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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 11/12/2010

File Folder CSCE 1984 (9/1/1983-6/4/1984)

FOIA

M10-323

Box Number 90898(M10-323)

MIYAWAKI

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100197	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE CSCE (ANNOTATED) <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	9/1/1983	B1
100198	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO WILLIAM CLARD RE THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SEC SHULTZ (CSCE MADRID MEETING) <i>R 1/29/2013 M323/1</i>	1	9/2/1983	B1
100199	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH SEC SHULTZ (ATTACHMENT TP 100198) <i>R 1/29/2013 M323/1</i>	1	ND	B1
100200	MEMO	UNANNOTATED COPY OF 100197 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	9/1/1983	B1
100201	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN MADRID <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	5	8/30/1983	B1
100202	FORM	RE REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS (PARTIAL)	1	9/6/1983	B6
100203	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 100199 <i>R 1/29/2013 M323/1</i>	1	ND	B1
100204	MEMO	UNANNOTATED TEXT OF 100197 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	9/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 11/12/2010

File Folder CSCE 1984 (9/1/1983-6/4/1984)

FOIA

M10-323

Box Number 90898(M10-323)

MIYAWAKI

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100205	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO AT MADRID <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	3	ND	B1
100206	FORM	SAME AS 100202 (PARTIAL)	1	9/6/1983	B6
100207	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO DOBRIANSKY RE SEC SHULTZ'S EVENING REPORT <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	9/8/1983	B1
100208	PAPER	RE CSCE ON DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES DUE IN STOCKHOLM ON 1/17/84 (ANNOTATED) <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

100197

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George Shultz *GS*

SUBJECT: CSCE: Solving the Maltese Problem

① *A* *continued not to the CSCE concluding document unless serious*
The Maltese have still failed to join the consensus on the concluding document of the Madrid CSCE meeting. In view of this, the Neutral and Non-Aligned delegations have proposed that all other 34 participants in the CSCE agree, prior to the Foreign Ministers meeting September 7, 8, and 9, that they would implement all aspects of the Madrid concluding document despite Maltese opposition. *consideration is given to their demands for a...*

As you know, we have strongly supported the concept of consensus among all 35 participants. However, we cannot permit the Maltese to seize center stage at Madrid with their unacceptable demands for a Mediterranean security conference which would drag in Libya and other Arab participants. And we cannot allow the situation to drag on without resolution, since that would lead to pressure to implement individual portions of the Madrid concluding document -- particularly the CDE preparatory conference in Helsinki in October and the main conference in Stockholm in January -- on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. This would destroy the balance of the Madrid agreements and jeopardize the human rights gains in the document and the important human rights meetings which are to be held in the next two years.

G.S. intends to discuss w/you
I have therefore decided that we should support the Neutral and Non-aligned initiative for agreement among 34 participants. We will, however, stress our continuing belief in the principle of consensus, and will argue strongly that this agreement should be made "provisional," to make clear that it is open to the Maltese to join at any point should they decide to do so.

to meet the option as w/out resolution ... jeopardize the implementation of the gains in the document.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NARS M323 #100197

BY KML NARA DATE 10/16/12

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

83 SEP 7 AIO: 03

DEPT OF STATE



03 AUG 1 9 31

B

S/S # 8326553

DECLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CAS 11/21/10

MESSAGE NO 1456 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE No. Pages 1

FROM CHILL S/S 22540
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SEC/PRES: CSCE: SOLVING THE MALTESE PROBLEM

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB KIMMITT		
	NSC 75		
	Dobriansky		
	Schmitt		
	Raymond		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT. PLS PASS TO WESTERN WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATELY.

S/S Officer: Covey

CSCE

SYSTEM II
91039

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

100198

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{FD}

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Secretary Shultz
(CSCE Meeting, Madrid)

Attached at Tab I is a briefing memorandum for the President's meeting with Secretary Shultz on Tuesday, September 6 at 9:45 a.m. It addresses the status of CSCE and the Soviet-Gromyko bilateral. This memorandum and its attachments (Tabs A and B) assumes that the Secretary will be going to the Madrid ad hoc CSCE gathering and will meet with Gromyko. These memoranda were written before the September 2 NSC meeting on the tragic KAL incident. Thus, talking points have not been provided.

Please note that an NSC staff options paper (Log No. _____) regarding the KAL tragedy has recommended that the Secretary not meet with Gromyko -- to do so would be a signal of appeasement and accommodation. Such a meeting should be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations, and render assistance in finding the bodies and blackbox. If it is determined that Shultz should meet with Gromyko, his proposed agenda at Tab B is unacceptable. Rather, the focus of the meeting should be on the KAL incident and its implications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President with the attachments at Tabs A and B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Shultz memorandum, August 30, 1983
- Tab B Shultz memorandum, September 1, 1983
- Tab II Clearance List

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100198

BY KHL NARA DATE 1/29/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

DATE: Tuesday, September 6, 1983
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 9:45 a.m.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

I. PURPOSE: To provide the President with a comprehensive summary of the key issues to be discussed at the CSCE review meeting in Madrid.

II. BACKGROUND: CSCE is stalemated due to Malta's continued insistence that its proposal for a Mediterranean security conference be included in the Madrid final document. In anticipation of this impasse, the Spanish invited the Foreign Ministers to meet in Madrid for an ad hoc gathering. The Secretary accepted the invitation and will be leaving for Madrid after his meeting with you. He intends to discuss briefly his support for the suggestions of the neutral and non-aligned delegations that all 34 CSCE participants agree to implement all aspects of the Madrid concluding document despite Maltese opposition. (See Shultz memorandum attached at Tab A).

Bilateral: In addition to CSCE, the Secretary will discuss his modified agenda (due to the KAL incident) for his prospective meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. (See Shultz memorandum, Tab B, which was prepared prior to the KAL tragedy.)

III. PARTICIPANTS:

- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary of State George P. Shultz
- Assistant Secretary of State Richard R. Burt
- William P. Clark
- Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Jack Matlock, NSC
- Paula Dobriansky, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House Photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: Meeting of 15-minute duration.

