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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEADS

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*

SUBJECT:

Resignation Policy

I want you to know that the President is extremely pleased with the professionalism and high degree of cooperation demonstrated by the transition officers throughout the government. I believe that this transition will be a model for many future transitions to follow.

A specific transition matter which requires your special attention is the resignation policy for your subordinates. As you know, Presidential and Secretarial appointees are not technically required to submit resignations unless they are requested to do so by the next Administration. As a practical matter, however, planning for resignations should begin for all appointees who are not on fixed terms. Accordingly, I would appreciate your coordinating the resignations and appointment of acting replacements for your respective departments and agencies.

Presidential Appointees

We would like to have letters of resignation on file for all Presidential appointees who are planning to resign on or before January 20. Those who have reason to expect that they will be asked to stay on temporarily for purposes of continuity may, of course, wait until an appropriate later time.

All letters of resignation should be submitted to the Presidential Personnel Office, EOB, Room 145, no later than December 22. Attached to each letter should be a draft Presidential letter of appreciation to the appointee which accepts the resignation and briefly cites the appointee's major accomplishments and contributions.

We also need to have the names of all acting replacements for Presidential appointees for transmittal to the Reagan transition team. Names should be sent to Harrison Wellford's Office, EOB, Room 246, by January 12. This will ensure operational continuity until the new appointees are confirmed by Congress.

Secretarial Appointees

Resignation policy for Secretarial appointees is a matter left largely to your discretion. In the past, many administrative Schedule C employees have wanted to stay on beyond January 20. I suggest that you make it clear that Secretarial appointees need not resign unless they are requested to do so by the new Administration. On the other hand, if such appointees do plan to resign on or before January 20, an early resignation letter would expedite processing and offer time for appropriate recognition by their respective senior officials.

Sample Letter of Transmittal

Attached is a sample memorandum for organizing and transmitting our resignation policy. Since you are the best judge as to its appropriateness for your department or agency, please feel free to alter it or use other means to communicate our policy.

ATTACHMENT

SAMPLE MEMO FOR TRANSMITTAL OF RESIGNATION POLICY*

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES
SECRETARIAL APPOINTEES

FROM: (Name)
(Assistant Secretary-Administration)

SUBJECT: TRANSITION MATTERS - LETTERS OF RESIGNATION

President Carter and Secretary (name) have pledged to provide a smooth and efficient transfer of the responsibility for running the (name of Department or Agency) to the new Administration. This includes taking reasonable care that during the transition period the necessary functions of the Department (or Agency) continue to be performed in an effective manner.

In past transition periods, the incoming Administration has asked some Presidential and Secretarial appointees to continue to serve the public by remaining beyond Inauguration day. You should also be aware that Presidential and Secretarial appointees are not technically required to resign unless they are requested to do so by the new Administration. On a practical level, however, many appointees have already begun to consider new career alternatives.

In this connection, it would be helpful to the Secretary if all Presidential and Secretarial appointees would complete the attached questionnaire, indicating their personal plans. The questionnaire should be submitted to (designee's name) of Secretary (name)'s office by December 18.

Many of you who plan to resign on or before January 20 have inquired about the appropriate protocol for termination of service. The appropriate procedure is for each Presidential appointee to submit a letter of resignation addressed to the President. Those of you who wish to submit resignation letters should send them to Secretary (name). There is no set format for the letters. They should be personal but brief. You should also state an effective date of resignation.

*For Departments of the Executive Branch; Agencies must change titles and nomenclature accordingly.

If you plan to resign on or before January 20, please send your resignation letter along with the attached questionnaire to (name of designee). He (or she) will coordinate transmittal to the President or the Secretary as is appropriate.

RETURN TO: (name and address of Secretary's designee)
by December 18, 1980

I plan to leave before January 20, 1981. My estimated date of departure is _____.
After resignation, I can be reached at _____.

I am willing to remain on the job after January 20, 1981, if asked.

NAME

TITLE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF MEMBERS AND
HEADS OF ALL EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ELEMENTS

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*

SUBJECT:

Meeting on the Disposition of
Presidential Papers

At 4:00 p.m., Tuesday, December 16, 1980, a meeting will be held in Room 450 OEOP to discuss the attached memorandum on the handling of Presidential Papers and the Departure Agreement.

I request that a representative of each White House staff office and each office within EOP attend. In addition, any staff member interested in the removal of Presidential Papers from the White House or the EOP is encouraged to attend.

This is the only scheduled meeting on this important subject and I stress the importance of a full understanding of procedures to be followed for the handling of Presidential Papers.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF MEMBERS AND
HEADS OF ALL EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ELEMENTS

FROM:

JACK WATSON
LLOYD CUTLER

*Jack
Lloyd*

SUBJECT:

PROCEDURES FOR THE DISPOSITION AND REMOVAL
OF PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS AND COPIES

1. Introduction.

1.1 Until 1974, Presidential Papers were treated as the personal property of the outgoing President, to be disposed of as he saw fit. While no statute specifically legalized this custom, the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 tacitly recognized it by authorizing government-operated Presidential libraries in which outgoing Presidents could deposit any papers they wished, and could specify the terms under which Government or public access would be permitted.

1.2 In 1974, because of the legal controversies over former President Nixon's right to dispose of his tape recordings, Congress enacted a special law dealing solely with the Nixon records. And in 1978, Congress enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978 setting forth procedures for the retention and disposition of all Presidential Papers beginning with the next term starting January 20, 1981.

1.3 Accordingly, President Carter's Papers are his own personal property, as in the case of all of his predecessors except President Nixon. In making his own decisions, President Carter has considered the practices of his predecessors, as well as the principles and policies of the Presidential Records Act of 1978.

1.4 President Carter intends to donate most of his Presidential Papers to the United States Government, subject to certain restrictions on access described below.

1.5 President Carter's three predecessors who completed their terms in office, Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson and Ford, each established procedures which prohibited members of their respective staffs from removing Presidential Papers or copies of such papers.* President Carter recognizes that staff members may have a legitimate interest in retaining copies of some papers recording actions in which they participated. He has, therefore, decided to allow members of the White House Staff and members of the staffs of elements of the Executive Office of the President to remove copies of certain Presidential Papers with his prior permission under the restrictions set forth below.

