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**Collection:** Dobriansky, Paula: Files

**Folder Title:** Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe 1984 [01/01/1983-07/14/1983]

**Box:** RAC Box 1

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

**Withdrawer**

**File Folder** CSCE 1984 (JAN 1983-07/14/1983)

CAS 11/10/2010

**Box Number** 90898(MR10-323)

**FOIA**

M10-323

MIYAWAKI

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100166	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE STATE'S REPORT ON CSCE MADRID MEETING <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	1/12/1983	B1
100167	PAPER	RE CSCE: STATUS OF MADRID MEETING (ATTACHMENT100167) <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	3	ND	B1
100168	MEMO	SAME AS 100166 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	1/12/1983	B1
100169	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS 100167 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	3	ND	B1
100170	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO CLARK RE STATUS OF THE MADRID CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	2/5/1983	B1
100171	CABLE	RE CSCE <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	5/5/1983	B1
100172	CABLE	STATE 127534 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	5/7/1983	B1
100173	PAPER	RE THE SOVIET UNION'S ADDRESS TO THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE MADRID MEETING <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100174	PAPER	RE CSCE (P. 2 ONLY) <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	1	5/12/1983	B1
100175	CABLE	RE CSCE (ANNOTATED) <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	2	6/14/1983	B1
100176	STATEMENT	BY MAX KAMPELMAN TO PLENARY SESSION CSCE #79 <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	1	7/1/1983	B1
100177	STATEMENT	SAME AS 100176 <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	1	7/1/1983	B1
100178	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH KAMPELMAN <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	2	7/13/1983	B1
100179	TALKING POINTS	ATTACHMENT TO 100179 <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	2	ND	B1
100180	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTS TO THE PRESIDENT RE CSCE - CONCLUDING THE MADRID MEETING (ATTACHMENT TO 100178) <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	3	7/11/1983	B1
100181	MEMO	ALMOST SAME AS 100178 <b>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</b>	2	7/12/1983	B1

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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M10-323

**Box Number** 90898(MR10-323)

MIYAWAKI

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100182	TALKING POINTS	ALMOST SAME AS 100179 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	ND	B1
100183	MEMO	SAME AS 100180 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	3	7/11/1983	B1
100184	MEMO	ALMOST SAME TEXT AS 100178 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	7/12/1983	B1
100185	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS 100179 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	ND	B1
100186	MEMO	SAME AS 100180 <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	3	7/11/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

0194

CSCE

HW

Dobriansky:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 12, 1983

10D166

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (1)

SUBJECT: State's Report on CSCE Madrid Meeting

State forwarded you a good summary (Tab I) on the status of the Madrid CSCE review conference which recessed on December 17 and will reconvene on February 8. It concludes that we largely achieved our objectives this past fall. The NATO delegations maintained impressive unity on our human rights proposals and continued to focus on Eastern violations of the Helsinki Final Act.

The status report predicts that in the reconvened session some of our Allies might pressure us to change our approach so as to reach agreement on a full final document before Easter. Given the Soviet's more accommodating position on the CDE zone and Allied and neutral concern about the impact of the seemingly endless Madrid meeting on the CSCE process itself, it is likely that the Allies will begin to urge "flexibility" on our part. Yet, there appears to be no strong incentive to end the Madrid meeting with a short, non-substantive document. In the next session, Soviet objectives will continue to be to wedge us from the Allies through some modest, tactical human rights gestures and apparent moderation on the CDE mandate issue.

Finally, the report cites our strategy as being "the continued pursuit of agreement on a full, balanced and substantive final document which would further Eastern compliance with CSCE obligations, particularly on human rights." In this regard, Max Kampelman has made it clear to the Soviets that concrete actions on human rights issues would enhance prospects for final agreement at Madrid; the Soviets already have indicated that some gesture is under high-level consideration in Moscow.

*Blair* *S.K.* *u*  
Blair, Kraemer and Lord concur.

Attachment:

Tab I State's Report on the CSCE Madrid Meeting

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 \* 100166

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

DECLASSIFIED

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100167

NLRR M323 \* 100167

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

CSCE: STATUS OF MADRID MEETING

The Madrid CSCE review conference recessed on December 17 and will reconvene on February 8. Max Kampelman will attend an informal preparatory meeting of NATO delegation heads in Luxembourg on January 13. We have been successful thus far in maintaining Allied unity on our package of new human rights proposals, but the reconvened session could bring pressure from at least some of the Allies to water down our initiatives in pursuit of agreement on a full final document. This certainly will be the Soviets' objective, as they continue to try to pry us apart from the Allies through seeming reasonableness on the CDE mandate issue and some modest, tactical movement on a few human rights questions. There is growing reluctance to drag the meeting on beyond Easter, but not yet the clear will to shut down Madrid with a short, non-substantive document. We will continue to seek agreement on a full document which would incorporate our package of human rights proposals, but will also work quietly in favor of the Swiss idea of a non-substantive outcome which would accurately reflect the current state of East-West relations and the East's human rights transgressions.

THE FALL SESSION: SUMMING UP

We largely achieved our objectives this fall. NATO delegations continued to display impressive unity and kept the initiative by focusing debate on our human rights proposals and on Eastern violations of the Helsinki Final Act. There was no movement toward early adjournment on the basis of a non-substantive concluding document, although the Swiss indicated they were prepared to pursue such an outcome during the next round. We were helped in maintaining the high ground and sustaining Alliance unity by the fact that Jaruzelski's Warsaw initiatives fell short of meeting the three Western criteria and by continued lack of improvement in the human rights situation in the USSR.

The East, for its part, showed flexibility on some of our initiatives -- preambular language, working conditions for journalists, religious freedom -- but rejected our proposals on

~~SECRET~~

DECLAS: OADR

trade union rights, Helsinki monitors, jamming, and an experts' meeting on family reunification. In doing so the Soviet delegation, newly headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, was more successful than heretofore in projecting an image of seriousness, moderation, and willingness to compromise. But Soviet attempts to divide the Allies and appeal to key neutrals by stressing security issues, decoupling and denigrating human rights questions, and insisting that Poland was irrelevant met with failure.

#### THE CDE MANDATE AS SOVIET LEVERAGE

Eager to deflect attention from human rights concerns and to appeal to Allied desire for a security conference (CDE), the Soviets tried to concentrate discussion on the CDE's geographical zone of application. They dropped their insistence on including large portions of the Atlantic as compensation for inclusion of Soviet territory to the Urals, and moved instead toward the Western approach of identifying the activities to be covered on a "functional" rather than "geographical" basis. However, their new approach is still unacceptable because it includes all sea, ocean, and air activities "touching on the security of Europe." This would serve much the same purpose as their earlier broad geographical emphasis by trying to "capture" US military activities outside of Europe while diverting the focus of the CDE away from our own principal concern -- ground force activities on the continent.

In response to this tactic, Ambassador Kampelman, supported by the Allies, reaffirmed that a CDE mandate must unambiguously meet Western security criteria and that we will not permit the question of agreement on a CDE mandate to be isolated from human rights considerations. Nevertheless, we can expect the Soviets to continue to try to isolate us from the Allies by treating the CDE as the central issue, dangling the prospect of agreement on the mandate, and arguing that remaining human rights differences should not obstruct agreement on a full concluding document.

#### PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT ROUND

The Allies, pleased that we agreed to negotiate in November and generally satisfied with public reaction to the Western position, have not sought to change our agreed approach. But with some improvement in Poland, the Soviets' more accommodating position on the CDE zone, and Allied and neutral (NNA) concern about the impact of the seemingly endless Madrid meeting on the CSCE process itself, we should not be surprised if the Allies soon begin to urge "flexibility" on our own part in order to reach agreement on a full document before Easter. The Germans, who have been the most eager for a CDE, could again take the lead, although their basic political requirement may be met by the fact that the next session will extend through their March 6 elections.

There may also be a perceived INF connection. As preparations for deployment get underway, some Allies may seek to assuage public nervousness by turning up the heat for agreement at Madrid. We should be sensitive to such concerns but not allow them to determine the outcome at Madrid. After all, the INF-CDE linkage is a tenuous one at best. Agreement to a CDE would hardly mollify the opponents of INF deployment, nor is it likely to reduce anxiety about INF, since a CDE would deal with conventional, not nuclear forces.

In any case, the Allies remain unwilling to incur the blame for causing Madrid to end with anything less than a full concluding document. Therefore, in order to get agreement on the short document which we prefer, we must continue to depend on the neutrals, particularly the Swiss, to take the initiative. They, too, have thus far been loath to take such a step, desiring instead to exhaust every chance for a substantive agreement. But there is a growing feeling, one held reluctantly by the Yugoslavs and enthusiastically by the Swiss, that Madrid has played itself out and that a dignified way must be found to end the meeting or recess it for a long period.

For our part, in accordance with the President's guidance we will continue to pursue agreement on a full, balanced and substantive final document which furthers Eastern compliance with CSCE obligations, particularly on human rights. At the same time, we will continue quietly to encourage the Swiss and others to come forward with an alternative short document accurately reflecting present reality.

Max Kampelman has made it clear to the Soviets that concrete actions on human rights issues, such as the release of dissidents, would enhance prospects for final agreement at Madrid. The Soviets have indicated to Max that some such gesture is under high level consideration in Moscow. We will of course remain ready to take into account any such Eastern initiatives. We will be keeping the situation under constant review and will return to you with additional policy recommendations if circumstances warrant.



MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 12, 1983

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (17)

SUBJECT: State's Report on CSCE Madrid Meeting

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*Blair* *S.Y.* *u*  
Blair, Kraemer and Lord concur.

Attachment:

Tab I State's Report on the CSCE Madrid Meeting

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M323 \*100168

BY KML NA'U DATE 10/10/12

~~0226~~  
0194  
Add on



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 8, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: CSCE Madrid Meeting

Attached for your information is a status report on the CSCE Madrid Meeting.

*Charles Hiel*

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~  
DECLAS OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY            NARA DATE 11/10/10

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

100169

NLRR M323 # 100169

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

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RECEIVED 08 JAN 83 11

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 07 JAN 83

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~ **SUSPENSE**

*As 11/10/10*

KEYWORDS: CSCE

HUMAN RIGHTS

*Status rpt on*

SUBJECT: CSCE MADRID MTG & ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 11 JAN 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

KRAEMER

BLAIR

LORD

COMMENTS

REF# 8300586

LOG

NSCIFID

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ASSIGNMENT OFFICER (S)    ASSIGNED    ACTION REQUIRED    DUE    COPIES TO

ASSIGNMENT OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>DOBriansky</i>	<i>1/10</i>	<i>Recd state add'l memo</i>		<i>SK, JB, W</i>

SPATCH

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CSCE  
867

Dodie Livingston

February 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE



SUBJECT: Commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

As you requested in your memorandum of February 4, attached is a Presidential Commendation for Ambassador Max Kampelman to be read at the dinner in his honor on March 1, hosted by the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

The text has been cleared with Dodie Livingston (Presidential Messages) and should be returned to her office for final preparation and dispatch.

Attachments

cc: Dodie Livingston  
Presidential Messages

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

It gives me great pleasure to join members and guests of the Woodrow Wilson Center in honoring Ambassador Max Kampelman for his outstanding service to the United States and to my Administration.

For the past three years, Ambassador Kampelman has served with distinction and valor as Co-Chairman, then Chairman, of the United States Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This important and challenging assignment requires vigorous defense of our democratic ideals, tireless energy in uncovering egregious Soviet and East European violations, and tact and diplomatic adroitness in coordinating actions with our Allies. Max has successfully performed all of these complex tasks. He has brought to this job not only youthful zeal and dedication but his prodigious legal and academic knowledge as well.

Ambassador Kampelman's sterling statements at the Madrid Conference have upheld the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, he has persisted in monitoring the implementation of the Accords and meticulously tackled those issues which have hindered the Helsinki process -- for example, the imposition of martial law and the banning of Solidarity in Poland, the suppression of religious freedoms in the Soviet Union, and the increased harassment of those desiring to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

All who value the fundamental rights of individuals are indebted to Ambassador Max Kampelman for the services he has performed.

You have my best wishes for a most enjoyable evening, and Nancy and I both send our warmest congratulations to Max.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 8, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

**SIGNED**

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Jim Cicconi forwarding a commendation for the President's signature on Ambassador Max Kampelman, to be read at a dinner in his honor on Tuesday, March 1, hosted by the Board of Trustees of the Wilson Center.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and forward the attached commendation to Jim Cicconi.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Jim Cicconi with commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

0867

February 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: Jim Cicconi  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Max Kampelman

As you know, Max Kampelman has served with distinction as our chief delegate to the CSCE in Madrid. On March 1, the Wilson Center's Board of Trustees, on which Ambassador Kampelman serves, will host a dinner in his honor. It would, I feel, be appropriate that a message from the President, praising Ambassador Kampelman's service to his country, be read at the dinner.

If the NSC staff could draft such a message, I would then forward it to Bill Baroody, Jr., Chairman of the Wilson Center's Board of Trustees; he would read the message at the dinner and then present it to Ambassador Kampelman.

If any further details are needed, I will be happy to provide them.

Thank you.





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

100170

~~SECRET~~

February 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Status of the Madrid CSCE Review Conference

The CSCE review meeting resumes in Madrid on February 8 and is expected to remain in session until at least late March. Max Kampelman will again head our delegation.

On the eve of the new session, prospects for CSCE remain uncertain. Last year's spring session focused on the situation in Poland. In the fall the meeting was dominated by discussion of Western proposals designed to deal with unsatisfactory Eastern human rights performance. Now, allied and neutral pressure for a solution which would end the marathon meeting is building, but there is also great reluctance to rock the CSCE boat in the delicate days before the March 6 German elections. In sum, there is considerable sentiment for ending the meeting by Easter, but no agreement on how to go about it and pessimism that it can be accomplished.

For our part, we will continue to pursue agreement on a full, balanced and substantive final document which furthers Eastern compliance with CSCE obligations and ensures balance between progress on human rights and security issues. We will strive to maintain Allied support for this approach, while quietly encouraging the Swiss and others to come forward with an alternative short document to end the meeting as soon as practicable if Soviet intransigence at the meeting and conduct outside it continue to keep full agreement out of reach.

SOVIET STRATEGY

The Soviets are likely to step up their European "peace offensive" at Madrid and attempt to play on any allied nervousness over the INF issue. The text of the Warsaw Pact political declaration issued January 6 in Prague, including a proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty, is being provided to all 35 CSCE signatory states. Given Eastern efforts last fall to appear reasonable and to try to place the onus on the West for obstructing agreement on a concluding document, it appears unlikely that the Soviets would actually table new initiatives at Madrid. More likely they will continue to indicate some flexibility with regard to the draft

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NLRR M323 # 100170

BY KML NAM DATE 10/10/12

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- 2 -

concluding document tabled in 1981 by the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states, while holding up the Prague proposals in an attempt to cast us as the obstacle to arms control agreements generally and the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting in particular.

