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**Collection:** Dobriansky, Paula: Files  
**Folder Title:** Albania 1981-1982  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

**Withdrawer**

RBW 12/16/2016

**File Folder** COUNTRY FILES: ALBANIA (1981-1982)

**FOIA**

F1640/3

**Box Number** 1

HERSHBERG

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
185588	MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. MET. W/ THE PRESIDENT BY ALBANIAN ÉMIGRÉ	1	3/6/1981	B1
185605	MEMO	PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO ALLEN AND JAMES NANCE RE. MTG. WITH LEKA	1	3/20/1981	B1
185807	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO ALLEN AND NANCE RE. MTG. W/LEKA I AND MINISTER OF COURT	1	3/20/1981	B1
185575	MEMCON	RE. MEETING WITH LEKA I	3	3/26/1981	B1
185580	NOTES	RE. ALBANIA	5	ND	B1
185582	TALKING POINTS	RE. ALBANIA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 185580]	2	ND	B1
185584	MEMO	WILLIAM STEARMAN TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY LEKA I OF ALBANIA [W/NOTATIONS]	2	4/10/1981	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
185586	MEMO	STEARMAN TO ALLEN RE KING LEKA	1	4/15/1981	B1
185607	CABLE	STATE 103493	1	4/23/1981	B1
185613	CABLE	RE. ALBANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS	2	7/29/1981	B1
185615	PAPER	RE. ALBANIA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 185613]	6	ND	B1
185622	CABLE	RE. ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY <i>PAR 12/16/2016 F1640/3 #185622</i>	1	12/9/1981	B1
185631	REPORT	RE. ALBANIA AFTER SHEHU: THE INTERNAL SCENE <i>R 12/20/2016 F1640/3 #185631</i>	9	4/2/1982	B1
185636	MEMO	BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM ALBANIAN ÉMIGRÉ	1	5/18/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
185640	LETTER	LEKA TO RR	3	3/22/1982	B1
185651	MEMO	RE. ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE	1	ND	B1
185655	MEMO	RE. ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE [ATTACHED TO DOC. 185651]	5	ND	B1
185679	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE. CLAIMS/GOLD SETTLEMENT WITH ALBANIA	2	12/18/1982	B1

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677




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
17/2/80


Dear Ronnie,

It was unfortunate that we were not able to meet last time I was here. I hope you received my cables. I shall be in the country for ten days and would like to see you very much. I call on you in the name of our old personal friendship and I assure you that I will not embarrass you or add to the very real difficulties



of your new Stewardship. You can have your  
 people contact me through my friend Captain  
 Frank A. Manson Counselor of Foreign Relations  
 of the American Legion whose phone numbers  
 are herein included office 202 / 861-2730  
 home 202 / 544-4221. I'm the great hope of  
 seeing you soon I remain yours in affectionate  
 friendship





President Ronald Reagan

The White House

Washington

677

By hand

Personal





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *AW 12/16/14*

RECEIVED 20 FEB 81 19

5

TO PRES

FROM LEKA 1

DOC DATE 17 FEB 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

KEYWORDS: ALBANIA

HS

AP

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO MEET PRES WHILE IN US

ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS

DUE: 27 FEB 81 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

STATE

PIPES

LENZ

FARRAR

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 3/low read s/s recom of no acic*

*RP, CF, CT*

DISPATCH

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W/ATTCH

FILE

*WH*

*(c) dgm*

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185605	MEMO  PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO ALLEN AND JAMES NANCE RE. MTG. WITH LEKA	1	3/20/1981	B1

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185807	MEMO  DOBRIANSKY TO ALLEN AND NANCE RE. MTG. W/LEKA I AND MINISTER OF COURT	1	3/20/1981	B1

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*Dobriansky* 1073 *file*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 30, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Summary of Your Meeting with Leka I  
 (Friday, March 20, 1981; 5:15 - 5:45 p.m.)

Attached at Tab A for your review is the memorandum of your conversation with Leka I of Albania. It is for record purposes only. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve this memorandum of conversation for the record. (U)

Approve  Disapprove

*As amended*  
*P. 3*  
*(4/3/81)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review March 30, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED  
 Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
 White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
 BY NARA *kw*, DATE *12/11/10*

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185575	MEMCON  RE. MEETING WITH LEKA I	3	3/26/1981	B1

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# 1073

RVA HAS SEEN

RECEIVED

81 MAR 30 P 7: 44

JANET COLSON

31/1000

BUD NANCE

31/1630

DICK ALLEN

Mar 31/1153

IRENE DERUS

3/1640

JANET COLSON

Dick - As you directed, I have gotten Bill Stearman involved

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

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185580	NOTES RE. ALBANIA	5	ND	B1

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185582	TALKING POINTS RE. ALBANIA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 185580]	2	ND	B1

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185584	MEMO  WILLIAM STEARMAN TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY LEKA I OF ALBANIA [W/NOTATIONS]	2	4/10/1981	B1

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>RD</sup>  
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Concern About King Leka's Activities

I thought you should be aware of a State Department cable reporting a conversation between EUR/EE Deputy Director Gilmore and Yugoslav Minister Counselor Sindjelic on April 22. Sindjelic expressed immense concern about the ramifications of recent Albanian-American actions on U.S.-Yugoslav relations and more specifically, King Leka's activities during his visit to the United States. According to Sindjelic, the "Voice of the Homeland" radio repeatedly broadcasted a report that King Leka had a series of meetings with high officials in the White House (you, Admiral Nance and Rear Admiral Garrick were mentioned) and that, in these meetings, Leka had reached "full agreement concerning the establishment of a greater Albania."

Attachment

cc: JWNance  
JColson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review April 23, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Waiver 8/6/10  
BY RW NARA DATE 12/16/16

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185607	CABLE  STATE 103493	1	4/23/1981	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

19 44

*file Albania*

*(Cipes:)*


*25*

April 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR PAMELA H. SMITH  
Special Assistant to the  
Director-Designate  
International Communication Agency

SUBJECT: Clearance of Presidential Message

The NSC Staff has cleared ICA's draft Presidential Statement for the exhibit "The American Museum -- an Experience in Community" to be held in Bucharest from October 13 - November 1, 1981. However, please note that several changes have been made in the attached text.

  
Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

Attachment

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

26

Welcome to the Exhibition

"The American Museum -- an Experience in Community"

The museum in America is a place of learning and culture, a place of art and history, a place that celebrates America's commitment to the artistic spirit and mankind's unending struggle for human freedom. Museums are vital centers of community cultural life, whose programs and activities are shaped by the interests of the people they serve. The people, in turn, nourish museums with their volunteer service as guides, board members and teachers. They contribute their time, money, and talent and enjoy a lively and continuing two-way relationship with these institutions.

Our museums thus provide a unique mirror of the American character. I wish to thank you for joining us at this exhibition, and I hope that by sharing this glimpse of our life and culture, understanding between our peoples will be strengthened.

Ronald Reagan

[Bucharest, Romania: October 13 - November 1, 1981] (Possible showings in two cities in Poland, late 1981 and early 1982.)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
185613	CABLE  RE. ALBANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS	2	7/29/1981	B1

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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COUNTRY FILES: ALBANIA (1981-1982)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
185615	PAPER  RE. ALBANIA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 185613]	6	ND	B1

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**LEKA 1st, A KING IN SEARCH OF FREE ALBANIA**

Interview of "LIBERATION" newspaper (1.10.82)

*He succeeded his father, King ZOG 1st in exile. Since, he has been travelling all around the world to keep in touch with the albanian refugees and to establish his head quarters in South Africa after having been forced to leave Spain. He hopes to give Albania his country a king, unless the people decide in favour of a republic.*

*LIB. It seems that you have claimed the landing on the albanian coast. Did these men act following your instructions ?*

*LEKA 1st. No. This landing operation really surprised us. We were aware of such a project, however it was not assumed by the National Liberation Army which is under my command. The landing operation has been organised by a group of nationalists whose members died like heroes. The National Liberation Army does not claim the landing but we feel proud of being Albanians when considering the braviour of these patriots.*

*LIB. Have you had any connections with this group ?*

*LEKA 1st. Yes. Some of the member of this group have been linked to the National Army of Liberation. We had a view that the chances of such an attempt would be limited for reasons that I cannot disclose. The thing that astonished me is the fact that TIRANA tries to obtain publicity through this landing operation, which is not the first one.*

*LIB. You seem to think that Enver Hoxha's followers seized the opportunity to invent this intervention for domestic political reasons in order to justify new major purges ?*

*LEKA 1st. No. The landing operation has taken place, I am sure about it. I know the chief of the commando Xhevdet Mustafa. He was preparing this intervention six months ago. The fact that TIRANA mentioned his name may be an indication that they have been killed.*

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36

LIB. *Of how many people was this group made up ?*

LEKA Ist. I cannot answer. Assuming some of the men have escaped, into the mountains I would not endanger their lives.

LIB. *Do you think such an operation was suicidal ?*

LEKA Ist. No. If it were planned in connection of the usual networks which could have helped the commando. This attempt is neither the first nor the last. The commando landed at 6 a.m. has been fighting for 5 hours against the local force. This shows that to penetrate Albania is not impossible.

LIB. *What kind of network are you referring to ?*

LEKA Ist. It's obvious that to carry out landing operation you need some local support. We have in the past achieved such interventions. To establish a network is not easy, but we have done it. It's not an important network but quite useful for our purposes.

LIB. *Do you intend to launch a more important operation ?*

LEKA Ist. Could be. I cannot say more about, it's understandable.

LIB. *Since 1939, you are a king without a kingdom. Where did you live during all this time ?*

LEKA Ist. My father King ZOG was forced into exile by the invasion of the fascist Italian troops six months before the second world war broke out. Although our country was occupied our warriors kept on fighting the enemy. The royal family left for Turkey, then France, Britain. After the war we did settle in Egypt and later on in 1955 in France. My father died in 1961 and I succeeded him. We lived afterwards in Spain till 1979.

LIB. *What happened to the "maquisards" ?*

LEKA Ist. Many of them pursued the struggle first against the Nazi occupation that followed, and then against the communist regime. Some had to leave the country in 1945, others during the period of 1950-58. It's to be mentioned that every time there have been purges in Albania, entire families have succeeded to escape. We believe that every year about 300 people manage to run away and to search refuge in camps set up in Greece, Italy and Austria. From there they are taken in charge of various organisations which favour their emigration. Some states like Belgium also offer asylum.

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37

LIB. *What relations do exist between yourself, King in exile, and these refugees ?*

LEKA Ist. We keep a close contact with all emigrants who are represented by various political parties or associations. Each political organisation publishes its own newspaper or magazine to keep alive the spirit of albanian nationalisme.

LIB. *Do you also promote a publication ?*

LEKA Ist. A few years ago, when we were in Madrid, the royal court edited a specific bulletin which disclosed information and news of what was happening inside Albania. Today, unfortunately we are no longer in a position to ful-fill this task. Nevertheless we keep close contacts with our various representatives and offices throughout the free world.

LIB. *These offices are they considered to be Embassies ?*

LEKA Ist. They are considered by some gouvernements as being representations of the royal court. We have such representations in South-Africa, in the United-States, Indonesia, Thaïlande, Sweden, Italy, France, Australia, etc...

LIB. *Do you often visit these offices ?*

LEKA Ist. Well, I do travel quite a lot and I do visit the albanian communities wherever I go. Our representatives organise meetings and various local activities and are linked by phone and telex to the court. We also receive a great deal of correspondance.

LIB. *How many Albanians would you reckon are ready to fight and help you in gaining the throne ?*

LEKA Ist. This is very difficult to tell. One thing impresses me and that is the opportunity I get on each trip to meet most albanian refugees. For instance when I arrived in Australia in 1970 about 3000 Albanians met me at the airport. In 1977, I also met as many as 8000 Albanians during my stay in New-York. I have the feeling that my fellow country men stauntly back me in my stuggle to free Albania from communisme.

LIB. *Financially how can you carry out such an activity ?*

LEKA Ist. I must admit it's very difficult. When my father died I was left incharge of a big family and a court. I had to work and started first in the Middle-East. where the future King Faysal of Saudi Arabia a friend of my father, offered me his help. He was the person who introduced me into business. In 1975, the situation in Albania became so critical that I had to reduce some of my business activity. Today financial support mainly depends on the Albanian community, sometimes on friends living in the moslem world, Albania being a country where Mohamedans, account for 70 % of the population.

