## Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Dobriansky, Paula: Files

**Folder Title:** Bulgaria (5)

**Box:** RAC Box 1

To see more digitized collections visit: <a href="https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material">https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material</a>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <a href="https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide">https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide</a>

National Archives Catalogue: <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/">https://catalog.archives.gov/</a>

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 12/21/2016

File Folder

COUNTRY FILES: BULGARIA (5)

**FOIA** 

F1640/3

**Box Number** 

1

**HERSHBERG** 

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages
186209 REPORT	RE. BULGARIA [COPY	OF DOC. 186214] 6 10/24/1986 B1 B3
	PAR 12/21/2016 N	LR-145-1-13-6-9#186209
186214 REPORT	RE. BULGARIA	6 10/24/1986 B1 B3
	PAR 12/21/2016 N	LR-145-1-13-6-9#186214
186218 CABLE	STATE 015498	2 1/16/1987 B1
186219 CABLE	SOFIA 00389	6 1/29/1987 B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

OPEN DAILY 10-9 • SAT. 10-6 • SUN. 12-6 • VISA • MASTERCARD • OR TERMS ON APPROVED CREDIT

AIRAM ATMAS

S152 Hollister Ave. HABRAS ATMAS

1010 E. Main 3E. VENTURA

PALM DESENT 494 Orange Show Rd. at E. Street Ptr. 888-6725

SAN BERNARDINO MAEMBIDE

S4386 Swarts De OROT JS

2119 (C12) 9453 E. Firesh No. Weel Comer of bre & Rendolph - 990-2916 Just West of Bres Ville

233 M. Tuetin Ave. SONARO

3250 S. Bristol 3f. ANA ATHAS East of Euchd M meconil casi PHYHEIM

Next to Levilz PURNTE HILLS STI N. Azusa Ave.

1900 E. Colorado Siva,

19640 Sherman Way

ACSEDA 6321 Laurel Canyon Blvd. MOMIN HOLLYWOOD 17072 Devonshire Bivd. BOOMHTHON

4433 Candlewood TVKEMOOD 50430 Hemipouse BIAG

TORMANCE oży E. Manchesler

of Plaza, 714-556-7062, 1960-75 0050

Part I/Thursday, March 27, 1986

## U.S.-Polish Relations Start to Thaw After Stoessel Visit

By ROBERT GILLETTE, Times Staff Writer

WARSAW-After four years of glacial relations between the United States and Poland, the Soviet, Union's largest and most turbulent, partner, there are signs of a spring thaw in the air.

In a gesture that has clearly. pleased the Poles, a senior American statesman spent four days in Warsaw last week on an unannounced visit that included talks. with the Polish leader, Gen. Woiciech Jaruzelski, and Poland's Roman Catholic primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp.

The visit by Walter J. Stocasel Jr., a former ambassador to Poland. the Soviet Union and West Germamy who retired from his post as inder secretary of state in 1982, narked the first high-level contact hat the Reagan Administration. as allowed itself with the Polish. eadership since Jaruzelski supressed the independent Solidarity abor union under martial law in 981.

In addition the International Ionetary Fund is expected to acept Poland's application for memership no later than June and ossibly as early as April, opening

the way for the first substantial infusion of new credit into the stagnating Polish economy since **1981**. •

The United States lifted its veto on Poland's IMF membership in December, 1984, in return for a July, 1984, amnesty that freed most Polish political prisoners. But relations quickly soured again in early 1985 over the expulsion of three American diplomats from Poland and Warsaw's refusal to accept a ) new American ambassador.

voiced suspicions that Washington was delaying Poland's IMF membership, which many see as crucial to the country's economic recov-

Both Polish and U.S. officials have treated Stoessel's visit last week with great delicacy, while stressing that it was "unofficial" in nature, since Stoessel has retired from government. In private conversations, however, Polish officials have talked about it with guarded optimism, as a positive sign that the United States would like to return to the generally good relations that prevailed before

A spokesman for the U.S. Em bassy, John P. Harrod, confirmed that Stoessel met with Jaruzelskiand Glemp, as well as other Poles whom he declined to identify. Unofficial sources, however, said the others included at least one Solidarity activist

in the collection of the property of collection

#### - Polish-U.S. Ties Discussed

The Polish government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, also confirmed the Jaruzelski meeting and said Since then, officials here: have to that Stoe ser - falls with - Polish officials were "devoted to the full range of Polish-U.S. relations and Their prospects."

Reading a prepared statement in response to an inquiry. Urban de-

clined to characterize the outlook for relations but spoke warmly of Stoessel, saying that "we well remember his positive contribution" to U.S.-Polish relations when he served as ambassador to Warsaw in 1968-1972...

tallanur destausturanare, acusto du

"Another Polish official, who requested anonymity, said with a smile that the visit was "not harmful" but that it dealt with "exiremely complex" matters and could not be expected to produce an immediate turn in relations

As an indication of the importance the Poles attached to Stoessel's visit. Jaruselski was said to have cleared "several hours" from his schedule for the meeting, the

Please see POLAND, Page 17

Informal - 1st Class Freighter Cruises (818) 449-3106

FREE STRAWBERRY CAKE w/Real Whipped Cream w/ad . FRESH CHOC DIPPED EASTER BASKETS FILLES WITH GOODIES \$12.50 ETRAWBERRY CAKE 8-10

AT VAN NESS . . 780.7220

-દેશીનામાં કરાંડ લખીવામાં 🛦 િક્રીકાંપ છે respondent to sink the berille v. Oak.

CONTRACT TO THE WAY TO SEE THE

to andrest men in an

## **POLAND: U.S. Thaw Begins**

Continued from Page 16

evening of March 19, although it coincided with the start of a two-day foreign ministers' meeting of Warsaw Pact countries led by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

A Western diplomat familiar with the talks said that while Stoessel's visit was unofficial, he met with Administration officials in Washington before leaving and will do so on his return. The diplomat said Stoessel carried no specific message or proposals and that he was "here mainly to listen, and he did a lot of that."

Other diplomatic sources described the session with Jaruzelski as "frank and businesslike"—terms that usually imply polite but firm disagreement on important points—but that Jaruzelski was "impressive" in putting across his views.

#### Unofficial Visit

Over the last two years, Jaruzelski has gradually begun rebuilding relations with West European countries, partly out of an urgent need for fresh credit to revive the economy, whose output is still about 14% below its 1978 level. Poland's Western debt has ballooned to more than \$29 billion as foreign earnings have fallen and \$1 billion in unpaid interest has piled up annually.

European governments, in turn, have begun to acknowledge that, in spite of the suppression of Solidarity as an organization, its underground cultural and printing activities far exceed anything else of its kind in the Communist world.

And Poland, along with Hungary, remains one of the two least repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc. The official press is the liveliest in Eastern Europe, travel to the West is relatively unrestricted and small private enterprise has been allowed a significant expansion over the last three years.

#### A Lively Press Andre

In the midst of prolonged economic crisis, Jaruzelaki has also sought, with disappointing results so far, to introduce market-oriented reforms and to relax the grip of central planning.

central planning.

Relations with the powerful Roman Catholic Church remain tense, but spart from trying to limit its influence in the public schools, the state has made no effort to place new restrictions on the church of to hobble its massive building program of 1,000 new churches.

When Jaruzelski launched his:

martial-law crackdown against Solidarity in December, 1981—and described it implicitly as the only alternative to Soviet intervention—the Reagan Administration retaliated with an array of economic sanctions and a freeze on high-level political contacts.

With the gradual relaxation of political tensions in Poland and the freeing of most political prisoners, the Administration has lifted most of its economic sanctions—but stopped short of restoring Poland's favored-nation trading status, which carries an exemption from export tariffs.

#### A Return to Normal

Washington has insisted that a return to normal relations must come first, signified by Poland's acceptance of an American ambassador to replace Charge d'Affaires John R. Davis. A Polish official acknowledged in an informal conversation that Poland may have made a mistake in spurning an ambassador, but he said that since both sides have been so "burned" on this issue, it may be necessary to skirt it for some time yet.

With relations effectively frozen in 1985 and the ban on high-level contacts still in effect, U.S. officials declined to meet with Jaruzelski when he traveled to New York last September for the opening of the U.N. Nations General Assembly. Poland was conspicuously snubbed again last November after the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva, when ranking U.S. officials fanned out over the rest of Eastern Europe to provide briefings on the results.

In recent months, Polish Communist Party figures have put out informal feelers to the United States, suggesting that American rigidity was undermining liberals in the party leadership and strengthening the hand of a hard-line minority that favors tighter central control, harsher political discipline and closer ties with Moscow.

Among other signs of a possible thaw, a senior Polish consular official returned from Washington this week after talks that were described as amicable on bilateral issues of travel and immigration.

Discussions are also said to have been opened in Washington on constructive ways to spend millions of Polish zlotys that the U.S. government holds from food sales to Poland. One proposal under consideration is to invest them in major pollution control projects in Poland, which rates itself as one of most polluted countries in Europe.

# PLEASIFEED TH AT E

Dear Friend,

During this week, literally thousands of dest tute, homeless and hungry people will come to u seeking help.

They're afraid...anxious...tormented...alone. hurting...sick.

Many will try to drown their loneliness in chea wine or even drugs—running from the memorie of the past.

When these people come to us, cold, hungs and in despair, they are often shocked when they's not turned away, or treated like worthless juni

When we reach out to them in love ar compassion, binding up their wounds, providing clean, serviceable clothing, warm beds ar nutritious meals, they can't understand.

And, during this Easter season, we expect a provide more than 10,000 warm, nutritious mea for the hungry and the homeless of skid row.

On Saturday, March 29th, we'll fill our dinin hall 5 times and serve a special dinner of hone baked ham with raisin sauce, old fashion candid yams with marshmellows, French style gree beans, golden kernal corn, fresh baked apple pi bread and butter, and fruit punch.

Because so much of our food stuffs are donate

#### **OPEN DAILY MON.- FRI.**

SALEEN

At Ortho, you don't have



Kings a

wo sheets, 2 p fiber, 2 pillow with arr



BUREAU OF Intelligence and research

ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

#### (U) BULGARIA: POST-ZHIVKOV

#### (C) Summary

Todor Zhivkov, almost age 75, has led Bulgaria for 32 years. The post-Zhivkov leadership roles likely will be assumed by a group of technocrats who will seek to improve the country's faltering economy and fulfill Zhivkov's promise of making Bulgaria the "Japan of the Balkans." To do so, they will have to contend with increasing pressure from the USSR to integrate Bulgaria's economy more closely with those of the rest of the Warsaw Pact. They also will have to deal with such internal problems as the restive ethnic Turks, who recently have been angered by the regime's forced assimilation campaign. Zhivkov's successors are likely to want to improve relations with the United States -even if only at the margins--in order to encourage increased trade with the West, especially in high-technology items.

#### The Zhivkov Era

(LOU) Zhivkov has held the top leadership position longer than any other Pact ruler. He has survived at least six coup attempts (one of which nearly succeeded), broken up regional power cliques when their leaders threatened his authority, and kept rivals off balance by shifting them in and out of high-level government and party positions. Throughout, he has maintained a common touch and has allowed no personality cult to develop. It is fair to say that Zhivkov was a major factor in the transformation of a backward, peasant nation—on the losing side in three wars in the 20th century—into a modern industrial state.

(LOU) The frequently underestimated Zhivkov has remained in power not only by playing potential

Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)




Report 1283-AR June 24, 1986 rivals against one another but also by doling out material rewards to the old guard. In some measure he has even coopted the intellectual community—whose members on occasion have exhibited faint stirrings of dissidence—by appealing to their Bulgarian nationalism or by offering them financial incentives.

- (LOU) Accused of raising the level of Bulgarian obsequiousness to the Soviets even above the sycophantic standards of the rest of the bloc, Zhivkov can argue that he has had little choice given such factors as his country's geographic setting and economic exigencies. And his policy has succeeded to the extent that, unlike most other Pact countries, Bulgaria has never been drawn into a real crisis with the USSR. Moreover, Soviet assistance has been substantial, enabling Bulgaria to achieve one of the highest economic growth rates among member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
- (C) Zhivkov most probably presided over his last party congress in April. Rumored beforenand to be ready to announce his resignation or to appoint a special assistant, Zhivkov did neither. Instead, he made several personnel changes just before the congress—the most striking was to drop Grisha Filipov, age 66, as premier in favor of Georgi Atanasov, 56. His personnel shuffling, organizational changes, and ready acceptance of the Soviet-backed CEMA-2000 plan apparently were undertaken to convince Gorbachev, and Zhivkov's younger domestic rivals, that he would remain fully in control.

#### After Zhivkov, What?

- (LOU) The Japan of the Balkans. In the last few years Bulgaria has been beset with lagging productivity both in the factory and on the farm, although drought has contributed measurably to the agricultural decline. Oil, obtainable from the Soviets during the 1970s at relatively low prices, is no longer such a bargain. But previous contractual agreements give Bulgaria no choice but to pay the Soviet price, which currently is considerably above the world price according to official ruble-dollar exchange rates.
- (LOU) Zhivkov was once quoted as saying that Bulgaria was, or soon would be, the "Japan of the Balkans." He presumably is finding it harder in the 1980s to make good on this promise than it was in the 1970s to launch the country's "New Economic Mechanism"--a plan still carried on the books but in effect scrapped. (Todor Bozhinov, who had much to do with developing the NEM, was dropped from the Politburo in January.)
- (LOU) At the congress itself, Zhivkov outlined plans for a radical transformation of the Bulgarian economy. Enterprises



would have more freedom in contracting, hiring, and firing; new mechanisms would be instituted for fixing prices and tightening quality controls. (At the January party plenum he had already announced the formation of three supercouncils: economic affairs, headed by Ognyan Doynov; social affairs, Georgi Yordano; and scientific/cultural affairs, Georgi Karamanev.)

- (LOU) Government spokesmen were vague about how the outlined changes would be instituted, however, and there is considerable popular skepticism about their feasibility. But it is clear that Zhivkov or whoever replaces him will be compelled to do something to get the Bulgarian economy moving again.
- (LOU) At the same time, the country's future economic development is to no small extent mortgaged to CEMA's success. Bulgaria already has joined with the Soviets on three high-technology projects and has enthusiastically endorsed CEMA's 2000 program. Closer Soviet-CEMA economic cooperation and integration seems almost assured for a post-Zhivkov Bulgaria.
- (LOU) Technocrats to the Fore. A new generation of leaders, all with impressive technocratic resumes, will be dealing with these problems and attempting to effect the profound changes called for at the congress. Some of the technocrats Zhivkov apparently most favors are:
  - --Ognyan Doynov, 51, recently named director of the Council on the Economy. Prior to this position Doynov headed the Ministry of Machine Building, one industry that has flourished over the years. In 1980 he headed the Bulgarian Industrial Economic Association, an agency serving as liaison between Bulgarian enterprises and Western business firms.
  - --Chudomir Alekandrov, 49, named secretary of the Central Committee during Zhivkov's January shuffling and reportedly now in charge of party organization and personnel. Alekandrov has a technocratic background, having graduated from a mining institute in Leningrad.
  - --Andrey Lukanov, 48, Politburo candidate member and first deputy premier. He is especially interested in obtaining advanced technology and computer software from the West and in international exchange programs emphasizing agricultural and metallurgical research. Lukanov also has a strong economic background; until his recent promotion he handled CEMA affairs.
  - --Stoyan Markov, 43, first deputy premier (appointed in January) and a candidate Politburo member. He specialized in computer technology at an engineering institute in Moscow and

has held an impressive array of scientific-technological positions, foremost among them first deputy minister in the Ministry of Machine Building.

- (LOU) Whether these technocrats can succeed in revitalizing the Bulgarian economy remains to be seen. The heavy weight of the regime's bureaucracy has broken other innovators; but the new leaders do bring valuable experience to their jobs.
- (LOU) Assimilating the Ethnic Turks. On the final day of the April congress, the Bulgarian Government acceded to Western press requests and allowed a group of journalists to visit ethnic-Turkish areas where a gunpoint campaign to slavicize the inhabitants had taken place. Despite tight controls, foreign newsmen were able to get interviews substantiating reports that many resisters had been killed. The subsequent international press play revived an issue that had embarrassed the regime for more than a year.
- (C) The longstanding push to get ethnic-Turkish Bulgarians to slavicize their names went into high gear in late-December 1984 and extended through early-March 1985. Dozens of ethnic Turks reportedly were killed or injured in ensuing clashes with the militia over attempts to force signatures on name-change documents. Turkey and other nations protested, and the regime's brutal assimilation campaign was widely reported in the Western press.
- (C) In December 1985, the regime sought to formalize the "assimilation" results via its decennial census. The format of the census questionnaire ensured that virtually every citizen had to claim "Bulgarian" as his nationality. (Earlier censuses permitted a statement of ethnic origin.)
- (C) As a result of the census, ethnic Turks (an estimated 1 million in a total population of 9 million) officially are considered "Bulgarian." 1 On this basis they presumably can be denied Turkish-language schools and newspapers. Instruction in Turkish and the publication of Turkish literature have already been sharply curtailed.
- (C) The Turkish Government protested to Sofia throughout the course of the slavicization campaign and brought up the issue at the CSCE human rights meeting in Ottawa in June 1985, the UN General Assembly in September, and the UNESCO meeting in Sofia in October--all to little avail. Ankara nonetheless may continue to

<sup>1/ (</sup>U) The birthrate of the ethnic Turks is much higher than that of ethnic Bulgarians (27 per 1,000 vs 10 per 1,000).

raise the issue at forthcoming international forums, e.g., the UNGA this fall.

