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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
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**Withdrawer**

DLB 2/5/2010

**File Folder** CO002 (561000-562235)

**FOIA**

S10-306

**Box Number** 37

SYSTEMATIC

177

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description  | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 84235 | MEMO     | COLIN POWELL TO THE PRESIDENT, RE:<br>YOUR RESPONSES TO SENATOR<br>HUMPHREY AND TO CONGRESSMAN<br>MCCOLLUM ON AFGHANISTAN<br><br><i>R</i> 4/22/2019 <i>NSC WAIVER 10/6/2010</i> | 1           | 4/20/1988 | B1           |
| 84236 | CABLE    | ISLAMABAD 07240<br><br><i>R</i> 4/22/2019 <i>DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER<br/>11/6/2015</i>  | 4           | 4/4/1988  | B1           |
| 84237 | CABLE    | DUPLICATE OF #84236<br><br><i>R</i> 4/22/2019 <i>DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER<br/>11/6/2015</i>  | 4           | 4/4/1988  | B1           |

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

C. F. 561221  
1220  
1840  
C0002  
C0119  
C0165

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 25, 1988

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Thank you for your letters of March 30, April 4,  
and April 12, 1988 on Afghanistan.

At the very outset, let me reiterate what President Zia told you directly, on April 4: United States support of the Geneva process, and our agreement to guarantee the Geneva accords, were undertaken at the request of the Government of Pakistan. Over the years, our own commitment to securing freedom for Afghanistan has remained constant, and Pakistan has clearly taken the lead role and been the most important, indispensable factor in this regard. We have worked with Pakistan and other countries in assisting the brave Afghan people to obtain freedom and have made significant progress. We and Pakistan believe further progress will rapidly be achieved and facilitated by the accords.

Concern about the Geneva process appears to center around the fear that with the instruments signed, aid to the Mujahidin would cease and the Najibullah regime would be able to continue and might even consolidate its hold upon the country. As I have already pledged in my letter of March 11, 1988, to Senator Byrd: the cessation of military or other aid to the Resistance can only occur if it is matched by the cessation of similar aid to the Kabul regime; if not, military assistance will continue. The United States has made very clear to all concerned, including the Soviet Union, that this is a condition of our willingness to become a guarantor of the Geneva agreement.

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Furthermore, as you are aware, we have taken steps which enhance the capabilities of the Mujahidin, who should be able to bring about the removal of the Najibullah regime, if it is not achieved by other means. The Afghan people must be enabled to determine their own future, as several United Nations General Assembly resolutions require.

I understand that Prime Minister Junejo has explained in some detail to you why he considers the signing of the agreement at Geneva is the better alternative for getting the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan: principally, the shorter timeframe, and the Soviet commitment to complete withdrawal from all of Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan believes it can withstand whatever pressures may follow during the withdrawal period. You can be sure we will continue to stand by Pakistan and will remind the Soviets of our longstanding security commitment to Pakistan.

The United States and Pakistan have worked hard to help all Afghans free their country. The political future of Afghanistan must be decided by the Afghans themselves, including the Resistance Alliance in Peshawar, but also the Mujahidin and others fighting for freedom inside Afghanistan, who are the most important elements of the Resistance and the refugees. This remains my position, and I am sure you will agree that after their eight years of struggle against Soviet occupation no one can take that right away from them. As I stated to Mr. Khalis, on November 12, 1987: there can be no solution in Afghanistan until the Soviets leave and a free Afghanistan has been established. I believe the Geneva agreement (which secures Soviet withdrawal) and the United States' public commitment to continue assistance to the Mujahidin fulfills my pledge of support given to Mr. Khalis. We and the Government of Pakistan are confident this will lead to the removal of the Najibullah regime. Then, finally, the future will indeed be up to the people of Afghanistan.

The need for United States assistance to our friends in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue well beyond Soviet withdrawal. Your continued support, and that of your colleagues in Congress, will be crucial. The United States has an important role to play in an international effort enabling Afghan refugees to return home and resettle, and in assisting Afghanistan in reconstruction. We must be alert to and, if necessary, counter continuing Soviet efforts to dominate Afghanistan by means other than armed occupation. Moreover, we must make sure that the United States keeps its renewed six-year commitment for security assistance to Pakistan which began in 1988.

Soviet pressure on Pakistan is likely to continue through different means even should its military occupation of Afghanistan come to an end. Past Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, before its actual invasion, has been aimed in part at destabilizing Pakistan and we must stand solidly with that country to protect against future threats, during and after withdrawal. The recent visit by Secretary of Defense Carlucci was made to reassure Pakistan of the continuing support of my Administration, no matter what occurred at Geneva. We count upon your help in obtaining the promised funds for that support.

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

The Honorable Gordon J. Humphrey  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 8802513  
DATE 25 APR 88

SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL LTRS RE AFGHANISTAN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

| EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: | DATE  | TIME  | SIGNATURE |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
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COPY: 1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 25, 1988

Dear Congressman McCollum:

Thank you for your letters of April 4, and  
April 5, 1988, concerning Afghanistan issues.

We are forwarding to you herewith a copy of  
my reply to Senator Humphrey that will  
respond to the concerns that you have raised  
regarding Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

The Honorable Bill McCollum  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman McCollum:

Thank you for your letters of April 4, and April 5, 1988, concerning Afghanistan issues.