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38

LIB. *Is the community generous ?*

LEKA Ist. Well, although sometimes it may seem difficult, I usually manage to obtain their help.

LIB. *During the rule of your father, King ZOG I<sup>st</sup>, Albania was the most under-developed country with 90 % of the people being illetrate. The communist regime, a real dictator ship, has solved this problem.*

LEKA Ist. Listen, Albania till 1912 was an ottoman province. The people were not united owing the old system enforced which had established various clans and tribes throughout the country. The promote nationalism after being five centuries under foreign occupation seemed very difficult and long to achieve. My father became in 1928, President of the Republic and later on King of the Albanians in 1928 by a majority vote of Parliament. Why ? because sequelles left by the earlier period of albanian independance endangered the unity of our nation and many attempts to upset law and order were initiated by heads of clans who did not want to relinquish their privileges. It was therefore necessary to name as head of state a capable man who would act and defend the people's interests, beyond all provincial ambitions or feudalism. Monarchy lasted 11 years from 1928-1939, which was a very short time to build a modern state. On the other hand, Yougoslavia, Greece and Italy had serious territorial claims on Albania. My father had to manoeuvre shrewdly in order to avoid foreign interference. As far as the home affairs were concerned he made Albania a free and "laïc" state, created schools and launched an agrarian reform. Education became compulsory, freedom of civil and religious rights were granted for the first time. It is difficult to compare today 11 years of our rule with 40 years of communist rule.

LIB. *It seems however that the country left by your father provided privileged grounds for communism ?*

LEKA Ist. On the contrary, Albania had a population about 70 % of agricultural activity. The farmers known to be conservatives reject collectivisme. Generally speaking communisme spreaded in countries where strong labour forces existed.

LIB. *Do you have any contacts with the actual communist government ?*

LEKA Ist. No. But we are able to penetrate the system thanks to our network. We are quite well informed of what goes on.

LIB. *You left your home in South-Africa since 3 months. What is the purpose of this trip, and what are you aiming at ?*

LEKA Ist. Yes indeed it's a long journey and my wife is asking me wether I still remember my family left behing... Since many years we had foreseen a destabilisation of Yougoslavia to occur after Tito's death. This risky eventuality would offer russian troops to concentrate on our boundaries. On the other hand, the albanian nationals of Kossova (N.D.L.R. autonomous province in Yougoslavia, the population of which is in a large majority, albanian) have been struggling against the present regime of Yougoslavia causing real unrest. If this situation goes on and the process of destabilisation takes place the Russians will certainly reach the Adriatic coast and very shortly control Albania.

LIB. Have you any connections with the Albanians of Kossova ?

LEKA 1st. Yes, we entertain very close ties with our population in Kossova. We have tried to calm down the situation in the province in order to use our influence against the albanian government. Our aim being to free Albania from communisme, which may offer the possibility to consider our claims on Kossova. But we have also noticed that Russians have interfered in Kossova in order to take position in Yougoslavia and to threaten our country. It is vital to stop the Soviets to take over Yougoslavia and this in everybody's interest.

LIB. Is this the main object of your trip .

LEKA 1st. Yes, I am trying to convince western powers to take the necessary steps, while it is not too late. Mind you I don't really expect much.

LIB. Have you had any contacts with President Mitterand ?

LEKA 1st. Not recently. I had though the pleasure meeting him at President Sadate's funeral.

LIB. Did you have the opportunity to discuss with him ?

LEKA 1st. Unfortunately not, there was a big crowd, we only exchanged greetings.

LIB. Would you think that France may support you in your struggle ?

LEKA 1st. I think it would be to her advantage. You couldn't imagine how desperate the albanian people are. Many uprisings have been crushed. There are many concentration camps holding 45 000 prisoners. There is some resistance and sabotage work in the factories. Unfortunately, all these actions are not coordinated ; it is our duty and job, as free Albanians, to organize the opposition movements. To achieve our goal we need moral and political support from the West.

LIB. Let us consider your living conditions. In 1979 you were asked to leave Spain, because the government did not appreciate your National Liberation Army.

LEKA 1st. To pretend that we had an army is really exagerating. We kept our head quaters there. The government waswell aware and quite understanding for a long time. External political pressures upon the Spanish government were responsible for our exile.

LIB. Was this after Franco's death ?

LEKA 1st. I am quite sure that had General Franco been alive he would have not given in to such foreign pressures. Having said this, I was also very friendly with H.M. King Juan Carlos.

40

In 1978, I asked him whether our activities disturbed the authorities and if such was the case, we would do something about it. His Majesty reassured me saying we could pursue our activities. After a short while however we were told to leave the country. The Spanish army backed us and even offered us help in matters concerning security questions.

*LIB. It appeared that the Spanish government was bothered about the large amount of weapons in your possession.*

*LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. We had some weapons to protect our head quarters and our documents.*

*LIB. Your next destination South Africa ?*

*LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Not exactly. We were given 7 days to leave Spain. It was not easy to obtain asylum elsewhere. Finally Rhodesia offered us hospitality. We lived there for fifteen months before moving on to South-Africa. All these removals were tiresome owing to the fact that we carried about two and a half tons of documents.*

*LIB. How many people are involved in your royal court ?*

*LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Many members who deal with various duties such as propaganda, information, relationship with the albanian communities etc... If you prefer the royal court is made up of our offices.*

*LIB. Are you not embarrassed to be given asylum by the country of apartheid ?*

*LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Not at all, we do not interfere with the home affairs of countries who have accepted us. On the other hand let's face it, South-Africa is one of those countries that fights communisme.*

*LIB. Franco's Spain and South-Africa, does your struggle against communisme necessarily depend on such regimes which follow basically a right wing policy ?*

*LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Not necessarily, but under these regimes we were given possibility to maintain our activity. That is why we remain thankful. If France also granted us the same facilities we would be very grateful.*

*LIB. They say that you carry a passport labelled "Kingdom of Albania " How is it issued ?*

*The royal court delivers such passports which are very useful to certain refugees deprived of identity cards.*

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41

*LIB. Certainly there is no Kingdom at all !*

LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Let me tell you that the document issued is a diplomatic passport given to active members.

*LIB. Does your passport bear the number one ?*

LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. No, mine is n° 14. Number one was my father's.

*LIB. Are you affraid of being assassinated ?*

LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. Not particularly. I do live with such an apprehension since I was a child. I received many threats, but now it's becoming very common.

*LIB. Will your son succeed you ?*

LEKA 1<sup>st</sup>. According to the constitution the king's son succeeds his father and becomes King of the Albanians. I hope by then our country will be freed and the monarchy back again unless our people would prefer a republic, after being consulted democratically.

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COUNTRY FILES: ALBANIA (1981-1982)

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185622	CABLE  RE. ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY	1	12/9/1981	B1

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DIADIN 342-2A (AS OF: 1605 EST 8 DEC 81)  
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)  
)  
ALBANIA: FOREIGN POLICY UPDATE. (U)  
)

1. (C) RECENT REPORTING COUPLED WITH ALBANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF ENVER HOXHA'S 8TH PARTY CONGRESS SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY IS STRONGLY SUGGESTIVE THAT TIRANA APPEARS TO BE MODIFYING ITS ISOLATIONIST FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE HOXHA PROBABLY HAS A NUMBER OF REASONS FOR EXPANDING FOREIGN RELATIONS AT THIS TIME, HIS INITIAL OVERTURES HAVE BEEN ECONOMIC. FURTHERMORE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF HOXHA'S LESS ISOLATIONIST ADVISERS HAVE ATTAINED MORE INFLUENCE AND ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS POLICY SHIFT.

2. (C/NOFORN) TIRANA HAS RECENTLY EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING TIES WITH SEVERAL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA, ITALY, AND SOME WESTERN NATIONS. IT SIGNED A PROTOCOL WITH BULGARIA ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT CALLS FOR AN INCREASE IN BILATERAL TRADE FOR 1982. FURTHERMORE, ALBANIA IS NEGOTIATING WITH THE ITALIANS TO ESTABLISH A SMALL COMMERCIAL FERRY LINE BETWEEN DURAZZO, ALBANIA, AND BARI, ITALY. YUGOSLAVIA ALSO IS NEGOTIATING TRADE EXPANSION WITH ALBANIA. HOWEVER, TENSIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND TIRANA OVER THE HEAVILY ETHNIC-ALBANIAN YUGOSLAV PROVINCE OF KOSOVO PRECLUDE ANY REALISTIC CHANCE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR TERM.

3. (C) HOXHA HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY VOCAL CONCERNING HIS IRREDENTIST ASPIRATIONS TOWARD KOSOVO PROVINCE. HE ANNOUNCED AT THE RECENT 8TH ALBANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS THAT KOSOVO SHOULD BE GRANTED REPUBLIC STATUS WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA. IN RESPONSE, THE OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV MEDIA ACCUSED THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP OF TRYING TO "LEGITIMIZE A RIGHT" TO INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND BELGRADE HAS LODGED AN OFFICIAL PROTEST TO THAT EFFECT. HOXHA, IN TURN, ACCUSED BELGRADE OF JAMMING SOME OF ALBANIA'S RADIO BROADCASTS TO KOSOVO. ALBANIA'S SUPPORT OF THE AIMS OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS INSIDE YUGOSLAVIA IS BOUND TO PROLONG BOTH THE KOSOVO PROBLEM AS WELL AS CONTINUE TO COOL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

3. (C) ALTHOUGH HOXHA MAY HAVE ULTIMATE DESIGNS ON KOSOVO, THE MORE IMMEDIATE IMPETUS OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY WOULD APPEAR TO BE FURTHERING ECONOMIC RELATIONS. FOREIGN TRADE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF HOXHA'S POLICY OF BARTER-ONLY AGREEMENTS COUPLED WITH UNCOMPETITIVE PRODUCTS FOR THE WORLD MARKET. MOREOVER, ALBANIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS HAS BEEN RETARDED BY ITS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD BOTH THE WEST AND EAST. NEVERTHELESS, IT

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(U) ALBANIA AFTER SHEHU: THE INTERNAL SCENE

(C) Summary

The December "suicide" of Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, heir apparent to 73-year-old party leader Enver Hoxha, may destroy prospects for a smooth regime succession and seriously weaken the country's prospects for maintaining its independence and its unique brand of Marxism-Leninism.

Speculation about a Shehu-Hoxha power struggle cannot be confirmed, but persisting suspicion exists among some Yugoslavs and Western diplomats that an internal party dispute had taken place. If Shehu's death was connected with policy differences with Hoxha, then the latter's control of the regime probably has been strengthened, as has been his ability to dictate a successor. Given Albania's strategic location in the Balkans and on the Adriatic, signs of political factionalism and internal instability might tempt Moscow and Belgrade to intervene, particularly during a post-Hoxha period.

\* \* \* \* \*

(U) Albanian Regime Announces Shehu "Suicide"

On December 18, Radio Tirana announced that Premier Mehmet Shehu, 68, had committed suicide early that morning in a "moment of nervous crisis." On the following day, the Albanian party daily, Zeri I Popullit, published the announcement--signed by the Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, and the Council of Ministers--on its front page. The brief obituary made no mention of Shehu's close collaboration with party leader Hoxha for almost 40 years, or his importance and stature within the Albanian hierarchy--second only to that of Hoxha himself. While

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RDS-1,3 4/2/02 (Bellocchi, N.)

Report 351-AR  
April 2, 1982

Authority: State Waiver 1/16/15  
BY: RW NARA DATE 12/20/16

terse acknowledgment was made of Shehu's participation in the Spanish Civil War, his role in the Albanian wartime resistance, and his impressive party and government positions (Party Politburo member, Army General, Chief of the General Staff, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Premier), no period of mourning or state funeral was decreed.<sup>1/</sup>

(U) Shehu became a "non-person": his portraits were removed from public places and his books from libraries and bookshops. During the January parliamentary session which approved his successor as Premier, Shehu was not honored with a moment of silence, even though he had served in that body for some 35 years. Neither Hoxha nor the new Premier mentioned his name during their speeches.

(C/NF) Rumors of Shehu-Hoxha Policy Differences

Shehu's sudden death and his relegation to official oblivion provoked rumors and speculation abroad, above all in Belgrade, that he had lost a power struggle with Hoxha. The Yugoslav media and some high-level officials expounded on this view, but offered no evidence to support it. One of Yugoslavia's most prestigious journals even advanced a version that had the two Albanian leaders locked in a "shoot-out" at a December 17 meeting of party leaders in Tirana.