Max Kampelman has made clear to the Soviets that better human rights performance on their part would improve prospects for agreement. So far, however, there are no signs that the Soviets are prepared to take steps to improve the atmosphere in Madrid and enhance the prospects for a substantive agreement which includes a CDE mandate.

#### ALLIED UNITY

For the moment, Western solidarity looks reasonably good. Although clearly disappointed with the lack of progress so far, the allies agreed at an informal heads of delegation meeting in Luxembourg January 13 to stick by the Western package of human rights amendments tabled last November. We and the allies agreed to hold to the substance of our amendments, but to be flexible on wording and make more use of informal drafting groups where progress may be possible. No one, however, expects that this flexibility on wording will cause the East to accept the substance of our proposals.

#### PROSPECTS

In the absence of some marked change in Soviet behavior, and, in particular, as long as the Soviets continue to reject our proposals, we will continue to press our Allies to hold firmly to our package of amendments and to resist pressures to settle for an agreement just for the sake of an agreement. After the German elections, the political equation may change. It is possible that there will then be greater willingness among the allies to bring the meeting to a nonsubstantive conclusion. At that point, we will want to encourage the NNAs to come forward with a short nonsubstantive concluding document.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 8, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Jim Cicconi forwarding a commendation for the President's signature on Ambassador Max Kampelman, to be read at a dinner in his honor on Tuesday, March 1, hosted by the Board of Trustees of the Wilson Center.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and forward the attached commendation to Jim Cicconi.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Jim Cicconi with commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: BUD McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Commendation for Ambassador Kampelman

As you requested in your memorandum of February 4, attached is a Presidential Commendation for Ambassador Max Kampelman to be read at the dinner in his honor on March 1, hosted by the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

The text has been cleared with Dodie Livingston (Presidential Messages) and should be returned to her office for final preparation and dispatch.

Attachments

cc: Dodie Livingston  
Presidential Messages

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

It gives me great pleasure to join members and guests of the Woodrow Wilson Center in honoring Ambassador Max Kampelman for his outstanding service to the United States and to my Administration.

For the past three years, Ambassador Kampelman has served with distinction and valor as Co-Chairman, then Chairman, of the United States Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This important and challenging assignment requires vigorous defense of our democratic ideals, tireless energy in uncovering egregious Soviet and East European violations, and tact and diplomatic adroitness in coordinating actions with our Allies. Max has successfully performed all of these complex tasks. He has brought to this job not only youthful zeal and dedication but his prodigious legal and academic knowledge as well.

Ambassador Kampelman's sterling statements at the Madrid Conference have upheld the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, he has persisted in monitoring the implementation of the Accords and meticulously tackled those issues which have hindered the Helsinki process -- for example, the imposition of martial law and the banning of Solidarity in Poland, the suppression of religious freedoms in the Soviet Union, and the increased harassment of those desiring to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

All who value the fundamental rights of individuals are indebted to Ambassador Max Kampelman for the services he has performed.

You have my best wishes for a most enjoyable evening, and Nancy and I both send our warmest congratulations to Max.



57

February 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: Jim Cicconi *JC*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Max Kampelman

As you know, Max Kampelman has served with distinction as our chief delegate to the CSCE in Madrid. On March 1, the Wilson Center's Board of Trustees, on which Ambassador Kampelman serves, will host a dinner in his honor. It would, I feel, be appropriate that a message from the President, praising Ambassador Kampelman's service to his country, be read at the dinner.

If the NSC staff could draft such a message, I would then forward it to Bill Baroody, Jr., Chairman of the Wilson Center's Board of Trustees; he would read the message at the dinner and then present it to Ambassador Kampelman.

If any further details are needed, I will be happy to provide them.

Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Feb 4 *1/3/83*

Brian,

Please staff in the system with advance copy to JMP.

thanks,

Wilma

*Request for his Msg = Pd*

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CSCE

83 MAY 6 P10:48

RECEIVED

DEPT OF STATE

7:3 MAY 6 PM 10 37

TF

URGENT **B**

CLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

S/S #

AS 11/1/10

MESSAGE NO. 580 CLASSIFICATION Secret No. Pages 2

FROM: S/S: J. Covey 7224 S/S 632-8449  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CSCE: Approach to the Chancellor

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>1 - Michael Wheeler</u>	<u>395-3044</u>	
	<u>2 - <del>State</del> Blair</u>		
	<u>Dobriansky</u>		
	<u>Foster</u>		
	<u>Maerz</u>		
	<u>Zenczowski</u>		

FOR CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ASAP FOR IMMEDIATE CLEARANCE

S/S Officer: [Signature]

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

100171

~~SECRET~~

EUR/RPH: JWSUIHART  
05/05/83 EXT. 21134 (0371A)  
EUR: RBURT

EUR: JDOBBINS  
P: MONTGOMERY  
NSC:

EUR/RPH: JHAWES  
EUR/CE: JKORNBLUM  
S/S:

S/S. EUR. NSC ONLY

IMMEDIATE BONN

IMMEDIATE MADRID, USNATO

NOBIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS FROM UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CSCE, GE

SUBJECT: CSCE: APPROACH TO THE CHANCELLOR

REF: STATE 121962

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS DESCRIBED IN A MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR THE SECRETARY (BEING TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY TO YOU), WE ARE CONCERNED THAT RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE GERMANS AND CERTAIN OTHER ALLIES HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SOVIETS TO BELIEVE THAT WESTERN DEMANDS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED DRAFT CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AT MADRID DO NOT ENJOY WHOLEHEARTED ALLIED SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY BY THE FRG. IF OUR EFFORTS IN MADRID ARE TO SUCCEED, WE MUST ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE UNITY IS MAINTAINED. THE SECRETARY WILL RAISE THIS MATTER WITH GENSCHEM ON MONDAY, BUT WE BELIEVE, AS STATED ON BONN 10975, THAT A PARALLEL APPROACH TO THE CHANCELLOR WOULD ALSO BE VALUABLE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD FOLLOW-UP ON HIS ORIGINAL INTENTION TO SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH THE CHANCELLOR TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

RB  
JMS  
JD  
JHB  
MM  
JCR  
5/8

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ NLRR M323 # 100171  
BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~ | 2  
3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS

. -- WE REGARD FORMAL SOVIET ACCEPTANCE ON MAY 6 OF THE REVISED NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA) DOCUMENT (RM-39R) AS A TACTICAL MOVE DESIGNED TO ISOLATE THE U.S. AND TEST ALLIED SOLIDARITY BEHIND THE REVISED PACKAGE OF MODIFICATIONS PRESENTED TO THE EAST ON JUNE 3.

. -- WHILE THIS MOVE WAS TO BE EXPECTED SOONER OR LATER, THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED THAT THEY COULD UNDERMINE ALLIED UNITY BY STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM BONN AND ELSEWHERE WHICH GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT RM-39(R) WAS ACCEPTABLE AS PRESENTED.

. -- WE HOPE THAT THE FRG MAINTAINS THE POSITION, STATED BY THE CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER IN WASHINGTON AND CONFIRMED DURING ALLIED DELIBERATIONS IN MADRID, THAT RM-39(R) WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

. -- IT IS NOW VITALLY IMPORTANT TO SHOW ALLIED SOLIDARITY BEHIND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS THE WEST PRESENTED ON MAY 3, PROPOSALS WHICH ARE BOTH MODERATE AND REASONABLE.

