

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Bailey, Norman A.: Files
Folder Title: East-West Trade
(08/17/1982-08/23/1982)
Box: 5

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

Box Number 5

ZUBER

38

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
86823 MEMO	ROBINSON TO CLARK RE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROLS	2	8/17/1982	B1
86824 PAPER	DUPLICATE OF 86817	9	8/11/1982	B1
86828 MEMO	ROBINSON TO CLARK RE REPORT ON PIPELINE	1	8/19/1982	B1 B3
86837 MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 86818	1	ND	B1 B3
86840 REPORT	RE PIPELINE	6	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

ZUBER

Box Number

5

38

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86823	MEMO ROBINSON TO CLARK RE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROLS	2	8/17/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

ZUBER

Box Number

5

38

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86824	PAPER DUPLICATE OF 86817	9	8/11/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1982 AUG 17 PM 6 27

DF

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

82 AUG 17 P 6: 35

STATE ROOM

B

S/S #

EWT. 12

MESSAGE NO. 00016 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 4

FROM: R. AHERNE C X29332 7250N.S.
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Pipeline Sanctions: Legislative Strategy for the Findley Bill (H.R. 6836) and Tsongas Bill (S. 2836)

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Under Secretary Ikle</u>	<u>697-7200</u>	<u>4E830</u>
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Under Secretary Olmer</u>	<u>377-2867</u>	<u>3850</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Mr. Ken Duberstein</u>	<u>456-2230</u>	<u>2nd floor West Wing</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Mr. Robert Kimmit</u>	<u>395-4970</u>	<u>395</u>
	<u><i>NAU Robinson</i></u>		
	<u><i>Baker</i></u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: *NH Eady*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Secretary Ikle
Under Secretary Olmer
Mr. Ken Duberstein
Mr. Robert Kimmit

FROM: T - Under Secretary Buckley

SUBJECT: Pipeline Sanctions: Legislative Strategy for
the Findley Bill (H.R. 6836) and Tsongas Bill
(S. 2836)

SUMMARY

It is imperative that we begin to plan a strategy for defeat of these bills and mobilize our resources immediately. Although defeat of this legislation on the House floor could prove difficult, the situation in the Senate is more promising. Nevertheless, we must make every effort to defeat the bill in the House because of the political damage that would result from its adoption. In any event, our actions must clearly signal that the President remains fully and forcefully committed to the sanctions.

Stopping this bill on the House floor will be a difficult task. While House floor action on the Findley bill in theory could begin as early as Thursday (August 19), there are strong signs that this date will slip. Strategy for floor action will also be greatly complicated by the fact that Bob Michel is a supporter of the Findley measure.

A new factor is the Tsongas Bill (S. 2836) which contains language identical to the House version. Senator Tsongas may attempt to offer his legislation as an amendment to the debt ceiling bill currently before the Senate. In the Senate, however, we should have strong support from Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn and conservative Senators such as Bob Kasten who have been urging us to be tougher with the Soviets over Poland. In any event, we need to meet to coordinate strategy just as soon as possible and will try to arrange for a meeting this afternoon.

GENERAL THEMES

Our legislative action plan seeks to exploit the following four themes in our contact with House and Senate Members:

-- Poland: Sanctions are a measure of the United States Government's condemnation of Soviet actions in Poland. To abruptly lift the sanctions, at a time when Polish workers have taken to the streets again, sends entirely the wrong signal at the wrong time.

-- Infringement of Presidential Authority: The lifting of the sanctions interferes with the President's power and prerogatives. Termination of sanctions leaves the allies with a greater sense of confusion about who manages foreign policy and strongly suggests to the Soviets that the President lacks the authority to make his measures stick.

-- Inconsistency on Sanctions: It should be forcefully pointed out to those Members who have recently voted to tighten sanctions for Syria/Iraq/South Africa that relaxing sanctions against the Soviet Union is not a consistent policy.

-- Senate Action: House Members should realize that their action will be largely futile since the chances of the Senate passing any such similar legislation are very slim.

ACTION PLAN

Listed below are the main elements in our legislative action plan which can be revised or adapted to fit whatever circumstances should occur on the House or Senate floor. Suggested taskings are indicated.

-- Presidential Letter: Direct Presidential intervention is critical to our campaign. Preferably, this could take the form of a Presidential letter but we might also use a few selected phone calls to key Members to indicate the deep commitment of the President to the sanctions. (State to draft with DOD, DOC and NSC clearance)

-- Dear Colleague Letter: While the Presidential letter would effectively take the high ground, a Dear Colleague letter could appeal to more visceral instincts, particularly among Republicans. (State and DOD to draft, DOC and NSC clearing)

-- Phone Calls: A telephone campaign to key House Republicans and Democrats should be undertaken, both to convey the President's position but also to get a vote count. Agencies should divide up Members so that natural constituencies are involved, e.g., DOD contacts with Armed Services Committees.