Yugoslav speculation, rumor, and commentary were generally seen as part of a "disinformation" campaign against Albania related to the polemics over ethnic Albanian unrest in Yugoslavia. But some Western diplomats tended to give credence to suggestions that Shehu's death was associated with an internal party dispute over the choice of a successor to the 73-year-old, reportedly-ailing Hoxha, or over the easing of Albania's foreign isolation and its harsh domestic repression.

Albanian diplomats sought to explain the regime's treatment of Shehu and to refute speculation about an internal power struggle. Failure to honor Shehu, they claimed, accorded with the traditional Albanian position that suicide was a crime against society and a "disgraceful act aimed against the Party." The

<sup>1/</sup> (U) The regime's treatment of Shehu contrasted starkly with that accorded Hysni Kapo, third-ranking member of the hierarchy, who died in September 1979. Zeri I Popullit on that occasion announced a four-day mourning period and featured photographs of Hoxha and Shehu as the leading pallbearers. Shehu delivered the main eulogy.

diplomats pointed out that the party had treated the few other suicides of its officials in a similar manner and that Shehu's obituary noted the "important duties" he had been given in "appreciation of his merits." Yugoslav commentary on the suicide was dismissed as sheer propaganda, and it was asserted that no party meeting had taken place in Tirana on December 17.

Fate of Shehu's Relatives and Allies Unknown

(C/NF) No reliable information exists to challenge the official Albanian version of Shehu's death. He apparently had not fallen into sudden political disgrace; he had been reelected to the party hierarchy at the November 1981 Party Congress, where he had delivered a lengthy report on the economy and other foreign and domestic policy issues, all essentially following the line established in Hoxha's keynote address to the Congress. Shehu did sit while delivering his report--presumably because of illness.<sup>2/</sup> Whatever the actual state of his health, he carried out his duties as Premier and met with visiting Greek and Romanian officials only days before his death. Subsequent reporting by these officials gave no indication of any physical or mental distress.

(C) Since his death, unconfirmed reports and rumors allege that Shehu's relatives and supporters occupying leading positions are being systematically replaced as a first step in Hoxha's effort to eliminate this source of actual or potential opposition and to enhance his own power. Among those allegedly affected in the purges are:

--Shehu's wife, a longtime member of the Party Central Committee and Director of the Higher Party School in Tirana. She reportedly has been dismissed from all her functions and arrested.

--Fecor Shehu, who was dismissed as Minister of Internal Affairs in the cabinet reshuffle of January 15. The exact relationship between Mehmet Shehu and Fecor Shehu cannot be determined: Yugoslav and Soviet media said that Fecor was Shehu's nephew, while some confidential reporting alleges he was a son or brother. Albanian diplomats abroad deny any

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<sup>2/</sup> (C) Shehu was said to have a kidney disorder which resulted in extreme nervousness. He traveled to France in 1972 and 1973 for unspecified medical treatment.

family relationship between the two.<sup>3/</sup> If such a relationship did exist, the subsequent changes could suggest Hoxha-Shehu differences. Fecor Shehu's dismissal from the Cabinet constituted the only major change in the reshuffle. No information is available about his present status--i.e., whether he was assigned other functions or lost his membership in the Central Committee.

(U) On the other hand, Defense Minister Kadri Hasbiu, Shehu's brother-in-law, retained his portfolio. He also appeared publicly with Hoxha and other members of the "old guard" at an art exhibition in Tirana, as if to refute speculation that Shehu's relatives and supporters were being purged and to underline the continuity and closeness of the hierarchy.

(U) New Premier Pledges To Continue Hoxha Policies

On January 14, Hoxha addressed the Albanian Parliament and proposed Adil Carcani as the new Premier. He praised Carcani--60 years old, a member of the Party Politburo since 1956, Deputy Premier since 1965, and First Deputy Premier since 1974--for his "ceaseless and relentless" struggle against Albania's enemies.

In his maiden address as Premier, after having received unanimous endorsement from the Parliament, Carcani:

--indicated that no changes in either foreign or domestic policies were being contemplated. He closely followed the line enunciated by Hoxha at the November Party Congress, and promised to "implement fully the correct Marxist-Leninist line" as it has been established and interpreted by Hoxha;

--denied that Albania was "isolated"; rather, he said, it was prepared to establish relations with selected countries, in addition to those with which it currently maintains diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations, on the basis of mutual

3/ (C) Fecor Shehu became Minister of Internal Affairs in early 1980; he succeeded Hasbiu, who had become Minister of Defense, replacing Mehmet Shehu. The latter had assumed the defense portfolio--while remaining Premier--from Defense Minister Balluku, who was purged (and allegedly executed) in 1974. Hasbiu had been Minister of Internal Affairs from 1954 to 1980; he had assumed that portfolio when Mehmet Shehu became Premier. The exchanges and replacements involving the Shehus and Hasbiu illustrate the character of the postwar Albanian leadership, which has been a clique of a few families, relatives, and clan members.

- interest, non-interference, equality, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- excluded diplomatic or any other kind of relations with the US and the USSR. Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies were described as being among "our most ferocious enemies";
  - reaffirmed Albania's rejection and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in 1968;<sup>4/</sup>
  - reiterated Hoxha's pledges to fight alongside the Yugoslavs if they were attacked by either of the superpowers;
  - criticized Yugoslavia (as did Hoxha at length at the Congress) for its "savage, revanchist, chauvinistic, and terrorist" policies against the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia and for waging a "cold war" against Albania;
  - denied Albania had interfered or would interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs or had made any territorial claims against Yugoslavia, but vowed to continue to defend "all the rights pertaining to our Albanian brethren" in Yugoslavia; and
  - asserted that Albania's policy toward Yugoslavia had not changed since the Congress and that Albania wanted to continue "normal diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations" with Yugoslavia, but only on the basis of the "well-known principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, and respect for sovereignty and for each country's territorial integrity."

Leadership Changes Underscore Hoxha's Control; No Evidence of Factionalism

(C) Except for the possible dismissal of Fecor Shehu, the January 15 cabinet reshuffle--as well as changes in the party leadership at the November Congress--apparently were carried out under Hoxha's direction and not motivated by political factionalism or any "settling of personal accounts."

(U) Party Politburo member and Party Secretary Hekuran Isai replaced Fecor Shehu as Minister of Internal Affairs; two other replacements in the Cabinet also came from the Politburo,

<sup>4/</sup> (C) Carcani's comments were clearly in response to Yugoslav insinuations that Moscow and other Warsaw Pact members had not accepted Tirana's September 1968 denunciation and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Albania had been a founding member of the Pact in 1955, with Shehu as the Albanian signatory.

underscoring the new incumbents' credentials as party/Hoxha stalwarts and strengthening party control over the government apparatus. Haki Toska was dropped as Minister of Finance, but his demotion seems to have resulted from incompetence rather than any political differences with Hoxha. Toska had not been reelected to the Politburo in November, but he retained his membership in the Central Committee, indicating he was still in good grace with the party leadership. All three Deputy Premiers and 12 other cabinet members remained in place.

(C) The leadership changes that took place at the Party Congress made it clear that the privileged members of the partisan-dominated "old guard" would continue to wield decisive power.<sup>5/</sup> However, Hoxha stated that "new blood" had to be brought into the Central Committee and that "no political problem" (read purge) was involved in the cases of those not reelected to the Politburo or Central Committee. (All Central Committee members were "unanimously" elected by the congress delegates.) Some officials, Hoxha said, were no longer able to carry out leadership responsibilities because of ill health, old age, or incompetence. He also intimated that no political disgrace should be inferred from the demotions of three Politburo members (whose tenure in that top policymaking body extended back to 1948, 1952, and 1961); they would remain on the Central Committee. He said that those who would not be reelected understood the situation "correctly" and would remain honored and trusted "comrades."<sup>6/</sup> The main criteria for the "regeneration" process under way were political and ideological loyalty, capability, and a proper balance between younger and older members and between the sexes.

5/ (U) The "old guard" now includes Hoxha, Ramiz Alia (ideology), Carcani (government and economy), Hasbiu (military), Manush Myftiu (culture), and Rita Marko (trade unions). All are full members of the Politburo who served in the communist resistance movement during World War II. Their average age is 63.

6/ (C) At the 1976 Congress, Hoxha revealed the purges and executions of former Defense Minister Balluku and other "traitors," consigning them to the "rubbish heap of history." It is not clear why they were purged: whether they opposed various domestic political and economic policies or the foreign policy of Hoxha and Shehu, whether they were pro-Soviet, pro-Yugoslav, pro-Chinese, or anti-Chinese (at that time Albanian-Chinese relations were being affected by Chinese efforts to mend relations with the US and Yugoslavia), or whether they favored expanding ties with various Western countries.

(U) Four new members were added to the Politburo, increasing its membership to 18 (13 full and 5 alternate members): the Central Committee had 81 full and 39 candidate members, a slight increase from the 1976 Congress. The average age in the Central Committee was now 49, compared with 50.7 in 1976. Hoxha also claimed that the distribution between age groups and the sexes had improved, along with educational qualifications. The intelligentsia was represented in such new areas as science, literature, art, journalism, and culture--evidently the first real effort to include members of the intelligentsia since the purges of cultural-literary officials and personalities in 1973.

(C) Impact of Shehu's Death on Albania

Shehu's death appears to have had little effect on the internal situation. There are no signs of political factionalism, instability, or any weakening of Hoxha's control. Some Western diplomats profess to see a hardening of Albania's isolationism since Shehu's death, particularly where Tirana's relations with the West are concerned. But there are also opposite indications--e.g., Albanian diplomats in Vienna now claim that Tirana is prepared to normalize its relations with Spain and other Mediterranean countries.

Despite continuing rumor and speculation about Shehu's relatives and supporters being purged, no evidence is available to substantiate, or refute, them. The fate of Shehu's wife may throw some light on the situation, as well as on the circumstances of his "suicide"; whether his "treachery" will one day be exposed at a party congress or whether he will eventually be rehabilitated to Albania's pantheon of nationalist and communist heroes remains to be seen. Albania is an extremely closed society, with any kind of information pertaining to the leadership difficult to come by--unless it has first been carefully screened through official sources.<sup>7/</sup>

Little was known about the actual relationship between Hoxha and Shehu, but it was widely conceded that Shehu was the second most powerful leader in Albania. He had supported Hoxha during

<sup>7/</sup> (C/NF) Western diplomats resident in Tirana generally admit they had no knowledge of any Hoxha-Shehu differences or party factionalism. These diplomats also admit they have almost no contact with Albanian officials and none with the ordinary citizen. Rumors that circulated in the diplomatic community in Tirana on January 13 about an assassination attempt against Hoxha were suspected of having originated with the Yugoslav Embassy there, as part of Belgrade's "disinformation" effort against Hoxha and the regime.



the numerous factional struggles and purges and during Albania's bitter conflicts with Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China. He was said to be as committed to the regime's isolationist, repressive policies as Hoxha. In effect, the two leaders functioned as a political duumvirate, with Shehu expected to succeed Hoxha as party leader and thereby ensure a smooth succession and continuity of policy. Although Shehu presumably used relatives and friends to build his own base of power, there is no evidence suggesting he had ever done so in opposition to Hoxha.

(C) Possible Shehu-Hoxha Differences?

Nevertheless, despite their long collaboration and possible close personal friendship, policy differences between Hoxha and Shehu cannot be discounted, particularly because their special areas of activity and responsibility could have contributed to conflicting perspectives regarding present and future policies. As Premier, Shehu was responsible for the daily conduct of the government bureaucracy (economic matters, foreign affairs, internal security)--in short, he dealt with problems and developments which affected the daily lives of the population and the regime's official contacts with the outside world.

Hoxha was said to have devoted himself to long-term political and ideological issues; he was more remote and removed from the practical impact of his policies. His constant exhortations for ideological purity and for increased self-reliance and sacrifice may have been increasingly seen by Shehu as counterproductive, even inimical, to economic and social progress. Shehu conceivably may have proposed easing Albania's foreign isolation to obtain Western technology, and its harsh political/ideological controls to stimulate economic production.