1.6 The President respects the right of every staff member to speak and write freely about his experiences as a member of the White House Staff or the EOP. But he also expects those who

*Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, of course, did not complete their terms.

have had the privilege of serving on the White House Staff or in the EOP to respect the President's rights of ownership and control over the Presidential Papers generated during his term, and the principle that White House advisers do not disclose their own non-public advice or that of other advisers, or the President's non-public response, without the President's consent.

2. Distinction Between Presidential Papers and Personal Papers.

2.1 "Papers" include, but are not limited to, all correspondence, memoranda, documents, photographs, maps, recordings, logs, appointment books, journals, pamphlets, documentary material and copies of the above.

(a) "Personal Papers". Personal Papers are all materials, including personal correspondence, journals, diaries, and their functional equivalents, which are neither developed in connection with nor utilized during the transaction of official government business. The important criterion is not whether the papers merely refer to or are derived from public business, but whether they are actually used, or were created in the transaction of governmental operations. For example, an evening diary which refers to government business but is not used in transacting such business is a Personal Paper. On the other hand, office diaries, appointment books, telephone logs and personal notes taken during a government meeting or used in transacting subsequent government business are Presidential Papers.

(b) "Presidential Papers". Presidential Papers are all records which are not Personal Papers and were either originated or received by the following officials and elements of the Executive Office of the President:

White House Office
Intelligence Oversight Board
Domestic Policy Staff (except for the Drug Abuse Policy Section)
Council of Economic Advisers
National Security Adviser and Deputy National Security Adviser, and deposited in the White House Situation Room
Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability
Director of the Office of Administration
Those files of the Office of Science and Technology Policy reflecting its advisory role to the President.

(c) "Campaign Papers". Campaign Papers are all papers which were developed in connection with or utilized during the 1980 Presidential campaign and which originated in or were received by the above enumerated officials or elements of the Executive Office of the President. President Carter has decided to treat Campaign Papers as Presidential Papers. President Carter may segregate these papers from other Presidential Papers in order to provide special protection for their confidentiality.

2.2 A staff member owns his personal papers. Originals and all copies of Presidential Papers are owned by the President. The President intends to grant staff members access to Presidential Papers relating to actions in which they participated when such papers have been deposited in the Presidential Library. Consistent

with the practice of previous Presidents and President Carter's deed of gift, members of the general public will not be granted access to the Presidential Papers placed in the Carter Library until President Carter authorizes such access.

3. Copying or Removal of Papers from White House Files.

3.1 Staff members may remove their own Personal Papers from White House or EOP files.

3.2 Staff members may remove the following types of Presidential Papers: photographs and copies of published documents. The original of a staff member's personnel records, appointment books and telephone logs may not be removed. Copies of personnel records, appointment books and telephone logs may be removed.

3.3 Original drafts of documents which were circulated to any other office for comment are Presidential Papers which should remain in files for transfer to the Presidential Library. (Copies of such drafts may be removed as provided in subparagraph 3.4(b) below.) Subject to the restrictions of paragraph 4 below, original drafts which were not circulated by the author for any purpose, including comment by other staff or any other office, may be treated as Personal Papers and removed by the staff member who prepared them. The staff member may of course make originals or copies of drafts available for deposit in the Presidential Library. The President encourages doing so for drafts of historical interest.

3.4 Subject to the restrictions of paragraphs 4 and 6 below, staff members may also make and remove copies of a limited number of other selected Presidential Papers, but only after the following procedures are observed:

(a) The staff member shall execute a "Departure Agreement Relating to Presidential Papers" (hereinafter "Departure Agreement"), a copy of which is attached.

(b) Attachment A of the Departure Agreement shall list all Presidential Papers (other than those covered by paragraph 3.2), of which the staff member requests permission to remove copies. The list shall have appended to it a copy of each such Presidential Paper and a brief description of its contents -- e.g., staff member's weekly reports to the staff head or to the President. In the absence of special justification, the President expects every staff member to hold to an absolute minimum the number of Papers for which permission to remove copies is requested.

(c) Presidential Papers listed on Attachment A of the Departure Agreement shall be removed from the White House or EOP element only after Jack Watson or his designee has authorized their removal on behalf of the President.

(d) Copies of Presidential Papers removed by staff members under the procedures of this paragraph 3.4 may not be further

published or disclosed by the staff member except in compliance with the executed Departure Agreement and paragraph 6 below.

4. Classified Materials and Other Sensitive Files.

4.1 Staff members may not destroy or retain the original or a copy of any document which is:

(a) Classified for reasons of national security pursuant to Executive Order 12065, or any predecessor order;

(b) Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(c) Submitted to the government pursuant to statutes which make disclosure of such information a crime;

(d) Submitted to the Office of the Counsel to the President and related to the personal or financial affairs of any Administration nominee, proposed nominee or federal employee, unless submitted by the staff member.

4.2 (a) Permission may be obtained to remove copies of selected documents, classified pursuant to subparagraphs 4.1(a) and (b) above, if the departing staff member makes confirmed arrangements to store the documents in secure storage containers in an approved facility, and establishes a chain of secure custody over the documents. This permission must first be

obtained from the National Security Adviser after consultation with the Counsel to the President, and then from Jack Watson or his designee in accordance with the procedures described in paragraph 3 above.

(b) A staff member may have in his or her files originals or copies of sensitive Presidential Papers which do not bear security classification markings. If a staff member requests permission to remove a copy of any such Presidential Paper, its sensitivity should be specifically called to the attention of the Counsel to the President at the time Attachment A of the Departure Agreement is submitted.

4.3 The President intends to donate most of the classified materials in the Presidential Papers to the United States. In the President's deed of gift of his Papers to the United States, he will establish restrictions on access to all Presidential Papers. However, he intends to allow former staff members to have access under the terms of the Departure Agreement to any such materials they originated or received while working in the White House.

4.4 The use and transfer of classified materials are governed by criminal statutes. Strict adherence to the above rules is essential.

5. Disposition Recommendations to the President.

5.1 The President intends to donate the bulk of his Presidential Papers to the United States for deposit in the President's library. The President will, however, retain certain selected papers in his personal files. If the head of a White House Office staff or EOP element believes that the President should consider retaining an individual document or category of papers as part of his personal files rather than in the Presidential Library, he should bring this recommendation to the attention of the President or his Counsel.

