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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
186134	CABLE	SOFIA 3836	3	10/15/1984	B1
186135	CHECKLIST	RE. US-BULGARIAN RELATIONS	1	10/15/1984	B1
186138	CABLE	SOFIA 4793	2	12/21/1984	B1
186142	CABLE	STATE 000106	1	1/1/1985	B1
186145	CABLE	STATE 008376	1	1/10/1985	B1
186148	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO PAULA DOBRIANSKY RE. SHULTZ'S EVENING REPORT	1	1/11/1985	B1

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186166	MEMO	KIMMITT TO DOBRIANSKY RE. WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT	1	3/23/1985	B1
186169	FORM	RE. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	5/1/1985	B6

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BULGARIA

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

June 25, 1984

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Zhivkov Highly Critical of U.S. Policies

Speaking with Ambassador Barry during his farewell call today, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov was highly critical of U.S. policy towards the USSR, saying the U.S. had no concrete program for negotiations. He said the U.S. had destroyed the atmosphere for negotiations by installing first strike rockets in Europe and, unless the rockets were removed and the U.S. drive for military superiority was abandoned, there could be no talks with Moscow.

- o Zhivkov dismissed U.S. proposals and talk of a summit as rhetoric, saying "Chernenko would have to be a fool to talk to you under these circumstances and he isn't." He added that Chernenko was better prepared to deal with the U.S. and the West than Andropov had been, and denied press reports that Chernenko had been feeble at the CEMA summit.

Foreign Minister Mladenov interjected that Soviet INF deployment could be negotiable -- only after U.S. missiles were withdrawn -- perhaps down to a level of 75 or 80 SS-20s.

- o On bilateral relations, Zhivkov expressed the belief that Barry might receive a medal from the U.S. for the deterioration of ties that took place during his time in Sofia, although he agreed that the May business round-table had been a success. He asked that the President be told that he was for the expansion of ties in all areas and had instructed all government agencies to work to this end -- "everything is up to Washington."

Barry comments that Zhivkov's line on U.S.-Soviet relations was more unyielding than he has ever heard, perhaps reflecting Soviet insistence on "foreign policy unity." He was somewhat more upbeat than the foreign ministry has been recently on bilateral ties, but this is typical. (C)

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GENEVA FOR USINF USSTART
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PARM INF BU UR US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BARRY'S FAREWELL CALL ON ZHIVKOV
REF: SOFIA 1894 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: ZHIVKOV WAS VERY NEGATIVE ON THE PROSPETS FOR U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS UNLESS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DROPS ITS EFFORTS TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND WITHDRAWS INF FROM EUROPE. HE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS PARALYZED AND SAID CHERNENKO WAS BETTER PREPARED THAN ANDROPOV TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, HE SAID I HAD PROBABLY EARNED A MEDAL FOR WORSENING RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE SINCERELY WANTED TO EXPAND RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN ALL FIELDS AND THAT HE HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT TO ALL ELEMENTS OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. I PAID A 50-MINUTE FAREWELL CALL ON ZHIVKOV ON JUNE 25. FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV AND INTERPRETER VERA GEORGIEVA WERE PRESENT. MLADENOV FINALLY TERMINATED THE MEETING, NOTING THAT THE CHINESE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DUE IN A FEW MINUTES.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS

3. NOTING THAT ZHIVKOV KNEW CHERNENKO WELL AND HAD MET WITH HIM TWICE RECENTLY, I ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE PROPSOECTS FOR U.S. -SOVIET RELATTION. ZHIVKOV BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD NO CONCRETE PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS, UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAD DESTROYED THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BY CARRYING OUT A FAIT ACCOMPLI, THE INSTALLATION OF FIRST STRIKE ROCKETS IN EUROPE. UNLESS THE U.S. REMOVED THESE ROCKETS, AND

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DTG: 251330Z JUN 84 PSN: 060815

ABANDONED ITS DRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THERE
COULD BE NO TALKS WITH MOSCOW. "CHERNENKO WOULD HAVE
TO BE A FOOL TO TALK TO YOU UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND
HE ISN'T". ZHIVKOV DISMISSED U.S. PROPOSALS AND TALK
OF A SUMMIT AS RHETORIC.

4. I SAID I FOUND THIS APPROACH UNREALISTIC AND DEEPLY
DISCOURAGING. WE AGREED THAT INF AND START WERE THE KEY
ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP, BUT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES
WOULD NEVER AGREE TO WITHDRAW INF AS THE PRICE OF
RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN WANTS
TO RESUME THE NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS; THE U.S. IS READY TO
BE FLEXIBLE; BUT TO WITHDRAW INF AS A PRECONDITION FOR
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAVE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE--THE USSR
WOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING DEPLOYMENT.

5. MLADENOV BROKE IN TO REPEAT WHAT HE HAD EARLIER TOLD
ME (REFTEL). THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING TO NEGOTIATE; THE
LEVEL OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED
150. THERE COULD BE A DISCUSSION OF THE KVITSINSKY
PROPOSAL (SIC)--A LEVEL OF 75 OR 80 SS-20'S. I SAID THIS WAS
THE KIND OF ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE RAISED IN GENEVA, BUT
THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE WITHOUT TALKS.

6. I SUGGESTED THAT THE REASON FOR SOVIET INFLEXIBILITY
MIGHT BE THAT CHERNENKO, UNLIKE ANDROPOV, COULD NOT
MUSTER POLITBURO SUPPORT FOR COMPROMISES. REVEALING HIS
PREFERENCE FOR CHERNENKO, ZHIVKOV COUNTERED THAT HE WAS
BETTER PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST THAN
ANDROPOV HAD BEEN. HE ALSO DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT CHERNENKO
HAD BEEN FEEBLE AT THE CEMA SUMMIT.
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7. NOTING THAT ZHIVKOV EVIDENTLY SHARED MY CONVICTION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BE REELECTED, I SAID I WAS SORRY TO HEAR THAT MOSCOW WAS PASSING UP A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS. WE HAD A VERY SPECIFIC AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION WITH THE USSR, COVERING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT'S DUBLIN SPEECH HAD SET THE STAGE FOR PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM, BUT LIKE SO MUCH ELSE IT WAS DISCOUNTED BY THE SOVIET ALMOST AT ONCE. I URGED ZHIVKOV TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO BRING ABOUT A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH IN MOSCOW. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS UNLIKELY, ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED INTERESTED TO HEAR THAT DOBRYNIN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD MET FOR THREE HOURS LAST WEEK.
CEMA SUMMIT

8. I ASKED ZHIVKOV FOR HIS REACTION TO THE CEMA SUMMIT, AND HE REACTED (WITH MUCH SELF-APPRECIATORY LAUGHTER) THAT THANKS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IT HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. (I SAID CHERNENKO HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LONDON SUMMIT). THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE POINT HE MADE WAS THAT THE SUMMIT HAD "ENCOURAGED" CEMA MEMBERS TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST.
BILATERAL RELATIONS

9. ZHIKOV BEGAN THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT US-BULGARIAN RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED DURING MY TIME IN SOFIA, AND THAT I WOULD PERHAPS GET A MEDAL FOR THIS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING MY AUGUST MEETING WITH HIM. I HAD RAISED SOME VERY SENSITIVE BILATERAL ISSUES WITH THEM, BUT THESE WERE

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SERIOUS AND LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF MY GOVERNMENT, NOT MY PERSONAL WHIM OR THAT OF THE EMBASSY STAFF. I COMMENDED MY SUCCESSOR TO HIM AS AN EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONAL WITH GREAT INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON.

10. ZHIVKOV SAID THE MAY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE HAD BEEN A SUCCESS AND I AGREED, NOTING THAT THE GOB HAD EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A US COMPANY ON MINING COAL IN DOBRUDJA. WE WERE FOR THE EXPANSION OF BILATERAL TRADE IN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK AND READY TO INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, WITH A POSSIBLY GOODBY VISIT HERE AND POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON IN THE FALL.

11. ZHIVKOV ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WAS FOR EXPANSION OF BILATERAL TIES IN ALL AREAS--CULTURE, TRADE, SCIENCE, ETC., AND HAD INSTRUCTED ALL THE AGENCIES OF THE GOB TO WORK TO THIS END. "EVERYTHING IS UP TO WASHINGTON." (*) TO THEM TOO, AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE (*) OF THE SERIOUS CONCERNS I HAD RAISED DURING MY TIME HERE.

12. WE HAD JUST BEGUN TO RAKE OVER THE INF ISSUE AGAIN WHEN MLADENOV SAID THE CHINESE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DUE ALONG ANY MOMENT.
COMMENT

13. ZHIVKOV'S LINE ON U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS WAS MORE UNYIELDING THAN I HAVE HEARD FROM HIM, PERHAPS REFLECTING SOVIET INSISTENCE ON "FOREIGN POLICY UNITY". HE WAS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT THE MFA HAS BEEN RECENTLY, BUT THIS IS TYPICAL. (*) DID FIND IT NOTE WORTHY THAT HE DIDN'T EVEN MAKE PASSING REFERENCE TO THE ANTONOV CASE, THE DRUGS/ARMS ISSUE, OR THE KOSTADINOV CASE.

14. AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEK-END TRIP HE HOSTED FOR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN PLEVEN, ZHIVKOV APPEARED ALERT AND IN GOOD HEALTH. HE HAD NO NOTES ON BRIEFING PAPERS WITH HIM, EVIDENTLY RELYING ON AN ORAL BRIEF FROM MLADENOV BEFORE THE MEETING.

15. FOR USNATO: ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION BUT NOT FOR SHARING. BARRY
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BULGARIA

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Paula
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(U) THE IMPACT OF THE "BULGARIAN CONNECTION"



BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

CURRENT ANALYSES

Summary

International media and the general public have reveled in allegations of a Bulgarian connection to the 1981 papal assassination attempt and to wide-spread smuggling operations. Public opinion has already judged the papal assault case--even though the matter has not yet reached the Italian courts--and by association, assumption, and innuendo declared Sofia guilty. No matter what the legal resolution of the case, Bulgaria's international image, US-Bulgarian relations, and probably Bulgaro-Soviet relations have suffered extensive damage. At a time when Sofia was exploring new economic and political approaches to its future, the Bulgarian connection scandal threatens to drive it back into a protective shell of orthodoxy and rigidity.

* * * * *

The Making of a Bulgarian Connection

The latest round of sensationalist media revelations of the alleged connection was engendered by the leak to American journalist Claire Sterling of the contents of a still-secret report by Italian prosecuting magistrate Albano. The report recommends that six Turks (including the already convicted assailant Mehmet Ali Agca) and three Bulgarians--Sergei Antonov, the Rome-based representative of Bulgaria's Balkan Airlines, and two former employees of the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome who have returned home--be tried for conspiracy to assassinate the Pope. Albano evidently structured his report to support his conclusions but offered little new or concrete evidence, relying primarily on the argument that, because Agca knew the Bulgarians and shot the Pope, the Bulgarians must have directed the operation. After publishing Sterling's article, however, the New York Times editorialized, "proving a connection does not prove that Bulgaria recruited Mr. Agca to kill the Pope."

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/16

Report 886-CA
July 27, 1984

The current spate of negative publicity showered on Bulgaria also includes accusations of involvement at possibly high levels of the Bulgarian state in narcotics and arms smuggling.

US-Bulgarian Relations Sidetracked

Italo-Bulgarian relations have not suffered irreparable damage because of these Western accusations and vehement Bulgarian and Soviet denials. Although the Italians and Bulgarians withdrew their ambassadors in the immediate aftermath of Antonov's arrest in late 1982, relations recently have been quietly improving. New ambassadors returned to the capitals in spring 1984; one of two Italians convicted of espionage in Bulgaria (and rumored to be an exchange possibility for Antonov) was released in May. In June, Antonov's release from prison to house arrest for health reasons was authorized, fulfilling a longstanding Bulgarian request. Throughout the affair, Bulgaria has targeted very little of its invective against the Italians, characterizing them as helpless pawns in a CIA/White House crusade against socialism. Rome and Sofia have been handling the situation step-by-step so as to keep the bilateral damage to a minimum.

It is US-Bulgarian relations that have suffered. Hopes for improving relations peaked in August 1983 when Bulgarian leader Zhivkov received US Ambassador Barry for a wide-ranging discussion of concrete steps needed to move the relationship forward. Subsequently, Bulgaria stopped jamming the Voice of America (but resumed the practice in mid-July 1984), several divided family cases were resolved, and obstacles to staging a major US cultural exhibit were removed. Outstanding problems remained, however, e.g., Bulgarian intransigence in acknowledging or curtailing smuggling activities, conducted on or through Bulgarian territory usually by other nationals but with either the support or at least the tolerance of elements in the Bulgarian hierarchy. A further complication came with the September 1983 arrest in New York of a Bulgarian commercial office official, Penyu Kostadinov, on espionage charges. Kostadinov remains in US custody while the issue of his diplomatic immunity status is resolved; the actual merits of the espionage charges have yet to be considered in court.