We are forwarding to you herewith a copy of my reply to Senator Humphrey that will respond to the concerns that you have raised regarding Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

~~Enclosure:~~

~~Letter to Senator Humphrey~~

The Honorable Bill McCollum  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1988

NSC:

Please note on the McCollum letter attached, enclosures never go on the original Presidential letter. This is our correspondence style at the White House. Please have the McCollum letter revised accordingly. We will hold the original package in our office until a new letter gets here. Thanks.

  
Katherine Ladd

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman McCollum:

Thank you for your letters of April 4, and April 5, 1988, concerning Afghanistan issues.

We are forwarding to you herewith a copy of my reply to Senator Humphrey that will respond to the concerns that you have raised regarding Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

~~Enclosure:~~

~~Letter to Senator Humphrey~~

KDL  
Ken  
AD

The Honorable Bill McCollum  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen 4/25

64735

2513  
2908

C.F.

Received 56722155  
900 APR 20 PM 6:56  
0002

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 20, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *Jan for*

SUBJECT: Your Responses to Senator Humphrey and to  
Congressman McCollum on Afghanistan

Issue

Whether to sign the letters to Senator Humphrey (TAB A) and to  
Congressman McCollum (TAB B).

Fact

Senator Humphrey has written to you recently regarding his  
concerns on Afghanistan issues (TABS C - 1. 2. 3.). So has  
Congressman McCollum who endorses Humphrey's views.  
(TABS D - 1. 2.).

Discussion

The Senator recommended against the United States becoming a  
guarantor to the Geneva agreement. In addition, he asked that we  
prevail upon Pakistan not to sign the agreement. The Geneva  
agreement was signed on April 14, 1988, and your letter lays out  
the rationale for the decision to become a guarantor.

Recommendation

|            |               |   |
|------------|---------------|---|
| OK         | NO            | That you sign the attached letters to<br>Senator Humphrey (TAB A) and to<br>Congressman McCollum (TAB B). |
| <i>ROR</i> | <u>      </u> |   |

Attachments:

- TAB A Your Letter to Senator Humphrey
- TAB B Your Letter to Congressman McCollum
- TAB C Incoming Letters to The President from Senator Humphrey
  - 1. Letter dated April 12, 1988
  - 2. ISLAMABAD 7240, dated April 4, 1988 (CONFIDENTIAL)
  - 3. Letter dated March 30, 1988
- TAB D Incoming Letters to The President from Congressman McCollum
  - 1. Letter dated April 8, 1988
  - 2. Letter dated April 5, 1988

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff (2)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NRC ubiver 8/6/10  
BY dlw NARA DATE 4/22/2019

CONFIDENTIAL  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2513  
2908

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 20, 1988

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), 75 FR 10000  
White House  
BY NA 2/5/10

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKELY *Rob*

SUBJECT: Responses to Senator Humphrey and  
Congressman McCollum on Afghanistan

Attached at TAB A is a response from the President to Senator Humphrey which can also be used to respond to Congressman McCollum at TAB B. At TAB I is your memorandum recommending that the President sign the letters.

*AF* Fortier and *AK* Kranowitz concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve *Jan 10* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*April 20, 1988*

Attachments:

TAB I Your Memorandum to the President

TAB A The President's Response to Senator Humphrey

TAB B The President's Response to Congressman McCollum

TAB C Senator Humphrey's Letters to The President

1. Letter dated April 12, 1988 (Action 2908)

2. ISLAMABAD 07240, dated April 4, 1988  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Letter dated March 30, 1988

TAB D Congressman McCollum's Letters to The President

1. Letter dated April 8, 1988

2. Letter dated April 5, 1988

Prepared by:  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2901  
C1

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 12, 1988

The President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


We applaud your efforts to secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. However, we are deeply concerned that the draft Geneva agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet puppet government in Kabul which the United States intends to guarantee, is dangerously defective. The Geneva agreement has been bitterly denounced by all the leaders of the Afghan Resistance Alliance.

Mr. President, you have repeatedly stated that the Afghan Resistance Alliance is the true representative of the Afghan people. Last November, during a visit by the Alliance leadership, you stated, "Any proposal unacceptable to the resistance is destined to fail." In a speech to the Heritage Foundation during the same month you stated, "They. [the Soviets] should respect the voice of the Afghan people and negotiate with the resistance without whose assent no political solution is possible." For its part, the Senate has hosted the Alliance and has unanimously adopted two resolutions in their honor.

Therefore, we are shocked that the United States intends sign as a guarantor to the Geneva accords, despite the vehement opposition of the Afghan Resistance Alliance. To ignore completely the concerns of the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, while endorsing an agreement signed by the genocidal PDPA regime in Kabul, sends a tragic message to the people of Afghanistan.

We ask that the Senate be provided a full text of the Geneva accords, and the drafts of any "understandings" or "declarations" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union regarding future assistance to the Afghan Resistance. We ask that this material be provided to the Senate before the United States signs as a guarantor to the accords.

Sincerely,



Steve Symms

William Helms

Clive DeLoach

Michael McCannell

James Helms

Chuck Grossley

William G. Hahn

John McLane

Phil G.

