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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB PEARSON

FROM: SALLY GROOMS *SG*
SUBJECT: ALERT LIST Rev. 4

For this fourth and last Potential Problems Alert List before the President departs on Wednesday, we have divided issues into two groups: those most likely to have an impact during the trip (as well as beyond) and those of somewhat less immediate concern in terms of the trip. We continue to judge the level of seriousness on the merits of the issue itself without regard to its likelihood to impinge on the trip or Summit.

Otherwise, the main changes from the third list of May 20:

- o Persian Gulf events, including reaction of allies to the Stark attack, create a major new unknown in analyzing probable developments during the next two weeks; at best, could distract from other Summit issues;
- o early media treatment of the Summit has led us to revise that issue, replacing possible lack of public interest with concern that media could play the Summit as a demonstration of weakness in Western leadership;
- o recent polling in Europe led us to add "equidistancing" as a problem of immediate concern; the trip offers excellent opportunities to counter this view;
- o Gorbachev's East-West initiative expected during his visit to East Berlin did not happen; such a move is still possible, but not likely during the trip;
- o the question of handling the South Africa issue at the Summit apparently has been settled.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NSE/State Waivers
BY: *[Signature]* 3/20/2020

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Potential Problems Alert List (Revision 4)

June 1, 1987

VENICE SUMMIT/EUROPEAN TRIP PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Immediate Issues

1. Debate on INF:

- o Problem: Perception among some in U.S. and abroad that INF agreement will weaken Western security, divide NATO and give the Soviet Union political victory. Other voices, especially in Europe, call for any nuclear arms agreement, almost regardless of content.

-- Level of seriousness: High

- o Recommended treatment:

-- Speeches during the trip provide opportunities for focussing world attention on U.S. positions; exploit other occasions on trip for briefings, etc;

-- If INF issue is resolved among Europeans during trip, ensure U.S./NATO position is stressed in all public statements by the President, others;

-- Stress Alliance consultations;

-- Maintain aggressive interagency effort stressing that good INF agreement is an historic event in interest of the West;

-- Stress NATO's commitment to maintaining doctrine of flexible response while pursuing verifiable nuclear arms reductions and avoiding undue political or military burden on any NATO member;

-- Stress that good agreement is result of Presidential leadership and steadfastness;

-- Encourage NATO allies to engage their own publics in support of objectives on INF.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Waiver's

BY dhr 3/20/2020

2. Ineffectual Summit:

- o Problem: Lack of specific actions from Summit could create public perception of Western leadership unable to coordinate effective solutions to international problems; Summit could appear irrelevant to international scene.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Set specific, achievable, substantive objectives for Summit, e.g. in agriculture, terrorism, countering charge that Summit is all words and no action;
 - Brief heavily on background to shape media -- including foreign media -- expectations and define "success" on our terms;
 - Ensure 6,000 journalists covering Summit have substantive headline stories to report;
 - Tie the Summit and the trip as a whole to the range of U.S.-European/U.S.- Japanese issues.

3. Volatile Middle-East/Persian Gulf

- o Problem: Unpredictable events in the Middle East/Persian Gulf -- military confrontation, terrorist action -- could blow up in crisis while President is in Europe; Gulf issues could dominate coverage of Summit, detract from Western unity, U.S. leadership.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Active consultations with Congress could help build/demonstrate bi-partisan support for Presidential leadership;
 - Work for demonstrable Summit unity on key issues of region, including the Gulf, terrorism;
 - Plot contingency actions/statements for the unforeseeable.

4. The Problem of "Equidistance"

- o Problem: Increasing numbers of Europeans (according to polls), especially Germans, say that there is little to choose between the "superpowers" and that Soviet Gorbachev is more actively working for world peace than U.S.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - The trip itself will demonstrate unity of Western community and U.S.-European link;
 - Major speeches should stress U.S. commitment to Europe and emphasize values/principles fundamental to identity of the West;
 - Stress in speeches and briefings common Western approach to current issues of most concern to Europeans, e.g. arms control, East-West relations.