. -- WE HOPE THAT THE FRG WILL TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PERSUADING THE EAST OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT. AN AGREEMENT IS OBTAINABLE WITH FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WITHOUT SUCH PROGRESS, THE U.S. CANNOT SUPPORT A FINAL DOCUMENT AT MADRID. YY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

100172

PAGE 01 OF 02      SECSTATE WASHDC 7534      DTG: 071937Z MAY 83      PSN: 016367  
EOB531      AN002790      TOR: 127/2213Z      CSN: HCE565

DISTRIBUTION: FORT-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 LORD-01  
/005 A2

WHSR COMMENT: COVERED IN DAM REPORT FORM MAY 6

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #7534 1271943  
O 071937Z MAY 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 1649

INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7746

~~SECRET~~ STATE 127534 TOSEC 040400

EXDIS MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE, JERUSALEM FOR S/S HILL  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: CSCE, UR, US  
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE TO ACTING SECRETARY ON CSCE

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE~~ TEXT).

2. AT HIS REQUEST DOBRYNIN CALLED ON THE ACTING  
SECRETARY APRIL 6 TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM THE SOVIET  
GOVERNMENT AND ANDROPOV PERSONALLY TO THE PRESIDENT ON  
CSCE. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, EUR ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY BURT, AND EUR DAS PALMER TOOK PART IN MEETING  
ON U. S. SIDE, WHILE DOBRYNIN WAS ALONE.  
TEXT OF DOBRYNIN'S  
SPEAKING NOTE FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3.

3. BEGIN TEXT: THE MADRID MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF  
THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY  
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT -LINK IN  
THE EUROPEAN PROCESS INITIATED IN HELSINKI, HAS BEEN  
GOING ON EXCESSIVELY LONG.

THE PROGRESS OF THE MEETING HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT BY NOW  
THE POSITIONS OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE BEEN  
DEFINED WITH UTMOST CLARITY AND THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR  
FURTHER PRODUCTIVE TALKS HAVE VIRTUALLY BEEN EXHAUSTED.

ON MARCH 15, 1983 A GROUP OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED  
STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING OFFERED AN INITIATIVE  
AIMED AT AN EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT AND  
THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, BY SUBMITTING A  
REVISED DRAFT OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT.

THE DRAFT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF A NUMBER OF THE SOVIET  
UNION'S IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS, PERHAPS OTHER  
PARTICIPATING STATES ALSO THINK THAT THE DRAFT DOES NOT  
MEET THEIR VIEWS IN ALL RESPECTS.

NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIET UNION, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS  
OF CARRYING ON THE EUROPEAN PROCESS INITIATED IN  
HELSINKI, BY THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND  
SECURITY, DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND WEAKENING  
THE TENSIONS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION THERE, IS PREPARED

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100172

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

EXDIS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7534 DTG: 071937Z MAY 83 PSN: 016367

TO ADOPT THE ABOVE DRAFT OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING AS IT WAS SUBMITTED ON MARCH 15, 1983.

HOWEVER, IF ANYONE TRIED AGAIN TO GO ON SUGGESTING AMENDMENTS LET ALONE AMENDMENTS TO AMENDMENTS, ADDITIONS AND CHANGES IN THE CLAUSES OF THE SUBMITTED DRAFT WHICH ACTUALLY IS AN OUTCOME OF MORE THAN TWO YEAR LONG TALKS AND A SYNTHESIS OF THE POSITIONS OF 35 STATES -- AND EACH OF THEM WOULD IN SUCH A CASE HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUGGEST AMENDMENTS -- EVERYTHING POSITIVE THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN MADRID COULD GO OVERBOARD.

IF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING DISPLAY A SIMILARLY BROAD POLITICAL APPROACH AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, THE MADRID MEETING COULD BE ENDED WITH SUBSTANTIAL POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID MEETING IS WITHIN REACH. THE SOVIET UNION CALLS UPON ALL THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THAT MEETING NOT TO MISS THIS CHANCE FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES. END TEXT.

4. AFTER DOBRYNIN COMPLETED HIS PRESENTATION, THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE BRING THE SOVIET DEMARCHE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ;PRESIDENT. HE TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT THE U. S. POSITION AT MADRID IS WELL KNOWN -- IN OUR VIEW CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS NEED TO BE MADE IN THE NNA TEXT. NOTING THAT DOBRYNIN WAS CERTAINLY FAMILIAR WITH WHAT AMBASSADOR KAMPLEMAN HAD BEEN SAYING IN MADRID, THE ACTING SECRETARY URGED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SERIOUSLY CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS. THE ACTING SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY REMINDING DOBRYNIN THAT, IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE ARE INTERESTED IN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE AREA OF SOVIET JEWRY.

THIS CONCLUDED THE CSCE PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION.  
DAM  
BT

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NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE CSCE

ID 8303147

RECEIVED 09 MAY 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 07 MAY 83

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

CS 11/10/10

KEYWORDS USSR

CSCE

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SOVIET MSG ON CSCE

ACTION:	FOR RECORD PURPOSES	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES PA
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

( DOBRIANSKY

MYER

STEARMAN

COMMENTS \*\*\* LENCZOWSKI / FWD TO PRES FOR INFO IF APPROPRIATE \*\*\*

Kracmierz  
Forsticiz

REF# 8314103

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( H / H )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



(3147)

May 7, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Message on CSCE

Enclosed for your information is the Soviet message to the United States Government on CSCE, as delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin to Acting Secretary Dam May 6. The message was given to us in English; Dobrynin did not provide a copy of the original Russian.

Charles Hill  
Executive SecretaryAttachment:  
Soviet Message on CSCE

DECLASSIFIED

Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
CW NARA, DATE 1/10/00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OADR

10017

THE SOVIET UNION'S ADDRESS  
TO THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE MADRID MEETING

The Madrid meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is an important link in the European process initiated in Helsinki, has been going on excessively long.

The progress of the meeting has demonstrated that by now the positions of all the participating states have been defined with utmost clarity and that possibilities for further productive talks have virtually been exhausted.

On March 15, 1983 a group of neutral and non-aligned states participating in the meeting offered an initiative aimed at an early achievement of the final agreement and the successful conclusion of the meeting, by submitting a revised draft of the final document.

The draft takes no account of a number of the Soviet Union's important considerations, perhaps, other participating states also think that the draft does not meet their views in all respects.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, guided by the interests of carrying on the European process initiated in Helsinki, by the interests of strengthening peace and security, developing cooperation in Europe and weakening the tensions of military confrontation there, is prepared to adopt the above draft of the final document of the Madrid meeting as it was submitted on March 15, 1983.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 + 100173

BY KML NAJL DATE 10/10/12

However, if anyone tried again to go on suggesting amendments let alone amendments to amendments, additions and changes in the clauses of the submitted draft which actually is an outcome of more than two year long talks and a synthesis of the positions of 55 states - and each of them would in such a case have the right to suggest its own amendments - everything positive that has been achieved in Madrid could go overboard.

If the other participants in the meeting display a similarly broad political approach and a sense of responsibility, the Madrid meeting could be ended with substantial positive results within a matter of days.

The successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting is within reach. The Soviet Union calls upon all the states participating in that meeting not to miss this chance for the cause of peace and security of the peoples.