5.2 If the head of a White House Office staff or EOP element concludes that the ongoing nature and importance of a particular matter makes it essential that copies of selected Presidential Papers be provided to the succeeding Administration, he should recommend this to the President. Such recommendations should be the exception rather than the rule.

6. Duty of Non-disclosure, Liability to Subpoena, and Executive Privilege.

6.1 Duty of non-disclosure. Permission for staff members to remove copies of or obtain access to Presidential Papers is subject to the staff member's signed agreement and continuing duty to preserve the President's legal right as the owner of such papers to decide whether the papers should be published or disclosed to third parties. Publication or disclosure to third parties of

the complete or partial text of a Presidential Paper by a staff member shall be made only after approval from the President or his designee, pursuant to the procedures established in the attached Departure Agreement. The President's approval will be confined to the publication or disclosure of the Presidential Paper and will not be conditioned on prior review or approval of any comment the staff member desires to make in connection with such publication or disclosure.

6.2 Subpoena and Executive Privilege. Any papers retained by the departing President or a departing staff member, whether Presidential or Personal, remain subject to a valid judicial, Congressional or agency subpoena. If such a subpoena is served, its validity may be judicially challenged on various grounds (e.g., relevancy, specificity, or if President Carter or the incumbent President so elects in the case of Presidential Papers, Executive Privilege). The power to assert Executive Privilege resides both in the former President and in the incumbent President at the time the issue of disclosure arises. If a departing staff member is asked to produce his copy of a Presidential Paper by a court, Congressional committee or agency (whether by informal request or enforceable subpoena), the staff member should consult with President Carter and the Counsel to the incumbent President to determine whether President Carter or the incumbent President desires to assert Executive Privilege. As the attached Departure Agreement provides, if Executive Privilege is asserted by President Carter or the incumbent President, the departing staff member

should defer disclosing the information subject to the objection until such objection has been withdrawn or judicially resolved.

7. Departure Procedure.

7.1 Plans have been developed for the storage of Presidential Papers both before and after January 20, 1981. Procedures for packing files of Presidential Papers in cartons and identifying the cartons have been developed by the National Archives Office of Presidential Libraries, which has been responsible for the packing, shipment and storage of Presidential Papers of previous Presidents. Archives personnel will be assisted by the Office of Records Management. Presidential Papers are to be collected, packed, carefully identified and then stored in the Executive Office Building until January 19 or 20. Thereafter, they will be shipped under armed guard to a storage facility in Georgia. Presidential Library archivists will be in Georgia to receive the Presidential Papers when they arrive, to supervise their unloading and to maintain inventory control over them. If necessary, specific files and folders will be retrievable almost immediately.

7.2 The President, of course, retains control of these papers throughout the inventory and cataloguing process. Access to the papers will be controlled by the terms and conditions of the deed of gift which will convey the President's papers to the United States. The President intends to permit staff members who

comply with the terms of the Departure Agreement to have access to papers they originated or received after they go into the Presidential Library.

7.3 Representatives of the Office of Presidential Libraries will shortly be in touch with you to initiate the inventory and packing of the files in your office or in storage. You may reach these archivists by calling Extention 2545 (Room 415 OEOB). You are requested to follow their instructions for packing and storing of records.

7.4 The volume of Presidential Papers is great and it is important that we begin immediately to prepare the papers for storage and ultimate transfer to the Carter Presidential Library. We will need the cooperation of the entire staff to carry out this procedure efficiently.

7.5 Staff members departing before being contacted by archivists should make direct arrangements with the Office of Records Management to pack Presidential Papers in their respective offices for temporary storage.

8. Exit Interviews.

8.1 We are continuing the process of exit interviews of selected staff members by representatives of the Office of

Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Service. The information obtained from these interviews will be of considerable value in establishing the Carter Library. The President urges your cooperation with Archives personnel in this process.

9. Consulting Counsel.

9.1 As each staff member reviews his or her files, a number of questions of interpretation will arise. All such questions should be raised with the office of the Counsel to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: WHITE HOUSE STAFF
FROM: AL MCDONALD *AM*
HUGH CARTER *HC*
SUBJECT: Resignations

As part of a smooth and orderly transition, White House staff members should be making their personal plans for the transition.

White House staff members, not part of the permanent staff, should submit their resignations by January 6, 1981, with an effective date of January 20, 1981, or earlier. Senior staff members and deputies should submit their resignations directly to the President through the Staff Secretary. All other staff members should submit their resignations to their department head.

Those staff members who are part of what has historically been the career White House Operating Units should assume they will remain beyond January 20, 1981. After a reasonable amount of time, the new administration will then make whatever decisions they feel are appropriate on the continuation of individual staff members.

Secretarial staff and other support personnel in the White House Policy Offices who have expressed interest in staying should anticipate remaining with the White House after January 20. The new administration will then have an opportunity to select those staff members whom they wish to retain.

Since our task forces and special project efforts will be phased out, most detailees will be returning to their agencies between January 10 and January 19, 1981.

Some staff members will be leaving prior to January 20. It is important those leaving complete the formal check out procedures. To do so, please contact the White House Personnel Office on Ext. 2260. There will be further guidance provided on check out procedures for the remainder of the staff who will be leaving on or close to January 20.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF
FROM: HUGH A. CARTER, JR. *HAC*
SUBJECT: Check-out Procedures

White House staff members who will be leaving need to go through the check-out process before departing. For the convenience of departing staff members a central check-out station will be set up in the Treaty Room (474), OEOB, on Wednesday, January 14 and Thursday, January 15 from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Check-out forms will be available in the Treaty Room on the days and times specified above or in the White House Personnel Office. If the form is not completed properly and on time, staff members final pay check may be delayed.

Most of the check-out processes can be completed at the one stop, but those with unfinished business with the Credit Union will need to stop there separately and passes will not be turned in to the Secret Service in Room 23 until the employees last day.

Staff members who have equipment issued by the White House Communications Agency; i.e., TV receiver, AM/FM radio, dictation equipment, tape recorder, pageboy and FFN's (handi talkie), may schedule prior pickup by calling x4040 or SIG-442. WHCA will be grateful for any assistance you extend in scheduling pickup as early as possible. You should also be prepared to settle any outstanding bills with the White House Mess at check-out time.

