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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Zuber/F99-080/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	from James Nance, re: ...Support for the 1982 Economic Summit, 1 p. <i>Part 209/02 F99-080/1 #37</i>	12/23/81	P3/F3
2. Memo	Henry Nau through Bailey to Nance, re: ...Support for the 1982 Economic Summit, 1 p. <i>R n n #38</i>	12/21/81	P3/F3
3. Mtg Notes	Meeting of Personal Representatives [for] Versailles Summit, 11 p.	[12/81]	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 20 NOV 81 11

TO PRES

FROM MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS DOCDATE 19 NOV 81

Boat

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

HS

ECONOMICS

*Open file.
Versailles
Summit*

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES SUGGESTING FRANCE HOST NEXT MTG OF INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS

ACTION: RECM & DRAFT REPLY

DUE: 27 NOV 81 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

WEISS

CLEVELAND

BAILEY

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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REFERRAL

DATE: 20 NOV 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: MITERRAND

DATE: 19 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL IMMIGRATION

KENNEDY, R

REFUGEES

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS

AND DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 81

COMMENTS:



FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO

F WH

O JF C HW

Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis

Washington, DC

November 19, 1981


Dear Mr. Allen,

You will find herewith, for transmission to its high addressee, the text of a message sent by President Mitterrand which I have been asked today, November 19, to convey to President Reagan.

As soon as I receive the original of this message, I will also send it to you for transmission.

With my sincere thanks for your help and best regards,

Sincerely yours,



François Marcel Plaisant
Minister Counselor

The Honorable
Richard Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Monsieur le Président,

Vous aviez, lors de notre rencontre à Ottawa, accepté l'invitation que j'avais formulée au nom de mon pays, de réunir en France le prochain Sommet des pays industrialisés.

J'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer cette invitation et de vous proposer de nous réunir au Chateau de Versailles les 7 et 8 Juin prochains.

En espérant que cette date vous conviendra, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Signé : François Mitterrand

81 19 24. 25

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

for stuffing



SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC


*Industries Courtis
meet in Room*

Castle of Versailles

~~12/15~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 7, 1981

*Open file
Paris
Summit*

TO:  NORM BAILEY
DENNIS BLAIR
DON GREGG
JIM RENTSCHLER

FROM: HENRY NAU

The Personal Representatives of the Economic Summit governments meet on December 12-13 to begin discussing issues for the next Economic Summit in Paris. I drafted the attached paper to stimulate some initial thinking in State and Treasury about our approach to the Paris Summit. I would appreciate any comments you may have.

Attachment

The Economic Summit: From Montebello
to Versailles

At the Ottawa Summit in July, the United States encountered:

- Strong criticism of high U.S. interest rates and general skepticism about U.S. domestic economic policies, particularly the mix of monetary and fiscal policies and the policy of non-intervention in exchange markets.
- Sharp conflicts between the European Community and Japan in trade relations and a wider tendency among all countries to focus increasingly on trade "problems" (rather than opportunities) created by cyclical forces (recession) in Europe and structural rigidities.
- Opposition, in the generally poor domestic and international economic situation, to U.S. proposals to tighten trade restrictions with Eastern countries, particularly in areas such as energy which are not directly related to defense.
- Differences with the allies on the political urgency of the development dialogue with developing countries and on the approach to substantive development problems. France, Canada, Japan and the EC advocated increased aid, commodity agreements and new public institutions (e.g., Energy Affiliate), while the United States with private support from the UK and Germany pushed trade, private investment and commercial financing and no new institutions.

Despite these differences among participants, the Ottawa Summit was widely recognized by foreign governments and the press as a successful meeting. The United States and President Reagan, in particular, emerged as the renewed leader of the alliance. The summit communique sounded an upbeat economic note, despite the serious economic difficulties (particularly in Europe), and avoided even a hint of the protectionist language advocated by the European Community. Moreover, the summary of the political discussions released in a separate document by the Canadian host confirmed the extraordinary degree of consensus among the allies (initially expressed at the NATO ministerial meeting in early May) on the nature of the Soviet threat and the Western response to it.

Events since Ottawa have generally contributed to an exacerbation of differences between the United States and its allies on critical economic and political issues (the lone exception perhaps being the success of Cancun in bridging somewhat allied differences over North-South relations). Repeating the success of Ottawa at the Paris Summit in summer 1982 therefore will be an extremely difficult task. The United States will not have the advantage of a new President who was meeting some leaders for the first time at Ottawa or of a new program the results of

which were not yet evident for critical appraisal by the allies. And circumstances will be less favorable to resist protectionist pressures and to argue convincingly supply side economic concepts.

