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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 12, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. AHMED SHAH

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE ITERIM
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE		ORG	88/10/13	NAN C	88/11/03
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /		/ /
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CJ

RAR

See remarks section of DOS Transmittal form

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | * | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | * | * | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | * | * | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8829847

Date November 3, 1988

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan
From: Mr. Ahmed Shah
Date: September 22, 1988
Subject: Regarding Recognition of Interim Islamic Government
of Afghanistan

WH Referral Dated: October 13, 1988
NSC ID# (if any): 599594

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
 cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
 proposed travel.
 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: Ahmed Shah, whose government has no official standing and no
diplomatic relations with any other government, may exploit any official
correspondence with the USG to his advantage. The Department has decided not to
respond to this letter.


Director
Secretariat Staff

3829847

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 13, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 599594

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. AHMED SHAH
HEAD AND PRIME MINISTER
INTERIM ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN
KHATAK HOUSE
7-E MULBERRY ROAD
PESHAWAR PAKISTAN

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE ITERIM
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

599594

BE

DOS

حکومت عبوری اسلامی مجاهدین افغانستان



تاریخ

Phone: 43971

Camp Office: Khatak House
7-E Mulberry Road
Abdara Road
Peshawar -Pakistan

His Excellency
The President
United States of America
White House
Washington

Date: 22nd September 1988

Subject: RECOGNITION OF THE INTERIM ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT
OF AFGHANISTAN

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency on behalf of and as Head of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan:

1. That Afghanistan was a monarchy ruled by King Zahir Shah and his family as an autocratic tribal regime till July 1973;
2. That on 17th July 1973 the monarchy was overthrown by Sardar Dawood Khan with the help of some elements of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan trained in the USSR and a Republic was proclaimed;
3. That on the 27th of April 1978, the Communist Party of Afghanistan with the help of some elements of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan indoctrinated by it and trained in the USSR, through a coup de etat - but without the support of the majority of the people of Afghanistan - overthrew the regime of Sardar Dawood Khan - and proclaimed Noor Mohammad Tarahki of the Khalq Group of the Communist Party of Afghanistan - as the Head of the State and Government;
5. That subsequently the people of Afghanistan rose in revolt both against the minority Communist regime imposed on Afghanistan and against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan;
6. That consequently a war of liberation was launched by the Mujahideen which ultimately culminated in a successful revolution in Afghanistan which resulted in the complete erosion and disappearance of all state machinery throughout Afghanistan - the writ of the Kabul Regime being confined to Kabul and a few cities - and not to the countryside which constitutes 80% of the territory of Afghanistan which is now controlled by the Mujahideen of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan;



تاریخ ۲۰۰۰

7. That on Friday the 19th of February 1988, a historical and auspicious day in the annals of the history of Afghanistan - the formation of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan - as well as the name of the Head of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan - as unanimously agreed to by the 7 party Islamic Unity Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen was announced at a press conference by Engineer Hikmat Yar Gullbaddin - the then spokesman of the 7 Party Alliance;

8. That on thursday the 16th of June 1988, a cabinet which is the executive organ of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan consisting of 15 ministers - representing the 7 party Alliance was announced by Pir Syed Ahmed ~~Shah~~ Gilani, the then spokesman of 7 party Alliance;

9. That the the Cabinet of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan consist of the following ministers:

Prime Minister - Head of the Government: Engineer Ahmed Shah,
Deputy Prime Minister:: Dr. Zabihullah Mujadadi,
Deputy Prime Minister : Molvi Mohammad Shah Fazli,
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Mr. Najiullah,
Minister for Interior: Seyed Noorullah Emad,
Minister for Defence: Haji Deen Mohammad,
Minister of Education: Moulvi Meer Hamza,
Minister for Information: Mr. Mohammad Yassir,
Minister for Finance: Mr. Mohammad Ismail Siddiqui,
Minister for Justice : Mr. Ali Ansari,
Minister for Agriculture: Mr. Motiullah,
Minister for Planning: Mr. Abdul Aziz Farogh,
Minister for Educational Research: Professor Din Mohammad Gran,
Minister for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Dr. Farooq Azam.

10. That the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan is a representative government of the people of Afghanistan, representing the Mujahideen fighting inside Afghanistan, the five million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran and the other parts of the world and the 7 party Islamic Unity Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen;

11. That the Afghan Mujahideen have now liberated more than 80% of Afghanistan from the Soviet - Kabul Forces, have set-up local government executive and judicial institutions therein, exercise complete control and authority in these liberated areas, have set-up administrative machinery for the betterment and wellbeing of the common people of these liberated areas - and have also set-up the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan which exercises sovereignty in these liberated areas;

حکومت عبوری اسلامی مجاہدین افغانستان



تاریخ ۲۰۰۰

12. That the common people of the liberated area of Afghanistan which constitute 80% of its total area and population owe complete allegiance to the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan and fully support all its policies which are for the betterment and wellbeing of the common people;

13. That in accordance with the basic principles of international law as applied and practised by the Comity of Nations - and in accordance with the pratique' of the United Nations , the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan fulfils all the basic pre-requisites for both de facto and de jure recognition, that is,

i) That a succesful revolution has taken place against the Soviet - sponsored Government and has effectively replaced it;

ii) That a de jure government has been established in the liberated areas;

iii) That this Islamic revolutionary Government has now liberated and controls 80% of the territory of Afghanistan;

iv) That this Islamic revolutionary Government enjoys the allegiance and support of more than 90% of the population of Afghanistan;


It is, therefore requested that Your Excellency's Government grant de jure recognition to the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan - as the Government of Afghanistan -and establish friendly and cordial relations on the basis of sovereign equality of the two peoples.