- (C) Bulgaria meanwhile continues to pressure the ethnic Turks despite criticism from its Warsaw Pact allies, especially the Soviets, over the bad press generated. Families have been separated, Bulgarian-Turkish culture is being destroyed, and the Muslim religion is under heavy attack. All indications are that the leadership's determined effort to see the ethnic Turks assimilated will continue to prevail in the post-Zhivkov period.
- (LOU) Revival of Nationalism. Bulgaria celebrates its National Culture Day on May 24, a day traditionally devoted to fostering Bulgarian nationalism—and lately also to aggrandizing the Zhivkov regime. The recent holiday served to remind the Bulgarian people of the considerable posthumous influence of Zhivkov's daughter, Lyudmila, who died in 1981 at the age of 37.
- (LOU) With full support from her father, Lyudmila untiringly promoted native culture and sought international recognition of the Bulgarian national identity. Although the patriotic fervor she managed to whip up has gradually subsided, her father keeps her work alive by sponsoring cultural events in her name; e.g., the annual international children's assembly "Banner of Peace," held in Sofia. (Zhivkov's son Vladimir, assembly director and Culture Committee deputy chairman, was named a full Central Committee member in April 1986, a further indication that the elder Zhivkov still is intent on using the family name to promote Bulgarian culture.)
- (C) Several recent developments may prove a greater stimulus for Bulgarian nationalism than the somewhat artificial shows put on by the regime. Western denunciations of the ethnic-Turk assimilation, the notoriety given the so-called Bulgarian connection in the papal assassination-plot trial, US Congress condemnation of Bulgaria as a terrorist nation, and widespread accusations about the regime dealing in illegal drugs and gunrunning have bruised the Bulgarian sense of self-esteem. Together, they may be encouraging the development of an extremely insular, defensive--perhaps paranoiac--nationalism.
- (C) Bulgaria's friends are not helping to bolster the nation's self-esteem. The Soviet Ambassador has publicly criticized the faltering economy, describing the Bulgarian worker as insufficiently "proletarian." The Soviets, along with the rest of the Pact membership, were unhappy about the way Sofia handled the papal plot case, even though all the indicted Bulgarians eventually were freed. Finally, none of its bloc partners defended Bulgaria in the wake of Western criticism over the ethnic-Turk matter.



- (C) Although the regime probably welcomes an enhanced sense of Bulgarian nationalism as augmenting its legitimacy, a number of aspects must cause it concern. Some resurgently nationalistic Bulgarians might be tempted to resist certain Soviet and Pact demands as interference in Bulgarian affairs, thus inviting a harsh Soviet response. Moreover, nationalistic fervor could encourage a revival of long-suppressed dissident tendencies of all sorts, with spillovers in religious, artistic, cultural, intellectual, and even political fields. That in turn would invite a vigorous domestic crackdown.
- (C) In any event, a growth of Bulgarian nationalism bodes ill for the country's ethnic Turks. Because Ottoman Turks ruled the Bulgarians for centuries, assimilation of their descendants by whatever means necessary presumably will be justified—and accepted by ethnic Bulgarians—as an expression of national sovereignty.

#### Soviet Interests

- (LOU) At the April congress, USSR delegation leader Premier Ryzhkov made a short speech largely devoted to touting CEMA and urging closer Pact economic integration. Last July, in the Bulgarian magazine Pogled, Soviet Ambassador Grekov put into print what Moscow evidently had long felt about bilateral trade relations: The USSR was being shortchanged. Specifically, Grekov asserted that the Soviets wanted world-quality goods in return for the oil and other goods they were sending to Bulgaria.
- (C) Such demands for more balanced trade and closer economic cooperation promise to frustrate Bulgaria's technological development. More exports diverted to Pact (Soviet) trade will certainly impinge on Bulgaria's ability to sell to the West.
- (C) The Chernobyl nuclear accident further complicates the bilateral relationship. Bulgaria, the last Pact country to announce the accident, closely adhered to Moscow's play of the situation. The government reported only TASS dispatches and reassured the populace—yet at the same time publicized a number of health and safety precautions. (Sofia declared that Bulgarian nuclear plants were absolutely safe, though construction delays, repairs, and lack of materials have slowed progress at the Kozloduy nuclear complex. According to plan, Bulgaria expects to get 65-70 percent of its energy from nuclear power by the year 2000.)
- (C) It is unclear whether the Soviets will compensate Bulgaria for losses owing to the European Community embargo of east bloc agricultural products and the destruction of contaminated foodstuffs. But the affair indeed will affect the bilateral economic and political atmosphere. Bulgaria could argue that



Chernobyl-engendered economic setbacks have forced it to slow the pace of its participation in CEMA integration schemes.

#### (C) Foreign Policy Implications

Even with a new generation of leaders in place, there is little likelihood that Bulgaria will alter a foreign policy that has always adhered strictly to the Warsaw Pact line. Indeed, a new leadership may be more zealous in toeing the Pact line, hoping bona fides in foreign relations will permit more flexibility in domestic economic matters. Consequently, Bulgaria's role as purveyor of arms and training to revolutionary states and groups, including terrorists, probably will be tacitly continued by Zhivkov's successors.

Nevertheless the new team will likely pursue trade with the West more actively, especially computer and high-technology industrial goods. It will want to improve relations with the United States at least marginally, perhaps by being somewhat more cooperative on divided family problems and international drug control cases.

By and large, however, the United States can expect essentially more of the same from post-Zhivkov Bulgaria: a hardline foreign policy that includes acting as a Soviet surrogate, repression at home, and no-holds-barred efforts to acquire advanced technology.

Prepared by Edward D. Booth 647-9198

Approved by Richard A. Clarke 647-2402



y messer of

Fay 16, 1986

10

I am happy to extend warm greetings to all those gathered for the 19th Di-Annual Congress of the Bulgarian National Front, Inc.

The Notto graven on our coins -- E Pluribus Unum -- is a tribute to the rich diversity from which America draws its strength and vitality. Bulgarian Americans are a valued part of that diversity. Your organization's many and varied programs reflect the ancient traditions of your ancestral homeland while at the same time fostering qualities of excellence and leadership among men and women who preserve their Bulgarian heritage. You can take pride in the important role you play in furthering the patrimony of the Bulgarian people and in reminding us of their continuing courageous struggle, in the face of Soviet occupation, to realize the ideals of liberty, human dignity, and national independence.

May the ancient faith of your fathers give you strength, courage, and hope you seek to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. Doe do vi blagoslovi.

RR: CV/PN/AVH/ech (5PMNC)

SENT TO

Dr. Ivan Docheff Honorary President Bulgarian National Front, Inc. Post Office Box 64250 Chicago, Illinois 60646

CC: K.Osborne/R.McDaniel, NSC/L.Kojelis/C.Vedlik/C.Korte/CF

EVENT: May 24

Bulgarian

STRAIGHTWIRE -MAY 16, 1986

Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce 22 West 48th Street

New York, New York 10036

I take pleasure in congratulating Roger B. Smith and Dr. Luis Eulalio de Bueno

Vidigal Filho on being named Men of the Year by the Brazilian-American

Chamber of Commerce.

While public attention naturally focuses on relations between governments, the

activities of private individuals and corporations are frequently of equal

importance."

These awards are suitable recognition of the contributions that both Mr. Smith

and Dr. Vidigal have made toward the maintenance of a warm and productive

relationship between the United States and Brasil. I applaud their efforts, as

well as those of other members of the Brazilian-American Chamber, to increase

trade and investment between our countries. Such initiatives can lead to

greater prosperity and understanding in the United States and Brazil. God

bless you.

RONALD REAGAN

RR/PR/AVH/efr 1MSG

ec: K.Osborne/R.McDamel/P.Riley/C.Korte/CF

EVENT: May 17

Men of the Year

I am delighted to send greetings to everyone at the Righth Annual Convention of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. My warm welcome goes to our distinguished visitors from Turkey, our dependable NATO ally. With so many friends to greet them, both Turkish and American, they will surely enjoy their visit to these shores.

Your assembly brings together 39 distinct organisations, all of them contributing to the diversity and vitality of America. I applied your endeavor to preserve and pass on the rich Turkish culture and to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the American people and the Turkish people.

We are proud of our partnership with Turkey and the many contributions Turkish-Americans have made to our country. You have my best wishes for a memorable convention. God bless you.

CALL WHEN SIGNED: 293-4670.

SENT TO:
M. Kemal Goknar, M.D.
President
Assembly of Turkish
American Associations
2010 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

RR/PR/PN/AVH/efr (1MS6)
cc: K.Osborne/L.Acle/K.McDaniel,NSC/P.Riley/
C.Korte/CF
EVENT: May 16
Turkish American

,1-42		WASHFAX DEPARTMENT		
ARIMENI U 86 NUS 21	MI :13	S/\$ #	B (L	66 AUF ŽI AII;
MESSAGE	010223		PW 13/21/14 LIMITED OFFICIAL U	SE_ No. Pages 1
	Milest move)	(Office symbol)	(Extension)	(Room number)
TO: /Apane		ER TO:	Extension 45L-L5-4	Room No.
игс		Dobriensky		
FOR:		INFORMATION	PER REQUEST	COMMENT [
		S/S Office	Margoly	Light

## CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

#### LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FURY: CANADATA SANGE SAN

EUR/EEY: NRLANG

2/2:

EUR: TUSIMONS

S/CPR: KGIRARDI

NZC:

Z7Z-Z:JALBA

ALSO SSC

ROUTINE SOFIA

E.O. 12956: N/A

TAGS: OPDC. BU. US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR BULGARIAM MATIONAL DAY

L. PLEASE DELIVER THE ROLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHAIRMAN TODOR ZHIVKOV OR AN APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVE PRIOR TO BULGARIA'S NATIONAL DAY.

SEPTEMBER T. QUOTE: DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: AS THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA OBSERVES ITS NATIONAL HOLIDAY. I WISH TO EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE MY BEST WISHES AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. SINCERELY. RONALD REAGAN. UNQUOTE.

OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY THE GOB. YY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Waves 11/6/15

BY FW

LINITED OFFICIAL USE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

October 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR

Chief of the Executive Secretariat

U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message to International Writers

Conference in Bulgaria (U)

Attached, as requested in USIA's memoranda of August 22 and September 26, is a Presidential message to the International Writers Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, which convenes at the end of October. The message may be transmitted to Embassy Sofia now, with a signed copy to follow. There will be no videotape of the message. (C)

> Rodney B. McDaniel Executive Secretary

Attachment

Presidential Message Tab A

cc:

Mr. Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary Department of State

> Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 120 White House Cult

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this Conference of International Writers and to share with you my vision of the world over the next forty years.

Thomas Jefferson, the great American political philosopher, architect and President, and, of course, an outstanding writer, once said, "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past." His aphorism captures an essential ingredient of the American character: faith despite disappointment, hope in the maw of despair. As you pointed out in your invitation letter, the history of this century is rife with conflict, including two of the most terrible wars ever to scar the face of the Earth. But this century has also seen the flowering of forces which offer all of mankind hope for a better life -- a hope for a world founded on transcendant principles of justice and respect for human rights.

How can we achieve the realization of these hopes? As writers, you understand that the truth is no prisoner of time or territory. Because of this fact, the work of writers and artists has much to do with how the tide of history will run. All human beings are endowed with this ability to influence others by this means -- whether it be called the power of ideas, the imaginative gift, or the promptings of the spirit.

Can there be any doubt that the soil in which this ability flourishes best is the rich humus of freedom? Can anyone argue

that freedom of expression not only furthers the cause of peace but the betterment of the human condition? True peace rests on respect for the rights of man, a willingness to resolve differences peacefully, and an end to the artificial barriers to free communication of people and ideas. The suppression of the writer's voice anywhere in the world undermines that peace. We seek a peace that is more than the absence of conflict. We seek the peace that comes only with the knowledge that, as neighbors, we recognize in each other our rights and duties as human beings, that divine spark of infinite worth, which makes conflict between us unthinkable. The world we seek to build is one where the freedom of the writer and his moral lesson can serve as part of the cement of world peace.

In my recent meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland, we came close to a historic agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons and lay the foundations for a safer and more secure world. We discussed these issues in the context of those conditions which can best guarantee the realization of this dream: the importance of openness, the free flow of people, information, and ideas across borders, and resolving differences through peaceful dialogue and negotiation.

I went to Iceland in order to narrow the differences, wherever possible, between U.S. and Soviet positions and to lay the groundwork for more productive negotiations. While we succeeded in narrowing differences in many areas, much remains to be done.

We will continue to pursue a dialogue and negotiations to build trust and to take even greater strides toward common understanding and cooperation. Our aim is not only to reduce the massive arsenals of weapons which exist today, but to create a world in which the peoples of all lands are free to govern themselves and to decide their own futures. America's national credo is that "All men are created equal." It is this ideal, the ideal of the equality of men and their decisions over their own lives that is America's vision for the future. As our 16th President Abraham Lincoln said: "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

You have my best wishes for a successful and productive conference. Bog da vi blagoslovi.

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collec	ction Name	Į	Withdrawer	
DOBI	RIANSKY, PAULA: FILES	_	RB 12/21/2 W	2016
File F	Folder	F	FOIA	
COU	NTRY FILES: BULGARIA (5)		71640/3 HERSHBER	G
Box N	Number			
1		10	0	
ID	Document Type	No of	Doc Date	Restric-
	Document Description	pages		tions
18620	0 DEDORT	6	10/24/1986	D1
10020	9 REPORT	6	10/24/1980	
	RE. BULGARIA [COPY OF DOC. 186214]			В3

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

State Dept. review completed



MORI C05620796

Washington, D.C. 20505

DOJ Review Completed

#### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

#### 24 October 1986

#### Bulgaria: Prospects for Improved US Relations

#### Summary

Bulgaria is signalling increased interest in improving relations with the US following several years of unusually severe strains. It has worked to resolve several outstanding bilateral issues in recent months and has taken other steps to show its desire for more active dialogue. We believe Sofia is now susceptible to making further concessions to upgrade political, economic, cultural, and scientific ties to at least the levels of the late 1970's. But, in the broader sense, we believe that Bulgaria's fealty to Moscow, dismal human rights record, and international policies that regularly conflict with US interests will continue to prevent any major breakthrough.


25X1

STAT

#### STAT

This memorandum East Analysis. Comments addressed to	European Division, Office of European and questions are welcome and should Acting Chief, East European I	be
STAT	STAT EURM-86-2012	1

25X1



20

Bulgaria's relations with the US have long been among the coolest of any of Moscow's East European allies. As one of the most loyal Soviet bloc members, Bulgaria has based its policies toward Washington largely on the Soviet line, echoing Moscow's stances and rarely taking steps that the Kremlin might view with disapproval. Moreover, Bulgaria's repressive human rights policies—symbolized during the past two years by its harsh treatment of its Turkish minority—its continued efforts to steal high technology from the West, and its close ties to radical Third World regimes have further exacerbated relations. Even the interest in closer ties expressed more recently by top Bulgarian officials frequently has not been matched by a willingness to cooperate at the working level

Bilateral ties have undergone some fluctuations in recent years in response to international and other developments. Following an easing in tensions in the 1970's, as Soviet-US atmospherics improved, they worsened again in the early 1980's as a result of increased strains between Washington and Moscow and allegations of Bulgarian involvement in drug trafficking and the assassination attempt on the Pope. Relations grew so strained between 1982 and 1984, that Bulgarian officials routinely charged Washington with singling out Bulgaria for harsher treatment than the other hardline Soviet bloc countries:

#### Signs of Thaw

Since late 1984, the Bulgarians have taken increasingly obvious steps to signal interest in improved relations. The steps so far have been limited and in some cases designed to address problems of Sofia's own making. The most notable have been:

- o Narcotics Control. On 3 October, after almost two years of US efforts, Bulgaria formally agreed to cooperate with a US Drug Enforcement Agency signature program under which it would notify the US Embassy of heroin seizures exceeding 1 kilogram and turn over to the USDEA samples of intercepted contraband. Eleven days later, Sofia turned over its first sample from a seizure. It also has signalled its willingness to take part in international conferences on narcotics control, such as one in Vienna next year.
- o Embassy Access. On 26 September, following repeated US complaints, the Bulgarian government removed portable metal barriers that it had placed in front of the US Embassy in Sofia ten months earlier on the pretext of

25**X** |

21

protecting the Embassy from an unspecified terrorist threat. The removal has allowed several hundred Bulgarians a day access to a USIS window display.

- Economic Ties. Sofia recently has shown greater willingness to turn to the US for trade and credits. Bilateral trade during the first six months of 1986 was double that of the same period last year—up from \$50 million to \$99 million. Most of the increase came from a tripling of imports—primarily of US corn, fertilizer, and wheat—to compensate for poor domestic agricultural performance. Last year, after a six—year lull in borrowing from the West, Sofia negotiated \$570 million in new loans from a syndicate which included US and other banks. Bulgaria also stressed its desire for improved economic ties—particularly with individual US firms—during visits this year by a deputy trade minister and a parliamentary delegation.
- o Arms Shipments. Bulgaria this year appears to be adhering to a promise, made by Foreign Minister Mladenov in December 1984, to halt arms shipments to Nicaragua's Sandinista government. Before that pledge, Sofia regularly shipped arms to Managua, and its record last year is ambiguous.
- o Divided Families. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry has resolved pending divided family cases in most instances, allowing Bulgarian citizens to join their relatives in the US.

Bulgarian officials have accompanied these actions with increased rhetorical and symbolic support for improved relations. Most recently, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov urged expanded scientific ties at a meeting with US scientists in Sofia. Ambassador Zhulev in recent months has called repeatedly for establishing more normal relations. Official Bulgarian attendance at the Embassy's 4 July reception was the highest in recent years. Moreover, Foreign Minister Mladenov chose a Texas clinic for his recent successful heart surgery. The choice, unusual for a high Warsaw Pact official, presumably was made largely on medical grounds, although Sofia probably gauged that it would convey a useful political message.

Bulgarian Motivations

25X [

25X 1

Several factors seem to be prompting Sofia's increased show of interest in better US ties. Chief among them, in our view, is economic necessity. As this year's increased agricultural imports demonstrate, Sofia looks to the West to cover specific shortfalls in performance. But even more importantly, the US and other Western countries are prime sources of the high technology Bulgaria needs to generate long-term growth. This technology is unavailable from Bulgaria's partners in the Soviet Bloc and is, we believe, essential to implementing Sofia's program of economic modernization. Bulgaria also would like to enjoy the benefits of accession to GATT, both as a mouthpiece for Moscow and for its own economic interests.

Political and national image factors also are important. To achieve better ties with the US would appeal to Bulgaria's elevated sense of its own importance and at the same time ease its innate insecurity about its role on the world stage. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, at age 75 the senior party chief of a Warsaw Pact country, has long believed that small nations such as Bulgaria have an important role to play in international relations. Sofia may also believe that the Soviet-American climate is now more conducive to Bulgarian overtures to the US as long as they do not produce results counter to Soviet interests. Indeed, Moscow may be encouraging such overtures.