The key developments since Ottawa include:

- The onset of recession in the United States as well as in Europe, contributing to growing unemployment throughout the Western economy.
- Some decline in U.S. inflation and interest rates but fears that tight money policy will deepen and perpetuate the recession next year or that rates will increase again next year if private credit demand rebounds while federal budget deficits soar.
- The strength of the U.S. dollar throughout 1981 is expected to impact adversely next year on the U.S. trade balance, while an undervalued yen, among other factors, continues to fuel massive trade deficits with Japan both in the U.S. and Europe.
- Implementation of socialist economic policies in France which entail the possibility of higher inflation in France, a weaker franc, instability in the EMS, and conflicts with the United States and others over nationalization and foreign investment issues.
- Growing trade conflicts between the United States and Europe in steel, agriculture and textile sectors.
- An apparently worsening climate of economic and political resignation and protest in Europe, fueling the desire not only to maintain but also expand trade with the East (e.g., the gas pipeline project) and increasing pressures to cut defense obligations and to press ahead with arms control agreements.
- Unification of OPEC prices setting the stage, once recovery begins in the West, for a firming of the oil market that will again be vulnerable to short-term supply disruptions.
- The "bloom" of Cancun remains but may wear off by next spring if UN discussions contribute to new confrontation and isolation of the United States on third world issues.

These developments suggest at this point that the dominant issues at Versailles in summer 1982 are likely to include, roughly in order of priority, the following items:

-- Macroeconomic issues, particularly massive doubts about U.S. economic policies, which are unlikely to be muted as they were at Ottawa. If there is continued improvement in the U.S. in inflation and interest rates, the unemployment issue will move to center stage, creating great pressures for traditional demand-stimulus economic measures. French policies, assuming their full inflationary consequences are not yet visible, may gain enhanced recognition in the light as the appropriate response.

-- Trade issues, with the U.S. trade balance and domestic economic circumstances (particularly threatened Congressional actions on autos, etc.) increasing pressure on U.S. officials to "beat up" on the Europeans and Japanese, at least more so than was the case prior to and at Ottawa.

-- Monetary issues, with the French government expressing a traditional French interest and a current policy interest, stemming from domestic inflationary policies, in moving back to a more fixed exchange rate system.

-- East-West trade issues, unless the United States has toned down its policy emphasis on these issues, and, by June, worked these issues into discussions in lower profile fora, such as COCOM and IEA.

-- Energy and North-South issues are likely to be less important, particularly North-South issues if the United States can successfully avoid isolation in the U.N. over the next several months.

The likely seriousness of the macroeconomic, trade and monetary issues requires that we begin to consider now our strategy for dealing with them. Obviously, this strategy depends in good part on budget and other economic policy decisions taken by the Administration early next year. It also depends, however, on thinking through the purposes we hope to achieve in Paris and how we will use events between now and the next summit to press these purposes. Since we hold to the view that Summits are primarily consultative and not decision-making mechanisms, process aspects take on greater significance. We should think hard about a series of meetings between now and June to exchange views and show our sensitivity and desire to explain American policies (such as we did with the Sprinkel dinner, for example, at Vancouver).

-- OECD XCSS meetings.

-- Proposed EPC seminary on 1982 President's Economic Report.

- Trade discussions with Commission officials in January.
- President's trip to Europe for summit.
- Other events we need to create.

Drafted: H.R. Nau
12/7/81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Open file Paris Summit

December 23, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MCMAHON, DIRECTOR
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

SUBJECT: CIA Support for the 1982 Economic Summit

In past years, CIA's Office of Economic Research and other components played a very helpful role in the preparatory process for the annual economic summits. Both OER and the Office of Political Analysis, for example, did a substantial amount of work in advance of the President's participation in the Ottawa Summit in June.

The 1982 Economic Summit will be in Paris, tentatively in early June. Both the NSC and Treasury and State will again need substantial assistance from CIA. We have developed a good working relationship with [redacted] formerly in OER and now in the European and Global Issues offices respectively. I would hope that they could continue to serve as a joint contact point for CIA support, recognizing that they have to close the loop with appropriate components of the Directorate of Operations.