5. UK Elections:

- o Problem: UK parliamentary elections June 11 will absorb attention of UK press, others, distract from Summit.
 - Level of seriousness: Moderate.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Avoid any perception of U.S. involvement in UK electoral process;
 - U.S. statements on nuclear issues must not become campaign issues in UK;
 - Close, constructive relationship between the President and Mrs. Thatcher will be clear from meetings/discussions at Summit.

6. Italian Void:

- o Problem: Italian political situation killed state visit; President could appear underemployed during Italian visit.
 - Level of seriousness: Moderate.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Brief heavily on substantive objectives of Summit, trip;
 - Increase Presidential predeparture activities related to trip issues, e.g., Marshall Plan address;
 - Avoid impression of any involvement in Italian politics.

Longer Term IssuesA. Trade Crunch with Japan:

- o Problem: Perception in some quarters that U.S. sanctions against Japan could lead to a major trade war.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - If possible, announce lifting of sanctions before or during trip;
 - Stress U.S. support for free and fair trade;
 - Stress U.S. acted against Japanese violations only as last resort and seeks resolution of the problem;
 - The Summit itself should demonstrate that U.S. seeks to solve international economic problems through constructive cooperation.

B. Trade Crunch with Europe:

- o Problem: possible U.S. measures against unfair European trade practices in agriculture or other areas, create friction, threaten trade war.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

-- Work for concrete commitments on agriculture, other issues at Summit as demonstration of unity;

-- Stress U.S. desire to work for solutions to trade disagreements;

-- Ensure that U.S. positions on controversial issues, e.g., airbus, agriculture, are presented fully to media and public here and abroad.

C. Contrary Congress:

o Problem: Congress is challenging the President; legislative action could damage Presidential authority and leadership; key issues: trade, SDI, arms control.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

-- Take President's free trade message directly to the people; stress need for free trade, danger to America of protectionism;

-- Stress need for Congressional support on security/arms control issues and trade.

D. Iran-Contra Affair:

o Problem: continuing Congressional investigations will capture headlines daily; possibility of new revelations threatens re-ignition of issue.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Maintain stance of openness and cooperation with investigatory bodies;
- Continue demonstrating Administration's determination not to allow Iran-Contra to interfere with the process of government;
- Work for strong anti-terrorist statement in Venice Summit communique;
- Recess in hearings lessens seriousness of issue during trip itself.

E. The Uncertain Dollar:

o Problem: renewed fall of the dollar could threaten loss of faith in U.S. as economic leader and destabilization of international monetary system.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Stress U.S. position that dollar has fallen far enough, need for exchange rate stability;
- Urge trading partners to act to maintain dollar;
- Impress upon publics the negative consequences for them of a weak dollar.

F. ABM:

o Problem: confrontation with Congress over broad/narrow interpretation of ABM undercuts U.S. credibility as negotiator.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Avoid highlighting issue;
- Delay release of further Sofaer reports until after trip.

G. Nakasone's Political Situation:

- o Problem: Prime Minister Nakasone's political troubles could weaken key friend and international player; could weaken Summit effectiveness on international problems.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Ron-Yasu relationship remains strong;
 - Continue stressing message that U.S. seeks to resolve differences with Japan and deal with international economic problems through co-operation;
 - Settle U.S. sanctions as soon as possible.

H. Terrorism:

- o Problem: Iran-Contra affair undercuts U.S. anti-terrorism policy.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Seek strong declaration on terrorism from the Summit;
 - Stress firmness of U.S. policy, reaffirming U.S. opposition to dealing with terrorists.

