

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Dobriansky, Paula: Files
Folder Title: Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe 1984 [1981]
Box: RAC Box 1

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 11/10/2010

File Folder CSCE 1984 (1981)

FOIA

M10-323

Box Number 90898(MR10-323)

MIYAWAKI

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100148	PAPER	RE CSCE (P. 5 ONLY) R 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	2/21/1981	B1
100149	PAPER	RE CDE (P. 2 ONLY) R 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	ND	B1
100150	PAPER	RE USSR (P. 5 ONLY)	1	3/17/1981	B1 B3
100151	PAPER	RE CSCE R 10/10/2012 M323/1	5	3/27/1981	B1
100152	PAPER	RE CSCE (P. 5 ONLY) R 10/10/2012 M323/1	1	5/22/1981	B1
100153	STATEMENT	BY MAX KAMPELMAN TO CSCE INFORMAL HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING #35 R 10/10/2012 M323/1	4	6/10/1981	B1
100154	STATEMENT	BY MAX KAMPELMAN TO CSCE INFORMAL HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING #36 R 10/10/2012 M323/1	2	6/10/1981	B1
100155	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE CONCLUDING THE MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE R 1/29/2013 M323/1	1	7/10/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 11/10/2010

File Folder CSCE 1984 (1981)

FOIA

M10-323

Box Number 90898(MR10-323)

MIYAWAKI

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100156	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT (DRAFT ATTACHMENT TO 100155) <i>R 1/29/2013 M323/1</i>	1	ND	B1
100157	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE CONCLUDING THE MADRID CONFERENCE <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	2	7/9/1981	B1
100158	PAPER	RE CSCE (P. 3 ONLY) <i>R 10/10/2012 M323/1</i>	1	8/10/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

ROMANIA
(CSCE)

2/21/01

100148

5. CSCE--ROMANIA "OUT PROPOSES" AND DISTANCES ITSELF FROM OTHER
WARSAW PACT ALLIES

Romania is exploiting the Madrid CSCE forum to sharpen its image of independence in foreign policy. The Romanian delegation has so far submitted eleven proposals without going the co-sponsorship route of most other Warsaw Pact countries, and has openly diverged from Pact positions by supporting, or being willing to compromise on, Western human rights proposals.

* * *

Romania's eleven proposals account for almost a third of the Warsaw Pact countries' submissions (37) to the Madrid CSCE. (All in all, 86 proposals have been tabled.) The Soviets are probably vexed by the Romanian behavior, and with reason.

--On February 3, Bucharest explicitly endorsed the US-proposed bilateral human rights roundtable and said it was willing to compromise on all other human rights proposals, despite the fact that the Soviet representative had just attacked the Western proposals as confrontational.

--Romania's proposal for a Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe would explicitly make such a meeting an "integral part of the CSCE process," a point purposely sidestepped by the Warsaw Pact in its proposal for a conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe (CMD). (Curiously, the Romanians have neither offered a rationale for their submission nor indicated how it squares with the Pact proposal they also officially support.)

--Romania has called for institutionalizing the CSCE process (permanent machinery to function between conferences) and setting a venue (Bucharest) for the next follow-up--even though the USSR threatens to scuttle a follow-up unless the current session produces results desired by the Soviets.

--Some Romanian proposed confidence-building measures--e.g., no multinational maneuvers near the frontiers of other participating states--cannot please Moscow because of their current implications for Poland.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 * 100148

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

CSCC → 100149

2. CDE: LIKELY SOVIET TACTICS

The Soviets probably do not expect Brezhnev's February 23 statement to lead to an early agreement on the area to be covered by confidence building measures in Europe. The Soviets, however, may hope that a haggle over inclusion of American territory will eventually set the stage for a compromise which would set in motion a new disarmament conference without first having resolved the question of area.