-- Briefings of Republican Leadership: Secretaries Shultz, Weinberger or Baldrige could brief the House Republican Conference and/or the Senate Republican policy luncheon.

POSSIBLE ALLIES

We need to identify supporters and allies who will be helpful to us during the floor debate. Since Bob Michel will probably have to vote against us, we should look to Trent Lott as a possible floor leader and Republican spokesman. Lott will also be helpful during the Rules Committee debate. On the Senate side, we need to coordinate our strategy with Majority Leader Baker, Jake Garn (his Committee has formal jurisdiction over the Tsongas Bill), Jesse Helms and Bob Kasten.

Other House groups that we should look to include the following:

-- The House Republican Study Committee (Conservative House Republicans)

-- State will take the lead in contacting the Republican Leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Bill Broomfield and Bob Lagomarsino spoke out forcefully in support of the President's position during full HFAC markup and presumably could take leading roles during floor action. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of course, we expect more difficulty because Senator Percy is likely to oppose us.

-- DOD and DOC should make a full dress effort to personally visit as many of their allies on the Armed Services and Commerce Committees of both Houses as possible.

-- Organized labor. Lane Kirkland's organization represents a potent force. We should bring him into our thinking as quickly as possible with the objective of generating grass-roots support for the pipeline sanctions.

URGENT

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

snf 3/15/10

TO:

For


Clearance: EB/TDC/EWT - WARoot

L/EB - JCrook

EB - DRyan

H - MJohnson

EUR/RPE - RFriel

From: EB/TDC/EWT - RBoucher 21509 

8/17/82

127B28

Garn's staff confirms that Tsongas will probably offer his amendment (same as Findley Bonker in the House) on the floor today or tomorrow. Their preliminary plans are to offer the attached text as an amendment to the Tsongas amendment. He would like to be armed with a letter of Administration support.)

URGENT

Draft letter for the NSC or for Powell Moore

Dear Senator Garn:

I am writing to urge your opposition to S 2836. That bill would reverse the President's decisions of December and June to impose foreign policy export controls on exports to the Soviet Union. The export controls were a necessary part of our strong response to the brutal suppression of the Polish people by Polish military authorities with Soviet encouragement and backing.

The legislation would remove a significant instrument of pressure on the Soviet Union. The controls imposed by the President on the export to the USSR of oil and gas equipment and of high technology are targeted against critical sectors of the Soviet economy in order to make them pay a specific cost for their support of Polish repression. The Soviets must understand that if they wish to avoid those costs they must encourage reconciliation in Poland. The negative impact of our measures on U.S. commercial interests is an unfortunate sacrifice needed to further specific foreign policy goals. These goals are the agreed upon Allied conditions of progress in Poland: lifting of martial law, release of the political prisoners, and reestablishment of a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. The decisions of December and June are fully consistent with the Export Administration Act of 1979.

The Congress quite properly establishes guidelines and criteria for foreign policy export controls. However, legislation should not mandate imposition or removal of specific controls. S.2836 would intrude on the authority of the Executive Branch to pursue major foreign policy goals, and would limit our flexibility to deal with a crisis of major importance to the West.

URGENT

Your staff has made available to us the text of changes you seek to make in the amendment. We support those changes since the measure in its new form would restate the policy guidelines which apply to this decision: the emphasis on the situation in Poland and US willingness to reconsider our sanctions if the situation there should improve.

Sincerely yours,

URGENT

20

127A30

Termination of Certain Controls: Those export controls imposed under this section on December 30, 1981 and June 22, 1982 on goods or technology shall not be effective should the President determine that conditions in Poland, with respect to the ending of the state of martial law, to the release of those arrested under martial law, and to the restoration of a dialogue with the church and Solidarity, have progressed sufficiently to merit the discontinuation of said controls.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Secretary Ikle
Under Secretary Olmer
Mr. Ken Duberstein
Mr. Robert Kimmit

FROM: T - Under Secretary Buckley

SUBJECT: Pipeline Sanctions: Legislative Strategy for
the Findley Bill (H.R. 6836) and Tsongas Bill
(S. 2836)

SUMMARY

It is imperative that we begin to plan a strategy for defeat of these bills and mobilize our resources immediately. Although defeat of this legislation on the House floor could prove difficult, the situation in the Senate is more promising. Nevertheless, we must make every effort to defeat the bill in the House because of the political damage that would result from its adoption. In any event, our actions must clearly signal that the President remains fully and forcefully committed to the sanctions.