Ensuent Bulgarian rhetoric on the matter has done little to calm the situation. Public and private attacks on the US, the CIA, President Reagan, and Ambassador Barry for directing a "crusade against socialism" have been scurrilous and have envenomed an already tense atmosphere. The latest spate of anti-US Bulgarian polemics followed the June 28 US Senate resolution characterizing Bulgaria as a "terrorist nation" and citing the Albano report and past official comments on Bulgarian smuggling involvement as "proof" thereof. Sofia responded via an authoritative Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) declaration which protested the resolution,

calling it a "hostile act" and part of President Reagan's anti-socialism "campaign." The declaration also claimed the resolution was an attempt to pressure Italian judicial authorities on the Antonov case and noted the sad decline of relations despite Bulgarian efforts to improve them.

A reflection of the low level of US-Bulgarian relations was the minuscule official Bulgarian presence at this year's Fourth of July reception at Embassy Sofia. Fewer than 10 Bulgarians attended, the smallest representation at a US national day in years, despite the fact that the Soviet ambassador did attend for the first time since the invasion of Afghanistan and despite a NATO boycott of last November's Soviet national day.

Bulgaro-Soviet Relations Strained

The Antonov case and the attendant bad publicity probably have had a detrimental effect on Bulgaro-Soviet relations as well. Sofia had been taking tentative steps, particularly in foreign policies, to chart a course distinct from the Soviet line. This tact allowed the Bulgarians to assume a regional leadership role, for example, in promoting the formation of a Balkan Nuclear Free Zone, which had the added advantage of identifying Sofia with a desire not to have Soviet missiles stationed on its territory. But the Antonov affair has forced the Bulgarians to align themselves loyally with Moscow against the outside accusations.

Bulgaria's relations with the Andropov regime were never very warm. Not only did Sofia favor Chernenko in the post-Brezhnev succession sweepstakes, but the Antonov case dragged the Soviets, and former KGB chief Andropov personally, into the papal plot spotlight. Even if the Soviets were aware of or sanctioned the widespread Bulgarian involvement in smuggling operations, they would not appreciate revelations of evidence of those activities and, with it, documentation of a link between Agca and any Bulgarians.

Even with the Chernenko regime, relations have not returned to their formerly close terms. Sofia has taken steps to salve the Kremlin, however, including measures to clean up some of the more blatant examples of ostentatious living by third-country nationals reportedly involved in smuggling activities via Bulgaria. Bulgaria apparently has had to ask the Soviets for help in handling the Antonov affair. The Soviets for their part apparently did intercede on the case with the Italians--most notably during the spring 1984 visit by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti to Moscow. Soviet media also have been generally supportive in repeating Bulgarian denials but rarely offer separate rebuttals of their own, as if to say the problem is an entirely Bulgarian one.

Sofia may have had to use valuable bargaining chips with the Soviets to gain even this limited assistance. Bulgarian leader

Zhivkov made an unexpected visit to Moscow immediately before the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) summit in June. The ostensible purpose of the visit was to open an exhibit on the 40th Anniversary of Socialist Bulgaria, but it probably also served as an opportunity for discussion of bilateral problems and for Moscow to enlist Bulgaria in its drive for a show of unity among CEMA members. Sofia long has been Moscow's closest ally for political, economic, and cultural reasons; it may now be amenable to even closer allegiance given its responsibility for dragging the Kremlin into an international scandal.

Future Developments or Trial Likely To Reheat, Not Resolve, the Problems

An Antonov trial later this year undoubtedly will dominate the international media, fed by the occasionally sensational Italian press. Even after it is over the repercussions are likely to continue affecting Bulgaria's ties with a number of states.

New revelations--especially if seen in Sofia as deliberate, hostile leaks--and an actual trial could cause serious problems in Italo-Bulgarian relations. The two countries withdrew their ambassadors before; repetition of such a step is likely in the face of the inflammatory press in both countries. If Antonov is convicted, the Italian public will demand further actions, possibly even severance of diplomatic relations. In any event, an Italian Government would have difficulty justifying business as usual with Sofia under such circumstances.

The media coverage surrounding any trial stands to exacerbate US-Bulgarian frictions. The Bulgarians could stage a counter-trial of Agca in absentia in Sofia, charging US and/or CIA involvement with the Turk, and thereby heighten the prospects for radical responses. The fact that the process of appointing, getting agreement, and confirming a new US Ambassador to Bulgaria has just begun complicates matters further, for each step holds potential for misinterpretations of normal delays.

It is clear that Moscow would like the entire matter settled quickly and with the least damage to Soviet interests as possible. The longer the process smolders, the more the Soviet image suffers and the greater the strain on Bulgaro-Soviet relations.

For Bulgaria itself, the implications of the embroglio may force the leadership to concentrate on damage control rather than on its recent initiatives at economic reform, technological advancement, and a greater role in the Balkans. Instead, Sofia may have to retreat to protect itself and to save its allies from further damage.

Prepared by Jane Miller Floyd
632-9198

Approved by Martha M. Mautner
632-9536

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BULGARIA

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Paul

10

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

August 9, 1984

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Improvements in U.S.-Bulgarian Relations

During discussions with Charge Lake on August 8, Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Gotsev gave strong indications that Sofia is looking for a positive response from the U.S. to what he described as a desire by "the highest levels" of the Bulgarian government to improve relations with the U.S.

- o Gotsev expressed Bulgaria's satisfaction with the results of recent U.S. Congressional actions concerning Bulgaria, and said he believes President Reagan may have had a hand in lessening the impact of the Congressional hearings.
- o As a result of this positive Bulgarian assessment, Sofia has decided to "lift all punishments against the U.S."

Lake recommends that he be authorized to see Fourth Department Chief Pchelintsev and officially tell him we appreciate the Bulgarian response on smugglers as a first step in dealing with the problem and will follow up on a working level. He also recommends suggesting that both sides prepare an agenda of bilateral issues to be discussed during Gotsev's consultations in Washington. (C)

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(U) BULGARIA: AFTERMATH OF RECENT BOMBINGS

Summary

Media reports of several recent bombings in Bulgaria raise questions about the identities and motives of the perpetrators as well as the inability of Bulgarian officials to solve the crimes. The Bulgarian Turkish minority is perhaps most suspect. The authorities in any event have increased security measures and likely will suppress further news reports of the investigation.

* * * * *

The Bombings

Two bombings are known to have occurred in Bulgaria on August 30--one in Plovdiv at the railroad station resulting in 12-14 deaths and perhaps more than twice as many injured, and another at the airport in Varna resulting in no deaths or injuries. In addition, there are fairly reliable reports of bombings in Ruse and Burgas (in late August or early September) and explosions or defused bombs in Sofia. Meanwhile, rumors are rife in Sofia: bombs planted in as many as five other cities; an attempted assassination in Turgovishte; cattle poisoning in Pravets; arrests of Turks, or Arabs, or Nigerians; reports of telephone calls warning of other bombs; and so on. A Western participant at the Agrarian Party Peace Conference in Varna heard from a Bulgarian attendee that there would be "40 blasts in honor of the 40th anniversary" of the regime's coming to power.

Western Media Reaction

Three weeks after the fact, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Welt, and the Vienna Domestic Television Service carried the first

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Report 934-CA
October 19, 1984



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public accounts of the bombings. The Vienna TV reported that the Plovdiv episode had been confirmed by the official Bulgarian news agency BTA. BTA was cited as saying "the incident was the work of criminals," resolutely denying any political motivation. According to Die Welt, the BTA spokesman reacted to reports that the bombing occurred on the day Zhivkov was expected to arrive at Plovdiv by train by simply denying "that other bomb explosions occurred in the same period."

Although his reply obviously failed to answer the question, the spokesman apparently was attempting to squelch rumors that bombs also had been detonated in several other Bulgarian cities. The FAZ account speculated that, although no one had claimed responsibility for these bombings, "some observers assume that it might be members of the Turkish minority, which is kept out of responsible positions [in Bulgaria]."

A Turkish Dissent

Gunaydin, an Ankara newspaper often described as "sensationalistic," carried a September 25 feature article headlined "800,000 Turks in Bulgaria are saved from suspicions of terrorism." The article declared that although "the foreign press, particularly the French and American press, had been attempting... to draw a connection between the Bulgarian Turks and the blasts," in reality a "Bulgarian Socialist Party in Exile" had announced in Vienna its responsibility for the attacks. The article admitted that "little is known about the group, that it is not clear who they are or when they left Bulgaria."

Who Did It?

Observers have singled out three groups as the most likely culprits: disgruntled Bulgarian youths, dissidents within the party, or Turks (or other) minority dissidents. Circumstantial evidence and possible motivation implicate members of the Turkish minority:

- they constitute a large (8 percent) minority group which has claimed to have been suppressed by the Bulgarians;
- many Turks work in mining and excavation and thus have relatively easy access to explosives; and
- the confirmed bombings occurred on August 30--Turkey's Armed Forces Day.

Contrary to Gunaydin's information, the organization in Vienna cited (which, however, is called the "Bulgarian Socialist Democratic Party," not the "Bulgarian Socialist Party in Exile")

so far as can be determined has not claimed responsibility for the bombings. Rather, this group, chaired by Bulgarian emigré Stefan Tabakov, who has lived in Vienna since 1948, appears to be quiescent and has never been implicated in any terrorist activity.

Aftermath

These bombings are unprecedented in the 40 years of communist rule in Bulgaria. Although there is no indication of a clear threat to the regime, the Bulgarians have definitely strengthened security measures in the aftermath. The number of guards protecting public buildings in Sofia has been increased, roadblocks have been introduced throughout eastern Bulgaria, and restrictions on foreigners in the capital are being strictly enforced. It seems clear that the authorities fear more terrorism may follow.

Moreover, regardless of who was responsible, the most noteworthy facet is the inability of Bulgarian security to catch the perpetrators. As long as this unsettled situation persists, a tight clamp on relevant information can be expected.

Prepared by Edward Booth
632-9198

Approved by Martha C. Mautner
632-9536

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FROM Dr. Stephen D. Bryen OFFICE DESK DASD/IETSP PHONE NBR 697-9347

SUBJECT Newspaper Articles (The New York City Tribune)

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SUBJECT: Attached Newspaper Articles

The attached article from the New York City Tribune should be of interest to you.

We do not know how this could have happened, or even why these requests were not sent to the Defense Department for review.


Steve Bryen

Attachment

New York City Tribune

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1984

Commerce Dept. gave U.S. firms OK to sell explosives to Bulgaria

East-bloc nation has ties to terrorism

**Said to supply weapons
to Sandinistas and PLO**

By Bill Gertz
New York City Tribune Correspondent

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Commerce Department authorized the sale of \$81,000 worth of dynamite and high explosives to Bulgaria during the first half of 1984, according to statistics released by the department.

The sale was not prohibited by U.S. export controls despite the fact that the Bulgarian state trading agency that handles explosives sales, KINTEX, has been identified by U.S. officials as a major conduit of illicit arms and narcotics to terrorists.

KINTEX supplies weapons and munitions to Palestinian terrorists

and others in the Middle East, according to U.S. officials. Bulgaria itself is a major supplier of armaments to Nicaragua, and U.S. officials believe some of these weapons are passed on to communist-backed insurgents in El Salvador.

The Bulgarian ship Christo Dotev docked at Nicaragua's port of Bluefields last week and offloaded sophisticated radar equipment that will enable Nicaragua's air force to support and direct advanced combat aircraft, U.S. intelligence sources said Friday.

While Nicaragua's third Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radar was being removed from the Bulgarian vessel, an attack helicopter, two minesweepers and other patrol boats secured the port.

(see KINTEX, page 6A)

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Banned dynamite sold by U.S. to Bulgaria

(From page 1A)

Commerce Department officials told the *New York City Tribune* they did not know why the high-explosives sales were permitted, but one spokesman said they may have been approved by mistake.

The Commerce Department said the sale was made under an unrestricted "general license" — requiring little or no paperwork — even though export control regulations list explosives as a proscribed item on the commodities control list.

Federal regulations place a "50" limit on explosives sales to Bulgaria and other communist-bloc countries and give "national security" as the reason for the prohibition.

