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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

File Folder CSCE 1984 (1982)

CAS 11/10/2010

Box Number 90898(MR10-323)

FOIA

M10-323

MIYAWAKI

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100159	PAPER	RE CSCE (P. 2 ONLY) <i>R</i> 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	2/6/1982	B1
100160	PAPER	RE CSCE <i>R</i> 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	3/16/1982	B1
100161	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE SOVIET HUNGER STRIKERS <i>R</i> 1/29/2013 M323/1	1	ND	B1
100162	PAPER	RE CSCE (P.2 ONLY) <i>R</i> 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	8/4/1982	B1
100163	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE CSCE: US APPROACH TO THE RESUMED MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE <i>R</i> 1/29/2013 M323/1	1	11/6/1982	B1
100164	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE CSCE: US APPROACH TO THE RESUMED MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE (ATTACHMENT TO 100163) <i>R</i> 10/10/2012 M323/1	2	11/5/1982	B1
100165	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR ET ALL TO CLARK RE CSCE: US APPROACH TO THE RESUMED MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE (ATTACHMENT TO 100163) <i>R</i> 1/29/2013 M323/1	1	11/6/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

452
(8201103)


February 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Nomination to the CSCE Commission

The President has asked me to notify you that he concurs in Walt Stoessel's recommendation and intends to name Elliott Abrams to replace Stephen E. Palmer as State Department Commissioner to the CSCE Commission.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1982

ACTION**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Nomination of Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights to CSCE Commission

I concur in Acting Secretary of State Stoessel's recommendation (Tab A) that you name Elliott Abrams as State Department Commissioner to the CSCE Commission. If you agree, I will forward the memorandum at Tab B to the Department of State, notifying them of your decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you name Elliott Abrams to replace Stephen E. Palmer when he departs in early February.

Approve ✓ RE Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Stoessel
Tab B Memorandum to Stoessel from William P. Clark

0452

8201103

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Secretary
SUBJECT: Nomination to the CSCE Commission

On November 17 you nominated Stephen E. Palmer, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, as State Department Commissioner to the CSCE Commission. Elliott Abrams has since become Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. I recommend that you name Mr. Abrams to replace Mr. Palmer, who plans to depart the Human Rights bureau in early February.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 26, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES ^h

SUBJECT: Nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights to CSCE Commission

I have reviewed and concur in Acting Secretary of State Stoessel's recommendation (Tab A) that the President name Elliott Abrams to replace Stephen E. Palmer as State Department Commissioner to the CSCE Commission. A memorandum to the President is at Tab I. A memorandum to Stoessel for your signature is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

cl

Carnes Lord concurs.

SIGNED

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Acting Secretary Stoessel's memorandum to the President
- Tab B Memorandum from Clark to Stoessel

**National Security Council
The White House**

ED

Package # 452

92 28 P 5: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>		
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		
Sit Room			

SIGNED

I-Information A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

SIGN at red Tab. done

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 0452

82 JAN 27 A 8:40

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>	<u> </u>	<u>DISPATCH</u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

SIGNED

I-Information A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Meese	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Baker	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
CY To Deaver	<u> </u>	Show CC	<u> </u>
Other	<u> </u>		

COMMENTS

CSCE
100159
2/6/82

2. CSCE: RESUMPTION AND RECESS TACTICS

The West is certain to censure Poland for its violations of the Helsinki Final Act when the Madrid CSCE talks resume on February 9. The USSR and its allies will seek to limit discussion and charge the West with eroding European cooperation. The Soviets as well as most Western participants are not likely to favor a quick recess. But in the probable event of a protracted polemical debate, both sides would prefer to see the neutral and non-aligned states (NNA) take the initiative in calling for a recess.

* * *

The West agrees that the Madrid conference cannot be reconvened on a "business as usual" basis. The NATO Foreign Ministers who will attend Tuesday's opening session (Carrington and van der Stoep will arrive on February 12), are expected to denounce the repression in Poland, just as they condemned the Afghanistan invasion when the Madrid review session first convened in the fall of 1980.