NLRR M323 #100174

- 2 -

CSCE

5/12/83

100174

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/122. CSCE: ALLIES PRESS FOR CONCLUSION AND CDE

Most NATO members--led by the FRG and France--have urged the US to accept the revised concluding document for the CSCE which the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states have drafted. In the absence of a rapid conclusion in Madrid, it will therefore be more difficult to maintain the allied negotiating unity that has existed until now.

\* \* \*

The Netherlands, Canada and the UK share to varying degrees US unwillingness to sign the NNA's concluding document, which is weak in the areas of human rights and freedom of information. Other Western participants, however, continue to urge us to accept the document, largely because a successful conclusion of the CSCE is a prerequisite to the convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Allied motives for wanting a CDE vary, but a common refrain is that it would provide a forum for NATO countries to demonstrate their commitment to detente.

The French--who were the first to propose a CDE--view it as a means of playing a role in arms control without having French nuclear programs challenged. French interest in an early end to the CSCE was illustrated by Cheysson's request to you for flexibility on this issue. The French attitude toward solving the problem was shown by the subsequent query of a French diplomat, who asked whether permission for Sakharov to leave the USSR would constitute "acceptable performance" that could result in a conclusion of the current meeting. Cheysson recently said that the conclusion should be based on a "balanced and meaningful compromise" that would lead to a CDE.

The West Germans have been the strongest advocates of a CDE. They believe it would help deflect public criticism of the INF deployment scheduled to take place later this year, as well as facilitate the continuation of Ostpolitik and improved inner-German relations. Genscher's has been the loudest voice exhorting the US to soften its CSCE negotiating position for the sake of a positive conclusion. Two weeks after communicating his views to you, he issued a press release calling for a rapid and "successful" ending. He has welcomed Soviet acceptance of the NNA's draft, but has also urged Moscow to reply to the West's proposals for improving the document.

The Kohl government has taken a firm stand in support of human rights, in part because of the involvement of many West German groups with this issue. Nevertheless, Kohl's concern over anti-INF sentiment among West Germans, his desire for a CDE, and his need for a smooth working relationship with Genscher incline him to follow the latter's lead on CSCE.

**URGENT**

15 JUN 1983 12 46

**EXPEDITE**

**WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**B**

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

83 JUN 15 11:25

RECEIVED

**EXPEDITE**

MESSAGE NO. 496 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2

FROM: CHILL S/S 22540  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO MADRID: CSCE: POSSIBLE SPANISH INITIATIVE  
TO CONCLUDE THE MADRID MTG

TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO: Extension Room No.

NSC

BOB KIMMITT

395-3044

*Lobrasby*  
*Loverough*  
*Forster*  
*Kinemer*

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: CLEARANCE REQUESTED ASAP

**URGENT**

S/S Officer: *Quinn*

**CROSSHATCH**

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.



100175

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100175

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

EUR/RPM: JWSWIHART  
06/14/83 EXT. 21134 (0866A)  
P: LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR: RBURT  
EUR: JDOBBINS  
S/S:

EUR/RPMJHHAWES  
EUR/SOV: TSIMONS

S/S, EUR, NSC ONLY

IMMEDIATE MADRID

NOBIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE: POSSIBLE SPANISH INITIATIVE TO  
CONCLUDE THE MADRID MEETING

REF: MADRID 6104 X

1. ~~CS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. A SPANISH INITIATIVE ALONG THE LINES YOU DISCUSSED WITH YOUR SPANISH AND FRG COLLEAGUES COULD PROVIDE A WAY TO MOVE THE SOVIETS TOWARD MEETING OUR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCLUDING THE MADRID MEETING. IF THE SOVIETS RESIST IT, THEY WILL BE EVEN MORE ISOLATED AND DISCREDITED. SUCH AN INITIATIVE COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN SOLIDIFYING SPAIN'S ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE AND GONZALEZ' LEADERSHIP OF THE PSOE. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT SUCH A SPANISH INITIATIVE PROVIDING: *to be explored*

-- YOU ARE ASSURED IN ADVANCE THAT IT WILL CONTAIN THE ELEMENTS NOTED IN PARA 7 OF MAT: 6104, NAMELY REAFFIRMATION OF SPAIN'S NATO IDENTIFICATION; ADDITION OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR A HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS' MEETING IN RM-39 (REVISED); DROPPING THE WORD "POSITIVE" FROM

LSE  
JWS  
RB  
JHH  
JSD  
S/S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12

THE REFERENCE TO HELSINKI MONITORS; AND ELIMINATION OF THE WORD "SUCH" FROM THE SECURITY MANDATE.

. -- YOU OBTAIN THE FAVORABLE CLARIFICATIONS FROM KONDRASHEV ON THE MATTERS NOTED IN MADRID 5882 AND 5958 AND HE REITERATES THE ASSURANCES GIVEN EARLIER THAT MOSCOW WILL FOLLOW THROUGH IN GOOD FAITH ON THE ACTIONS HE HAS PROMISED.

. -- OUR ALLIES AND KEY NEUTRALS WILL ALSO SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE.

3. IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE PACKAGE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE GIVING FINAL APPROVAL TO AN AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD AVOID COMMITTING THE USG EXPLICITLY TO ACCEPTING THE SPANISH INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME. INSTEAD, IF YOU ARE SATISFIED ON THE POINTS NOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO OUR FRIENDS THAT THE USG WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND GIVE IT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. YY

~~SECRET~~



STATEMENT BY  
MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
CHAIRMAN - U.S. DELEGATION  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
PLENARY SESSION

PD  
100 76

MADRID

JULY 1, 1983

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
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**HLRR M323 \* 100176**

Mr. Chairman: **BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12**

The delegation of the United States listened with keen interest to the remarks delivered a few minutes ago by the head of the Soviet Union's delegation. We noted the statement that the Soviet delegation intends to respond to the Spanish Government's initiative of June 17 in a constructive spirit.

When our delegation, a week ago today, announced its full support for the proposals presented by Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, we and our friends who joined us did so in the hope that we could thus help to bring this meeting to a consensus behind a concluding document which would dramatically and decisively lead us closer to the peace, security, and cooperation that our peoples all yearn for.

From the first days of our meeting, which opened on September 6, 1980, the American delegation has expressed its determination to help create here a "Spirit of Madrid" which would strengthen the Helsinki process by elevating the Helsinki Final Act to the level of seriousness, relevance and conformity that its provisions deserve.

The remarks of the Soviet delegate lead many here to hope that today we may be nearer that goal than we have been since our meeting began two years and nearly 10 months ago. It is for that reason that we note the Soviet statement. We will study it with care and attention. We and other delegations have begun that process, and will continue those explorations conscientiously.

The Soviet delegation has gone far toward meeting the recommendations that were a part of the Spanish initiative. Our delegation is prepared to work with that delegation and others so that the final steps can be taken and consensus arrived at expeditiously.

There still, however, appear to be some issues of consequence that divide us. In one sense, they are fewer than ever before. But, as we all appreciate, agreements depend on trust and a basic integrity of relationship and commitment. We heard reference this morning to a statement by the head of the Soviet Government about the necessity "to preserve and increase that which has been achieved during the years of detente". That trust and basic integrity to which I referred is indispensable for that detente.

We join the Soviet delegation in urging that there is no reason for unnecessary delay.

STATEMENT BY  
MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
CHAIRMAN - U.S. DELEGATION  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
PLENARY SESSION

FILE  
CSC/E  
120 17

MADRID

DECLASSIFIED

JULY 1, 1983

LRM323 #100177

Mr. Chairman:

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

The delegation of the United States listened with keen interest to the remarks delivered a few minutes ago by the head of the Soviet Union's delegation. We noted the statement that the Soviet delegation intends to respond to the Spanish Government's initiative of June 17 in a constructive spirit.