Again, CIA assistance in these economic summits has been valuable. I look forward to working with your people on the preparation process for the 1982 meeting.



James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

RELEASCD
F99-080/1 #37

CK

2/9/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Handwritten initials

December 21, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

SIGNED

THROUGH: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

FROM: HENRY R. NAU *HRN*

SUBJECT: CIA Support for the 1982 Economic Summit

I have drafted a short memo from you to John McMahon, Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, requesting that the CIA continue to provide analytical support for the preparation of the Economic Summits. The next one is scheduled for Paris in June of 1982. The CIA Office of Economic Research provided very valuable assistance in the preparation of the Ottawa and Cancun Economic Summits this past year. This office has been reorganized as part of the broader reorganization at the agency. But the individuals who coordinated the work for Ottawa and Cancun continue to provide the necessary liaison with the NSC and the agencies.

The memo indicates that we would like to maintain the current working relationships which were so valuable during the Ottawa and Cancun Summits.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo to McMahon at Tab I.

APPROVE ✓

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to John McMahon

DECLASSIFIED / *RE (EXE)*
NLS F99-080/1 #38
BY CAJ NARA, DATE 2/9/02

31-10-88

JANET COLSON



BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

Barley

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # 6364

32

40

Carroll
Barnett

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	✓	JC
BUD NANCE	✓	JC
JOHN POINDEXTER		
JACQUE HILL	✓	JH
JUDGE CLARK	✓	
JANET COLSON	✓	

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COMMENTS


Called [Signature]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 7, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: HENRY NAU

SUBJECT: President's Personal Representative for the
1982 Economic Summit

The attached memo (Tab A) sent to Dick Allen on November 13 examines the alternatives in designating the President's personal representative for the Economic Summit in France in June.

Mike Rashish attended the first preparatory meeting in Paris on December 12-13. His notes of the meeting are attached at Tab B. Three items emerged from this meeting that need urgent attention:

1. For immediate attention: The US is the only country that has not formally accepted the June 4-5-6 dates. France asked for confirmation by December 24.
2. For immediate attention: It has been suggested that the US might host the preparatory meeting on April 24-25. If we choose to do so, we would have to make the decision soon.
3. For immediate attention: Mike Deaver, the Vice President's office, Dick Darman, and NSC played a variety of roles in the preparation and execution of the Ottawa and Cancun Summits last year. It is imperative that the White House role, both internally and as it relates to the overall coordination with State, be clarified immediately. A number of options are available, which we would like to discuss with you as soon as possible.
4. For attention by February 1: France has requested a letter containing US suggestions on themes, agenda, and priorities for the Summit. This is the opening shot of deciding how issues will be formulated for the Summit discussions. Mike

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on January 6, 1988

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlr NARA, Date 10/12/00

~~Rashish has called: [redacted] January 12, at [redacted] level for preliminary review of [redacted]~~

Expected participants: Rashish and other State representatives, Sprinkel from Treasury, Henry Nau from NSC, and representatives from the Vice President's office and Council of Economic Advisers.

RECOMMENDATION

That we discuss this matter promptly.

_____ Discuss
_____ Handle Otherwise

Attachments:
Tab A - Memo to Allen
B - Rashish Notes

*Judge Clark called
Chuck Lynn 1/11/81
jefferson*

cc: Norm Bailey
Dennis Blair

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: NORMAN BAILEY *NB*FROM: HENRY NAU *HN*SUBJECT: President's Personal Representative for
French Summit

While I was away last week, Rud informed you that Mike Rashish's office seeks guidance on who will be the President's personal representative for the Summit next year in France. There are at least four options (and undoubtedly more):

1. Give Mike the go ahead to continue to play this role.

Pro:

-- supports Mike who richly deserves it and continues an arrangement which worked beautifully in the case of Ottawa (despite some self-serving views to the contrary)

Con:

-- may be inconsistent with present bureaucratic realities in State

-- perpetuates this role in State if Mike leaves

2. Transfer the role to the White House (you should assume it).

Pro:

-- consolidates representation with decision-making and avoids confusion of previous arrangements under V-P or State

Con:

-- invites conflict with State at an inauspicious time

3. Give Mike go-ahead but appoint a deputy to Mike in the White House

Pro:

-- disturbs status quo least and preserves option to move function to White House if Mike leaves

Con:

-- still inconsistent with present bureaucratic realities in State.