But our NATO allies are unlikely to go along with an early recess. They believe that remaining in Madrid for a "reasonable period" will permit the West to maintain the rhetorical offensive on Poland. They also would like to put the onus for an adjournment on the East. At some point, the West Europeans are likely to enlist one of the neutrals, probably the Swiss, to propose a recess until next fall to preserve the possibility of agreement on the NNA draft concluding document.

The Soviets, the Poles, and their allies (joined by the Yugoslavs) have flatly stated that they would construe a discussion of Poland as interference in that country's internal affairs. The Polish foreign ministry's aide-memoire of January 21 to all CSCE signatories and Jaruzelski's January 25 speech to the Sejm warned that Warsaw would strongly oppose such a discussion.

By procedural coincidence, Poland will be sitting in the chair on February 9 and speaking first. Consequently, the Soviets and their allies will be in a position to filibuster and to adjourn the plenary, if they choose, after three hours. But they are unlikely to exercise this option because they would not wish to undercut their leverage with the NNA and become saddled with the responsibility for undermining the CSCE process. Publicly, the Soviets claim that CSCE must be "consistent and continuous." Privately, however, they recognize that some criticism of Poland will be unavoidable and they have intimated a willingness to "study" a recess after a discussion of other substantive issues.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 #100159

BY KML NADA DATE 10/10/12

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MARCH 16, 1982

1. CSCE: A LONG PAUSE AFTER A SHORT SESSION

In agreeing to recess the Madrid conference until November 9, Moscow in effect conceded that current prospects for agreement on a CDE were nil. It also probably reasoned that by fall, West European NATO countries may be less critical about Poland and out in front of the US in their willingness to negotiate a CDE. In any case, the recess will provide Moscow some relief from the West's attacks on martial law in Poland and Soviet complicity in it.

* * *

Moscow, and Warsaw as well, may have hoped to overcome the West's opposition to martial law in Poland and its refusal to negotiate an agreement on a CDE during the course of the Madrid session. During the recess Moscow is likely to step up its effort to isolate the US by exploiting changing perceptions within NATO in the wake of further relaxations (however small or cosmetic) in martial law. This was suggested by Brezhnev's statement during Jaruzelski's Moscow visit that, although US-Soviet relations are important, West European voices also could be decisive.

Such divisive intents were also reflected in the communique on Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Minister Mladenov's March 4-5 talks with Gromyko in Moscow. That communique made an obvious pitch to the West Europeans by claiming that US actions on Poland "signified an open disregard for the interests of all European states."

Moscow and most of its Warsaw Pact allies can be expected to continue blaming the US for the lack of progress on a CDE, a theme which they emphasized throughout the five-week session. Interestingly, however, Romania, and to a lesser extent Hungary, appeared to disassociate themselves from the sharpening polemics on Poland.

The recess agreement calls for adoption of a "substantial and balanced concluding document" on the basis of the neutral/non-aligned draft text tabled last December. Should the Allies again be in a bargaining position when the conference resumes, they would certainly want to amend the security and human rights provisions therein. The East is likely to oppose Western conceptions of "balance," which it regards as a codeword for promoting human rights provisions; but it may opt to accept the NNA text without change as a tactic to put the West on the defensive.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR M323 # 100160

BY KHL NARA DATE 10/10/12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED with
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

June 24, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{TD}

SUBJECT: U.S. CSCE Telegram re: Soviet Hunger Strikers

Attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to the President which forwards a telegram (Tab B) from the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding the Soviet hunger strikers and a proposed reply to Congressman Fascell, Chairman of the Helsinki Commission (Tab A), for the President's signature.

Ken Duberstein's office has suggested that separate identical replies be sent to the 11 other U.S. CSCE members who co-signed the telegram; these additional letters (to be machine-signed) are at Tab II.

The text of the response has been cleared by Speechwriters.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 Tab A Proposed response to Congressman Fascell
 Tab B Incoming telegram
 Tab II Identical letters for machine-signature

UNCLASSIFIED with
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

*This signed &
ltr 24th out 28th
recopies of signed ltr*

100161

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

NLRR M323 * 100161

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY KML NARA DATE 1/29/13

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Hunger Strikers

Issue: Should you, as requested by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe, personally intercede with the Soviet government on behalf of the hunger strikers?