Should Your Excellency accede to our request for recognition we would request Your Excellency to support our claim for admission to the United Nations and other international forums and organisations.

And in pursuance of Your Excellency's recognition we shall send a goodwill delegation to promote goodwill and friendship between the two countries and open a diplomatic mission in your country.

Assuring Your Excellency of our highest considerations,

We remain,
Very sincerely yours,


Engineer Ahmed Shah,
Head and Prime Minister,
Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan.



GORDON J. HUMPHREY
NEW HAMPSHIRE

531 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-2841

NEW HAMPSHIRE TOLL FREE NUMBER
1-800-852-3714

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
JUDICIARY

LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 26, 1988

600954

0002

00119

FG006-12

Lt. General Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Colin:

It was a pleasure to see you this morning at the White House. I appreciate your willingness to follow-up on the issue that I raised with the President.

As I discussed with the President, I believe the Government of Pakistan is seriously considering recognition of the Afghan Resistance Alliance once they establish an interim government inside Afghanistan. I recommend that the United States convey to the Government of Pakistan that we would support such a move, and would be prepared to follow Pakistan's lead.

On June 18, 1986 the New York Times reported that a senior Administration official cited several criteria that the Alliance must meet before we consider recognition: greater cooperation, greater control over their territory, and greater international visibility. As you know, the Alliance has made tremendous progress in each of these areas. The Resistance now controls almost 80% of the territory of Afghanistan. They have represented the Afghan people at the United Nations and the Islamic Conference. As the President noted on March 20, 1987, "the Alliance has also become the focal point for the distribution of social services and humanitarian resources inside the country." The President has also praised their cohesiveness on the battlefield, which has secured a Soviet commitment to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan.

Recently, the Alliance announced plans for an interim government. They have selected a president and a vice president. They have indicated that leaders from all of the seven parties will participate in the interim government, along with some Afghans outside the current Alliance structure. I realize that there may be concerns with some elements of the Alliance - however I am calling for recognition of the interim government that includes leaders from all of the parties. I do not in any way suggest that we confer recognition on only one faction of the Alliance.

ONE EAGLE SQUARE
CONCORD, NH 03301
(603) 228-0453

157 MAIN STREET
BERLIN, NH 03570
(603) 752-2800

NSC # 8803183

Lt. General Colin L. Powell
April 26, 1988
Page #2


The interim government is merely a first step to restoring a government in Afghanistan that enjoys the broad support of the Afghan people. It seems that we could provide an important incentive to the Alliance to establish a broad based government inside Afghanistan, if they knew that the United States would be willing to move toward recognition.

We should not hold the Alliance to a "text book" standard. ~~The United States maintains ambassadors in nations all over the world that do not meet a perfect "democratic standard," and that are far less representative of their people than the Resistance Alliance.~~ But if we sincerely believe -- as we have stated repeatedly -- that the Alliance is the true representative of the Afghan people, then we should move to confer recognition.

I look forward to hearing your views on this issue.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,


Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

GJH/tk

*please push this effort, Colin
we need your help to overcome
State Dept. inertia.*

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803183
RECEIVED: 27 APR 88 07

TO: POWELL

FROM: HUMPHREY, GORDON J

DOC DATE: 26 APR 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE GOVT OF PAKISTAN IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RECOGNITION
OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 30 APR 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE
FORTIER
LEDSKY
RODMAN
ROSS

FOR INFO
CURTIN
OAKLEY
ROSTOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSCTF

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8803183

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 TAHIR-KHELI
001

Z 88042707 PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
X 88091214 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803183
RECEIVED: 27 APR 88 07

TO: POWELL

FROM: HUMPHREY, GORDON J

DOC DATE: 26 APR 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

NCO

SUSPENSE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RECOGNITION
OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL DUE DATE: 30 APR 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE
FORTIER
LEDSKY
RODMAN
ROSS

FOR INFO
CURTIN
OAKLEY
ROSTOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

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6491
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FG006-12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1988

Dear Mr. Forrest:

Thank you for forwarding a copy of your recent report on Afghanistan, which I received through Chuck Bernard. I have passed it on to appropriate members of my staff for their review. I appreciate the opportunity to have the benefit of your efforts to track the situation in the region.

Sincerely,


Colin L. Powell

X
Mr. Vaughn S. Forrest
1507 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

NSC # 8806491

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 19, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM:

WILLIAM J. BURNS *WJB*

SUBJECT:

Afghan Material from Vaughn Forrest

Chuck Bernard forwarded to you material on Afghanistan (Tab II) prepared by Vaughn Forrest, Administrative Assistant to Representative McCollum (R - FL). We have looked at the papers by Forrest, and find that they are not especially enlightening. A short note of thanks to Forrest would be appropriate (draft at Tab I); no further contact is necessary.

Mike Mike Andricos and Shirin Tahir-Kheli ^{FK} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

cc to Chuck Bernard

Prepared by: Stephen E. Benko

Attachment

Tab I Powell Letter to Forrest

VAUGHN S. FORREST
~~1507 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING~~
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

?

Dear General Powell,

Knowing of your interest in
Afghanistan I thought you
might be interested in this
report.

Respectfully,
Vaughn Forrest

Staff to
Bill Bernard
6491

CBC

COLUMBIA BAY COMPANY

1307 DUKE STREET • ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314 • TEL. (703) 836-7825

Bin Beans,
Anything
here?
CD

30 August 1988

Colin

TO: ~~LITG COLIN L. POWELL~~

Vaughn Forrest is one of the unsung heroes of the war in Afghanistan. He travelled there on numerous occasions, and understood the political picture better than most of the people who were making a living at it. He is pouring his heart out in these papers. I would highly recommend that you give him a call and have him visit with you and describe to you his view of that world.