Stopping this bill on the House floor will be a difficult task. While House floor action on the Findley bill in theory could begin as early as Thursday (August 19), there are strong signs that this date will slip. Strategy for floor action will also be greatly complicated by the fact that Bob Michel is a supporter of the Findley measure.

A new factor is the Tsongas Bill (S. 2836) which contains language identical to the House version. Senator Tsongas may attempt to offer his legislation as an amendment to the debt ceiling bill currently before the Senate. In the Senate, however, we should have strong support from Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn and conservative Senators such as Bob Kasten who have been urging us to be tougher with the Soviets over Poland. In any event, we need to meet to coordinate strategy just as soon as possible and will try to arrange for a meeting this afternoon.

GENERAL THEMES

Our legislative action plan seeks to exploit the following four themes in our contact with House and Senate Members:

-- Poland: Sanctions are a measure of the United States Government's condemnation of Soviet actions in Poland. To abruptly lift the sanctions, at a time when Polish workers have taken to the streets again, sends entirely the wrong signal at the wrong time.

-- Infringement of Presidential Authority: The lifting of the sanctions interferes with the President's power and prerogatives. Termination of sanctions leaves the allies with a greater sense of confusion about who manages foreign policy and strongly suggests to the Soviets that the President lacks the authority to make his measures stick.

-- Inconsistency on Sanctions: It should be forcefully pointed out to those Members who have recently voted to tighten sanctions for Syria/Iraq/South Africa that relaxing sanctions against the Soviet Union is not a consistent policy.

-- Senate Action: House Members should realize that their action will be largely futile since the chances of the Senate passing any such similar legislation are very slim.

ACTION PLAN

Listed below are the main elements in our legislative action plan which can be revised or adapted to fit whatever circumstances should occur on the House or Senate floor. Suggested taskings are indicated.

-- Presidential Letter: Direct Presidential intervention is critical to our campaign. Preferably, this could take the form of a Presidential letter but we might also use a few selected phone calls to key Members to indicate the deep commitment of the President to the sanctions. (State to draft with DOD, DOC and NSC clearance)

-- Dear Colleague Letter: While the Presidential letter would effectively take the high ground, a Dear Colleague letter could appeal to more visceral instincts, particularly among Republicans. (State and DOD to draft, DOC and NSC clearing)

-- Phone Calls: A telephone campaign to key House Republicans and Democrats should be undertaken, both to convey the President's position but also to get a vote count. Agencies should divide up Members so that natural constituencies are involved, e.g., DOD contacts with Armed Services Committees.

-- Briefings of Republican Leadership: Secretaries Shultz, Weinberger or Baldrige could brief the House Republican Conference and/or the Senate Republican policy luncheon.

POSSIBLE ALLIES

We need to identify supporters and allies who will be helpful to us during the floor debate. Since Bob Michel will probably have to vote against us, we should look to Trent Lott as a possible floor leader and Republican spokesman. Lott will also be helpful during the Rules Committee debate. On the Senate side, we need to coordinate our strategy with Majority Leader Baker, Jake Garn (his Committee has formal jurisdiction over the Tsongas Bill), Jesse Helms and Bob Kasten.

Other House groups that we should look to include the following:

-- The House Republican Study Committee (Conservative House Republicans)

-- State will take the lead in contacting the Republican Leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Bill Broomfield and Bob Lagomarsino spoke out forcefully in support of the President's position during full HFAC markup and presumably could take leading roles during floor action. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of course, we expect more difficulty because Senator Percy is likely to oppose us.

-- DOD and DOC should make a full dress effort to personally visit as many of their allies on the Armed Services and Commerce Committees of both Houses as possible.

-- Organized labor. Lane Kirkland's organization represents a potent force. We should bring him into our thinking as quickly as possible with the objective of generating grass-roots support for the pipeline sanctions.

24

CONCLUSION

Finally, we should take pains to portray the sanctions as a foreign policy measure directed against Soviet actions in Poland and not just an "anti-pipeline" policy.

25

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6838

To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to terminate certain export controls imposed on December 30, 1981, and June 22, 1982.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 22, 1982

Mr. FINDLEY (for himself and Mr. BONKER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to terminate certain export controls imposed on December 30, 1981, and June 22, 1982.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 That section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
4 U.S.C. App. 2405) is amended by adding at the end thereof
5 the following new subsection:

6 “(1) TERMINATION OF CERTAIN CONTROLS.—Those
7 export controls imposed under this section on December 30,
8 1981, and June 22, 1982, on goods or technology shall not

1 be effective on or after the date of the enactment of this
2 subsection.”.