Background: On May 10, seven Soviet citizens declared a hunger strike as a way of protesting the unreasonable denial by Soviet authorities of exit visas to join their spouses in the West. Of the seven original hunger strikers, three have been promised exit visas and three have been refused and have abandoned their hunger strike. The seventh hunger striker, Yuri Balovlenkov, on the 41st day of his fast, Monday, June 21, was also promised an exit visa. (C)

Facts: The following actions have been initiated on behalf of the hunger strikers: a) two demarches have been presented to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, b) four spouses of the hunger strikers met with Vice President Bush, c) their cases have been raised in discussions in connection with the Haig/Gromyko meeting in New York. (C)

The members of the U.S. CSCE sent you a telegram (Tab B) which expresses their concern about the Soviet hunger strikers and requests your personal intervention on their behalf with Soviet authorities. Given the difficult circumstances of the remaining three divided families and the considerable progress made in resolving the other cases -- especially that of Yuri Balovlenkov -- your personal intervention is unwarranted. Instead, continued pressure on Soviet authorities should be applied through diplomatic channels. At Tab A is a suggested reply to Congressman Fascell, Chairman of the U.S. CSCE. Ken Duberstein recommends that separate, identical replies be machine-signed and sent to the 11 U.S. CSCE members who co-signed the telegram at Tab B. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

- — That you sign the proposed response at Tab A to Rep. Fascell.
- — That you authorize machine-signature of 11 identical separate letters to the co-signers of the telegram.

Attachments: Tab A Proposed response to Congressman Fascell.
 Tab B Incoming telegram

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review June 1988.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the June 11 telegram which you cosigned with 11 other members of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation. I fully share your concern about the tragic plight of Soviet citizens attempting to join their spouses in the West.

As you may know, the Administration has undertaken a wide range of measures to secure their release. Two demarches have been presented to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing the extreme importance which the U.S. Government attaches to the successful resolution of these and other divided family cases. At the end of May, four spouses of Soviet hunger strikers met with Vice President Bush, who reaffirmed the Administration's firm commitment to upholding the principles of the Helsinki Accords. Most recently, this issue was raised in connection with the June 10-11 meeting of Secretary of State Haig with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York.

I am extremely pleased that our efforts have prompted the resolution of four of the seven original hunger striker cases. Please be assured that we shall continue to work steadfastly toward the reunification of families divided by Soviet restrictions on emigration. This Administration has not and will not tolerate flagrant violations of the Helsinki Accords.

Again, thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DANTE B. FASCELL
CHAIRMAN

ROBERT DOLE
CO-CHAIRMAN

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

R. SPENCER OLIVER
STAFF DIRECTOR

SAMUEL G. WISE
DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

MICHAEL J. PACKARD
DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

237 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2

(202) 225-1901

TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE HUNGER STRIKERS IN MOSCOW

June 11, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Last weekend in a letter to Chairman Brezhnev, We, the undersigned Members of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), expressed our deep concern about four Soviet citizens -- Yuri Balovlenkov, Tatiana Lozanskaya, Marija Jurgutis and Iosif Kiblitisky -- who began a hunger strike on May 10 in a desperate attempt to receive permission to join their spouses in the West. We are encouraged by the news that Tatiana Lozanskaya has received permission to leave the Soviet Union with her daughter and has discontinued her hunger strike. However, the information available to us on this, the thirty-third day of their hunger strike, indicates that the physical conditions of Yuri Balovlenkov and Iosif Kiblitisky are deteriorating rapidly to the point that their lives are now threatened. The circumstances of Marija Jurgutis continue to be extremely difficult.

We firmly believe that only your urgent personal involvement can bring about a resolution of this critical situation, and we urge you to intercede personally with the Soviet leadership on behalf of these families.

DANTE B. FASCELL
Chairman

ROBERT DOLE
Co-Chairman

SIDNEY R. YATES
U.S. House of Representatives

ORRIN HATCH
U.S. Senate

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
U.S. House of Representatives

JOHN HEINZ
U.S. Senate

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH
U.S. House of Representatives

ALFONSE M. D'AMATO
U.S. Senate

MILLICENT FENWICK
U.S. House of Representatives

CLAIBORNE PELL
U.S. Senate

DON RITTER
U.S. House of Representatives

PATRICK LEAHY
U.S. Senate

Aug. 4/82

100162

2. MOSCOW ASSAILS US ON SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF CSCE

In its first significant press comment on CSCE since the March recess, Moscow has alleged that US policies advocating nuclear confrontation, psychological subversion, and economic warfare are "sabotaging" the 1975 Helsinki accords and "threatening" the sovereignty and prosperity of West European countries. This propaganda tack is likely to be central to Moscow's CSCE strategy.