Sincerely,

Chuck

CHUCK BERNARD

I have been analyzing and reporting my findings on Afghanistan since 1985. Hundreds of interested parties and organizations have been interviewed by myself during that time in the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I would like to report some concerns regarding the current situation in Afghanistan. First, the pre-mature unilateral cessation of the most tactically important weapons has not accomplished the wished for goal of allowing the Soviets to withdrawal unimpeded and thereby expedite the fall of the Najibullah regime. Instead, the structured withdrawal by the Soviets from their outer perimeter bases has assisted in consolidation of DRA forces and gives those DRA forces tactical supremacy by the nature of changing from an offensive to a defensive mode. The Soviets service those abandoned bases by long range artillery and high altitude bombing. The Soviets held in reserve the two Soviet trained DRA Divisions until it was absolutely appropriate for their engagement i.e. when mujahideen threatened outlying principal cities and became more desperate as supplies decreased but supply lines grew longer and more vulnerable to artillery and air power interdiction. The Soviets have accomplished all of the above.

The end result being that each major population center is ringed with an iron moat of anti-personnel mines with interdicting fields of fire between outposts, unbreechable and unreachable to

any meaningful mujahideen military effort. A Soviet reserve of all munitions for 10 Soviet divisions for one year is in place. This reserve in the current DRA configuration will enable the current level of fighting by DRA ground and air forces to continue for two to two and one half years. This allows harassment and interdiction of mujahideen supplies and operations with high DRA successes. Concurrently the farther away the mujahideen are forced to operate from city centers without adequate supplies of long range weapons 120 mm mortar and 122 mm rockets and even with adequate supplies there will be a dramatic increase in civilian casualties. Each civilian death increases the staying power of the Najib regime. Regardless of the inter-party fighting of this regime the professional DRA Army will remain unified in this modern day version of the medieval castle under siege. Under seige is actually a misnomer in that resupply will continue by air with even more regularity as the air corridor widens proportionately to the decline in available Stingers to keep the corridor as narrow as possible. Simultaneously, the DRA and WAD are making deals with each tribe and village further dividing and denying both the political and military support required by an effective guerrilla force attempting to transfer into a conventional army just as the guerrilla political apparatus must transfer into a conventional government. The guerrilla political apparatus cannot without a method and plan serve the populace that is now the status of the seven mujahideen political parties therefore, Najib grows

stronger within the city centers. The Pakistani, expecting firm directions from Washington, but receiving none, have proceeded along their normal short-sighted approach -- driven by domestic political concerns and old military prejudices -- continuing to divide and then favor certain Afghan commanders and parties. The Pakistanis instigated the tribal groups in the Chaman, Spin Buldak, and Qandahar regions into inter tribal fighting as well as inter DRA and Mujahideen fighting, not with the goal of winning but in making it impossible to win Qandahar. Zahir Shah is from the Qandahar area, if Qandahar would fall first there would be a general call for the Kings return. The Pakistanis more specifically Gen. Aqtar does not want Zahir Shah because of old bills of revenge due from the 1960-1970's tribal wars between the Pathans and Pakistan. Zia himself would not object to Zahir Shah if two conditions were met: one, that Zahir Shah recognize the Durand line as the legitimate border; two, that all treaties old and new with the Soviet Union are declared null and void. Zia cannot defy Gen. Aqtar and the other past and current Pakistani intelligence officers. ISI has become a domestic intelligence operation with information on both supporters and opponents of Gen. Zia. Zia remains in power as long as ISI allows it. ISI is split between the old and new groups and could be neutralized to some extent. Pakistan's intentional efforts to keep Qandahar under Soviet control affects all the political parties but for Saayaf and Gulbadeen.

Concurrently, the Pakistanis are now courting Ahmed Massoud -- further splitting Jamiat Islami and further dividing the two majority ethnic groups the Tajiks and the Pashtus (Mahaz - Jamiat - Khalis) Pakistanis would prefer a Tajik ruled Afghanistan, which may well be the case but not the way the Paks are currently going.

Additionally, the Pakistanis believe that by supporting Massoud they can convince him to do their bidding. Pakistanis bidding entails the capture of a major city. The Pakistanis must have this for domestic political consumption. Gen. Zia must create the perception that the war is winding down and the refugees are returning to Afghanistan. Gen. Zia's failure to do this will signal the end of his control. This situation has been exacerbated by Zia's calling for elections in November. Zia must win the war by November. Consequently, the Paks will increase pressure on Massoud to save the day. Massoud will not save the day, if pressured too hard he will cut a deal with Najib. This will take away the threat of a northern offensive and keep Najib in power. Massoud will eventually turn on Najib but in his own time. Meanwhile the Pathans will turn on Zia inside Pakistan, the Baluchis likewise and the Indians will gain ground on Pakistan's eastern borders. The Iranians are continually growing into this Pakistan-created division among the mujahideen, adding another dimension of uncertainty.

Political and military manipulation by various Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi and radical fundamentalists the least of which is Libya not to mention the DRA, WAD, the Soviet GRU as well as KGB can only spell disaster for Afghanistan, Pakistan the region and nearby regions both east and west of the conflict.

The United States has taken a public hands-off policy. That policy is not believed by any Afghan political leaders or commander I've interviewed . Conversely, the mujahideen believe that every Pakistani initiative either militarily or politically is directed or approved at the highest levels of the American government. It is inconceivable to the Afghans that after investing the time, effort, blood, sweat and American national honor that it could be otherwise.

The vacuum created by the real hands-off policy allows all the aforementioned groups to rain havoc and in the end, insures Najib's communist regime in all facets.