Final pay checks will be mailed on January 30 for the pay period ending January 24. Those staying until the 20th will be paid for the full day. Payments for any unused annual leave will be included in the final check. Those requesting refunds of their retirement payment should expect to receive the checks in four to six weeks. Staff members who will want to continue their health benefits will have their notification to provide to their carrier mailed to them the week after they leave. Their coverage will continue 31 days from the date of the form.

Staff members with any specific questions, please call the Personnel Office, x2260.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: JACK WATSON *Jack*

SUBJECT: Message Center for Departing White House Staff

A team of volunteers has organized a message center for departing White House staff who would like to have a place where messages can be left and received. If you need a forwarding telephone number for your friends, you may give them the following:

202/797-5900, extension 221.

If you have time to assist the volunteer message center please call and arrange to do so. The center will begin operating on January 21, 1981.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: JACK WATSON 

SUBJECT: Transition Offices

The President's transition office will be located in Atlanta at the following address:

Richard B. Russell Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

404/221-3900 - commercial
242-3900 - FTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This memo went to:

ACTION

Commission on White House Fellows

OTP

EEOC

SEC

ICC

FMC

FCC

FTC

CAB

CIEP

Federal Reserve Board


Council on Wage and Price Stability

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: AGENCY AND COMMISSION
HEADS

FROM: JOHN O. MARSH, JR. 
Counsellor to the President

SUBJECT: Designation of Transition
Officers for Your Agency or
Commission ...

The purpose of this memo is to advise you that we have been advised by Mr. Jack Watson, Director of the Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group, that a Transition officer has been designated by them to meet with individuals handling Transition in your Agency or Commission.

It would be appreciated if you or your representative would meet with these individuals and assist them in their Transition efforts.

In the event you have not designated a Transition Officer, it would be appreciated if you would do so in order that representatives of the Carter-Mondale team will know the individual designated by you with whom they are authorized to discuss Transition affairs.

Please advise me of the name of the person you designate.

The name (or names) of the person designated as your Transition Officer is:



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nov. 19, 1980

Sonny,

I have attached for your review a proposal prepared by WHCA regarding WHCA services to be provided during the transition in and out of office.


Marty B.



WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

WHCA-B

NOV 19 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: MARTY BEAMAN
FROM: BG BLASINGAME 
SUBJECT: WHCA Transition Support

The communications support provided during the 1976/1977 transition, along with the recommended communications support for the 1980/1981 transition for the President-elect, Former President, Vice-President-elect, and Former Vice President, is described in Inclosures 1 - 8. This support is over and above that provided for the United States Secret Service.

8 Inclosures
As stated

WHCA Transition Support
for
President-elect Carter in 1976

In Plains, Georgia:

Telephone: WHCA Trip Signal Switchboard with extensions to the Carter residence and the Carter-Mondale transition office in Americus.

Radio: None

Record Communications: Secure teletype, Dacom, and Dex

Audiovisual: None

In Washington, DC (716 Jackson Place):

Telephone: WHCA Signal Switchboard extensions in residence and office at 716 Jackson Place.

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Comm Center available as required.

Audiovisual: Television receiver and AM/FM receiver in residence.

In travel status (Atlanta, St. Simons Island):

Telephone: WHCA provided commercial telephones in Carter residence and for 2 or 3 key staff members.

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office

Audiovisual: None

Recommended WHCA Transition Support
for
President-elect Reagan

In Pacific Palisades, California

Telephone: WHCA Signal Switchboard with extensions to the Reagan residence and the Reagan transition office.

Secure Voice: Available at residence

Radio: None

Record Communications: Secure teletype, Dacom, and Dex

Audiovisual: None

At the Santa Ynez Ranch

Telephone: Commercial telephone (MB) service for Mr. Reagan's house. Additional service for 2 - 3 members of his staff at an off-ranch office location.

Secure Voice: Available at Pacific Palisades

Radio: None

Record Communications: Available via courier from Pacific Palisades

Audiovisual: None

In Washington, DC

Telephone: WHCA Signal Switchboard extensions in residence/office at 716 Jackson Place or Blair House

Secure Voice: Available at White House/Old Executive Office Building complex

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Communications Center available as required

Audiovisual: Television receiver and AM/FM receiver available in residence

In travel status (overnight stops only):

Telephone: Commercial telephone (MB) service for Mr. Reagan's quarters and for 2 or 3 members of his key staff. Intercom capability between telephones.

Secure Voice: None

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office

Audiovisual: None

WHCA Transition Support
for
Former President Ford
21 January - 20 July 1977

In Palm Springs, California, 20 January - 30 June 1977 and in Vail,
Colorado, 30 June - 20 July 1977

Telephone: WHCA Trip Signal Board with extensions to the Ford residence and Ford staff office

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office and courier service as required from Washington, DC

Audiovisual: None

In Washington, DC

Telephone: WHCA Signal Switchboard extensions in residence and office at 716 Jackson Place

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Communications Center available as required

Audiovisual: Television and AM/FM receivers available in residence

In travel status (overnight stops only)

Telephone: Commercial (business telephone) telephone service in the Former President's residence and in 2 or 3 key staff quarters. Intercom between subscribers.

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office

Audiovisual: None

Recommended WHCA Transition Support
for
President Carter after 1981 Inauguration

In Plains, Georgia

Telephone: WHCA Trip Signal Switchboard with extension in Mr. Carter's residence and Carter staff office

Secure Voice: Available in Carter residence

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office and courier service as required from Washington, DC

Audiovisual: None

Recommended WHCA team composition in Plains:

- 1 Trip Officer
- 4 Switchboard operators
- 4 Radio technicians (USSS support only)
- 1 Admin NCO
- 1 Comm Sec

Washington, DC

Telephone: White House Signal service available in residence and office

Secure Voice: Available in White House/Old Executive Office Building complex

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Communications Center available as required

Audiovisual: Television and AM/FM receivers available in residence

Travel status (overnight stops only):

Telephone: Commercial telephone service in Carter quarters and 2 or 3 key staff members with intercom capability between subscribers.

Secure Voice: None

Radio: None

Record Communications: Dex in WHCA office

Audiovisual: None

WHCA Transistion Support
for
Vice-President-elect Mondale in 1976/1977

There was no support of any kind provided to Mr. Mondale during the transition of 1976/1977.

Recommended WHCA Transition Support
for
Vice-President-elect Bush

In Washington, DC

Telephone: White House Signal extensions in residence and office*

Secure Voice: Available in White House/Old Executive Office Building complex.