Explosives deals with Bulgaria were made earlier this year, Commerce Department officials confirmed, but they are forbidden by department regulations to divulge the name of the U.S. company or companies involved in the sales.

Explosives sales to communist countries normally require a validated export license after undergoing review by Commerce, State and Defense Department officials and in some cases additional review by representatives of U.S. allies.

The department also revealed that part of the total shipment left New York by ship in April. Sources said that shipment consisted of 270 pounds of "explosive substances" valued at \$16,279.

Bulgarian knows nothing

George Musorliev, a commercial counselor at the Bulgarian embassy in New York said he had no information about the explosives sale.

Musorliev confirmed that KINTEX is the Bulgarian firm "dealing in sporting goods and explosives" and said it was a "possibility" that KINTEX purchased the explo-

Commodity control regulations do not cover the sale of dynamite, since it is not "effective" as a weapon, Commerce spokesman Tracy Evans said. "Dynamite for industrial purposes is just not a controlled item," he explained.

The export of dynamite from U.S. companies is only prohibited for five countries: Libya, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and Kampuchea, Evans said.

He could not provide specifics on the sale, listed in department statistics under the category of "dynamite and high explosives."

The State Department's Office of Munitions Control, which regulates U.S. weapons exports, said the sale of dynamite and high explosives to Bulgaria does not fall under that office's jurisdiction. Officials there said the United States has not sold any munitions — weapons, firearms or ammunition — to Bulgaria.

In addition to explosives, since 1981 unnamed U.S. companies have sold more than \$2 million worth of "natural crude drugs, hypnotics and anti-convulsant drugs" — products available on the international illegal narcotics market. No specifics on the drugs were provided by the Commerce Department statistics.

The Export Administration Act of 1979 states that U.S. trade policy is aimed at encouraging commerce with all nations linked diplomatically to Washington. The exception to this is trade determined by the president to be "against the national interest."

The 1979 act also prohibits "the export of goods and technology which make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."

Published accounts have

base for some 30 Nicaraguan pilots who are in the process of learning to fly advanced Soviet MiG-23 fighters. A Nicaraguan airstrip to facilitate the fighters is under construction near the capital, Managua.

There is also the "Bulgarian connection" in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. In Rome last Friday, Italian magistrate Ilario Martella released a 1,243-page report on the conspiracy against the pope, which implicates Bulgarian state security officials.

One of the suspects named in the report, a reputed Turkish drug smuggler named Bekir Celenk, has been identified by U.S. officials as having close ties to KINTEX. During a 1980 meeting in Bulgaria, Celenk allegedly agreed to pay convicted papal assailant Mehmet Ali Agca a sum of money (3 million German marks) to kill the pope, U.S. sources said. Celenk is believed to be either living in Bulgaria or buried there — after his own assassination by his hosts, who reportedly feared he might be forced to testify in Rome.

Last summer, the Senate passed an amendment to a spending bill that declared Bulgaria to be a nation engaged in "state-sponsored terrorism" because of Bulgarian complicity in the attempted assassination of the pope. The Helms amendment, sponsored by Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., was later excised in conference after State Department officials lobbied against it, saying Italy had expressed concern that the measure would affect its investigation.

Nations already labeled "terrorist" include Libya, Syria, Cuba, South Yemen and Iran.

A knowledgeable administration source who spoke on condition he remain anonymous told the *City Tribune* that current trade

tary of State George Shultz "is trying to argue for non-linkage."

"Shultz is saying we should separate our trade from our security requirements, and liberalize our trade even when there is no reciprocal concession on the part of the [Soviet]-bloc countries," the source said.

"I think their strategy is that if they can get away with it with respect to Bulgaria — the most egregious violator of international morality — then it would be a fairly easy matter to upgrade that policy with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations," the source said.

After the State Department defeated efforts in Congress to label Bulgaria a pariah state, the department placed new restrictions on "non-essential government travel" to Bulgaria as a measure aimed at appeasing critics of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria, according to White House sources.

A State Department official, speaking on background, said the travel restrictions were not related to the anti-Bulgaria measures in Congress. Last summer, an internal State Department memo was sent to all government agencies declaring that travel by government personnel to foreign countries, "specifically Bulgaria," requires prior approval from the department.

"We are concerned that various officials of different parts of our government turn up in countries like Bulgaria without the embassy knowing they are there," the official said.

Diplomatic efforts to curb Bulgarian narcotics and arms trafficking are "the No. 1 priority of the State Department," the official said. "There has been a long series of efforts in that regard both here and in Sofia. That is a regular subject of diplomatic

Soviet or other sources — of weapons and arms materiel to Nicaragua." He said the issue of those arms going to Salvadoran rebels was "tangential" to the Nicaraguan shipments.

Congressional efforts to curtail U.S. trade promotion efforts with Bulgaria have met stiff resistance from the State Department. Helms aide Cliff Kiracofe said the senator's efforts to curb U.S. trade promotion were aimed at cutting off funds to the State and Commerce departments that would be used to promote trade with Bulgaria.

"We thought we needed to send a signal that the U.S. government is not going to condone the activities of the Bulgarian government by expending taxpayers' money to promote trade," Kiracofe said in an interview.

Earlier this year the State Department invited 58 U.S. companies to attend an international trade exposition in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, in September. Prior to the fair, Commerce Department officials helped organize a "Bulgarian-U.S. Business Roundtable" last May.

The state-run KINTEX firm was described by Justice Department officials last June as a major dealer in illicit narcotics, including heroin and morphine base. The department's acting director of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), John Lawn, told a congressional subcommittee that 25 percent of all the heroin entering the United States passes through Bulgaria.

"In virtually every report available to the DEA since 1970 about narcotics trafficking in and through Bulgaria, the state trading organization of KINTEX is mentioned as a facilitator of transactions," Lawn told the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on international narcotics control.

A 1980 Commerce Department report aimed at stimulating U.S. trade with Bulgaria lists KINTEX

company dealing in "special equipment, explosive materials and equipment, hunting and sports equipment."

A declassified DEA report on KINTEX found incidental evidence of Bulgarian involvement, through KINTEX, with "terrorist-related activity."

"In its quest for hard currency, KINTEX assists the flow of illicit arms and ammunition, primarily to left-wing insurgency groups, although it has been known to supply terrorist groups regardless of political affiliation," the DEA report states.

Armed both sides

It was common knowledge during the internecine gang warfare that plagued Turkey during the late 1970s, for instance, that both leftists and rightists were armed by Bulgaria.

The report says KINTEX was formed in 1968 and that its directors are "top-ranking members of the Bulgarian intelligence service."

DEA agents confronted Bulgarian officials with evidence of the illicit arms shipments last year during a meeting in Austria. The Bulgarians brazened it out, saying that the United States is "also" a major supplier of arms.

Most of Bulgaria's trade with the United States has involved agricultural products including Bulgarian imports of yellow corn totaling \$185 million since 1981. Other major U.S. exports to Bulgaria include \$54.7-million worth of chemical fertilizers and \$34.4-million worth of tobacco since 1981.

Items under export control that have both covert and military potential, according to Commerce officials, include the licensed sales of bacteria, chemical materials, electronic equipment (communications equipment, computers and integrated circuits) and photographic film worth \$20.8 million.

Bulgaria exports arms, crude oil, tobacco, and some machinery

Bulgaria's largest share of export earnings, 9.1 percent, came from arms sales, primarily to the communist bloc, according to Wharton Econometrics in Washington. The arms sales were valued at more than \$1 billion.

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

October 29, 1984

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT APPROVED EXPLOSIVES SALE TO BULGARIA

An article in today's New York City Tribune reveals that the U.S. Commerce Department approved the sale of \$81,000 worth of dynamite and high explosives in apparent violation of export control regulations.

The sales were revealed by Commerce Department statistics of U.S. exports to Bulgaria during the first half of 1984. Commerce Department officials said the explosives were exported under a general export license and did not undergo review by Commerce, State, and Defense Department officials.

Explosives are proscribed items on the Commerce Department's commodities control list and their export to communist bloc countries is prohibited.

Officials at Commerce did not know how the sales were permitted, but said it may have been a mistake, the City Tribune article reveals.

A Bulgarian trade official in New York said it was a "possibility" the official Bulgarian trading company KINTEX purchased the explosives, the article states. KINTEX has been identified by U.S. officials as a major dealer in illicit arms and narcotics trafficking.

Today's City Tribune article examines the Bulgarian explosives exports in light of new administration policies aimed at de-coupling trade requirements from U.S. security concerns—specifically illegal Bulgarian arms shipments to terrorists in the Middle East and the recent disclosures in Italy linking Bulgarian officials to the 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

For more details, see today's New York City Tribune.

Contact Robert J. Morton, Editor-in-Chief, for further information.



BULGARIA

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VIENNA FOR DEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ODIP SNAR SHUM BU US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. IN NINETY-MINUTE MEETING NOV 12 IN PREPARATION FOR PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS THE NEXT DAY, FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE COVERED BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV AND AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY:

--GENERAL RELATIONS: MLADENOV SAID RELATIONS WERE BAD AND HAD WORSENERED OVER PAST TWO YEARS. HE PUT THE BLAME ON THE U.S. IN SINGLING OUT BULGARIA FOR CRITICISM. AMBASSADOR SAID RELATIONS WERE CERTAINLY DIFFICULT BUT THAT HE PREFERRED TO LOOK AT RELATIONS IN TERMS OF ISSUES INVOLVED. THERE WERE NO OBJECTIVE POLITICAL, HISTORICAL OR CULTURAL REASONS FOR THE U.S. TO PICK ON BULGARIA; SUCH ISSUES AS OFFICIAL SUPPORT BY BULGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS FLOW, PROVISION ON WEAPONS TO EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST GROUPS AND EXTREME MEDIA ACCUSATIONS ABOUT U.S. ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS INVOLVEMENT IN THE GHANDI ASSASSINATION, WERE WHAT COMPLICATED THE RELATIONSHIP. WE INTENDED TO WORK ON THESE ISSUES ONE BY ONE.

--ANTONOV TRIAL. MLADENOV SAID THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE FACT TO INDICATE BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. HE ACCUSED THE U.S., PARTICULARLY THE CIA, OF PUSHING THE CASE FOR THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION AND WARNED THAT ONCE THE CASE GOES TO TRIAL THE SITUATION COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. AMBASSADOR POINTED

OUT THE EXTREME CARE WITH WHICH USG HAD AVOIDED COMMENT ON THE TRIAL, RATHER RELYING ON THE ITALIAN JUDICIAL PROCESS TO REACH ITS CONCLUSIONS. HE DENIED ANY OFFICIAL U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF JOURNALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE PLOT POINTING OUT THAT MANY OF THESE SAME JOURNALISTS HAD ACCUSED THE CIA OF TRYING TO PLAY DOWN THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION. WITHOUT TAKING A POSITION ON THE TRIAL ITSELF, AMBASSADOR SAID BULGARIA WAS PAYING THE PRICE FOR MANY YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT AND HOSTING OF DRUGS AND ARMS SMUGGLERS.

--DRUGS, MLADENOV CLAIMED BULGARIA HAD COOPERATED AND WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. ON STEMMING DRUGS TRAFFIC. NO BULGARIANS WERE INVOLVED AND A GOOD AMOUNT OF DRUGS HAD BEEN SEIZED IN THE PAST YEAR. U.S. CHARGES OF BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL DRUGS WERE UNJUSTIFIED. AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED INCREASED DRUG SEIZURES AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT BUT DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN BORDER OPERATIONS AND SOLID EVIDENCE THAT OFFICIAL BULGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS NAMELY KINTEX, WERE INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFIC. HE SAID DRUGS SEEM TO HAVE BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY FOR BULGARIAN ARMS SALES TO EXTREMIST GROUPS.

--ARMS. MLADENOV SAID BULGARIA CONSIDERED ITS ARMS SALES (WHICH WERE MUCH SMALLER IN SCALE THAN U.S.) AS LEGITIMATE WHETHER TO GOVERNMENTS OR "NATIONAL LIBERATION GROUPS".
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VIENNA FO DEA

AMBASSADOR SAID WE HAD A STRONG DISAGREEMENT ON BULGARIAN SALES TO SOME GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS NICARAGUA, WHICH WAS PROVIDING ARMS TO GROUPS TRYING TO TOPPLE THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR, BUT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISAGREEMENT ON SALES OF ARMS TO SUCH EXTREME TERRORIST GROUPS AS BLACK JUNE OR TO GEORGE HABBASH, WHO WERE INVOLVED IN MURDER AND TERROR AND HAD ALREADY KILLED MANY U.S. CITIZENS.