That is the present situation with the caveat that the reader has the details through cable traffic and a working knowledge of the Afghan/Russian war. The continuation of this undirected mob will be chaos. Unfortunately, the U.S. standing in the Islamic world will decrease considerably. This decreased influence will affect the moderate Arab states ability to keep in check their more radical fundamentalists, increase Israeli vulnerability (at an

already difficult time) and fuel the fires of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia, Indonesia and particularly the moslem areas of the Philippines. We once again, as in Viet Nam, are allowing defeat to be snatched from the jaws of military victory and entrench a communist regime in what would otherwise be a representative -- if not democratic -- government.

Congressional staffers, Members and Senators have asked the CIA repeatedly what the plan is for winning this war. The CIA has never answered the question directly. Congressional investigation has uncovered a simple but incredible fact:there is no plan. This reminds me of Clark Clifford's quote about walking into government a hawk on Viet Nam but walking out of the Pentagon a dove when he discovered there was no coherent plan to win the war.

That is why we should insist on the military and political structure and plans that will carry the mujahideen to victory, the Paks toward domestic stability and the United States to a principal place as a world power.

I would like to make several recommendations.

Can the Communist Army of Afghanistan hold the strategic centers and safeguard Najib's regime? The answer is yes, because the

THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

The Government of Afghanistan, including an 18-month long Zahir Shah regime, is organized on the basis of the following premises:

1. All institutions are defined in accordance with Islamic tradition and are recognized as legitimate by traditional Islamic writings on government and ruling; and
2. The true power of implementation rests with the local power, that is, the commanders inside, the tribal authorities and any other source of local power who is loyal to the new regime.

The Government of Afghanistan is organized around a centralized center of power, a separate legislating institution and a separate implementing and supervising body. The legitimacy of the government is reached by locally-based elections and the Jirga process. In addition, there are two independent supreme institutions guaranteeing the implementation of law and justice as well as the Islamic character of Afghanistan.

The Head of State is the AMIR [1] or the KHEDIVE. [2]

1
The Amir is a traditional Islamic title who derives his authority from military achievement. "Jihad is incumbent upon you under every amir," said the Prophet. Amir is a traditional title of leaders in Islamic Central Asia and Persia. The title of the Afghan rulers during the 19th Century who built and consolidated independent Afghanistan in its current boundaries was 'the Amir of Afghanistan.' Therefore, Amir will be acceptable to both Pushtuns and Pasarsi-speakers in the northern provinces. However, in Pasarsi, Amir is a royal title which can be transferred from father to son.

2
The Khediye is a traditional title for a supreme leader from eastern Iran and western Afghanistan. In modern time, it was used by Muhammad Ali in the early 19th century as a demonstration of his break from the Turkish Empire. The Khediye is a title preferable to the commonly used Rais. At present, the Rais is associated with anti-Islamic secular regimes in the Arab world such as Nasser's who urged the Islamic Brotherhood. Therefore, any ruler seeking the support of the Islamists of Afghanistan must not have a totally secular title with anti-Islamic connotations.

He rules with the aid of two Wazirs (or Sacred Azam) who are in charge of the smooth and effective running of the government. One Wazir will be a distinguished Pushtun with traditional legitimacy as a leader as well as capabilities. The other Wazir will come from the northern provinces and his authority and legitimacy will be determined by his knowledge in jurisprudence. Pir Sayed Ahmad Gaylani and Burhanuddin Rabbani should be the first wazirs in the Zahir Shah regime.

The Amir/Khedive chairs a diwan [3] of eight for the solution of major crises and disagreements in the country. The diwan should convene periodically in order to examine the state of the nation and ensure the correct implementation of the policy of the government. The members of the diwan are the Amir/Khedive, the two Wazirs, and additional five key figures in the country. In the Zahir Shah regime, the heads of the seven main Resistance Parties will constitute the diwan.

The Government of Afghanistan is divided into two arms -- a legislative branch with strong Islamic identity and an executive branch whose power is based on local legitimacy and support.

The legislative branch is comprised of a hukuma [4] which answers to a shura. [5] The hukuma is chaired by a Prime Minister. The hukuma ministers are elected from among the ranks of the shura. The hukuma is answerable to the shura whose members approve all legislation and decisions of the hukuma. The members of the shura are nominated from the ranks of the Afghan notables in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the West. They will include the key religious scholars and jurists, experts in fields required for the rebuilding of the country (education, agriculture, industry, health and public services, etc.), as well

3

A ruler's court or council. Diwan also has an organizational connotation as it is also used for major government departments and officers (especially in Persian). Therefore, it denotes adherence to constitutional discipline.

4

Hukuma is the more modern term in Islam for an institutionalized government which exercises the authority through ministers and legislative activities. It has, however, a traditional positive connotation which identifies it as a political ruling body based on wisdom, knowledge and religious judgement.

5

Shura is a council of nominated elders and men of integrity and knowledge. Their role in traditional Islam is to supervise and oversee the actions of the ruler and/or the ruling body (government), ensuring adherence to the Law and providing expert assistance and advice.

as some of the key commanders.

The executive branch of the Government of Afghanistan is based on the maillis. [6] The deputies of the Afghan Maillis will be elected on a localized basis so that they represent the power structure throughout the country. The true power of the local resistance commanders and tribal chieftains will be best represented in the maillis. These deputies will translate the policy and decisions of the hukuma and shura into specific actions and will implement them in their own regions.

THE LEGISLATION PROCESS AND STRUCTURE OF POWER

The hukuma determines the general policy of Afghanistan through its legislative activities. The outlines for the solution of the major challenges facing Afghanistan is determined in principle by the hukuma. The related laws and decisions have to be approved by the shura by vote. The experts among the members of the shura provide the oversight and support for the hukuma. The Islamic jurists guarantee the Islamic character and legitimacy of the legislative and policy formulation processes.