* * *

Now that Brezhnev has stated that the USSR could include all of its European territory provided that the area were appropriately expanded on the Western side, the Soviets may take the line that it is now up to the US and its allies to make an offer to include American territory on the Western side.

--The Soviets may hope that Brezhnev's move will produce some friction between the US and those in Europe who are anxious to have the Madrid meeting charter a new arms control forum.

--Recalling the arguments of the late fifties over aerial inspection zones, we think it likely that the Soviets will demand parity in the amount of Soviet and American territory to be covered (the Soviet arms-control bureaucracy has a phenomenal institutional memory).

The Soviets probably see little chance for resolution of the area issue at Madrid, but they may believe that as frustration sets in there may be a growing sentiment among the neutrals and in some NATO countries to charter a new arms control forum and leave the details of area to be negotiated later on.

Yugoslavia tabled a proposal in December to have different areas for different CBMs rather than to negotiate one area for all possible measures. The concept was one which the Poles had mentioned even earlier; it probably represented Moscow's idea of a fallback which would allow the Soviets to signal a willingness to go beyond the 250 km band of Soviet territory defined in the 1975 CBMs without undertaking any specific commitments. Moscow may believe that a Soviet offer to accept the Yugoslav proposal as a compromise would be substantially more attractive now that Brezhnev has indicated that the USSR has no objection in principle to coverage of all of European Russia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 #100149

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
Dobriansky, Paula: Files

Withdrawer
CAS 11/10/2010

File Folder
CSCE 1984 (1981)

FOIA
M10-323
MIYAWAKI

Box Number
90898(MR10-323)

8

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
100150	PAPER RE USSR (P. 5 ONLY)	1	3/17/1981	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

100913

100913



(U) CSCE: MOSCOW'S CRUNCH TACTICS AT MADRID

BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

(C) Summary

Since the opening of the CSCE review conference in Madrid last November, Moscow has not slackened its drive to obtain agreement on a mandate for a security conference, nor its insistence that the CSCE process hangs in the balance. Brezhnev's February 23 proposal to extend confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the Urals--albeit coupled with a demand that the West reciprocate with "a corresponding extension"--and subsequent signs of Soviet flexibility on other criteria in the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) attest to Moscow's determination to forge a mandate on its terms.

Moscow probably regards the review conference as at least a partial success--i.e., the West's acceptance of the idea of a post-Madrid security conference--and is counting on the neutral/nonaligned states to fashion a late-hour compromise on a relatively unfettered mandate. Moscow apparently does not feel constrained for time, but it may resort to pressure tactics to encourage an early agreement. (There has been no agreement on a concluding date for the session.)

The Soviets' preoccupation with security issues (Basket I) has been accompanied by considerable foot-dragging on economic (Basket II) and humanitarian (Basket III) issues. The East continues to make positive noises about human contacts--something it did not do at Belgrade in 1977-78--and on a CSCE follow-up, but it is clearly holding those prospects hostage to an agreement on the security conference.

* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED

ALRS M323 * 160151

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 3/27/01 (Stoddard, P.)

Report 99-CA
March 27, 1981

(C) Piecemeal Elaboration of Brezhnev's CBM Proposal

Soviet CSCE Representative Ilichev's initial exposition, March 3, of Brezhnev's February 23 proposal cautiously preserved the ambiguities, particularly with respect to the area of CBM application. Moscow's allies dutifully echoed Ilichev's call for a Western response. (Not all of them were surprised by the Brezhnev proposal; the Poles had informally broached the idea in January.)

Subsequently, the Soviets sought to appear more forthcoming, but did not commit themselves on any substantive points. Ilichev, in a luncheon discussion with US Ambassador Kampleman on March 6, reaffirmed Moscow's interest in a decision at Madrid to hold a future security conference and displayed less rigidity than heretofore on various other criteria in the French proposal. He stated that the Soviet Union:

--was prepared to accept that CBMs should be "politically obligatory"; and

--could accept verification of certain CBMs which, he claimed, lent themselves to verification.