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The remarks of the Soviet delegate lead many here to hope that today we may be nearer that goal than we have been since our meeting began two years and nearly 10 months ago. It is for that reason that we note the Soviet statement. We will study it with care and attention. We and other delegations have begun that process, and will continue those explorations conscientiously.

The Soviet delegation has gone far toward meeting the recommendations that were a part of the Spanish initiative. Our delegation is prepared to work with that delegation and others so that the final steps can be taken and consensus arrived at expeditiously.

There still, however, appear to be some issues of consequence that divide us. In one sense, they are fewer than ever before. But, as we all appreciate, agreements depend on trust and a basic integrity of relationship and commitment. We heard reference this morning to a statement by the head of the Soviet Government about the necessity "to preserve and increase that which has been achieved during the years of detente". That trust and basic integrity to which I referred is indispensable for that detente.

We join the Soviet delegation in urging that there is no reason for unnecessary delay.

1525

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ↗  
PETER SOMMER ↗

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Kampelman  
and Secretary of State Shultz

Attached at Tab I is a Briefing Memorandum for the President's meeting with Ambassador Max Kampelman and Secretary of State George Shultz. Talking Points for the meeting are provided at Tab A and at Tab B is a detailed memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz on CSCE.

<sup>gm</sup> Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Briefing Memorandum at Tab I and its attachments to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Briefing Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Secretary Shultz's memorandum, July 11, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 9.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY: BOB A. [initials] DATE 11/10/10

100178

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN  
U.S. Representative to the  
Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

DATE: Wednesday, July 13, 1983  
 LOCATION: Oval Office  
 TIME: 1:30 p.m. -- 30 minutes  
 FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

- I. PURPOSE: To consult with Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz on the possible conclusion of the Madrid CSCE meeting.
- II. BACKGROUND: At the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, our negotiators reached agreement on a concluding document on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The document provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and the provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings. Presently, the Allies are pressuring us to wrap up the meeting this week.

One outstanding problem concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on improvements in their human rights "performance." In early June, Soviet representatives at Madrid made specific assurances that several Soviet citizens (including Anatoly Shcharansky) would be allowed to emigrate. Already, the Soviets have manifested some "performance" in this area (i.e., release of 15 Pentecostalists), but recently, Soviet negotiators have indicated that Shcharansky may not be released.

In your meeting, Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz will recommend that the Madrid meeting be concluded on the basis of the present package. They will also point out that we should not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharansky and thus will suggest that you authorize both of them to approach appropriate Soviet officials to state that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of imprisoned Soviet citizens.

Attached at Tab A are talking points which reflect your agreement to the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. Also, at Tab B is a detailed memorandum from George Shultz to you on CSCE.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100178

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
William P. Clark  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Max Kampelman  
Jack Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: White House photo and discussion.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/cards  
Tab B Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, July 11, 1983

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky/  
Peter Sommer

1001#7

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

Tuesday, July 11, 1983

- I recognize that we are under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the Madrid meeting. Foreign Minister Genscher made this abundantly clear to me yesterday.
- I agree that the U.S. can join the consensus for concluding the meeting and that George Shultz should go to Madrid for the concluding session. The concluding document appears to provide the balanced result we have long sought. I am happy to hear that it includes humanitarian provisions and human contacts experts' meetings.
- In agreeing, I ask that both George and Ambassador Kampelman inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoly Shcharansky.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100179

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

TALKING POINTS: MTG. W/AMB. MAX KAMPELMAN

-- RECOGNIZE INCREASING ALLIED PRESSURE TO WRAP UP MADRID MEETING. GENSCHER MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR.

-- AGREE U.S. CAN JOIN CONSENSUS FOR CONCLUDING MEETING AND GEORGE SHOULD GO TO CONCLUDING SESSION. CONCLUDING DOCUMENT APPEARS TO PROVIDE BALANCED RESULT WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT. HAPPY TO HEAR IT INCLUDES HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS AND HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS' MEETINGS.

-- ASK BOTH GEORGE AND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN INFORM SOVIETS WE EXPECT THEM TO LIVE UP TO THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES ON RELEASE OF CERTAIN IMPRISONED SOVIET PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, INCLUDING SHCHARANSKY.



DECLASSIFIED

SYSTEM II  
90864

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

NLRB M323 #100180

BY kml NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz *gjs*  
Subject: CSCE - Concluding the Madrid Meeting

Our negotiators have achieved agreement on a concluding document at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The Madrid document is a good one from our point of view. It provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings as well as agreement to hold the first stage of a European security conference dealing with surprise military attack.

As far as the Madrid document is concerned, the only point still open is the mode for agreeing to an experts' meeting on human contacts. All of the other participants are prepared to agree on the meeting by means of a Chairman's Statement. This would be consistent with the Spanish compromise proposals. Congressman Fascell, Chairman of the CSCE Commission, has expressed concern that agreement to the meeting in this way might downgrade its status. I am confident, however, that Max Kampelman will be able to ensure that the statement meets our needs and does not have the effect Congressman Fascell fears.

The only problem remaining concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on specific improvements in their implementation of CSCE commitments -- the so-called human rights "performance" issue. In early June, the Soviet representatives at Madrid furnished Max, our negotiator, with specific assurances that several Soviet citizens, imprisoned for their activity on behalf of the Helsinki Final Act, would be allowed to emigrate. These assurances, including one on Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, were furnished on behalf of the highest Soviet authority, and Max passed them on to you.

There has already been some "performance" with the release of 15 members of one Pentecostalist family plus the emigration of five additional families, two of which are Jewish. The Soviets have assured Kampelman that the 15 members of the second Pentecostalist family will receive permission to leave

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

as soon as the letters of invitation arrive from Israel, expected later this week. -

In their latest contacts with Kampelman, the Soviet negotiators have hinted that a problem has arisen with the release of Shcharanskiy. This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that Shcharanskiy has thus far refused to write the appeal for clemency which the Soviets had earlier told us would be necessary to initiate the process of release. At that meeting, the Soviets agreed to add the name of an additional imprisoned Helsinki monitor to their list.

This problem and the fact that the list of those to be released includes only one Jew, Shcharanskiy, creates a problem for us. The intensity of feeling on this issue will be exacerbated by indications of increased anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Moscow's worsening record on Jewish emigration. There is also, more importantly, the question of credibility in our long-range relations with the USSR. On the other hand, our Allies have consistently refused to associate themselves with an effort to link conclusion of Madrid to specific human rights steps by the Soviet Union. They would not, under present circumstances, support an effort on our part to hold up completion of the meeting until the situation regarding Shcharanskiy is clarified.

With the concluding document at Madrid completed, we are coming under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the meeting. The Allies want us to agree in days, and certainly this week, on ending Madrid.

My recommendation is that we not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharanskiy, and that we hold them to their previous assurances. If you approve, Max Kampelman will tell the Soviets in Madrid that we expect them to live up to all their assurances, including that on Shcharanskiy. I will reinforce this message with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin this week, making clear that we consider this a commitment by the Soviet leadership to you and that there will be tangible consequences if they do not live up to this commitment.

I further recommend that having made these approaches, we go forward to agreement at Madrid. The Soviets may carry out their assurances. If they do not, we will have to react, not by calling the CSCE process to a halt, but by reviewing other aspects of our bilateral relationship.