Attachments:

- Tab A Shultz memorandum, September 1, 1983
- Tab B Shultz memorandum, August 30, 1983

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100199

BY KAL NARA DATE 1/29/13

100200

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George Shultz
SUBJECT: CSCE: Solving the Maltese Problem

The Maltese have still failed to join the consensus on the concluding document of the Madrid CSCE meeting. In view of this, the Neutral and Non-Aligned delegations have proposed that all other 34 participants in the CSCE agree, prior to the Foreign Ministers meeting September 7, 8, and 9, that they would implement all aspects of the Madrid concluding document despite Maltese opposition.

As you know, we have strongly supported the concept of consensus among all 35 participants. However, we cannot permit the Maltese to seize center stage at Madrid with their unacceptable demands for a Mediterranean security conference which would drag in Libya and other Arab participants. And we cannot allow the situation to drag on without resolution, since that would lead to pressure to implement individual portions of the Madrid concluding document -- particularly the CDE preparatory conference in Helsinki in October and the main conference in Stockholm in January -- on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. This would destroy the balance of the Madrid agreements and jeopardize the human rights gains in the document and the important human rights meetings which are to be held in the next two years.

I have therefore decided that we should support the Neutral and Non-aligned initiative for agreement among 34 participants. We will, however, stress our continuing belief in the principle of consensus, and will argue strongly that this agreement should be made "provisional," to make clear that it is open to the Maltese to join at any point should they decide to do so.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100200

BY KNL NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~

6069

100201

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Gromyko in Madrid

I. Our Strategic Approach

My meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid will be the first of a number of sessions with him in September. I see this series of meetings as an opportunity to pursue our testing strategy with the Soviets in a way that maximizes pressure on them to be forthcoming on issues we can identify as ripe for doing business, and, possibly, to attenuate their response to the prospect of U.S. INF deployments in Europe later this fall. Substantively, the Soviets have been responding in small ways to our testing (on the Pentecostalists, the grains agreement, CSCE, and even in START and MBFR). Having back-to-back meetings in September gives us a chance to create bureaucratic incentives for positive decisions in Moscow by putting issues before Gromyko in Madrid to which he should respond three weeks later.

Realistically, we cannot expect major movement from the Soviets in the weeks and months ahead: they are in a sour mood, and are facing a serious political defeat on INF deployment. Hence, we will not want my meetings with Gromyko to be seen as harbingers of a major breakthrough, or even a significant improvement in relations. If European pressures grow for a delay in INF deployment we may have to put less emphasis on the progress we have made and more emphasis on continuing Soviet intransigence. We want to maintain hope that obstacles to progress can be overcome; but suggesting that the Soviets are being less obstructionist than they really are could jeopardize INF deployments and our strategic programs.

The risk we currently face, however, especially with the allies, is not one of excessive expectations. Rather, they are worried about no progress at all, and as the INF deployment date approaches they will see a danger of all-out confrontation. These mounting concerns are being used to bring pressure on us to make concessions to the Soviets in arms control. For the present, I believe one antidote may be public perception that some modest movement in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations is possible. At the same time, we must counter any new over-optimism which could eat into support for our rearmament program by continuing to point to Soviet obstructionism on the essential issues.

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DECL: OADR

NLRR M323 # 100201

BY KNL NARA DATE 10/10/12

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-2-

The setting seems more favorable than for my meeting with Gromyko a year ago. We are regaining the initiative in international affairs from the Soviets. Our economic recovery and improved ties with our allies and friends give us reason for confidence in dealing with the USSR; we have a lead in the INF debate in Europe; and the prospect of your and Cap Weinberger's visits to Asia will demonstrate that we are on the move there as well. Of course, we will need alert U.S. diplomacy if we are to manage the strategic/MX debate here and the INF "hot autumn" in Europe successfully. We also face problems in the Middle East which give the Soviets satisfaction. But overall they will be on the defensive, trying to walk the line between demonstrating their unhappiness with the INF deployments and threatening counter-actions, and keeping the door open to dealing with the U.S.

We understand Gromyko's people have recommended to him that he engage me in a broad review of the relationship in the shorter Madrid meeting, and reserve discussion of specifics for New York. At Madrid, I will certainly want to convey to him that we are sticking to our broad agenda, and that there can be no basic improvement in relations before they show us in deeds that they are willing to act on our concerns about human rights and regional issues as well as arms control and bilateral matters. I will underscore our willingness and ability to sustain and win a long-term competition and undercut any illusion that they can simply wait us out.

But it would be a mistake, as I see it, to play Gromyko's game by putting off discussion of specifics to New York. On our side, we have, as you know, serious problems about treaty compliance in the arms control field and about fulfillment of their earlier commitment to liberate Anatoliy Shcharanskiy by early 1984 (assuming he appealed for early release, which he has been unwilling to do so far). We have major concerns over Soviet activities in Central America, Libyan forces in Chad, and Soviet-encouraged Syrian intransigence in the Middle East. I will want to press all these issues: they cannot wait.

At the same time, in order to get the most from the multiple-meeting scenario I should be in a position to demonstrate that we are ready to move toward settlements that are consistent with the interests of both countries. I do not expect Gromyko to be a willing partner: diplomats on the defensive rarely are. But rather than debate him on philosophy or on INF, I would like to put forward some new ideas in the arms control field. My hope would be that some of the

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-3-

modifications we are making in our negotiating positions in key negotiations -- START, INF and MBFR -- will combine with our continuing military buildup and our revived activism in the Third World to make the case for restraint and compromise more credible within the Kremlin.

The decisions we will be considering on arms control issues over the coming weeks will therefore be critical to success in my September meetings with Gromyko. If we wish to give the Soviet bureaucracy a push, in other words, we also need to give a push to ours.

Following the Madrid session, we may wish to consider whether we should invite Gromyko to Washington after the New York meeting. In that case he could meet with you as well as me. If properly managed such a visit could drive home both the seriousness of your message and contribute to the perception that we are doing our utmost to probe for Soviet flexibility. It would also position us well to make use of what may have to be our second theme of the fall -- that despite our efforts we are prevented from moving forward on the issues by Soviet intransigence.

II. The Madrid Agenda

At Madrid, I plan to take up all four areas of our long-standing agenda with Gromyko, but I will want to lead with human rights and arms control.