But he also noted, in connection with the Soviet offer to extend the zone of CBM coverage, that the US and Canada "still exist" and provide a "sanctuary for troops and weapons."

Soviets Float Paper on CBM Conference

(C) Ilichev's implication that the US and Canada should be included in the CBM zone and that the question of zones could be considered at the security conference were reflected in a paper suggesting final language on a CBM conference. (The Soviets passed this paper to the neutrals on March 11, i.e., to Austria's Representative Ceska, who heads the drafting group on security issues.) The verbatim text of the Soviet paper, as amended on March 18, reads in part:

"On the basis of the quality of rights and obligations of all participating states in the CSCE process, the goal of the first stage of the Conference will be to negotiate and adopt confidence and security building measures covering both Europe with adjoining air and sea (ocean) space and correspondingly non-European participating states. These confidence and security building measures which are militarily significant will have the nature of political obli-

gations, in conjunction with a corresponding form of verification, if this flows from their concrete content."

(C) The formulations tended to obfuscate the Soviet position even further. Besides reflecting an attempt to defer issues crucial to a mandate for the security conference, the text:

- injected an element of ambiguity as to which CBMs were militarily significant;
- broadly implied the inclusion of US and Canadian territory, as well as air and sea space; and
- sought to emasculate the criterion of verification (which, along with that regarding political obligations, was seemingly relegated to the security conference for decision) by calling for "corresponding" forms of verification, i.e., making verification dependent on the nature of each CBM.

(C) The Soviet text represented the first parrying of the French criteria, undoubtedly in an attempt to attract the support of the neutrals and some NATO allies. Its generalized formulations leave the Soviets considerable latitude to negotiate a fallback position, which could mean compromising their implied requirement of including portions of the North American continent. However, the reference to the application of CBMs to all of Europe, including air and sea space, and "correspondingly non-European participating states" suggests a zone of large expanse. This was intimated by Soviet Representative Ilichev in a conversation with FRG Ambassador Kastl on March 13. Ilichev stated that there was a need to balance the CBM extension to the Urals with an approximately equal area extension within the US, suggesting that the extent of North American coverage might be determined by calculating the mileage between the present 250-km zone in the USSR and the Urals, i.e., about 2,000 kms (1,200 miles). The US and its NATO allies, however, in supporting the French proposal, have categorically rejected the inclusion of any area not part of the European Continent.

(S) The new Soviet text may find some resonance among neutral/nonaligned states because of its inclusion of naval CBMs, similar to the 1975 Final Act's reference to CBM maneuver notifications that encompass "adjoining sea area and air space." (The Final Act's language is more precise, however, and is clearly tied to CBMs relating to ground activities.) The Soviets have not officially defined "sea" space, but they have cited the definition in the nonaligned states' proposal for naval CBMs, i.e., "the inner seas of Europe, the Baltic, North Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and ocean areas adjacent to the territorial

This may account for obstructionist tactics by the East on other Basket II issues. It has refused to consider a NATO paper on economic and commercial information, arguing that delegates unwilling to engage in the work of senior energy advisers in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) should not interfere in the work of the ECE in other areas (e.g., in the information sphere).

Some progress, however, has been achieved on the industrial cooperation issue pushed by the Romanians: that is, agreement on a preambular accord stating that industrial cooperation should be based on both economic considerations and mutual interests. But this probably piques the Soviets, who have not been successful in achieving agreement on their pet theme for long-term industrial cooperation.

Basket III (Humanitarian). The discussions and drafting on the issue of human contacts have been difficult. The East's submission on March 11 of its non-paper has not been constructive. While supportive of the furthering of contacts between persons and organizations and other related activities, the paper contains the Soviets' traditional qualifier--"under mutually acceptable conditions." The East, except for Romania, also opposes major humanitarian-related proposals by the West: an experts meeting on human rights and improved implementation of human rights.

On information issues, the Soviets have not been entirely negative. They have tentatively agreed to the idea of allowing foreign correspondents to bring in documents in single copy for professional purposes and have left open the door for accepting some formulation on the expeditious processing of visa applications by journalists.

(C) CSCE Follow-Up

The Soviets have remained rigid in their view that discussions on a future CSCE meeting would be premature and that no decision can be taken until it is seen if positive results emerge from Madrid. Given the Soviets' stake in CSCE--which, after all, was Moscow's own creation--they would probably be most reluctant to cut off the process. Their threat to do so seems directed at exerting leverage over the session's outcome, particularly on the matter of a post-Madrid security conference. Informally, at least, they have indicated that they are prepared to accept the Western idea that the Madrid procedures be used for all future CSCE meetings.

Prepared by J. S. Bodnar
x23288

Approved by M. Mautner
x29536

waters of the European participating states." (Except for certain aspects of amphibious activities agreed in NATO, the US opposes air and naval CBMs.) The Soviets can be expected to exploit the neutral/nonaligned states' formulation as a way to extend CBMs beyond Europe.

(C) The Soviet formulations also resemble elements of the Yugoslav proposal on a CBM conference, tabled in December, which called for zonal variations in the application of CBMs and for deferring specific mandate issues to a special preparatory meeting. The Soviets, who may yet view the Yugoslav approach as a viable fallback, especially if it ensures reaching agreement on a post-Madrid conference, probably assess as slim any chance of getting agreement on specifics at Madrid. They may believe that, as frustration builds, the neutrals and possibly some NATO allies may be susceptible to compromise.

(C) Discussions on Other Issues Businesslike, But Unspectacular

Apart from the discussions on CBMs, the negotiating and drafting sessions have reflected scant progress and have held little glamour. The Soviets appear to have been impressed by the cohesion of the West at Madrid and have found it difficult to counter its resolve on key issues. The Soviets also appear to have been hampered by some of their Warsaw Pact allies who evidently fear that Soviet tactics could bog down the conference and prove detrimental to their respective proposals.

The Soviets probably have been irritated by Romania's divergence on various issues. The Romanians have proposed a CBM conference directly linked to the CSCE process and have pressed for a CSCE follow-up, hosted by Bucharest. While all Warsaw Pact countries have endorsed the idea of Bucharest as the site for another CSCE meeting, the Soviets have sought to decouple a CBM conference from CSCE and have deferred the decision on such a meeting pending agreement on a security conference and their own assessment of the discussions in all three Baskets. Romania's CBM proposals undoubtedly have also unnerved the Soviets, particularly the proposal to prohibit multinational maneuvers near the borders of participating states.

Basket I (Security Principles). The impasse over terrorism continues in the Basket I sessions. The East has steadfastly refused to condemn "all aspects of terrorism" on the grounds that there is no agreed definition of terrorism and any language agreed upon must allow for the legitimate use of force by national liberation movements. Although the East has stated that it would condemn only "international terrorism," it has indicated a desire to find an acceptable formulation.

Basket II (Economic). The East's proposal for an international conference on energy has not generated much response.

CSCE 100152

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 22, 1981

1. CSCE: MOSCOW LOOKING FOR A "FIG LEAF" ON CBM AREA ISSUE

Moscow's recent propaganda urging reciprocity in confidence-building measures (CBMs) is intended to bolster its negotiating position at the Madrid CSCE, where it is pressing to include the US and Canada in CBMs. Soviet representatives continue to insist on a Western concession to balance Brezhnev's proposal to extend CBMs to the Urals. Without such a concession the Soviets say there will be no security conference. But there are indications that they may be ready to accept something less.

* * *

Soviet commentaries concede that the Helsinki Final Act excludes US and Canadian territory from CBM coverage. But they also contend that both countries have obligations equal to those of European participants in CSCE and that the Final Act envisages "the expansion...of CBMs on the basis of accumulated experience." None of the commentaries suggests specific geographic formulations, but all stress reciprocity and negotiating flexibility.

--Izvestiya on May 4 dramatized Brezhnev's proposal as "requiring other states, including the US, to take corresponding steps because all CSCE participants whose forces contribute to the military balance in Europe must take on equal obligations."

--Lt. Gen. Chervov of the Soviet General Staff, in a televised speech on May 4, claimed that the USSR's unilateral expansion of its CBM zone would be tantamount to extending non-reciprocated privileges and pointedly mentioned "possibilities for expanding CBM zones by the West."

--Oleg Bykov, Deputy Director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute, in Pravda on May 7, stressed that the USSR is ready to listen to other proposals.

In Madrid, the Soviets still hope to crack Western solidarity on the area issue--especially now that Giscard, a proponent of the "Atlantic to the Urals" concept, has left the scene. They admit that "prestige reasons" dictate their need for a Western concession and continue to hold progress on human rights issues hostage to results in the security area.

Several NATO allies, including the French, are amenable to a neutral states' proposal to apply CBMs to "adjoining sea and air space" as well as to the European continent. This may be the "fig leaf" Polish representative Dobrosielski says the Soviets are looking for.

The Soviets are reportedly under instructions to attempt to conclude the session by the end of June. They have now indicated a willingness to negotiate a concluding document on the basis of the neutrals' draft and to agree "in principal" on a follow-up CSCE.

DECLASSIFIED
ALFR M323 # 100152
BY KML DATE 10/10/12

100153

Statement by
Max M. Kampelman
Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Informal Heads of Delegation Meeting - CSCE

Madrid

June 10, 1981

Mr. Chairman:

It is now a week since I returned from a short visit back to my home. When I left Madrid, there were encouraging signs of some movement at our meeting--some indication that we were developing a consensus around the desirability of coming to grips with our problems in a responsible, efficient and timely manner.

Those signals do not seem to be as evident today. It is highly desirable that we take inventory, each of us, as to where we stand so that we can evaluate the prospects for our meeting.

In Basket II, we are continuing to show positive movement.

In our Mediterranean deliberations, a fundamental issue of controversy still remains on the agenda.

In our Follow-Up discussions, we find ourselves again inexplicably faced with a position held by a small group--a position which puts in question the future of CSCE by making future Follow-Up Meetings conditional, hostage, upon results here in Madrid that are satisfactory to that small group.

In our discussion of Principles, I am afraid that we have been at a standstill for some time now on issues fundamental to many of us: human rights; religious freedom; implementation; monitors.

In our deliberations on the military aspect of our responsibilities, we were making some progress until the rather unfortunate developments of yesterday afternoon, which obviously set us back significantly.

In the Third Basket, there is continued forward movement, but at an extremely slow pace, with every indication that there is still a great deal of time-consuming work ahead on the agenda of those sessions, which include the important issue of information and the need for preparing for additional advances in the humanitarian area of family reunification.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 #100153

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/12

And in our work on the Preamble to our concluding document, we remain far apart in our conceptual approach to that task.

Our Delegation remains hopeful that we will be able to overcome the remaining obstacles and produce a significant substantive document here at these meetings. We have also indicated and repeat that if that substantive agreement cannot be achieved, we are prepared to use all of our creative energies to work with other Delegations in developing consensus around more realistic objectives.

Whichever direction taken by this Madrid meeting, our Delegation remains firm in its commitment to the vitality of our CSCE process.

In reviewing the situation as we see it, I think it appropriate to add a word about a principle that we have all accepted--the principle of balance in any concluding document that we agree upon.

This is not the time to discuss the parameters of balance because all of our ingredients to be balanced are not yet present. But I do want to assert that the American Delegation attaches great importance to two proposals, about which there has been inadequate discussion--RM.16 and RM/H.21.

I referred a moment ago to the area of family reunification, an important humanitarian issue of great interest to the people of my country. My Delegation welcomes the movement in that area already made in Basket III. The steps taken are small, within the larger context, but they are concrete. We trust that they will significantly contribute to improved implementation of the Final Act in our respective countries by further facilitating the reunification of families, family visits, and binational marriages.

It should not surprise anybody in this body, however, to learn that many of us feel strongly that there is important room for improvement. Our discussions here have demonstrated the need for yet additional discussions on these important issues. RM/H.21 would meet that need.

We have joined with four other Delegations in proposing the convening of a Meeting of Experts on Family Reunification. This would be a good fit with the texts we have already agreed upon. Such a meeting would provide an excellent opportunity for the Participating States seriously to consider how to build upon the work that was begun in Helsinki and is continuing here in Madrid.

We propose a Meeting of Experts because expert knowledge and the exchange of expert views among us would be of great value to all of us.

We do not envisage such an Experts Meeting as an excuse for a review of implementation or as an area for further confrontation. We see it, rather, as an opportunity for a serious discussion of how we can improve the implementation of the Final Act and our further agreements here. It would be of value in the exchange of technical information on the procedures followed by each of us regarding the reunification of families.

There is no need for this Meeting of Experts to last, in our opinion, for more than about three weeks. There is no need for a concluding document. There is a need for a forum to reach a better understanding among us on one another's policies and procedures and how best to improve implementation.

There are significant humanitarian problems that arise in connection with our family reunification provisions. These should be explored, and we owe it to our citizens to do so with earnestness.

RM/H.21 is a modest and reasonable approach toward resolving one of the most difficult and divisive problems that exists between us. In our judgment, holding of an Experts Meeting would go far toward helping all of us in meeting our responsibilities in a constructive fashion.

A few moments ago we heard a lucid and impressive statement by the Canadian Delegation in support of the convening of an Experts Meeting on Human Rights. The United States fully associates itself with that statement.

RM.16, in which we join Canada and Spain in sponsorship, would hold an Experts Meeting on Human Rights. This meeting is in no way a substitute for the necessity of language in the final document on human rights that we adopt here. It is, rather, an indispensable complement to such language, the kind of language originally proposed in RM.19.

An Experts Meeting on Human Rights would permit sober discussion of this indispensable responsibility within a setting and a time frame which would insure that discussion by all of us in depth, in seriousness, and in earnest.

Here again we think it is important to have a limited time period put on the meeting. We have proposed four to six

weeks so that we spend our time in deep exploration, genuine exchange, and free from fervor and contention. Again, we do not require a final document. It is the exchange of views which we hope will bring about greater understanding among us.

We all look to a time when the differences between us will be reconciled. An Experts Meeting on Human Rights would go far toward providing the basis for that reconciliation. At the very least, it could prove outstanding as a basis for reconciliation.

We fervently hope that other Delegations will understand that we make this proposal for a Human Rights Experts Meeting with the greatest of earnestness. This is important to us. We feel that it is indispensable for our understanding of one another. We urge its adoption in the belief that it can help produce the mutual understanding which is so important to the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

100154

Statement by
Max M. Kampelman
Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Informal Heads of Delegation Meeting - CSCE

Madrid

June 10, 1981

Mr. Chairman:

The vituperative, intemperate and polemical attacks by the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, not in harmony with the spirit of this morning's discussion, obviously reflect a frustration and a desperation which my Delegation notes with interest. And there will be other occasions to note them further.

Human rights are an essential part of the Helsinki Final Act. What is clear is that this commitment has been violated grossly by the Soviet Union. It is understandable that they suffer embarrassment when the issue is raised. To note and criticize a development not in harmony with an undertaking in the Helsinki Final Act is not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state. We do not have the power to interfere, but we do have the right and the duty to observe, to evaluate, and if necessary, to criticize a lack of commitment to agreements made when we believe the facts so warrant. To withhold that observation, evaluation, and criticism is to make our commitment meaningless.

The unique quality of the Helsinki Final Act has been the understanding that the protection of human rights within our own societies is a proper matter of international commitment and concern and is directly related to the larger questions of security, cooperation and relations between the Participating States. To weaken that commitment is to weaken the CSCE process, and we proceed in these meetings with a resolve to strengthen the process. We want to assure every Delegation here of that resolve.

Mr. Ilichev says the United States does not advocate a conference on military detente and disarmament. He is right. What we advocate, together with our Allies, are concrete measures to strengthen security. A conference is one means to reach agreement on such measures. But such a conference will not achieve that objective if it fails to observe the four simple criteria which we have advanced. That is why it is the criteria, and not the conference, on which we must concentrate. To refer one of those criteria - as the Soviet proposal of yesterday would do - to the conference itself would make a mockery of efforts for genuine progress on the military aspects of security.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 *100154

BY KML NADA DATE 10/10/12

We do not put forward these criteria as bargaining counters. We put them forward as the minimum elements necessary to assure that such a conference will deal with serious issues in a serious way.

It was, therefore, disappointing to hear on February 22 that the Soviet Union would not agree to a matter of obvious reasonableness--that its European territory should be included in the CBM Zone--unless the West made what was referred to as a corresponding step. It was most disappointing to hear that condition repeated on May 22. It was most disappointing to hear, in the same speech, that a final decision on the Zone could be referred to the conference itself. And it was most disappointing yesterday to hear that same position voiced in an even more negative way. To leave such an important issue unsettled would be to endanger the likelihood of the conference making a genuine contribution to security. It was for that very reason that our Delegation has joined others in concluding that it is necessary for us to decide on the criteria here at Madrid. If we cannot do so, then we are all obviously not ready in this international atmosphere for a conference.

My Delegation, Mr. Chairman, is ready to continue, and even to increase, its efforts to achieve a successful outcome to the negotiations on the military aspects of security. But we are not prepared to refer to the conference itself a decision on any of the four criteria; or to accept that a "reciprocal step" on the zone is called for by the West; or to reach decisions that are inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the French proposal, RM.7. The sooner these simple and reasonable points are understood, the sooner we will be able to make genuine progress in the security aspects of our meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1981



100155

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY PD

SUBJECT: Concluding the Madrid CSCE Conference

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President agreeing with and commenting on Secretary Haig's memorandum (Tab A) on a strategy for concluding CSCE. It is noteworthy that the strategy Haig sets forth in his memorandum is the very strategy which NSC strongly advocated in the "CSCE" SIG (which Schweitzer attended, Stoessel chaired). In that meeting, DOD supported our stance but State did not. Thus, this memorandum from Haig signifies a complete turnaround in State's position on CDE. (S)

Stearman and Schweitzer concur; Lord and Rentschler had no comment. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Your memorandum to the President
Tab A Haig's memorandum to the President, July 9.

~~SECRET~~

Derivative from State
Review July 8, 1991.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100155

BY KML NARA DATE 1/29/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Concluding the Madrid CSCE Conference

Al Haig's memorandum (Tab A) sets forth a strategy we should pursue to conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) this summer. This strategy can secure our broad goals of maintaining Allied cohesion, preserve the CSCE human rights gains, and reach a CDE mandate which meets our criteria. Specifically, it asserts and preserves our firm negotiating stance and yet, provides for further Allied consultation to formulate a more unified position on this issue. It also upholds your February decision to achieve the adoption of a CDE mandate based on French criteria and seeks to assure additional human rights gains on CSCE. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 *100156

BY KML NARA DATE 1/29/13~~SECRET~~Derivative from State
Review July 8, 1991.