#### Outlook

We believe that Bulgaria will probably carry forward with diplomatic and other initiatives to improve US ties in the coming months, barring a major downturn in Soviet-US relations. We do not expect, however, any change in its close orientation to the Soviet Union and Soviet policies. Nor do we believe it will substantially improve its record on key domestic or foreign policy issues.

Nonetheless, we believe that Sofia is probably more susceptible than it has been at any time during the past several years to making at least marginal improvements in some areas. These areas could include human rights—especially better treatment of Catholic and Protestant religious sects and ending jamming of Western radio broadcasts—further movement on narcotics control, improved commercial climate for US firms, nuclear safety cooperation, and at least discussions on compliance with US technology controls.

Sofia is probably most Likely to respond positively in areas that can be discussed on an issue-by-issue basis. The Bulgarians probably would be most responsive to a judicious mixture of

25X (

25X \

25X

25X )

pressure and incentives. The following are some incentives that could induce movement:

- o Economic Ties. Sofia is interested in intensifying official fora for economic exchanges—such as the US-Bulgarian Economic Council, scientific and trade seminars, and business roundtables. The Bulgarian leadership seems to respect and listen to American business leaders and is eager to bring more American expertise, in the form of joint ventures and consultations, to Bulgarian soil.
- o Technology Sharing. Bulgaria is highly interested in increased access to US technology, even if slightly outmoded. Nuclear safety technology in particular is of increased interest in the wake of the Chernobyl accident. Sofia may be willing in return to improve controls on legal acquisition of advanced technology. In a conversation with the US Ambassador in early October, Deputy Prime Minister Markov expressed interest in a technology control verification system, possibly including end-user checks and plant visits, to determine Bulgaria's compliance with US laws. Nonetheless, Sofia is continuing its illegal diversion of advanced technology from the West, much of which is destined for Moscow.
- o Official Contacts. The Bulgarians would welcome assurances of an increase in the number and level of official bilateral contacts. Sofia especially values exchanges—such as past briefings by US officials on arms control issues—that help it project the image of an important and autonomous player in European political affairs.
- o Other Exchanges. Sofia remains highly interested in stepping up exchanges in culture, science and technology, and other fields. Bulgarian officials recently expressed a willingness to discuss CSCE Basket III human rights issues including information, education, and tourism.


Regardless of any new agreements, Bulgaria will probably do little more than the minimum to meet US interests and will avoid actions that would interfere with its other policy objectives. Particularly in economic areas, numerous bureaucratic obstacles will continue to exist to hinder even those improvements approved by top Bulgarian officials.

25X


25X

25**X**1

Bulgaria: Imports from US: 1st 6 Months of the Yeara



Bulgaria: Total US Trade with CEMA 6, 1985<sup>a</sup>
Million US \$



According to US Statistics.

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	Withdrawer
DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES	RB 12/21/2016 W
File Folder	FOIA
COUNTRY FILES: BULGARIA (5)	F1640/3 HERSHBERG
Box Number	
1	10
ID Document Type  Document Description	No of Doc Date Restric- pages tions
186214 REPORT	6 10/24/1986 B1
DE BIII CADIA	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

RE. BULGARIA

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Central Intelligence Agency



State Dept. review completed

DOJ Review Completed

Washington, D. C. 20505

MORI C05620796

#### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

#### 24 October 1986

#### Bulgaria: Prospects for Improved US Relations

#### Summary

Bulgaria is signalling increased interest in improving relations with the US following several years of unusually severe strains. It has worked to resolve several outstanding bilateral issues in recent months and has taken other steps to show its desire for more active dialogue. We believe Sofia is now susceptible to making further concessions to upgrade political, economic, cultural, and scientific ties to at least the levels of the late 1970's. But, in the broader sense, we believe that Bulgaria's fealty to Moscow, dismal human rights record, and international policies that regularly conflict with US interests will continue to prevent any major breakthrough.

25X1

STAT

STAT

nalysis. Comments and q	uestions are wel	ffice of European come and should be East European Div
	STAT	EURM-86-20124
	25X1	DECLASS

Bulgaria's relations with the US have long been among the coolest of any of Moscow's East European allies. As one of the most loyal Soviet bloc members, Bulgaria has based its policies toward Washington largely on the Soviet line, echoing Moscow's stances and rarely taking steps that the Kremlin might view with disapproval. Moreover, Bulgaria's repressive human rights policies—symbolized during the past two years by its harsh treatment of its Turkish minority—its continued efforts to steal high technology from the West, and its close ties to radical Third World regimes have further exacerbated relations. Even the interest in closer ties expressed more recently by top Bulgarian officials frequently has not been matched by a willingness to cooperate at the working level.

Bilateral ties have undergone some fluctuations in recent years in response to international and other developments. Following an easing in tensions in the 1970's, as Soviet-US atmospherics improved, they worsened again in the early 1980's as a result of increased strains between Washington and Moscow and allegations of Bulgarian involvement in drug trafficking and the assassination attempt on the Pope. Relations grew so strained between 1982 and 1984, that Bulgarian officials routinely charged Washington with singling out Bulgaria for harsher treatment than the other hardline Soviet bloc countries.

#### Signs of Thaw

Since late 1984, the Bulgarians have taken increasingly obvious steps to signal interest in improved relations. The steps so far have been limited and in some cases designed to address problems of Sofia's own making. The most notable have been:

- o Narcotics Control. On 3 October, after almost two years of US efforts, Bulgaria formally agreed to cooperate with a US Drug Enforcement Agency signature program under which it would notify the US Embassy of heroin seizures exceeding 1 kilogram and turn over to the USDEA samples of intercepted contraband. Eleven days later, Sofia turned over its first sample from a seizure. It also has signalled its willingness to take part in international conferences on narcotics control, such as one in Vienna next year.
- o Embassy Access. On 26 September, following repeated US complaints, the Bulgarian government removed portable metal barriers that it had placed in front of the US Embassy in Sofia ten months earlier on the pretext of

25X1

protecting the Embassy from an unspecified terrorist threat. The removal has allowed several hundred Bulgarians a day access to a USIS window display.

- o Economic Ties. Sofia recently has shown greater willingness to turn to the US for trade and credits. Bilateral trade during the first six months of 1986 was double that of the same period last year--up from \$50 million to \$99 million. Most of the increase came from a tripling of imports--primarily of US corn, fertilizer, and wheat--to compensate for poor domestic agricultural performance. Last year, after a six-year lull in borrowing from the West, Sofia negotiated \$570 million in new loans from a syndicate which included US and other banks. Bulgaria also stressed its desire for improved economic ties--particularly with individual US firms--during visits this year by a deputy trade minister and a parliamentary delegation.
- o Arms Shipments. Bulgaria this year appears to be adhering to a promise, made by Foreign Minister Mladenov in December 1984, to halt arms shipments to Nicaragua's Sandinista government. Before that pledge, Sofia regularly shipped arms to Managua, and its record last year is ambiguous.
- o Divided Families. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry has resolved pending divided family cases in most instances, allowing Bulgarian citizens to join their relatives in the US.

Bulgarian officials have accompanied these actions with increased rhetorical and symbolic support for improved relations. Most recently, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov urged expanded scientific ties at a meeting with US scientists in Sofia. Ambassador Zhulev in recent months has called repeatedly for establishing more normal relations. Official Bulgarian attendance at the Embassy's 4 July reception was the highest in recent years. Moreover, Foreign Minister Mladenov chose a Texas clinic for his recent successful heart surgery. The choice, unusual for a high Warsaw Pact official, presumably was made largely on medical grounds, although Sofia probably gauged that it would convey a useful political message.

Bulgarian Motivations

25X i

Several factors seem to be prompting Sofia's increased show of interest in better US ties. Chief among them, in our view, is economic necessity. As this year's increased agricultural imports demonstrate, Sofia looks to the West to cover specific shortfalls in performance. But even more importantly, the US and other Western countries are prime sources of the high technology Bulgaria needs to generate long-term growth. This technology is unavailable from Bulgaria's partners in the Soviet Bloc and is, we believe, essential to implementing Sofia's program of economic modernization. Bulgaria also would like to enjoy the benefits of accession to GATT, both as a mouthpiece for Moscow and for its own economic interests.

Political and national image factors also are important. To achieve better ties with the US would appeal to Bulgaria's elevated sense of its own importance and at the same time ease its innate insecurity about its role on the world stage. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, at age 75 the senior party chief of a Warsaw Pact country, has long believed that small nations such as Bulgaria have an important role to play in international relations. Sofia may also believe that the Soviet-American climate is now more conducive to Bulgarian overtures to the US as long as they do not produce results counter to Soviet interests. Indeed, Moscow may be encouraging such overtures.

#### Outlook

We believe that Bulgaria will probably carry forward with diplomatic and other initiatives to improve US ties in the coming months, barring a major downturn in Soviet-US relations. We do not expect, however, any change in its close orientation to the Soviet Union and Soviet policies. Nor do we believe it will substantially improve its record on key domestic or foreign policy issues.

Nonetheless, we believe that Sofia is probably more susceptible than it has been at any time during the past several years to making at least marginal improvements in some areas. These areas could include human rights—especially better treatment of Catholic and Protestant religious sects and ending jamming of Western radio broadcasts—further movement on narcotics control, improved commercial climate for US firms, nuclear safety cooperation, and at least discussions on compliance with US technology controls.

Sofia is probably most likely to respond positively in areas that can be discussed on an issue-by-issue basis. The Bulgarians probably would be most responsive to a judicious mixture of

25X

25X1

25X

pressure and incentives. The following are some incentives that could induce movement:

- o Economic Ties. Sofia is interested in intensifying official fora for economic exchanges—such as the US-Bulgarian Economic Council, scientific and trade seminars, and business roundtables. The Bulgarian leadership seems to respect and listen to American business leaders and is eager to bring more American expertise, in the form of joint ventures and consultations, to Bulgarian soil.
- o Technology Sharing. Bulgaria is highly interested in increased access to US technology, even if slightly outmoded. Nuclear safety technology in particular is of increased interest in the wake of the Chernobyl accident. Sofia may be willing in return to improve controls on legal acquisition of advanced technology. In a conversation with the US Ambassador in early October, Deputy Prime Minister Markov expressed interest in a technology control verification system, possibly including end-user checks and plant visits, to determine Bulgaria's compliance with US laws. Nonetheless, Sofia is continuing its illegal diversion of advanced technology from the West, much of which is destined for Moscow.
- Official Contacts. The Bulgarians would welcome assurances of an increase in the number and level of official bilateral contacts. Sofia especially values exchanges—such as past briefings by US officials on arms control issues—that help it project the image of an important and autonomous player in European political affairs.
- o Other Exchanges. Sofia remains highly interested in stepping up exchanges in culture, science and technology, and other fields. Bulgarian officials recently expressed a willingness to discuss CSCE Basket III human rights issues including information, education, and tourism.


Regardless of any new agreements, Bulgaria will probably do little more than the minimum to meet US interests and will avoid actions that would interfere with its other policy objectives. Particularly in economic areas, numerous bureaucratic obstacles will continue to exist to hinder even those improvements approved by top Bulgarian officials.

25X1

25X1


25X1

## Bulgaria: Imports from US: 1st 6 Months of the Year<sup>a</sup>



<sup>d</sup> According to US Statistics.

Bulgaria: Total US Trade with CEMA 6, 1985°



According to US Statistics.

25X1

### DECLASSIFIED Authority State Wainer 11/6/15

#### -CONFIDENTIAL

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02

AND05483

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 WAC-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /004 A2

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI> RUEHC #/DTG> 25BB29Z DEC 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY DOOD ALL NATO CAPITALS

< SUBJ> SUBJECT: CALL BY BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ON EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY

#### CONFIDENT LALISTATE 398837

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL. CSCE, MARR, SNAR, BU

SUBJECT: CALL BY BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ON EUR

ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. > REGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY. BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ZHULEV CALLED ON EUR A/S RIDGWAY DECEMBER 23 TO PRESENT TEXT OF REPLY FROM BULGARIAN PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV TO A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCERNING BILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES TOUCHED UPON BULGARIA'S POLICY OF CLOSING PART OF ITS TERRITORY TO DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL, A SYMPOSIUM IN WASHINGTON NEXT SPRING IN CONNECTION WITH BULGARIA'S APPLICATION FOR ACCESSION TO THE GATT, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A TRIP BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO BULGARIA. ZHULEV, NOTING THAT BULGARIA HAD BEEN GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT FOR CONVENTIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, THEN ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY'S ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE "BUDAPEST APPEAL." AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY REPLIED THAT CONSULTATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN NATO TO ELABORATE THE AGREED SET OF PRINCIPLES INTO A POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER WHICH TALKS MIGHT APPROPRIATELY TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES ON A NEGOTIATING MANDATE. END SUMMARY. SEND SHMMARYS

- 3. ABBASSADOR RIDGWAY REITERATED HER APPRECIATION TO THE GOB FOR ITS HOSPITALITY DURING HER NOVEMBER VISIT TO SOFIA. WHICH SHE HAD FOUND USEFUL AND INFORMATIVE. THERE HAD BEEN GOOD MEETINGS ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, AND SHE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE BRIEFING ON THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY PROVIDED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER LUKANOV. ZHULEV SAID THAT THE GOB SHARED THIS ASSESSMENT.
- 4. ZHULEY HANDED OVER THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER ON BILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING (TEXT REPORTED SEPTEL). AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY SAID THAT THIS WAS AN AREA IN WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO BUILD BILATERAL COOPERATION WITHOUT REFERENCES TO THE DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST BETWEEN THEM IN OTHER AREAS. THE USG IS SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS FIELD AND HOPES IT WILL SERVE AS A SPUR TO DO MORE.
- 5. BULGARIAN CLOSED TRAVEL AREAS. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY AGREED WITH PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV'S CLOSING OBSERVATION

THAT A SIMILAR SPIRIT SHOULD CHARACTERIZE COOPERATION ON OTHER ISSUES, BUT SHE NOTED THAT THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS WHICH WILL NEED TO BE WATCHED CLOSELY DURING THE NEW YEAR IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS. ONE SUCH PROBLEM WAS BULGARIA'S POLICY OF CLOSING A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ITS TERRITORY TO DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL, A SUBJECT THAT HAD BEEN RAISED

DURING HER VISIT TO SOFIA. RIDGWAY NOTED THAT LEGISLATION PASSED DURING THE LAST CONGRESS REQUIRED THE ADMINISTRATION TO PROVIDE A REPORT ON CLOSED AREAS BY MARCH, 1987. IF THE SITUATION DOES NOT CHANGE, THE CONGRESS IS LIKELY TO VIEW IT AS ASYMMETRICAL AND ASK FOR A RECIPROCAL RESPONSE. THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED THAT MOVEMENT SHOULD BE TOWARD FREER RATHER THAN MORE RESTRICTED TRAVEL FOR DIPLOMATS AND HOPED THAT THE GOB WOULD CONSIDER THIS QUESTION. ZHULEY AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE PROBLEM.

6. POSSIBLE TRIP BY DEPUTY SECRETARY. ZHULEV NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF A SECOND TRIP BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO EASTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING BULGARIA. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER TRAVEL BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN, AND THE DEPARTMENT WOULD ADVISE THE GOB WHEN THEY ARE. ZHULEV SAID THAT THE GOB WAS VERY FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO A VISIT, AND THAT IT IS LIKELY THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND POSSIBLY BY PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV.

- 7. ECONOMIC ISSUES. ZHULEV NOTED THAT THE GOB PLANNED TWO SYMPOSIA ON BULGARIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE GATT SECRETARIAT IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPLICATION FOR ACCESSION. THE FIRST SYMPOSIUM WAS BEING HELD THIS MONTH IN GRAZ, AUSTRIA; THE SECOND IS PLANNED FOR WASHINGTON IN THE SPRING, AND THE GOB WOULD APPRECIATE USG SUPPORT. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER AGENCIES IN THE PLANNING FOR THIS SYMPOSIUM. GIVEN THE FACT THAT BULGARIA AND THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY ARE NOT WIDELY KNOWN IN THE U.S., SHE RECOMMENDED THAT THE EMBASSY WORK FOR THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE SYMPOSIUM. ZHULEV SAID THAT THE RECONSTITUTED U.S. - BULGARIAN BUSINESS COUNCIL WOULD HOLD ITS FIRST SESSION IN THE U.S. AT ACOUT AT THE SAME TIME; AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD WORK WITH THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY ON POSSIBLE CALLS FOR DEPUTY-FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER GINEV.
- 8. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, ZHULEV MOTED THAT BULGARIA HAD BEEN GIVEN THE CHAIRMANSHIP WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT OF A WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES STEMILING FROM THE "BUDAPEST APPEAL." AND ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY'S ASSESSMENT OF WESTERM REACTIONS. RIDGHAY REPLIED THAT THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION WAS THE RESULT OF THE WORK OF A HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE. WHICH WILL STAY IN EXISTENCE TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF GREATER STABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. THE ALLIANCE BELIEVED THAT THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION FROM THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, GIVEN THE IMBALANCE WE BELIEVE EXISTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. RIDGWAY SAID THAT EVENTUAL DISCUSSIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY BETWEEN THE

ATLANTIC AND THE URALS SHOULD BE HELD BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, BUT THAT A PHASED APPROACH WAS NECESSARY. IT WAS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE ON WHEN SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT OCCUR. THE NEXT STEP FOR NATO IS FOR THE HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE TO TURN FROM THE PRINCIPLES THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION TO THE SUBSTANCE OF POSSIBLE DISCUSSION. THEN,

THE TWO ALLIANCES WOULD NEED TO AGREE ON A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

9. ZHULEV SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME CONFUSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY'S ENDORSEMENT OF ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RECENT REFUSAL OF NATO OFFICIALS TO RECEIVE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR KHRISTOV, WHO WAS REPRESENTING THE WARSAW PACT. RIDGWAY REPLIED THAT THIS CONFUSION WAS BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT ISSUES. WE DO NOT SEE WHAT CAN BE GAINED FAGE 02 OF 02

AND05483

FROM GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR BLOC-10-BLOC CONTACTS, WHICH THE WARSAW PACT HAS ADVANCED A NUMBER OF TIMES OVER THE YEARS. A NEGOTIATING MANDATE ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL SECURITY, HOWEVER, IS ONE THAT CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES REPRESENTING THE COUNTERES INVOLVED. ARMACOST

+ DECT JECTION: 01 OF 01-SSM+ 6037+TOR 861224201652 MSG0D0157145212

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name

DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RB 12/21/2016

W

File Folder FOIA

COUNTRY FILES: BULGARIA (5) F1640/3

HERSHBERG

Box Number

1

ID	Document Type	No of Doc Date	Restric-
	Document Description	pages	tions

186218 CABLE 2 1/16/1987 B1

STATE 015498

## Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES RB 12/21/2016

W

File Folder FOIA

COUNTRY FILES: BULGARIA (5) F1640/3

HERSHBERG

Box Number

10

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of Doc Date pages	Restric- tions
186219	CABLE	6 1/29/1987	В1

**SOFIA 00389** 

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

LEVITSKY, M

17 MAR 87 FILE BULGARIA

WORDS: BULGARIA

DUR

HS

3JECT:	BULGARIAN (	CHIEF O	F STATE	ZHIVKOV	RESPONSE	TO PRES	LTR RI	E DRUG CON	TROL
rion:	PREPARE MEN	MO FOR (	CARLUCCI	DU	JE: 18 MAR	87 STA	TUS S	FILES WH	
	FOR ACTION	CLOSE		RESPO	CONCURRENCE USE IS		2	FOR INFO SESTANOVIC PEARSON RODMAN	Н
MMENTS	URGENT 3 HO	OUR TURI				NSCIFID	+	( IB	)
'ION OF	FICER (S)	ASSIGN	ED	ACTION	REQUIRED		DUE	COPIES TO	
SPATCH						W/AI	TCH F	ILE	(C)

(CLASSIFICATION)

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTAL FORM

\$/\$	87072	220	
DATE	March	17,	1987

FOR:

MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL THE WHITE HOUSE

R	F	F	F	D	F	M		F	
$\mathbf{I}$				$\Gamma$		I V	┕.		