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN POWELL

FROM: SALLY GROOMS *SG*
SUBJECT: ALERT LIST Rev. 4

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: State/Use Waivers
BY: ds [unclear] 3/20/2020

VENICE SUMMIT/EUROPEAN TRIP PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Immediate Issues

1. Debate on INF:

- o Problem: Perception among some in U.S. and abroad that INF agreement will weaken Western security, divide NATO and give the Soviet Union political victory. Other voices, especially in Europe, call for any nuclear arms agreement, almost regardless of content.
 - Level of seriousness: High
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Speeches during the trip provide opportunities for focussing world attention on U.S. positions; exploit other occasions on trip for briefings, etc;
 - If INF issue is resolved among Europeans during trip, ensure U.S./NATO position is stressed in all public statements by the President, others;
 - Stress Alliance consultations;
 - Maintain aggressive interagency effort stressing that good INF agreement is an historic event in interest of the West;
 - Stress NATO's commitment to maintaining doctrine of flexible response while pursuing verifiable nuclear arms reductions and avoiding undue political or military burden on any NATO member;
 - Stress that good agreement is result of Presidential leadership and steadfastness;
 - Encourage NATO allies to engage their own publics in support of objectives on INF.

2. Ineffectual Summit:

- o Problem: Lack of specific actions from Summit could create public perception of Western leadership unable to coordinate effective solutions to international problems; Summit could appear irrelevant to international scene.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Set specific, achievable, substantive objectives for Summit, e.g. in agriculture, terrorism, countering charge that Summit is all words and no action;
 - Brief heavily on background to shape media -- including foreign media -- expectations and define "success" on our terms;
 - Ensure 6,000 journalists covering Summit have substantive headline stories to report;
 - Tie the Summit and the trip as a whole to the range of U.S.-European/U.S.- Japanese issues.

3. Volatile Middle-East/Persian Gulf

- o Problem: Unpredictable events in the Middle East/Persian Gulf -- military confrontation, terrorist action -- could blow up in crisis while President is in Europe; Gulf issues could dominate coverage of Summit, detract from Western unity, U.S. leadership.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Active consultations with Congress could help build/demonstrate bi-partisan support for Presidential leadership;
 - Work for demonstrable Summit unity on key issues of region, including the Gulf, terrorism;
 - Plot contingency actions/statements for the unforeseeable.

4. The Problem of "Equidistance"

- o Problem: Increasing numbers of Europeans (according to polls), especially Germans, say that there is little to choose between the "superpowers" and that Soviet Gorbachev is more actively working for world peace than U.S.

- Level of seriousness: High.

- o Recommended treatment:

- The trip itself will demonstrate unity of Western community and U.S.-European link;

- Major speeches should stress U.S. commitment to Europe and emphasize values/principles fundamental to identity of the West;

- Stress in speeches and briefings common Western approach to current issues of most concern to Europeans, e.g. arms control, East-West relations.

5. UK Elections:

- o Problem: UK parliamentary elections June 11 will absorb attention of UK press, others, distract from Summit.

- Level of seriousness: Moderate.

- o Recommended treatment:

- Avoid any perception of U.S. involvement in UK electoral process;

- U.S. statements on nuclear issues must not become campaign issues in UK;

- Close, constructive relationship between the President and Mrs. Thatcher will be clear from meetings/discussions at Summit.

6. Italian Void:

- o Problem: Italian political situation killed state visit; President could appear underemployed during Italian visit.
 - Level of seriousness: Moderate.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Brief heavily on substantive objectives of Summit, trip;
 - Increase Presidential predeparture activities related to trip issues, e.g., Marshall Plan address;
 - Avoid impression of any involvement in Italian politics.

Longer Term Issues

A. Trade Crunch with Japan:

- o Problem: Perception in some quarters that U.S. sanctions against Japan could lead to a major trade war.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - If possible, announce lifting of sanctions before or during trip;
 - Stress U.S. support for free and fair trade;
 - Stress U.S. acted against Japanese violations only as last resort and seeks resolution of the problem;
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C. Contrary Congress:

o Problem: Congress is challenging the President; legislative action could damage Presidential authority and leadership; key issues: trade, SDI, arms control.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

-- Take President's free trade message directly to the people; stress need for free trade, danger to America of protectionism;

-- Stress need for Congressional support on security/arms control issues and trade.