If you approve these recommendations, I will be prepared to go to Madrid for the concluding session, at a time to be arranged. A concluding session at this level is felt by our Allies to be a highly desirable demonstration that the East-West dialogue continues despite the approach of INF deployment, a perception that is in our interest to reinforce. In order to avoid the appearance of serious dissension with our Allies, we need your decision as soon as possible, preferably today or tomorrow.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize approaches by Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid and by me to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize Ambassador Kampelman to agree to conclude the Madrid meeting on the basis of the present package. I would plan to go to Madrid to participate in the formal closing session, probably this month.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>TD</sup>  
PETER SOMMER <sup>TS</sup>

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Kampelman  
and Secretary of State Shultz

Attached at Tab I is a Briefing Memorandum for the President's meeting with Ambassador Max Kampelman and Secretary of State George Shultz. Talking Points for the meeting are provided at Tab A and at Tab B is a detailed memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz on CSCE.

<sup>gm</sup>  
Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Briefing Memorandum at Tab I and its attachments to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Briefing Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Secretary Shultz's memorandum, July 11, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, 5.11.2008, as amended  
DATE 11/10/08  
BY [signature]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN  
U.S. Representative to the  
Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe

DATE: Tuesday, July 12, 1983  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 11:40 a.m. -- 20 minutes  
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

- I. PURPOSE: To consult with Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz on the possible conclusion of the Madrid CSCE meeting.
- II. BACKGROUND: At the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, our negotiators reached agreement on a concluding document on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The document provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and the provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings. Presently, the Allies are pressuring us to wrap up the meeting this week.

One outstanding problem concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on improvements in their human rights "performance." In early June, Soviet representatives at Madrid made specific assurances that several Soviet citizens (including Anatoly Shcharansky) would be allowed to emigrate. Already, the Soviets have manifested some "performance" in this area (i.e., release of 15 Pentecostalists), but recently, Soviet negotiators have indicated that Shcharansky may not be released.

In your meeting, Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz will recommend that the Madrid meeting be concluded on the basis of the present package. They will also point out that we should not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharansky and thus will suggest that you authorize both of them to approach appropriate Soviet officials to state that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of imprisoned Soviet citizens.

Attached at Tab A are talking points which reflect your agreement to the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. Also, at Tab B is a detailed memorandum from George Shultz to you on CSCE.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRS M323 # 10018J

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
William P. Clark  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Max Kampelman  
Jack Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: White House photo and discussion.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/cards  
Tab B Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, July 11, 1983

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky/  
Peter Sommer

SECRET

100192

DECLASSIFIED

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

NLRR M323 \* 100182

Tuesday, July 11, 1983

BY km NARA DATE 10/10/12

- I recognize that we are under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the Madrid meeting. Foreign Minister Genscher made this abundantly clear to me yesterday.
  
- I agree that the U.S. can join the consensus for concluding the meeting and that George Shultz should go to Madrid for the concluding session. The concluding document appears to provide the balanced result we have long sought. I am happy to hear that it includes humanitarian provisions and human contacts experts' meetings.
  
- In agreeing, I ask that both George and Ambassador Kampelman inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoly Shcharansky.

TALKING POINTS: MTG. W/AMB. MAX KAMPELMAN

- I RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE UNDER INCREASING ALLIED PRESSURE TO WRAP UP MADRID MEETING. FM GENSCHER MADE THIS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO ME YESTERDAY.
  
- I AGREE THAT U.S. CAN JOIN THE CONSENSUS FOR CONCLUDING THE MEETING AND THAT GEORGE SHULTZ SHOULD GO TO MADRID FOR CONCLUDING SESSION. CONCLUDING DOCUMENT APPEARS TO PROVIDE THE BALANCED RESULT WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT. I AM HAPPY TO HEAR THAT IT INCLUDES HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS AND HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS' MEETINGS.

TPS: MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN

2.

- IN AGREEING, I ASK THAT BOTH GEORGE AND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO LIVE UP TO THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES ON THE RELEASE OF CERTAIN IMPRISONED SOVIET PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, INCLUDING ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz *gps*  
Subject: .CSCE - Concluding the Madrid Meeting

Our negotiators have achieved agreement on a concluding document at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The Madrid document is a good one from our point of view. It provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings as well as agreement to hold the first stage of a European security conference dealing with surprise military attack.

As far as the Madrid document is concerned, the only point still open is the mode for agreeing to an experts' meeting on human contacts. All of the other participants are prepared to agree on the meeting by means of a Chairman's Statement. This would be consistent with the Spanish compromise proposals. Congressman Fascell, Chairman of the CSCE Commission, has expressed concern that agreement to the meeting in this way might downgrade its status. I am confident, however, that Max Kampelman will be able to ensure that the statement meets our needs and does not have the effect Congressman Fascell fears.

The only problem remaining concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on specific improvements in their implementation of CSCE commitments -- the so-called human rights "performance" issue. In early June, the Soviet representatives at Madrid furnished Max, our negotiator, with specific assurances that several Soviet citizens, imprisoned for their activity on behalf of the Helsinki Final Act, would be allowed to emigrate. These assurances, including one on Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, were furnished on behalf of the highest Soviet authority, and Max passed them on to you.

There has already been some "performance" with the release of 15 members of one Pentecostalist family plus the emigration of five additional families, two of which are Jewish. The Soviets have assured Kampelman that the 15 members of the second Pentecostalist family will receive permission to leave

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 #100183BY kml NARA DATE 10/10/12

as soon as the letters of invitation arrive from Israel, expected later this week.

In their latest contacts with Kampelman, the Soviet negotiators have hinted that a problem has arisen with the release of Shcharanskiy. This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that Shcharanskiy has thus far refused to write the appeal for clemency which the Soviets had earlier told us would be necessary to initiate the process of release. At that meeting, the Soviets agreed to add the name of an additional imprisoned Helsinki monitor to their list.

This problem and the fact that the list of those to be released includes only one Jew, Shcharanskiy, creates a problem for us. The intensity of feeling on this issue will be exacerbated by indications of increased anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Moscow's worsening record on Jewish emigration. There is also, more importantly, the question of credibility in our long-range relations with the USSR. On the other hand, our Allies have consistently refused to associate themselves with an effort to link conclusion of Madrid to specific human rights steps by the Soviet Union. They would not, under present circumstances, support an effort on our part to hold up completion of the meeting until the situation regarding Shcharanskiy is clarified.

With the concluding document at Madrid completed, we are coming under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the meeting. The Allies want us to agree in days, and certainly this week, on ending Madrid.

My recommendation is that we not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharanskiy, and that we hold them to their previous assurances. If you approve, Max Kampelman will tell the Soviets in Madrid that we expect them to live up to all their assurances, including that on Shcharanskiy. I will reinforce this message with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin this week, making clear that we consider this a commitment by the Soviet leadership to you and that there will be tangible consequences if they do not live up to this commitment.

I further recommend that having made these approaches, we go forward to agreement at Madrid. The Soviets may carry out their assurances. If they do not, we will have to react, not by calling the CSCE process to a halt, but by reviewing other aspects of our bilateral relationship.