Human rights will head my list both because of its importance and the CSCE context of our meeting. Unless we have some word on Shcharanskiy before we meet, I will give his case -- and the promise Max Kampelman was given for his release -- top priority. In addition to Shcharanskiy, I will mention Sakharov, the Pentecostals, Soviet Jewry and the recently established "Anti-Zionist Committee," and the Soviet spouses of Americans that the Soviets are not allowing to emigrate. To put these cases in a broader framework I will also elaborate the themes of my CSCE speech, on the connection between human rights and security.

Gromyko will, as always, attach highest priority to arms control, arguing that for Moscow this is the litmus test of U.S. seriousness in pursuing more constructive relations. I will need to be able to deal with arms control in this meeting in a way that denies him the claim that we are intransigent in this important area. Accordingly, I propose to emphasize two basic themes:

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-4-

-- that we are serious about reaching agreements in START, INF and MBFR, and are prepared to be flexible as long as the end results meet our criteria of reductions, equality, stability, and verifiability;

-- but that Soviet failure adequately to address our concerns about compliance with existing agreements will undercut any prospects for reaching agreements.

On specific negotiations, I propose to proceed as follows:

-- On INF, I would like to give a substantive reply to Andropov's weekend message to you by previewing with Gromyko the new elements of flexibility that Paul Nitze will be outlining in the first days of the new round in Geneva. One thought would be to hand him your answer to Andropov. At the same time, I will want to reiterate that any increase in tensions from Soviet counter-deployments will be the Soviets' fault.

-- On START, I will point to the important changes tabled by Ed Rowny in the last Geneva round, and emphasize our flexibility in finding a mutually acceptable way to reduce the throw-weight disparity. Given Moscow's complaints that our proposal seeks radical restructuring of Soviet strategic forces, I would like to inform Gromyko in Madrid that at our UNGA meetings later in the month, I will be prepared to address possible changes to the framework of the U.S. proposal, if the Soviets are prepared to take similar steps to meet our basic concerns.

-- On MBFR, I plan to pick up on Dobrynin's reference to the possibility of additional verification measures, and urge that the Soviet negotiator present more specific ideas when he and Ambassador Abramowitz resume their private exchanges in Vienna.

As for compliance, the Soviets have to understand that much is at stake. I intend to voice in strong terms our concerns about the new large phased-array radar's compatibility with the ABM Treaty. I will state bluntly that the Soviet claim that the radar is for space-track rather than ABM purposes is implausible, and that failure to resolve the situation will undermine our arms control efforts. I will also reiterate our dissatisfaction with Soviet explanations about the PL-5's consistency with SALT II, and point to the corrosive effect on mutual confidence of Moscow's telemetry encryption practices.

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-5-

I also plan to press Gromyko on regional issues of importance to us. On Central America, I will reiterate our warnings against the introduction of Cuban combat troops or jet aircraft into Nicaragua and emphasize the danger that current Soviet policies -- particularly the large supply of arms -- could lead to a confrontation. Larry Eagleburger has just warned the Soviets about Syrian foot-dragging on a pullout from Lebanon, but I would plan to press the point again with Gromyko. Afghanistan will, of course, be touched on, but New York on the eve of the UNGA Afghanistan debate is probably a better place to press the Soviets. We want to keep up the pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan, and if we are careful should be able to assure that they take the blame for any failure of the UN-sponsored negotiating effort currently underway. Similarly, in order to keep the Soviets from claiming that lack of consultation on southern Africa excuses their foot-dragging there, I plan to offer Gromyko another side meeting at senior working level -- with Chet Crocker on our side as before -- at the UNGA.

I plan to use bilateral issues essentially as means to suggest to the Soviets that further progress may be possible in our bilateral relationship if they are willing to meet our concerns on other, more vital issues. If we can develop negotiating positions on the consulates and exchanges agreement in time, these could serve as examples. But I will underscore to Gromyko that small steps forward in such areas cannot substitute for agreement on more substantive questions.

~~SECRET~~

160202

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OE0B

Please admit the following appointments on Tuesday, September 6, 1983

for The President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
State
Secretary George P. Shultz
Assistant Secretary Richard R. Burt
Amb. Arthur A. Hartman

B6.



White House
William P. Clark
Jack Matlock

NSC
Paula Dobriansky

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing
Room No. Oval Office
Time of Meeting 9:45 a.m.

Requested by Francesca Lapinski
Room No. 368 Telephone x5646
Date of request September 2, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OE0B - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
91039

1. Route
FILE -> 2. CSCE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

September 5, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACOB MATLOCK/PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PRS for*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Secretary Shultz
(CSCE Meeting, Madrid)

Attached at Tab I is a briefing memorandum for the President's meeting with Secretary Shultz on Tuesday, September 6 at 9:45 a.m. It addresses the status of CSCE and the Shultz-Gromyko bilateral (Tabs A and B).

As he noted at the NSC meeting, in his bilateral session with Gromyko Shultz plans to concentrate on the KAL tragedy, treaty compliance, and human rights. The Shultz memo on the bilateral (Tab B) is an advance, unsigned copy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President with the attachments at Tabs A and B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting memorandum for the President
- Tab A Shultz memorandum, August 30, 1983
- Tab B Shultz memorandum, undated
- Tab II Clearance list

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *11/17/17*, DATE *11/17/17*

S

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: Tuesday, September 6 1983

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 a.m.

NLRR M323 #100203

Y KML NARA DATE 1/29/13 FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

I. PURPOSE: To provide the President with a comprehensive summary of the status of the CSCE review meeting in Madrid, and the topics Secretary Shultz plans to raise with Gromyko.

II. BACKGROUND: CSCE is stalemated due to Malta's continued insistence that its proposal for a Mediterranean security conference be included in the Madrid final document. In anticipation of this impasse, the Spanish invited the Foreign Ministers to meet in Madrid for an ad hoc gathering. The Secretary accepted the invitation and will be leaving for Madrid after his meeting with you. He intends to discuss briefly his support for the suggestions of the neutral and non-aligned delegations that all 34 CSCE participants agree to implement all aspects of the Madrid concluding document despite Maltese opposition. (See Shultz memorandum attached at Tab A).

Bilateral: In addition to CSCE, the Secretary will review the modified agenda for his meeting with Gromyko, that he suggested at Friday evening's NSC meeting. The Secretary plans, you will recall, to focus on the KAL tragedy, treaty compliance, and human rights (Tab B).