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Communications Center available as required.

Audiovisual: Television and AM/FM receivers available in the Jackson Place office.

In travel status

No WHCA support

*Office service provided by the Admin Board per direction of Mr. Hugh Carter

WHCA Transition Support
for
Former Vice President Rockefeller in 1977

There was no support of any kind provided Mr. Rockefeller in 1977.

Recommended WHCA Transition Support
for
Vice President Mondale after 1981 Inauguration

In Washington, DC

Telephone: White House Signal extensions in residence and office

Secure Voice: Available in White House/Old Executive Office Building complex

Radio: None

Record Communications: White House Communications Center available as required

Audiovisual: Television and AM/FM receivers available in the Jackson Place office

No service provided outside the Washington, DC, area, except:

In Minnesota residence

Telephone: Commercial (MB) telephone in residence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This memo went to:

Vice President
State
Treasury
Defense
Interior
Justice
Agriculture
Commerce
Labor
HEW
HUD
Transportation
ACTION
AID
CIA
CSC
Community Services Administration
ERDA
EPA
FEA
GSA
NASA
National Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the Humanities
SBA
USIA
ACDA
Veterans Affairs
NSC
OMB
CEA
OST
Council on Wage and Price Stability
Federal Reserve Board
CIEP
CAB
FTC



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FCC

Federal Maritime Commission


ICC

SEC

EEOC

OTP

White House Fellows Commission




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: AGENCY, DEPARTMENT AND
COMMISSION TRANSITION OFFICERS

FROM: JOHN O. MARSH, JR. 
Counsellor to the President

SUBJECT: Designation of Additional
Transition Officers by the
Carter-Mondale Transition
Planning Group

This is to advise you that Jack Watson, Director of the Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group, has authorized certain additional transition representatives on their behalf for whom he requests access from time to time. Please note the following are in the nature of at-large representatives who on occasion will be working with various Departments, Agencies and Commissions; however, you will note that groups 2 and 3 have a limited area of responsibility insofar as your Department, Agency or Commission may be concerned.

The new authorizations to discuss Transition matters with you are as follows:

1. Stu Eizenstat, Director of the Policy Development and Agency Liaison part of the Transition Group, and his supervisory staff, which consists of Curt Hessler, Bruce Kirschenbaum, Al Stern and David Rubenstein.
2. Frank Moore, the Transition Group's Director of Congressional Liaison, and his Deputy, Joe Mitchell. Authorization is given and access requested for these two individuals to meet with members of your Congressional Relations staff. If you do not have a formally designated staff function for Congressional Relations, then they would like to meet with those on your staff who have this as a part of their responsibility.

3. Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the Transition group and his Deputy, Doug Huron. This access is requested and authorization given for the purpose of their meeting with your General Counsel or the individual who performs this role in your Department, Agency or Commission.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1980

FEB
RA

COPY
from ORM

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

FROM: *ML* Mary Lawton

SUBJECT: Use of Blair House by President-Elect

At Hugh Carter's request I researched the question whether Blair House had been or could be made available to the President-elect when in Washington. Rex Scouten advised that President-elect Carter had stayed in Blair House during the transition, November 21-23, 1976, December 8-10, 1976, January 11-13, 1977, and January 19-20, 1977. Mrs. Carter stayed there December 20-21, 1976. Mrs. Hood at the Protocol Office at the State Department (632-1702) advised that GSA reimbursed the State Department for the November 21-23 and December 8-10 visits but not for the others. The records did not show why the other visits were not reimbursed but it was our speculation that on the other occasions they were visiting at the invitation of President and Mrs. Ford.

Mrs. Hood also advised that there are two foreign visitors scheduled to sue the Blair House in November.

I advised Hugh that the Blair House could be made available to the President-elect (when not required for its primary purpose of housing foreign visitors). However, use would be on a reimbursable basis, unless at the President's express invitation, and should be limited to occasional use not full-time occupancy.

FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STREAM

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the extent that there is a compelling need for uniformity in interpretation of the law." It exercised similar restraint in providing advice and oversight. This approach was taken because increased managerial flexibility is a major objective of the reform act. Serious problems have developed, however, because the determinations of "compelling need" have failed to recognize adequately the importance of more uniform applications of the law.

The basic dilemma was described by the U.S. comptroller general when he testified in support of the reform bill before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:

A fundamental issue is how can we give management flexibility to improve Government operations and productivity, while, at the same time, protect employees from unfair or unwarranted practices? The greater the degree of management flexibility, the greater the potential for abuse. The greater the controls against abuse, the greater the restrictions on innovative management.

In a May 13, 1980 report to Congress, the comptroller general stated that a good balance was struck between these objectives in the legislation, but he also expressed concern about the balance being changed in the course of implementing the law.

I believe the balance has tipped, and in the case of SES some adverse consequences have already begun to appear. Taken together, the problems discussed in this article have produced enormous uncertainty among career executives. But it is not too late. The balance can be restored.

More so than for any other category of civil service employees, the reform act intended that career executives

would begin seeing themselves as members of a corps for the entire executive branch. Progress in this direction has been threatened by an almost slavish devotion of the Carter Administration to the idea that each agency should do as it sees fit under the law, with resulting significant differences in the operation of SES. It is simply unrealistic to expect career executives to develop a government-wide orientation without reasonably equal treatment under similar conditions.

In commenting on OPM's implementation of the act, the comptroller general told Congress in his May 1980 report that "Agency personnel management programs should be based on a basic framework provided by OPM, and these programs should be similar throughout the government, unless there is a compelling need for an agency's program to be different." This strikes me as a sound approach; carrying it out would require more effective advice and oversight by OPM.

In view of the flexibilities authorized by the Civil Service Reform Act, OPM can provide better guidance and monitoring without reverting to the tight controls exercised by the former Civil Service Commission. OPM can move from a very limited leadership role to a more active middle ground, and do so in healthy cooperation with the agencies. A decision to this end by the Reagan Administration would be a giant step forward. It would establish much needed confidence in SES particularly among career executives; and it would enhance the possibility of realizing the high promise of SES—significant improvement in government operations.

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: CRITICAL, IF NOT DECISIVE

Donald H. Haider, *Northwestern University*

The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 provides funds, office space, travel, and other expenses for the president-elect prior to inauguration. It establishes a policy that transitions should be "orderly" and "assure continuity." Nothing in the act warns a president-elect and his advisers that the transition period may be decisive, if not determinative of their political fate. Like quick-drying cement, a transition can rapidly lock in a new administration even before it gets moving.