Strom Thurmond

Rs Farrow

James A. M. Clure

Dave Karnes

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Warer 116116  
BY db NARADATE 4/27/2019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84236 C. 2

BAKERS, BATJERS, DONLEYS, ERMARTH, IN, NEGROPONTE, OAKLEY, PERITO, POWE  
STEVENS

<DIST>

PRT: BAKER BATJER DONLEY ERMARTH NEGROPONTE OAKLEY PERITO POWELL  
STEVENS

SIT: WHSR IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE

<DTG> 041400Z APR 88

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 07240~~

WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL POWELL

PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, SENATE MAJORITY  
LEADER ROBERT BYRD, SENATE MINORITY LEADER ROBERT  
DOLE, SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL, SENATOR JESSE HELMS,  
SENATOR ORRIN HATCH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR HUMPHREY

1. THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN ASKED TO SEND HE FOLLOWING  
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR GORDON HUMPHREY  
WHO IS CURRENTLY VISITING ISLAMABAD. BEGIN TEXT.

APRIL 4, 1988

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS STUNNED WHEN AT A THREE HOUR MEETING WITH THE  
LEADERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE IN PESHAWAR  
ON APRIL 2 EACH OF THEM VEHEMENTLY AND BITTERLY  
DENOUNCED THE PROPOSED AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL  
STATEMENTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ IS PROMOTING IN  
GENEVA.

I KNOW YOU WILL SHARE MY SHOCK AT THE UNEQUIVOCAL  
STATEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP DEMANDING THAT  
THE GENEVA ARRANGEMENTS BE REJECTED. MR. PRESIDENT,  
IN A NOVEMBER 1987 WHITE HOUSE MEETING WITH YUNIS  
KHALIS, WHO WAS RAIS (PRESIDENT) OF THE ALLIANCE AT  
THAT TIME, YOU PERSONALLY ASSURED HIM THAT NO  
SETTLEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO  
THE RESISTANCE.

CLEARLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WE ARE AT A MOMENT OF TRUTH  
AND A MOMENT OF HONOR. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE  
RESISTANCE HAVE MADE IT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR THAT THEY  
FIND THE GENEVA ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE.  
THE QUESTION IS, WILL THE WHITE HOUSE KEEP ITS WORD.  
MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE AFGHAN  
RESISTANCE ALLIANCE ARE FIRMLY REJECTING THE GENEVA  
AGREEMENTS. I URGE YOU TO REFUSE TO COMMIT THE UNITED  
STATES TO THE AGREEMENTS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ALLIANCE  
LEADERS AGREE IN WRITING TO THE TERMS.  
THE EARLIER STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS TO YOU AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONGRESS WERE WRONG. WHEN FOR EXAMPLE DAS ROBERT A. PECK TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 25, 1988, "RESISTANCE LEADERS HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS", HE GROSSLY UNDERSERVED THE CASE. IN FACT, AS YOU WILL SEE BELOW THE LEADERS STRONGLY URGE THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT GUARANTEE A GENEVA SETTLEMENT.

BELOW I QUOTE THE STATEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS AS REPORTED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE MEETING:

AHMAD SHAH:

AHMED SHAH, PRESIDENT OF THE PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTING ITTIHAD, THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY, "WHY DOES THE U.S. SUPPORT THE MUJAHIDEEN? TO TOPPLE COMMUNISM? IF SO, THE GENEVA ACCORDS SOLVE NOTHING.

HE TOLD THE SENATOR THAT CONTINUATION OF AID HAS BEEN DUE TO THE SENATOR'S EFFORTS. YOU RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, HE SAID. BUT...WHEN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE MICHAEL ARMACOST MET WITH THE ALLIANCE, HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OR IN THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY AID. HE RECOUNTED THAT KHALIS HAD ASKED ARMACOST FOR RECOGNITION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THAT ARMACOST HAD RESPONDED THAT MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SUFFICIENT. "WE WERE ALL INSULTED," HE SAID.

AHMAD SHAH CONTINUED, "THIS MAY SOUND STRANGE, BUT WE FEEL THAT THE USSR IS ALWAYS AHEAD OF THE U.S. IN POLITICAL PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS LETS DOWN ITS FRIENDS."

AHMED SHAH URGED THE SENATOR TO USE HIS FRIENDSHIPS

BT

#7240

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 07240

WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL POWELL

PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD, SENATE MINORITY LEADER ROBERT DOLE, SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL, SENATOR JESSE HELMS, SENATOR ORRIN HATCH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR HUMPHREY AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES TO CONVINCE THE U.S. NOT TO SIGN AT GENEVA. THE GENEVA ACCORDS, HE INSISTED, ENDANGER THE FREE WORLD.

GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR: " 'IN OUR VIEW,' HEKMATYAR SAID, SPEAKING FOR THE ALLIANCE, 'SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS WILL BE A GREAT HISTORICAL MISTAKE. PAKISTAN'S CREDIBILITY WILL BE DAMAGED, AND THE REFUGEES WILL FEEL THAT THEY'VE BEEN LET DOWN IN MID-COURSE. THE HEZB-E ISLAMI LEADER THEN TOLD THE SENATOR THAT



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SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN THEIR PRESENT SHAPE IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE ACCORDS ARE NOT IMPLEMENTABLE... THE RESISTANCE HE CONCLUDED WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A PSEUDO-PEACE BASED ON THE TERMS OF THE ENEMY.