4. Appoint a White House official to serve with Mike as the President's personal co-representatives.

Pro:

-- gives White House official equal status with State (creating a position at the level of your deputy to be consistent with Mike's Undersecretary status)

Con:

-- formally divides rather than consolidates responsibility between State and White House.

This is an issue that requires some thought. The French seek an initial preparatory meeting in early December. A timely decision is necessary. Perhaps Norm, Chuck Tyson, I and others should discuss this with you.

Chuck Tyson concurs.

Discuss _____

Being handled otherwise _____

2 Attachments

Tab I Memo to RVA, Nov 2, 81

Tab II Memo to Colson, Nov 4, 81, w/atch

cc: Rutherford Poats

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: NORMAN BAILEY

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS

SUBJECT: President's Personal Representative for 1982 Economic Summit

*File
France
Summit*

Jacques Attali, Mitterrand's new Personal Representative for economic summits, has asked the Paris embassies of the six other summit countries to designate the other principal "sherpas" for the 1982 Economic Summit. He plans to hold the first preparatory meeting, believe it or not, in the middle of December. Mike Rashish's office called to clear a telegram stating that he continues to be our personal representative and will attend the December meeting.

The proposed response avoids stirring gossip. But it also tends to perpetuate the recent division of responsibility for actual inter-agency planning and decision-making from representation of the US at the international summit preparatory meetings. It would strengthen the presumption that when Mike leaves office his successor will continue to be the President's personal representative.

If you have any wish to consolidate US management of the preparatory processes in a single person, whether located in the White House or elsewhere, an answer to the Paris inquiry should be deferred while sorting out this delicate question.

RECOMMENDATION

That you give me your guidance on how to respond to State's designation of Rashish.

No Change _____

Defer answer pending review _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*File
Paris - France
Summit*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

November 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JANET COLSON

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS *RP*

Per your request, here is the Paris telegram re the President's personal representative for the next economic summit. State is clearing a message dealing only with the dates of the summit and postponing a response on the personal representative until I hear from Dick Allen. As to the date, State will tell our Paris Embassy to remind the French that we need to fix the dates of the OECD and NATO ministerial meetings, which normally precede the economic summits, before discussing the summit dates. The message will note that the White House has not had time to address this question adequately.

I Attachment
Paris 33063 Cable

cc: Norman Bailey
Henry Nau

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES) *dr 10/2/00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01
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PARIS 3063
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O 021835Z NOV 81
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SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4109

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 7597
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 8708
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3243
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4402

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 33063

E. G. 12065: GDS 11/02/81 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A.) OR-M
TAGS: EGEN, OCON, FR
SUBJECT: (C) NEXT SUMMIT MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT BREAKFAST THIS MORNING WITH UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH AND ME, JACQUES ATTALI, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S ADVISOR, RAISED QUESTION OF NEXT SUMMIT. HE SAID THAT MITTERRAND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT HELD NEAR PARIS, PERHAPS VERSAILLES, DURING THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF JUNE. HE WANTED IT TO BE LESS BUREAUCRATIC, WITHOUT A FORMAL COMMUNIQUE. TO THIS END NO MORE THAN 3-4 PREPARATORY MEETINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE HELD, AND ~~THEY PROPOSED THE FIRST BE DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF DECEMBER.~~ TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE, EACH COUNTRY, EXCEPT CANADA, WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THESE MEETINGS BY THE SAME PERSON AS BEFORE, I. E. ATTALI FOR FRANCE, SCHULMAN FOR GERMANY, ARMSTRONG FOR ENGLAND, BERLINGUER FOR ITALY, KIKUCHI FOR JAPAN. ATTALI WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE NAME OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AT THESE MEETINGS; HE HIMSELF VERY MUCH HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE THE SAME. FRANCE WOULD ALSO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF HAVING A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON RESPONSE TO ATTALI.
CHAPMAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dw NARA, Date 10/12/00

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*File
France
Summit*

To: Treasury - Mr. Sprinkel
NSC - Mr. Nau
CEA - Mr. Weidenbaum
Vice President's Office - Mrs. Dyke
EUR - Mr. Eagleburger
EB - Mr. Hormats
EA - Mr. Holdridge
Amembassy Paris - Ambassador Galbraith

From: Myer Rashish *MR*

Subject: Versailles Summit

Attached for your information is a copy of my notes on the December 12-13 meeting of Personal Representatives to begin preparations for the Versailles Summit.