--MEDIA. AFTER AN EXCHANGE ABOUT U. S. MEDIA CRITICISM OF BULGARIA, AMBASSADOR PROTESTED BULGARIAN OFFICIAL PRESS ACCUSATIONS OF U.S. COMPLICITY IN THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION.

2. MEETING WAS STRAIGHT FORWARD AND CORDIAL, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH MLADENOV TAKING NO NEW APPROACHES EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR THE INTENSITY OF HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANTONOV TRIAL. LENGTH OF MEETING WAS UNUSUAL, PARTICULARLY SINCE NEWLY ARRIVED HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR WAS KEPT WAITING FOR ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR. BULGARIANS CLEARLY WANTED TO GET THEIR POSITIONS ON THE RECORD FROM THE OUTSET AND THEIR MESSAGE WAS ANY IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. - BULGARIAN RELATIONS WAS UP TO U.S. WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OUR POSITIONS ON THE RECORD AS WELL. BULGARIANS ARE CLEARLY VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE ANTONOV TRIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS, AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY, ACCOMPANIED BY POLEC CHIEF BUTLER, PAID A 30 MINUTES COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR

BORIS DZHIBROV, HEAD OF STATE PROTOCOL, AND AN 85 MINUTE CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER PETUR MLADENOV ON NOVEMBER 12. THE MLADENOV MEETING WAS APPARENTLY SLATED TO LAST LESS THAN 60 MINUTES, BUT WHEN THE DISCUSSIONS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF WANING AFTER 45 MINUTES, MLADENOV PICKED UP A PHONE AND ORDERED DZHIBROV TO KEEP THE (NEWLY APPOINTED) HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR WAITING.

4. AMBASSADOR LEVISTKY OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING U.S. -BULGARIAN RELATIONS WERE DIFFICULT, THAT THERE WERE SOME AREAS FOR POSITIVE PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY IN TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE AND THAT WE INTENDED TO WORK ON THE RELATIONSHIP ISSUE BY ISSUE, BOTH WHERE WE HAVE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND WHERE WE HAVE PROBLEMS. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY, VIA DISCUSSIONS IN BOTH SOFIA AND WASHINGTON.

5. MLADENOV NOTED FROM THE OUTSET THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO "BEAT AROUND THE BUSH". HE DECLARED THAT U.S. -BULGARIAN RELATIONS, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "BAD" REACHED A LOW POINT OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. WHILE IN A LARGER CONTEXT EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAD GONE SOUR DURING THE SAME PERIOD, ONE CAN NOT BLAME THAT FOR THE POOR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE NOTED THAT ZHIVKOV HAD TAKEN IMMEDIATE STEPS WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP WORSENEO CITING THE ZHIVKOV-BARRY MEETING OF AUGUST 1983 WHERE ZHIVKOV ASKED BARRY FOR A LIST OF "DEMANDS" TO BE MET FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO MLADENOV'S VERSION OF THE MEETING, ASIDE FROM IDEOLOGICAL DEMANDS (CHANGE SOCIAL SYSTEM OR ALLOW RELATIONSHIP TO BECOME "UNEQUAL"), BARRY LISTED VOA JAMMING, DIVIDED FAMILIES, MILITARY SUPPORT FLIGHT, AND THE AMERICAN THEATER TODAY EXHIBIT.

6. MLADENOV SAID THAT ALL OF BARRY'S DEMANDS HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY MET: VOA IS UNJAMMED: THE SUPPORT FLIGHTS WERE PERMITTED; A SUITABLE LOCATION WAS FOUND FOR THE EXHIBIT; AND 26 OF 35 DIVIDED FAMILY CASES WERE RESOLVED. MLADENOV CONTINUED HIS COMPLAINT THAT DESPITE THE BULGARIANS' GOODWILL GESTURE, RELATIONS TOOK A DOWNWARD TURN WITH NEW ATTACKS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANTONOV CASE, AND USG OFFICIALS (THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY) MADE "UNFLATERING" ANTI-BULGARIAN STATEMENTS.

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VIENNA FOR DEA

7. ANTONOV CASE

IN A CALM, BUT OBVIOUS ANNOYED, MANNER, MLADENOV STATED THAT FOLLOWING THE MARTELLA DECISION TO PROSECUTE THE CASE, HE HAD READ THE REPORT AND FOUND "NOT A SINGLE FACT", ONLY "ACCUSATIONS". HE CLAIMED THAT "NEVER BEFORE IN THE HISTORY OF MAN HAD SUCH A CASE EXISTED". WITH SARCASM HE SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. HAS A LOW OPINION OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, SUCH A PRIMITIVE STORY (AS THE ANTONOV CASE) COULD NOT BE "PATCHED UP" ANYWHERE.

8. MLADENOV STATED THAT, AT FIRST, THE GOB MOVED IN A "DELICATE WAY" TO COUNTER THE CHARGES OF A BULGARIAN CONNECTION. BUT, HE CONTINUED, "WE KNOW WHEN AND WHO STARTED THE ACCUSATIONS. WE KNOW THESE PERSONS WELL (STERLING AND HENZE), THEY WORKED CLOSE TO US. LATER WE MOVED AT HIGHER LEVELS TO GET THE CIA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE, NOT OUT OF LOVE FOR THE CIA, BUT BECAUSE IT WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE FEAR THAT ONCE IT GOES TO TRIAL, WE WILL LOSE CONTROL OF THE SITUATION". MLADENOV DENOUNCED US CHARGES OF BULGARIAN COMPLICITY IN ARMS AND DRUG TRAFFIC. HE REPEATED THE STANDARD ARGUMENT THAT AS BULGARIA DOES NOT HAVE A DOMESTIC DRUG PROBLEM (EXCEPT FOR A FEW "CASES"), THEIR BORDER INTERDICTION EFFORTS HAVE A HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER, THAT THE US AND BULGARIA HAD A FRUITFUL CUSTOMS RELATIONSHIP WHICH WAS UNILATERALLY BROKEN OFF BY THE U.S.

HE COMPLAINED THAT THE US PRESENTS A DISTORTED IMAGE OF BULGARIA AS A COUNTRY WHICH SUPPLIES A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. THIS IS NOT BULGARIA'S FAULT FOR ITS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, AND CERTAINLY BULGARIA SHOULD NOT BEAR SOLE BLAME FOR DRUG FLOWS WHICH ALSO TRANSIT ITALY AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

10. MLADENOV WAS MIDLY IRATE IN ACCUSING THE USG OF ULTERIOR MOTIVES IN WHAT HE CALLED PLANS TO BUILD A NEW CUSTOMS CONTROL POINT ON THE YUGOSLAV SIDE OF THE YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN BORDER WITH DEA/CUSTOMS ASSISTANCE. HE CHARGED THAT DRUG SEIZURES AT THE CHECK POINT WILL BE USED AS PROPAGANDA AGAINST BULGARIA. HE REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. (IN CUSTOMS), AND SUGGESTED SOME KIND OF U.S.-BULGARIAN COOPERATION ON BULGARIA'S SOUTHERN BORDER. HE SAID THE QUESTION IS IN U.S. HANDS NOW.

11. SAYING THAT BULGARIA IS A SMALL PRODUCER OF SMALL ARMS, MLADENOV CLAIMED THAT ALL SALES ARE TO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS THROUGH LEGITIMATE CHANNELS. NOTING DIFFERING VIEWS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS ON NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, MLADENOV STATED THAT THE GOB FIGHTS AGAINST TERRORIST GROUPS, RECALLING THE ARREST OF IVE BADER-MEINHOFF MEMBERS IN BULGARIA. HE SAID THE PLO OR SANDINISTAS ARE LEGITIMATE MOVEMENTS: GOVERNMENTS, AND THAT THE GOB NEVER MADE CESSATION OF U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES TO AFHAN "REBELS" (HIS QUOTES) AS A PRECONDITION TO BETTER RELATIONS.

DIALOGUE

12. MLADENOV CONCLUDED THAT THE WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS IS VIA DIALOG NOT VIA CONFRONTATION. HE SAID THAT BULGARIA DOES NOT HAVE A QUARREL WITH THE U.S. AND THAT ON MOST QUESTIONS HE FELT THAT WE CAN FIND A SOLUTION. BUT HE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THE BURDEN FOR IMPROVEMENT WAS ON THE U.S.

AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE

13. AMBASSADOR LEVISTKY THANKED MLADENOV FOR THE FRANKNESS OF HIS REMARKS, STRESSING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE GOB TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NO POLITICAL, HISTORICAL OR CULTURAL REASON FOR THE US TO SINGLE OUT BULGARIA FOR CRITICISM. PROBLEMS AROSE FROM ISSUES AND DISAGREEMENTS RATHER THAN FROM ANY US DESIRE TO PICK ON BULGARIA.

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VIENNA FOR DEA

14. ANTONOV: THE AMBASSADOR REPEATED THE USG POSITION OF NEUTRALITY ON THE ANTONOV CASE UNTIL THE ITALIAN JUDICIARY HAS FINISHED WITH IT. HE REJECTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE, OR THAT STERLING AND HENZE ARE CONNECTED TO THE CIA. HE POINTED OUT, IN FACT, THAT BOTH HAD CRITICIZED THE CIA FOR ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO DISPROVE THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WITHOUT TAKING A POSITION ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE, BULGARIA IS NOW PAYING THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL NOTORIETY FOR HAVING GOTTEN INVOLVED IN DRUGS AND ARMS FLOW AND FOR HAVING HOSTED TURKISH AND MIDDLE EASTERN UNDERWORLD FIGURES OVER THE YEARS.

15. HE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE MAIN ISSUES ON DRUGS, THAT OF TRANSIT FLOWS AND THAT OF PERMITTING THE DEALING OF DRUGS FROM BULGARIAN TERRITORY. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT BASED ON EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM IN WASHINGTON AND WHICH HE STUDIED CLOSELY, HE WAS CONVINCED OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF BULGARIAN INSTITUTIONS IN DRUG TRADE, WHICH ALSO RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE ARMS ISSUE. HE NAMED KINTEX AS A PRIME CULPRIT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT OF THE OPINION THAT BULGARIA WAS INVOLVED IN DRUGS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, THAT IS TO DESTABILIZE WESTERN SOCIETY, BUT THAT DRUGS WERE CONNECTED WITH THE SALE OF ARMS TO EXTREMIST GROUPS AND HAD BEEN USED AS A KIND OF INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TO PAY FOR THEIR ARMS.

16. RMS: THE AMBASSADOR DISAGREED WITH MLADENOV ON THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE PLO AND NICARAGUA. STATING THAT

AS THE PLO IS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION, WHICH INCLUDES A VARIETY OF GROUPS, SOME EXTREMIST, AND SOME PURE TERRORIST, SUCH AS BLACK JUNE AND GEORGE HABASH, THE U.S. HAS AN INTEREST IN STOPPING THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE TERRORISTS. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE CHARACTERIZATION OF PEOPLE LIKE HABASH AS NATIONAL LIBERATION FIGHTERS. THEIR PEOPLE DESTROYED AMERICAN PROPERTY AND MURDERED AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

ON THE QUESTION OF NICARAGUA, THE AMBASSADOR SAID, WE HAVE MORE OF A TRADITIONAL DISAGREEMENT. HE NOTED THAT ARMS SUPPLIED TO NICARAGUA HAVE ALSO TURNED UP IN THE HANDS OF SALVADOREAN REBELS, WHO OPPOSE THE DEMOCRATIC DUARTE GOVERNMENT WE SUPPORT, UNDERMINING THE PEACE PROCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AN AREA WHICH IS VERY CLOSE TO OUR BORDER.

17. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE USG WAS PLEASED AT THE PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS MADE SINCE THE ZHIVKOV MEETING, MENTIONING VOA AND DIVIDED FAMILY CASES. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE FELT VOA SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN JAMMED IN THE FIRST PLACE. DRUGS AND ARMS SALES ARE OF HIGH CONCERN TO THE USG AND WE EXPECTED TO WORK TOWARD SOLUTIONS ON THESE ISSUES AS WELL AS TO ADVANCE MORE POSITIVE AREAS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

18. MEDIA TREATMENT: AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY PROTESTED BULGARIAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF CHARGES THAT THE US WAS BEHIND THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION. NOTING THAT AS OPPOSED TO THE U.S.' FREE PRESS, BULGARIA HAS AN OFFICIAL PRESS. WHEN A NEWSPAPER, WHICH CLAIMS TO BE THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE BCP, ACCUSES THE USG OF COMPLICITY IN PRINT, WE FEEL THAT IT REFLECTS THE GOB POSITION. SUCH STATEMENTS ARE DESIGNED TO STIR UP TROUBLE AND GO FAR BEYOND NORMAL IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND CRITICISM OF THE US WHICH WE SAW IN THE BULGARIAN PAPERS EVERY DAY.

19. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THERE ARE AREAS WHERE WE CAN MOVE FORWARD, ESPECIALLY TRADE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AND CONTACT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HOPES FOR IMPROVED ACCESS FOR EMBASSY OFFICERS TO BULGARIAN OPINION MAKERS. HE PROMISED TO REPORT MLADENOV'S COMMENTS ON DRUGS ISSUES, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO BORDER COOPERATION, TO WASHINGTON.

20. MLADENOV RESPONDED TO THE AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS ON BULGARIAN PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION BY ASKING AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY TO PUT HIMSELF IN MLADENOV'S PLACE AND REACT TO CHARGES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS THAT BULGARIANS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT TO KILL A HEAD OF STATE-THE POPE. HE EMPHASIZED THE POINT THAT NOT A SINGLE BULGARIAN HAS EVER BEEN CAUGHT IN THE DRUG TRADE, AND THAT BULGARIA AND THE U.S. ARE CAUGHT AS VICTIMS OF "OUR OWN PROPAGANDA". HE SUGGESTED THAT WITH ALL OF THE HEINOUS CRIMES OF WHICH BULGARIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED, THE USG MUST THINK THAT THE CAPITAL OF THE EMPIRE OF EVIL HAS MOVED TO SOFIA. THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES IN THE OPERATIONS AND NATURE OF THE US AND BULGARIAN MEDIA AND REPEATED HIS COMMENT THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE REASONS, OTHER THAN THE SPECIFIC ISSUES INVOLVED, FOR THE US TO PICK ON BULGARIA.

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21. COMMENT: OUR MEETING TOOK PLACE THREE DAYS AFTER THE SEMI-ANNUAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ZHIVKOV SPOKE AT THE PLENUM ON THE ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. MORE INTERESTING FROM OUR STANDPOINT WAS THE FACT THAT THE GOB'S AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, STOYAN ZHULEV, SPOKE AT THE PLENUM, THE FIRST TIME WE KNOW OF HIM DOING SO. US-BULGARIAN RELATIONS MUST THEREFORE HAVE BEEN ON THE AGENDA, MAKING MLADENOV'S COMMENTS ALL THE MORE FRESH AND MEANINGFUL.

22. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED, THE MEETING WAS CALM AND RELATIVELY RELAXED. MLADENOV MADE HIS POINTS AND I MADE OURS. MLADENOV SEEMED MOST PERTURBED ABOUT ANTONOV AND DRUGS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF A US-SPONSORED CUSTOMS CHECKPOINT TO BE SET UP ON THE YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN BORDER (PRESUMABLY KALOTINA). MLADENOV INDICATED THAT THE GOB BELIEVES THE PURPOSE OF THE CHECKPOINT IS TO MAKE SEIZURES OF DRUGS THAT BULGARIAN CUSTOMS MISSES, THUS CAUSING IT EMBARRASSMENT.

23. THE MAIN IMPRESSION I CARRIED AWAY FROM THE MEETING WAS THAT THE BULGARIANS ARE TERRIBLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ANTONOV TRIAL. THEY SEE THE PROBABILITY THAT THEY WILL BE CAST EVEN MORE IN THE ROLE OF A PARIAS STATE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THEIR PLANS FOR MORE ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WEST. HIS COMMENT ABOUT THE SITUATION GETTING "OUT OF CONTROL" PROBABLY REFERS TO PLANS FOR A COUNTER-TRIAL OF THE USG OR CIA. LEVITSKY

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

file Bulgaria handle



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January 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC REGIONAL STAFFERS

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER

SUBJECT: Annual Human Rights Report for 1984

The attached report(s) have been sent by the State Department for NSC clearance. Since these reports must go to the Hill in final form by the end of the month, we need to respond to State this week. Please let me know ASAP if you have any problems on the reports in your area. I need to hear them NLT COB Thursday January 24. Thanks.
(This is the first batch. More will follow soon!)

Seems to be

OK.

TD

1/23/85

Steve

FRAN - File in Albania / Bulgaria .

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OF 1984

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BULGARIA

Bulgaria is a Marxist-Leninist state ruled by the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Communist leadership, a self-perpetuating elite group which holds a monopoly of power, seeks to direct and control all economic, social, and cultural activities. A minority party, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, is represented in the Government and the National Assembly (Parliament) but is totally subservient to the Communist Party.

The Bulgarian Constitution provides for certain basic rights, including the right to citizenship, work, rest, access to health care and free education, speech, press, association and demonstration, and freedom of worship. In practice, these freedoms are circumscribed to varying degrees, and they are not permitted to be exercised in any way that might weaken Communist Party control. All challenges to this control are dealt with quickly, firmly, and harshly. The Communists' power monopoly seems to have been tolerated in Bulgaria less grudgingly than in some of the other Eastern European states. Nevertheless, latent discontent exists among persons of all age groups, particularly with regard to the lack of political, cultural, and intellectual freedom under the party's tight rein.

The Government's observance of human rights during 1984 has not changed significantly. Beatings and mistreatment of political prisoners, and arbitrary arrest and detention of persons critical of the authorities reportedly continue. The Government maintains its constant widespread interference in the affairs of its citizens through its system of police informers, electronic monitoring, mail censorship, and control of information. Basic human freedoms continue to be abridged. With legitimate areas of free expression closed off to Bulgarian citizens, several instances of terrorism in 1984 posed an ominous new feature on the Bulgarian scene. Bomb explosions at the Plovdiv railway station, Gorna Oryakhovitsa post office, and Varna airport, which caused multiple casualties, seem to have been politically inspired.

Concerted industrialization of Bulgaria's primarily agricultural economy got under way only in the postwar years. As the executor of this economic modernization, which brought increased urbanization and a rise in living standards, the Communist Party has taken credit for Bulgaria's emergence into modernity.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political Killing

Although there were no reports in 1984 of politically inspired killings by security forces or anti-regime groups, Bulgaria's tight control of its information media renders it impossible to assess whether such killings have occurred.

Three executions were publicly announced in 1984, including that of Plamen Antonov Penchev. He had been convicted of sending a package bomb which killed several persons at the Gorna Oryakhovitsa train station post office in April 1984. His death sentence was announced in July, and a Bulgarian

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official said in August that Penchev had been executed. The other two announced executions were for armed robbery.

b. Disappearance

No cases of disappearance in 1984 at the hands of official or quasi-official security forces have come to light.

c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Beatings continue to be a feature of imprisonment in Bulgaria, according to 1984 reports by dissidents and their families. Political prisoners, who are usually intellectuals, are detained together with common criminals and subjected to brutal treatment by these elements as well as by guards. These practices are confirmed by veteran inmates from various prisons. Three inmates at the Central Prison in Sofia were allegedly shot in early 1984 when they failed to respond to a command in the prison courtyard.

At the Razvigor Street Jail in Sofia, prisoners are held two to a cell during the pretrial investigation stage. The cells measure one and a half by two paces and are furnished only with a plank bed and pallet. Each cell is illuminated around the clock by a single naked bulb. Access to washing facilities is limited, with one shower permitted about every 2 weeks. Latrines consist of a hole in the ground. Only two daily latrine trips are permitted. Toilet paper is severely rationed, and cell walls are smeared with excrement.

Convicts are assigned to the most hazardous jobs at the Devnia Chemical Plant but at rates of pay considerably below those of their coworkers. One Bulgarian dissident characterized the conditions of forced labor at this facility as potentially fatal in a matter of months.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Bulgarians may be detained, tried, and punished for many actions which are generally considered political in nature. Any type of unauthorized demonstration, public expression of view critical of the Government, or even the simple act of entering a Western embassy can bring detention or arrest. Occasionally, arrestees are charged with having committed a "crime" such as visiting an embassy, although there appears to be no law against such activity. More often, however, they are charged with vaguely-worded political "crimes", or with a common petty crime such as currency violation, or with violation of administrative restrictions on their personal travel.

The principle of habeas corpus exists under the Bulgarian Criminal Code and is followed in most cases. Except for some cases which the Government considers politically sensitive, the law provides that preliminary detention is limited to 10 days, and then only whenever evidence indicates some justification for a later indictment. The accused may wait for formal indictment for up to 6 months provided charges have been made. In all cases, according to the law, the accused must be informed of the charges pending against him. The letter of the law is usually, but not always, followed.

Persons may also be subject through administrative regulation

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to an informal system of detention in which they are detained at their place of residence and must appear at the local police station several times daily to sign in. Another form of punishment is forced change of domicile or internal exile. A person's right to live in a certain town may be revoked, and he may be required to move to a town far away from family, friends, and familiar surroundings. Banished persons are often sent to remote villages to perform agricultural labor. One dissident banished from Sofia in 1984 was denied lodging upon arrival at the place of exile. He spent several weeks living in the open at a public park, where he became ill from exposure. The identity cards of exiles are stamped to note their restriction to a particular locality. Should the exile leave despite these prohibitions, he may face more severe administratively imposed imprisonment.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Bulgarian law and general practice provide for public trial in criminal cases. Defendants are entitled to counsel, but only after the preliminary investigation, sometimes lasting many weeks, has been completed and an indictment prepared. When legal counsel is finally available to the accused, it often cooperates with the prosecution. In theory, the accused is informed of the charges against him, but recent practice indicates that detainees are often not told precisely under what statutes they are being held.

Special court procedures are followed in cases involving state security. Such trials may be held in camera, as was that of Plamen Antonov Penchev, the convicted bomber at Gorna Oryakhovitsa. The trials of Volodya Nakov and Yanko Yankov, dissidents who suffered exile for contacting Western embassies, were also conducted in secret.

Generally, the Bulgarian penal system follows the letter of the law. However, although the laws themselves are codified and published, numerous procedural and administrative regulations are not. Frequently, such regulations, access to which is restricted, are invoked arbitrarily. The defendant and his counsel have little recourse, since the validity or applicability of the regulation in question cannot easily be verified. These procedural regulations play a central role in the judicial system and enable the Government and its prosecutors to manipulate the circumstances and outcome of trials.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Government interferes in the private lives of its citizens in myriad ways. An elaborate system of informers directed by the party and security apparatus, with representation in virtually all workplaces, residential areas, and social organizations, monitors the daily lives of Bulgarians in search of signs of dissidence or other unacceptable behavior.

Sanctity of the home is safeguarded by law, and police may legally search property only with prior permission from a court or prosecutor. However, searches may be undertaken in urgent situations before judicial permission is given.

The Government organizes the private lives of its citizens. Virtually all citizens belong to "mass" political

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organizations. Children and young adults belong to the Pioneers and Komsomol, while their elders join the Fatherland Front, a mass organization, or, in the case of the elite, the Communist Party. There appears to be strong pressure on all citizens at least to pay dues and become nominal members of these organizations. Those who refuse--an extremely small percentage of the population--are likely to be denied normal promotions and other benefits and to come under official scrutiny.

The Government attempts to insulate the populace from most kinds of contact with foreign non-Communist influence. International mail and telephone conversations are closely monitored, and Western shortwave radio broadcasts have been subjected to periodic jamming. Western publications, except for those of Communist parties, are virtually unavailable in Bulgaria. Suspect publications are often confiscated from travelers' luggage before they are admitted to the country. Some persons with valid visas have been denied entry to Bulgaria because objectionable literature was found in their possession.

Foreign citizens, including even family members of Bulgarians, have sometimes been denied the opportunity of staying in the homes of their Bulgarian relatives and friends while visiting the country.

In the case of the Turkish and Pomak minorities, Bulgarian authorities have reportedly even interfered with the normal registration of civil documents. The Pomaks, numbering some 200,000 in Bulgaria, are ethnic Slavs whose ancestors converted to Islam during the 500 years of Turkish rule. Many have kept Muslim religion, habits, dress, and names to this day. According to several sources, Bulgarian authorities have put increasing pressure on Muslim minorities to accept Slavic or Slavized names and have even refused in some provinces to issue birth and marriage documents, diplomas, and other civil documents to Pomaks who refuse to accept Bulgarian names.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for certain basic rights including freedom of speech, press, association and demonstration, and worship. In practice, these freedoms are circumscribed and are not permitted to be exercised in any way that might weaken Communist Party control. The state controls the press, decides which political organizations may exist, and determines which political demonstrations may take place.

Laws provide for severely punishing anyone accused of criticizing the state. The dissemination of "untruthful remarks which might increase mistrust of state power or cause confusion in society" is proscribed. The divulging of certain information (for example, the size of the foreign debt) is illegal and subject to severe penalties.