YUNIS KHALIS:

"KHALIS ASSERTED THAT THE ONLY ADVANTAGE WILL GO TO THE SOVIETS IF THE ACCORDS ARE SIGNED. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM WILL HAVE DIVEN A WEDGE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD CATEGORICALLY STATED HIS VIEWS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON AND ASKED WHO THE SECRETARY WANTED TO SEE RULING IN WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY, HE INSISTED, DIDN'T LIKE HIS WORDS, TURNED HIS BACK, AND WALKED OFF.

HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL TO THE SENATOR. THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE NOT YET SIGNED, HE SAID. HE EXHORTED THE SENATOR TO TELL THE U.S. NOT TO LEAVE PAKISTAN STRANDED AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME. PAKISTAN, HE SAID, HAS NO POWER TO SAY NO TO GENEVA. BUT YOU SENATOR HUMPHREY, HE SAID, CAN CREATE CONDITIONS IN THE U.S. AGAINST SIGNING AT GENEVA."

PROFESSOR RABBANI:

"HE ASSERTED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF GAINING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. THE ONLY THING THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED, HE SUGGESTED, IS THAT THE KABUL REGIME, IMPOSED BY THE TANKS OF A SUPERPOWER, WILL GAIN STABILITY.

PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI:

PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS TRIED TO RESIST SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT HER RESISTANCE WAS OVER. HE ASKED THE SENATOR TO THINK WITH HIM HOW THE RESISTANCE CAN GET OUT OF THIS MESS... HE PLEADED FOR AID TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE PUPPET REGIME IS GONE. HE THEN ASKED THE SENATOR HOW AID CAN CONTINUE IF PAKISTAN IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HELP.

MAULVI NABI MOHAMMADI:

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM IS NOT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUT THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN. GENEVA REMOVES THE SOVIETS BUT LEAVES BEHIND THE SYSTEM, HE SAID. IT WAS THE SYSTEM THAT CALLED IN THE SOVIETS.

IF AID TO THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE TO CONTINUE, THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE PROVOCATION AND ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE PRETEXT OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE...HE REMINDED THE SENATOR THAT KABUL AND NEW DELHI HAVE A MILITARY AGREEMENT. HE SAID THT THE USSR MAY INDEED STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE'S NOTHING TO STOP THE INDIANS.

PIR GAILANI:

PIR GAILANI OF THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT OF AFGHANISTAN TOLD THE SENATOR HE CAN TRY TO STOP THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT IT LOOKS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HOPELESS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE RESISTANCE IS FIGHTING AGAINST A SYSTEM AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT THAT SYSTEM UNTIL IT IS REMOVED FROM THE SOIL OF AFGHANISTAN. GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR:

"ASKED THE SENATOR KINDLY TO QUESTION THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE GOP IF THEY ARE SIGNING AT GENEVA WITH THE INTENT TO VIOLATE THE ACCORDS. HE COUNSELLED THAT NO ONE SIGN IF VIOLATION IS INTENDED.

MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE ARE FIRMLY REJECTING THE

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#7240  
BT

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 07240  
WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL POWELL

PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD, SENATE MINORITY LEADER ROBERT DOLE, SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL, SENATOR JESSE HELMS, SENATOR ORRIN HATCH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR HUMPHREY GENEVA AGREEMENTS. I URGE YOU TO REFUSE TO COMMIT THE UNITED STATES TO THE AGREEMENTS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ALLIANCE LEADERS AGREE IN WRITING TO THE TERMS.

SINCERELY,

GORDON J. HUMPHREY.

RAPHEL##

BT  
#7240

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GORDON J. HUMPHREY  
NEW HAMPSHIRE

531 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
(202) 224-2841  
NEW HAMPSHIRE TOLL FREE NUMBER  
1-800-852-3714

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
March 30, 1988

C. 3. COMMITTEES 2513  
ARMED SERVICES  
JUDICIARY  
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Lt. General Colin L. Powell  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20500

PS  
Will need  
reply  
C

Dear General Powell:

I understand that the President will meet today with his senior advisors to decide how to respond to a request yesterday from Pakistan to support the abandonment of the U. S. - Pakistan position on symmetry.

Under the Geneva agreements as they now stand, Pakistan and Afghanistan pledge not to interfere in affairs of each other. In practical terms, that means the Soviets are free to resupply the puppet regime in Kabul, but Pakistan must cut off aid to the Resistance, and the U. S. must act as a guarantor of this one-sided arrangement. It was precisely, the one-sidedness of the arrangement, I understand, that led the Administration two weeks ago to publicly call for symmetry.

I urge you to counsel the President against acceding to the Pakistani request. Indeed, we should tell Pakistan we simply cannot act as guarantor to such a disadvantageous arrangement.

I understand there are certain private assurances about what recourse we might have in the event of difficulties. But please point out, that Pakistan would have to violate the Geneva agreements in order to resupply the resistance, should that prove necessary. And we, as a guarantor, would have to work hand in glove with the Pakistanis in violation of our role as guarantor.


After eight years of struggle to restore Afghanistan, we are at a critical moment. Firmness on our part is essential.

In my view, there would be no support in the Senate for any decision by the U.S. to abandon our policy of symmetry, in favor of the Geneva agreements which do not contain symmetry provisions. Any agreement that the Government of Pakistan must violate in order to resupply the Mujahideen, while the Soviets would be within their rights to supply Kabul, would be a sharp departure from the policy unanimously endorsed by the U.S. Senate.