Attachment:

Memcon.

*French want results but no preparations -
guar. recipe for success*

*Confirm June 4-6 date?
Host April 24-25 meeting?
Letter on special paper topics?*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 4/12/00

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~2/15~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1982

~~2/26~~
Versailles

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

SUBJECT: Preparations for the Economic and NATO
Summits, June 1982 (NSDD-25)

The President has reviewed and formally approved the Directive establishing agency responsibility for preparations for the Economic Summit in Versailles, France, on June 4-5-6 and the NATO Summit on June 9-10.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William Clark
William P. Clark

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 25

February 12, 1982

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND NATO SUMMITSJUNE 1982

As announced on January 29, I will be attending the annual Economic Summit in Versailles, France, on June 4-5-6, 1982, and a special NATO heads of state/government meeting on June 9-10, 1982. This Directive clarifies the responsibilities of various agencies in preparing for the two Summit meetings.

I. Economic SummitA. Preparations With Other Governments - "Sherpa" Team

The Secretary of State will designate from the Department of State the President's Personal Representative to head the U.S. delegation to preparatory meetings for the Economic Summit. A representative of the NSC staff and of the Department of Treasury will also participate as official members of this delegation.

B. Preparations Within the U.S. Government

The President's Personal Representative will convene a Senior Interdepartmental Group with representatives from the Vice President's Office, the Departments of Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce and Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, USTR, NSC, and CEA to coordinate preparations for the Economic Summit. The NSC representative will serve as Executive Secretary of the SIG and will coordinate with a representative of the Office of Cabinet Affairs. The SIG will have responsibility for preparing all economic and political issues and briefing materials for the economic Summit, including coordination of U.S. participation in Summit preparatory meetings and other international meetings where Summit issues are discussed.

The SIG will coordinate on a regular basis through the National Security Council apparatus with a Senior White House Group chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Senior White House Group will provide guidance on all matters relating to the Economic Summit and will provide recommendations to me for decisions.

Discussions relating to the Economic Summit will be taken in the National Security Council expanded to include the agencies participating in the SIG. Discussions of Summit-related issues may also take place in the relevant Cabinet Councils, as determined by the Senior White House Group.

II. NATO Summit

A. Preparations With Other Governments

The Secretary of State has primary responsibility for representing the United States in policy preparations with other countries for the NATO Summit.

B. Preparations Within the U.S. Government

The Department of State will convene and chair a Senior Interdepartmental Group with representatives from the Vice President's Office, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate preparations for the NATO Summit. The NSC representative will serve as the Executive Secretary of the SIG. The SIG will have responsibility for preparing all issues and briefing materials for the NATO Summit.

The SIG will coordinate on a regular basis through the National Security Council apparatus with a Senior White House Group chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Senior White House Group will provide guidance on all matters relating to the NATO Summit.

Decisions relating to the NATO Summit will be taken in the National Security Council.

RR

ECONOMIC SUMMIT PLANNING

(Decisions)

PRESIDENT

(Recommendations)

SENIOR WH GROUP

Co-Chairmen:
CLARK/DEAVER

MEESE/BAKER
DARMAN/McFARLANE

(Discussion)

OFFICE
CABINET
AFFAIRS

CABINET
COUNCILS

(Discussion)

N S C

(Coordination)

SHERPA
TEAM

PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE
(HORMATS)
SIG

EXEC. SEC.
NSC

VP
OFC

TREAS.

DOD

AGRIC.

COMM.

ENERGY

CIA

USTR

NSC
STAFF

CEA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1982

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*
SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on Preparations
for Economic and NATO Summits

To initiate preparations for your attendance at the Economic and NATO Summits, Mike Deaver and I have put together the attached Directive for your signature. It clarifies responsibilities of the various agencies in preparing for these two important meetings.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the Directive at Tab A.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Directive

National Security Council
The White House

CLASSIFIED

Package # 90045

82 APR 2 11:43

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>_____</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>_____</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	<u>_____</u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Sit Room	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>

I-Information A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	<u>_____</u>	Show CC	<u>_____</u>
CY To Meese	<u>_____</u>	Show CC	<u>_____</u>
CY To Baker	<u>_____</u>	Show CC	<u>_____</u>
CY To Deaver	<u>_____</u>	Show CC	<u>_____</u>
Other	<u>_____</u>		

COMMENTS

February 1, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CP*FROM: HENRY R. NAU *HRN*SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on Preparations
for Economic and NATO SummitsIssue

Should you request that the President issue a directive clarifying responsibilities among the various agencies for preparations for the Economic and NATO Summits?