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Assistant Secretary of State Richard R. Burt

William P. Clark

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Jack Matlock, NSC

Paula Dobriansky, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House Photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: Meeting of 15 minute duration.

Tab A Shultz memorandum, September 1, 1983

Tab B Shultz memorandum, undated

Prepared by:

Paula Dobriansky/Tyrus Cobb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

100204

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

30

p 2: 52

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George Shultz *WS*
SUBJECT: CSCE: Solving the Maltese Problem

The Maltese have still failed to join the consensus on the concluding document of the Madrid CSCE meeting. In view of this, the Neutral and Non-Aligned delegations have proposed that all other 34 participants in the CSCE agree, prior to the Foreign Ministers meeting September 7, 8, and 9, that they would implement all aspects of the Madrid concluding document despite Maltese opposition.

As you know, we have strongly supported the concept of consensus among all 35 participants. However, we cannot permit the Maltese to seize center stage at Madrid with their unacceptable demands for a Mediterranean security conference which would drag in Libya and other Arab participants. And we cannot allow the situation to drag on without resolution, since that would lead to pressure to implement individual portions of the Madrid concluding document -- particularly the CDE preparatory conference in Helsinki in October and the main conference in Stockholm in January -- on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. This would destroy the balance of the Madrid agreements and jeopardize the human rights gains in the document and the important human rights meetings which are to be held in the next two years.

I have therefore decided that we should support the Neutral and Non-aligned initiative for agreement among 34 participants. We will, however, stress our continuing belief in the principle of consensus, and will argue strongly that this agreement should be made "provisional," to make clear that it is open to the Maltese to join at any point should they decide to do so.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100204

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

DECLASSIFIED

100205

NLRR M323 # 100205

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Gromyko at Madrid

As we discussed earlier, we have notified the Soviets that under present circumstances, it will not be possible for me to meet with Gromyko in the same format we had previously agreed to for Madrid, and that we now envisage a briefer meeting on Thursday. We have not yet received Moscow's reply.

Although it is still possible that Gromyko will reply by cancelling the meeting entirely, I suspect he will not want to bear the onus of breaking off dialogue with us at a time when the Soviets are under tremendous international pressure, and I thus expect the meeting to take place.

Assuming Gromyko agrees to a shortened meeting, I intend to focus my presentation on three issues: (1) first and foremost the Korean airliner; (2) arms control treaty compliance (Soviet testing of new ICBMs, and especially their new large phased-array radar); and (3) human rights (Shcharanskiy, plus Jewish emigration/anti-Semitism).

In these three priority areas, we are justly accusing the Soviets of irresponsible conduct that makes it difficult to move forward in any field, and demanding authoritative explanations and corrective action. These three cases -- and regional problems as well -- also highlight the broader message I had intended to convey to Gromyko even before the airliner shoot-down: if the Soviets ever want to improve relations with us, they must deal seriously with the three interrelated problem areas of the use of force to settle disputes, the high and rising level of armaments, and the shortage of trust and confidence in the relationship.

I will set the scene by spelling out these problems and by showing how Soviet actions have exacerbated them:

-- On the KAL shoot-down, I will convey your indignation at the Soviets' brutal action, and their attempts to evade responsibility through the most preposterous explanations. I will point to the incident as an illustration of Moscow's

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

dangerous inclination to use force, but also of the effects of the Soviets' excessive arms buildup. I will push hard for all our specific demands: access to the area and anything recovered; compensation; assurances that it will never recur; and concrete steps to that end -- i.e. the measures you have proposed to improve communications and consultations so that there would be no need to react the way the Soviets did this time. I will stress to Gromyko that Soviet actions -- both the attack itself and Moscow's subsequent handling of it -- have delivered another blow to the mutual confidence that is needed if we are to make even incremental steps forward in our relationship.

-- I will then move to arms control compliance. I will stress the corrosive effect on arms control of the expanding record of Soviet actions that raise questions about the USSR's compliance with its obligations. Focusing specifically on the issues of "yellow rain," the PL-5 ICBM and the new large phased-array radar, I will stress that Soviet unwillingness to date to address our concerns seriously, like the KAL shoot-down, has eroded the mutual confidence needed for a sound relationship.

-- On human rights, my emphasis will be on the Shcharanskiy case. I will reiterate our expectation that Andropov will live up to his commitment to release him, the danger of further damage if they do not follow through, and of catastrophe if he dies in prison. In addition, I plan to voice our deep concern about the decline in Jewish emigration, and the recent increase in officially-sponsored anti-semitism in the USSR.

Gromyko will have his own agenda, and if he runs true to form it will probably include the Middle East and other regional issues. I will not engage him in extended discussion on such topics. If he raises the Middle East, I will take the opportunity to reiterate the markers we have already laid down to the Soviets on their behavior in Central America and on Lebanon/Syria, but will essentially defer all discussion on topics outside the three issues we have chosen to our later UNGA sessions in New York.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

W
Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow/TWSimons, Jr. *tw*
9/5/83 x8040 2058m

Cleared: EUR:MPalme
EUR:RBurt *Φ*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

100206

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Tuesday, September 6, 1983

for The President of White House

(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
The Vice President

(AGENCY)

B6.

State

Secretary George P. Shultz
Assistant Secretary Richard R. Burt
Amb. Arthur A. Hartman



White House

William P. Clark
Jack Matlock

NSC

Paula Dobriansky

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing

Requested by Francesca Lapinski

Room No. Oval Office

Room No. 368 Telephone x5646

Time of Meeting 9:45 a.m.

Date of request September 2, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

CSCE

100207

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of

The following excerpt is for your information only. Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

1. CSCE - Maltese Impasse Ends. The Maltese finally agreed yesterday to join a consensus of 35 in the Madrid CSCE Review Conference. They gave up their demands for a Mediterranean security conference in return for some bland face-saving language in a Chairman's statement. This means that the Foreign Ministers meeting today through Friday can be held on the basis of a definitive CSCE consensus, rather than on the basis of a 34 nation ad hoc agreement to abide by the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. With a consensus on the concluding document, Madrid is formally concluded and the CSCE process will move on to further meetings on the schedule. The next meeting is the European Security Conference (CDE) beginning with a preparatory meeting in October and the main meeting in Stockholm in January.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 * 100207

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~

CSCCE DIGEST

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

U.S. Congress • Washington, D.C. 20515

202/225-1901

October 12, 1983

* * SPECIAL EDITION * *

This special edition of the "Digest" consists exclusively of an analysis of the Madrid Review Meeting, which concluded September 9 after nearly three years. We will revert to our usual format with our next edition.