The two leaders also may have differed over the choice of a successor to Hoxha, with the latter favoring someone more sympathetic to his thinking, as, for example, the ideologist Ramiz Alia, who is now being touted as the most likely successor to Hoxha as party leader, with Carcani remaining as Premier. Such a scenario, however, would hardly be revealed to the outside world.

But if such a scenario did occur and Shehu was murdered or forced into suicide, internal instability and party factionalism would probably increase unless Hoxha managed to move quickly and decisively against Shehu's allies. Hoxha would, by doing so, seek further to consolidate his control over the government bureaucracy, presumably Shehu's stronghold, and so be much more able to dictate his successor without challenge.

On the other hand, if Shehu had committed suicide because of his health, in a "moment of nervous crisis," then his absence would be all the more sorely felt. It might well result in

greater uncertainty and confusion about the leadership succession and the direction the post-Hoxha regime will take. It could also provoke factionalism, especially among rivals within the leadership, and, as a consequence of this ensuing uncertainty and factionalism, tempt Soviet or Yugoslav intervention in Albania. A strong successor would be in a much more advantageous position to cope with potential popular unrest, pressing economic difficulties, and party divisions--as well as foreign influences.

Outlook

(C/NF) There is little likelihood that Hoxha will significantly alter his unique brand of Marxism-Leninism. His successor or successors, presumably coming from the "old guard," can be expected to make little change in his policies, at least in the short term. However, the demise of the "old guard" and the emergence of a younger, more educated, and pragmatic element might eventually force marked departures from Hoxha's domestic and foreign policies. Some Yugoslavs and Western diplomats believe there is a pro-Soviet element in the Albanian party that is merely waiting for Hoxha's death or political departure before making its own bid for power. Such a possibility disturbs the Yugoslavs, who feel that Soviet influence or, more ominously, a Soviet military/naval presence in Albania could destroy Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity and undermine Balkan/Adriatic stability. Moscow has made several overtures to reestablish relations with Tirana, but has been spurned--thus far. Hoxha's successors, however, may perforce change this aspect of Hoxha's foreign policy, particularly if the Soviets were to provide substantial economic/military assistance and "protection" against a threatening Yugoslavia.

(C) One cannot identify future Albanian leaders, especially among the younger elements. Even such relatively known and prominent officials as Alia and Carcani are enigmas to Westerners. In a sense, Hoxha and Shehu were at least predictable; they were known for their ruthlessness, their unswerving devotion to Stalinism, and their hostility to "revisionists" and US "imperialism."

(C) Yet, because so little is known about Albania, and because its traditions and behavior can hardly be judged in a Western/democratic context, even those younger and more educated leaders who come to power could just as well prove as adamant as Hoxha and Shehu in perpetuating isolationism and repression. In the end, foreign pressure and influence may be more important in determining the future Albanian leadership and its internal policies than strictly internal developments.

Prepared by P. Costolanski  
x22876

Approved by M. Mautner  
x29536

FILE ALBANIA

RECEIVED 20 APR 82 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM LEKA I

DOCDATE 22 MAR 82

52

DEAVER, M

08 APR 82

BREMER

18 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: ALBANIA

USSR

LAXALT, PAUL

YUGOSLAVIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE INTERNAL ALBANIAN SITUATION

ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS

DUE: 21 APR 82 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STEARMAN

PIPES

KEMP

DOBRIANSKY

FYI

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185636	MEMO  BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM ALBANIAN ÉMIGRÉ	1	5/18/1982	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

54

Mr. P. Van Wyk DeVries  
416 Volkscas Building  
76 Market Street  
P.O. Box 8542  
Johannesburg 2000  
Republic of South Africa

MAY 13 1982

Dear Mr. Van Wyk DeVries:

I am responding to the letter of March 22, 1982 to President Reagan from Leka, the son of former King Zog of Albania. The letter was sent to Senator Paul Laxalt, who forwarded it to the White House.

I must inform you that the U.S. Government is not in a position to be of assistance to Leka in the matter discussed in his letter.

Sincerely,

John R. Davis  
Director, Office of  
Eastern European Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

55

MAY 17 1982

Dear Senator Laxalt:

I am writing with regard to a March 22 letter to President Reagan from Leka, pretender to the throne of Albania. At Leka's request, your office forwarded a copy of his letter to the White House. I have enclosed a copy of our brief response to Leka's letter, which we coordinated with the White House. Mr. Van Wyk DeVries, to whom we addressed our response, is Leka's "representative."

Let me add by way of background that the United States Government has never recognized Leka, son of former King Zog of Albania, as a legitimate representative of the Albanian people. He appears to have no strong following among Albanians inside or outside of Albania. Our own very occasional contacts with Leka, all originated by him, have been at a junior level in the Department.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,

*opt*  
Powell A. Moore  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Department's response to Leka's March 22 Letter.

The Honorable  
Paul Laxalt,  
United States Senate.

REFERRAL

DATE: 21 APR 82

56

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8211237

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: LEKA I

DATE: 22 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: ALBANIA

USSR

LAXALT, PAUL

YUGOSLAVIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES RE INTERNAL ALBANIAN SITUATION

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUEDATE: 28 APR 82

COMMENTS: PLEASE COORDINATE RESPONSE W/ WILLIAM STEARMAN -- 395-6923

*Cathy Millison*  
FOR MICHAEL WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

*Received in S/S-I  
4/22 at 9:50 A.M.  
CWH*

PAUL LAXALT  
NEVADA

20 APR 1982

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
315 RUSSELL OFFICE BUILDING  
(202) 224-3542

CARSON CITY OFFICE:  
705 NORTH PLAZA STREET  
(702) 833-1930

LAS VEGAS OFFICE:  
300 LAS VEGAS BLVD., SOUTH  
(702) 385-6347

RENO OFFICE:  
300 BOOTH STREET  
(702) 784-5568

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 8, 1982


Dear King Leka:

Thanks for your recent letter and the correspondence for the President.

You may be sure that I will make sure that the President sees your letter at the earliest opportunity.

Hope to see you when you come to the U. S., and let me know if I can assist further.

Sincerely,

  
PAUL LAXALT  
U. S. SENATOR

H. H. King Leka I of the Albanians  
P. O. Box 8542  
Johannesburg 2000  
South Africa

PL/ed

Blind copy to: Mike Deaver



P. VAN WYK DEVRIES  
REPRESENTATIVE TO  
H.M. KING LEKA I  
OF THE ALBANIANS

*E. Leka  
accumulation  
sent to  
M. H. C.*



418 VOLKSKAS BUILDING,  
76 MARKET STREET,  
P.O. BOX 8542,  
JOHANNESBURG 2000  
TEL. AD. "FRYSWYK"

Monday, 22nd March, 1982.

Senator Paul Laxalt,  
Room 315,  
Russel Office Building,  
Washington D. C. ,  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

SENATOR PAUL LAXALT  
**RECEIVED**  
APR - 5 1982  
**RECEIVED**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Laxalt,

Once again I am imposing on your good offices to transmit a letter to President Ronald Reagan, as I would prefer that this letter goes directly into his hand, and to know that it does reach him safely. I am sending this letter open so that you too may read it before you give it to President Reagan, and understand the gravity of the situation.

I also pray and hope that you will accept to act as intermediary at least initially, as I have no other safe route to reach the President on this subject.

I hope that Your Excellency will permit me to call on you when I am next in the United States, which should be some time in late May or early June. Of course, should there be any earlier requirement, I am entirely at your disposal as well as the President's.

Please accept my best wishes.

I remain, yours in friendship,

H. H. KING LEKA I OF THE ALBANIANS.

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185640	LETTER  LEKA TO RR	3	3/22/1982	B1

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APRES LA LIQUIDATION DE "LA BANDE DES CHIMAINAIS"  
EN ALBANIE

62

Tirana se tait encore - LEKA 1er, fils du Roi détroné Ahmet ZOGU, a pris et s'approprié la responsabilité de la diversion en ALBANIE.

Belgrade 1er Octobre

Tirana n'a commenté ni donné aucun détail à l'occasion de la déclaration se rapportant au débarquement sur la côte albanaise d'une " bande de criminels "ai oi que de sa liquidation dans la guerre " des cinq heures " à l'aube du 26 Septembre. Pendant , qu'après les premières déclaration sur cet événement en Albanie, Tirana se tait, la presse de plusieurs pays de l'Europe et au delà traite cet incident et considère qu'il reste entouré complètement de mystère. Maintenant apparaît aussi le fils du Roi Albanais détroné ZOGU, LEKA 1er, qui n'abandonne pas les prétentions de devenir Roi. Il a déclaré au quotidien parisien "FRANCE SOIR" que le groupe qui a essayé de débarquer en Albanie, fait partie de "Son Armée de libération nationale. Mais dans ces deux interviews "le prétendant au Trône albanais déclara vouloir "l'ALBANIE libre et indépendante " qui comme il se précisa, doit englober non seulement le territoire de KOSOVO mais aussi des territoires de la MACEDOINE et du MONTENEGRO "habités par les Albanais". Les frontières de sa "S grande ALBANIE" concordent entièrement avec les objectifs des irrédentistes de maintenant "Marxistes-Léninistes" et des autres irrédentistes à Tirana et ailleurs.

"L'affaire , au delà est entourée de mystère" ceci est la conclusion fondamentale qu'en tirent la presse et les agences étrangères qui écrivent sur "le débarquement". Les diplomates albanais à Vienne, comme l'inquent les agences étrangères, présentent Mustafa comme "criminel notoire" qui émigra dès 1944 pendant que le Roi LEKA l'identifie comme un "quadragénaire".

"Les experts européens occidentaux pour l'Albanie", ce me il est dit, ont déclaré " n'avoir jamais entendu parler de lui, et ils ajoutent qu'il est difficile supposer "qu'un émigrant de la guerre", maintenant vieux puisse commander un groupe dans une opération de débarquement.

Les informations de source française se sont montrées prudentes et le dilemme envers la version officielle de Tirana demeurant, elles sont à peu près unanimes avec l'appréciation qu'en Albanie "il y a passé quelques choses" et que la lutte pour le pouvoir n'"pas près fin". Le quotidien parisien "Le Monde" écrit "qu'il est peuement certain que l'a faire éclata dans un climat politique trouble en ALBANIE" après le "suicide" de Mehmet Shehu.

Le journal de Milan "Corriere della Sera" considère que le débarquement peut se rattacher aux exigences de la situation politique interne et "ou bien qu'a Enver Hoxha d'un prétexte é pour commencer la campagne contre les véritables adversaires"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLP-145-141-15-2  
BY RW NARA DATE 12/16/16

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De ce fait, plusieurs journaux n'abandonnent pas la piste selon laquelle "l'affaire" été montée par le service d'information albanais". Dans ce contexte, la presse rappelle plusieurs purges anciennes qui se sont produites en Albanie de Koci Xoxe à Mehmet Shehu, et mettent en relief les affirmations d'Enver Hoxha selon lesquelles "les ennemis cherchent à miner la politique du parti" et l'attaque que son fidèle collaborateur Ramis Alija fit en Septembre contre "les ennemis de l'intérieur" et qui comme le signale "Il Corriere della Sera" témoigne, de manière implicite, que Enver Hoxha a, au delà, des problèmes très sérieux avec l'opposition intérieure qui lui avait ~~partant~~ pourtant semblé diminuée après le "suicède" mystérieux de Mehmet Shehu.

## Dr. VLADIMIR BAKARIQI NË MJEKIM

Zagreb, 1 tetor (TANJUG)

Në mbështetje të konkluzioneve të konziliumit mjekësor, nënkryetari i Kryesisë së RSF të Jugosllavisë dhe anëtar i Kryesisë së KQ të LKJ, dr. Vladimir Bakariqi, do të pranohet në spitalin ushtarak në Zagreb për t'u shtruar një intervenimi plotësues urologjik kirurgjik.

## KOLË SHIROKA PRITI PËRFAQËSUESIT E «BORBËS»

Kryetari i Kryesisë së KSA të Kosovës Kolë Shiroka priti dje përfaqësuesit e redaksisë së gazetës «Borba» - kryeredaktorin përgjegjës Zdravko Čoliqin, zëvendësin e kryeredaktorit përgjegjës Milomir Kravogiqin dhe redaktorin e redaksisë krahinore të «Borbës» për Kosovë Murtezë Dacin.