D. Iran-Contra Affair:

o Problem: continuing Congressional investigations will capture headlines daily; possibility of new revelations threatens re-ignition of issue.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Maintain stance of openness and cooperation with investigatory bodies;
- Continue demonstrating Administration's determination not to allow Iran-Contra to interfere with the process of government;
- Work for strong anti-terrorist statement in Venice Summit communique;
- Recess in hearings lessens seriousness of issue during trip itself.

E. The Uncertain Dollar:

o Problem: renewed fall of the dollar could threaten loss of faith in U.S. as economic leader and destabilization of international monetary system.

- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Stress U.S. position that dollar has fallen far enough, need for exchange rate stability;
- Urge trading partners to act to maintain dollar;
- Impress upon publics the negative consequences for them of a weak dollar.

F. ABM:

o Problem: confrontation with Congress over broad/narrow interpretation of ABM undercuts U.S. credibility as negotiator.

- Level of seriousness: High.

o Recommended treatment:

- Avoid highlighting issue;
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G. Nakasone's Political Situation:

- o Problem: Prime Minister Nakasone's political troubles could weaken key friend and international player; could weaken Summit effectiveness on international problems.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Ron-Yasu relationship remains strong;
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H. Terrorism:

- o Problem: Iran-Contra affair undercuts U.S. anti-terrorism policy.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Seek strong declaration on terrorism from the Summit;
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM GRISCOM

FROM: SALLY GROOMS *Rf*
SUBJECT: ALERT LIST Rev. 4

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Comment / Venice Summit / European Trip Public Diplomacy

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Authority: NSC/state Waivers
3/20/2020

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Declassify on: OADR

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Auth: NSC/State W/over 3
BY ds
DATE 3/20/2020

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o Problem: Congress is challenging the President; legislative action could damage Presidential authority and leadership; key issues: trade, SDI, arms control.

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D. Iran-Contra Affair:

o Problem: continuing Congressional investigations will capture headlines daily; possibility of new revelations threatens re-ignition of issue.

-- Level of seriousness: High.

- o Recommended treatment:
 - Maintain stance of openness and cooperation with investigatory bodies;
 - Continue demonstrating Administration's determination not to allow Iran-Contra to interfere with the process of government;
 - Work for strong anti-terrorist statement in Venice Summit communique;
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E. The Uncertain Dollar:

- o Problem: renewed fall of the dollar could threaten loss of faith in U.S. as economic leader and destabilization of international monetary system.
 - Level of seriousness: High.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Stress U.S. position that dollar has fallen far enough, need for exchange rate stability;
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- o Problem: confrontation with Congress over broad/narrow interpretation of ABM undercuts U.S. credibility as negotiator.
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- o Problem: Prime Minister Nakasone's political troubles could weaken key friend and international player; could weaken Summit effectiveness on international problems.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
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H. Terrorism:

- o Problem: Iran-Contra affair undercuts U.S. anti-terrorism policy.
 - Level of seriousness: Low.
- o Recommended treatment:
 - Seek strong declaration on terrorism from the Summit;
 - Stress firmness of U.S. policy, reaffirming U.S. opposition to dealing with terrorists.