Lt. General Colin L. Powell  
March 30, 1988  
Page Two

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

GJH/tk

**BILL McCOLLUM**

5TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON  
BANKING, FINANCE AND  
URBAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON  
THE JUDICIARY

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE COVERT  
ARMS TRANSACTIONS  
WITH IRAN

# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

### Washington, DC 20515

1507 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 226-2176

DISTRICT OFFICE:

SUITE 301

1801 LEE ROAD

WINTER PARK, FLORIDA 32789

(305) 846-3100

FROM LAKE COUNTY, TOLL FREE:

383-8641

*D.*  
*1.*

~~MARCH~~ **APRIL** 8, 1988

Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

*F*

*FYI / HAND-  
DELIVERED 4/8/88  
INCORRECT DATE  
ON LETTER*

Dear Mr. President,

Press accounts of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva regarding Afghanistan indicate that it may be likely that the United States will agree to the negotiated accords in the very near future.

In letters to you from myself and fifty other Members, as well as other letters sent by the Senate, many Members and Senators have expressed reservations about these accords and their impact on the ability of the Afghans to secure their own independence and freedom. Most, if not all, the Congressional correspondents to you on this issue have been strong supporters of your policies in this region and in other regions.

I urge you not to agree to these accords until the Congress comes back into working session on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week and you have the time to consult with your supporters on the Hill.

Sincerely,



Bill McCollum  
Member of Congress

BMcC/djm

**BILL McCOLLUM**  
5TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON  
BANKING, FINANCE AND  
URBAN AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE ON  
THE JUDICIARY  
SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE COVERT  
ARMS TRANSACTIONS  
WITH IRAN

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

**1507 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20515**  
**(202) 225-2178**

DISTRICT OFFICE:  
SUITE 301  
1801 LEE ROAD  
WINTER PARK, FLORIDA 32789  
(305) 645-3100  
FROM LAKE COUNTY, TOLL FREE:  
383-8541

April 5, 1988

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. President:

Senator Gordon Humphrey, whom you have known as a strong supporter of the Afghan freedom fighters, recently circulated the attached cable to his Senate colleagues from his visit to Islamabad.

I wish to bring this cable to your attention, as I feel that it will have an important impact on your decision on the State Department negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva on the question of Afghanistan's future independence and sovereignty.

I urge you to read this cable and take it into consideration.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,



BILL McCOLLUM  
Member of Congress

84237

5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Waiver 11/6/15  
BY dlr NARRATIVE 4/22/015

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

TEXT OF CABLE SENT BY SENATOR HUMPHREY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

APRIL 4, 1988

THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS STUNNED WHEN AT A THREE HOUR MEETING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE IN PESHAWAR ON APRIL 2 EACH OF THEM VEHEMENTLY AND BITTERLY DENOUNCED THE PROPOSED AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ IS PROMOTING IN GENEVA.

I KNOW YOU WILL SHARE MY SHOCK AT THE UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP DEMANDING THAT THE GENEVA ARRANGEMENTS BE REJECTED. MR. PRESIDENT, IN A NOVEMBER 1987 WHITE HOUSE MEETING WITH YUNIS KHALIS, WHO WAS RAIS (PRESIDENT) OF THE ALLIANCE AT THAT TIME, YOU PERSONALLY ASSURED HIM THAT NO SETTLEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE RESISTANCE.

CLEARLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WE ARE AT A MOMENT OF TRUTH AND A MOMENT OF HONOR. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RESISTANCE HAVE MADE IT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR THAT THEY FIND THE GENEVA ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. THE QUESTION IS, WILL THE WHITE HOUSE KEEP ITS WORD.

MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE ARE FIRMLY REJECTING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. I URGE YOU TO REFUSE TO COMMIT THE UNITED STATES TO THE AGREEMENTS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ALLIANCE LEADERS AGREE IN WRITING TO THE TERMS.

THE EARLIER STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS TO YOU AND CONGRESS WERE WRONG. WHEN FOR EXAMPLE DAS ROBERT A. PECK TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 25, 1988, "RESISTANCE LEADERS HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS", HE GROSSLY UNDERSTATED THE CASE. IN FACT, AS YOU WILL SEE BELOW THE LEADERS STRONGLY URGE THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT GUARANTEE A GENEVA SETTLEMENT.

BELOW I QUOTE THE STATEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS AS REPORTED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE MEETING:

AHMAD SHAH:

AHMAD SHAH, PRESIDENT OF THE PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTING ITTIHAD, THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY, "WHY DOES THE U.S. SUPPORT THE MUJAHIDEEN? TO TOPPLE COMMUNISM? IF SO, THE GENEVA ACCORDS SOLVE NOTHING.

HE TOLD THE SENATOR THAT CONTINUATION OF AID HAS BEEN DUE TO THE SENATOR'S EFFORTS. YOU RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, HE SAID. BUT...WHEN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE MICHAEL ARMACOST MET WITH THE ALLIANCE, HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OR IN THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY AID. HE RECOUNTED THAT KHALIS HAS ASKED ARMACOST FOR RECOGNITION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THAT ARMACOST HAD RESPONDED THAT MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SUFFICIENT. "WE WERE ALL INSULTED," HE SAID.

