accusation of "incitement" (para 100) was levelled against Matej Nemeth, a Catholic priest, who was accused of possessing illegal religious material "aimed against the Socialist system." On October 12, three Slovak Protestants, Jan Juhascik, Sr., Jan Juhascik, Jr., and Rudolf Sobanos, were taken into custody because they possessed religious materials, which the authorities believed were destined for the Soviet Union. Charges remain pending against them, although they have since been released from custody.

In a similar case during the reporting period, three Slovak

Catholics -- Alojz Gabaj, Bronislav Borovsky and Tomas Konc -- were sentenced on March 21 to terms ranging from sixteen to eighteen months each for having tried to bring three backpacks filled with religious material across the border from Poland.

Virtually all workers in Czechoslovakia are enrolled in the officially-sponsored trade union movement, the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (ROH). Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations which are under the control of the Communist Party. No organizations which are not approved by the state are allowed to exist in Czechoslovakia; unauthorized trade unions are also not permitted. Therefore, workers are not allowed "freely to establish" unions, nor are they allowed freely not to be members of the regime-sponsored workers' organization. Rights of unions -- such as the right to strike -- do not exist, although on occasion the official workers' organizations within industries or factories have been able to gain some improvements in working conditions through negotiation with plant management.

In its official statements, the Czechoslovak government has always proclaimed its adherence to Principle Four, respecting the territorial integrity of all CSCE states. On October 30, 1984, however, Czechoslovak border guards crossed into Austrian territory, where they shot -- and killed -- a Czechoslovak citizen, 25-year old Frantisek Faktor, who was attempting to flee to Austria. In addition to violating the territorial integrity of a neighboring state, this action illustrates the consequences of the Czechoslovak government's continued unwillingness to allow its citizens to travel freely.

Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. To what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance is impossible to say. Occasionally, Western press reports carry stories alleging that there are terrorist training camps on Czechoslovak territory. We are, however, unable to verify these reports.

#### BULGARIA

The Bulgarians continue to respect Principles One through Six. However, during this six month period, the regime reached a new high level of violations of basic human rights and minority rights. Bulgarian officials have not prevented security forces from committing the reported rape, detention

and murder of members of the ethnic Turkish minority during the government's campaign to assimilate these people by forcing them to change from Turkish names to Bulgarian names.

The Embassy has obtained reports from eyewitnesses that whole villages were surrounded by militia and army forces while ethnic Turks were rounded up and forced to exchange personal documents containing Turkish names for documents with Bulgarian names. The preponderance of evidence indicates that persons who resisted or tried to escape were shot and some women were reportedly raped as the Bulgarian forces "sought vengeance for five hundred years of Turkish rule." The wounded were reported to have been denied medical treatment. Travel in and out of the ethnic Turkish areas was heavily restricted. The Bulgarian authorities stopped Western diplomats and journalists, sometimes at gunpoint, from gaining access to the affected areas.

We have been unable to obtain exact figures on the numbers of deaths; estimates vary. There is no disagreement, however, among Western embassies that numerous deaths have taken place. It may have been the reported deaths of two militiamen that sparked violent reactions by militia comrades which brought about the deaths of numerous ethnic Turks.

The goal of the assimilation campaign appears to be simple: the total elimination of any minority identities in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government, however, has refused to acknowledge that any deaths have occurred and, until recently, it refused to acknowledge the existence of an assimilation program. Assimilation is still characterized by the Bulgarian authorities as "voluntary." The Bulgarian government has protested Western interest in the assimilation campaign as "interference in internal affairs," which the Embassy rejected, and mounted a propaganda campaign claiming that Western nations are "slandering" Bulgaria by promulgating information in the Western media about the assimilation campaign. Toward the end of this period, we learned that prominent ethnic Turks were being held at the Belene Island prison camp.

In addition to the repression of minorities but, in some respect linked to it, has been the heightened repression of religion during the past six months. During the assimilation campaign mentioned above, increased numbers of mosques were alleged to have been closed and some demolished. Muslim rites such as circumcision and burial were confirmed to be forbidden. "Tame" Imams have come out publicly stating that such rites are "unhealthy." We have learned that the teaching

of the Muslim faith is now forbidden in many areas, as is the use of the Turkish language.

The oldest and most prominent Protestant church was forced to accept a government-appointed pastor who earlier had presided over the demolition of two other churches in the country. The congregation's choice, two brothers named Kulishev, were forced from the pulpit and imprisoned. There is a strong likelihood that some members of the congregation have gone underground in order to continue church meetings.