Although censorship does not exist officially, the media operate within well-understood party and government guidelines and practices. International news is usually limited to that provided by the government news agency or official Soviet sources. Forbidden topics in the Bulgarian press include unauthorized criticism of party and state leaders, of

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socialist ideology, and of other socialist countries, particularly the U.S.S.R. All-pervasive party control of the media makes self-censorship by journalists unnecessary. However, self-censorship is practiced carefully by virtually the entire population in all aspects of public life. There have also been instances of interference with academic inquiry in the social sciences.

The public is permitted to send criticism, suggestions, and complaints by letter to newspapers and to National Assembly representatives on a broad range of topics such as inadequate service from public agencies and housing shortages. None of the letters published goes beyond criticism of specific economic or service shortfalls or failure of individuals in government administration. None deals with fundamental questions of how society, the economy, or the nation's political life are structured. Thus the state allows limited criticism and reportedly seeks to investigate complaints and respond to them.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

In practice, freedom of assembly is a right granted only to legally constituted organizations and only for approved purposes. Private associations are totally unknown, and the law provides for punishment of anyone "founding an illegal, anti-state organization." Public assemblies are never spontaneous affairs, but rather are party-organized to achieve a particular purpose. The possibility of an unauthorized group demonstration is remote.

Bulgarian trade or labor unions are totally controlled and organized by the Government. Their important political function is to increase public support for the Government and the quality and quantity of production. Members are not in a position to negotiate or strike for better pay or working conditions. Union leaders represent the interests of the management. Bulgarian trade unions organize vacations for workers and look after the general social welfare of their members.

People working as lawyers, doctors, artists, musicians, writers, and academics are represented by professional associations which also have the party-assigned function of controlling their membership. Professional associations are more likely to have contacts with foreign--even Western--professional associations, however, and arrange foreign travel for trusted members to attend conferences and take part in international exchanges.

c. Freedom of Religion

Bulgaria is a Communist state which officially espouses atheism and discourages religion. Openly expressed religious conviction is incompatible with party membership or the attainment of responsible government position. Nevertheless, a number of faiths do hold services. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the state religion before the Communists took power, is the largest and most acceptable in the Government's view. This is in recognition of the Church's historical and cultural role in Bulgarian history, as well as its continuing appeal to masses of ordinary Bulgarians. The Church receives substantial government financial support and in return voices concurrence with government propaganda lines such as on peace

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and disarmament. The Church is allowed to print a newspaper and sell religious articles such as candles, small jewelry crosses, etc. A Bulgarian Orthodox bookstore sells limited editions of scholarly books on church history, but the number of Bibles in circulation is strictly limited.

Worship services continue to be popular, especially on important holidays such as Palm Sunday and Easter. Authorities tend not to interfere with older worshipers entering churches on these occasions, but in some cases in 1984, youths have been required to have passes to gain admittance. The passes are handed out by local branches of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). On Easter Eve 1984, militiamen harassed young people trying to enter a neighborhood church in Sofia.

Islam and Judaism are also officially recognized by the state. Ethnic Turks make up the majority of Bulgaria's Muslims, the remainder being Gypsies or Slavic Pomaks. Muslim believers have been inhibited from practicing their religion by the closure of many mosques and by prohibition against religious education of children. Although Sofia's main mosque is being slowly renovated with some government funds, many other mosques throughout the country have fallen into disrepair, been razed, or been converted to other uses. When mosques have been razed, their associated graveyards have usually also been razed, often without a trace.

Muslims have no access to Korans, which are not printed in Bulgaria. A Muslim wishing to undertake the hajj to Mecca would encounter the same barriers faced by any Bulgarian seeking a private trip abroad: currency restrictions and a letter of support from an overseas relative. The Bulgarian press for the past few years has not reported even token contingents from Bulgaria making the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Bulgaria's Jewish minority of about 5,000, mainly middle-aged and elderly persons, is permitted freedom to attend worship services. Jews in Bulgaria have not undergone strident anti-Semitic repression. Sofia's Sephardic Synagogue was provided government funds for refurbishing as a national architectural monument, but work has come to a virtual halt. The synagogue's prayer books are old, with no replacements provided. Bulgaria's Jewish cultural center emphasizes the community's ethnic, not religious, identity. Government slaughterhouses will not cater to the special dietary requirements of pious customers. The Government will not allow appropriate clergy to participate in slaughterhouse operations.

Relations between churches and the Government are regulated by the Foreign Ministry's Committee for Questions of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Religious Cults. Although no churches are "licensed", only the Orthodox, Moslem, and Jewish religions enjoy any sort of official support. A number of other religions and sects are allowed to operate churches and congregations in Bulgaria. Included in this group are Catholics, Evangelicals, Baptists, Pentecostalists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Armenians, Congregationalists, and Methodists.

Bulgaria's Roman Catholics are few in number and divided between followers of the Latin and Uniate rites. Church sermons hew closely to topics of personal piety, avoiding

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social and political issues. During 1983-84 two priests were allowed to study in Rome. Upon their return to Bulgaria, the authorities confiscated Bibles and theological books which they had brought back with them. Two Uniate Roman Catholic nuns are studying theology in Rome.

No religious groups may engage in open proselytizing, and foreign missionary activity is likewise banned. Religious education of children is prohibited, but some youngsters do enter churches with family members for services. Although a Bulgarian-language Bible was printed in 1982, only 2,000 copies were distributed domestically. Most denominations have privately complained about the lack of scriptural materials.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Government controls where Bulgarians live, work, and travel. All Bulgarians carry a personal identity card with them at all times stating their legal place of residence and work. Without this card, they cannot purchase domestic airline tickets, register at a hotel, or seek any kind of social service such as medical assistance. Change of place of residence or work is a complicated process unless the change is at the Government's initiative and convenience. Changing residence to Sofia and other major cities from the provinces is especially difficult because of the desire to limit the size of cities. Travel around the country is unrestricted, except for border areas where non-local Bulgarians are stopped and questioned if they do not have special permission to be there.

Foreign travel is extremely restricted. Bulgarian citizens must have a passport for foreign travel and an exit visa specifying the destination for each trip. If they go to a country not mentioned in the exit permit, they can face serious complications upon their return home. A citizen's application for an exit document is refused most often because travel is deemed "not in the interest of the state." Applications for pure tourist travel to the West are rarely granted except to trusted and highly placed individuals. Travel to Eastern European countries is encouraged.

Emigration is provided for by law, but is rarely permitted. However, the Government occasionally permits members of divided families, including spouses, to join relatives in the West in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act. Since 1983, several of the approximately three dozen American divided family cases were resolved, as were a few cases involving other Western countries.

The Government encourages the repatriation of ethnic Bulgarians residing abroad, although the right of repatriation is not guaranteed. In the summer of 1981, the authorities declared an amnesty for all Bulgarians who had left the country illegally, inviting them to return home without fear of prosecution. Few took advantage of this offer before it expired at the end of 1983. Among those who did, one family had their U.S. passports confiscated by local militia authorities. A new amnesty was announced in 1984. A number of Bulgarian-born foreign residents and citizens do voluntarily return to Bulgaria to live in retirement each year. These repatriates are well treated by the Government. Less fortunate are those involuntary repatriates who are

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returned from other Communist countries for having attempted illegally to emigrate. Likewise, Bulgaria's policy is to return to their home countries potential refugees from other Warsaw Pact countries who have tried to cross the Bulgarian border into Greece, Turkey, or Yugoslavia.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Bulgaria is governed by a small ruling elite representing the Bulgarian Communist Party. Rank and file members of the party have little, if any, actual political power or opportunity to change the party's policies. Non-party members are virtually denied any role in influencing the policies of their Government or in changing its form.

Political pluralism and free participation in the political process are essentially nonexistent. Domestic opposition to the state or party is dealt with promptly and severely with prison sentences. Premier Grisha Filipov told Austrian journalists on September 26, 1984: "We do not have any opposition. Our national and political unity is important." Opponents and dissidents are not tolerated, he added, since Bulgaria's economic successes are based on this national unity under the party.

Bulgaria has no free elections in the Western sense, although it tries to maintain the appearance of pluralism through the participation of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union in the Government and National Assembly. The Communist and Agrarian parties, together with labor, youth, and other organizations, comprise the Fatherland Front, an umbrella organization of Communist and non-Communist elements established in 1942. In practice, the Fatherland Front as well as its various organizations are all ultimately controlled by the Communist Party, to which the Constitution gives clear primacy. The Agrarians run separate candidates but do not compete against Communist candidates or face any other opposition. They hold about one-fourth of the seats in the National Assembly, but all votes in the Assembly are unanimous.

The National Assembly, which normally meets fewer than four times a year, has no independent role in governing. No debate of alternatives takes place. The National Assembly has never failed to endorse government policy.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The human rights record of Bulgaria has not been the subject of resolutions by international human rights organizations. Bulgaria has not admitted any independent group to investigate questions of human rights violations, and has not responded to or communicated with any non-governmental human rights group. Although Bulgaria is a member of the UN Human Rights Commission, Bulgarian authorities contend that human rights are strictly an internal matter for each government to resolve. There are no government or private organizations in Bulgaria which attempt to protect individual liberties or observe and report on human rights violations.

Amnesty International has repeatedly commented on human rights violations in Bulgaria. In its 1984 report, Amnesty expressed

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concern about the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and two cases of confinement to psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. Freedom House rates Bulgaria "not free."

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SITUATION

During the past 40 years, Bulgaria has changed from an overwhelmingly agricultural country to one with a mix of industry and agriculture. Communist rulers have emphasized state ownership of nearly all means of production, rapid economic growth, central control over the economy, and industrial development. The country remains a large producer of agricultural goods, and Bulgarians can sell produce raised on their own private plots. Per capita income in 1980 was estimated at \$2,625.

Bulgaria has been successful in feeding, educating, and looking after the basic necessities of its citizens. Its present performance in all of these areas is better than at any other time in Bulgaria's history. All citizens are guaranteed a job. Officially there is no unemployment, although in practice underemployment is widespread. Basic needs are generally met on a non-discriminatory basis, although high party officials and those with access to hard currency may be able to afford superior foreign health care, education, and better food. There are no grounds for charges of discrimination on the basis of sex when it comes to provision of the necessities of life. Although Bulgaria has poor people, there do not seem to be great disparities between poverty and wealth. Success in the Government or party results more in privileges than in great personal wealth.

A system of government facilities caters to the health needs of Bulgarian citizens. Patients do not pay direct fees for medical care, which appears to be of adequate quality. Bulgaria's leaders have expressed concern about the country's low and dropping population growth rate of 0.3 percent in 1984 and have established financial incentives for families to have more children. Despite extensive construction of new public apartment buildings in the past decade, the general housing shortage continues.

Education is free through the university level with a general system of merit selection for university admission. However, certain priorities and privileges go to the children of the influential. Adult literacy is high. The primary school enrollment ratio in 1981 was 132 percent.

Women are guaranteed equal rights with men, and all citizens are declared to be equal before the law, regardless of national origin, creed, social status, education, or sex. Educational and professional opportunities do not discriminate against Bulgarian women. One-half of the openings for university students available each year are reserved by law for women, who consequently are well represented in some of the more prestigious professions such as medicine. However, women continue to be underrepresented in policymaking jobs within the Government, and overrepresented in manual occupations in areas such as farming, light industry, and cleaning and maintenance.