~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

4131

100157

July 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
SUBJECT: Concluding the Madrid CSCE Conference

We want to conclude the Madrid meeting this summer and must begin laying the basis for final "end game" moves. We and the Allies so far have extracted tentative agreement on human rights advances. But deadlock persists on other key human rights proposals, and while we have brought the East a long way toward our concept of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), we do not yet have agreement on a mandate for negotiations.

As we try to wrap up Madrid, our goals are to maintain Allied unity, preserve the human rights gains we have made, secure still greater human rights gains, and ensure that the CDE mandate is based on the advantageous terms pushed by the West all along. The best way to achieve this, in my view, is to reach agreement with the Allies on the following strategy:

-- Inclusion in the CDE mandate of area language recently proposed by the French that locks in Soviet agreement to coverage to the Urals and rules out independent air and naval CSBMs or coverage of U.S. military movements through Europe to other areas.

-- Some form of a post-Madrid conference or forum on human rights, without which we and the Allies could not agree to a CDE.

-- A clear understanding that if the Soviets do not accept our area move, we will make no further moves to refine the mandate but instead signal that the West could agree to a post-Madrid "experts meeting" to continue the effort to reach an agreed CDE mandate in line with our criteria. (However, if we end up with an experts meeting instead of a CDE, we will get less than we otherwise could on human rights.)

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 (7/8/91)

DECLASSIFIED

NLIS M323 #100157

BY KML DATE 10/10/12

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

ACTION TAKEN

This strategy, which has the support of DOD and ACDA, is consistent with your February decision to work towards adoption of a CDE mandate based on the French criteria, and with our interest in assuring additional human rights steps in CSCE. Accordingly, I am instructing Max Kampelman to begin consultations with the British, French and Germans; once our Quad partners have agreed, we will then work together to secure full Alliance consensus. After that, Max would be authorized to use the package when he judges that the tactical situation at Madrid requires it.

~~SECRET~~

filed 1/10/81

100158

3. CSCE: CONFERENCE IN RECESS, BUT DEBATE LINGERS ON

The allies were disappointed by Moscow's rejection at the Madrid conference of Western language on the CBM zone which would have included air and naval activities directly related to notifiable land maneuvers. When the CSCE conference resumes in October the allies probably will propose further concessions in order to obtain agreement on a post-Madrid security forum. Short of that, they will at least seek to sustain the dialogue with Moscow in a follow-on experts meeting.

*

*

*

Moscow's unequivocal opposition to the Western proposal on the geographic coverage of confidence-building measures (CBMs) provoked considerable disappointment among the allies and the neutral/nonaligned states (NNA). The Soviets responded by proposing the extension of the geographic area of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to the entire Atlantic and North America. They are now likely to insist on independent air and naval CBMs extending an unspecified, but substantial, distance into the Atlantic.

Soviet rejection of the Western proposal does not seem to have adversely affected allied solidarity. But the allies are intent on reaching some agreement on a post-Madrid security conference, or at least an experts' meeting. A number of them, including the British, are therefore likely to favor further concessions on air and naval CBMs when the conference reconvenes at the end of the present recess. The FRG, which has opposed any deadlines, may be inclined to continue talks on a post-Madrid security conference beyond the end of this year.

The allies had hoped to consolidate their own position, while providing Moscow with a face-saving gesture (although it was not seen as such). The US-proposed language made the allied and NNA positions on air and sea space more explicit, while restating the West's intention to negotiate a CDE which would exclude North America. The US language also satisfied Norway, which had advocated the inclusion of some air and sea space within the CBM zone.

It seems unlikely that the allies would support the extension of the CBM zone to North America. But it is possible that the French, who initially proposed the CDE concept and first suggested the latest Western initiative, would accept a broader definition of air and naval CBMs to include the "whole of Europe," encompassing inland seas and the Atlantic. If the impasse continues, the NNA will probably press for experts' meetings to examine outstanding CSCE issues, including a CDE and human rights. This would probably be well received by France and, as Western frustration mounts, by the UK and the FRG as well.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M323 # 100158