Me këtë rast Kolë Shiroka vuri në dukje drejtimet më të rëndësishme të aksionit të forcave përparimtare të Kosovës në planin e stabilizimit të mëtejshëm të situatës politike dhe ekonomike në Krahinë.

Kolë Shiroka theksoi se «Borba» gjatë periudhës së kaluar, ndoqi me sukses dhe në mënyrë objektive të gjitha ngjarjet në Kosovë dhe në këtë mënyrë i kontriboi shumë informimit të publikut të gjërë jugosllav për aktivitetet në Kosovë.

Sic kumton Komiteti Krahinor i Informatave, me rastin e jubileut të 40-vjetorit të «Drinika Borba», përfaqësuesit e redaksisë Kolë Shiroka, ia dorëzuan kompletin e «Borbës» e botuar gjatë LNC-së.

Përfaqësuesit e «Borbës» dje vizituan edhe redaksinë e gazetës «Rilindja», ku i priti Maksut Shehu, kryeredaktor përgjegjës.

## PAS LIKUIDIMIT TË «BANDËS SË KRIMINELËVE» NË SHQIPËRI

# TIRANA ENDE HESHT

### Leka i Parë, biri i mbretit të përmbysur, Ahmet Zogut, mori dhe tërhoqi përgjegjësinë për diversionin në Shqipëri. - Ç'dëshiron «prezuesi i frontit shqiptar»

Beograd, 1 tetor

Në Tiranë nuk u kumtuam kurrfarë hollësi të reja me rastin e deklarimit zyrtar për zbarkim në bregdetin shqiptar të një «bande kriminelësh» dhe për likuidimin e saj «në luftën pesorëshe».

Në orët e para të mëngjesit, më 26 shtator, Derisa pas kumtesës së parë për këtë ngjarje në Shqipëri po heshtet, shtypi i shumë vendeve evropiane edhe më tej trajton këtë «incident», duke konsideruar kryesisht se mbetet i mbështjellë nga fshehtësia. Tash u paraqiti edhe i biri i mbretit të përmbysur shqiptar, Zogut, Leka i Parë, i cili nuk heq dorë nga pretendimet për t'u bërë mbret. Ai i deklaroi gazetës së Parisit «Frans soar» se grupi që u përpoq të zbarkojë i takon «Armatës së tij të çlirimit kombëtar» dhe se Xhevdet Mustafa «është komandanti i njërës nga njësitë e saj». Në intervistën e mëvonshme që ia dha Frans presit, ai tërhoqi pa shpjegime deklaratën se këtu janë «njëzërë të tij». Mirëpo, në të dy këto intervista, «prezuesi i frontit shqiptar» deklaroi se dëshiron «Shqipërinë e lirë e të pavarur», e cila - sipë saktësoi ai - do të përfshinte jo vetëm territorin e Kosovës, por edhe territoret të Maqedonisë e të Malit të Zi «të banuara me shqiptarë». Kufijtë e kësaj «Shqipërie të madhe» të tij

përpunohen plotësisht me synimet e irredentistëve të tashëm «marksist-leninistë» e të irredentistëve të tjerë në Tiranë dhe gjetkë.

«Afera edhe më tej është e mbuluar nga misterit». Ky është përfundimi themelor i gazetave dhe i agjencive, të cilat shkruajnë për «zbarkimin». Diplomatat shqiptarë në Vjenë, sic njoftojnë agjencitë e huaja, identifikuan Mustafën si «kriminel të njohur», i cili emigroi që në vitin 1944, ndërsa «mbreti» Leka e prezantoi si «40-vjeçar», «Ekspertë e Evropës Perëndimore për Shqipërinë», sic njoftohet, deklaruan se «kurrë nuk kanë dëgjuar për të» dhe shtuan se është vështirë për të supozuar se një «emigrant i luftës», tashmë plak, mund të jetë komandant i një grupi në një operacion zbarkimi.

Mjetet franceze të infomimit duke shprehur maturi dhe dilema kundrejt versionit zyrtar të Tiranës, pak a shumë janë unanime në vlerësimin se në Shqipëri «po ndodh diçka» dhe se lufta për pushtet «nuk ka marrë fund». Gazeta e Parisit «Mond» shkruan se «është e sigurt vetëm çështja se afera shpërthye në një klimë gjithnjë më të turbullt politike të Shqipërisë», pas «vetëvrasjes» së Mehmet Shehut.

Gazeta e Milanos, «Korriere dela sera» konsideron se zbarkimi mund t'u vishet kërkesave të caktuara të politikës së brendshme dhe «nevojës së Enver Hoxhës për një pertekst të madh me qëllim që ta fillojë fushatën kundër kundërshtarëve të vërtetë dhe të trilluar». Për këtë shkaku, shumë gazeta nuk heqin dorë nga teza se «afëren e montoi shërbimi informativ shqiptar». Në këtë kontekst shtypi përkujton shumë spastrime dhe likuidime të përparshme, të cilat u bënë në Shqipëri prej Koçi Xoxës e deri te Mehmet Shehu, në dhjetor të vitit të kaluar. Shumë gazeta përkujtojnë vërejtjet e Enver Hoxhës se «armiqetë përipiden ta minojnë politiken e drejtë të Partisë», dhe sulmin e rreptë të bashkëpunëtorit të tij të ngushtë, Ramiz Alisë, që e bëri në shtator, kundër «armiqve të brendshëm», i cili sic vlerëson «Korriere dela sera» dëshmoi në mënyrë implite se «Baba Hoxha» edhe më tej ka probleme serioze me opozitën e brendshme për të cilën atij iu duk e u eliminua pas «vetëvrasjes» misterioze të Mehmet Shehut.

## KËSAJ JAVE SESIONI

Sesioni i rregullt i Kuvendi sivjet fillor me parëndomshme për atë se kush është i fajshëm dhe është mirë se fajtorët pë nuk merren. Pse, askush nuk janë «interesat vitale» dhe «afër». Për këto sfera dhe interesat numëruan votat e krizave në tër. Zaten, kjo edhe është i justifikuar «të armatosur» me veton.

Nuk do mend se në qendër të ministral e punëve të jashtme Sovjetik, përkatësisht përshlytë keqësuar ndërkomëtare. Nga një «ata» «aktorë» - pasi e dinë rivali pasi akuzat gjithmonë është. Prandaj, jo më kot Xhorxh stanin dhe Kampaunin, ndërsa jen e Afert, Amerikën Qendrore SHBA-ve. Megjithatë vrojtu hiroyne dominimin e asnjërisht aleançen e pushkruar të të me botën me të mirat e saj. Duke pufuqinë e organizatës ndërkomëtare shkojnë njëmend në dobi të mjafton vetëm të flitet.

## OFERTA

Moska është lirishtënë për përparësimit e n përkuajtje me Kina pretendon. Pas ofertës i dërgoi edhe një përvjetorit të pavarësisë në të mendë të arriturat e saj në vitin këto i mori si të vërteta e të duhet të fillojë nga gjysmë e të kapërcehen edhe pengesat. Në Pekin do të shkojë një jashtëm të Bashkimit Sovjetik sovjetik në Konferencën evropiane është një diplomat i rrytë edhe në Pekin, ku në qendër kontestet kufitare. Porse, njoh se Kina është Evropë prandaj hen që në start të bisedimeve të zëshëm theksohet se Mao jendër e socializmit botëror.

## KANCLER

Në kohën kur në Evropë gjithnjë e më tej mëdhen u kthyen në pushtet; socialdemokratik Bundesagun gjerman është liberalizim Gensher. Ish bërë të mundshme socializmit tyre në Bundesagun, me Helmut Schmidt më të reja në an qarqet vëzhgues. Bota, politike, sidomos karshi Bashkimit të bashkësisë socialnjothur evropiane. Bon-Romëranin e mbanë që të gjermanët.

## DUKE KËRKUAR BOMBA...

(Vijon prej faqes së parë) have të mbetura nga lufta izraelito-palestineze.

Njësitë speciale të të katër armatave të pranishme po gjurmojnë minut dhe bombat, duke i asgjësuar aty ku po i gjejnë.

Një marina amerikane humbi jetën, kurse tre të tjerë u plagosën rëndë në afërsi të aeroportit kur dje eksplodoi bomba e ashtuquajtur «kloster», armë e ndaluar, me të cilat izraelitët masivisht sulmonin qytetin.

Kjo bombë në realitet është një kacë në të cilën rëndom ndodhen 88 aparate të vogla të kurdisura të një madhësie dhe forme të ndryshme me topin e pingpongut, të cilat në një hapësirë të madhe shpërndahen e më vonë shpërthejnë me rastin e prekjes.

Me gjasë të madhe, «bomba klaster» që shkaktoi vdekjen e viktimit të parë amerikan - është e prodhimit amerikan.

Derisa Beirut ngadalë po qetë-

Përfaqësuesit i Stejt-Dapartamentit më vonë këtë bisedë e përshkoi si «justifikonishit të suksesshme» dhe shoi se emisuri apertur i Dashingtonit Filip Habibi së shpejti do të vizitojë Damaskun.

«An Nahari» autoritar i Beirutit sol shkruan se Habibi tashmë ka planin mbi tërheqjen e trupave të huaja nga Libani në tri faza. E para është largimi i izraelitëve nga rajoni i Beirutit. E dyta tërheqja e harmonizuar e izraelitëve dhe e Sirianëve nga Lugina Beka dhe nga Veriu. Tok me sirianët, nga Veriu do të dërgoheshin edhe forca të tjera të PLO-së. Në fazën e fundit izraelitët do të braktisnin Jugun libanez.

Mirëpo, izraelitët edhe më tej insistojnë në marrëveshjen paqësore me Libanin, si parakusht për çfarëdo lëvizje të armatës së vet okupuese.

... DOKUMENTI I ARRIJET ME IMDO

65

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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OF ALBANIANS  
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2994591 (301).

H.M. King Leka of Albania

Your Majesty:

I much enjoyed our conversation of December 2 and appreciate your sharing with me your insights into the situation in your country and the neighboring states.

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## KREMLIN OVERTURE TO ALBANIANS SEEN

Warm Pravda Tone on National Day Is Related to a Recent Comment by Andropov

By JOHN F. BURNS

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 29 — Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, today marked Albania's national day with an unusually warm article.

Although the paper has printed similar articles in previous years, the commentary today was notable for its emphasis on the importance the Soviet Union attaches to improved ties with Albania, which has lived in diplomatic isolation since it broke with China five years ago, and for the link the paper made between the overture and the new Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov.

Pravda recalled that Mr. Andropov had affirmed the Kremlin's concern for "the further strengthening of the great community of socialist countries" in a speech at Leonid I. Brezhnev's funeral two weeks ago. The paper noted that Mr. Andropov had also offered a fresh start in relations with any country that displayed the same desire and was prepared to work on the basis of equity and cooperation.

As in the bid to improve relations with China, although to a lesser degree, the effort to entice Albania reflects strategic as well as political considerations. Mr. Andropov's speeches have implied that the Soviet leaders see new opportunities for ending the schism in the Communist world that has undermined Soviet foreign policy.

### Strategic Considerations Seen

In the case of Albania, with a strategic coastline on the Adriatic Sea and a common border with Greece, a member of the Western alliance, this interest is compounded.

The problem for the Kremlin is that the Albanians, up to now, have shown no sign of responding to the overtures. Only two months ago, a meeting commemorating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian party was told by Ramiz Alia, a Politburo member, that Albanian hostility toward the superpowers, meaning the Soviet Union and the United States, was "clear-cut, unwavering and consistent."

"We do not have, nor will we ever maintain, relations of whatever kind and nature with them," Mr. Alia said.

Soviet efforts to mend ties have been made periodically since 1964, three years after Albania forced the original rupture for what were stated then to be ideological reasons.

The Pravda article today praised Albania's achievements under Communism and, by comparison with a similar article last year, it played down Albanian responsibility for the 1961 break. Today's article spoke of meetings here to commemorate the Albanian anniversary and a series of publications by Soviet scholars on Albania's history, linguistics and ethnography.

## Andropov Speech Cited

# Soviet Offer to Albania Seeks End to 22-Year Rift

By Dusko Doder  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 29—The Soviet Union made its strongest and most direct appeal to the Communist leaders of Albania today, proposing "honest, equal and mutually beneficial" cooperation to end the 22-year-old breach between them.