Much has changed since 1963 or, for that matter, since scholarly attention last turned to presidential transitions:¹ a shift in executive-legislative power, a trend toward one-term presidents, new budgetary procedures and more uncontrollable budgets, and greater interdependency between domestic and foreign policies. New administrations face an increasing volley of crises. The interval between them is shortening, and the time horizons necessary for their solution is lengthening.

Our politics and institutions have undergone changes as well. Interrelated trends such as the disintegration of political parties, congressional rejection of political leader-

ship, popularization of presidential nominations, and fragmentation of authority in the Congress have fundamentally altered government's ability to formulate policy. Indeed, some question whether the conglomeration of subgovernments is now beyond the control of the president, the Congress, or even our Constitution, making coherent policies a near impossibility.²

Gone, in many respects, is the traditional honeymoon period of bipartisanship that allowed presidents "a sporting chance" in their shakedown cruise. Between inauguration day and March 15th, for example, the Congressional Budget Act specifies that the House and Senate Budget Committees will receive reports from all other congressional committees on their respective views and estimates of the appropriate level of total budget outlays, total new budget authority, the public debt, the surplus or deficit, and

Donald H. Haider participated in the transition from President Ford to President Carter as a White House Fellow at the Office of Management and Budget in 1975-1976. He is professor of public management at Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management.

federal revenues. In order to meet this deadline, as well as the May 15th deadline for the first concurrent resolution on the budget, a new administration has roughly 26 days (i.e., from inauguration day to February 15) to make decisions on revising the outgoing president's proposed budget, including economic assumptions, fiscal policy within the context of an overall economic policy, tax policy, program levels and outlays. These decisions, in turn, are preceded by agreements with the Congress on form and specifics of the budget revisions, as well as the degree of agency participation in policy and expenditure decisions.

The inelasticities of the clock have greatly reduced whatever slack existed in presidential transitions. New administrations are expected to hit the ground running. The current and prospective conditions of the economy received principal attention by our last three presidents. Support continues to grow for the view, "as goes economic performance, so goes the election."³ Inescapable are hard, visible quantitative economic indicators: unemployment rates, consumer price index, GNP, stock market averages, interest and mortgage rates, food prices, and real income growth. These figures have become daily, weekly, and monthly barometers for judging how a president's economic game plan is faring against recessions, inflation, and mounting federal deficits. Then, too, there are the political inelasticities—36 months from January 20th comes the Iowa caucuses; the likelihood of, by 24 months, one or more persons having declared their presidential candidacy; and 12 months until an election year changes the congressional environment. Transitions soon become overtaken by deadlines: budgetary, economic, and political.

Transitions are of different types and durations. The president and the president-elect may be of the same or of different parties, or be from vice president to president. Transitions may begin with the close of a nominating convention, or an incumbent's non-candidacy, and extend beyond the inaugural well into the first 100 days. In contrast to parliamentary systems where transitions are immediate, decisive, and predictable, we have a lapse of 11 or 12 weeks between the national election and the inauguration. This gap seems to make no more sense than the length of time between national party conventions and the election.

What Has Changed

Orderly transitions once proceeded within systematic planning by the Office of Management and Budget and the Executive Branch when the incumbent was not a candidate for re-election (1952, 1960, 1968). Hoover was the first to pursue consultations and joint policy making with the president-elect. Truman refrained from presenting a legislative program to Congress in January 1953, and instead Eisenhower, through his institutional staff in the old Bureau of the Budget, prepared a full legislative program in early 1954—one year after assuming office.⁴ Kennedy operated his transition out of a Georgetown town house with Clark Clifford dealing with the outgoing administration, and Sargent Shriver heading the task forces and talent hunt for staffing

the new administration. Charles Murphy, who helped manage the Truman-Eisenhower transition, also handled the Johnson-Nixon transition for the outgoing group, while Bob Mayo, Arthur Burns, and Roy Ash served as liaisons for the Nixon people. In other words, the entire transition process was once more orderly and informal.⁵ Public expectations as to dramatic changes, other than the New Deal era, were less pronounced.

Yet, recent transitions have been quite different than the orderly ones handled by Washington veterans and the institutional staff of the presidency. In the era of the modern presidency (post 1930s), incumbent presidents have been defeated twice in succession: Gerald Ford in 1976 and Jimmy Carter in 1980. The Ford to Carter transition was not smooth and orderly from the vantage of many participants. This difficulty transcended the personal feelings of the two men, and even their fundamental differences in philosophy or approaches. More important, the transition left an indelible mark on the Carter administration, one from which, according to some, it never fully recovered.

Some tentative propositions from that 1976-1977 experience may shed light on the pitfalls and problems that lie ahead for the Carter to Reagan transition. It also may suggest a range of reforms and changes that might be considered in the future if we are to provide for smoother transitions. The stakes and risks of the transition period have risen, and these are all too little understood even by those engaged in "transitioning." In a nuclear age where mistakes may be fatal and consequences world-wide, and when the economy has become so pervasive and sensitive to changes, these concerns are of no small importance.

The Problems

Many of the 300 or so most critical policy-making appointments remain unfilled at a time when the most important policy decisions affecting individual departments and agencies are being made, namely successive budget year revisions and internal restructuring. Presidential staff, cabinet designees, congressional members, party officials, and interest group constituencies compete over sub-cabinet head appointments which, once decided, become the equivalent of policy. Recent transition reports have urged president-elect to set deadlines for staffing key departmental positions. These have yet to be met. Start-up costs have become greater, career and relocation decisions weightier, and conflict of interest scrutiny more intense. Although claimants on jobs may have increased, recruitment of top-level people also has become harder. To quote from one assistant secretary of the Nixon-Ford years: "The job of assistant secretary is nowhere near as attractive a job as it used to be."⁶ The number of positions has increased, prestige decreased, access to the White House limited, perquisites and pay diminished, and policy making overshadowed by White House staffs and policy councils. Moreover, immediate budgetary decisions compel OMB and presidential policy staffs to make early policy decisions often to the neglect of departmental and agency consultation.