AHMAD SHAH CONTINUED, "THIS MAY SOUND STRANGE, BUT WE FEEL THAT THE USSR IS ALWAYS AHEAD OF THE U.S. IN POLITICAL PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS LETS DOWN ITS FRIENDS."

AHMAD SHAH URGED THE SENATOR TO USE HIS FRIENDSHIPS AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES TO CONVINCING THE U.S. NOT TO SIGN AT GENEVA. THE GENEVA ACCORDS, HE INSISTED, ENDANGER THE FREE WORLD.

GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR:

" 'IN OUR VIEW', HEKMATYAR SAID, SPEAKING FOR THE ALLIANCE, 'SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS WILL BE A GREAT HISTORICAL MISTAKE. PAKISTAN'S CREDIBILITY WILL BE DAMAGED, AND THE REFUGEES WILL FEEL THAT THEY'VE BEEN LET DOWN IN MID-COURSE.' "

THE HEZB-E ISLAMI LEADER THEN TOLD THE SENATOR THAT SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN THEIR PRESENT SHAPE IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE ACCORDS ARE NOT IMPLEMENTABLE... THE RESISTANCE HE CONCLUDED WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A PSEUDO-PEACE BASED ON THE TERMS OF THE ENEMY.

YUNIS KHALIS:

"KHALIS ASSERTED THAT THE ONLY ADVANTAGE WILL GO TO THE SOVIETS IF THE ACCORDS ARE SIGNED. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM WILL HAVE DRIVEN A WEDGE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD CATEGORICALLY STATED HIS VIEWS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON AND ASKED WHO THE SECRETARY WANTED TO SEE RULING IN KABUL. THE SECRETARY, HE INSISTED, DIDN'T LIKE HIS WORDS, TURNED HIS BACK, AND WALKED OFF.



HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL TO THE SENATOR. THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE NOT YET SIGNED, HE SAID. HE EXHORTED THE SENATOR TO TELL THE U.S. NOT TO LEAVE PAKISTAN STRANDED AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME. PAKISTAN, HE SAID, HAS NO POWER TO SAY NO TO GENEVA. BUT YOU, SENATOR HUMPHREY, HE SAID, CAN CREATE CONDITIONS IN THE U.S. AGAINST SIGNING AT GENEVA."

PROFESSOR RABBANI:

"HE ASSERTED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF GAINING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. THE ONLY THING THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED, HE SUGGESTED, IS THAT THE KABUL REGIME, IMPOSED BY THE TANKS OF A SUPERPOWER, WILL GAIN STABILITY.

PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI:

PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS TRIED TO RESIST SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT HER RESISTANCE WAS OVER. HE ASKED THE SENATOR TO THINK WITH HIM HOW THE RESISTANCE CAN GET OUT OF THIS MESS... HE PLEADED FOR AID TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE PUPPET REGIME IS GONE. HE THEN ASKED THE SENATOR HOW AID CAN CONTINUE IF PAKISTAN IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HELP.

MAULVI NABI MOHAMMADI:

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM IS NOT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUT THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN. GENEVA REMOVES THE SOVIETS BUT LEAVES BEHIND THE SYSTEM, HE SAID. IT WAS THE SYSTEM THAT CALLED IN THE SOVIETS.

IF AID TO THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE TO CONTINUE, THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE PROVACATION AND ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE PRETEXT OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE... HE REMINDED THE SENATOR THAT KABUL AND NEW DELHI HAVE A MILITARY AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE USSR MAY INDEED STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE'S NOTHING TO STOP THE INDIANS.

PIR GAILANI:

PIR GAILANI OF THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT OF AFGHANISTAN TOLD THE SENATOR HE CAN TRY TO STOP THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT IT LOOKS HOPELESS. HE ASSERTED THAT TYHE RESISTANCE IS FIGHTING AGAINST A SYSTEM AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT THAT SYSTEM UNTIL IT IS REMOVED FROM THE SOIL OF AFGHANISTAN.

GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR:

"ASKED THE SENATOR KINDLY TO QUESTION THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE [GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN] IF THEY ARE

04.06.88 10:12 AM

P07

8

SIGNING AT GENEVA WITH THE INTENT TO VIOLATE THE ACCORDS. HE COUNSELLED THAT NO ONE SIGN IF VIOLATION IS INTENDED."

MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE ARE FIRMLY REJECTING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. I URGE YOU TO REFUSE TO COMMIT THE UNITED STATES TO THE AGREEMENTS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ALLIANCE LEADERS AGREE IN WRITING TO THE TERMS.