The various ministries of the hukuma are in charge of the organization and providing of the professional support for the implementation of their legislation. For example, the ministries will provide the expert training of individuals required to implement a certain rebuilding function. The acquisition (on a national level) of new equipment will also be conducted through the hukuma. The hukuma will also provide the professional and quality control functions (inspectors and instructors) throughout the implementation of its policies and guidelines in the field. The hukuma will also be in charge of national issues such as foreign policy and international-economic cooperation. The shura will ratify all treaties and international agreements by vote.

Once a law or a policy guideline are approved, they are submitted for final approval by the two wazirs, or the full diwan if necessary. The members of the diwan are: The Amir/Khedive, the two wazirs, the Prime Minister, the Chairmen ('Speakers') of the shura and the maillis, and the Chief Jurist and Chief Mullah

6

The maillis is the modern term for Parliament whose members are elected by the public. In Islamic political thought, the maillis is in charge of concrete details in state affairs as well as concerning their application to, and implementation in, worldly affairs. The maillis deputies deliberate state affairs within their interest, expertise and knowledge. They oversee and supervise the implementation of their decisions and regulations.

of Afghanistan. In the Zahir Shah regime, these seven positions will be held by the heads of the seven parties of the resistance. Following approval, the appropriate wazir then takes the law to the majlis for implementation.

The majlis is organized along regional lines. Its committees and subcommittees will reflect common interest and priorities in provinces and regions of the countries. The members of the majlis are the local resistance commanders, tribal and clan chieftains, as well as other local leaders and notables. The leading resistance commanders, such as Ahmad Shah Massud, Ismail Khan and Amin Wardak, will be able to retain their power and position by becoming the chairmen of the majlis committees concerning the regions of Afghanistan where their influence and power are undisputed. Regional treaties and existing cooperation formed during the fighting can be transferred into the majlis in the form of arrangements between locally elected members.

The law or policy guideline submitted to the majlis will be dealt with by the entire house or by specific committees depending on its merits. For example, a programme for the rebuilding of the irrigation system in one province will be dealt with only by the deputies from that province and nearby regions. Once the specific steps for the implementation of the programme are approved by the deputies, they are in charge of carrying out the programme in their home districts. The applicable ministries of the jukuma will provide the experts and expertise, but the enforcement of cooperation and implementation of the programme in question is solely in the hands of the members of majlis.

ELECTION AND NOMINATION

The people elect their representatives for local jirgas and the local deputies for the majlis. These elections are conducted in the districts, villages and valleys of Afghanistan. The population is expected to elect the individuals believed to best represent local interests and power. Therefore, the winners of such elections will reflect the distribution of power inside Afghanistan as consolidated during the last decade of fighting.

The local jirgas and the majlis together constitute the Loya Jirga, which is the Afghan traditional and popular method for reaching significant decisions. The Loya Jirga will be convened periodically to elect key individuals for supreme positions in the Afghanistan. The Loya Jirga will elect the Amir/Khedive, the seven members of the diwan, and half the deputies of the shura. The Amir/Khedive and the members of the diwan must come from among the ranks of the Loya Jirga in order to ensure that they received popular votes and thrust at least in their own district. Since the deputies of the shura are selected for their

expertise and knowledge, they can be nominated from among the academia, intelligentsia, etc. and not necessarily from among the members of the Loya Jirga. Each of the offices of Chief Jurist and the Chief Mullah selects a quarter of the deputies of the shura. The Chief Jurist will select people notable for their honesty as well as the professionals and technocrats. The Chief Mullah will select the religious leadership of the shura. The mallis votes to approve the final composition of the shura.

The Prime Minister, who is personally nominated by the Loya Jirga, builds his hukuma from among the leading members of the shura. The shura votes its trust in the composition of the hukuma. Both the diwan and the mallis have to give their final approval for the hukuma before it can start functioning. Both institutions can order the firing of the hukuma and direct the Prime Minister (which they cannot change) to organize a new hukuma.

Each of the Amir/Khedeive, the wazirs, the diwan and the entire mallis can order the convening of the Loya Jirga, which can order the disruption of the shura, the mallis as well as call for new elections.

THE MILITARY

The Military of Afghanistan is comprised of a centralized force under the command of the diwan and the oversight of the shura and a host of locally-based paramilitary (militia) forces, each under the command of a mallis deputy. The Amir/Khedeive is the Commander in Chief (CIC) and the two wazirs are his Deputy-CIC. Such an organization is aimed at institutionalizing the retention of the military forces of the local commanders and chieftains in their hands. It is highly unlikely that any of these warlords would agree to the dismemberment of their forces, which constitute the key to their power, under any circumstances.

The centralized force will include the high performance elements requiring specialized training and maintenance such as air force, armour and artillery. The military academies and schools will also be in the national-level. Of special significance are the Corps of Engineers and the Medical Corps which will play a central role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, thus gaining legitimacy and authority to the new Armed Forces.

The on going functioning of the Armed Forces, including training and maintenance, are under the responsibility and supervision of the shura. However, only the diwan has authority to activate the military and order the conduct of military operations. Under conditions of extreme national emergency, such as a surprise attack, the Amir/Khedeive along with the two wazirs

will be able to order a military reaction in the absence of the other members of the diwan.

The bulk of the military forces in the country will be local forces based on the resistance and tribal forces. Each of these units is under the command of a local commander who is a mallis deputy. These forces will be organized into larger formations on a regional basis in parallel with the organization of their mallis-deputy commanders in subcommittees and committees with a distinct order of seniority. Each of the local mallis-deputy commanders will contribute a portion of his force to the centralized command in order to organize and facilitate the logistical supply for the local forces. These troops will also participate in the engineering and construction projects (roads, garrisons, etc.) in their own area.

The mallis-deputy commanders will be obliged to use their forces for the defense of their own areas against internal and external threat to the Government, as well as actively participate in the defense of the country against all threat in accordance with the orders of their superiors in the mallis. Only the full diwan can order a national mobilization and activation of the local forces even in case of a major emergency. Such an order can be overturned only by the entire Loya Jirga.

The military professionalism of these local forces will be ensured by the presence of representatives of the central command in the local forces. These representatives will facilitate the supply of weapons and ammunition to the local forces, conduct and supervise advance training, as well as oversee their overall capabilities, so that their loyalty to the Government is always checked independently. Such a mechanism of close supervision and oversight would allow for local forces that cooperated with the Kabul authorities to be integrated into the new Armed Forces without fear of anti-Government rebellion. Afghanistan will have to cope with the ex-resistance and sarandoy forces, integrating them into the new national order. These forces are too large to be effectively confronted by the resistance, and their commanders are the legitimate leaders of the population in the areas where they operate.

QANDAHAR

The establishment of Qandahar as the first capital of Zahir Shah is a multi-stage operation. It is imperative that the operation is conducted with minimum casualties to the civilian population in order to ensure a genuine surge of popular support for the restoration of a Zahir Shah regime. Militarily, each stage of the operation is conducted by a quality core which engages the enemy, incites, and gains support of, the local population and irregular forces.

The main stages of the operation:

1. Insertion of Zahir Shah and the leadership of the resistance to Akhtarzi.
2. Laying siege on the regional military infrastructure and capturing Qandahar.
3. A series of diversionary attacks and isolation of the region.

Description:

Stage 1: A resistance force (preferably ISI's 1,500-man strong Afghan force) advances from Chaman and puts pressure on Spin Buldak. Once the DRPA's attention is fixed on the escalation there, the massive insertion of the Afghan leadership begins. The central insertion will get Zahir Shah and his escort from Kurduna through a pass to Sar Khaliznay and on to Loy Karez, and, if possible, to Akhtarzi. The leaders of the seven parties will be inserted simultaneously in adjacent passes.

The forces of Zahir Shah and the seven leaders will advance simultaneously in passes No. 277 through 287, each with a VIP Escort Force, and converge on Sar Khaliznay. Forward headquarters in Pakistan -- Kurduna.

Zahir Shah declares the independence of Afghanistan and the establishment of a non-communist/non-PDPA government. Messengers are sent to incite the local population for a march on Qandahar.

Quality resistance forces will bloc the main roads to Kabul and to Lashkar-Gah, diverting Soviet forces to clearing the roads and preventing the arrival of Soviet-DRPA reinforcements.

Stage 2: The popular march on Qandahar shields and covers the advance of quality forces that will lay siege on the main Soviet-DRA bases, break into the city and secure it. The assault on the city will be conducted from several directions simultaneously: The masses will advance from the Spin Boldak basin, the Sar Khalizhay/Akhtarzi area, and the Kako Killi area along the water system. Simultaneously, quality forces for the blocking of Soviet-DRA operations from the airbases will advance from Loy Kalay in the east and from the Band-e Arghandab Dam in the north-east. The overwhelming force that will break into Qandahar itself will advance from around the Dam and approach the city from the north-west, shielded by the myriad of military activities.

Once the city is secured and the main bases neutralized, Zahir Shan and the leaders of the seven parties can make a triumphant entry into the city, emphasise their legitimacy as the Government of Afghanistan and call for a march on Kabul.

The Quality Forces

Principles: As many identical forces as possible so that complete units and components are interchangeable. Each force/unit can operate autonomously as well as control and guide/lead locally available popular forces and even ex-DRA forces who decide to join them. The popular force will build around the quality force like solidification of crystals around a string. Each force/unit is divided to a core fighting element and a reinforcement component for the delivery of reinforcements and supplies according to the principles of reflexive control (rate of resupply determined by the superiors in the rear and pushed forward so that the resupply and reinforcements are not dependent on communication and/or the incapacitation of the local commanders).

Stage 1: 10 VIP Escort Forces of 300 fighters each for the insertion of the leaders:

- Fighting force of 200 (from the party of the escorted leader) including a Stinger detachment (of 20 men) and a reconnaissance detachment (of 10 men) on motorcycles and horses.
- Reflexive support force of 100 (from the party of the escorted leader) to arrive with heavy weapons required to establish the base of the leader in the 'capital'.

3-2 Quick Reaction Forces of 50 fighters each for the protection of the main axes of advance and engagement with Soviet-DRA forces, SPETSNAZ-ambushes, etc.:

- 10 fighters on horses and motorcycles for reconnaissance of road and flanks.
- 40 fighters with 10 4X4 trucks, with 9 84mm Carl-Gustav shoulder-fired recoilless guns (diversified shells); 3 Milan launchers; 20 Stingers; 3 120mm mortars; 3 ZU-23-2 automatic guns (installed on the trucks); 3 BM-14s (installed on the trucks); and 10 DShK/ZPU (in removable turret above the cabin). The trucks are organized and equipped:
 - * 1 command vehicle,
 - * 3 AT vehicles each with 2 Carl Gustavs and 1 Milan launcher;
 - * 3 Fire support vehicles each with 1 BM-14 and 1 120mm mortar; and
 - * 3 Air defence and fire support vehicles each with 1 ZU-23-2 and 1 Carl Gustav.
 - * Each vehicle is equipped with 1 DShK/ZPU and 2 Stingers.

3-4 Main Fighting Forces each of 200 fighters for operations in the flanks of the main insertion zone in order to establish the perimeter, engage Soviet-DRA forces and prevent them from reaching the VIPs, assault DRA posts, etc. These forces operate in pairs so that they are interchangeable in case of heavy losses and/or repeated Soviet-DRA assaults.

- 1 Quick Reaction Force of 50 fighters (see above);
- 1 Air Defense Force of 50 fighters in 10 teams for capturing and holding controlling heights, each equipped with 1 launcher/3 Stingers and 1 DShK/ZPU;
- 2 Blocking Forces of 100 fighters each for establishing semi-static defenses and containing enemy armoured forces; with 6 Milans, 18 Carl Gustavs, 12 DShK/ZPU, 3 120mm mortars, extensive mine laying and obstacle building capabilities.
- 1 General force of 200 fighters with small arms and some mine laying and obstacle building capabilities.

- 1 Reflexive support force of 100 fighters to arrive with heavy weapons required to establish the perimeter and reinforce and defenses.

Stage 2: 10 Main Fighting Forces each of 600 fighters (TO&E as above) for the following operations: 2 units for each airbase (total of 4); 1 unit for assault on the controlling posts; 1 unit for assault on the citadel inside Kandahar; 1 unit in the Band-e Arghandab Dam area for perimeter security and command reserve; 1 unit to spearhead each of the popular marches on the city (a total of 3).

6 Air Defense Siege Forces each of 150 fighters deployed with each Main Fighting Force attacking the air bases (a total of 4) and for covering the southern and western approaches to Kandahar (a total of 2):

- 10 teams of 10 fighters each for the blocking of Soviet-DRA air operations, capturing and holding controlling heights, each equipped with:

- * 1 launcher/3 Stingers,
- * 2 DSHK/ZPU, and
- * 1 barrage balloon.

5 teams of 10 fighters each for the reflexive control resupply and reinforcement of the above teams.

15-12 Quick Reaction Force of 50 fighters (TO&E as above) for the following operations: 2 units for securing the axis and area of operations of each Main Fighting Force against the airbases and the controlling posts (a total of 10); 2 units for securing the approaches to Kandahar from the west; and 1 unit spearheading each of the popular advance routes (a total of 3).

Stage 3: The series of ambushes and diversionary attacks along the roads from Kandahar to Kabul and Lashkar-Gan should be conducted by the local forces in the interior (advancing from the west and north) with whatever forces and weapons that are available to the local commanders. Any attempt to significantly reinforce and resupply these forces will give away the surprise factor.

The Air Operations


For the above offensive to succeed, both the Soviet-DRA air operations and the fears of the resistance from aircpower must be significantly reduced. In order to secure the VIP insertion and establish the siege around the airbases, the initial stages must be completed with little or no hostile air activity. The only viable way to curtail the Soviet-DRA air operations is by subjecting them to a massive surprise that will compell the Soviet command to unilaterally reduce or even cease air operations for a few days.

It is highly likely that once a major build-up is detected along the Pakistani border, the Soviets will commit high-altitude bombers for saturation bombing of the large penetration. If at least one of these bombers is shot down by a what appears to be a rebelling DRA MiG-21, air operations will be ceased until the KGB-WAD burge the DRA Air Force. In reality, 4 MiG-21s and/or F-7Ms in DRA colors can take off from Zargooha without radar and in radio silence in the middle of an F-16 exercise. These aircraft must be equipped with all aspect IR AAMs (advance Sidewinders or Piton 3s) to ensure a kill under less than perfect conditions. Pakistani GCI can lead them into ambush intercept of the Soviet bombers. Afterwards, the MiG-21s/F-7Ms will go on the air (appropriate channels) and identify themselves as defecting DRA pilots advancing toward Pakistan in order to defect. The PakAF F-16s will be in position to protect these "defectors" once they reached the vicinity of the border. With supporting psyops and different axis of advance it would be possible to repeat the act for another time, albeit with friendly losses.

The success of the resistance quality forces -- as well as the legitimacy of the Zahir Shan Government -- will be greatly enhanced if the resistance can conduct air support missions of its own. Soviet-DRA air defense is negligent because they were never challenged from the air. Therefore, a surprise attack from the air will have a severe impact on the local units and will greatly reduce their ability to react to and counter the advancing resistance forces on the ground.

Such operations can be conducted with the Pakistani-produced MFI-17 Mussohak -- a STOL 2-seat light attack aircraft which can carry air-to-surface and anti-tank rockets, ATGMs, light guns, and supply docs. The MFI-17 can operate from forward sites with little or no maintenance. Pakistan has an active production line in Kamra and a closed line in Risalpur which can be activated.

One should expect the resistance to initially shoot at anything that flies, shooting down a few friendly aircraft. However, once it becomes clear that the aircraft are the resistance's Air force, shooting will be greatly reduced. Moreover, the Zahir Shah Government will then be in a unique position, having been able to deliver something no other resistance commander and leader could -- an air force challenging the Soviet-DRA domain in the sky.



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Sarāb
Orūzgan
Khakerān
Moqor
Zābol
Dah Rāvod
Tarin Kowt
Sayagaz
Jabbar Kalā
Monārī
Malek Dīnī
Owr Dobolāgh
Sardāgh
Kajaki
Kajak-e Soflā
Rāgay
Qal'eh-ye Gaz
Sangīn
Asad
Qalāfī
Rowghānī Kalay
Pamāzai
Darakht-e Yahyā
Chehel Gazi
GANDAHĀR
Loy Kalay
Aghastān
Takhtek Pol
Kurdūn
Kodānny Rm
Qandahār
Sak Kelizhay
Spir Baldak
Kako Kili
Chaman
Gwal Bāgh
2775
Khojak Pass
Hindubāgh
Tongai
Sērāh Tsāhān
Gwal
Bostān
Burj Aziz Khan
2637
QUETTA
Smāllān
2815
Kurram
Kōlbur Mastūng
Bolān Pass
Sangār
Gr. hollā

ESTĀN

Paki

Kazā

Shāra Joghza

Loralāi

Gr. hollā

National Security Council
The White House

CM

SEP 22 P 4: 39

System # I
Package # 6491
DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>RP</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>PNY</u>	<u>A</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	<u>JON</u>	_____
Colin Powell	<u>4</u>	<u>CP</u>	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>DN</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>9/23</u>	<u>OE D</u>

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Duberstein Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)



UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8806491

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BURNS	Z 88090813 PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
002 POWELL	Z 88092214 FOR SIGNATURE
003	X 88092319 POWELL SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8806491
RECEIVED: 08 SEP 88 12

TO: FORREST, VAUGHN S

FROM: POWELL

DOC DATE: 19 SEP 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

MP

PERSONS: FORREST, VAUGHN S

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR POWELL TO CALL / MEET W/ FORREST & DESCRIBE HIS VIEW
OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: POWELL SGD LTR DUE DATE: 12 SEP 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BENKO

BURNS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

CF

DATE

9/23

W/ATTCH: YES

NO

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSCTF

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0002
Dun

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 04, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. HABIB MAYAR

SUBJECT: APPRECIATION LETTER, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN
MUJAHIDEEN DURING THE LAST 8 YEARS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE	ORG	88/11/04		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>Culva</i>				
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>Culva</i>		88/11/07		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>Culva</i>		88/11/08		588/11/18
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

8. - SEE ID 238187

603845

H. Chumachenko



افغانی ټولنی پاره کی کمیټی

AFGHAN COMMUNITY IN AMERICA

Main Office: P.O. Box 311 • Flushing, New York 11352 • Phone (718) 658-3737

P.O. Box 57165
Washington, D.C. 20037-0165

October 31, 1988

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As your second and final term as President of the United States is approaching its end, I wish to thank you and your administration for your support of the Afghan mujahideen during the last eight years and the cause of freedom and peace with justice for ALL. This, as you very well know, can only be attained from a position of strength, by those who profess belief in Allah (God Almighty) and the accountability for their actions.

I know that when you will leave your office, you will continue to do all you can to support human rights, which are given to mankind at birth by The Almighty, and which are from time to time, and from place to place taken away from some by the greedy oppressors of the un-Godly governments and their puppets.

I am sure you will be interested in the following quotation of a few decades ago, which was said by Allame Muhammad Iqbal, who was not even an Afghan, and points out the importance of Afghanistan and the necessity of its freedom:

"The continent of Asia is like a body alive. The heart that throbs in it is the Nation of Afghans. The destruction of the Afghans would mean the destruction of Asia. And in their progress and prosperity lies the well-being of Asia. So long as the heart is free, the body also enjoys freedom. If otherwise, it becomes like a straw adrift in the wind."

May Almighty bless not only this land, not only Afghanistan, but the world and its peoples with faith in and obedience to THE CREATOR; conditions requisite for prosperous nations to grow morally and spiritually and for moral and spiritual nations to grow prosperous in peace, freedom and harmony. Amen.

Continued . . .

I would also like to thank you for the opportunity I had in meeting you at the White House and pray for your, your wife Nancy Reagan's, your children's and their families health, well-being and eternal prosperity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,



Habib Mayar
Chairman
Afghan Community in America

HM:mt

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

0002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: DECEMBER 08, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. M. S. NOORZOY

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN AND URGES
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES WITHIN
THE TIME LIMIT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
KATHERINE CHUMACHENKO		ORG	88/12/08		/ /
99 State	REFERRAL NOTE: NE 4	A	89/11/19		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: ENCLOSED LETTER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT SENT
TO J. MOZLEY

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE     *C-COMPLETED        *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE      *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY      *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SE
/

(encl ltr - VP sent to J. Mozley)

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AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE COUNCIL

H. J. ...

December 2, 1988

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to you at a critical period of the history of the ongoing war in Afghanistan. As you know, Mr. President:

While the war has been intensified by the Soviet Army against the Afghan people,

While the Soviets have brought in many heavy and new weapons into Afghanistan, including the SS1 Scud missiles, Mig 27s, and deploy their Backfire bombers, both in Afghanistan and from Soviet territory, against the civilians,

While the Soviets have delayed the withdrawal of the remaining 50% of their troops from Afghanistan indefinitely,

While the Soviet KGB has kidnapped an additional 1700 Afghan children in recent weeks from the kindergardens in Kabul,

While the results of the latest Soviet atrocities have been thousands of additional deaths and tens of thousands of new refugees and further destruction and levelling of urban areas;

The Soviets have made peace gestures to meet with the Mujahideen as the Soviet delegation under the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yuli Vorontsov, is holding talks in Taif, Saudi Arabia, with the Mujahideen leaders, Professors Rabbani and Mojaddedi.

Mr. President, we have several concerns that we want to convey to you and to President Elect Bush:

The Mujahideen are ready to carry on with the war effort, as Professor Rabbani must have conveyed this general message from the Mujahideen to you when he visited you in Washington in November. Our concern is that if the Soviets are insincere and do not meet the deadlines for completing the withdrawal of their troops by February 15, 1989, as stated in the Geneva Accords; the outcome would be a prolongation of the war with continued sufferings on the part of the Afghan people.

.../...