Senate confirmation of appointments, from assistant secretary levels up, draw a higher policy price with each successive change of administration. Even where prior negotiation with committee members may have assured confirmation, senators extract commitments from designees on programs, expenditure levels, and projects as a price for speedy approval. The Carter appointments paid dearly at the hands of their committee overseers even before assuming office. In the absence of a policy clearance process, appointees are often on their own to run the confirmation gauntlet—a path that is risk laden and, at times, fatal.

The federal budget constitutes the most sobering, action-forcing pressure a new administration confronts. The 1974 Congressional Budget Act requires a new president to submit to Congress within weeks after January 20th revisions both to the current year budget (FY 1981 in Reagan's case) and to his predecessor's outgoing budget for the forthcoming fiscal year (FY 1982). Decisions on the short-range budget outlook are made within the context of a multiyear perspective for 1982-1986. The more extended these forecasts are, the more favorable estimates are of the economy and budgets since they are interrelated. Outlays, however, have exceeded estimates in 11 of the past 12 years; deficits have been greater than forecasts in nine of these years; and deficits more than doubled what presidents have proposed in five cases.

President Truman declined to send a legislative program to the Congress in his final budget message. Eisenhower included about 95 legislative recommendations, and outgoing presidents since have sent up final budgets which they content would have been proposed if they had continued in office. President Ford, for another example, repeated the major components of his FY 1977 budget in his final FY 1978 budget, namely large spending cuts tied to major permanent tax cuts. President Carter rejected his predecessor's recommendations, as had the Congress. Instead, he added nearly \$20 billion to outlays which dissipated whatever fiscal margin Carter may have had in moving toward a balanced budget. This was the result of unanticipated expenditure growth and the 1980 recession.⁷ Carter's FY 1982 lame duck budget forecasted a \$27.5 billion deficit which, without congressional action on taxes and spending recommendations, more realistically appears to be headed toward double the deficit projection.

Outgoing presidents' budgets have come to contain more "booby traps" and deferred "time bombs" than once was the case, all of which makes these initial revisions more critical. Although the budget is one conspicuous tool that the president has to affect the economy, it has become a blunt and increasingly unwieldy instrument. What a new president proposes in January or February has increasingly become further removed from what actually transpires in a fiscal year that does not end until 19 or 20 months later. Suggestions to extend the fiscal year from October-September to a calendar year would mean that the period from the president's proposed budget to full spend out would increase from 20 to nearly 24 months. Given the economic turbulence of the 1970s, this reform does not make a great deal of sense.

Budgets and policy are interrelated as much as the budget and the condition of the economy. Budgets drive policy. Yet, the federal budget has become more out of control with an expenditure momentum that consistently outpaces current year revenues, leading to mortgaged futures. More than 75 percent of the budget contains "relatively uncontrollable" expenditures mandated by existing statutes, prior year contracts or obligations. Some 50 percent of expenditures are linked to judicially enforceable entitlement payments such as social security. And 30 percent of expenditures are fully indexed which means benefits are adjusted one or more times each year for inflation. Many of the remaining "controllables" involve hundreds of programs surrounded by well organized, vociferous, and politically active constituencies.

Presidential advice-giving processes stand in disarray during transitions. . . . Until decision channels are defined and a president's decision-making style emerges, "ad-hocracy" tends to triumph over an orderly clearance process. Mistakes and miscues proliferate. . .

It took nearly 50 years to arrive at this impasse. Major corrections are unlikely to occur in one year, or even over one term since the structure of the budget allows for relatively little change other than that induced by non-inflationary growth. If left on automatic pilot, the current momentum underlying budgetary growth is simply inconsistent, if not incompatible, with the limits imposed by today's economy. Uneven growth and unforeseen inflation of the 1970s have propelled expenditure growth rates that consistently outpace current year revenues, and have led to the mortgaging of the future. Once appropriable resources shrank, government resorted to back door spending through a bewildering maze of escalating loan and loan guarantee programs outside of the budget process. These programs added to the federal deficit, increased government borrowing in the credit markets, and transferred much purchasing power and resources from the private to the public sector.

Accordingly, presidential decisions embrace a multiyear perspective which, in Reagan's case, requires decisions for FY 1981, FY 1982, and beyond. The dilemma for a new president is compounded by the fact that substantial cuts or reallocations are more difficult in the short run than in the longer run. It is in the short run, however, that adjustments to fiscal policy are made to meet political and economic pressures for stabilizing the economy. Such immediate decisions have a longer term cost, as Carter discovered with his economic stimulus package in 1977-1978 that took hold too late to have much stimulant impact, but added to inflation later on. Then, there are the multi-billion dollar "big ticket" decisions, whether military weapon systems, entitlement programs, loan guarantees, or tax expenditures, that somehow get deferred, or are resolved incrementally at the margin. Many of these issues are, by definition, complex and cross departmental and congressional committee juris-

dictional boundaries. No easy solutions exist. Trade-offs result in constituency pain, and departmental players are ill-equipped to deal with them internally or across departments. Congress, too, tends to cannibalize complicated legislation that involves several committees, as Mr. Carter discovered with his major proposals in energy, welfare reform, health care, and the like. The momentum for quick, decisive action tends to get bogged down by trench warfare. Instead, many of these issues are remanded to OMB, commissions, and interagency task forces for further study and options. Carter faced immediate decisions on energy, the B-1 bomber, unemployment benefits, price supports, social security, trade adjustment assistance, New York loan guarantees, and health-environmental expenditures. Reagan faces these plus Chrysler, the MX missile system, a much expanded range of entitlements, regulatory reform, and major economic policy decisions.

Presidential advice-giving processes also stand in disarray during transitions. Task forces, transition teams, campaign issue staffs, and outside think tanks compete with institutional coordinating staffs such as OMB, the National Security Council, and Domestic Policy Staff, as well as high level careerists for position and power. Until decision channels are defined and a president's decision-making style emerges, "ad-hocracy" tends to triumph over an orderly clearance process. Mistakes and miscues proliferate, sending out multiple, confusing, and often contradictory signals. The early Carter decision management process—untidy even by Washington standards—prevailed during much of the four years: a continuum from the transition itself. In contrast to the Nixon transition, much of which occurred in New York, the early Carter administration suffered from "over-transition": unstructured departmental teams bolstered by campaign issue staffs who, without much direction and even authority, overwhelmed the new policy-making appointees with information, recommendations, and briefing material. There was no clear, consistent policy direction from the very onset.