SINCERELY,

GORDON J. HUMPHREY, USS

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8802908  
RECEIVED: 18 APR 88 10

TO: POWELL

FROM: TAHIR-KHELI  
OAKLEY

DOC DATE: 20 APR 88  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR  
NCO

AFGHANISTAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FM AFGHANISTAN

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ACTION: SEE 8802513 FOR FINAL ACTION      DUE DATE: 21 APR 88      STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEDSKY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

---

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
POWELL

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSAPK

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8802908

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

|             |   |          |                              |
|-------------|---|----------|------------------------------|
| 001 ERMARTH | Z | 88041810 | PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL      |
| 001         | Z | 88041920 | ACTION TRANSFERRED           |
| 001 OAKLEY  | Z | 88041920 | PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL      |
| 002 POWELL  | Z | 88042014 | FWD TO PRES FOR SIG          |
| 002         | X | 88042515 | SEE 8802513 FOR FINAL ACTION |

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council  
The White House**

88 APR 25 P 1: 34

System # \_\_\_\_\_  
 Package # 2513  
 DOCLOG JP A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN       | DISPOSITION   |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|
| Bob Perito      | <u>1</u>    | <u>RP</u>      | <u>review</u> |
| Marybel Batjer  | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| Paul Stevens    | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| John Negroponte | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| Colin Powell    | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| Paul Stevens    | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____          | _____         |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>2</u>    | <u>JP 4/25</u> | <u>N</u>      |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>3</u>    | _____          | <u>D</u>      |

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP \_\_\_\_\_ Baker \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

NSC/S -  
 Remember; don't send  
 congressional letters thru  
 regular mail - either get  
 OA or on couriers to  
 handcarry them - JP 4/25



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 8802513  
DATE 25 APR 88

SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL LTRS RE AFGHANISTAN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE                      TIME                      SIGNATURE

OA COURIERS

25 APR 88                      16:31                      Renee Staunton

COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8802513  
RECEIVED: 01 APR 88 11

2908

TO: POWELL

FROM: HUMPREY, GORDON J

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 88  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN

NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE SUPPORT ABANDONMENT OF US PAKISTAN POSITION ON SYMMETRY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL DUE DATE: 05 APR 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION  
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE  
FORTIER  
ROSS

FOR INFO  
KELLY, B  
OAKLEY  
RODMAN  
ROSTOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8802513  
RECEIVED: 01 APR 88 11

TO: HUMPHREY, GORDON J  
MCCOLLUM, BILL

452/5/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NSC/S PROFILE(S)~~

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 25 APR 88  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN

NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE SUPPORT ABANDONMENT OF US / PAKISTAN POSITION ON SYMMETRY

ACTION: PRES SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 05 APR 88

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI

LOGREF: 8802459 8802908

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

OAKLEY

TAHIR-KHELI

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

APK

DATE

4/25

W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSAPK

DOC 4 OF 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

John <sup>EX3123</sup> 5/26/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 8802513

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 TAHIR-KHELI  
002 POWELL  
002  
003 PRESIDENT  
004

Z 88040111 PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL  
Z 88042014 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG  
X 88042020 NEGROPONTE APPROVED RECOM  
Z 88042020 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 88042515 PRES SGD LTRS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
oh 2/5/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF

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2251 0002

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *CP*

SUBJECT: Your Response to Senator Byrd on Afghanistan

Issue

Whether to sign the letter to Senator Byrd (TAB A).

Fact

Senator Byrd has written to you recently regarding his concerns on Afghanistan (TAB B).

Discussion

The Senator has serious reservations about the United States acting as a guarantor of the Geneva accord. In particular, he believes that the agreement signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, will be detrimental to the Mujahidin in their struggle to secure freedom for Afghanistan.

Recommendation

|       |       |   |
|-------|-------|---|
| OK    | NO    | That you sign the attached letter to Senator Byrd at TAB A. |
| _____ | _____ |   |

Attachments:

- TAB A Your Letter to Senator Byrd
- TAB B Senator Byrd's Letter to The President dated March 22, 1988

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff (2)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Byrd:

Thank you for your letter of March 22, 1988 on Afghanistan.

On April 11, I announced that the United States would join the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the agreement on Afghanistan which has been negotiated at Geneva. At my request, Secretary Shultz signed on behalf of the United States Government.

Before signing the Geneva accords, we made very clear to the Soviet Union, that as guarantors of this agreement, our obligations must be symmetrical and reciprocal. The Soviets fully understand that we will continue our aid to the Resistance, since they refused to stop their assistance to the Najibullah regime. This will ensure that the Resistance will be put at no disadvantage in the period following the entry into force of the accords.

Let me reiterate what President Zia told Senator Humphrey on April 4: United States support of the Geneva process, and our agreement to guarantee the Geneva accords, were undertaken at the request of the Government of Pakistan. I understand President Zia also spoke directly to you along these lines, as he did to me. Over the years, United States commitment to securing freedom for Afghanistan has remained constant, and Pakistan has clearly taken the lead role and been the most important, indispensable factor in

this regard. The Geneva accords record and facilitate the achievement of our objective of the prompt, total, irreversible and verifiable withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Soviet withdrawal, in turn, combined with continued support for the Resistance, will create the conditions necessary for the return of the refugees, the exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people, and the restoration of Afghanistan's status as an independent and nonaligned country.

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces, we expect that millions of Afghan refugees will begin returning to their homes. Without the support of Soviet troops, the Kabul authorities can expect their days to be numbered. Already Soviet troops are withdrawing from outlying areas and the Afghan army is leaving with them rather than defending key garrisons.

The United States and Pakistan have worked hard to help all Afghans free their country. The political future of Afghanistan must be decided by the Afghans themselves, including the Resistance Alliance in Peshawar, but also the Mujahidin and others fighting for freedom inside Afghanistan, who are the most important elements of the Resistance and the refugees. This remains my position, and I am sure you will agree that after their eight years of struggle against Soviet occupation no one can take that right away from them. As I stated to Mr. Khalis, on November 22, 1987: there can be no solution in Afghanistan until the Soviets leave and a free Afghanistan has been established. I believe the Geneva agreement (which secures Soviet withdrawal) and the United States' public commitment to continue assistance to the Mujahidin fulfills my pledge of support given to Mr. Khalis. We and the Government of Pakistan are confident this will lead to the removal of the Najibullah regime. Then, finally, the future will indeed be up to the people of Afghanistan.