* * *

Moscow has seized upon the CSCE anniversary to contrast its European disarmament and sundry other peace initiatives with alleged US breaches of CSCE that infringe on European security interests. One Soviet commentary has implied that NATO's decision to deploy nuclear missiles could lead to "limited" nuclear conflict in Europe. Moscow also continued to criticize the US ban on the sale of equipment for the Siberian pipeline, an indication that it will continue to attempt to take advantage of tensions between the US and the European allies.

The articles represent a pastiche of previous charges, but with consultations for Madrid about to begin they may signal an accelerated Soviet effort to portray the US as Western Europe's nemesis. Soviet press accounts have pointed out that West European governments have demonstrated "greater concern" about US policies and have noted that "millions of people" in Europe are opposed to new missile deployments.

Following the recent relaxation of Polish martial law, Moscow probably hopes the West European countries will become resigned to conditions in Poland and will be ready to negotiate an agreement on a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) when Madrid resumes. The FRG has already privately urged that Poland not become an impediment to a CDE mandate, a view reportedly shared by other European allies and by some nonaligned states.

The Soviets are scheduled to begin consultations with the Swiss in September and probably will convoke a Warsaw Pact foreign ministers strategy session prior to Madrid. In April, Gromyko reaffirmed that the nonaligned draft concluding document tabled last December still constituted a "good basis" for a "positive outcome" of the Madrid talks, especially on the question of a CDE. The Soviets can be expected to continue to press the West to expand the area covered by the CDE to include the seas adjoining Europe. It will oppose Western attempts to adopt provisions that would promote human rights.

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR M323 # 100162

BY KML NADA DATE 10/10/12

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

Dobriansky
7672 CSCE
100

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK ✓
SUBJECT: CSCE: U.S. Approach to the Resumed Madrid Review Conference

Attached for your approval is George Shultz's recommendation on the approach the U.S. should take when the CSCE Review Conference reconvenes in Madrid next week. The recommended approach is to join the Allies in proposing new provisions to the concluding document which was under negotiation before the imposition of martial law in Poland. These new provisions will keep the focus at Madrid on Poland and Soviet human rights violations. (S)

We anticipate that these new proposals would make the document unacceptable to the East, and that after several weeks of haggling, the Conference would be concluded with a short, non-substantive document. (S)

This approach by the United States would be welcomed by the Allies, who have feared that we might refuse to negotiate at all. The approach proposed in George's memorandum will maintain Allied unity, continue to isolate the East and bring the conference to a close, satisfying the primary U.S. objectives. (S)

Defense, the JCS and ACDA all concur in the approach in this memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No
RR

That you approve the approach to the Resumed Madrid Review Conference in Secretary Shultz's memorandum

Tab A Shultz memo

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 + 160163

BY KML NARA DATE 1/29/13

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 5, 1982

82 5 PM: 21

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: CSCE: U.S. Approach to the Resumed Madrid
Review Conference

On November 9 the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will resume. This meeting, called to review implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and to consider the extension of its provisions, has been in recess since March as the result of events in Poland. We now need to decide the approach we will take when the meeting reconvenes.

Last February we secured Allied support for our position that it would be inappropriate to continue negotiations on a substantive concluding document, in view of the imposition of martial law in Poland. The firm Western position against negotiations resulted in adjournment of the Madrid meeting in March for an eight-month recess. The document then under consideration, and the one which will be the basis for negotiations at the resumed Madrid meeting, was put forward by the Neutral and Nonaligned states. It includes provisions on human rights and East-West economic exchanges, and calls for the convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to work out military confidence-building measures to deal with the danger of surprise attack in Europe.