The offer was linked directly to the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, by the authoritative Communist Party newspaper Pravda. It said Andropov had Albania in mind when he spoke of his "sincere wish" to develop and improve relations with all socialist countries.

Although Andropov made no direct reference to Albania in his Nov. 22 speech, he said "mutual good will, respect for each other's legitimate interests and common concerns for the interests of socialism and peace should prompt correct solutions also where appropriate trust and mutual understanding are still lacking for various reasons."

Relations between the two former allies were broken in November 1960 when Albanian leader Enver Hoxha last visited Moscow. According to an official Albanian account of the visit, Hoxha bitterly quarreled with Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader at the time, and Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's chief ideologist.

The Albanians refused to even shake hands with their Soviet hosts and immediately left a Soviet government residence house in Lenin Hills to sleep at their embassy here for fear they would be poisoned, according to the account.

The Albanians, according to the account, also refused to fly aboard an airliner to Albania and instead went by train.

The same account mentions that the Albanian leadership prior to meeting Khrushchev and Suslov had a reasonably friendly meeting with Andropov, who at the time served as chief of the Soviet Central Committee's department for relations with other Communist countries. Andropov is one of the few Soviets who have actually visited Albania.

The two countries broke diplomatic relations in early 1961 over ideological differences and what Albanians claimed to be Moscow's interference in their internal affairs. The strongly Stalinist Hoxha then allied his country with China.

China was Albania's only ally from then until 1978, when the two fell out over Peking's policy toward the United States.

The tiny, strategically located Balkan country sandwiched between Greece and Yugoslavia has since kept itself isolated from the outside world.

Hoxha, 74, who has ruled Albania's 2.7 million people for 38 years, frequently has made news by bloody purges of the party leadership. Virtually all top leaders over the previous three decades have been executed on charges of having worked for the intelligence services of the United States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Most recently, Defense Minister Kadri Hasbia disappeared under mysterious circumstances. He was the brother-in-law of Mehmet Shehu, former prime minister and Hoxha's closest associate for more than three decades. Shehu was reported to have been executed. A number of relatives of Hasbia and Shehu are reported to be in jail on conspiracy charges.

Today's overture to the Albanian leadership made no mention of Hoxha. The Pravda article marking Albania's national day, in contrast to previous such commentaries, refrained from criticizing the leadership and spoke in glowing terms about the struggle of Albanian Communist partisans against Nazi Germany and Italy in World War II.

The only critical reference spoke of the Albanian leadership "at the beginning of the 1960s" as having adopted a policy of "terminating political, economic and cultural relations" with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The present state of relations, Pravda said, is not in the interest of either country and is harming "the work of socialism and the anti-imperialist struggle."

The breach in relations, however, had deprived Moscow of access to Albania's Adriatic ports at Durrës and Vlorë, something that the Soviet military is eager to regain.

Although Moscow has made periodic overtures to Albania, today's Pravda article is the strongest to date as it links it directly to Andropov's appeal.

While this is in line with Moscow's current policy, including its gradual rapprochement with China, the Soviets apparently believe that Albania's economic difficulties and political turmoil give hopes for an eventual improvement in relations with the small Balkan country. Given Hoxha's age, the Russians apparently also believe that future Albanian leaders may be more ready to resume ties.

Along with the Pravda article, the Soviet media today blossomed with reports about Albania. The news agency Tass reported that the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Society, a largely dormant body, today held a meeting to commemorate the Albanian national day.

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25



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(U) RENEWED SOVIET OVERTURES TO ALBANIA

Over the years, the Soviet Union has repeatedly offered to normalize relations with its socialist compatriot, Albania. The overtures this year reflect a marked upgrading in warmth, possibly owing to a coincidence of leadership changes in Moscow and Tirana. As before, however, the Albanians can be expected to reject the appeals of what they see as the "social-fascist and social-imperialist" Soviets.

\* \* \* \* \*

Three major Soviet publications, Pravda, Izvestiya, and the foreign affairs weekly Novoye Vremya, marked the 70th Anniversary of Albanian Independence (November 28) and the 38th Anniversary of the Liberation of Albania from Fascist Occupation (November 29) with major articles hailing Soviet willingness to normalize relations between Moscow and Tirana. The items stressed the standard Soviet lines on past friendship and cooperation between the two states, but they also played to such recent developments as Brezhnev's death, the "thaw" in Sino-Soviet relations, and the government shakeup in Tirana.

The Soviets have varied motives in wanting Albania to return to the fold of fraternal socialist countries. They would prize not only access to the Adriatic but also the propaganda value of a repentant Albania back in the true socialist community. An Albania reunited with the Soviet Union would also be a major irritant to neighboring Yugoslavia (which has internal problems with its Albanian ethnic minority), to say nothing of the impact such a rapprochement would have for NATO's southern flank and Europe in general.

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Report 510-CA  
December 3, 1982

In response to new Soviet leader Andropov's speech to the November Soviet party plenum, however, the official Albanian news service (ATA) on November 25 reiterated condemnation of the Soviet Union as a "social-fascist and social-imperialist state." ATA noted that Soviet policy "is not defined by the persons who advent to power, but by the system which is in power." Despite Brezhnev's death and Andropov's stress on good relations with all socialist states, it is clear that the Albanians see no change in the Soviet system, which they continue to despise.

Instead of seeing the Sino-Soviet "thaw" as improving the chances of better Soviet relations with Albania (the 1961 falling out between Moscow and Tirana was in part blamed on the growing rift between Moscow and Beijing), the ATA commentary decried Soviet "friendship" with both the US and China. (China's fall from Albania's good graces in the late 1970s resulted in the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors in 1978.)

The considerable personnel changes instituted in Albania by the recently elected People's Assembly do not bode well for improved relations between Albania and the Soviet Union. In fact, the shakeup served to confirm the authority and strength of Albanian party boss Hoxha and his hardline policy of isolation from the superpowers. At least as long as Hoxha remains in power, there is no hope of conciliation between Tirana and Moscow. Even after Hoxha, there seems little possibility of immediate change, because the individuals (such as newly elected head of state and apparent second in command Ramiz Alia) who are likely to follow Hoxha are known for their allegiance to isolation. Indeed, the purge was in part based on the desire to root out any trace of liberalism or effort to open Albania to either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Relations with other countries could improve as Albania reaches out for trade and technology badly needed to improve the economy, the least developed in Europe. While avoiding the superpowers, Albania has established diplomatic relations with almost 100 countries. Discussions currently under way could make Canada the next in that group, which includes most of Western Europe (except Great Britain and the FRG) and which has more than doubled since the early 1970s when relations began to cool with China, Albania's last "big brother."

Albanian attitudes toward the US appear doomed to remain hostile for quite some time, for both practical and ideological reasons: disagreements and difficulties remain over gold settlements and war reparations following World War II; and the US, as a superpower, remains a primary focus of Albanian invective. The US and the USSR are condemned, most recently in the November 25 commentary, for imperialism, aggressiveness, and the arms

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- 3 -

race. Alia, leading party ideologist and heir apparent, clearly put forth the Albanian position last September when he noted that Albania "neither has nor ever will maintain any relations of whatever kind and nature with the superpowers." But even this resolute rejection will not keep the Soviets from trying.

Prepared by Jane Miller  
x29198

Approved by Robert H. Baraz  
x29194

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P.D.

78



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(U) ALBANIA: A MAJOR GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP

(C) Summary

In an effort to complete the purge of less doctrinaire individuals which began last December with the "suicide" of then-Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the new Albanian People's Assembly recently elected a new head of state for the first time in almost 30 years and voted to remove more than half the Council of Ministers. These party-supported changes in the government also bring in new cadres to replace those ministers and representatives who either had become too old to serve effectively or had failed to perform well.

The changes are major for a state known for the continuity of its hierarchy. Some developments suggest that the post-Hoxha succession is being prepared. The new ministers appear loyal and closely tied to him and his rigid isolation from the United States and Soviet Union. The shakeup reaffirms Hoxha's strength and authority and eliminates those inclined to moderate traditional policies.

\* \* \* \* \*

(C) Hints of a Purge

The first indications of internal discord in Albania came last December with the mysterious, but official, announcement that Prime Minister Shehu had committed suicide in a "moment of nervous crisis." Immediately following the suicide, Shehu's wife, a longtime member of the Party Central Committee and Director of the Higher Party School, reportedly was dismissed from all her functions and arrested. In January, the People's Assembly replaced Shehu with Adil Carcani, a party Politburo member since 1956, Deputy Premier since 1965, and First Deputy Premier since 1974.

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Report 517-CA  
December 10, 1982

At the same time, Fecor Shehu (believed to be related to Mehmet, although the exact relationship is unclear) was dismissed as Minister of Internal Affairs. He subsequently dropped from view and his current status is unknown. But Mehmet's brother-in-law, Kadri Hasbiu, retained his portfolio as Defense Minister. The Finance Minister also was dropped at the January Assembly meeting, but his removal apparently was not part of the purge, for he retained his Party Central Committee membership.

Further changes in the Albanian Council of Ministers were announced by the Albanian news service on July 1:

- Foreign Minister Nesti Nase (then 60) was "retired on pension" and replaced by Deputy Foreign Minister Reis Malile.
- Alternate Politburo member Prokup Murra gave up his position as Minister of Energy for an "important party task," later identified as the first secretary post of the Tirana District party committee, the most important administrative district in the country.
- Minister of Health Llambi Zicishti was "removed from his post" without further comment or an onward assignment, apparently in disgrace. Zicishti's brother also lost his high party position.

Overall, only some of those closest to Shehu or otherwise in disgrace seemed to have suffered. There were no signs of a wide-spread purge or of substantial plans or prospects for either domestic or foreign policy changes.<sup>1/</sup>

The next concrete indications that more Shehu supporters would be routed came with the October 26 publication of the list of nominees for the November 14th elections for the People's Assembly. Three incumbent ministers, notably Hasbiu at Defense, were not included. Ministers are constitutionally selected from among the members of the Assembly, so absence from the list fore-shadows removal. The fact that the other two ministers involved handled domestic economic functions led to speculation that their fall might have had more to do with the performance of their ministries and their own incompetence than with any connection they might have had to Shehu.

<sup>1/</sup> (U) For further information on the immediate aftermath of Shehu's suicide, see INR Reports 351-AR, "Albania After Shehu: The Internal Scene," April 2, 1982, CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN, RDS-1,3, and 416-AR, "Albania After Shehu: Foreign Policy," June 22, 1982, CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN, RDS-1,3.



The Shakeup

(C) At the first day's session of the new People's Assembly, Albanian President since 1953 Haxhi Lleshi was replaced by Ramiz Alia, a member of the party Politburo and Secretariat in charge of ideology. The Assembly also elected three new Vice-Presidents to replace a trio whose ages ranged from 74 to 83. These changes were based primarily on the need to "relieve the burden" on some of the hierarchy's older members, according to the nominating speech. The eloquent praise and gratitude expressed for their work as well as promises of continued "love and respect" which accompanied the announced changes indicate that at least these leaders were still in the good graces of the party and Hoxha and were indeed being removed because of their age.

(C) The new President is known as a leading party ideologist and a strong supporter of Hoxha's hardline isolationist policy. Although the presidency is largely honorary in a strong party-ruled state, the appointment of Alia will give him valuable experience and credentials as both a party and government leader and further his claim as apparent eventual successor to Hoxha and current second in command. The only other individual in Albania who approaches Alia's new level of authority is Prime Minister Adil Carcani. Carcani had replaced Shehu but was only now officially elected to that post by the members of the People's Assembly. Carcani, however, lacks Alia's status as a member of the Party Secretariat, although he is a member of the Politburo.

(U) The Council of Ministers not only confirmed Carcani as its head but also replaced eight ministers and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and removed two of the Deputy Premiers (see below).