○

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

ZUBER

Box Number

5

38

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86828	MEMO ROBINSON TO CLARK RE REPORT ON PIPELINE	1	8/19/1982	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

ZUBER

Box Number

5

38

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86837	MEMO DUPLICATE OF 86818	1	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/9/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [08/17/1982-08/23/1982]

FOIA

F99-078/3

ZUBER

Box Number

5

38

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86840	REPORT RE PIPELINE	6	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Richmond Times-Dispatch

JOHN STEWART BRYAN III

Publisher

EDWARD GRIMSLEY
Editor of the Editorial Page

ALF GOODYKOONTZ
Executive Editor

MARVIN E. GARRETTE
Managing Editor

Monday, August 16, 1982

John Chamberlain

But Can They Lay a Pipeline?

THE SOVIETS, so it is reported, will be building the Siberia-to-Europe gas pipeline with slave labor. Well, there isn't any other kind of labor to be had in Russia, so what else is new?

For myself, as an assiduous reader of Radio Liberty translations from the Soviet press, I wonder how the slaves will ever manage to complete the pipeline even if they do get Western financing and the full complement of high-grade American-patented pumping equipment.

It wasn't so long ago that a conclave of Soviet editors and Communist Party officials was complaining that nobody seemed able to complete an oil and gas complex linking West Siberian fields with local Russian manufacturing centers.

To quote from a Radio Liberty summary of Soviet planning discussions, the "whole planning system is chaotic. . . . The schedule for laying pipelines is not coordinated with the construction of compressor stations and other installations. There is no overall plan for the integrated equipment of pipelines although the production plan for the fields they are to serve already exists. There have even been cases in which it has not been clear where the pipelines are to be laid."

Pipeline construction everywhere is riddled with defects, but the "client bodies" that commission the construction, never bother with visiting the sites. Thus there is never any follow-through.

The Ob compressor station, for example, was built in a marsh. But only 34,000 tons of sand were provided instead of the 50,000 tons that were actually required.

Special storage space, transport and machinery is needed for use in the north, but it is virtually impossible for those in charge of fulfilling vehicle construction quotas to adapt their products to meet specialized conditions.

Deliveries of machines and equipment in the north country are wholly hit-or-miss. Materials arrive in huge quantities all at once, without reference to storage possibilities. In order to avoid waiting to be unloaded, the drivers of trucks dump pipes into the snow, from which they have to be exhumed when construction personnel get around to it.

Material orders are so imprecise that the delivered pipes are often of the wrong diameter or have been dispatched to the wrong destinations. Redirecting them is a major problem.

"Quite frequently," so Radio Liberty analyst Allan Kroncher says, "the firms responsible for carrying out the work receive their production targets too late, the targets are beyond the capability of the firms, and the materials required are not available."

"For example, even before the start of the winter construction season, when almost two-thirds of the annual pipeline construction program in the northern areas is carried out, the construction organizations had still not received

their guidelines for 1982 and, consequently, had no precise idea what equipment and resources they would need."

★★★

SINCE THE FULL story of Soviet ineptitude in building pipelines in Arctic country is available in the Soviets' own press, one can only wonder that Western bankers are willing to finance the gas pipeline from Siberia to West Europe. Says Kroncher, "The true extent of assistance required by the Soviet Union is emerging only gradually but may yet jeopardize the gas-for-pipes agreement."

Ronald Reagan is concerned lest the West Europeans become too dependent on Siberian gas. But if Soviet experience tells us anything, that gas will be a long time in coming. It is obvious that slaves can't do construction work that requires any expertise. When it was a matter of digging a canal to connect the Gulf of Finland with the White Sea, all that was needed was strong backs.

But laying pipe and connecting it with a system of compressors requires not only strong backs but skilled direction. This direction could be imported if Brezhnev were to emulate Peter the Great and extend a welcoming hand to Western experts on the spot. But is it likely that a suspicious KGB would permit foreign construction crews to take over in Siberia?

The bigger danger is not that the



Chamberlain

Soviets will be able to blackmail Western Europe by shutting off the gas. What should really be worrying West Germany's Helmut Schmidt and France's Mitterand is the probability that they will still be waiting for the gas in 1990.

A determined effort by Britain and Norway, with North Sea gas at their disposal, could still beat the Soviets in supplying an alternative energy to West Germany and France. Ronald Reagan still has time to talk to Maggie Thatcher and the Norwegians.

© 1982 King Features Syndicate, Inc.

158