In the light of the current situation in Poland and the Soviet Union, and the need to maintain balance between human rights and other aspects of the CSCE process, we could not justify a conclusion to the Madrid conference which included agreement to a CDE without a clear demonstration by the Soviets of more serious intent to abide by existing CSCE undertakings. Our Allies agree that we should not return to "business as usual" in Madrid due to continued repression in Poland, and further deterioration in the Soviets' own domestic human rights performance. They are not, however, willing to refuse substantive negotiations altogether. They have proposed instead that the West return to Madrid with new proposals designed to keep the focus at Madrid on Poland and on Soviet human rights violations.

These proposals include new provisions on:

- trade union rights;
- CSCE monitors;
- self-determination;

DECLASSIFIED

NLRI M323 # 100164

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- religious freedom;
- rights of journalists;
- radio jamming;
- access to diplomatic missions; and
- strengthened language on the CDE mandate.

These initiatives represent a significant improvement over the existing draft concluding document. The East will not be able to accept these proposals. In making them, however, we will be further highlighting the gap between Soviet actions and accepted norms of conduct, and we will be demonstrating that the West is not prepared to acquiesce in the repression of the Polish or the Soviet people.

Our objective should be an early end to the Madrid meeting on the basis of a short, non-substantive concluding document which would set the date and place for the next review meeting, perhaps also providing for experts' meetings in the interim on security and human rights. To achieve such a result, which must be agreed unanimously, we will need both Allied and neutral support and Soviet acquiescence. At the moment our Allies are not prepared to agree to such an early conclusion, and the Germans in particular will be reluctant to do so any time before their elections planned for next March.

Nevertheless, the Swiss are ready to put forward a proposal for such a conclusion before the end of the year. By joining with our Allies in support of strong new human rights demands, which we recognize the Soviets cannot accept, and by insisting that these new provisions are a sine qua non for any substantive concluding document, including a CDE, we will help generate the broader consensus needed to secure agreement on an early non-substantive conclusion of the meeting.

A division in the Alliance over our approach to Madrid would ease pressure on the Soviets, and allow them to portray the US as exacerbating East-West tensions. The new proposals set out above offer us a possibility of maintaining Alliance unity behind the approach of refusing to return to business as usual at Madrid.

RECOMMENDATION

That we join our Allies at Madrid in the presentation of proposals which would serve to sustain the focus on Poland and Soviet human rights violations and to maintain Alliance unity; enable us to work toward a non-substantive concluding document closing out the Madrid meeting as early as possible. All interested agencies concur.

Approve

✓RR

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

415

Package # 7472

02 NOV 6 All: 05

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION

John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[check]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[check]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[check]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Sit Room	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 7672

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION

John Poindexter	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Judge Clark	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Send by DX copy of Tab A
to Bremer at State Dept
from NOV 9 1966
1530 [initials]

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7672

130125
Mc
down

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *[Signature]* RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: CSCE: U.S. Approach to the Resumed Madrid Review Conference

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's recommendation on the U.S. approach to the reconvened Madrid Conference. All other concerned agencies (Defense, JCS and ACDA) concur with State's recommendation: the U.S. should support the Allies' human rights proposals, which they intend to propose as additions to the concluding document which was proposed last year by the Neutral and Non-aligned (NNA) nations. (S)

As your memo to the President explains, we fully expect that these additions will make the document unacceptable to the East, and the Conference will fall back to a short, non-substantive concluding document. This strategy will maintain Western unity, keep the East on the defensive, and eventually put the Madrid conference out of its misery. (S)

Because the negotiations resume next week, we need to have the President's approval today, Saturday, so that State can send out the implementing cables. I talked with Ambassador Kampelman last night, and he is ready to go on the basis of these instructions once he gets word that the President has approved. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM323 #100165

BY KN NARA DATE 1/29/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 15, 1982

TO:

BOB SIMS
WALT RAYMOND
DENNIS BLAIR
DICK PIPES
DON FORTIER



FROM:

CARY LORD

FYI.

→ Sims
Raymond
Blair
Forster
Pipes

Summary of VOA Editorial for 10 Nov. 82

Madrid: A Question of Trust

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reconvened on Tuesday in Madrid. It is a continuation of the process which produced the Helsinki Final Act in 1975--and agreement that recognized the present boundaries of states in Europe in exchange for the Soviet and Eastern bloc's recognition of basic human rights.