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARL PREL BU UR US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING BULGARIAN ON ARMS CONTROL: FISCHER
AND DUNKERLEY VISIT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: FISCHER (ACDA) AND DUNKERLEY (EUR/RPM) PARTICIPATED IN A THREE HOUR "EXPERTS' MEETING" WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS JANUARY 21, BRIEFING THEIR COUNTERPARTS ON THE GENEVA SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. BULGARIAN SIDE'S RESPONSE WAS MORE IN DEPTH THAN WE HAVE SEEN BEFORE, ALTHOUGH IT HEWED CLOSELY TO STANDARD SOVIET LINE ON OUTCOME OF THE MEETING, STRESSING THE GOB'S "GUARDED OPTIMISM AND RESTRAINED REALISM" ON FUTURE PROSPECTS. GOB COMMENTS CENTERED ON ALLEGED LACK OF UNITY AMONG US NEGOTIATORS, EXPRESSED HOPE THAT A SCHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW THIS SUMMER WOULD DEAL WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S. SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, STATED THAT CONTINUED INF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD JEOPARDIZE NEGOTIATIONS, DEcriED VERIFICATION AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, SUGGESTED THAT AN "APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE" NOW EXISTS, AND STATED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT LIKE THE CHOICE OF GENEVA AS THE VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, PREFERRING VIENNA. NOT BROUGHT UP WERE GOB FEELINGS

3. LUCAS FISCHER, CHIEF OF THEATRE OPERATIONS (ACDA), AND CRAIG DUNKERLEY, HEAD, ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS SECTION (EUR/PRM) MET WITH BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ARMS CONTROL SPECIALISTS JANUARY 21 TO PRESENT A BRIEFING OF THE US PERSPECTIVE OF THE GENEVA SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING. THE BULGARIAN SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR LYUBEN PETROV, HEAD OF MFA GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENTS AND HEAD OF THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION AT THE STOCKHOLM CDE TALKS, AMBASSADOR BORISLAV KONSTANTINOV, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MFA UN AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT, SVETLA POPOVA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT (WESTERN COUNTRIES), AND TWO LOWER RANKING OFFICIALS. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LYUBERN GOTSEV JOINED THE GROUP FOR THE LAST HALF HOUR OF THE MEETING. THE BULGARIAN SIDE HOSTED A LUNCH AFTERWARDS, DURING WHICH DISCUSSION CONTINUED. AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY AND POLEC CHIEF ALSO ATTENDED. BCP DAILY RABOTNICHESKO DELO CARRIED A BRIEF MENTION OF THE MEETING JANUARY 22.

4. FOLLOWING THE US SIDE'S EXPOSITION ON THE GENEVA MEETING AND ITS OUTCOME, AMBASSADOR PETROV RESPONDED STATING THAT THE USSR HAD ALREADY BRIEFED THE GOB AND TOUCHED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--HE STRESSED THAT THE US PRESENTATION "CONFIRMED" HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS ARE "NEW" NEGOTIATIONS, DIFFERING FROM THE INF TALKS, WHICH WERE "BROKEN OFF BECAUSE OF NATO DEPLOYMENTS";
--THE BULGARIANS VIEW THE PROSPECTS FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS

WITH GUARDED (OR RESTRAINED) OPTIMISM BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OR POSITION TAKEN BY ONE SIDE (READ US) COULD CAUSE THE TALKS TO BE BROKEN OFF. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD SAID THE SAME THING DURING HIS "MEET THE SOVIET PRESS" INTERVIEW;
BT

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- THE GOB WONDERS ABOUT THE UNITY OF THE US SIDE, CITING REPORTS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DOD AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT;
- CALLED FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND SAID THAT THE GOB HOPES A SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW THIS YEAR WILL DEAL WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP;
- NOTHING CAN BE EXPECTED FROM THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS IF US INF FORCES CONTINUE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE;
- DECRIED US INSISTENCE ON VERIFICATION AS A "PRE-CONDITION TO BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS. BULGARIAN SIDE FEELS THAT WILLINGNESS TO TAKE POLITICAL RISKS AND TRUST THE OTHER SIDE MEANS THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD NOT BE AN "OBSTACLE" TO NEGOTIATIONS.

5. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LYUBEN GOTSEV, WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL, PICKED UP ON THE THEME OF UNITY OF THE US ARMS NEGOTIATING POSITION, SARCASTICALLY NOTING THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE BELIEVES HE WILL SEE A "CLEAR, CONSISTENT AND COHERENT US TEAM". AFTER LISTENING TO FISCHER AND DUNKERLEY'S REBUTTAL OF PETROV'S REMARKS, GOTSEV RETURNED TO A THEME HE HAS USED BEFORE, THAT THE US WENT TO THE GENEVA MEETING AND AGREED TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THE USG ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS AN "APPROXIMATE" MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE US CONSIDER A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS REACHING OTHER AGREEMENTS. US SIDE EXPLAINED US PROBLEMS WITH VERIFICATION OF A TEST BAN AND HISTORY OF PREVIOUS MORATORIUM. GOTSEV CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING TOWARDS A MARCH DATE FOR THE

NEW TALKS, BUT THAT THEY HAVE A PROBLEM WITH GENEVA AS THE VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, PREFERRED VIENNA INSTEAD. (COMMENT: FROM LATER CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHERS PRESENT, THEY INDICATED THAT SOVIETS PREFER VIENNA AS A WAY OF STRESSING "NEWNESS" OF THE NEGOTIATIONS).

6. COMMENTING ON THE JANUARY 18 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM, GOTSEV INDICATED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAS PROBLEMS WITH THE CHOICE OF MAX KAMPELMAN AS CHIEF US NEGOTIATOR BECAUSE OF GOTSEV'S EXPERIENCE WITH HIM AT THE CSCE MADRID CONFERENCE. (AMBASSADOR TOLD GOTSEV BULGARIANS OUGHT TO BE PLEASED TO HAVE A MAN OF KAMPELMAN'S EXPERIENCE AND INFLUENCE AT THE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION AND GOTSEV BACKED OFF SOMEWHAT, SAYING HE WAS ONLY JOKING.)

7. DURING LUNCH, THE SUBJECT OF THE US SDI INITIATIVE WAS RAISED, AS WAS THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION (OR NON-INCLUSION) OF FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE SDI INITIATIVE, AMBASSADOR PETROV QUESTIONED THE WILLINGNESS OF ONE SIDE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IF IT POSSESSED A CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FISCHER AND DUNKERLEY PRESENTED US THINKING ON THE PROBLEM AND EXPLAINED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE SOVIETS PRIOR TO THE SDI BECOMING A TECHNICAL REALITY. PETROV THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF COUNTING FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE NATO ARMS TOTAL. US SIDE REVIEWED HISTORY OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO LINK FRENCH AND BRITISH WEAPONS TO US TOTALS DURING BOTH STRATEGIC AND INF TALKS, MAKING THE POINT THAT THE

WEAPONS ARE NOT UNDER US CONTROL.

8. WHEN ASKED ABOUT WARSAW PACT CONSULTATION MECHANISMS, AMBASSADOR PETROV FIRST STATED THAT THE SOVIETS USE THEIR AMBASSADORS TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AND CONDUCT CONSULTATIONS. HE LATER SAID THAT, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WTO, A CONSULTATIVE GROUP HAD BEEN SET UP LAST YEAR ON ARMS CONTROL. PETROV ENVIENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN WHETHER OR NOT NATO MEMBERS HAD TO AGREE
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THE LATTER REMARK MAY HAVE BEEN MADE LIGHTLY OF THE CUFF, THIS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HIS COMMENT ABOUT "APPROXIMATE" MILITARY BALANCE, IS ANOTHER INDICATION OF BULGARIAN CONCERN THAT A FAILURE OF THE TALKS COULD RESULT IN INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE ON BULGARIAN TO ACCEPT COUNTER DEPLOYMENTS.

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12. FISCHER AND DUNKERLEY DID NOT SEE THIS CABLE PRIOR TO DEPARTING. LEVITSKY
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~~CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 0304~~

IN ADVANCE ON US ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE COUNCIL.

9. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO FISCHER, THE BULGARIAN RESPONSE TO HIS AND DUNKERLEY'S PRESENTATION WAS DEEPTER AND MORE TECHNICAL THAN IN OTHER STOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE THE BULGARIANS DISPLAYED KEEN INTEREST IN THE PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION AND APPARENTLY RAISED THE LEVEL OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AT THE MEETING AT THE LAST MINUTE. ON THE WHOLE, THE BULGARIANS STUCK TO THE SOVIET LINE, RITUALISTICALLY COUNTERING US VERSION OF THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS WITH THE SOVIET VERSION. HOWEVER, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE RECEPTION AFFORDED FISCHER AND DUNKERLEY. THE GOB OFFICIALS TREATED THE SUBJECT WITHOUT POLEMICS AND AVOIDED THE EMOTIONAL HISTORICALS APPEARING DAILY IN THE PRESS ON THE THREAT TO THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE THAT THE SDI REPRESENTS.

10. EMBASSY FOUND THE VISIT VALUABLE FOR PROVIDING THE BULGARIANS WITH ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUES LACKING IN LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE, AND PROBABLY LACKING IN THE WAY OF PERSONAL CONTACT WITH SOVIET ARMS CONTROL SPECIALISTS. PETROV MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SENT ANYONE OUT FROM MOSCOW TO BRIEF THE EAST EUROPEANS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA MEETING, RELYING SOLELY ON "DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS."

11. GOTSEV PROVIDED THE MOST CURIOUS LINE OF THE DAY, WHEN ASKED WHAT ADVICE HE WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS ON THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID FIRST, BE CAREFUL OF THE AMERICANS AND SECOND, "DO NOT BETRAY US." WHILE

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186161	CABLE RE. BULGARIA	2	1/24/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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SECRET

File
Civil Unrest
49

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 USDAO SOFIA BU 0319 DTG: 240610Z JAN 85 PSN: 026344
EOB268 AH007991 TOR: 024/0713Z CSH: CR1329

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TO DIA WASHDC
INFO DIA WASHDC//DB-1E1//
USDAO ANKARA

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO

SERIAL: [REDACTED]
PASS: DIA PASS TO AIG 11869
COUNTRY: (U) BULGARIA (BU)
SUBJ: (U) [REDACTED] MORE ON DOMESTIC UNREST (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
DOI: (U) 850118 (RO)
REQS: (U) T-1E1-23031-0001-8509
SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]
C. MEMBERS US EMBASSY SOFIA

SUMMARY: (S/NF) A KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE PROVIDES DETAILED INFORMATION ON RECENT CIVIL UNREST AMONG THE TURKISH POPULATION IN BULGARIA TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC DATES, PLACES AND CASUALTIES SUFFERED. ALTHOUGH SOURCE WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS TO THESE EVENTS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS MANY OF HIS COMMENTS. A TENTATIVE LINK BETWEEN THE CURRENT UNREST AND THE BOMBINGS IN BULGARIA REPORTED EARLIER IS SUGGESTED.

TEXT: 1. (S/NF) SOURCE B REPORTS THAT THE CURRENT ROUND OF DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT (GOB) AND THE TURKISH POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY BEGAN AS FAR BACK AS THE SPRING OF 1983. AT THAT TIME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE KURDZHALI REGION BEGAN TO RENEW THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE TURKISH POPULATION TO SLAVICIZE THEIR NAMES. SOURCE POINTED OUT THAT THE IMPACT OF SUCH A CAMPAIGN ON THE TURKISH COMMUNITY COULD ONLY BE JUDGED WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENERAL SECOND CLASS STATUS OF TURKS HERE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED LIMITED OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION, IN PROFESSIONS, AND IN PARTY MEMBERSHIP. TURKISH WEDDING CEREMONIES HAD BEEN LIMITED, MOSQUES WERE ALLOWED TO FALL INTO A STATE OF DISREPAIR, AND THE CIRCUMCISION OF MALE INFANTS (AN IMPORTANT CEREMONY OF TURKS) HAD BEEN LIMITED AND SUBJECTED TO A SERIES OF CRITICISMS IN THE PRESS. THE SAME PRESS OFFERED HIGH PRAISE FOR TURKS WHO HAD CHANGED THEIR NAMES, HOWEVER, WERE SUBJECTED TO HARASSMENT IN ALL OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. THERE WAS APPARENTLY SOME VIOLENCE DURING THIS PERIOD AS SOME TURKS WERE KILLED BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES. THE FAMILIES OF THE DEAD WERE DENIED THE RIGHT TO

2. (S/NF) INTIMIDATION OF THE TURKISH POPULATION HERE APPARENTLY CONTINUED THROUGH 1984. LOCAL BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS QUOTED AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT EVREN OF TURKEY AND ZHIVKOV OF BULGARIA (ARRIVED AT, ACCORDING TO THESE OFFICIALS, DURING THE FORMER'S VISIT TO BULGARIA) GIVING ANKARA'S TACIT APPROVAL TO THE ACTIONS OF THE GOB. LOCAL MILITIAMEN CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO KILL UP TO 10 PERCENT OF THE TURKISH POPULATION IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE DESIRED NAME CHANGES. THERE WERE REPORTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESPECIALLY FAMILY MEMBERS OF LEADERS OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY, BEING JAILED AND BEATEN IN AN EFFORT TO GET FAMILIES TO CHANGE THEIR NAMES. WHEN THE NAME CHANGE WAS ACCOMPLISHED, IT WAS DONE ON A FORM WITH WHICH THE TURKISH FAMILY (REQUESTED) A SLAVIC NAME AND IN MANY CASES THIS FORM WAS BACKDATED TO AS LONG AGO AS 1974. PRESSURE APPARENTLY BECAME SO BAD THAT IN AUGUST OF 1984 A YOUNG BULGARIAN TURK VISITED THE TURKISH EMBASSY IN SOFIA TO TEARFULLY DESCRIBE THE PLIGHT OF HIS COMMUNITY. IT WAS ONLY WITH A GOOD DEAL OF PERSUASION THAT THE YOUNG MAN, NOW BADLY FRIGHTENED OF GOVERNMENT RETRIBUTION, WAS CONVINCED TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY.