If you approve these recommendations, I will be prepared to go to Madrid for the concluding session, at a time to be arranged. A concluding session at this level is felt by our Allies to be a highly desirable demonstration that the East-West dialogue continues despite the approach of INF deployment, a perception that is in our interest to reinforce. In order to avoid the appearance of serious dissension with our Allies, we need your decision as soon as possible, preferably today or tomorrow.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize approaches by Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid and by me to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize Ambassador Kampelman to agree to conclude the Madrid meeting on the basis of the present package. I would plan to go to Madrid to participate in the formal closing session, probably this month.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



~~SECRET~~ *Dobruensky*

SYSTEM II  
90864

CSCE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 12, 1983

100184

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100184

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN  
U.S. Representative to the  
Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

DATE: Wednesday, July 13, 1983  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 1:30 p.m. -- 30 minutes  
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

- I. PURPOSE: To consult with Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz on the possible conclusion of the Madrid CSCE meeting.
- II. BACKGROUND: At the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, our negotiators reached agreement on a concluding document on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The document provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and the provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings. Presently, the Allies are pressuring us to wrap up the meeting this week.

One outstanding problem concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on improvements in their human rights "performance." In early June, Soviet representatives at Madrid made specific assurances that several Soviet citizens (including Anatoly Shcharansky) would be allowed to emigrate. Already, the Soviets have manifested some "performance" in this area (i.e., release of 15 Pentecostalists), but recently, Soviet negotiators have indicated that Shcharansky may not be released.

In your meeting, Ambassador Kampelman and Secretary Shultz will recommend that the Madrid meeting be concluded on the basis of the present package. They will also point out that we should not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharansky and thus will suggest that you authorize both of them to approach appropriate Soviet officials to state that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of imprisoned Soviet citizens.

Attached at Tab A are talking points which reflect your agreement to the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. Also, at Tab B is a detailed memorandum from George Shultz to you on CSCE.

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
William P. Clark  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Max Kampelman  
Jack Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: White House photo and discussion.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/cards  
Tab B Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, July 11, 1983

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky/  
Peter Sommer

100185

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

Tuesday, July 11, 1983

- I recognize that we are under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the Madrid meeting. Foreign Minister Genscher made this abundantly clear to me yesterday.
  
- I agree that the U.S. can join the consensus for concluding the meeting and that George Shultz should go to Madrid for the concluding session. The concluding document appears to provide the balanced result we have long sought. I am happy to hear that it includes humanitarian provisions and human contacts experts' meetings.
  
- In agreeing, I ask that both George and Ambassador Kampelman inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoly Shcharansky.



TALKING POINTS: MTG. W/AMB. MAX KAMPELMAN

-- RECOGNIZE INCREASING ALLIED PRESSURE TO WRAP UP MADRID MEETING. GENSCHER MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR.

-- AGREE U.S. CAN JOIN CONSENSUS FOR CONCLUDING MEETING AND GEORGE SHOULD GO TO CONCLUDING SESSION. CONCLUDING DOCUMENT APPEARS TO PROVIDE BALANCED RESULT WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT. HAPPY TO HEAR IT INCLUDES HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS AND HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS' MEETINGS.

-- ASK BOTH GEORGE AND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN INFORM SOVIETS WE EXPECT THEM TO LIVE UP TO THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES ON RELEASE OF CERTAIN IMPRISONED SOVIET PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, INCLUDING SHCHARANSKY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

100144

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *WJS*

Subject: CSCE - Concluding the Madrid Meeting

Our negotiators have achieved agreement on a concluding document at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting on the basis of the Spanish initiative, which you approved in June. The Madrid document is a good one from our point of view. It provides the balanced result which we have long sought -- significant improvement on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and provision for human rights and human contacts experts' meetings as well as agreement to hold the first stage of a European security conference dealing with surprise military attack.

As far as the Madrid document is concerned, the only point still open is the mode for agreeing to an experts' meeting on human contacts. All of the other participants are prepared to agree on the meeting by means of a Chairman's Statement. This would be consistent with the Spanish compromise proposals. Congressman Fascell, Chairman of the CSCE Commission, has expressed concern that agreement to the meeting in this way might downgrade its status. I am confident, however, that Max Kampelman will be able to ensure that the statement meets our needs and does not have the effect Congressman Fascell fears.

The only problem remaining concerns the bilateral dialogue which we have maintained with the Soviet Union on specific improvements in their implementation of CSCE commitments -- the so-called human rights "performance" issue. In early June, the Soviet representatives at Madrid furnished Max, our negotiator, with specific assurances that several Soviet citizens, imprisoned for their activity on behalf of the Helsinki Final Act, would be allowed to emigrate. These assurances, including one on Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, were furnished on behalf of the highest Soviet authority, and Max passed them on to you.

There has already been some "performance" with the release of 15 members of one Pentecostalist family plus the emigration of five additional families, two of which are Jewish. The Soviets have assured Kampelman that the 15 members of the second Pentecostalist family will receive permission to leave

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M327 # 100186

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

as soon as the letters of invitation arrive from Israel, expected later this week.

In their latest contacts with Kampelman, the Soviet negotiators have hinted that a problem has arisen with the release of Shcharanskiy. This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that Shcharanskiy has thus far refused to write the appeal for clemency which the Soviets had earlier told us would be necessary to initiate the process of release. At that meeting, the Soviets agreed to add the name of an additional imprisoned Helsinki monitor to their list.

This problem and the fact that the list of those to be released includes only one Jew, Shcharanskiy, creates a problem for us. The intensity of feeling on this issue will be exacerbated by indications of increased anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Moscow's worsening record on Jewish emigration. There is also, more importantly, the question of credibility in our long-range relations with the USSR. On the other hand, our Allies have consistently refused to associate themselves with an effort to link conclusion of Madrid to specific human rights steps by the Soviet Union. They would not, under present circumstances, support an effort on our part to hold up completion of the meeting until the situation regarding Shcharanskiy is clarified.

With the concluding document at Madrid completed, we are coming under increasing Allied pressure to wrap up the meeting. The Allies want us to agree in days, and certainly this week, on ending Madrid.

My recommendation is that we not let the Soviets off the hook on Shcharanskiy, and that we hold them to their previous assurances. If you approve, Max Kampelman will tell the Soviets in Madrid that we expect them to live up to all their assurances, including that on Shcharanskiy. I will reinforce this message with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin this week, making clear that we consider this a commitment by the Soviet leadership to you and that there will be tangible consequences if they do not live up to this commitment.

I further recommend that having made these approaches, we go forward to agreement at Madrid. The Soviets may carry out their assurances. If they do not, we will have to react, not by calling the CSCE process to a halt, but by reviewing other aspects of our bilateral relationship.

If you approve these recommendations, I will be prepared to go to Madrid for the concluding session, at a time to be arranged. A concluding session at this level is felt by our Allies to be a highly desirable demonstration that the East-West dialogue continues despite the approach of INF deployment, a perception that is in our interest to reinforce. In order to avoid the appearance of serious dissension with our Allies, we need your decision as soon as possible, preferably today or tomorrow.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize approaches by Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid and by me to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to inform the Soviets that we expect them to live up to their previous assurances on the release of certain imprisoned Soviet prisoners of conscience, including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize Ambassador Kampelman to agree to conclude the Madrid meeting on the basis of the present package. I would plan to go to Madrid to participate in the formal closing session, probably this month.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

SIGNED

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY  
PETER SOMMER

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Kampelman  
and Secretary of State Shultz

Attached at Tab I is a Briefing Memorandum for the President's meeting with Ambassador Max Kampelman and Secretary of State George Shultz. Talking Points for the meeting are provided at Tab A and at Tab B is a detailed memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz on CSCE.

gm  
Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Briefing Memorandum at Tab I and its attachments to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Briefing Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Secretary Shultz's memorandum, July 11, 1983

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA CA DATE 11/21/10

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR