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File Folder FO006-01 (019807-019999)

FOIA
F16-011

Box Number

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49

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
243468	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT	5	7/10/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NUMBER = 019807SS

ACTDATE = 810706
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SUBJECT OTTAWA SUMMIT

SUBCODE F0006-01 FG006-03 FG006-01

ACTION PDANDE RSA 810706 C 810708
 SEGERG RSA 810706 C
 APHARP RSA 810706 C
 99CPA RAA 810706 C
 CAPULL RSA 810706 C
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 CNNEES RSI 810706 C 810706
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 NSALLE RSI 810706 C 810706
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THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

C.F.

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July 10, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President

SUBJECT: Ottawa Economic Summit

After extensive and in-depth interagency coordination, the Cabinet-level task force you asked me to chair completed our Ottawa Economic Summit preparations and provided briefing and background books to your staff June 26. Your staff is now putting the final touches on the materials and ensuring they are in a form which meets your desires. You should receive the package and the schedule shortly. The original books were lengthy but included some excellent back-up material, some of which I hope you will have a chance to read.

As you know, the Summit will address a wide range of important economic matters, including macroeconomic policy, energy, trade, North-South issues, and East-West economic relations. There will also be substantive political talks on some critical issues of concern to us and our Summit partners. Developing options and positions on this broad agenda for your decision has proved to be a demanding but rewarding task. Many of the issues have been contentious, but all of the agencies and departments involved in our preparations have cooperated and assisted extraordinarily well. We used a number of mechanisms to coordinate policy, including several Cabinet Councils, the NSC, Interdepartmental Groups, meetings of the Summit country Personal Representatives ("Sherpas"), and informal meetings between my staff, yours, the NSC staff, and members of the Cabinet departments. All in all, interagency coordination has been extremely smooth and effective. The result has been, in my view, a set of sound and well-considered proposals for your consideration.

The luncheon briefing meetings Dick Allen is setting up next Thursday and Friday will give you a chance to go over the issues in depth and to make any revisions you want.

Although my formal part of the preparations is completed, I will continue to monitor the progress. I'll be glad to help in any way I can.

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NAME HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
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SUBJECT OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT
CONFIDENTIAL
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Document No.

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F0006-01

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

COB

DATE: July 9, 1981

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: JULY 13, 1981

SUBJECT: Ottawa Communique

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JAMES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOFZIGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WEIDENBAUM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ALLEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CANZERI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ANDERSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	FULLER (For Cabinet)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BRADY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DOLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HODSOLL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MC COY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GARRICK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OSTP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GERGEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HARPER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

7/13 see comments RUD has

Remarks:

Attached is a draft of the Ottawa Summit Communique. It does not have any standing other than having been discussed by the "sherpas" (with US participation). Please provide comments/edits by Monday, COB.

Thank you.

(NOTE: Those of you who were handed a copy of the Communique are not being sent another with this staffing Memo.)

Richard G. Darman
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x-2702)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY NAU

FROM: ROGER PORTER AND MARC LELAND

SUBJECT: Ottawa Economic Summit Communique

In reading the current draft of the Ottawa Summit communique one's first overriding impression is that this is not a document that Ronald Reagan would have drafted. It is obviously the product of negotiations between several parties and we are told that this version is considerably improved from earlier versions.

Nonetheless, it seems wise to step back and look at what it says and what it does not say.

1. The Theme of Government Intervention.

Throughout the draft the often subtle theme of government intervention in the economy is pervasive. The references to relying on the market are few and often limited; the references to government management and intervention are more frequent. This is clearly not the approach the President would take in addressing domestic problems or a domestic audience.

*need
ref. to
market*

On page two section one the draft indicates that the 1979 adjustment to energy price increases was "better managed" than in the mid-1970s. In reality, the adjustment was better because of a greater reliance on the market to establish prices and allocate resources. We recommend eliminating the sentence. It does not add materially to the paragraph. Indeed, the paragraph reads better without it.

*avoid
"manage
language*

On page three section three there is discussion of the "use of a range of policy instruments" to improve "the ability of our economies to adapt to change." This is followed by a lengthy, seemingly neverending sentence, talking about the need "to convince our peoples" of the need for change and then specifying a number of "needed" changes. We see little merit in this sentence. It leaves open the question of what forms of "persuasion" governments will use to "convince their peoples." But one need not be terribly imaginative to conclude that many, if not most, would read that greater government intervention in the economy.

*aren't
we in
favor
of change*

On page three section four the draft states that where circumstances permit, "we will increase support for productive investment and innovation." This would be a good opportunity to

emphasize the use of tax policy as the vehicle for stimulating investment and innovation.

*Mention
of tax
policy*

On page four section four the draft states that "we must not let transition measures that may be needed to ease change become permanent forms of protection or subsidy." That is certainly true, but we may be better off without the sentence altogether since it may well be read as endorsing transitional measures, even while arguing that they should not become permanent. However, we don't feel particularly strongly about this.

On page four section five the draft states that it is "desirable to minimize volatility of interest rates and exchange rates." But this is premised again on the notion that government intervention is important in shaping economic activity. Indeed, it suggests that governments control interest rates. Yet, U.S. representatives have consistently argued, at least since this administration has come to office, that interest rates are the result rather than the cause of inflation. Moreover, we have also adopted an exchange rate intervention policy that maximizes reliance on market forces and limits intervention only to severe circumstances.

On page eleven section one, we again find evidence of this tension between reliance on the market and government intervention. In the last sentence of the section one again finds the qualifier of supplementing reliance on the market "as necessary by government action." We recommend the sentence end at the comma following market mechanisms.

Not only would we downplay the theme of government intervention, but we would emphasize the theme of the important role of the private sector.

We do emphasize the need for an open world trading system. We could profitably also encourage on page four section six the free flow of capital and removing impediments to international investment. Likewise, the private sector is not sufficiently emphasized as a way of helping developing countries. What is needed less than government to government aid (which at best can only make a dent in the problems of the developing countries) is open markets for the goods and services produced in developing countries and a steady stream of private investment providing capital and technological know-how.

2. Length: Imbalance among the Sections.

Readers frequently interpret the amount of space given to a topic in such a communique as indicative of its importance, or at least its perceived importance at the meetings. Examining the amount of space devoted to each of the five principal topics

at the Summit is instructive.

Macroeconomic policy is covered in a little less than three pages. Trade is approximately two pages. Energy policy takes up about a page and three-quarters. East-West economic relations is limited to one paragraph of less than half a page in length. Relations with developing countries is about three and a half pages in length. Rather than expanding some sections, we would encourage shortening the section on relations with developing countries and we offer some suggestions on this below.

3. The Emphasis on Unemployment.

The section on macroeconomic policy emphasizes heavily the problem of unemployment. Careful observers will note the difference between the Summit emphasis on unemployment in comparison with the recent OECD declaration.

We believe, and should articulate at the Summit, that reducing inflation is the most important step one can take to fight unemployment. Rather than emphasize unemployment, we recommend emphasizing "sustained economic growth" as the best means of reducing unemployment.

Moreover, we find the assertion on page two section two that "in many countries, unemployment has risen sharply and is still rising" questionable. Depending on one's definition of a sharp rise, one is hard pressed to identify "many countries" among those at the Summit where this is true.

4. Short-term versus Long-Term.

One of the important missing elements in the draft is any reference to the trade-off between short-term political expediency and staying the course long-term. One of the characteristics of great leaders is that they set a long-term course and stick with it. Indeed, this is one of the hallmarks of the President and one of his greatest assets. The communique should emphasize that the leaders reached agreement to eschew policies designed to produce benefits in the short-term, but which were inconsistent their long-term objectives.

5. Relations with the Developing Countries.

This is the longest section in the communique and could usefully be reduced. We strongly urge adopting the second alternative paragraph on page five relating to Cancun. Moreover, within this alternative paragraph, we recommend removing the first two phrases of the third sentence which now read: "Further, recalling the positive spirit expressed at Venice towards the prospect of global negotiations, subject to mutually satisfactory agreement on procedures and agenda." The sentence

would read: "We reaffirm our willingness to explore all avenues of consultation and international cooperation with developing countries in whatever forums may be necessary."

The President is currently in an extremely strong position. He is well liked and well respected by the other leaders and they are looking to him for leadership. The global negotiations issue is an excellent one for him on which to stand firm.

The idea of global negotiations, from the standpoint of the developed countries, is not particularly well formed. It is not clear what the developed countries expect to gain from such negotiations (except possibly, some temporary good will), nor what the potential costs are for them.

Wise leaders do not embark on courses whose destination is unknown. They are leaders because they have a vision of where they are going. And others, trusting them, are willing to follow. That is the essence of leadership.

The President can appropriately say that he is deeply concerned about conditions in developing countries and that despite severe budgetary constraints, he has maintained and increased the U.S. level of funding for aid programs. Even more importantly, the U.S. is putting its economic house in order and keeping its doors open to the goods and services of developing countries recognizing that what they need most is the wherewithal to produce and markets in which to sell.

But there is little point, in traveling down the global negotiations trail with no assurance of where it is leading. It is a trail that is potentially both steep and slippery.

On page six section four we see little merit in committing to allocating the major portion of our aid to poorer countries. That statement is simply unnecessary and could require a major reallocation of U.S. aid.

In the same section it is not clear whose impediments are being removed "to nonconcessional and private capital flows." What we need to talk about here is creating a favorable climate that will encourage private investment.

On page seven section seven we recommend striking "valuable" in referring to the efforts of OPEC in financing development in non-oil developing countries. It is gratuitous and unnecessary. We also ~~strongly recommend eliminating all references to the World Bank.~~ The U.S. has clearly taken a position against a ~~World Bank energy affiliate.~~ Communiqués from meetings such as this should reflect a consensus, not a majority view. And it is not clear that by the end of the Summit this will be the majority view.

Finally, we see no need to specify how the leaders will maintain contact with one another and therefore, in the closing sentence of the communique, prefer the later alternative language.

)(N)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 9, 1981

DRAFT

DECLARATION OF THE OTTAWA SUMMIT

JULY 20 AND 21, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/State/Treasury
BY dr NARA on 11/4/2019 *Wen*

I INTRODUCTION

1. We met at a time of intense change and challenge, with serious economic difficulties and increased international political dangers confronting our societies, and all countries of the world, both developed and developing. For several of us, it was the first occasion to meet each other, and for us all it served to underline the strength of our common bonds -- of values, of interests, and of aspirations.

2. As leaders of major industrial democracies, we welcomed this opportunity to consult on global economic issues. In the years since the first Summit meeting in 1975, our countries have encountered persistent and deep-seated economic problems. The realities of interdependence require that we tackle these problems in a spirit of shared responsibility, both among ourselves and with our partners throughout the world, and that we take into account the effects on others of policies we pursue. In shaping our long-term economic policies, care should be taken to preserve the environment, ecology and resource bases of our plant.

3. We also recognize that economic issues both reflect, and affect the broader political purposes we share. We have

concerns before our countries: the challenge to world economic progress and the challenge to world peace.

II THE ECONOMY

1. The ~~primary~~ challenge we addressed at this meeting was the revitalization of the economies of the industrial democracies. In the year since the Venice Summit, the adjustment to the ~~energy~~ ^{oil/petroleum} price rise of 1979 has in important respects been better managed than was the case in the middle 70s. The fight against inflation has been pursued with determination and the average rate of inflation has fallen. Energy use and oil dependence have been reduced. [Growth in the two years 1980 and 1981 will be higher on an average than in 1974 and 1975 in the industrial countries, while inflation is likely to be lower.] Growth has been better maintained in the developing countries than in the industrial countries. The large balance-of-payments deficits which the ~~(energy)~~ ^{oil} price increase produced have so far been financed at substantial cost in both developed and developing countries but without imposing intolerable adjustment burdens.

2. ~~On the other hand,~~ the experience of individual countries has differed within this broad picture. In four of our seven countries, inflation remains in double figures. In many countries, unemployment has risen sharply and is still rising. There is a prospect for moderate growth in the coming year but at present it promises little early relief from unemployment. Balance of payments surpluses and deficits originating in the

all countries?

rates have reached record levels in many countries. If long sustained at these levels, they would threaten productive investment and impose heavy burdens, particularly on deficit countries, developed and developing.

3. We are agreed that the fight to bring down inflation and reduce unemployment must be our highest priority. We are agreed too that these linked problems must be tackled ^{concurrently.} [at the same time] We must continue to reduce inflation if we are to secure the higher investment and sustainable growth which are necessary ~~pre~~ [pre] conditions of the durable recovery of employment. To reduce unemployment and to improve the ability of our economies to adapt to change requires the balanced use of a range of policy instruments. We have to convince our peoples, especially the social partners, of the need for change: change in expectations about pay ^{consistent with lower inflation,} [and conditions, and about the policy environment in which decisions on both pay and prices have to be made] change in management and labour practices, change in the pattern of industry, change in the direction and scale of investment, and change in energy use and supply.

4. We need urgently to reduce public borrowing; but where our circumstances permit or we are able to make changes within the limits of our budgets, we will increase support for productive investment and innovation. We have also to accept and strengthen the application of market disciplines throughout the economy, including heavy reliance on the price mechanism

to conserve energy. And we must not let transitional measures that may be needed to ease change become permanent forms of protection or subsidy.

5. We see low and stable monetary growth as essential to reducing inflation. ^{High} Interest rates have to play their part in achieving this and are likely to remain high ^{until inflation can be brought under control.} [where fears of inflation remain strong.] But we are acutely aware that levels and movements of interest rates in one country can make more difficult stabilization policies in other countries by influencing their exchange rates and their economies. For these reasons, as much reliance as possible should be placed on restraint in government expenditure and containment of budgetary deficits. It is also desirable to ^{seek stable economic growth which will} minimize ~~the~~ volatility of interest rates and exchange rates.

6. In a world of strong capital flows and large deficits it is in the interests of all that the financial soundness of the international banking system and the international financial institutions be fully maintained. ^{7.} We welcome the expanded role of the IMF in financing balance-of-payments deficits on terms which encourage needed adjustment.

III RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

1. We support the stability, growth, independence and ~~genuine~~ non-alignment of developing countries. We recognize the reality of interdependence and reaffirm our commitment

to cooperate and to strengthen our relations with developing countries in a spirit of mutual interest, respect and benefit. We look to them to play a full part in the international system commensurate with their capabilities and responsibilities and to become more fully integrated in it.

2. We look forward to constructive and substantive discussions with them, individually and multilaterally, particularly at the Cancun Summit. We reaffirm the positive spirit we expressed at Venice towards the prospect of Global Negotiations, subject to mutually satisfactory agreement on procedures and agenda, and are willing to participate as soon as possible in efforts to reach an agreed basis for the launching of such Negotiations. (Supported by other Summit countries).

OR

2. We look forward to constructive and substantive discussions with them, individually and multilaterally. The Cancun Summit offers an early opportunity to address our common problems ~~in a new light.~~ Further, recalling the positive spirit expressed at Venice towards the prospect of Global Negotiations, subject to mutually satisfactory agreement on procedures and agenda, we reaffirm our willingness to explore all avenues of consultation and international cooperation with developing countries in whatever forums may be ~~necessary.~~ *appropriate.*
(Supported by the US.)

3. We are deeply conscious of the serious economic problems

especially by the poorer among them. We remain ready to support their efforts to promote economic and social development since these efforts are vital to their success.

4. We are committed to maintaining substantial and, in many cases, growing levels of ODA, and will seek to increase public understanding of this policy. We will allocate the major portion of our aid to poorer countries and we will participate actively in the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. It is important to emphasize that strengthening our own economies, increasing access to our markets, and removing impediments to nonconcessional and private capital flows contribute much larger amounts of needed resources and technology to developing countries and thereby complement official aid.

5. The Soviet Union and its partners, whose contributions are meagre, should make more development assistance available, and take a greater share of exports of developing countries, while respecting their independence and non-alignment.

6. We support the crucial role played by the International Financial Institutions. We will maintain a strong commitment to those bodies, and work to ensure that they have, and use effectively, the financial resources necessary for carrying out their important responsibilities and for encouraging sound policies in member countries.

7. We attach high priority to the resolution of the problems created for the non-oil developing countries by the damaging effects on them of high costs of energy imports following the two oil price shocks. The surplus oil-exporting countries have, with us, a large stake in the resolution of these problems. We call on them further to broaden their valuable efforts to finance development in non-oil developing countries, especially in the field of energy. We stand ready to co-operate with them for this purpose and to explore with them, in a spirit of partnership, possible mechanisms, such as those being examined in the World Bank, which would take due account of the importance of their financial contributions. A favorable climate for ~~energy~~ energy exploration and investment in non-oil developing countries is indispensable. We will work for practical achievements at the forthcoming UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy.

8. In view of our concerns about food shortages and malnutrition, we recognize the importance of accelerated food production in the developing world and of greater world food security; and the need for developing countries to pursue sound agricultural and food policies. We will examine ways to make increased resources for assistance available for these purposes. We welcome the emphasis being given to food-related issues within multilateral institutions, including the new facility in the IMF.