The USG-ed recounts that this second part of the Helsinki agreements--the part dealing with recognition of natural rights--is not being observed by the Soviets or their satellites; and that this nonobservance is contrary to the success on international agreements.

The success depends on all signatories observing all parts of agreements--even the ones they don't like. Otherwise, what meaning do agreements have and why should we enter into further such arrangements with those whose present behavior continues to cast doubt on their trustworthiness?

MADRID: A QUESTION OF TRUST (OUR06)

ANNCR: Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

VOICE: On Tuesday the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reconvened in Madrid. This meeting is another in a series that began in 1975, when the United States, Canada and thirty-three European countries signed a formal agreement that was supposed to mark the end of one era in European history and the beginning of another.

The agreement has come to be known as the Helsinki Final Act. Its purpose was to put an end to European post-war insecurity by recognizing the boundaries of states and by creating mechanisms, such as advance warning of military maneuvers, to reduce the risk of accidental war.

The Helsinki agreement was also supposed to begin an era of economic, scientific and environmental cooperation between East and West; of expanding educational and cultural exchanges; of the free movement of people, ideas and information; and of respect for fundamental human rights.

Seven years ago, there was a tremendous sense of accomplishment over the signing of that document in Helsinki. Today there is a proportionate sense of regret, here in the United States and elsewhere, that so many of its terms have never been observed.

When Soviet troops cross the border into Afghanistan or martial law is imposed in Poland, the Final Act's provisions on military security and self-determination are violated directly. When dissidents are locked in psychiatric

hospitals, when people are persecuted for practicing their religion or for trying to emigrate, when workers are denied their right to organize, when radio broadcasts are jammed and publications censored, the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki document are broken once again.

To be sure, the Soviet Union and its allies are willing to live up to some of the Final Act's provisions. They are happy to take advantage, for example, of the opportunities created in Helsinki for increased trade and technology transfer.

But international agreement means very little if each side is free to observe only those terms which it finds convenient. The conference that reopened in Madrid on Tuesday to review compliance with the Helsinki document will have to consider the entire document. No one has a right to declare some of the provisions off-limits to inspection.

Agreements are built on trust, and those in the West who trusted the promises that the Soviet Union and its allies made seven years ago have good reason to feel that their trust was betrayed. At a time when new negotiations are under way on the reduction of strategic weapons and the limitation of nuclear forces in Europe, at a time when people all over the world feel that it is extremely important for the major powers to reach agreement with each other, it is essential that the delegates in Madrid find a way to restore the sense of trust -- not just for either side's advantage, but for the sake of world peace.

ANNCR: That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

[Handwritten signature]

December 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Thirteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE
Commission

We have reviewed the subject report and concur in the State Department's recommendation that Secretary of State Shultz forward the 13th Semiannual Report to the CSCE Commission on behalf of the President.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: Thirteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE
Commission

The Department of State has forwarded (Tab II) the 13th Semiannual Report to the CSCE Commission and recommends that Secretary of State Shultz be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President in accordance with existing practice.

As there are no objections to the Report, I recommend that you authorize Mike Wheeler to forward the memorandum at Tab I to the Department of State.

Sven Kraemer and Dennis Blair concur. *SK*

RECOMMENDATION

That Mike Wheeler be authorized to forward the memorandum at Tab I to the Department of State.

Approve *RP* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum from Wheeler to Bremer
Tab II Bremer's memorandum to Clark, forwarding
Thirteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE
Commission

November 26, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Thirteenth Semiannual Report to the CSCE
Commission

Public Law 94-304 requires the President to submit a report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to the CSCE Commission semiannually. The attached draft report, which covers the period June 1 - November 30, 1982, is due on December 3, 1982. The report concentrates on Soviet and Eastern European compliance with particular focus on events in Poland and human rights aspects.

The Department recommends that Secretary Shultz be authorized to transmit the report to the Commission on behalf of the President, in accordance with existing practice.

The report has been cleared as appropriate by the Departments of Defense and Commerce, U.S. Information Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been reviewed thoroughly within the Department of State and incorporates working level NSC comments.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

1. Draft Report

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