To: President Reagan	FROM: Bulgarian Chief of State Zhivk
DATE: December 17, 1986	SUBJECT: Drug trafficking
REFERRAL DATED:	ID#(IF ANY)
	WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
ACTION TAKEN:	
A DRAFT REPLY	IS ATTACHED.
A DRAFT REPLY	WILL BE FORWARDED.
A TRANSLATION	IS ATTACHED.
AN INFORMATION	COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
WE BELIEVE NO CITED BELOW.	RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
THE DEPARTMENT PROPOSED TRAVE	OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
OTHER (SEE REM	
REMARKS: The attached letter from President Reagan's letter	om General Secretary Zhivkov responds to ter of Nov. 29. No further reply needed,

1. Original Letter from Zhivkov

Attachments:

2. Translation of Letter from Zhivkov

3. Earlier Letter from President Reagan

Melvyn Levitsky EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(CLASSIFICATION)

## Уважаеми господин Президент.

Преди всичко бих искал да Ви благодаря за писмото, което ми изпратихте чрез Вашия посланик в София. В него Вие засягате един тревожен проблем - както за Съединените тати, така и за редица други страни. Проблем, който се отнася до здравето на младото поколение - бъдешето на всяка нация. Именно това го прави особено важен и изисква честните усилия на всички нас.

За мастие, в моята страна проблемът за наркоманията не съществува. Поради своето геограйско разположение
обаче Народна пепублика България е пряко ангажирана в борбата
среду транзитното преминаване на наркотици, преди всичко от
трайиканти на Турция, както и на някои други страни. Като
държава - членка на ООН и на Съвета за митническо сътрудничество, в съответствие с принципите на външната политика,
която провеждаме, и изхождайки от дълбоки хуманни подбуди
както в миналото, така и сега, ние взимаме най-решителни мерки, без да жалим йинансови и морални средства за водене на
постоянна и безкомпромисна борба срещу контрабандата с наркотини.

Бих искал да Ви съобщя, господин Президент, че в борбата срещу наркотиците Народна република България има

ПО

НЕГОВО ПРЕВЪЗХОДИТЕЛСТВО Г-Н РОНАЛД РЕЙГЪН ПРЕЗИДЕНТ НА СЪЕДИНЕНИТЕ АМЕРИКАНСКИ МАТИ

## Вашингтон

сериозен принос, признат и оценен и от редица страни, включително и от американската митническа служба. Именно България бе една от първите държави в началото на 70-те години, която откликна на призива на ООН за засилване на борбата срещу незаконния трабик и на молбата на американската администрация за съдействие.

В продължение на години между българската и американската митническа служба съществува сътрудничество, което допринася и за разширяване и задълбочаване на усилията на митниците в цял свят. В българския град Варна, през 1978 и 1980 г. бяха проведени международни митнически конберенции за сътрудничество в борбата срещу контрабандата с наркотици.

Ние със задоволство отбелязваме успехите, които имаме в борбата срещу незаконния трафик на наркотици и сме готови и занапред енергично да присъединяваме усилията си както за изграждане на още по-емективно сътрудничество на широка международна основа, така и да работим с всяка държава, която има искрено желание за това.

НР България участвува активно в работата на Комисията на ООН за наркотици, подготвителният орган за предстоятата през юни идната година Международна конференция по въпросите на злоупотребата с наркотици и борбата срещу незаконния трафик.

Господин Президент, във Вашето писмо Вне споменавате за установилото се сътрудничество между нашите две страни в борбата срещу наркотиците. Това буди и у нас задоволство и е потвърждение на разбирането ни, че при решаването на този въпрос са необходими общи усилия, независимо от

съществуващите идеологически различия. Резултатите, които постигнахме, ме насърчават да мисля, че бихме могли да подходим конструктивно и при решаването на другите въпроси от двустранните отношения, което ще доведе до тяхното развитие в интерес на българския и американския народ.

С уважение

Тодор Живков

mypully

EMBASSY OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
1621 - 22ND STREET, NW
WASHINGTON D C
20008

Ref. No. 1847

December 17,1986.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honor to submit the text of the answer of His Excellency Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council to the President of the United States:

"To His Excellency Mr. Ronald Reagan President of the United States of America

Esteemed Mr. President:

I would like, first of all, to thank you for your letter forwarded to me through your Ambassador in Sofia. In the letter you address an alarming problem - both for the United States and a number of other countries - a problem that concerns the health of the young generation which is the future of every nation. This is what makes it particularly important and requires every sincere effort on the part of all of us.

Fortunately, the problem of narcotics abuse does not exist in my country. Due to its geographic situation however, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is directly engaged in the efforts against drug trafficking, mainly by Turkish traffickants, as well as by citizens of some other countries. As a member of the United Nations and the Customs Cooperation Board and in accordance with the principles of its foreign policy, as well as guided by deeply humanitarian concerns, Bulgaria has always taken and continues to take today most decisive measures without sparing financial and moral means in carrying a permanent and uncompromising fight against drug trafficking.

I would like to bring to your attention, Mr. President, that in its anti-drug efforts, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has made a substantial contribution, that has been recognized and appreciated by many, including the United States Customs. Bulgaria was one of the first countries that responded

to the thored Nation opposition the 75 the top enhancing one measure against the illicit drug trating, as well as to the request on the  $\Omega_{\rm c}$  Government for cooperation

Throughout the years, between the Bulgarian and the US Customs offices there has been cooperation, which contributes also for the strengthening and improvement of the efforts of customs worldwide in 1976 and 1980 the Bulgarian city of Varna hosted two international customs conferences on mutual assistance against drug trafficking.

We note with satisfaction the achievements in our fight against the illicit drug trafficking errors a are ready to energeticable job, in the effects both transplaying or the scale interactional cooperation, one or who engineer are contracted as the energy of the energy of the contracted and the energy of the

The Common of t

The fires dead and note of their concentrations the estatic streets of a decrease of the concentration of a solution of the so

Kingson 1 Jaan Jawi - 1

The Embessy of the People's Republic of Bulgeric available of the opportunity to renew to the Department of Otate of the Golden and America the assurences of its highest consideration.

Department of State of the United State of Amorrow Washington, D. (190520) PAGE EL

STATE 371528

DRIGHA INN-87

COPY-81 ADS-86 EUR-88 SS-88 98-022 98-3228 DEAE-DE /BBS R

DRAFTED BY: INM: EROSENOUIST APPROVED BY: INH: ABWROBLESKI

EUR/EE: JCASWELL

VANZ : MMI S/S-S: JAL BA NCC: JSTARK/RPE ARSON

MILLIONIN: 212

3/S-0: LTRACY DESIRED DISTRIBUTION 322 02 16

0 2983527 NOV 86 FH SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 37152E

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SNAR, BU, US

AMEASSADORS LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT

1. AT THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMERICADORS OF NOVERSEF 13. IT WAS REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT SEND A LETTER TO EACH READ OF GOVERNMENT OF COUNTRIES REFRESENTED AT THE AMEASSADORS CONFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CHAIRMAN ZHIVKOV. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

#### 2. TEXT FOLLOWS: . . . .

DEAR ME. CHAIRMAN:

RECENTLY I INVITED TWENTY-ONE U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE WHITE HOUSE TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE WHICH I CONSIDER ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGES OF OUR MODERN WORLD ---ELIMINATING NARCOTICS ABUSE AND TRAFFICKING. THE AMERS-SADORS CONFERENCE ON NARCOTICS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE WITH THEM MY CONCERNS ABOUT REDUCING THE DEMAND FOR DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FURTHERING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS EFFORT, WHILE HEARING FROM OUR AMEAS-SADORS AFOUT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE OVERSEAS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS.

AMEASSADOR LEVITSKY TOLD ME OF THE STEPS YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE TAKING TO COOPERATE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. ALL GOVERNMENTS. DESPITE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, CAN AGREE THAT DRUGS ARE A MENACE TO MANKIND, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU PERSONALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ELIMINATE ILLICIT NARCOTICS FROM OUR WORLD.

WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THOSE STEPS TAKEN RECENTLY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA TO IMPROVE THE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO INTERDICT THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRADE. SPECIFICALLY. I REFER TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT DECISION TO SHARE HEROIN SEIZURE INFORMATION WITH THE U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, AS WELL AS CREATING A FOCAL POINT FOR U.S. MARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS WITHIN THE PROCURATOR GENERAL'S OFFICE AND THE BULGARIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE. OUR GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THESE STEPS PRESAGE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE SHARING OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS. THE SUPPRESSION OF WHICH IS WITHIN OUR COUNTRIES' MUTUAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS, MAVE BECOME LEADERS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS. THE U.S. IS ENTRUSIASTIC ABOUT THE UPCOMING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, SCHED WLED FOR JUHE 17-26 IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, AND WE ARE WILDR-DUZLY SUPPORTING THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON NARCOTICS TRAF-FICKING, CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE U.N. BOTH INITIATIVES PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR GOVERNMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS ABOUT THE . MARCOLICS ESSUE, AND TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LEGAL TOOLS TO DISABLE THOSE WHO TRAFFIC IN NUMAN MISERY.

I ABOU FORWARD TO MORNING WITH YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TOWARDS OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF CREATING A DRUG-FREE FUTURE FOR OUR SOCIETIES. WE CANNOT FAIL IN THIS MISSION WHICH DEMANDS OUR INMEDIATE AND UNVAVERING COMMITMENT.

#### SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT INTEND TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESS, BUT HAS NO DEJECTIONS IF GDE WISHES TO RELEASE IT. SHULTZ

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 12/21/2016

File Folder

COUNTRY FILES: [CZECHOSLOVAKIA] MATLOCK FILES

(1)

F1640/3

**FOIA** 

**Box Number** 

HEDGLIDE

HERSHBERG

BOX IVU	linei 1		11				
ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions		
186234	PAPER	RE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA [27-28 ONLY]	2	12/22/1981	B1 B3		
186318	REPORT	RE. ISRAEL/CHINA/CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1	2/27/1983	B1		
186319	REPORT	RE. CZECHOSLOVAKI [PG. 8 ONLY]	1	3/17/1983	B1 B3		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

C28CA | ID 8107215

TO LENZ

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 16 DEC 81 14 GOLD

CLAIMS

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS

CZECHOSŁOVAKIA

LEGAL ISSUES

MFN

URGENT

SUBJECT:	S-1946 - CZEC	HOSLOVAKIAN CLA	ims sett	CLEMENT	ACT		
	par quan suma spunsapun sema dain sema silan quini dira quin silan quin diri	n with think sales were with think spirituline spirit spirit film spirit spirit spirit			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	g galag agam agam asam igada agam agam asam asam asam a	
ACTION:	PREPARE MEMO	LENZ TO PETERSO	N DUE:	21 DEC	81 STATUS	S FILES	
	FOR ACTION	3841 or 2000 A	FOR CON	CURRENCI	E	FOR INFO	)
	BAILEY	PIPES		STEARM	MA	LENZ	
		KIMMITT		NAU			

COMMENTS COMMENTS DUE BY NOON MONDAY

REQUEST TAKEN OVER PHONE BY MR. LENZ

REF#			LOG 8	103579	8106296	NSCIFIL	)	( (	c /	)
ACTION	OFFICER	(S)	ASSIGNED	ACTIO	N REQUIRE	D	DUE	COPIES '	TO	
DISPATO	СН					W/A7	TTCH E	FILE	((	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Der 16 Congressional Reind,

PG 15503-7

Czich Claims issue

Clemence on enabled bell

As act out in Congressed

by from Hendry to

Londle Cathern

Jackey

Jon

CAE SON SON

Hence, today we are offering amendments to the House-passed version of this legislation that clarify the transition nature of most of the provisions. I believe that these changes will be acceptable to the House. The basic concept in these proposed amendments is that the Federal Communications Commission currently has the authority to do everything that the bill directs them to do. We are merely giving specific guidance during a transition period as to the regulatory policies that we want to emphasize.

Some of the provisions in the bill overlap with certain other parts of the current Communications Act. It is not the intent to override, either explicitly or implicitly, any other sections of the Communications Act. There is to be no lmplication drawn that in the absence of legislation the Commission does not have the same interconnection authority through section 201(a) as it does through this provision.

Nor are we saying that the Commission does not currently have the authority to forebear from regulation. We are simply providing policy guidance for the transition period. After that period of time, the bill makes it clear that the Commission has authority to continue its regulatory functions in the manner most consistent with promoting competition.

I think it is important to point out that this bill is a genuine deregulation bill in one major respect. It specifically removes the statutory barriers for entry into the domestic record carrier market. Applicants no longer need file applications under section 214 of the act unless specifically required to do so by the Commission. We have left a residual of FCC authority in this area to cover such contingencies as satellite applications or similar circumstances.

The Commission could also use its authority to require 214 applications by dominant carriers who do not now provide extensive record carrier service. In any case, it is the strong desire that the residual authority be used sparingly, if

The domestic record carrier market is currently a virtual monopoly by one carrier. Open entry is the best solution to breaking that monopoly. The Commission should not exercise its authority except for technical considerations or to promote competition. Moreover, in light of this entry decontrol, we would encourage the Commission to examine other regulations imposed upon the record carrier industry and forebear from whatever regulation that is not necessary-including tariffs, reporting requirements, and so on.

By way of explanation, those provisions of the legislation that specifically do not apply to any record carrier not having a "significant market share" of the market for record communications services, leave the Commission with substantial discretion. In determining which carriers do or do not have a substantial market share at any given time, the FCC must look at the overall picture of the number of carriers involved and the various percentages of market share.

It is our view that currently all but four carriers would be exempted from these provisions-ITT World Communications, Inc.; RCA Global Communications, Inc.; TRT Telecommunications Corp.; and Western Union International, Inc. If in the future, smaller carriers build their market share to a substantial share, or if Western Telegraph Co. enters international markets, they would also be included.

There is another aspect of this bill that also warrants comment. The international telecommunications market has proven to be difficult for new carriers to enter because of the resistance by foreign telecommunications monopolies, PTT's. We believe that this bill's interconnection guidance, including subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii)—the "inbound flow" provision, is a good first step in aiding U.S. carriers that want to enter the international record market. The Commission should explore other ways to aid U.S. entry overseas.

While the "inbound flow" part of the interconnection subsection ceases to have any force or effect 3 years after the date of enactment under the provisions of subsection (e)(1), the Commission has the authority under other provisions of the Communications Act, including section 201, to continue such a requirement if it finds that such a requirement will. enhance competition in the international record communications market and there is not a more effective method of easing entry and thereby increasing competition in the international record communications market.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the amendment offered to the House amendment to S. 271 provides for a sunset of 3 years to the interconnection, including return flow, requirements of the bill. The purpose of these sunset amendments about to be agreed upon by the Senate is to fall back upon the general provisions of the Communications Act after the initial 3-year period of operation under the specific terms and conditions of interconnection and return flow detailed in this measure.

This is appropriate, Mr. President, because this bill, in our view, merely makes explicit authority already available to the FCC under section 201(a) and other sections of the act. Both during and after this 3-year start-up period, of course, other remedies in addition to the ones specified in this bill might be chosen by the Commission to achieve a competitive environment in international record tele-communications.

It would be completely consistent with these sunset provisions that the Commission at the end of or prior to the expiration of the 3-year period to extend these specific interconnection and return flow provisions and to adopt any other provisions deemed by them to assure the continuation of a competitive environment under the existing authority of the Communications Act as amended.

Indeed, if the new carriers that we expect might enter this business have not signed operating agreements with foreign

PTT's at that time, we would expect the FCC to continue the interconnection, including return flow, requirements in subpart (c). Rather than freezing in detailed remedies forever, the purpose of the sunset provision is to point the way and we are relying on the Commission's general authority to extend or modify these remedies to assure the continuing accomplishment of purposes of this act, that is, providing a competitive environment for both existing and new carriers in the international record carrier business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House with an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Alaska.

The state of the s

de

4

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

## ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Alaska will yield for a question?

Mr. STEVENS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I do not want to be picky on this last day, but this Senator has a personal interest in a bill that is pending. I have been trying all day to find out what the schedule is. I wonder if the Senator from Alaska, as the floor manager, would lay out what the agenda is for all Senators?

Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator.

It is my understanding we are now going to proceed with bills which have passed the House or will pass the House if we get them to the House in time. Following that we will take up other matters, including, I believe, the matter in which the Senator from Colorado is deeply interested, the NRC bill, which we will get to as soon as we can. We have no similar assurance that the House will pass that bill today. We do have assurance the House will pass the bills we are working on at this point.