The Madrid Meeting - An Analysis

The second follow-up meeting of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) finally came to a close on September 9, 1983, nearly three years after the deliberations began on November 11, 1980. Burdened throughout by sharply deteriorating East-West relations -- the result of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland and continuing Soviet human rights abuses -- the Madrid Meeting served to focus international attention on Soviet actions which violated the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Even the formal closing week of the meeting was overshadowed by yet another Soviet atrocity -- the shooting down of a Korean commercial airliner with the loss of 269 lives.

Review meetings like Madrid and its predecessor in Belgrade (October 1977 - March 1978) have a three-fold function: a review of the implementation records of the 35 participating states, the consideration of new proposals to enhance the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the adoption of a concluding document. The review of implementation at Madrid was frequently heated, at times tempestuous. Continuing East-West tensions over human rights and other issues determined that the consideration of new proposals and the adoption of a concluding document would necessarily be a protracted affair. While it did not take consensus to criticize implementation failures, CSCE procedures require unanimous consent of all 35 signatory states for agreement to a concluding document. The gulf between East and West was such, particularly on the key issues of human rights and military security, that more than two years of negotiations were necessary to produce the compromise concluding document. The length of these negotiations was also heavily conditioned by external events such as Poland and Afghanistan which had a strong negative effect on the proceedings.

COMMISSIONERS

Dante B. Fascell, Chairman • Robert Dole, Co-chairman
Senators Orrin Hatch, John Heinz, Alfonse M. D'Amato, Claiborne Pell, Patrick J. Leahy
Representatives Sidney R. Yates, Timothy E. Wirth, Edward J. Markey, Don Ritter, Christopher H. Smith

R. Spencer Oliver, Staff Director • John Sandstrom, Editor

The Preparatory Meeting

That Madrid would be a particularly difficult meeting was already evident at the very start during the nine-week preparatory session held from September to November 1980. Originally envisioned to last two to three weeks, the preparatory session was still in deliberation at midnight on November 10, 1980, with the main conference slated to open the next day. The inability to reach agreement on an agenda and procedures was largely the result of Soviet efforts to deny the West sufficient opportunity to conduct a thorough and orderly review of implementation. Repeated Soviet refusal to agree to procedural arrangements based on the Belgrade model led to fears that Moscow had decided to scuttle the CSCE process.

Finally, four days after the main meeting had begun, the Soviets agreed to procedures closely resembling those used at Belgrade, i.e., a separate phase for the review of implementation and deliberations conducted both in plenaries and specialized working groups, one for each "basket" or section of the Final Act. In return, the West agreed to a small reduction in the length of the formal review period and to dropping the provision automatically providing for the next CSCE review meeting.

The Review of Implementation

For nearly six weeks, from November through December 1980, the signatory states conducted an in-depth and contentious review of the state of implementation of the provisions of the Final Act with special attention focused on Eastern human rights violations and the invasion of Afghanistan. While this phase formally ended shortly before Christmas 1980, in fact the consideration of implementation questions continued throughout the entire three years of the meeting. The human rights and other violations resulting from the imposition of martial law in Poland and the banning of the free trade union Solidarity, along with continuing Soviet repression, imprisonment of human rights activists and the occupation of Afghanistan, were themes to which Western delegations, and particularly the U.S., turned repeatedly.

Specifically, the U.S. delegation, headed for the first few months by former Attorney General Griffin Bell and for the remainder of the meeting by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, made explicit reference to some 119 individuals in Warsaw Pact countries whose Helsinki-guaranteed rights had been in one way or another violated. A large number of these were members of the Moscow, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian and Armenian Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the USSR, the Charter '77 organization in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland. The U.S. delegation cited the cases of such well-known dissidents as Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov, Andrei Sakharov, Mykola Rudenko and Viktorus Petkus, as well as lesser-known victims of Soviet and East European repression. Other human rights

concerns raised by the U.S. and other Western delegations included the continuing repression of those advocating cultural and linguistic freedoms, the attempted Russification of the Baltic states and Ukraine, the persecution of religious activists, Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes, the denial of emigration rights to Soviet Jews and others, and the harassment of members of unofficial peace groups and labor unions.

While the tactic of directly citing specific examples of human rights violations put the Eastern bloc decidedly on the defensive at Madrid, it did little to alleviate the plight of most of those human rights activists. During the course of the Madrid Meeting, more than 500 people in the Soviet Union alone were imprisoned for their activities on behalf of Helsinki-related goals. Nevertheless, these activists continued to urge that their cases be brought to public attention.

The invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces was frequently denounced by Western delegations at Madrid. In November 1980, Commission Chairman Dante B. Fascell, in his capacity as Vice-chairman of the U.S. delegation, delivered a strongly worded condemnation of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

The imposition of martial law in Poland, which violated the most basic precepts of the Helsinki Accords, became virtually the sole focus of the meeting during the period from February-March, 1982. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the Foreign Ministers of all the NATO states, in addition to several from the Neutral and Non-aligned countries (NNA), came to Madrid to denounce the imposition of martial law and the clear Soviet complicity in the events in Poland. In November 1982, Commission Co-chairman Robert Dole, serving as Vice-chairman of the U.S. Delegation, condemned the situation in Poland, catalogued the wide-range of Soviet human rights abuses and called on the Soviet Union to undertake a series of steps to improve their dismal record.

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, in his last major plenary address on July 18, 1983, crowned the implementation review by calling attention to the whole panoply of ongoing violations of the Final Act by the Soviet and East European governments. In that statement he noted that even during this concluding phase of the Madrid Meeting -- a period of negotiation and agreement -- violations continued. It must not be forgotten, he regretted, that "signatures on a document do not necessarily produce compliance with its provisions."

Ambassador Kampelman cited as examples continuing Soviet repression of Helsinki Monitors, religious groups and peace activists. He deplored the continued decline in Soviet Jewish emigration and the rise in officially-condoned anti-Semitic propaganda. This pattern of deeds contrary to promises made, Ambassador Kampelman stressed, was "the continuation of a pattern which has plagued the Helsinki process since 1975 and which continues to plague this meeting to this day."

In conclusion, Kampelman expressed the conviction that the Helsinki Final Act, unless taken seriously, will become historically irrelevant. For this reason he emphasized that the U.S. would continue to address implementation failures in various CSCE forums "in order to help mobilize a wider moral and political insistence upon universal respect for the Final Act by compliance with its provisions. Anything less threatens the integrity of our process and of our relationships under it."

On the whole, the Madrid Meeting produced a more thorough and candid review of implementation than was achieved at Belgrade, with a greater range of NATO and even Neutral and Non-aligned delegations criticizing aspects of Eastern compliance. Allied support for the tough U.S. stance on human rights issues was made considerably easier by the fact that Soviet representatives at Madrid reacted to criticism in a more relaxed and resigned manner than had been the case at Belgrade, where even the slightest criticism had evoked an immediate, polemical and for some, intimidating response.

The Helsinki Final Act is not a legally-binding document and there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, the review of implementation at follow-up meetings like Belgrade and Madrid have proven to be a timely and direct means of exerting political and moral pressure for improved implementation. Particularly at Madrid, the review afforded the opportunity for the vast majority of participating states to communicate to the Soviet Union their deep concerns about violations of the Helsinki Accords and to convey this concern through the media to the rest of the world as well.

New Proposals

In January 1981, the meeting began the consideration of new proposals designed to complement or reinforce already existing commitments in all the areas or "baskets" of the Final Act. In all, over 80 proposals were put forward. Both East and West strongly advocated their respective proposals for a post-Madrid security forum, while the West also emphasized its human rights-related proposals including provisions for experts meetings on human rights and human contacts, proposals dealing with the rights of Helsinki Monitors, expanded commitments in the field of religion and a series of measures aimed at improving the human contacts and information provisions in Basket III of the Final Act.

Despite 22 weeks of negotiations, from January through July, 1981, agreement could not be reached on which proposals to include in the Madrid concluding document. Two key issues were at the heart of the impasse -- human rights and military security. The West insisted that improvements in the military security area had to be balanced by adequate progress in human rights. The East was reluctant to make any human rights concessions and rejected outright many of the West's proposals. Important differences also arose over the nature of a post-Madrid security forum, originally presented in separate proposals by France on behalf of NATO and by Poland for the Warsaw Pact.

The participants reassembled in October, 1981 to resume efforts to reach an agreement. To aid in this effort, the Neutral and Non-aligned countries offered, in December 1981, the first of two formal compromise draft concluding documents. Unfortunately, the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981 shocked the meeting and destroyed all hope that any compromise could bring the Madrid Meeting to a successful conclusion by its scheduled recess date of December 18.

When the meeting resumed again in February 1982, the West used it as an occasion to condemn the martial law crackdown in Poland and steadfastly refused to be drawn into what it considered, under the circumstances, sterile and futile discussions on a concluding document. Such was the effect of the Polish crisis that the participating states agreed to suspend further discussions until November, 1982, by which time it was hoped there might be sufficient improvements in the situation to justify the resumption of negotiations.

Towards a Concluding Document

Despite continuing repression in Poland, deliberations resumed on the concluding document in the fall of 1982. At this time the NATO allies introduced a number of amendments to the draft concluding document which took into account the Polish situation, the continuing occupation of Afghanistan and the dismal Eastern human rights record. While formally agreeing to negotiate on them, the East rejected many of these amendments out of hand, while offering minimal concessions on the others.

In March 1983 the Neutral and Non-aligned countries launched their second effort at a compromise draft which omitted important Western proposals and which the Western countries found especially lacking in the human rights dimension. While providing for an experts meeting on human rights and some improvements in the area of family reunification, it contained neither an experts meeting on human

contacts nor adequate references to certain other human rights provisions which the West insisted would have to be part of a balanced and substantive concluding document.

Finally, on June 17 the Spanish Prime Minister, acting in his capacity as leader of the host country, launched a further compromise initiative which cut the remaining issues down the middle but which met the key U.S. demand for an experts meeting on human contacts. On this basis agreement was reached on July 15 by all the participating states, except Malta, on a 38-page concluding document. The agreement came as a result of a surprise decision from Moscow, reversing the previous Soviet position of adamant opposition to an experts meeting on human contacts.

The only remaining obstacle still in the way of formal adoption of the Madrid concluding document was the obstinate refusal of Malta to add its agreement unless its demand for a special meeting on Mediterranean security was accepted. Such a meeting was strongly opposed by a majority of participating states, which feared that it would become dominated by Middle East issues outside the purview of CSCE. Nevertheless, Malta stubbornly insisted on its proposal until September 6 when it abruptly accepted a Swedish compromise proposal dropping the security meeting idea entirely but giving Malta the possibility of launching initiatives - to which the other CSCE states would have to agree before being implemented. The Maltese change of heart was believed to have stemmed primarily from a decision by the other 34 states to go ahead without Malta in holding a meeting of their Foreign Ministers and in implementing the concluding document provisionally agreed on July 15.

The final three days of the Madrid Meeting -- September 7, 8 and 9 -- were devoted to closing speeches delivered in all but a few cases by Foreign Ministers of the thirty-five countries. The character of the meeting during these last few days was abruptly transformed into an atmosphere of sharp confrontation following the destruction of a Korean commercial airliner by Soviet military aircraft. The resultant loss of 269 innocent lives, including a U.S. Congressman and other U.S. citizens, sent shock waves around the world and cast a heavy pall over the Madrid Meeting.

The speeches by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and other Western Foreign Ministers, both NATO and Neutral and Non-aligned, were replete with sharp condemnations of this brutal action. The response of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who not only defended the action but threatened future "intruders" with the same fate, only served to increase the tension and the exchange of recriminations. The long-heralded bilateral meeting at Madrid between Shultz and Gromyko, which had been widely viewed as an occasion to reduce hostility and to move forward in the area of arms control concentrated, at U.S. insistence, on the airliner incident and other Soviet human rights violations.

The overall result was that the meeting ended much as it had begun, on a note of uncertainty and ill-will. Even the lengthy concluding document full of promises for improved East-West relations was largely eclipsed by the renewed confrontation.

The Madrid Concluding Document

The concluding document which finally emerged from the Madrid Meeting constitutes a modest advance over the Helsinki Final Act. The new or strengthened provisions are focused largely on those areas of the Final Act -- human rights and human contacts -- where experience has shown that the greatest problems exist. Whether the reinforced language of the Madrid agreement will produce any improved performance in these areas is open to question. However, if the Soviet Union and its allies choose to ignore the new human rights and other commitments which they have undertaken at Madrid, the cynical nature of these repressive regimes will be all the more clear to the world at large. This prospect alone may produce some improvements in Soviet compliance with both the Helsinki and Madrid agreements.

New provisions contained in the Madrid document include oblique references to Helsinki Monitors and direct reference to the right freely to join trade unions, to enhanced religious liberty, to measures against terrorism, to better working conditions for journalists and to improved procedures for family reunification. Provision is also made for six specialized or "expert" meetings on a variety of subjects, including one on human rights in Ottawa in 1985, another on human contacts in Bern in 1986 and a "Cultural Forum" in Budapest in 1985. A successor to the Belgrade and Madrid review conferences will be held in Vienna beginning in November 1986, thereby providing for continuation of the CSCE process. In addition, a commemorative meeting will be held in Helsinki in 1985 marking the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act. These meetings will provide an additional spur for the Soviet and East European governments to improve their performance, particularly in the human rights area.

In the security field, the Madrid concluding document provides for a multi-stage Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe to commence on January 17, 1984 in Stockholm following a 3-week preparatory session in Helsinki in October, 1983. This will be a major new security forum devoted to the discussion and negotiation of early warning measures designed to diminish the threat of surprise military attack. Based primarily on a French proposal and strongly supported by our NATO allies, the conference has been purposely structured to minimize opportunities for the Soviets to turn it into an amorphous "disarmament forum" for propaganda speeches. The conference during its initial stage is intended by the West to concentrate solely on developing concrete confidence and security-building

measures (CSBMs) which expand upon the confidence-building measures (CBMs) already in the Final Act such as the advance notification of military maneuvers. These CSBMs will be applicable to all of Europe, including the entire European part of Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains. This extension of area is a significant new step because the CBMs contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act exempted the Soviet Union from coverage except for 250 kilometers of its territory extending from its European borders.

For most of the Madrid Meeting, the Soviet Union and its allies, unlike the Western and NNA delegations, refused to commit themselves to the continuation of the CSCE process by agreeing to the date and place of the next follow-up review conference. Instead, they hinged their agreement upon what they deemed the "successful" outcome of Madrid, meaning that the meeting had to be crowned with the establishment of a large-scale security meeting. In reality this was an attempt to intimidate the other participants into believing that the Helsinki process would end if the Madrid Meeting did not conclude to Soviet satisfaction. In the final analysis the Soviets dropped their preconditions and agreed to another follow-up review conference in Vienna, approximately three years after the conclusion of Madrid, a reasonable interval for ensuring the viability of the review process.

The Madrid Meeting in Perspective

When the Madrid Meeting began in November 1980, no one could have reasonably predicted that it would last for nearly three years. Certainly, the strained international atmosphere during the meeting -- the result of continued Soviet human rights violations, the occupation of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland -- did not provide a propitious climate for a speedy and successful conclusion.

Yet, these circumstances alone do not account for the protraction of the Madrid Meeting. Another basic reason for the length of the negotiations is that certain conference participants, notably the NNA countries and most of the NATO allies, were extremely desirous to end Madrid with a substantive and balanced concluding document in contrast to the outcome of the first CSCE review meeting in Belgrade -- a terse communique containing no new measures. A repeat of Belgrade at Madrid, they feared, would significantly diminish the stature and viability of the CSCE process.

In addition, many West European and NNA governments, under growing domestic pro-disarmament pressure, were anxious that the Madrid Meeting provide an impetus for improvements in East-West relations as well as for the invigoration of arms control negotiations. The focus of this latter desire was a strong push for a Madrid-mandated Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Particularly the United States, but other Western states as well, insisted that such a security conference be balanced by comparable developments in the human rights dimension of the Helsinki process. The difficult negotiations leading to the achievement of such a balance also account in great measure for the length of the Madrid Meeting.

On the whole, the results of the Madrid Meeting are mixed. On the plus side, the ending of the meeting with a balanced and substantive concluding agreement containing provisions for a security conference and the experts meetings on human rights and human contacts met with evident satisfaction among the Western allies and the Neutral and Non-aligned countries. At the same time, Madrid failed to produce any credible sign that the Soviet Union intends to regard its new commitments as an obligation to cease or diminish the pattern of internal repression and external brutality which characterized Soviet behavior throughout the entire meeting. In fact, such behavior, ranging from curtailed emigration to increased political oppression, is striking evidence that Soviet implementation of its Helsinki promises is at or near its lowest point since the signing of the Final Act in 1975.

Furthermore, there is no convincing evidence as yet that the Soviets intend to make the gestures of good will, including the release of political prisoners, which the U.S. informally demanded as a condition for ending the Madrid Meeting. If such gestures are eventually forthcoming, even though they may be merely one time concessions and hold no promise of changing basic Soviet behavior patterns, the Madrid Meeting will at least have established some minimal correlation between words and deeds in the CSCE process. On the other hand, the absence of even these minimal signs of good faith will be another clear indication that the Soviet Union does not have the slightest intention of honoring the human rights commitments it agreed to at Madrid.

A further question is whether the Korean airliner catastrophe will have a permanent impact on the results of the Madrid Meeting by, in effect, cancelling out the modest gains achieved in the concluding document. Whatever its long term effect, it seems certain that it will rank alongside the invasion of Afghanistan, the brutal imposition of martial law in Poland and the unrelenting repression of human rights in the Soviet Union as a major shock to the CSCE process. Nevertheless, the fact that the CSCE process can continue to sustain such setbacks and still survive would appear to indicate that the participating States themselves still view it as a viable mechanism for the consideration of East-West problems.

It can be said, in fact, that the participating states at Madrid, by mandating a series of specialized CSCE meetings ranging from military security to human rights to culture, have created, in effect, the foundations of a continuing framework for the consideration of a broad spectrum of East-West issues. It is generally acknowledged that the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament will likely continue for several years. Similarly, the specialized meetings on other issues may well be repeated in one form or another just as the post-Belgrade meetings on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Mediterranean Cooperation have now been scheduled to hold additional sessions between the Madrid and Vienna Conferences. Although, in terms of real accomplishment, the record of those meetings held so far is not particularly encouraging, they do serve to keep the door open to further dialogue and the possibility of some concrete progress when the international climate is propitious.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: CSCE Fifteenth Semiannual Report

At Tab II is the 15th Semiannual Report which has been submitted to the CSCE Commission. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period June 1 through November 30, 1983. The purpose of this report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab II.

Jack Matlock *JM* and Peter Sommer *PS* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab II CSCE - 15th Semiannual Report

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE Fifteenth Semiannual Report

The Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been completed. It surveys the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document and significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period June 1 through November 30, 1983. Key highlights of the Report include:

1. The Madrid Concluding Document (agreed to on September 7, 1983) raises the standards for responsible international behavior by strengthening and expanding the undertakings contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Specifically, some of the new provisions added include: (a) further support for and legitimization of "Helsinki monitoring groups" in the USSR and East Europe; (b) assured access of visitors to diplomatic missions and consular posts; (c) the resolution of family reunification cases "within six months"; and (d) "the insurance of the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions ..." (first reference to trade unions).
2. During the six-month review period, the USSR and Eastern Europe continued not to abide by their Helsinki undertakings. The most egregious violation was the sentencing by Soviet courts, within a few weeks after the agreement to the Madrid Final Document, of noted human rights activists Iosif Begun and Oleg Radzinskiy on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."
3. Performance on implementation of the Final Act varied. Human Rights: Eastern Europe's record (with the exception of Hungary) remained fundamentally flawed and, in some cases, showed no change in compliance. During this period, repression of dissidents and Jews increased in the Soviet Union. Economic: Most East European countries and the USSR demonstrated no marked improvement in compliance with Basket II provisions. For example, they continued to restrict the quantity and quality of economic/commercial information. Only the records of Hungary and Romania were satisfactory.

Prepared by: Paula Dobriansky

FIFTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
JUNE 1, 1983 - NOVEMBER 30, 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 19, 1983

FILE 8732
Dobriansky
PR

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Summary: CSCE Fifteenth Semiannual Report

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Prepared by: Paula Dobriansky

cc: Vice President

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: CSCE Fifteenth Semiannual Report

TYPE 3
SIGNED

At Tab II is the 15th Semiannual Report which has been submitted to the CSCE Commission. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act during the period June 1 through November 30, 1983. The purpose of this report is to assist the CSCE Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Accords. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the highlights of the Report. There is no need to forward the Report at Tab II.

Jack Matlock *Jan* and Peter Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab II CSCE - 15th Semiannual Report

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I
 Package # 8732
add on
CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>f</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>+</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date Time)

↑

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*SUBJECT: Fifteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE
Commission

I have reviewed and concur in the text submitted by the Department of State under memorandum of December 2, 1983 (Tab II), of the 15th Semiannual Report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission. As required by Public Law 94-304, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz authorizing the transmission of the report to the Commission on behalf of the President. Your authorization is needed by noon tomorrow, December 3, 1983, since the report is due at the Commission on Monday, December 5, 1983.

JM Jack Matlock, *RR* Roger Robinson and *PS* Peter Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the transmitting memorandum to Secretary Shultz at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed memorandum to Secretary Shultz
- Tab II State's memorandum, December 2, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100208

BY KML - NARA DATE 10/10/12

CSCE
1. Jm - Italy (missile
placement)



100208

CSCE on Disarmament and Confidence building measures
due in Stockholm on January 17th 1984

On behalf of our group, I have the honour to draw your attention to the increased militarization of all Central and Eastern European (USSR) states. All the nations to which we belong, reject this process which adds a tremendous burden and intensifies internal repression. Contrary to statements issued by various persons connected with their totalitarian leadership, public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe (USSR), considers Western aggression as most unlikely. This became obvious at the government organized demonstrations in Hungary, RSR and USSR where the millions of people who were marched through the streets lacked both enthusiasm and spontaneity.

Central and Eastern Europeans feel that previous talks on disarmament have not solved the problems because they concentrated on a few types of weapons - mainly nuclear - while ignoring a large range of other means. Officers of all rank, brought up by the communist regime have built the frame of a new janissary army, ready to support any form of internal oppression in order to defend the system which represents also a major threat for peace in Europe.

To eliminate the danger of war, all these means must be first reduced and then banned. This requires a global agreement to start with a few steps :

- To reduce the compulsory military service period in the Warsaw Pact countries to the existing level of the NATO countries. At present, this period is twice if not three times longer in the Warsaw Pact.

- To reduce the number of soldiers of both sides, to the level which is lowest in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. When calculating the number of troops, para-military troops such as the KGB, secret police and military special troops should be taken into account. Those who lived during World War II cannot forget that the fighting and fire power of the SS para-military units exceeded by far those of the corresponding regular army.

- To reduce the number of Soviet stationed troops in the various Central European countries.

- To reduce the conventional as well as the nuclear arms to the lowest existing level in the two camps.

- Denuclearized zones can only have a meaning if they apply to prior demilitarized zones. After World War II, three Central European states, Bulgaria, Hungaria and Rumania, were supposed to have a reduced number of military means and forces. These levels have been, however, largely exceeded now, if regular, para-military troops and militia are added and if one considers the

existing or possible installation of Soviet missiles. They should be reduced in all three countries and also in Yugoslavia, to the level existing in Austria. That means that the percentage of regular and para-military troops plus militia, compared to their population, should be the same in the four countries as it now is in Austria. The reduction should be reached by the end of 1985.

- To reduce the number of army, para-military troops and militias in the other Central European states (Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and Poland).

The fact that Austria is already neutral, helps to start disarmament in the Danube countries without changing the balance between the two military blocs.

We proposed the 1985 deadline, because it leaves time for negotiations but remains prior to the next CSCE follow up meeting, due in Vienna 1986. If by then, in that central part of Europe, an efficient disarmament policy has been initiated, the outlook for the future becomes brighter in other areas.

Yours truly,

Michel Korné