3. (S/NF) THE GOB'S CAMPAIGN CONTINUED AND ONCE AGAIN RESULTED IN VIOLENCE. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1984 IN A VILLAGE NEAR KURDHALI, TWO MILITIAMEN AND THREE MEMBERS OF A TURKISH FAMILY WERE KILLED IN A GUN BATTLE. A BULGARIAN SUBSOURCE OF SOURCE B ALSO REPORTS THAT ON 13 DECEMBER, 28 TURKISH BULGARIANS WERE KILLED IN THE VILLAGE OF TIKHOIR (LF 740750), SOME 35 KMS SOUTH OF KURDZHALI. LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN PLOVDIV REPORTED THAT 19 DECEMBER WAS THE DAY OFFICIALLY SET ASIDE FOR NAME CHANGES EN MASSE IN THE VILLAGES OF DOLNI VODEN AND GORNI VODEN (LG210530) SOUTH OF PLOVDIV. SOME EMPLOYEES WHO LIVED THERE TOOK OFF WORK TO BE PRESENT WHILE OTHERS REFUSED TO ATTEND. ONE OF THOSE WHO DID NOT ATTEND TELEPHONE THE CONSULATE AT 0300 THE NEXT MORNING TO REPORT THAT THE VILLAGES WERE NOW SURROUNDED AND THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE USING PRESSURE, BEATING AND DOGS IN AN EFFORT TO GET THE INHABITANTS TO REQUEST NAME CHANGES.
BT

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Authority NLR-145-1-11-16-D-18616
BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/16

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PAGE 01 USDAO SOFIA BU 0319 DTG: 240610Z JAN 85 FSN: 026391
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A LITERARIAN. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF HIS CHANGE OF HEART
PERCIPITATED HIS RE-ASSIGNMENT OR VICE-VERSA.
COMMENTS: 1. (S/NF) SOME OF THE EVENTS DETAILED HERE WERE
FIRST OUTLINED IN OUR IIR 6 82/UWAV85 ADEMB SOFIA
CABLE 0122, (052 101105Z JAN 85.

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SECTION TWO OF TWO

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

4. (S/NF) MATTERS APPARENTLY CAME TO A HEAD IN KURDZHALI ON
27 DEC WHEN A LARGE NUMBER OF TURKS GATHERED IN THE TOWN
SQUARE. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THIS GATHERING WAS A PLANNED
DEMONSTRATION OR SIMPLY A SPONTANEOUS OUTBURST BY TURKS
WHO HAPPENED TO BE THERE. IN ANY EVENT, THE GOB SAW IT
AS SUFFICIENTLY DANGEROUS TO CALL IN THE ARMED FORCES AND
OVER 3000 SOLDIERS SUPPORTED BY ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
WERE SENT INTO THE CITY. THREE TURKS WERE REPORTEDLY
KILLED AND SOME 30 MORE WOUNDED. IN ONE INCIDENT,
A TURKISH MOTHER PLACED HER INFANT CHILD IN THE PATH OF
AN APC AND DIRECTED THE VEHICLE TO MOVE FORWARD, APPARENTLY
IN A GESTURE OF DESPAIR. THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE
COLUMN ORDERED HIS MEN FORWARD BUT THE DRIVER OF THE
LEAD APC REFUSED UNTIL THE CHILD HAD BEEN CLEARED FROM HIS
PATH. A DAY LATER A TURKISH BULGARIAN, WHO KNEW OF THE
TROUBLES IN KURDZHALI, APPROACHED A MEMBER OF THE TURKISH
EMBASSY HERE IN SOFIA FOR ASSISTANCE IN ACQUIRING EXPLOSIVES.
THE MAN CLAIMED TO KNOW HOW TO USE THEM AND WERE TO PUT
THEM IF THEY COULD ONLY BE PROVIDED.

5. (S/NF) IN LATE DECEMBER-EARLY JANUARY THE GOB'S CAMPAIGN
TO SLAVICIZE TURKISH NAMES MOVED TO THE AREA WEST OF BOURGAS
AND REPORTS THAT SOME 30 TURKS HAD BEEN KILLED AND
MANY MORE WOUNDED (FOUR SERIOUSLY) IN THE VILLAGE OF
MOMCHILGRAD (LF670990) NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER. TELEPHONE
CALLS BEGAN TO FLOOD INTO THE-TURKISH CONSULATE IN BURGAS
REQUESTING ADVICE ON WHAT TO DO AND ON 3 JAN A GROUP
OF SOME 100 TO 150 TURKS WAS PREVENTED FROM VISITING
THE BURGAS CONSULATE BY BULGARIAN MILITAIEN. ON 5 JAN
THE BURGAS CONSULATE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL REPORTING
THAT FOUR VILLAGES INCLUDING CHERNOGRAD (NH080280) AND
RAKLIHOVA (NH403340) HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY UP TO 8000
SOLDIERS AND THAT ALL ROADS INTO THE AREA HAD BEEN BLOCKED.
AT LEAST 500 PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

6. (NF) NEWS OF THE EVENTS IN KURDZHALI APPARENTLY IS
KNOWN TO SOME HERE IN SOFIA. ACCORDING TO SOURCE B, A
BULGARIAN COMMUNIST OF TURKISH DESCENT NOW REGRETS HIS
DECISION TO JOIN THE PARTY. HE HAD BEEN EMPLOYED IN
THE BROADCAST/NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY BUT IS NOW WORKING AS

2. (S/NF) MUCH OF THE DATA ABOVE CANNOT BE INDEPENDENTLY
CONFIRMED BUT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
INDICATING THAT, AT LEAST IN BORAD OUTLINE, IT MAY BE
CORRECT. FIRST OF ALL, SOURCE B HAS REPORTED RELIABLY AND
CAREFULLY IN THE PAST AND IN THIS INSTANCE WAS REPORTING
FROM A COMPLETE COMPILATION OF RECENT EVENTS THAT HE
HAD PREPARED FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. SECONDLY, OBSERVATIONS
MADE BY SOURCE B (CITE IIR 6 811 005 85) (AMEB SOFIA
CABLE 0132, DTG 101105Z JAN 85) CONFIRM THAT KURDZHALI INDEED
HAS A VERY HEAVY SECURITY PRESENCE. RO AND INTEL
ASSIST ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE KURDZHALI AREA (WHICH
IS NOT IN THE RESTRICTED AREA) ON 17 JAN 85. OUR VEHICLE
WAS STOPPED FOR A DOCUMENT CHECK BY MILITAIEN ON THE
ROAD (LG420380) SOUTH OF ASENOVGRAD AND WAS FINALLY
TURNED BACK AT A MILITARY ROADBLOCK NORTH OF THE VILLAGE OF
KUMONIGA (LG520290). THE ROADBLOCK CONSISTED OF MILITIA-
MEN ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, A CABLE ACROSS THE
ROADWAY, AND CHIRDS WITH SPIKES IN THEM SO ARRANGED THAT
ONE HAD TO SERPENTINE IN ORDER TO MOVE AHEAD. IT WAS
QUITE IMPRESSIVE TO MERELY TELL US THAT THE ROAD AHEAD
WAS SNOW COVERED AND THAT WE COULD NOT PASS. IT SHOULD
BE POINTED OUT THAT KUMONIGA WAS THE FIRST TURKISH VILLAGE
WE WOULD HAVE PASSED ALONG THAT ROAD AND THAT, AS WE WERE
PROCEEDING BACK TO THE NORTH, WE PASSED THE SOUTHBOUND
PLOVDIV-KURXHSALI BUS. ONE FINAL DETAIL TENDING TO SUB-
STANTIATE THIS REPORT IS THE INCREASED SECURITY AT
DIPLOMATIC, ESPECIALLY TURKISH, FACILITIES IN BULGARIA.
THE CONDITIONS IN SOFIA WERE DESCRIBED IN OUR IIR 6 811
001 85. SOURCE B REPORTS THAT SECURITY AT TURKEY'S
PLOVDIV CONSULATE HAS BEEN DOUBLED AND NOW INCLUDES A
GUARD DOG; THE BURGAS CONSULATE, NORMALLY GUARDED BY TWO
MILITAIEN, NOW HAS A REGULAR CONTINGENT OF TEN.

3. (S/NF) IT IS INTERESTING TO SPECULATE ON THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE EVENTS OUTLINED ABOVE AND THE BOMBING
REPORTED IN LATE AUGUST 1984 [REDACTED]
0069, 84 AN 0074, 84). THE TIMING SEEMS TO BE CORRECT AND
THERE APPEARS TO BE NO LACK OF MOTIVATION. IN FACT,
SOURCE B VOLUNTEERED THAT BULGARIAN TURK DISCONTENT IS ONE
POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE ATTACKS. RO FEELS THAT EVEN
THOUGH A FIRM LINK HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, TURKISH
DISCONTENT IS INDEED THE MOST PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION
OFFERED TO DATE.

PROJ: (U) NA
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) NONE US: NO
PPRE: (U) [REDACTED]
APPR: (U) [REDACTED]
EVAL: (U) [REDACTED] TO NONE
ENCL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) NA
DECL: OADR
BT

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186166	MEMO KIMMITT TO DOBRIANSKY RE. WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT	1	3/23/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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BULGARIAN

2678

512

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: MARY M. WENGRZYNEK *man*

SUBJECT: Photo Opportunity for US Ambassador to Bulgaria

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a Schedule Proposal recommending that Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky be scheduled for a photo opportunity with the President.

Ambassador Levitsky was appointed, confirmed and departed for Bulgaria in the fall of 1984. At that time the President's schedule did not permit a photo opportunity.

77
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

REQUEST: Photo Opportunity

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Levitsky was appointed, confirmed, and departed for Bulgaria in the fall of 1984. At that time the President's schedule did not permit a photo opportunity.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: May 28-June 4 -- Administrative Time
DURATION: five minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo Opportunity

REMARKS REQUIRED: 3x5 card

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer

PROPOSED "PHOTO": Photo with Ambassador Levitsky

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Handwritten:
30 May
Bulgaria
54

May 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *may for*

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *TD*

SUBJECT: Photo Session with U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria,
Melvyn Levitsky
(Thursday, May 30 -- 4:30 p.m. -- Oval Office)

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President forwarding a 3x5" card with pertinent information for his photo session with Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky, our Ambassador to Bulgaria.

Copy of a clearance list is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President with 3x5" card
- Tab A Clearance List

Handwritten:
forwarded
last 5/2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PHOTO SESSION WITH AMBASSADOR LEVITSKY

DATE: Thursday, May 30, 1985
 LOCATION: Oval Office
 TIME: 4:30 p.m.
 FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

Photo session with U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria,
 Melvyn Levitsky.

II. BACKGROUND

Your schedule did not permit a photo opportunity with
 Ambassador Levitsky before he departed for Sofia in the fall
 of 1984.

A three-by-five inch card with pertinent information is
 attached.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky and his son, Ross.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo session; brief conversation.

Prepared by:
 Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:
 3x5" card

PHOTO SESSION

AMB. MELVYN LEVITSKY (BULGARIA)

PARTICIPANTS: FAMILY - SON, ROSS (17)
 WH - ROBERT C. McFARLANE
 NSC - WILLIAM F. MARTIN
 PAULA DOBRIANSKY

- APPOINTED AMBASSADOR SEPTEMBER 1984.
- YOUR SCHEDULE DID NOT PERMIT A PHOTO OP
 BEFORE HE DEPARTED LAST FALL.
- FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, HAS SERVED IN
 GERMANY, BRAZIL, USSR.
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR, VOICE OF AMERICA,
 1983-1984.

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186169	FORM RE. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	5/1/1985	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/22/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Photo with Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky,
U. S. Ambassador to Bulgaria

DATE: May 30, 1985

TIME: 4:30 pm - during Administrative Time

DURATION: 5 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|------------|
| cc: K. Barun | J. Kuhn | R. Kimmitt |
| P. Buchanan | C. McCain | |
| D. Chew | B. Oglesby | |
| T. Dawson | E. Rollins | |
| B. Elliott | J. Rosebush | |
| M. Friedersdorf | R. Scouten | |
| C. Fuller | R. Shaddick | |
| W. Henkel | B. Shaddix | |
| E. Hickey | L. Speakes | |
| J. Hirshberg | WHCA Audio/Visual | |
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