Changes in the People's Assembly

	<u>Old</u>	<u>New</u>
Chairman of the Presidium (President)	Haxhi Lleshi	Ramiz Alia
Deputy Chairmen (Vice-Presidents)	Spiro Koleka Gen. Shefket Peci Muslim Peza Xhafer Spahiu	Rita Marko Xhafer Spahiu Emine Guri Sihat Tozan

Changes in the Council of Ministers

Chairman (Premier)	Adil Carcani	elected
Deputy Chairmen	Manush Myftiu Pali Miska (promoted) Qirjako Mihali	reelected  Besnik Bekteshi

28

Mininisters

Old

New

Agriculture	Themie Thomai	reelected
Communal Economy (services)	Rrapo Dervishi	Kudret Arapi
Communications	Luan Babemeto	reelected
Construction	Rahman Hanku	Farudin Hoxha
Domestic Trade	Viktor Nushi	Osman Murati
Education and Culture	Tefta Cami	reelected
Energy	Pali Miska	Lavdosh Hametaj
Finance	Qirjako Mihali	reelected
Foreign Affairs	Reiz Malile	reelected
Foreign Trade	Nedin Hoxha	Shane Korbeci
Health	Dr. Ajli Alushani	reelected
Industry and Mines	Llambi Gegprifti	Hajredin Celiku
Internal Affairs	Hekuran Isai	reelected
Light Industry and Food Industry	Esma Ulqinaku	Vito Kapo
People's Defense	Kadri Hasbiu	Prokup Murra
Chairman of the State Planning Commission	Petro Dode	Harilla Papajorgi

(U) The speed with which these changes were accomplished is illustrated by the case of Nedin Hoxha (whose relationship to Enver Hoxha is unclear). He signed a treaty protocol with Greece as the Foreign Trade Minister on November 19 and on November 23 was ousted and assigned to a significantly lower job as chairman of the Executive Committee of the People's Council of Gjirokastr District.

(C) The most apparent victim of a purge is Defense Minister Kadri Hasbiu. He had initially retained his Defense portfolio after Shehu's death, but apparently it had been decided to rid Albanian leading circles of the last remnants of the Shehu connection. Shehu himself recently had been vehemently denigrated as a spy for the US, the USSR, and Yugoslavia (in a campaign speech by Hoxha on November 10) and for sabotage during the battle of Tirana in 1944 when he was a division commander (in the party organ Zeri i Popullit, November 17). There might also have been some displeasure with Hasbiu's Defense Ministry handling of the September "invasion" of Albania. (The very existence of such an invasion has been questioned by Western observers, but this does not preclude it having been used against Hasbiu.) Hasbiu was replaced by Prokup Murra, another Hoxha loyalist, who had recently been promoted to head the Tirana District party apparatus. Other ousted ministers, such as the former Minister of Domestic Trade Viktor Nushi, seem to have fallen from grace and thus could be considered to have been purged.

(C) Another group of those removed from their ministerial positions, primarily economic-related ministries, seems to have been merely demoted rather than purged. Some went to other

government positions, others to party posts. In either case, they have not been removed from public view.

- Former Deputy Premier and Minister of Energy Pali Miska was elected chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly and appointed first secretary of the Elbasan District party committee.
- Former Minister of Industry and Mines Llambi Gegprifti was appointed director of the "Enver Hoxha" automobile and tractor combine in Tirana.
- Former Chairman of the State Planning Commission Petro Dode, who retained his membership in the Party Central Committee, was appointed first secretary of the Vlore District party committee.
- Former Minister of Foreign Trade Nedin Hoxha also retained Central Committee membership and, as noted above, was appointed chairman of the Executive Committee of the People's Council of the Gjirokastr District.
- Former Minister of Light Industry and Food Industry Esma Ulqinaku was appointed First Vice-Minister of his former ministry. He was replaced by Vito Kapo, the widow of a former close wartime associate of Hoxha's.
- Former Minister of Construction Rahman Hanku remained in the Party Central Committee and was elected a member of the Presidium of the People's Assembly.

(C) The Assembly as a whole suffered a turnover of slightly less than half its members. As with the ministers, some members undoubtedly were purged, and attrition, age, and incompetence were responsible for the removal of others.<sup>2/</sup>

(C) The Results

One effect of this latest set of changes in the Albanian leadership is the elimination of the final remnants of Shehu's reportedly more liberal policies. There may yet be further

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<sup>2/</sup> (C) The turnover in communist parliaments is usually less, but this is about the same rate as in the last (1978) Albanian elections. Those elections, however, took place in the wake of the Albanian falling-out with China. Many of those not reelected in 1978 are supposed to have had ties to the policy of friendship with China or to ex-Defense Minister Balluku, who was purged (and reportedly executed) in 1974.

Stalinist-type removals using a Shehu connection for condemnation, whether or not the victims really knew or supported Shehu.

The shakeup also is a warning to others to toe the line, especially on foreign policy matters, or face possible ouster. The warning applies to all managers and to those new ministers to perform their duties with more success than their predecessors. As Albania tentatively tries to develop its economy, there needs to be a careful guarding and use of scarce resources.

Perhaps the most important result of the reshuffle is the confirmation of Hoxha's authority. There is no one with more longevity or prestige than Hoxha among the "old guard" that dominates the Albanian state and party leadership. His position seems above challenge. This will give Hoxha the power to undertake whatever policies he wants, including changes from past principles.

There seems little possibility, however, for any dramatic changes while Hoxha is in power. Rather, in foreign policy matters, Hoxha will continue his course of isolation from the United States and the Soviet Union. (The Soviets, who have long tried to lure Albania back into the fold,<sup>3/</sup> reported the changes as matter-of-fact elections, noting without comment the replacement of 10 ministers.) Domestically, there is little likelihood that Hoxha will significantly alter his ruthless brand of Marxism-Leninism. The appointment of Hoxha's stalwart Alia to a high government post, in addition to his active party duties, indicates that Hoxha's policies could live on after his death. A party plenum anticipated for this month may shed new light on the fate of some of the unseated ministers and the state of the post-Shehu purge.

Prepared by Jane Miller  
x29198

Approved by Robert Baraz  
x29194

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3/ (U) For more information see Report 510-CA, "Renewed Soviet Overtures to Albania," December 3, 1982, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

(LOU) SUMMARY OF INR PRODUCTION FOR DECEMBER 14, 1982

(C) Albania: A Major Government Shakeup: In an effort to complete the purge that began last December with the "suicide" of then-Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the new Albanian People's Assembly recently elected a new head of state and voted to remove more than half the Council of Ministers. The changes are major for a state known for the continuity of its hierarchy. Some developments suggest that the post-Hoxha succession is being prepared. The new ministers appear loyal and closely tied to him and his rigid isolation from the United States and Soviet Union. The shakeup reaffirms Hoxha's strength and authority and eliminates those inclined to moderate traditional policies. (Report 517-CA, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, Decl. OADR)

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85

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Possible "Claims/Gold" Settlement with Albania (C)

We have reviewed and concur in the State Department's recommendation that the process of settling gold claims with Albania should be initiated at an early date. (C)

*Michael O. Wheeler*

Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

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United States Department of State

88

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
 THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible "Claims/Gold" Settlement with Albania

In February 1982, the American-British-French Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC) delivered to Czechoslovakia the remainder of its share of Nazi-looted gold, leaving Albania the only country which had not received its gold allocation. Delivery of Albania's share (held in a TGC account in the Bank of England and currently worth \$20-25 million) has been blocked by 1) unpaid U.S. expropriation claims against Albania; 2) an unpaid award to the UK by the International Court of Justice against Albania in the "Corfu Channel case"; 3) an Italian Government claim to the gold itself; and 4) Albania's refusal to cooperate in a settlement of these claims.

Several factors have led us to consider whether now might be a propitious time to seek to resolve this issue:

Soviet Interest in Albania. Soviet overtures to Albania continue; the latest came in public remarks by Andropov in November. There is little likelihood Tirana will respond positively while Hoxha remains in power, but he is 73 and not in good health. Little is known about his potential successors or their attitudes toward the USSR. (Hoxha's long-time heir-apparent, Mehmet Shehu, reportedly committed suicide last December. Hoxha has since denounced Shehu as a traitor and instituted sweeping, ministerial-level personnel changes.) Soviet objectives are plain: to regain access to Albanian port facilities and influence in an area bordering Yugoslavia's sensitive Kosovo region.

Potential Western Opportunity. While there is no immediate prospect of Albanian interest in relations with the U.S. (Tirana's anti-U.S. invective is nearly as strong as that used against the Soviets), it behooves us to do what we can to position ourselves better for the coming transition period. Even as Tirana continues its unsteady, cautious moves to strengthen (primarily trade) links with selected Western and non-aligned countries, "claims/gold" remains a significant obstacle to closer Albanian-Western ties. To resolve it on terms acceptable to Tirana (but which also satisfy our interests) might: permit normalization of British-Albanian relations, enhance French and/or Italian influence in Albania; and remove an impediment to eventual U.S.-Albanian relations.

U.S. Claims. Normally we conclude claims settlements based on prior adjudications by the U.S. Foreign Claims

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Settlement Commission (FCSC) of the exact amount of U.S. claims. While there has been no adjudication of U.S. claims against Albania (an adjudication would require authorizing legislation and could take years), the FCSC feels it has sufficient information to estimate U.S. claims reliably. Their estimate is that the principal amount of all awards would not exceed \$1 million.

Given the high price of gold and the current expertise and relative flexibility of the British and French on this issue -- in the wake of the Czech claims/gold settlement -- now may be our best opportunity for the foreseeable future to obtain a favorable settlement for the aged U.S. claimants.


U.S. Initiative -- Current Status

We have been engaged in exploratory talks with the British, French, and Italian Governments for several months, seeking to determine whether there is a basis for resolving this issue. (There has been no contact with the Albanians.) Largely for political-security reasons, all three are clearly interested in seeing it resolved. The Italians -- their own claim to the gold notwithstanding -- have assured us, the British, and the French that they would not block delivery of the gold to Albania. We have discussed with the French on a completely non-committal basis the possibility of their making an approach to Tirana on this issue on behalf of us and the UK. While we have not asked for a French commitment in this regard, their attitude has been cooperative. We and the UK have agreed ad referendum on the broad terms of a (U.S. and UK) claims/gold settlement proposal (including settlement of U.S. claims for at least \$1.5 million) and on draft talking points for possible French use in an eventual approach to Tirana.

Congressional Interest

With the Czechoslovak precedent in mind, Congress likely would block delivery of gold to Albania absent a satisfactory settlement of U.S. expropriation claims. Before we decide formally whether to go ahead with an approach to Albania on this issue, we need a better feeling for how the Congress would react to the kind of settlement we envision.

We hope this week to brief selected Senators and Congressmen, or their aides, on the results of our review of this issue and on the consequent possibility that the U.S. will seek a claims/gold settlement with Albania. We intend to stress 1) the attractiveness -- from a constituent viewpoint -- of the claims settlement we might seek; 2) that no final decision has been made on whether to approach Albania; and 3) that knowledge of this matter should be held closely.



L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

8588

90

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 20, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*

SUBJECT: "Claims/Gold" Settlement with Albania

I support State's position on this for two reasons:

1. The gold is theirs. The Italians stole it in the first place, and we are accessories after the fact. I don't believe in blackmailing people with their own property. If legitimate claims can be settled, they should have it back.

2. It would be completely inconsistent for us to make a deal with Czechoslovakia and not with Albania, which is at least anti-Soviet. I don't mind being inconsistent sometimes, but I don't see what we get from it in this instance.

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MEMORANDUM

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91

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 20, 1982

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~~INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: "Claims/Gold" Settlement with Albania

Without unduly increasing the paper flow on the above subject, I maintain a somewhat different position than Paula or Norm. I agree with Paula's depiction of a kind of "knee-jerk" reaction at State to recent Soviet overtures designed to expand their influence in Albania in an uncertain post Hoxha period, and the poor state of U.S.-Albanian relations. I also do not completely agree with Norm's view that the Czech precedent and original ownership of the gold are, in themselves, reasons to proceed with a negotiated settlement, particularly when the Albanians have consistently stone-walled all efforts for a civilized dialogue on the subject.

On balance, I am most swayed by the U.S. taking an action which at least positions us to effectively compete with the Soviets for the shaping of the post Hoxha period. Potentially losing ground to the USSR in such a strategic point on the Mediterranean would indeed be very serious. Although somewhat premature, we can later point to this issue as an important unsolicited initiative by the U.S. and the allies to accept Albania, even marginally, back into a Western orientation. I, therefore, concur with State that we should proceed in a cautious, low-key fashion.

cc: Bailey  
Nau  
Blair

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92 ✓

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(U) ALBANIA: NOT AN INTERNATIONAL HERMIT

(C) Summary

Albania's foreign policy frequently is characterized as isolationist. In fact, however, Albania has diplomatic relations with almost 100 countries, including most of Western Europe (the UK and West Germany are the only exceptions), and is a member of such international organizations as the United Nations, International Postal Union, and World Health Organization. Negotiations with Canada on establishment of diplomatic ties are now in progress.