ROME REPORT
ON PRE-SUMMIT

UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE #1 **INTERVIEW**

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ACTION OFFICE PFW-02
INFO ACOC-01 DSO-02 VG-01 PG-01 PH-07 PGF-01 EU-03 PPF-01
TV-02 TVSP-03 TVP-04 TVS-02 TVSM-01 VBB-01 VBX-01
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USIA FOR P/R, P/F, TV/WC MESSINGER

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRE-ECONOMIC SUMMIT
INTERVIEWS WITH LA STAMPA AND RAI CHANNEL ONE TV

REF: USIA 34600

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRE-ECONOMIC SUMMIT INTERVIEW
WITH FOREIGN PRINT JOURNALISTS

- THE MAY 27 EDITION OF TURIN'S CENTRIST DAILY "LA STAMPA" (CIRCULATION APPROX. 420,000) LED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRE-ECONOMIC SUMMIT INTERVIEW WITH PRINT JOURNALISTS REPRESENTING THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. OTHER ITALIAN NEWS MEDIA, IN PARTICULAR MAY 27 RADIO NEWSCASTS, NOTE AND COMMENT POSITIVELY ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO THE PRINT JOURNALISTS REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT THIS YEAR.

- IN "LA STAMPA," INTERVIEW IS ACCOMPANIED BY A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PRESIDENT AND IS HEADLINED "REAGAN: 'U.S.-USSR SUMMIT BY THE END OF THIS YEAR'." THE Q&A PORTION IS PRECEDED BY AN INTRODUCTION THAT BEGINS WITH THE FOLLOWING QUOTE BY THE PRESIDENT: "I CAN'T DENY WHEREVER IN THE WORLD I FIND A COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, THEIR CONDUCT HAS BEEN SUCH THAT IT'S OF CONCERN... I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR ME TO INJECT ANY OPINIONS INTO YOUR ELECTIONS THERE, BUT I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL DO WHAT'S RIGHT, AS THEY HAVE FOR QUITE SOME TIME NOW." CARETTO COMMENTS: "IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THIS PRESIDENT, ON A MEMBER OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, WHILE REFRAINING FROM DIRECTLY EXPRESSING HIS VIEWS ON ITALIAN COMMUNISTS, HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS REGARDING THEIR TAKING A ROLE IN GOVERNMENT."

- CARETTO DESCRIBES PRESIDENT REAGAN DURING THE INTERVIEW AS "ELEGANT IN A GREY SUIT AND RED TIE, IN EXCELLENT SHAPE... THE LANGUAGE DURING THE INTERVIEW WAS OPTIMISTIC, WITH IRANGATE IN FULL SWING; INSTEAD OF A LEADER FACING A CRISIS AND CLOSE TO THE END OF HIS MANDATE, REAGAN APPEARED SELF-CONFIDENT, FIRM AND CONVINCED OF HIS PERSONAL ROLE IN HISTORY. ON IRANGATE, HE COMMENTED, "FRANKLY I SLEEP VERY WELL AT NIGHT. I NEVER THOUGHT ABOUT RESIGNING." HE EXPRESSED IN POSITIVE TERMS REGARDING HIS DIALOGUE WITH GORBACHEV: "I BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE A SUMMIT IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE END OF THIS YEAR..." ARTICLE CONTINUES WITH FULL TEXT OF INTERVIEW.

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN TV
JOURNALISTS

- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERVIEW WITH SIX TELEVISION JOURNALISTS REPRESENTING THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE VENICE SUMMIT LED THE MAY 27 MAIN EVENING NEWSCAST ON RAI MODERATE CHANNEL ONE TELEVISION. TO-1'S U.S. CORRESPONDENT GIUSEPPE LUGATO WAS SHOWN AS HE INTRODUCED THE OTHER FIVE JOURNALISTS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OPENED THE ROUND OF QUESTIONS AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUMMIT'S HOST COUNTRY. THREE-MINUTE FOOTAGE INCLUDED BOTH OF LUGATO'S QUESTIONS AND THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWERS TO THEM, AS WELL AS FRENCH-TV'S QUESTION ABOUT IRAN'S ANTICIPATED DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE. ESTIMATE AUDIENCE FOR THE RAI CHANNEL ONE EVENING NEWS IS 11 MILLION. 040505
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FOR **PRES.**
TOM
BRISCON
FYE / E.B