Mr. HART. I wonder if the Senator has any idea at what time we will be on

Mr. STEVENS. Our present process, as I understand it, is trying to handle the matters which would be almost pro forma and are going to take about the next hour, but not much more, and we will try to do it in less time than if it is possible.

Mr. HART. I thank the Senator.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 1946.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the House of Representatives:

Resolved. That the bill from the Senate (S. 1946) entitled "An Act to provide for the final settlement of certain claims against Czechoslovakia, and for other purposes", do pass with the following amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause.

#### and insert:

## SHORT TITLE

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of 1981".

#### APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT

Sec. 2. (a) The Congress hereby approves the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues, initlated at Prague, Czechoslovakia on November 6. 1981.

(b) The President may, without further approval by the Congress, execute such rechnical revisions of the Agreement approved by subsection (a) of this section as in his judgment may from time to time be required to facilitate the implementation of that Agreement. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize any revision of that Agreement to reduce any amount to be paid by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United States Government under the Agreement, or to defer the payment of any such

## DEFINITIONS

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act—
(I) "Agreement" means the Agreement on
the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues approved by section 2(a) of this Act;

(2) "national of the United States" has the meaning given such term by section 401(1) of the International Claims Settlement Act

- of 1949; (3) "Commission" means the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States:
- "Fund" means the Czechoslovakian (4)Claims Fund established by section 402(b) of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949:
- (5) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury; and

(6) "property" means any property, right, or interest.

## THE FUND

SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary shall cover into the Fund the amount paid by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in settlement and discharge of claims of nationals of the United States pursuant to article 1(1) of the Agreement, and shall deduct from that amount \$500,000 for reimbursement to the United States Government for expenses incurred by the Department of the Treasury and the Commission in the administration of this Act and title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. The amount so deducted shall be covered into the Treasury to the credit of misceWaneous receipts. The deduction required by this subsection shall be made in lieu of the deduction provided in section 402(e) of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.

(b) The Secretary shall establish three accounts in the Fund into which the amount covered into the Fund pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, less the deduction required by that subsection, shall be covered as follows:

(1) An account into which 372,500,000 shall be covered, to be available for payment in accordance with section 8 of this Act on account of awards certified pursuant to section 410 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.

(2) An account into which \$1,500,000 shall be covered, to be available for payment in accordance with section 8 of this Act on account of awards determined pursuant to section 5 of this Act.

(3) An account into which the remainder of amounts in the Fund shall be covered, to be available for payment in accordance with section 8 of this Act on account of awards determined pursuant to section 6 of this Act.

#### DETERMINATION OF CERTAIN CLAIMS

SEC. 5. (a) The Commission shall receive and determine, in accordance with applicable substantive law, including international law, the validity and amount of claims by nationals of the United States against the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for losses resulting from the nationalization or other taking of property owned at the time by nationals of the United States, which nationalization or other taking occurred between August 8, 1958, and the date on which the Agreement enters into force. In making the determination with respect to the validity and amount of any such claim and the value of the property taken, the Commission is authorized to accept the fair or proved value of such property as of the time when the property taken was last operated, used, managed, or controlled by the national or nationals of the United States asserting the claim, regardless of whether such time is prior to the actual date of nationalization or other taking by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

(b) The Commission shall certify to the Secretary the amount of any award determined pursuant to subsection (a).

## DETERMINATION OF OTHER CLAIMS

SEC. 6. (a) (1) The Congress finds that-

(A) in the case of certain persons holding claims against the Czechoslovakian Govern-ment who became nationals of the United States by February 26, 1948, the date on which the current Communist Government of Czechoslovakia assumed power, under generally accepted principles of International law the properties of those persons were taken by the Communist Government because the actions by the previous Government of Eduard Benes against those properties were accompanied by promises of compensation which the Communist Government repudiated; and
(B) while the Commission had the author-

ity to deny those claims described in subparagraph (A) on the basis that the properties involved had been taken by the Benes Government while the claimants were not yet nationals of the United States, the effect of that denial is to withhold compensation to persons who have been United States citizens for many years and whose expropriated property has benefited the Communist Government of Czechoslovakia no less than properties expropriated more directly and clearly by the Communist Government.

(2)(A) It is therefore the purpose of this section, in accordance with the intent of the Congress in enacting title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 and in the interests of equity, to make ex gratia payments to the claimants described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(B) The Congress reaffirms the principle and practice of the United States to seek compensation from foreign governments on behalf only of persons who were nationals of the United States at the time they sustained losses by the nationalization or other taking of their property by those foreign governments. In making payments under this section, the Congress does not establish any precedent for future claims payments.

(b) The Commission shall reopen and redetermine the validity and amount of any claim against the Government of Czechoslovakia which was filed with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act. of 1949, which was based on property found by the Commission to have been nationalized taken by the Government of Czechoslovakia on or after January 1, 1945, and before February 26, 1948, and which was denied by the Commission because such property was -not owned by a person who was a national of the United States on the date of such nationalization or taking. The provisions of section 405 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 requiring that the property upon which a claim is based must have been owned by a national of the United States on the date of nationalization or other taking by the Government of Czechoslovakia shall be deemed to be met if such property was owned on such date by a person who became a national of the United States on or before February 26, 1948. The Commission shall certify to the Secretary the amount of any award determined pursuant to this subsection.

#### PROCEDURES

SEC. 7. (a) The provisions of sections 401. 403. 405. 406, 407, 408. 409, 414, 415, and 416 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, to the extent that such provisions are not inconsistent with this Act. together with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe. shall apply with respect to any claim determined pursuant to section 5(a) of this Act or redetermined pursuant to section 6(b) of this Act.

(b) Not later than sixty days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall establish and publish in the Federal Register a period of time within which claims described in section 5 of the Act must be filed with the Commission, and the date for the completion of the Commission's affairs in connection with the determination of those such claims and claims described in section 6 of this Act. Such filing period shall be not more than one year after the date of such publication in the Federal Register, and such completion date shall be not more than two years after the final date for the filing of claims under section 5. No person holding a claim to which section 6 of this Act applies shall be required to refile that claim before the Commission makes the redetermination required by that section,

## PAYMENT OF AWARDS

SEC. 8. (a) As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall make payments from amounts in the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(1) of this Act on the unpaid balance of each award certified by the Commission pursuant to section 410 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.

(b) As soon as practicable after the Commisison has completed the certification of awards pursuant to section 5(b) of this Act, the Secretary shall make payments on account of each such award from the amounts in the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(2) of this Act.

(c) As soon as practicable after the Commission has completed the certification of awards pursuant to section 6(b) of this Act, the Secretary shall make payments on account of each such award from the amounts in the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(3) of this Act.

## (d) In the event that-

(1) the amounts in the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(2) of this Act exceed the aggregate total of all awards certified by the Commission pursuant to section 5(b) of this Act, or

(2) the amounts in the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(3) of this Act exceed the aggregate total of all awards certified by the Commission pursuant to section  $\theta(b)$  of this Act.

the Secretary shall cover such excess amounts into the account established pursuant to section 4(b)(1) of this Act. The Secretary shall make payments pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, from such excess amounts, on the unpaid balance of awards certified by the Commission pursuant to section 410 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.

(e) Payments under this section shall be made on the unpaid balance of each award which bear to such unpaid balance the same proportion as the total amount in the account in the Fund from which the payments are made bears to the aggregate unpaid balance of all awards payable from that account. Payments under this section, and applications for such payments, shall be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.

(f) In the event that-

(1) the Secretary is unable, within three years after the date of the establishment of the account prescribed by section 4(b)(1) of this Act, to locate any person entitled to receive payment under this section on account of an award certified by the Commission pursuant to section 410 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 or to locate any lawful heirs, successors, or legal representatives of that person, or if no valid application for payment is made by or on behalf of that person within six months after the Secretary has located that person or that person's heirs, successors, or legal representatives: or

(2) within six months after the Commishas completed the certification of awards pursuant to sections 5(b) and 6(b) of this Act, no valid application for payment is made by or on behalf of any person en-titled to receive payment under this section on account of an award certified by the Commission pursuant to either such section.

the Secretary shall give notice by publication in the Federal Register and in such other publications as the Secretary may determine that, unless valid application for payment is made within sixty days after the date of such publication, that person's award under title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 or this Act, as the case may be, and that person's right to receive payment on account of such award, shall lapse. Upon the expiration of such sixty-day period that per-son's award and right to receive payment shall lapse, and the amounts payable to that person shall be paid pro rata by the Secretary on account of all other awards under title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 or this Act, as the case may be.

## INVESTMENT OF FUNDS

SEC. 9. The Secretary shall invest and hold in separate accounts the amounts held respectively in the accounts established by section 4 of this Act. Such investment shall be in public debt securities with maturities suitable for the needs of the separate accounts and bearing interest at rates determined by the Secretary, taking into consideration the average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities. The interest earned on the amounts in each account established by section 4 of this Act shall be used to make payments, in accordance with section 8(e) of this Act, on awards payable from that account.

## IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT ..

Sec. 10. (a) If, within sixty days after the date of the enactment of this Act-

(1) the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not make the payments to the United States Government described in article 6(2) of the Agreement, or

(2) the Czechoslovak Government does not receive the gold provided in article 6(1) of the Agreement,

the provisions of this Act shall cease to be effective, and the provisions of the Agreement may not be implemented unless the Congress approves the Agreement after the end of that sixty-day period.

(b) The sixty-day period for implementation of the Agreement required by subsection (a) shall be extended by an additional period of thirty calendar days if, before the expiration of that sixty-day period, the Secretary of State certifies in writing that such extension is consistent with the purposes of this Act and reports that certification to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, together with a detailed statement of the reasons for the extension. If at the end of that additional thirty-day period the events set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) have not occurred, the provisions of this Act shall cease to be effective and the provisions of the Agreement may not be implemented unless the Congress approves the Agreement after the end of that thirty-day period or unless, before the expiration of that thirty-day period, authorizes by joint resolution a further extension of time for implementation of the Agreement. Such joint resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and in the House of Representatives a motion to proceed to the consideration of such joint resolution after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged.

SOCIAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

SEC. 11. The Secretary of State shall conduct a detailed review of the exchange of letters between the United States and Czechoslovakia providing for reciprocal social security payments to residents of the two countries. Such review should include an examirealized by residents of Czechoslovakia and is complying with the spirit and provisions of the letters, a comparison of the benefits being realized by residents of Czechoslovakia and of the United States under the letters, and an evaluation of the basis of differences in such benefits. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services, shall report to the Congress, not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the results of such review, together with any recommendations for legislation or changes in the agreement made by the letters that may be necessary to achieve greater comparability and equity of benefits for the residents of the two countries. Such report should include specific assessments of the feasibility, likely effects, and advisability of terminating United States social security payments to residents of Czechoslovakia in response to inequities and incomparabilities of benefits payments underthe exchange of letters.

## UP AMENDMENT NO. 802

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a series of amendments submitted on behalf of Senator Percy, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Re-

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rub-MAN). The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: .

The Senator from Alaska (Mr. Stevens) for Mr. Percy proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 802.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows: . - -

On page 3, line 18, following the word "amount", strike out the figure \$500,000 and insert the figure "\$50,000".

On page 4, line 2, following the date "1949", change the period to a semi-colon and insert the following phrase: "however, it is the sense of the Congress that the United States government is entitled to a larger percentage of the total award (generally presumed to be 5 per cent) and that the ex gratia payment hereinafter provided to certain claimants, who were otherwise excluded from sharing in this claims settlement under generally-accepted principles of international law and United States practice, is justified only by the extraordinary circumstances of this case and does not establish any precedent for future claims negotiations or payments."

On page 4, line 6, following the word "which", strike out the figure "\$72,500,000" and insert "\$74,550,000".

On page 5, line 20 (or thereabouts), following the word "power", strike out the comma and all language down to and including the word "repudiated" on page 6, line 3.

Mr. President, this bill would approve the agreement negotiated with Czechoslovakia for the compensation of American citizens whose property was expropriated by the Communist Government of Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Senate has previously passed a version of this bill which is virtually identical to the one just received from the House, with one exception. The House would include a provision which would devote \$7 million of the total lump sum settlement payed by Czechoslovakia to a group of people-the so-called Benes group-who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the original taking of their property by the pre-Communist Benes Government.

Under longstanding U.S. practice and accepted principles of international law. the U.S. Government was not able to negotiate on behalf of people who were not citizens at the time their property was lost. Therefore, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, after a full hearing in 1958, decided that this group of people were not eligible to share in any future claims settlement negotiated with the Czech Government. (Attached is a paper prepared for me by the Department of State describing this socalled continuous nationality principle.)

Those members of the Foreign Relations and Finance Committees who have had an interest in this legislation have sought to preserve this principle and therefore, the bill which passed the Senate last Friday did not include an amount for the Benes claimants.

Given the strong arguments in the House, however, that some payment to the Benes group are justified because of the compelling equities of their case, and in the interest of resolving this matter during this session, we have here agreed to include \$4.95 million for this group, but to do so with the understanding that this money is being paid ex gratia out of the share which would otherwise be provided to the U.S. Treasury as compensation for the expenses of the Government in negotiating and implementing this agreement, plus \$925,000 from the account which would otherwise been held to pay those claimants who may still come forward because they were not adjudicated claimants in 1958 and are hereafter found to be eligible to recover.

In short, Mr. President, we are agreeing to provide some compensation to the Benes group, but only because the formula I have just outlined allows us to do so without violating two important principles of U.S. practice and international law: First, that the U.S. Governmentthat is, the U.S. taxpayer—is entitled to some reimbursement from the amounts awarded to claimants under a lump-sum settlement of this kind, and second, that only those people who were American citizens at the time their property was taken are entitled to be represented by the U.S. Government in claims negotiations and to share in the the resulting settlement.

I urge the Senate to accept this bill as reamended and I hope the House will act expeditiously to see that it becomes law this year.

THE CONTINUOUS NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

Under generally accepted principles of international law, a claim for compensation for losses or damages may be espoused by one government against another only on behalf of persons who were nationals of the espousing government at the time of the loss or damage and continuously thereafter until the date of the presentation of the claim. This principle of continuous nationality rests on two primary foundations.

First, the espousing government is in reality asserting its own right to redress for a breach of an international legal duty owed to it, through injury to its nationals; no such breach occurs when the persons involved were not nationals of the espousing government at the time of inquiry.

Second, any other rule could give rise to nationality shopping among claimants seeking a government willing to assert a claim notwithstanding the absence of a breach of an international legal duty to that government at the time the loss or damage took place.

The U.S. Government has consistently adhered to the continuous nationality principle in its espousal of private claims. This practice is reflected in bilateral claims settlement agreements and in U.S. legislation.

## INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Since World War II the United States has entered into numerous claims settlement agreements with foreign governments. These agreements settled only those claims falling within the scope of the continuous nationality principle. A number of such agreements expressly recognize the applicability of that principle. These include the agreement of July 16. 1960 with Poland (TIAS 4545); the agreements of July 19, 1948 and November 5. 1964 with Yugoslavia (TIAS 1803; TIAS 5750); the agreement of March 30. 1960 with Romania (TIAS 4451); the agreement of July 2, 1963 with

Bulgaria (TIAS 5387); and the pending agreement of November 6, 1981 with Czechoslovakia.

Certain other claims settlement agreements, such as the agreement of March 6, 1973 with Hungary (TIAS 7569) and the agreement of May 11, 1979 with the People's Republic of China (TIAS 9306), do not include language explicitly reflecting the continuous nationality principle. The negotiating histories and the record of the implementation of such agreements make clear, nonetheless, that no departure from that principle was involved.

The continuous nationality principle has also been adhered to by numerous Mixed Claims Commissions and similar tribunals to which the United States has been party, as well as in bilateral claims settlement agreements not involving the United States, and by international tribunals such as the Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor to the International Court of Justice. The United States-Iran claims settlement mechanism established pursuant to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of January 19, 1981, also follows the continuous nationality principle.

The multilateral treaties of peace between the allied and associated powers with Italy (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1948), Bulgaria (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1659), and Hungary (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1651), and Romania (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1649), respectively require payment of compensation to United Nations nationals for loss or damage to property in each such country during World War II, and define "United Nations Nationals" to include persons having the nationality of any of the United Nations on the date of entry into force of such treaties so long as such persons held that nationality as of the date of the armistice with the country against which the claim is made.

This adaptation of the normal rule reflected both the ability of the victors to dictate terms departing from the norm and requiring the defeated Axis powers to provide such compensation, and the difficulty of determining the precise date of losses or damages occurring during wartime hostilities. As noted below, the Congress in 1955 rejected attempts to extend the U.S. program for settlement of such wartime claims to include persons who became U.S. nationals subsequent to the armistice but prior to the effective date of the peace treaties.

## U.S. LEGISLATION

Under U.S. law and practice, settlement of individual claims against a foreign government is normally made subsequent to the determination by the Foreign Claims. Settlement Commission of the validity and amount of such claims, and the certification of the resulting awards for payment. The Commission operates pursuant to express statutory authority embodied in the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. as amended (22 U.S.C. §§ 1621 et seq.; hereinafter: the "1949 Act"). With one limited exception, described below, the 1949 act has authorized only those settlements consistent with the continuous nationality principle.

The 1949 act is organized into seven titles, each dealing with a discrete category of claims. Section 4(a) of title I (22 U.S.C. 1623c(a)) provides general authority for the Commission to adjudicate claims of U.S. nationals included within the terms of the Yugoslav Claims Agreement of 1948 (supra), or within the terms of any claims agreement hereafter concluded between the United States and a foreign government and providing for the en bloc settlement of claims. That section further provides that in adjudicating such claims the Commission is to apply: First, the provisions of the applicable agreement; and second, applicable provisions of international law, justice, and equity.

The only departure from the continuous nationality principle anywhere in the 1949 act is in section 304 of title III (22 U.S.C. 1641c, as amended by Public Law 85-604). That section authorizes the Commission to receive and adjudicate claims against Italy by natural persons who were citizens of the United States on the date of enactment of title III, that is, on August 9, 1955.

Such adjudication was to take place only after payment of the principal amount of all other claims against Italy under an August 14. 1947 memorandum of understanding (TIAS 1757), and any resulting awards were to be paid from any balances remaining in the \$5.000,000 paid by Italy under that agreement in settlement of claims not provided for in the 1947 peace treaty.

This unique departure from consistent principle was clearly recognized as such at the time, see the Senate debate set out at 104 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 13246 et seq. (July 9, 1958), and was justified on the ground that the amount paid by Italy was more than that required to pay the principal amount of claims of persons who were U.S. nationals at the time of loss. It also reflects the special considerations, noted previously, arising in the context of the World War II peace settlements.

As noted previously, the Congress, in its consideration of title III, rejected an effort to expand the class of eligible claimants against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania to include persons who became U.S. nationals after the date of loss. A House amendment that would have had such effect was deleted in conference (see H. Rept. 1475, 84th Cong., 1st sess.) thereby preserving the continuous nationality rule with regard to claims against those three countries under title III.

The remaining titles of the 1949 act each expressly apply to the continuous nationality principle in defining the authority of the Commission to adjudicate claims in the context of specific claims settlement programs. Section 405 of title IV relating to claims against Czechoslovakia (22 U.S.C. 1642d), section 504 of title V relating to claims against the People's Republic of China and Cuba (22 U.S.C. 1643c), section 603 of title VI relating to claims against the German Democratic Republic (22 U.S.C. 1644c), and section 704 of title VII relating to claims against Vietnam (22 U.S.C. 1645c) all specifically limit the authority of the Commission to claims arising

from property interests owned at the time of loss by nationals of the United States and continuously thereafter until presentation to the Commission for adjudication.

By request of Mr. Stevens the following statement was ordered to be placed in the Record.

• Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, this bill would approve the agreement negotiated with Czechoslovakia for the compensation of American citizens whose property was expropriated by the Communist Government of Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Senate has previously passed a version of this bill which is virtually identical to the one just received from the House, with one exception. The House would include a provision which would devote \$7 million of the total lump sum settlement payed by Czechoslovakia to a group of people—the so-called Benes group-who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the original taking of their property by the pre-Communist Benes Government.

Under long-standing U.S. practice and accepted principles of international law, the U.S. Government was not able to negotiate on behalf of people who were not citizens at the time their property was lost. Therefore, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commissions after a full hearing in 1958, decided that this group of people were not eligible to share in any future claims settlement negotiated with the Czech Government.

Those members of the Foreign Relations and Finance Committee who have had an interest in this legislation have sought to preserve this principle and therefore, the bill which passed the Senate last Friday did not include an

amount for the Benes claimants.

Given the strong arguments in the House, however, that some payment to the Benes group are justified because of the compelling equities of their case, and in the interest of resolving this matter during this session we have here agreed to include \$4.95 million for this group, but to do so with the understanding that this money is being paid ex gratia out of the share which would otherwise be provided to the U.S. Treasury as compensation for the expenses of the Government in negotiating and implementing this agreement, plus \$925,000 from the account which would have otherwise been held to pay those claimants who may still come forward because they were not adjudicated claimants in 1958 and are hereafter found to be eligible to recover.

In short, Mr. President, we are agreeing to provide some compensation to the Benes group, but only because the formula I have just outlined allows us to do so without violating two important principles of U.S. practice and international law: First, that the U.S. Governmentthat is, the U.S. taxpaver—is entitled to some reimbursement from the amounts awarded to claimants under a lump-sum settlement of this kind; and second, that only those people who were American citizens at the time their property was taken are entitled to be represented by the U.S. Government in claims negotiations and to share in the resulting settlement.

I urge the Senate to accept this bill as reamended and I hope the House will act expeditiously to see that it becomes law this year.

I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the "continuous nationality" principle.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE "CONTINUOUS NATIONALITY" PRINCIPLE

Under generally accepted principles of international law, a claim for compensation for losses or damages may be espoused by one government against another only on behalf of persons who were nationals of the espousing government at the time of the loss or damage and continuously thereafter until the date of the presentation of the claim. This principle of "continuous nationality" rests on two primary foundations. First, the espousing government is in reality asserting its own right to redress for a breach of an international legal duty owed to it, through injury to its nationals; no such breach occurs when the persons involved were not nationals of the espousing government at the time of injury. Second, any other rule could give rise to "nationality shopping" among claimants seeking a government willing to assert a claim notwithstanding the absence of a breach of an international legal duty to that government at the time the loss or damage took place.

The United States Government has consistently adhered to the "continuous nationality" principle in its espousal of private claims. This practice is reflected in hilateral claims settlement agreements and in United States legislation.

#### INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Since World War II the United States has entered into numerous claims settlement agreements with foreign governments. These agreements settled only those claims falling within the scope of the "continuous nationality" principle. A number of such agreements expressly recognize the applicability of that principle. These include the Agreement of July 18, 1960 with Poland (TIAS 4545); the Agreements of July 19, 1948 and November 5, 1964 with Yugoslavia (TIAS 1803; TIAS 5750); the Agreement of March 30, 1960 with Romania (TIAS 4451); the Agreement of July 2, 1963 with Bulgaria (TIAS 5387); and the pending Agreement of November 6, 1981 with Czechoslovakia.

Certain other claims settlement agreements, such as the Agreement of March 6, 1973 with Hungary (TIAS 7569) and the Agreement of May 11, 1979 with the People's Republic of China (TIAS 9306), do not include language explicitly reflecting the "continuous nationality" principle. The negotiating histories and the record of the implementation of such agreements make clear, nonetheless, that no departure from that principle was involved.

The "continuous nationality" principle has also been adhered to by numerous Mixed Claims Commissions and similar tribunals to which the United States has been party, as well as in bilateral claims settlement agreements not involving the United States, and by international tribunals such as the Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor to the International Court of Justice. The United States-Iran claims settlement mechanism established pursuant to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of January 19, 1981, also follows the "continuous nationality" principle.

The multilateral Treatles of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers with Italy (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1948), Eulgaria (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1659), Hungary (February 10, 1947; TIAS 1651), and

Romania (February 10. 1947; TIAS 1649), respectively, require payment of compensation to "United Nations nationals" for loss or damage to property in each such country during World War II, and define "United Nations nationals" to include persons having the nationality of any of the United Nations on the date of entry into force of such treaties, so long as such persons held that nationality as of the date of the armistice with the country against which the claim is made.

This adaptation of the normal rule reflected both the ability of the victors to dictate terms departing from the norm and requiring the defeated Axis powers to provide such compensation, and the difficulty of determining the precise date of losses or damages occurring during wartime hostilities. As noted below, the Congress in 1955 rejected attempts to extend the U.S. program for settlement of such wartime claims to include persons who became United States nationals subsequent to the armistice but prior to the effective date of the peace treaties.

#### UNITED STATES LEGISLATION

Under United States law and practice, settlement of individual claims against a foreign government is normally made subsequent to the determination by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the validity and amount of such claims, and the certification of the resulting awards for payment. The Commission operates pursuant to express statutory authority embodied in the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S.C. §§ 1621 et seq.; hereinafter: the "1949 Act"). With one limited exception, described below, the 1949 Act has authorized only those settlements consistent with the "continuous nationality" principle.

The 1949 Act is organized into seven titles, each dealing with a discrete category of claims. Section 4(a) of title I (22 U.S.C. § 1623c(a)) provides general authority for the Commission to adjudicate claims of United States nationals "included within the terms of the Yugoslav Claims Agreement of 1948 (supra), or within the terms of any claims agreement hereafter concluded" between the United States and a foreign government and providing for the en bloc settlement of claims. That section further provides that in adjudicating such claims the Commission is to apply (1) the provisions of the applicable agreement, and (2) applicable provisions of "international law, justice, and equity".

Section 2(c) of title I (22 U.S.C. § 1621(c)), defines "national of the United States" for the purposes of that title to include natural persons who are U.S. cfitzens and persons "who, though not citizens of the United States, owe permanent allegiance to the United States." Aliens are expressly excluded. This definition forms the basic pattern for comparable definitions in other titles of the 1949 Act. A Senate amendment that would have broadened this definition to include persons who, at the time of loss, were permanent residents of the United States intending to become citizens and who, prior to the effective date of a settlement agreement, became citizens, was rejected in conference.

Title III of the 1949 Act relates to claims against Hungary, Bulgaria, Eomania, Italy, and the Soviet Union. (Title II deals with the vesting and liquidation of certain foreign property located within the United States, and does not address claims settlement procedures directly.) Claims cognizable under title III include those provided for in the 1947 peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania (see above) and certain other subsequent claims covered in applicable bilateral claims settlement agreements with those countries. Title III also provides for the determination of claims against the

Soviet Union in connection with . the "Litvinov Assignment" of 1933.

The only departure from the "continuous nationality" principle anywhere in the 1949 Act is in section 304 of title HI (22 U.S.C. \$ 1641c, as amended by Public Law 85-804). That section authorizes the Commission to receive and adjudicate claims against Italy by natural persons who were citizens of the United States on the date of enactment of title III (that is, on August 9, 1955).

Such adjudication was to take place only after payment of the principal amount of all other claims against Italy under an August 14. 1947 Memorandum of Understanding (TIAS 1757), and any resulting awards were to be paid from any balances remaining in the \$5,000,000 paid by Italy under that agreement in settlement of claims not provided

for in the 1947 peace treaty.

This unique departure from consistent principle was clearly recognized as such at the time (see the Senate debate set out at 104 Cong. Rec. 13246 et seq. (July 9, 1958)), and was justified on the ground that the amount paid by Italy was more than that required to pay the principal amount of claims of persons who were United States nationals at the time of loss. It also reflects the special considerations, noted previously, arising in the context of the World War II peace settlements.

As noted previously, the Congress, in its consideration of title III, rejected an effort to expand the class of eligible claimants against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania to include persons who became United States nationals after the date of loss. A House amendment that would have had such effect was deleted in conference, see H. Rept. No. 1475, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., thereby preserving the "continuous nationality" rule with regard to claims against those three coun-

tries under title IT.

The remaining titles of the 1949 Act each expressly apply to the "continuous nationality" principle in defining the authority of the Commission to adjudicate claims in the context of specific claims settlement programs. Section 405 of title IV relating to claims against Czechoslovakia (22 U.S.C. § 1642d), section 504 of title V relating to claims against the People's Republic of China and Cuba (22 U.S.C. § 1643c), section 603 of title VI relating to claims against the German Democratic Republic (22 U.S.C. i 1644c), and section 704 of title VII relating to claims against Vietnam (22 U.S.C. § 1645c), all specifically limit the authority of the Commission to claims arising from property interests owned at the time of loss by national of the United States and continuously thereafter until presentation to the Commission for adjudication.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House with the amendments of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. BRADUEY, Does this relate to the Finnish population as well as the Czech

population?

Mr. STEVENS. I can state to the Senator not to my knowledge unless the Senator has more knowledge than I do of particular Senate committee amendments.

If they were in the amendments as they came from the committee they are in the series of amendments.

Mr. BRADLEY. Is this bill similar to the bill adopted in the House of Representatives?

Mr. STEVENS. It is, but with the Senate amendments sent to us by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. BRADLEY, I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Alaska.

The motion was agreed to. Mr. STEVENS, Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was

## NATIONAL YEAR OF DISABLED PERSONS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President. I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate, Senate Joint Resolution 134, the National Year of Disabled Persons resolu-

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the joint resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as

A foint resolution (S.J. Res. 134) to designate 1982 as the National Year of Disabled Persons.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolu-

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, this resolution before us for consideration. Senate Joint Resolution 134, designates 1982 as the "National Year of Disabled Persons." The year 1981 was declared by the United Nations to be the International Year of Disabled Persons, and this year was very beneficial in terms of increasing awareness of the special needs and potential of handicapped individuals, and generating a spirit of cooperation between the public and private sector in carrying out various activities in communities throughout this country.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The Senator from West Virginia agrees with the Senator from Kansas that this past year has been very successful in highlighting the problems and capabilities of 35 million Americans who happen to live with some kind of disability. The spirit of this year was manifested in many activities beyond our own borders that promoted public awareness of the problems of handicapped people.

Mr. DOLE. The Senator from West Virginia has very eloquently expressed the results of the international year, and the Senator from Kansas is supportive of the goals implied in designating a national year of disabled persons. However. I would question this kind of a year following so closely on the one that just passed. I realize that there has been a certain momentum gained from the activities this past year, but we perhaps should be headed in the direction of substantive program changes and other ways of improving the quality of the lives of 35 million Americans who are disabled.

The Senator from Kansas is very in-

terested in taking this momentum one step further than the designation of another year-I would like to take a close look at the services we provide handicapped people, and encourage a stronger participation by the private sector in improving the life style of our disabled citizens-in helping them to lead independent, productive lives within the mainstream of our society.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The Senator from West Virginia shares the goals and approach that the Senator from Kansas has just expressed, and it is my understanding that Senate Joint Resolution 134 will encourage private sector participation in accomplishing the goals carried out by the International Year through the U.S. Council on the IYDP, and continue the kind of momentum that has been gained.

Mr. DOLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for underlining this aspect of private sector participation in carrying out what will be the goals of a national year of disabled persons, and I think this is a very important point to make at this time. It is the intention of those who have previously been involved with the International Year that no Federal funds or expenditures be used for the purpose of implementing the goals of the national year resolution.

It is the anticipation of many of us who are concerned about issues affecting our disabled citizens, that the U.S. Council will build on the momentum that has been gained in 1981 by finding alternative sources of private funding for their activities-I understand that they did a very commendable job of harnessing the resources of over 250 corporations in IYDP efforts and activities, and this kind of support should be encouraged to the maximum. Available Federal resources should be reserved for direct services provided through effective programs.

Mr. RANDOLPH. I am pleased that the Senator from Kansas has raised these funding issues, because the Senator from West Virginia shares these concerns, and believes that our limited Federal resources should be used for programs that provide direct services to handicappel individuals. At a time of budget constraints, Federal funds must be reserved for essential Federal programs. I think we should set our priorities and direct our limited Federal financial resources to those programs that have been proven effective.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution is before the Senate and open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

## S.J. RES. 134

Whereas the designation by the United Nations of 1981 as the International Year of Disabled Persons has stimulated new progrese toward achieving the full participation in national and community life of the thirtyfive million Americans who have disabilities;

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name
DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RB 12/21/2016

W

File Folder

**FOIA** 

COUNTRY FILES: [CZECHOSLOVAKIA] MATLOCK FILES (1)

F1640/3

**HERSHBERG** 

Box Number

1

1			11	
ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
186234	PAPER	2	12/22/1981	B1
	RE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA [27-28 ONLY]			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

## CONFIDENTIAL

CZECH GOLD

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE RI E0B833

PRAGUE 8421

DTG: 291415Z JAN 82 PSN: 051085 TOR: 029/15097

ANØØ2589

DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 MYER-01

/ØØ5 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOR:

OP IMMED STH0967 DE RUDKRP #Ø421 Ø291432 0 2914157 JAN 82 FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6345

#### CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PRAGUE Ø421 E. O. 12865: N/A TAGS: EFIN CZ SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAK CLAIMS/GOLD AGREEMENT: FORMAL STATEMENTS

- 1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF REMARKS BY CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK (DELIVERED IN ENGLISH) AND THE AMBASSADOR (DELIVERED IN CZECH) FOLLOWING SIGNING OF THE CLAIMS AGREE-MENT JANUARY 29
- 2. CHNOUPEK TEXT. BEGIN QUOTE. WE HAVE SIGNED A DOCUMENT WHICH BY ITS SIGNIFICANCE DECISIVELY BELONGS TO THE MOST IMPORTANT CZECHOSLOVAK-U.S. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. IT FINALLY SETTLES ONE OF THE LAST REMNANTS OF WORLD WAR TWO AND THUS IT REMOVES A VERY SERIOUS OBSTACLE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR STATES. THE AGREEMENT SOLVES ALSO THE PROBLEM OF OPEN FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY ISSUES.

OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THOUGH LONG AND PERSISTANT. HAVE AFTER ALL RESULTED IN A POSITIVE OUTCOME. ALSO IN THIS FACT WE SEE A PROOF THAT WITH ENOUGH GOOD POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES THERE ARE NO INSOLVABLE PROBLEMS.

NOW WE SHOULD PROCEED ALSO TO A DETAILED ASSESS-MENT OF FURTHER PROBLEMS IMPEDING A BROADER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR CONTACTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. WE ARE INTERESTED IN IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS AND IN STRENGTHENING A MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS EQUAL COOPERATION IN ALL SPHERES AS IT WAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASION BY A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.

I BELIEVE THAT A SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREE-MENT SIGNED TODAY WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

PERMIT ME FINALLY TO THANK ALL THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ELABORATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE MADE A GOOD WORK WHICH CERTAINLY IS A PROMISE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT IN OUR FUTURE TALKS. END QUOTE.

3. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF AMBASSADOR'S TEXT. BEGIN QUOTE I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE MINISTER FOR THE REMARKS HE HAS MADE ON THIS IMPORTANT OCCASION. IT IS GRATIFYING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND TO ME PERSONALLY, THAT THESE DIFKICULT QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE IMPEDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES FOR SO MANY YEARS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ALONG WITH YOU, MR. MINISTER, WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT WE CAN NOW BEGIN TO DIRECT OUR ATTENTION TO OTHER APSECTS OF OUR RELATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, I DO NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS FOLLOW DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW ON MANY

CSN: HCE558 MAJOR INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. THESE DIFFERENCES CANNOT FAIL TO AFFECT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS. THE AGREEMENT WHICH WE HAVE SIGNED TODAY IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE EFFORT OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE THESE RELATIONS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE TRUE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR SUCCESS IN THIS MATTER DEMONSTRATES THAT WE CAN OVERCOME OBSTACLES IF THE WILL TO DO SO EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES. I CAN ASSURE YOU, MR. MINISTER, THAT SUCH A WILL IS PRESENT ON OUR PART. I WOULD ALSO LIKE, MR. MINISTER, TO THANK ALL OF THOSE WHO HAVE WORKED SO LONG AND SUCCESSFULLY TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. END QUOTE. MATL OCK

RT

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1982

2050 (S/S 8208246) fle Gyeckoslavol.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Agrement of Jaroslav Zantovsky of the Government

of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as

Ambassador to the United States

We have reviewed and concur in the recommendation of the Department of State that the appointment of Jaroslav Zantovsky as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (C)

> Michael O. Wheeler Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL Review March 30, 1988.

## **MEMORANDUM**

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 30, 1982

## ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES H

SUBJECT:

Agrement for new Czech Ambassador to the U.S.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the Department of State for signature by Michael Wheeler informing them that the Administration has no objection to the appointment of Jaroslav Zantovsky of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as Ambassador to the United States. The incoming memorandum (with attachments) from State is at Tab II. (C)

Steaman concurs.

## RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Mike Wheeler to sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the Department of State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove\_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum from Wheeler to Bremer
Tab II State's memorandum of March 26

CONFIDENTIAL Review March 30, 1988.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment of Jaroslav Zantovsky of the

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as Ambassador

to the United States.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Jaroslav Zantovsky as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the United States (Tab 2). A biography of Ambassador Zantovsky is attached (Tab 1).

The Department believes from the information available that Zantovsky is acceptable to the United States as Ambassador and recommends that the President agree to the proposed appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

L. Faul Bremer, III Executive Secretary

## Attachments:

- 1. Biography.
- Note dated March 22, 1982 from Embassy of Czechoslovakia.

(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Warver 11/4/18

BY LW MARADATE 12/21/16

## CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHY - Jaroslav Zantovsky

## Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Jaroslav Zantovsky has served as Czechoslovakia's Ambassador to Greece since March 1979. Throughout most of his diplomatic career, however, he has been intimately concerned with U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.

In March 1981 Zantovsky was temporarily recalled from Greece to head the Czechoslovak delegation in the ultimately successful U.S.-Czechoslovak "claims/gold" negotiations. (Pending a settlement of U.S. expropriation claims against Czechoslovakia, the U.S. had refused for 34 years to consent to the delivery to Czechoslovakia of the remainder of its share, some 18.4 metric tons, of the Nazi-looted monetary gold recovered by Allied armies at the close of World War II. An agreement was reached and approved by the Congress in December 1981 and was implemented in February 1982.)

Before being made Ambassador to Greece, Zantovsky had for five years headed the Sixth Department (English-speaking countries, including the U.S.) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. His prior assignments had been: Minister-Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington (1968-1973); Deputy Director of the Sixth Department (including U.S.) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1964-1968); Counselor of Embassy in Washington (1959-1964); Deputy Director of the British and Scandinavian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1957-1959); Second Secretary of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Oslo (1953-1957) and Charge d'Affaires of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Reykjavik from 1955.

Seven years ago, two close Czechoslovak colleagues of Zantovsky described him as genuinely predisposed to improved relations with the United States. Based on U.S. contacts with Zantovsky during the recent "claims/gold" negotiations, this description of his attitude toward U.S.-Czechoslovak relations remains valid.

Zantovsky's designation as Ambassador to Washington follows several months of convalescence after an apparently serious illness of undisclosed nature. He also has an eye problem, for which he often wears very dark glasses. Zantovsky, 57, speaks English, Norwegian, Russian, and German. He is married and has two daughters.

A thorough search of U.S. Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

CONFIDENTIAL RDS-2 3/24/02 Authority State Waiter Mulis
BY EW MADIA DATE 12/21/4

Washington, March 22, 1982

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the President of the Cezchoslovak Socialist Republic Mr. Gustav Husák is desirous of appointing Mr. Jaroslav Žantovský as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United States of America nad to inquire, at the instance of my Government, whether his appointment would be agreeable to the Government of the United States of America.

For Your Excellency's information I am attaching hereto a curriculum vitae of Mr. Jaroslav Žantovský who has had a long and distinguished career in the Czechoslovak Foreing Service.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency
Mr. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
U.S. Secretary of State
W a s h i n g t o n



797

## National Security Council The White House

John Poindexter

**Bud McFarlane** 

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Staff Secretary

Sit Room

CY To VP

CY To Meese

CY To Baker

CY To Deaver

Other \_\_

I-Information

A-Action

Package #

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION

ACTION

R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

Show CC

Show CC

Show CC

Show CC

COMMENTS

Cych 29 July 82

(2)

## 1. PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS

AMB. JAROSLAV ZANTOVSKY (Shon tof skee) CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

PARTICIPANTS: FAMILY - WIFE: MILADA

WH - WILLIAM P. CLARK
NSC - RICHARD PIPES
STATE - JOHN R. DAVIS
ESCORT - RICHARD MASSEY

- -- AMB. IS 57, CAREER DIPLOMAT, PRIMARILY INVOLVED U.S./WESTERN AFFAIRS
- -- SERVED AS AMB. TO GREECE; NEGOTIATOR U.S.-CZECH CLAIMS/GOLD NEGOTIATIONS
- -- SERVED TWICE BEFORE IN WASHINGTON -- TOTAL 9 YEARS.

## AMB. ZANTOVSKY (Shon tof skee)

° EXPRESS U.S. SATISFACTION THAT THE CLAIMS/ GOLD ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND THAT THIS PROBLEM IS AT LAST BEHIND US.

- ° NOTE TRADITIONAL WARMTH AMERICANS HAVE FELT FOR PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A NATION WE HELPED CREATE AFTER WORLD WAR I.
- EMPHASIZE THAT WHILE U.S. DESIRES IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE EVIDENCE LATELY THAT CZECH LEADERS SHARE THIS DESIRE. STRESS U.S. IS PREPARED TO CONDUCT NORMAL RELATIONS ON BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND PURSUIT OF MUTUAL INTERESTS.

Cipilira dia

## REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Thursday, July 29, 19 82

for The President of (NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Ambassador Jaroslav ZANTOVSKY (of Czechoslovakia)

Mrs. Milada ZANTOVSKY

John R. DAVIS

Richard MASSEY

**MEETING LOCATION** 

Building West Wing Requested by Richard Pipes

Room No. Oval Office Room No. 368 Telephone X5646

Time of Meeting 4:30 p.m. Date of request July 29, 1982

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

## CONFIDENTIAL

Jaroslav Zantovsky (Phonetic: Shon tof skee) - Appointed Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Head of State - Gustav Husak (Pronounced: Hoo sok), President of the Republic (and General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party)

Head of Government - Lubomir Strougal (Pronounced: Stroo gol),
Prime Minister


Ambassador Zantovsky is 57 and a career diplomat. He is married (wife, Milada) and has 2 adult daughters. He served most recently as Ambassador to Greece. In 1981 he was recalled from Greece to be Czechoslovak negotiator in the U.S.-Czechoslovak claims/gold negotiations. His career has been focused almost entirely on Western, primarily U.S., affairs. He has served twice before in Washington, living here 9 years. Other recent assignments have been in Prague, as Deputy Director, and later Director, of the Foreign Ministry's U.S.-UK-Canada Department.

Significant Programs or Issues: U.S.-Czechoslovak relations have been poor for most of the period since the Soviet invasion in 1968 and the subsequent installation of the Husak regime. The last visit to Czechoslovakia by a ranking American official was that by Secretary of State Rogers during a brief warming of relations in Through intense negotiations in 1981, we removed a major, 35-year-old obstacle to improved relations: the so-called "claims/ gold" dispute, involving U.S. expropriation claims against Czechoslovakia and U.S. refusal, pending settlement of the claims, to deliver to Czechoslovakia its share of the Nazi-looted gold recovered by Allied armies. Resolution of this problem has not led to improved relations. The Husak regime's adamant support of martial law in neighboring Poland, its obsequious support of Soviet policy across the board, its repression of internal dissent, and its continuing public attacks on the U.S. have produced a chilly bilateral atmosphere at present. Czechoslovak leaders profess to want improved relations, and the Most Favored Nation status they hope would follow, but we see little evidence as yet.

## Issues for Discussion:

- -- Express U.S. satisfaction that the claims/gold issue has been resolved and that this problem is at last behind us.
- -- Note the traditional warmth Americans have felt for the people of Czechoslovakia, a nation we helped to create after the First World War.
- -- Emphasize that while the U.S. desires improved relations with Czechoslovakia, we have seen little evidence lately that Czechoslovak leaders share this desire. Stress that the U.S. is prepared to conduct normal relations with Czechoslovakia on a basis of mutual respect and the pursuit of mutual interests.





# background

# Czechoslovakia



United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs May 1981



## Official Name: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

## PROFILE

## People

NATIONALITY: Noun and adjective—Czechoslovak(s). POPULATION (1980): 15.2 million. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 0.6%. ETHNIC GROUPS: Czech (65%), Slovak (30%), Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, German. RELIGIONS: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish religious community. Churches—Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, Slovak Lutheran, Czechoslovak

Hussite Church, Reformed Church of Slovakia, Church of Seventh-Day Adventists, Unitarian Church. LANGUAGES: Czech, Slovak, Hungarian. LITERACY: 99%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 70 yrs. WORK FORCE (7.5 million): Agriculture-12%. Industry, construction, and commerce-66%. Services and government-18%.

## Geography

AREA: 127,870 sq. km. (49,371 sq. mi.); about the size of NY. CITIES: Capital—Prague (pop. 1.2 million). Other—Bratislava (375,000), Brno (373,000), Ostrava (325,000), Kosice (201,000), Plzen (Pilsen—169,000).

## Government

TYPE: Communist state (Socialist Republic). INDEPENDENCE: Czechoslovak state established 1918. CON-STITUTION: July 11, 1960.

BRANCHES: Executive—President (Chief of State), Premier (Head of Government), Cabinet. Legislative—bicameral Federal Assembly. Judicial—Supreme Court 1960, Constitutional Court 1968.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Czechoslovak Communist Party, Slovak Communist Party, Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Czechoslovak People's Party, Slovak Freedom Party, Slovak Revival Party. SUF-FRAGE: Universal over 18.

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: Czech Socialist Republic (Bohemia, Moravia), Slovak Socialist Republic (Slovakia). DEFENSE: 7.1% of 1978 GNP.
FLAG: A blue triangle extending the length of the staff side, with its apex toward the center; a white band on the upper half of the remaining space; and a red band on the lower half.

## **Economy**

GNP (1979 dollars): \$77 billion. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (1980 est.): 1%. PER CAPITA GDP: \$5,000.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, coke, timber, lignite, uranium, magnesite.

AGRICULTURE (12% of GNP): Products—wheat, rye, oats, corn, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, hogs, cattle, horses.

INDUSTRY (66% of GNP): Types—iron and steel, machinery and equipment, cement, sheet glass, motor vehicles, armaments, chemicals, ceramics, wood, paper products.

TRADE (1979): Exports—\$13.9 billion: machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, consumer durables, footwear, textiles. Imports—\$14.4 billion: machinery, equipment fuels, raw materials, food, consumer goods. Partners—USSR, GDR, Hungary, FRG, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, UK.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE (1980): 5.32 crowns = US\$1 (official); 9.75 crowns = US\$1 (tourist).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), UN and its specialized agencies, Warsaw Pact, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), GATT.

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

TO THE REMARKS OF THE

NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

JAROSLAV ZANTOVSKY

UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF

HIS LETTER OF CREDENCE

## Mr. Ambassador:

Let me welcome you as the newly-accredited Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United States of America. I accept as well the Letter of Recall of your predecessor.

I appreciate your expression of best wishes for myself and for the American people. As I recall the role played by the United States in the creation of Czechoslovakia, so too am I aware of the rich contribution to the development of America made by persons of Czech and Slovak descent. It is understandable that the American people have traditionally felt a closeness and warmth for the people of Czechoslovakia.

Your arrival comes at a time of continuing international tension and, unfortunately, at a time of some tension in our

bilateral relationship as well.

The United States welcomed the recent successful resolution of the claims issue and the delivery of the gold to Czechoslovakia. We had long sought an improved, mutually beneficial relationship with your country. We look forward to the time when conditions permit concrete steps toward such improvement.

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, my best wishes for a productive assignment. I assure you that you will find the United States Government cooperative and receptive in any endeavor to further relations on a basis of full mutual respect and mutual interest.

#### REMARKS OF THE

NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

JAROSLAV ZANTOVSKY

UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS LETTER OF CREDENCE

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit to you the letter from the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic accrediting me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United States of America. I am simultaneously presenting the Letter of Recall of my predecessor, Ambassador Jaromir Johanes.

It is my hope and the hope of my government, that our relations will improve and expand during the period of my service in Washington. We believe that progress in all aspects of our relations can benefit both countries.

Mr. President, permit me to begin my mission in the United States of America by extending to you personally and through you to the American people the best wishes of my government and the hope of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for improved and expanded ties with the United States of America.

Miroslav Houstecky (MEEruhslahf HOEshtetskee) - Appointed Ambassador of Czechoslovakia

Chief of State: Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia since 1969, President of the Republic since 1975.

Biographic Sketch: Ambassador Houstecky, 59, is married and has three children, all adult. Houstecky, an academic and a journalist by training, began his diplomatic career comparatively late in life. He received a Ph.D. in history from Prague University in 1953 and taught modern history there. In 1964 he became the New Delhi correspondent of the Czechoslovak News Agency (CTK) and in 1969 became the Deputy Director General of CTK. In 1977 he joined the Central Committee staff, working for Party ideologist Vasil Bilak. He was named Czechoslovak Ambassador to Great Britain and to Ireland in 1983, his first diplomatic assignment. British interlocutors characterize him as a competent if not outgoing representative of his country's interests. Houstecky was selected for his present position in 1985.

Pertinent Background: Because of the low level of relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia, there have been no visits by the heads of state of either country since the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948. On a visit to Prague in 1973, however, Secretary of State Rogers did meet with General Secretary Husak. In April of this year Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Ridgway visited Prague in connection with the signing of an agreement with Czechoslovakia on educational, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges; hers was the first Assistant Secretary level visit in eleven years.

Significant Programs or Issues: U.S.-Czechoslovak relations have been at a low level for many years. The Czechoslovak leadership has since 1969 conspicuously demonstrated its fealty to Soviet policies. Nevertheless, the upgrade in U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of your November, 1985 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev also presents an opportunity to expand U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. The conclusion this March of an agreement with Czechoslovakia on educational, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges is indicative of increased willingness on the part of that country's leadership to address some of the issues on U.S. agenda. Other issues of interest include:

DECL: OADR

Authorio State Waiver 11/4/15
BY AW MARADATE 12/23/10

- -- Expanded contacts between the people of the two countries, building on the Exchanges Agreement.
- -- Further visits to Czechoslovakia by U.S. briefers on arms control, East-West, and regional issues, which give us the opportunity to counter Soviet accounts of our positions.
- -- Improved access to Czechoslovak authorities for personnel at our Embassy in Prague.
- -- Better Czechoslovak performance on human contacts issues, especially on divided family cases and on visas for naturalized American citizens who want to visit Czechoslovakia.

For their part, the Czechoslovaks would like Most Favored Nation trade status (for which they have no prospect at present) and consultations at the Ministerial level (which we do not believe the present level of relations justifies).

Issues for Discussion: Ambassador Houstecky is unlikely to raise any substantive issues during his presentation of credentials, but will probably express the hope that U.S.-Czechoslovak relations will improve during his service as Ambassador. The following points respond to such sentiments:

- -- The United States also sees the possibility for improved relations between our two countries.
- -- The recently signed Exchanges Agreement is a good example of the sort of issue which we may address to our mutual benefit.
- -- We believe that, through small, concrete steps, the United States and Czechoslovakia can create an atmosphere in which further progress can take place.
- -- I wish you success in the role you will play in working toward better relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Excellency,

I have a great honor and privilege to transmit to you the letter from the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic accrediting me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United States of America. I am simultaneously presenting the Letter of Recall of my predecessor, Ambassador Stanislav Suja.

Troughout our histories, Mr. President, there were important periods when our nations enjoyed rich and mutually benefitial relations.

It is the hope of my Government and my own, that contemporary relations between our two countries will improve and expand during the period of my service in Washington.

A new bilateral agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, recently signed in Prague, is undoubtedly an important step in the right direction.

We are also prepared to work towards progress in other areas of mutual interest. We sincerely believe that progress in our relations can benefit both Czechoslovakia and the United States and that it can also contribute to better understanding among the nations.

Mr. President, permit me to begin my mission in Washington by extending to you personally and through you to the American people the best wishes of my Government and the hope of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for improved and expanded ties with the United States of America.

## THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE REMARKS OF THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

#### OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

MIROSLAV HOUSTECKY

## UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF

#### HIS LETTER OF CREDENCE

#### Mr. Ambassador:

I am pleased to accept the letter from the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic accrediting you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, as well as the Letter of Recall of your predecessor.

Many historic ties have linked the United States and Czechoslovakia. Official and private Americans share your Government's desire for improved and expanded relations. As Ambassador, you through your views and recommedations can contribute significantly to creating an atmosphere in which progress can occur.

As you suggest, the recently concluded Exchanges Agreement is a useful step in creating such an atmosphere. Other items remain on our respective agendas, and we believe that, with good will on both sides, the United States and Czechoslovakia should be able to address those issues to our mutual benefit.

I hope that your period of service in Washington will see

# THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE REMARKS OF THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

#### MIROSLAV HOUSTECKY

## UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS LETTER OF CREDENCE

#### Mr. Ambassador:

I am pleased to accept the letter from the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic accrediting you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, as well as the Letter of Recall of your predecessor.

Many historic ties have linked the United States and Czechoslovakia. Official and private Americans share your Government's desire for improved and expanded relations. As Ambassador, you through your views and recommedations can contribute significantly to creating an atmosphere in which progress can occur.

As you suggest, the recently concluded Exchanges Agreement is a useful step in creating such an atmosphere. Other items remain on our respective agendas, and we believe that, with good will on both sides, the United States and Czechoslovakia should be able to address those issues to our mutual benefit.

I hope that your period of service in Washington will see such progress occur. I extend to you and to all the people of Czechoslovakia the best wishes of the United States and a hope for fruitful bilateral relations.

- 2. Aiming at a broadening of cooperation in education, the contracting Parties will encourage, among other activities, the study and teaching of the languages of the other state's peoples, an exchange of educational specialists and students, cooperation between institutions of higher learning, granting of scholarships, and the exchange of textbooks, pedagogical and other literature of general interest.
- 3. The contracting Parties will encourage mutual cooperation in cinematography, radio, television and press media and in the showing of documentary and feature films, the organization of, and participation in, film and television festivals and film weeks on a commercial and non-commercial basis, as well as the exchange of programs, press and published materials between radio, television and press organizations designed to increase knowledge of the peoples and cultures of the two countries.
- 4. The contracting Parties will encourage cooperation and exchanges between the sports organizations of the two states through team and individual exhibitions and competition and the exchange of specialists in physical education and sports.
- 5. The contracting Parties will encourage contacts and cooperation between women's organizations of the two states.
- 6. The contracting Parties will encourage travel between the two states of tourists, as individuals and in groups, to acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture of the peoples of the other state.