9. We recognize the need for many developing countries to deal with problems of excessive population growth, in ways sensitive to human values and dignity; and to develop human resources, including technical and managerial capabilities. We will place greater emphasis on international efforts in these areas.

impetus to the strengthening of the open and multi-lateral trading system. We welcome the proposal by the Consultative Group of Eighteen that the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES should envisage the convening of a meeting at Ministerial level during 1982. Bearing in mind in particular the need further to integrate the developing countries into the world economy, we will be prepared to cooperate with others in assuring the implementation of the results of the Tokyo Round, and in analyzing both the issues confronting the trading system and the trends and opportunities likely to emerge in the 1980s. We will also work together with the other OECD countries in their program of study to examine trade issues.

4. We will keep under review the role played by our countries in the smooth functioning of the multilateral trading system, with particular emphasis on the need to maximize the openness of markets while allowing for the safeguard measures provided for in the GATT ~~or~~ ^{DELETE} (Disruption by the concentration of exports on specific markets and in narrow sectors should be avoided through appropriate international cooperation. Within the framework of this cooperation and according to internationally established rules, a timely industrial adjustment should be sought.)

5. We endorse the accelerated efforts to conclude by the end of this year an agreement to reduce the subsidy effects of official export credit schemes, since an unbridled export credit race will bring about distortion of trade.

V. ENERGY

1. At Venice we set the objective of breaking the link between economic growth and oil consumption by effecting fundamental structural change in our energy economies. That change is now underway. But our countries continue to be vulnerable and energy supply remains a potential constraint to revived economic growth over the decade. We must accelerate the development and use of all our energy sources, both conventional and new, promote energy efficiency and replace oil by other fuels. To these ends we will continue to rely heavily on market mechanisms, supplemented as necessary by government action.

2. We are confident that, with perseverance, our goals for the decade can be achieved. We will continue to watch progress closely. In the meantime, our capacity to deal with short-term oil market problems should be improved, particularly through the holding of adequate levels of stocks.

3. In many countries, progress in constructing new nuclear facilities is disappointingly slow. We recognize concerns about safety, health, nuclear waste management and non-proliferation but are convinced that these concerns can and will be met. We intend, in each of our countries, to encourage public acceptance of nuclear energy. We will further our efforts in the development of advanced technologies and in spent-fuel management.

4. We will also take steps to realize the potential for economic production, trade and use of coal; this ~~could~~ include removal of impediments, and an improvement in the climate which would favor the conclusion of long-term arrangements between buyers and sellers. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of coal does not damage the environment.

5. The successful implementation of our energy strategy will contribute significantly to the health of the global economy. We look forward to improved understanding and cooperation with the oil exporting countries.

VI. EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

We also reviewed the significance of East-West economic relations for our political and security interests. We

recognized that there is a complex balance of political and economic interests and risks in these relations. We concluded that continuing consultations and (where appropriate) coordination are necessary to ensure that, in the field of East-West relations, our economic policies continue to be compatible with our political and security objectives, for example in such areas as strategic trade controls and the need to guard against the risks of becoming vulnerable to dependence on Eastern resources and markets.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

1. This and earlier Economic Summits confirm our conviction that our common problems can be resolved only through close consultation and cooperation. The resources of our democratic, free societies are equal to the tasks we face. This Summit finds us more united than ever in our perception of shared concerns and in our attachment to our common values and goals. We shall move forward together and with all countries ready to work with us in a spirit of cooperation and harmony. In order to ensure the greatest possible degree of ~~concertation~~ ^{consistency in} ~~of~~ our approaches to the fundamental problems which we all face, we intend between now and the next meeting to maintain continuing contact with each other (both directly and through our Personal Representatives) or (with a view to agreeing how consultation and cooperation can be made even closer).

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NAME DAVID CHEW
ORG DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
SUBJECT OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE,
COMMENTS BY ROGER PORTER AND MARC LELAND
SUBCODE P0006-01 FG012
INDCODE 1130
ACTION SSDARN 810713

MEMORANDUM

#4168

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1981

[01990955
FO006-01]

~~THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/2011 BY [signature]~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT:

Political Discussions at the Ottawa Summit

Al Haig has sent you a briefing paper on political issues to be discussed at the Ottawa Summit (Tab A). This material will be incorporated into your briefing book for the Summit.

Attachment

Tab A

Memo from Haig re Political Discussions
at the Ottawa Summit

~~UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

10:59 AM JUL 18 81

'81 JUL 14 P12:01

~~SECRET~~



IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

MEMORANDUM

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-441100)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

BY: [Illegible]

[Handwritten signature]

100-441100

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

A

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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NAME RICHARD ALLEN
ORG NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AT OTTAWA SUMMIT - NSC 4168
~~SECRET~~
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