The Catholic church still lacks juridicial recognition in Bulgaria and its clerics are subject to official harassment. According to reliable sources, two of the major problems facing the Catholic church in Bulgaria include the restrictions on Catholic youths from gathering in meetings prior to their sixteenth birthday and the lack of seminaries. During the period, Cardinal Koenig of Vienna visited Bulgaria at the invitation of the Austrian ambassador. Although he was met cordially by Bulgarian officials, he was not able to meet privately with Bulgarian Catholics.

During the period the Bulgarian government has not taken any steps toward greater cooperation on the prevention or suppression of international terrorism. Although we do not have any new information to add during this period on Bulgarian support for terrorist groups, we have no reason to believe that Bulgarian support either directly or indirectly has been reduced.

As a probable corollary to the assimilation campaign, internal terrorism has become a problem in Bulgaria and authorities cite their efforts against internal terrorism as evidence of compliance on the suppression of terrorism. As a result of a train bombing, a hotel bombing, a railway station bombing and an airport bombing, Bulgarian authorities have increased visible internal security mechanisms. We have noted increased roadblocks and heavily-armed guards around public buildings, and the appearance for the first time of a paramilitary organization dubbed by diplomats as "the Red Berets." This latter organization has supplemented regular militia security on diplomatic establishments, chanceries and residences, throughout Sofia. There are also indications that the "Red Berets" were active in the suppression of ethnic Turk resisters. For the first time in our memory, regular militia guards have been issued automatic weapons. Bulgarian authorities are clearly nervous about internal threats from terrorists.

The authorities are committed to the protection of diplomatic missions from acts of terrorism but Bulgarian efforts to thwart terrorism have not been in consultation or cooperation with Western missions or governments. In fact, our efforts to obtain information on the security situation have been met with official silence or refusal to discuss the subject.

Throughout this period of heightened security, embassy officers from various Western missions have witnessed actual incidents of police-state tactics as citizens were subject to identity checks and forcible removal from public transportation at gunpoint.

#### Principle Eight: Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples

Principle Eight reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine freely their own political status and to pursue their political, social, and cultural development without outside interference. Preferences of ordinary citizens are, of course, difficult to ascertain in countries which allow no political opposition and restrict the right of free expression. In connection with Principle Eight, the United States continues not to recognize the forcible and unlawful incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union. Expressions of nationalism in the Baltic republics, as detailed elsewhere in this report, and in other non-Russian republics are severely repressed by the Soviet Government.

The United States has also made clear that, in accordance with Principle Eight, the resolution of Poland's problems by the Poles themselves can best be achieved in an atmosphere of calm and moderation free of all outside interference. However, the Soviet Union continues to exert pressure on Poland's political process.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's 5-year occupation of Afghanistan continues to strike at the heart of the Final Act principles related to the rights of sovereign countries, refraining from the threat or use of force, the right to self-determination, and the acceptance of rules of international conduct. With a permanent military presence of over 115,000 troops, Soviet armed forces have directed a calculated terror campaign, including destruction of villages, killing of women and children, poisoning water supplies,



burning crops, and, most recently in the Panjsher Valley, indiscriminate high-altitude bombings against civilian targets in an effort to demoralize the resistance. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets continue to provide the Vietnamese with the support necessary to maintain Hanoi's efforts to subjugate and colonize neighboring Cambodia.

Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state, and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO Allies continued their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany notified the major maneuver, Central Guardian, which took place on January 21-31, 1985, on FRG territory with the participation of approximately 72,000 troops from the U.S., the FRG, Luxembourg and France. Observers were invited to attend by the Federal Republic. A voluntary notification was also made by Norway of the maneuver, Cold Winter 85, which took place on March 15-21 on Norwegian territory with the participation of about 10,000 troops from Norway, the Netherlands, the U.S. and UK.

Among the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries, Sweden

made a voluntary notification of the maneuver "Vastgrans" which took place from February 18 to March 5, 1985, involving 22,000 Swedish troops. Observers were also invited to attend.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies did not provide formal notification of any military maneuvers in the present reporting period, and there is no indication that maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops occurred. The GDR media reported on February 9-10 that a combined military exercise involving Soviet, East German and Polish troops would take place on GDR territory, but did not indicate the duration of the exercise or the size of the forces involved. Such reports cannot be considered a notification under the Final Act.