#### ARTICLE II

#### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1. The contracting Parties will encourage and facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges and cooperation between the competent bodies, organizations and enterprises of the two states in the fields of science and technology. Such cooperation and exchanges will be the subject of separate agreements which may include, inter alia, the following contacts and activities:

- a) Development and implementation of cooperative projects, including joint research, testing and the exchange of research results and experience;
- b) Study visits, scholarships, consultations and stays organized by scientific and professional institutions;
- c) Organization of joint conferences, symposia and workshops;
- d) Exchange of scientific and technological information and documentation;
- e) Such other forms of scientific and technological cooperation as may be mutually agreed upon.
- 2. The separate agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may cover the subjects of cooperation, procedures to be followed, treatment of intellectual property, funding, and other appropriate matters. With respect to funding, costs shall be borne as mutually agreed between the respective organizations participating in the separate agreements.
- 3. The contracting Parties will facilitate the development of cooperation in health care and medical science. To this end, they will exchange scientists and specialists, books and publications in these fields. The subjects and conditions of this cooperation will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
- 4. Scientific and technological information derived from cooperative activities under this Agreement may be made available to the world community through customary channels and in accordance with the normal procedures of the participating organizations.
- 5. Scientists, technical experts, and organizations of third countries or international organizations may be invited, upon mutual consent of both sides, to participate in projects and programs being carried out under this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE III

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

- 1. For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, a periodical program of cooperation and exchanges will be negotiated in cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields. The executive agents for the Agreement and the above-mentioned program for the United States of America will be the United States Information Agency and the Department of State and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will be the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Commission for Science, Technology and Investments.
- 2. In order to seek improvements in the implementation of this Agreement, representatives, designated by the executive agents named in paragraph 1 of this Article, will meet at the request of either Party, and at least once a year, to review current activities, consider future activities and make recommendations.
- 3. The contracting Parties will encourage and facilitate, as each side deems appropriate, mutually acceptable additional exchanges and cooperation initiated in accordance with the provisions and objectives of this Agreement.
- 4. This Agreement, and the exchanges and cooperation under it, will be subject to the constitutions, laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, both Parties will use their best efforts to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the provisions and objectives of this Agreement and the exchanges and cooperation under it. To this end, the receiving side agrees to provide no-fee visas, prompt entry into and exit from its territory of personnel and equipment of the other side and access to relevant geographic areas, institutions, data, and materials. The procedures for provision of no-fee visas are described in the Annex to this Agreement.
- 5. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of separate agreements made hereunder.

This Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signature by the contracting Parties and will remain in force for four years. It shall remain in force for additional periods of two years unless either Party shall have given written notice of termination not later than six months before the Agreement is due to expire. Amendments to this Agreement can be agreed upon in written form through diplomatic channels.

In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for this purpose, have signed this Agreement.

Done in on , in two original copies, each in the English and Czech languages, both being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

For the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

#### ANNEX

to the Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the United States of America on Co-operation in the fields of Culture, Education, Science, Technology, and Other Fields

In the implementation of Article III, paragraph four, of the Agreement, nationals of the States parties to the Agreement participating in the cooperation and in all exchanges carried out under this Agreement will be issued visas free of charge and their lengths of stay validated at least for a period of time needed for the fulfillment of their tasks, under the following conditions:

- 1. Czechoslovak nationals, holders of a valid Czechoslovak travel passport will be issued visas upon request by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic addressed to the Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the United States.
- 2. United States nationals, holders of a valid United States travel passport, will be issued visas upon request by the United States Information Agency or the Department of State addressed to the Diplomatic Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the United States of America in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
- 3. If the fulfilment of the tasks envisaged by the present Agreement requires more than one entry of nationals of one Contracting State in the territory of the other Contracting State, such nationals will be issued two entry visas upon request by the authorities mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, subject to the observance of the conditions provided for by the internal regulations of the relevant State.
- 4. Should the period of validity of the visa prove insufficient for the fulfillment of the tasks envisaged for the period for which the visa has been issued, the necessary no-fee extensions of stay will be provided on the request of the Diplomatic Mission of the sending State through the relevant authorities of the receiving State for the necessary periods, subject to the observance of the conditions provided for by the internal regulations of the two States.
- 5. The present Agreement does not affect the right of the respective authorities of the Contracting States to deny a visa, entry or stay in their sovereign territories to persons who do not fulfill the necessary conditions for admission under the relevant laws of the respective countries.

PROGRAM OF COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
IN CULTURE, EDUCATION, SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER FIELDS
FOR THE YEARS 1986 and 1987

In accordance with the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Czecnoslovak Socialist Republic on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science, Technology and Other Fields signed at on the contracting Parties will make every effort to carry out the following Program for the years 1986 and 1987:

#### ARTICLE I

#### CULTURE AND EDUCATION

- 1. The contracting Parties will provide for the annual exchange of up to 15 eminent figures and specialists for periods of approximately one month for professional observation and consultation. The individuals, their fields of specialization, length of stay and type of program (individual or group) will be determined through diplomatic channels.
- 2. The contracting Parties will provide for annual exchanges of up to nine scholars for visiting lectureships, consultation and research. Nominations may be made in all fields, but not more than half from either side will be in the natural sciences. Special consideration will be given to Czechoslovak and American studies. The individuals, their fields of specialization and lengths of stay will be determined through diplomatic channels. However, the normal length of stay will be one academic semester.
- 3. The contracting Parties will provide for annual exchanges of up to three scholars in the fields of Czech and Slovak languages and literature, English language and American literature for visiting lectureships of one academic year. The individuals and the receiving institutions will be determined through diplomatic channels.
- 4. The United States Party annually will send up to 10 English teaching specialists to participate in, and lecture at, summer courses organized by the Czechoslovak Party.

- 5. The contracting Parties will provide for the annual exchange of up to 20 participants to attend summer language courses in the other's country. The individuals and the receiving institutions will be determined through diplomatic channels.
- 6. The contracting Parties will encourage direct exchanges between universities, research institutions, and other scholarly, scientific and academic institutions, including exchanges of books, documents, publications, and audio-visual materials, as well as other mutually acceptable forms of cooperation.
- 7. The contracting Parties will facilitate direct educational exchanges of lecturers, instructors and specialists from universities and other institutions of higher learning. The arrangements and financial terms of such exchanges will be determined directly by the participating institutions and organizations.
- 8. The contracting Parties will facilitate development of contact between libraries of the two countries and encourage the exchange of information and professional publications in this field. During the period of the program each party will receive at least two specialists in the field of libraries for a period of one month each.
- 9. The contracting Parties will facilitate development of contact between major archives of the two countries and encourage the exchange of information and professional publications in this field.
- 10. The contracting Parties will facilitate the distribution of cultural, informational and other materials to enrich the mutual knowledge of the peoples and their cultural values.
- 11. The contracting Parties will encourage direct exchanges between museums, galleries and other similar institutions, including the exchange of artistic publications and other mutually acceptable forms of cooperation.
- 12. The contracting Parties will encourage visits by professional and non-professional musical, dance and theatrical groups, individual performing artists and plastic artists.

- 13. Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3 of the Agreement, the contracting Parties will encourage an exchange of film weeks during the period of the Program. The venues and dates of, and delegates to, the film weeks will be arranged through diplomatic channels. The contracting Parties will also encourage mutual participation in film and television festivals.
- 14. The contracting Parties will consult with each other on conducting bilateral seminars between specialists of the two countries on subjects of mutual interest. The subjects of the seminars will be determined through diplomatic channels.
- 15. A) The contracting Parties agree to exchange at least one official exhibit during the period of the Program which will be presented in two to three cities of the other country for periods of at least three weeks in each city. Each of the exhibits may incorporate such mutually acceptable collateral activities as conferences, symposia, lectures, consultations and other activities related to the themes of the exhibit and may be accompanied by personnel such as exhibit director, curator, guides and similar specialists. The details of these exhibits, including themes, dates and collateral activities, shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The conditions for the exhibits are regulated by the Annex to this Program. The Contracting Parties will ensure that the implementing institutions will adhere to and carry out the provisions of the Annex.
- B) In addition to the exhibitions to be arranged under the provisions of paragraph 15 A, the contracting Parties may initiate the organization of other exhibitions subject to separate agreements.

#### ARTICLE II

#### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1. The contracting Parties will encourage fulfillment of the Memorandum of Understanding between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences of July 1, 1969, as revised.

- 2. The contracting Parties will encourage and facilitate the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the National Science Foundation of the United States of America and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences for cooperation in selected fields of science and technology.
- 3. The contracting Parties will encourage organizations and institutions of the two countries to explore additional areas of cooperation, and will consider, as deemed necessary, the conclusion of agency-to-agency memoranda of understanding for mutually beneficial cooperation between other United States Government agencies and Czechoslovak organizations and institutions. The subjects and conditions for the cooperation and exchanges to be specified in such memoranda of understanding will be established separately by the respective participating organizations and institutions, with the concurrence of the executive agents.
- 4. The contracting Parties will encourage and facilitate cooperation in the fields of health services and medical science. Such cooperation shall include, but not be limited to:
- a) Encouragement and facilitation of contacts between appropriate agencies for the purposes of establishing exchange programs and developing joint research projects;
- b) The exchange of publications and intormation in these fields;
- c) The exchange of information about congresses and symposia with international participation in the fields of health services and medical science, organized in each of the two countries.

#### ARTICLE III

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The individuals exchanged in implementation of this Program will be nominated by the sending Party and will be subject to approval by the receiving Party. However, this provision shall not exclude the possibility of invitations, through diplomatic channels, from the receiving Party, subject to the approval of the sending Party.

- 2. For the exchanges specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of Article I of the Program, the following provisions shall apply:
- a) The sending side will provide round trip transportation between the capitals of the two countries, Washington, D.C. and Prague.
  - b) The receiving side will provide:
- The internal travel necessary for successful completion of each visitor's stay in the receiving country;
- 2) An appropriate stipend, to be determined in advance of the visit, to cover costs of housing, food and incidentals in the receiving country;
- 3) Tuition and fees connected with the approved programs of study for academic exchanges conducted under Article I, Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5;
- 4) Medical and hospital care or insurance in case of sudden illness or accident, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
- 3. The conditions governing direct exchanges between universities, research institutions and other appropriate organizations, specified in Article I, paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Program, will be established by direct agreements between the participating organizations.
- 4. The exchanges and visits provided for herein shall be subject to the constitutional requirements and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries. Within this framework, both Parties will use their best efforts to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these exchanges and visits in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the Agreement.
- 5. This Program will not preclude other exchanges and visits which may be arranged by interested organizations and institutions, it being understood that arrangements for additional exchanges and visits will be encouraged and facilitated in accordance with the objectives of the Agreement.

This Program shall enter into force on the day of signing and remain in force for two years from that date.

Done in duplicate at this day of , in the English and Czech languages, both being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

For the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

#### ANNEX

For exhibitions specified under Article I, Paragraph 15 A, the following conditions will apply:

- a) The international shipping and return transportation of the exhibition and full insurance coverage will be handled and the related expenses borne by the sending side;
- b) The receiving side will make available suitable exhibition halls, will provide necessary installation and will take care of unpacking, repacking and customs clearance;
- c) The expenses of internal transport will be borne by the receiving side;
- d) The receiving side will be responsible for the local publicity of the exhibit;
- e) The cost of international travel of any specialists accompanying the exhibition will be paid by the sending side and the expenses of their stay (accommodation, daily allowance) by the receiving side. The number of such persons and the length of their stay will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

#### 3. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SOVIETS PRESSING CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP

Rumors of impending leadership changes in Czechoslovakia probably reflect Soviet pressure to boost economic efficiency and improve Prague's international reputation, not a push to remove present leaders. Prague may be getting the message: there has been a recent barrage of unusually open and sharp criticism of its own economic performance, and Prague's acceptance in principle of US proposals on humanitarian issues and business facilitation shows heightened interest in polishing its image abroad.

Disagreement in the open. The October 13-18 Moscow visit of a Czechoslovak ideology delegation witnessed an unusual public display of disagreement between the Sovieta and the conservative Prague regime. Both countries' press reported that the delegation (headed by Jan Pojtik, a leading hard-liner) held "businesslike and frank" talks--a surprisingly frosty characterization. Pravda then published an article by Pojtik calling for "creative and innovative" ideological work-suggesting the Soviets worked him over on the subject of the Czechoslovak party's rigidity.

Czechoslovak self-criticism. The Czechoslovak party's economic secretary, Milos Jakes, was in Moscow on October 19-21 in connection with failures to meet delivery commitments to the USSR. The day before his arrival, Rude Pravo criticized ll local firms by name for estimated shortfalls in deliveries of 3.7 billion rubles so far this year. Jakes reportedly took with him comprehensive ideas for reforming the Czechoslovak economy.

Prague's unprecedented criticism of its own economic performance (despite an overall growth rate of 3.2 percent) contrasts sharply with the praise the Czechoslovak party congress lavished on that same performance last March. Now, the Husak regime is decrying the slow transition from traditional heavy industry towards high-technology production and the continuing decline of Czechoslovakia's technology vis-a-vis the developed world.

Looking westward. Addressing these shortcomings, Prague has taken modest steps toward closer cooperation with western companies, signing its first joint venture with a Danish firm last August, and now negotiating with eight other firms.

Running counter to these endeavors has been the unfavorable publicity over Czechoslovak border quards shooting a West German this summer and the arrest of the Jazz Section dissidents. Prague now may be more responsive to Moscow's push for a general Warsaw pact courting of West European opinion.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Waiver 11/11/15

BY LW MANY DATE 12/23/11/9

January marks the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak human rights initiative Charter 77. The Declaration of Charter 77 enumerated ways in which the government denied the people of Czechoslovakia the basic rights provided for in the country's legal code, in the Helsinki Accords, and in international covenants. The Charter, which also spelled out the responsibility of citizens in ensuring compliance with those principles, first appeared on January 1, 1977, carrying the signatures of 241 persons from a wide cross section of Czechoslovak society. On January 6, representatives of Charter 77 first tried to present the text of that document to the Czechoslovak authorities. Though then and now government officials have tried to characterize the signers of the Charter as "criminals," they could not diminish the moral authority of those who had the courage to hold them accountable to basic laws and principles.

Charter 77, Eastern Europe's longest-lasting human rights initiative, served for ten years as a champion of civil and human rights, a repository for national values, and a cultural and publishing network at home and abroad that has kept unified and alive a rich national literature. Pluralistic in its membership and interests, the Charter has avoided the role of a political opposition. Despite imprisonment and intimidation, Chartists have persisted in issuing numerous documents on many aspects of Czechoslovak life and on international affairs, witnessing steadfastly for the humanistic and democratic convictions of its reformist, Christian, and cultural memberships. The Charter also gave rise to the Committee for the Defense of Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), which has documented and focused international attention on a vast number of injustices.

The more than 1,000 signatures of the Charter to date have had influence far beyond their numbers; they articulate the ideals of an uncountable number of their fellow Czechoslovaks and, indeed, of all who want to see human rights respected. By their activities, Charter 77 signers have in countless small and large ways pushed back the gloom over Czechoslovakia's barren political landscape.

#### WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RB 12/21/2016

W

File Folder

Collection Name

FOIA

COUNTRY FILES: [CZECHOSLOVAKIA] MATLOCK FILES (1)

F1640/3

**HERSHBERG** 

Box Number

1

11

ID	Document Type	No of	Doc 1
	Document Description	pages	

Ooc Date Restrictions

186318 REPORT

1 2/27/1983

**B**1

RE. ISRAEL/CHINA/CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name Withdrawer DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES 12/21/2016 RBW File Folder **FOIA** COUNTRY FILES: [CZECHOSLOVAKIA] MATLOCK FILES (1) F1640/3 **HERSHBERG** Box Number IDDocument Type No of Doc Date Restrictions pages Document Description 186319 REPORT 3/17/1983 **B**1

**B**3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

RE. CZECHOSLOVAKI [PG. 8 ONLY]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- 3 -

11/83

### 3. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE SOVIET FACTOR IN THE IMPENDING LEADERSHIP CHANGES

The rumored retirement of ailing Czechoslovak Premier and Party Presidium member Strougal is likely to force the Prague leadership to make major changes in the party-government hierarchy. Given the factionalism which has immobilized the Czechoslovak leadership, Moscow will surely have a major role in any changes. Moscow may even order the new leadership to carry out economic reforms and modify its repressive policies in order to gain more popular support.

Strougal's absence from official functions and the reported cancellation of trips to Japan and India planned for the end of this month have increased speculation in Prague that the Czech premier will shortly be replaced in his party-government functions. This could lead to the most significant changes in the Czechoslovak leadership since Husak replaced Dubcek as party leader in 1969. Strougal's departure would intensify personal and factional maneuvering within the Party Presidium, the top policy-making body, where impasses over proposed replacements have blocked changes for years and have precluded agreement on major policy initiatives, such as economic reforms. Unable to act on its own, Prayue appears to be waiting for direction from Moscow on what it should do.

There were rumors in Prague that Andropov made a secret, one-day visit in mid-February to discuss pending personnel changes, but that the changes were postponed when the severity of Strougal's illness became known. While the rumors cannot be confirmed, they serve to underscore the dependence of the Prague regime on Moscow. Prague will undoubtedly seek Moscow's approval for leadership changes, particularly those involving Strougal, Husak, Presidium member Jakes (a leading contender to replace Husak as party leader), and Minister of Interior Obzina (a leading candidate to replace Strougal).

Andropov has had long experience in Eastern Europe and knows its leaders. He may not support Husak or other Czechoslovak leaders as did Brezhnev, if only because the criteria for evaluating Czechoslovak leaders and for obtaining Soviet objectives in Czechoslovakia have changed. Husak's performance in maintaining internal stability following the tumultuous "Prague Spring" was commendable from Moscow's point of view, but Andropov may now have more pressing priorities for Czechoslovakia. He may instead turn to Czechoslovak communists whom he knows from personal contact and whom he feels would willingly promote his policies, especially those affecting Eastern Europe.

Authority State Waiver 11/6/15
BY WW MARA DATE 12/23/16