The impression of Albania as isolated stems more from the changing pattern of the country's alliances than from the actual diplomatic situation. Having discarded a series of mentors--Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and finally China in the late 1970s--Albania now appears to stand alone. But although its contacts may not be intimate and its trade is limited, Albania maintains a fairly broad range of international ties--it is from the US and the USSR that it has isolated itself.

\* \* \* \* \*

(U) Albania's Changing Alliances

Immediately following World War II, Albania was aligned with Yugoslavia. Yugoslav communists were instrumental in establishing the Albanian Communist Party in 1941. Indeed, Tirana stood so close to Belgrade that Albanian foreign policy often reflected more the interests of Yugoslavia than those of Albania itself. But this alliance ended in 1948 when Tito broke with Stalin and was expelled from the Cominform. Albania then linked up with the Soviet Union and adopted Moscow's line, including a series of purges of those suspected of pro-Yugoslav sympathies.

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Report 575-AR  
March 16, 1983

Strains surfaced in the Moscow-Tirana relationship with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program, Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia, USSR interference in the Albanian economy, and the growing friction between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). At its 22nd congress, the CPSU denounced Albania. By late 1961 Albania had ordered the Soviet submarine base at Vlora closed, and there was a mutual withdrawal of diplomats; Soviet aid ceased and Soviet advisers and technicians left Albania. Tirana remained a nominal member of the Warsaw Pact until the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia but then withdrew completely. It continues to trade with members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) but not with the USSR.

In 1961, the PRC emerged as the staunch ally of Albania, providing substantial economic, developmental, and military aid. In return, Albania followed China's foreign policy and in 1971 sponsored the UN resolution calling for China's admission to that body. But the relationship began to deteriorate in the early 1970s when the Chinese started cutting back aid and delaying deliveries for domestic as well as foreign policy considerations. Tensions mounted in October 1976 when, after the overthrow of the "Gang of Four," Beijing sought a rapprochement with the United States--a move Tirana denounced. In July 1977, the Albanian party openly attacked Mao's "Three Worlds Theory"; in 1978 it supported the Vietnamese against China in their border clashes. The actual split came in July 1978, when a Chinese diplomatic note declared that, because of Albania's anti-China course, the Chinese Government had no choice but to terminate its aid programs and recall its experts. Trade halted and diplomatic activity became perfunctory, leaving Albania without a big-power ally and badly needed economic assistance.

In September 1978, Albanian party chief Enver Hoxha publicly called for closer economic and cultural ties with "well-disposed" bourgeois states of the West "which respect Albania." Today Tirana has diplomatic relations with almost 100 countries (more than half of them established during the 1970s), including all of Europe except West Germany and the UK. (See list appended.) The need for trade and technology seems to be the primary motivation of this reaching out for contact. The Albanian Constitution flatly bars credits from "capitalist" and "revisionist" states, thus necessitating trade and exports to generate funds for internal development.

#### Diplomatic Ties Reflect Changing Political Affiliation

(C) The history of Albania's post-World War II diplomatic ties clearly reflects relations between Albania's mentor of the moment and the country with which relations were being established.

(C) With Yugoslavia, 1945-48: In the aftermath of World War II, Albania found itself part of the Soviet-leaning East

European bloc, under Belgrade's immediate protective wing. Although Albania did not extend formal diplomatic recognition to Yugoslavia until 1946, ties between Belgrade and Tirana were extremely close. They were based on a common struggle against fascist Italy, certain historical affinities (and accompanying hostilities) between the Albanian people and ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, and traditional economic and commercial connections rooted in geographic proximity. Albania was especially subservient in foreign policy matters: it followed Yugoslav policy to the letter.

(U) Albania's first formal recognition after the war came from Bulgaria (1945), reflecting the close ties then prevailing among the newly communized regimes in the Balkans. As the Cominform sought to organize the countries of recently Soviet-liberated Eastern Europe into loyal Moscow supporters, Albania established diplomatic ties with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania in 1948; East Germany, Hungary, and China in 1949; and North Korea and Mongolia in 1950. (The USSR opened a legation in Tirana in 1945, but did not establish full diplomatic relations or place an embassy there until 1953.)

(C) The only other states to establish diplomatic relations with Albania during this period were France (1946), Italy (1949), and Ethiopia (1948). In the case of France, the action reflected both the influence of the French Communist Party, then part of the government, and the cultural affinity developed over the years as a result of Albanians obtaining education and medical treatment in France. With regard to Italy, historical ties based on geographic proximity and commerce in goods and ideas overcame Albanian hostility engendered by the Italian occupation. Ethiopia's reasons for mutual recognition stemmed from at least two factors: 1) as one of the few independent African states, Ethiopia was eager to acquire partners in the international field to underscore its independence; and 2) the United Nations was in the midst of debating the disposition of former Italian colonies in Africa, and Ethiopia was particularly concerned about strengthening its influence in Somaliland. (The Soviet Union and its allies eventually supported the Ethiopia-desired solution.)

(U) With the Soviet Union, 1949-61: Even during the period of Albanian fealty to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was Albania's mentor. When the Soviets arranged to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948 for "revisionism," Tirana went along with Moscow--in some respects acting more orthodox than the Soviets. "Revisionism" remains a cardinal sin in the Albanian political vocabulary.

(U) Like the rest of Eastern Europe, Albania had little interchange with any countries outside the socialist family in the

first decade after the war. Along with Romania and Bulgaria, it did not join the United Nations until 1955. Its establishment of bilateral relations with other countries closely followed developments in Soviet foreign policy. After the promulgation of the Austrian state treaty, Tirana established relations with Vienna (1956). As the Soviets moved closer to friendship with India, Albania set up an embassy in New Delhi (1956). With the growth of Soviet ties with Egypt, Albania reached out to Cairo (1958). In 1960, along with the rest of the socialist world, Albania recognized revolutionary Cuba. At the time of Tirana's break with Moscow in 1961, it had established relations with 25 countries.

(C) With China, 1961-78: When Moscow and Beijing broke with each other in the early 1960s, Albania took the Stalinist route and turned to a close political and economic relationship with China. During the first half of this almost 20-year marriage of convenience, Albania and China were very much isolated from the rest of the world. Albania's foreign relations suffered during this period of retrenchment: new ties were established with only 10 countries, including newly independent Algeria (1963), China-supported North Vietnam (1963), and such developing African states as the Congo (1968).

(U) As its relationship with China soured in the 1970s, Albania's official ties with the outside world increased significantly. Between 1970 and 1980, Albania established diplomatic ties with 58 countries, more than doubling the number of its bilateral relationships. Because of the high costs of maintaining diplomatic missions, however, many of these ties did not (and still do not) include a resident ambassador.

(U) New Efforts in the Balkans and Among Developing Countries

As relations with China deteriorated, Albania's earliest attempts at outside contacts involved its closest neighbors. In 1971, it reestablished diplomatic relations with Greece after a 30-year break and restored ambassadorial representation with Yugoslavia. Friendly ties were also cemented with Romania (the two countries maintain representation at the ambassadorial level; Albania and other Warsaw Pact countries exchange only chargés d'affaires) and Turkey, with an embassy at Ankara and a consulate general at Istanbul.

Relations were opened with states as far away as Nigeria (1972), Argentina (1973), Bangladesh (1977), and Panama (1978). The political situations in host countries evidently influenced Albanian moves: for example, relations were established with Chile in 1971 during the Allende period, Nicaragua in 1979 under the Sandinistas, and Zimbabwe in 1980 following its independence.

Future Considerations

(U) Albanian expansion of diplomatic ties with other countries in the future will be restricted both by cost considerations (the Albanian Embassy in Ghana was closed down in 1966 as an economy measure, and Albanian ambassadors often are accredited to multiple countries to keep down hard-currency costs) and by Hoxha's ideological orthodoxy. Any major change in the direction of Albanian foreign policy will have to await a post-Hoxha leadership.

(C) Albania and Canada are discussing establishment of relations, with trading possibilities seemingly a major motivation. And intermittent talks, so far fruitless, continue with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Settlement of long-outstanding financial questions pose obstacles in both of these cases--the UK seeks restitution for the Corfu Channel ship loss in 1946, while Albania wants its Axis-confiscated gold back from the custody of the Allied Tripartite Gold Commission; West Germany refuses to pay or even consider payment of war reparations as a precondition for discussing diplomatic relations. Yet, the Albanians claim to see "no insurmountable difficulties" here; time and economic necessity could mitigate current Albanian obstinacy.

(C) Tentative moves also seem afoot for renewed China-Albania trade relations. No immediate improvement is foreseen on the political level, however. The current move is based on a need for spare parts for Albania's predominantly Chinese-manufactured machinery. But it does suggest a first indication of Albanian pragmatic economic needs superseding dogmatic philosophical stands.

(C) In contrast, chances of relations improving between the USSR and Albania remain slim. Tirana's reaction to the Andropov succession and renewed Soviet overtures was a categorical rejection, based on opposition to the whole system of "social imperialism" regardless of its leader. The Soviet Union is clearly the main military and political enemy of Albania.

(C) The United States is routinely condemned as imperialist and one of the superpowers, with whom, according to Ramiz Alia, current Hoxha heir-apparent, "Albania does not and will never have relations." But recent visitors to Albania claim to have found a mood generally more friendly toward the West prevailing within the bureaucracy. The Albanian Government does not encourage foreign tourism, fearing contamination, but it continues to allow hundreds of ethnic Albanian Americans to visit each year. Such personal contacts and third-party trade contacts through European countries represent a considerable potential for improving relations, especially after Hoxha has passed from the scene.



(C) In any event, Albania is not the international hermit it often is portrayed to be. The wide geographic range of its diplomatic relations may not compensate for the superficiality of those ties. But the existence of recognized conduits for communications is a first and vital step toward the possibility of deepening those relations.

Prepared by Jane Miller  
632-9198

Approved by Martha Mautner  
632-9536

Alphabetical Listing of Albanian Diplomatic Recognition  
(not necessarily a reflection of the level  
of activity of current bilateral relations)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>
Algeria	1963	Kenya	1983
Argentina	1973	Korea, North	1950
Austria	1956	Kuwait	1968
Bangladesh	1977	Laos	1975
Belgium	1970	Lebanon	1974
Benin	1974	Lesotho	1980
Brazil	1961	Libya	1970
Bulgaria	1945	Luxembourg	1972
Burma	1976	Madagascar	1976
Burundi	1973	Malaysia	1981
Cameroon	1973	Mali	1965
Cape Verde	1980	Malta	1973
Central African Republic	1970	Mauritania	1977
Chile	1971	Mexico	1974
China	1949	Mongolia	1950
Colombia	1979	Morocco	1962
Congo	1968	Mozambique	1975
Costa Rica	1973	Nepal	1972
Cuba	1960	Netherlands	1970
Czechoslovakia	1948	New Zealand	1973
Denmark	1970	Nicaragua	1979
Djibouti	1980	Niger	1980
Ecuador	1980	Nigeria	1973
Egypt	1958	Norway	1971
Equatorial Guinea	1972	Pakistan	1965
Ethiopia	1948	Panama	1978
Finland	1970	Peru	1971
France	1946	Poland	1948
Gabon	1974	Portugal	1977
Germany, East	1949	Romania	1948
Ghana	1961	San Marino	1976
Greece	1971	Sao Tome and Principe	1979
Guinea	1958	Senegal	1973
Guinea-Bissau	1974	Seychelles	1980
Hungary	1949	Sierra Leone	1976
Iceland	1976	Somalia	1960
India	1956	Spain	1980
Indonesia	1965	Sri Lanka	1980
Iran	1971	Sudan	1957
Iraq	1958	Sweden	1972
Italy	1949	Switzerland	1970
Japan	1981	Syria	1978
Kampuchea	1962	Tanzania	1966

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>
Thailand	1982
Togo	1977
Tunisia	1973
Turkey	1958
Upper Volta	1977
USSR	Legation 1945 Embassy 1953 Closed 1961
Venezuela	1975
Vietnam	1963
Yemen (Sanaa)	1979
Yugoslavia	1946
Zambia	1979
Zimbabwe	1980
United Nations	1955

**Sources:**

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Directory of Officials of the People's Socialist Republic of  
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