The Eastern record of compliance with the spirit, and in some cases the letter, of the confidence-building provisions in the Final Act has generally been poor. When notifications are made, they usually provide the bare minimum of information required. Czech notification of "Shield 84" last August failed to specify the dates and location of the exercise as well as the countries taking part. Similar omissions occurred in the notification of "Shield 82" by Bulgaria. In September 1981, at a time when great pressure was being put on Poland, the USSR failed to live up to its Helsinki obligations by not specifying the number of troops participating in the major maneuver, "Zapad 81," which led to a formal protest by the U.S. The voluntary notification of maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops and the invitation of observers from NNA or NATO countries have also been the exception rather than the rule. The only discretionary notification by the USSR occurred in 1983 for the maneuver "Dnestr" to which, in a rare move, observers were invited to attend from Turkey, Greece and Italy and a few NNA states.

It remains to be seen whether the Eastern performance noted above will improve when the Warsaw Pact next holds maneuvers of a size which will require notification.

Chapter Three  
Implementation of Basket II:  
Cooperation in the Fields of Economic,  
of Science and Technology and of the Environment

Some improvements were noted in the implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and the East European countries during the review period, but the level of implementation continues to be generally unsatisfactory. Commercial contacts were broadened slightly in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and certain other Eastern European countries, with an increase in official missions and businessmen visiting these countries. Business facilitation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continues to remain far below Western standards. Countertrade demands continue to complicate business relations with these countries, but there has been some decrease in the pressure put upon Western firms to engage in such trade practices. The economic reporting performance of the Soviet Union and other covered Eastern European countries deteriorated during the review period as many of these countries sought to mask increased economic problems.

The following country-by-country survey specifies the extent to which the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have implemented the Basket II provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

SOVIET UNION

General Assessment

Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions improved slightly, but continues to be poor. General business conditions underwent little change during the reporting period. There is promise of improvement in firms' access to direct telephone lines to the West, although only a few U.S. firms have received new lines. Business visitors had fewer complaints regarding difficulties in obtaining Soviet visas. Soviet publication of economic performance data has become more restrictive with the omission of some categories from the monthly production statistics.

Business Working Conditions

U.S. business representatives are generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and have few complaints about interference in their business activities.

Access to end-users has never been good in some industries and has not improved. U.S. firms report an increase in the number of inquiries from Soviet Foreign Trade Organization (FTO's).

### Business Offices

One U.S. firm lost accreditation during the period under review. It was charged by the Soviets with questionable business practices including bribery, according to one Soviet press article. In all, there are now twenty-six accredited U.S. firms with offices in Moscow, and one, U.S.-USSR Marine Resources, with an office in Nakhodka. Most non-accredited firms continue to have problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support.

Hotel and housing accommodations for businessmen have not changed. Visiting businessmen generally are able to obtain suitable hotel accommodations. Housing is satisfactory, although there is an ongoing problem about adequate provision for fire safety in the housing made available to business representatives. Business representatives have lodged few complaints about travel and visa restrictions, but ongoing problems occur for business representatives traveling by automobile for equipment installation inspections. Representatives are barred from using restricted roads, and face increased travel time as a result. The Nakhodka-based representative must use the Khabarovsk airport instead of the much closer one at Vladivostok.

Accredited representatives of U.S. firms, whether actually resident in Moscow or not, occasionally have difficulty renewing their accreditation. Denials tend to be made without explanation, but usually appear to reflect official opposition to marriage to, or the emigration of, Soviet citizens.

### Other Working Conditions for Business Offices

International communication links continue to be limited. Some offices of Western business in Moscow have received new telephone lines which permit direct dialing out of the USSR. A number of resident U.S. firms have sought, and been promised, by the Ministry of Communications direct dialing capability. Only a few firms have received the new service, although several others expect it in the very near future.

An active period of complaints about miscellaneous Sovincenter fees and restrictions on imports for Soviet staff

appears to have passed with no final resolution. There have been several recent complaints regarding Sovincenter provision of basic support services.

#### Availability of Economic and Commercial Information.

The availability of economic and commercial information decreased slightly during the reporting period. Several categories have been omitted from monthly production statistics published by the Soviet Union. Further omissions occurred in early 1985, perhaps reflecting an effort to obscure the poor performance of the Soviet economy. The availability of general information of the economy remains limited and the quality of the statistical data is often poor. Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic development remains severely limited.

Soviet policy toward cooperation arrangements has not changed. Soviet officials encourage such cooperation under mutually beneficial terms whenever an opportunity arises, although there is some skepticism about long-term relationships with U.S. firms. We are not aware of any new complications for existing cooperation arrangements with U.S. firms.

#### Official visits

In January, A U.S. delegation headed by the Under-Secretary of Commerce visited the Soviet Union for working-level talks on bilateral trade issues. Some CSCE Basket II concerns, such as business operating conditions, were discussed. Business visits continue, including those by senior executives of major U.S. firms.

#### Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements.

The trend continues away from requiring Western firms to link specific sales contracts with purchase contracts. However, the Soviets continue to insist that companies from which they buy engage in purchasing activity in the Soviet Union.

#### Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises are not different from those affecting other companies.

## Romania

### General Assessment

Romanian foreign trade policy continues to stress the country's need to enlarge its trade surplus to build up foreign exchange reserves and retire foreign debt. Trade officials are under instructions to limit hard-currency imports and generally to require Western firms which conclude sales contracts with Romania to accept payment in counter-purchases of Romanian goods. Over the last several years, the proportion of Romania's trade with other soft-currency countries, and especially CEMA, has grown as total volume of trade fluctuated downward. GDR 1984 trade figures, however, indicate Romania's trade volume is increasing once again. Trade with CEMA and other soft-currency countries nevertheless continues to be predominant given the GDR's reluctance to assume new hard-currency credit obligations with the West and Japan. A policy of limiting investment and reorganization of foreign trade has also contributed to a decrease in the number of contracts concluded with Western firms. While information provided U.S. businessmen working on specific projects is considered adequate, official information on the performance of the Romanian economy and international trade is tardy and incomplete. Transient and resident accommodations for businessmen are adequate though expensive and of uneven quality. Foreign firms' high local operating expenses in the face of poor sales prospects remain a significant burden to the development of trade.

### Business Working Conditions 'A

Embassy officers have generally had good access to government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations. Visiting U.S. government officials and businessmen obtain appointments with their Romanian counterparts easily in most instances. Senior-level U.S. officials and business leaders are often received at the highest official level of the Romanian Government. Businessmen have adequate access to directors of foreign trade organizations (FTO's) and their staffs. However, as a result of recurring personnel changes at FTO's and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, businessmen have difficulty pinpointing responsible decisionmakers for negotiations. Advance planning and appropriate notification to the U.S. Embassy generally facilitate establishment of appropriate business contacts.

During the past six months, there have been two opening and two closing of U.S. firms' Bucharest offices. Twenty-nine U.S. firms with separate offices are now represented in Romania. From past experience, authorities take six to eight months or longer to process applications of Western firms to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels is commonly offered firms in Bucharest. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian government agency "Argus". Romanian employees of foreign businesses must be hired through Argus. The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. Extremely high cost of telecommunications services is an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available for transient businessmen at rates comparable to world commercial centers. Resident businessmen are referred to the National Tourist Office to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time-consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable with those in Western Europe, though furnishings and facilities are often inferior. Rental and utility charges have remained constant over the past few years.

Visa restrictions are minimal and business travel is not impeded.

#### Availability of Economic and Commercial Information

Information for businessmen seeking Romanian commercial contacts is readily available, and Romania continues to distribute in several languages a range of information on doing business in the country. Romanian performance on publication of statistical data, however, is very poor, and is noteworthy for the omission of much basic statistical information common to government reporting elsewhere. Organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally twelve to fourteen months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. As a result of negotiations on rescheduling of foreign debt, Romania continues to provide more financial information to foreign banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions than it provided in the past. The requisite financial data for the first half of 1984, however, was distributed in early 1985, much later than usual.

### Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation

As a policy, the Romanian government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration. However, only one such venture involving a U.S. firm exists in Romania. Romania is interested in cooperating with American companies in third country markets, particularly in the development of natural resources and large construction projects. Although such projects have been discussed, no third country cooperation agreements with U.S. firms (except for ordinary subcontracting arrangements) have come to the attention of the Embassy.

### Official Visits

The U.S.-Romanian Economic Commission and the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council insure regular contact between senior-level U.S. officials and businessmen and their Romanian counterparts. The 1985 meetings of the Commission and the Council are scheduled to take place in Bucharest.

### Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements

As a result of the recent policies aimed at generating hard currency to make payments of principal and interest for reducing foreign debt, Romania has changed the emphasis of its countertrade policies. On the one hand, Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Thus, Romanian enterprises routinely ask Western firms seeking to sell goods to take payment in counter-purchases of Romanian-manufactured goods from the Ministries of Machine Building and Machine Tools. On the other hand, U.S. firms have encountered difficulty in setting up countertrade for their products when they buy Romanian goods. Romanian organizations want U.S. firms to buy their products for hard-currency and not link purchases of Romanian goods to purchase of U.S. goods. Consequently, a policy of what could be called "one-way countertrade" has developed in trade with the West.

### Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which maintain offices and so allocate the expense of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counter-purchases, which might otherwise force smaller firms