The transition from campaigning to governing, a gradual but nonetheless crucial distinction, leaves in its wake many a casualty, not the least of whom are campaign loyalists who, if rewarded with policy-making appointments, can be the bane of consistent policy. The trappings of presidential campaign rhetoric immediately conflict with the realities of compromise and congressional bargaining. In a partisan campaign, issues have a "right" and "wrong" side, while questions of public policy tend to be simplified, reduced to slogans, and a variety of "goods" and "bads."⁸

Tensions mount when a president's early efforts to broaden his constituency and to achieve policy consensus irritates party, ideological, or issue advocates who have not made the transition to governance. During the early Carter period, his campaign "Promises Book" was assumed by some to be administration policy, only to be expurgated in early spring of 1977 following the president's ill-advised decision to delete congressionally-sponsored water projects from his budget revisions. Although Carter had campaigned on the issue of cutting back pork barrel projects, few sensed the critical connection between such expendi-

tures and the fate of the president's agenda before the Congress.

A mismatch occurs in transitions between a president-elect's allocation of time and where the president will actually devote most time and energy. Incentives and pressures eventually converge that compel a president to concentrate on foreign policy at the expense of domestic policy, and on economic policy to the subordination of domestic policy.⁹ Yet, beyond the choice of people and structures, the transition period often becomes absorbed by domestic policy and politics. At some point, in the case of Kennedy and Nixon right from the beginning, national security and foreign policy drove out domestic policy in competition for their attention. One veteran careerist who briefed several presidents on defense budgets noted, "I have yet to witness a new president who did not emerge from such sessions and not conclude, 'how much for defense, with the remainder for domestic programs.'" President Kennedy was fond of saying much the same thing: "National security decisions can kill us; and defeated domestic legislation can only embarrass us."

Congress is the most immediate fatality of transitions. As a coequal branch sharing power, its insatiable need for full consultation can never be met, extending from leaders, committee chairmen, staff, to even freshman legislators. Insufficient time exists to provide the full range of briefings to members and staff that is necessary to minimize intercameral and interbranch clashes early on. More White House congressional liaison staff only compounds this problem. As communication lines increase, authority tends to decrease. Short on consultation and long on a complex legislative agenda, Carter's relations with the Congress began on a disastrous basis and did not substantially improve over time.

Finally, there is a certain rhythm to the presidency, for which numerous exceptions can be found. Year one of a new administration is likely to be the most important from the vantage of policy, direction, and in establishing the president's professional reputation in the Washington community. Years two and four are consumed by campaign and electoral survival strategies. Year three tends to be decisive in foreign policy, as presidents find greater latitude and discretion in this realm than in the quagmire of domestic issues.

Also, in the first year, presidents have some latitude to set the government's agenda. Thereafter, it is largely set for them as events and forces beyond their control begin to take over. In Carter's case, the Panama Canal Treaty was to be the precursor to SALT, but timing and events preempted the latter. Energy was the only major presidential issue to survive in any durable way beyond the first year. How the first year is played out in the context of a multi-year agenda has grown in importance to presidents. Once again, decisions governing this strategy tend to be made during the transition period.

Conclusions

If the 1976-1977 transition suggests anything, it is that transitions may be critical to the fate of an administration. The new Reagan administration is pursuing a comprehensive economic policy package that includes tax cuts and major proposals to curb federal expenditures and to control future outlays and credit allocation. The success or failure of these proposals will not only affect the future of the Reagan administration, but very likely American politics in the 1980s.

As imprecise as a definition of these pressing difficulties of presidential transitions may be, a variety of remedies and prescriptions have evolved over time. In a nostalgic sense, some wish to return to a more powerful institutional presidency, in which the Office of Management and Budget becomes the exclusive agent for transitions. Its transition role increasingly has come to be shared with others, however, and its contribution is limited by the budgetary imperatives of developing an outgoing president's final budget. One outgoing administration budget architect observed of the "largely useless work" involved in a lame-duck budget: "one of the cruelties of American politics is the peculiar requirement that defeated presidents must prepare and propose a budget for a time beginning well after their departure from office."

Borrowing from the parliamentary model, others contend that national political parties and their headquarter staffs must begin to play more of a policy role as opposed to one consisting largely of supplying names and lists of hopeful appointees. Still another element wishes to institutionalize the contribution of the "wise old owls": veterans of previous administrations and luminaries of the public administration-public policy world whose involvement in transitions has been increasing.¹⁰

A more sweeping alternative involves a constitutional rather than an administrative or procedural change in transitions. The 20th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution could be revised to provide that the terms of the president and vice president would end in early December as opposed to the current January 20th following a presidential election. To avoid lame-duck sessions, the terms of senators and representatives might be made more contiguous with that of a new president during a presidential election year, perhaps no more than a day or two apart. Although a constitutional remedy should not be taken lightly, the 20th Amendment was adopted to correct the "yawning hiatus" from election to inauguration which, before 1932, spanned November to early March. The changeover from the 19th century horse-and-buggy days to the train and automobile era of the 1930s is not less of a quantum leap than one to the contemporary era of nuclear weaponry, supersonic travel, and instantaneous communication.¹¹ An early December inauguration merits further consideration. Moreover, in spite of the growing importance of this lapse between election and presidential submission of a program to the Congress, this critical period has all but been neglected by historians and students of government. It constitutes one of

those baffling "gaps and deficiencies" in our knowledge about and understanding of the American presidency.

The compression of our political calendar may have many intended and even many unintended consequences. There are those who have grappled with the means to strengthen political parties, to link presidential candidates to party leaders, to develop "shadow cabinets," and to sharpen the policy differences in national elections. Presidential candidates and the Congress might operate with greater discipline and dispatch due to shorter transitions, knowing that succession would follow some 30 days after an election was held. A new president would be less handicapped by his predecessor's outgoing budget and economic policy if we allowed political cycles to become more harmonious with budgetary and economic policy ones.

Predictably, transition periods fade into year one of the presidency in an almost imperceptible way. Presidents will change course many times over a quadrennial period in the policies and organizational structure of their office. It is my contention, however—one that only history may prove correct—that transition periods are becoming more linked to presidential survival. This period sets the tone, to paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, as to whether a new president will "grow or swell" once ensconced in office. This period also deserves greater practitioner and scholarly attention than it has been given to date.

Notes

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