Facts

On January 20, you received the memo at Tab III asking that you discuss the draft Presidential Directive on preparations for the Economic and NATO Summits with Mike Deaver. Apparently, Deaver sent back comments but the papers were lost. Chuck Tyson checked again with Deaver. Deaver approved the draft as is, although he asked if Meese would have any difficulty with the fact that the NSC will take decisions on issues related to the Summits, while the Cabinet Councils will only discuss these issues.

Discussion

Having only one Cabinet-level decision-making body make decisions for the Summits is the crux of the coordinating problem. If the Cabinet Councils take decisions as well as the NSC, more than one staff support mechanism in the White House will be coordinating with outside agencies to prepare these decisions. These parallel channels of coordination will create inevitable and unnecessary confusion and conflict.

The Directive will be most effective if it follows quickly on the announcement of the President's travel plans, which took place last Friday.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you decide to go forward with the memo and, if necessary, check with Meese and Haig before sending it to the President.

APPROVE *V*

DISAPPROVE _____

2. That you send the cover memo (Tab I) to the President, along with the Directive at Tab A for his signature.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

3. After the President signs the Directive, that you transmit it to the agencies by signing the cover memo at Tab II.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

Attachments

Tab I Cover memo to the President
 II Cover memo to the agencies transmitting Directive
 III January 20 memo to you
 A Presidential Directive

Alan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

File
Finance
Summit

Package # 0318

92 23 210 00

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	✓	<i>[Signature]</i>
BUD NANCE	✓	<i>[Signature]</i>
JOHN POINDEXTER	_____	_____
JACQUE HILL	_____	_____
JUDGE CLARK	✓	✓
JANET COLSON	✓	<i>[Signature]</i>

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____

*Chuck + Henry
Drawer was empty - waiting his
copy - vls - ok*

COMMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

SUBJECT: Economic and NATO Summits

This is to advise that the Secretary of State is authorized to confirm United States' attendance at the annual Economic Summit in Versailles, France, on June 4-5-6, 1982 -- and to arrange for a special NATO heads of state/government meeting on June 9-10, 1982. The dates of June 7-8, 1982, are set aside for briefings and a visit with the Pope.



CHARLES P. TYSON
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
(Coordination)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHARLES P. TAYSON
HENRY NAU *at*

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on Summit Preparations

Attached at Tab A is a draft Presidential directive to the agencies establishing responsibilities for preparations for the Economic Summit on June 4-5-6, and the proposed NATO Summit on June 9-10.

We have checked out the NATO Summit portions of the draft with Jim Rentschler and Dennis Blair, who would be the NSC staff members involved in the preparations. Per your instructions, we have not discussed the proposed arrangements with anyone in the agencies.

The following points are key in your discussions on this matter with Deaver and Haig:

- The Secretary of State retains all authority vested in him under NSDD-2.
- The one addition (not modification) to NSDD-2 is to place the NSC staff member in the position of Executive Secretary to the SIG. This White House role seems appropriate given the President's personal participation in the Summits and provides a point of daily contact between the SIG and the Senior White House Group, precluding any surprises or gaps in communications as we approach the Summit. Also note that the SIG coordinates with the Senior White House Group; it reports to the Secretary of State.
- For the Economic Summit, the directive indicates the White House offices that will participate in the Senior White House Group. You may not wish to specify these offices (since it is an internal White House matter) or to expand the list (e.g., to include the Communications office, Scheduling and Advance offices, Staff Secretary's office, etc.). At a minimum, you may wish to identify the Vice President's office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 1/20/88

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By *dh* NARA, Date 10/12/00

which played a role in the Ottawa Summit and may feel slighted if it is excluded entirely in the new directive. Listing other White House offices (or at least discussing their roles with Deaver and Haig in preparing this directive) has the advantage of ensuring that there will be no alternative channels of communications with the White House except through the NSC apparatus.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you discuss this directive with Deaver and then with Haig.

_____ Done

_____ Let's discuss

- 2. That you request that the President issue the directive as agreed by you, Deaver and Haig.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

Attachment
Tab A: Draft Directive