The need for United States assistance to our friends in Afghanistan and in Pakistan will continue well beyond Soviet withdrawal. The United States also has an important role to play in an international effort aimed at assisting the return and resettlement of Afghan refugees. We must also stand solidly with Pakistan against Soviet pressure. I count on your support and that of other Members of Congress in meeting our commitments in the months ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd  
Majority Leader of the Senate  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510-7010

ROBERT C. BYRD  
WEST VIRGINIA

United States Senate  
Office of the Majority Leader  
Washington, DC 20510-7010

506743

March 22, 1988

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March 11 outlining the Administration's policy on several aspects related to an Afghanistan settlement, particularly on the issue of termination of assistance to the Afghanistan resistance. I have serious reservations about the policy you have outlined.

You indicate that in recent months the Administration has told the Soviets that "any commitment to guarantee the Geneva accords must be symmetrical, i.e., cessation of military or other aid to the Resistance must be matched by a cessation of similar aid to the regime in Kabul." However, the question of the "symmetry" of withdrawal or suspension of assistance is a murky one, with obvious dangers. What, in fact, constitutes "aid?" Certainly a reasonable definition would include the in-country military forces, military and civilian advisors, as well as material and financial aid. I fail to understand why we would terminate our only form of aid, namely military assistance, in return for Soviet agreement to terminate only one form of their efforts to subjugate that nation. The shocking result of that formula is to telegraph the end of our commitment to the mujaheddin while the Soviets maintain the major portion of leverage in Afghanistan.

In terms of the Geneva negotiations, it is unclear what exactly the United States is being asked to guarantee. I understand that no one in the Senate has been shown copies of these proposed accords. I certainly have no idea what is in these agreements, particularly the instrument which the United States is considering signing, the accord on guarantees.

It is also my understanding that the Administration has opened bilateral discussions with the Soviets on a mutual termination of assistance. While this new Administration position may appear to some to be equitable and balanced, I believe it involves a withdrawal of a long-standing American commitment to the Afghanistan resistance to support them until the Soviets have withdrawn totally from Afghanistan.

I call attention to the position taken by the Senate in a unanimous vote on February 29, 1988, that "the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise



The President  
March 22, 1988  
Page 2

restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujaheddin is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections." I enclose a copy of this resolution.

Mr. President, you state in your letter that to be credible, the Soviet withdrawal must be front-loaded, must actually begin on the first day an agreement enters into force, and "must be irreversible." How is it possible to determine that the Soviet withdrawal is "irreversible" on the first day of withdrawal? How can the United States give up the only leverage we have--military assistance to the resistance--and rely on the Soviets' good intentions to complete their withdrawal?


Reliance on, in your words, "our own national means...to detect and verify...if the Soviets are acting in good faith" obviously is essential. But if we determine that they are not acting in good faith, what recourse do we have if we have terminated our assistance program? It would place the Government of Pakistan in an extremely difficult position for the United States to ask for assistance to restart the aid program. I simply do not believe that course of action is feasible.

Yesterday, I met with the Ambassador from Pakistan, to commend his government for its longstanding efforts and courage in supporting the mujaheddin. I believe it is more important than ever to closely coordinate our program and policy with that nation as well as with the mujaheddin leaders.

Mr. President, as I have said repeatedly on the floor of the Senate, I do not believe the Soviets need enticements from the United States to leave Afghanistan. We should not reward the Soviets for having failed to devour Afghanistan.

I respectfully urge you to make a thorough review of any commitments which may have been made without your full support or knowledge.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert C. Byrd", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert C. Byrd

RCB:jeh/crd

S1588

## S. Res. 386

Whereas the Soviet Union invaded the sovereign territory of Afghanistan on December 17, 1979, and continues to occupy and attempt to subjugate that nation through the use of force, relying upon a puppet régime and an occupying army of an estimated 120,000 Soviet troops.

Whereas Pakistan has harbored more than 3 million Afghan refugees and has endured hundreds of brutal raids across its borders by Afghan and Soviet aircraft and artillery, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians;

Whereas on February 8, 1988, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could begin on May 15, 1988 if the agreements on the settlement being negotiated between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva were signed no later than March 15, 1988;

Whereas General Secretary Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union could complete the troop withdrawal within 10 months and that it could arrange the withdrawal such that during the first phase, a relatively greater portion of the Soviet contingent could be withdrawn;

Whereas Pakistan has made it clear that it will not sign any agreements with the current Soviet puppet régime headed by Najibullah;

Whereas the Congress condemned Soviet policy toward and behavior in Afghanistan in Public Law 99-299, calling for appropriate provision of material support to the people of Afghanistan, so long as the Soviet military occupation continues; and

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a time frame based solely on logistical criteria;

Therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate hereby—

(1) reiterates its belief that the only acceptable formula for settlement of the Afghan situation is one which provides for the self-determination of the Afghan people and results in a government genuinely representative of the Afghan people, outlines a definite timetable based solely on logistical criteria for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future, and provides for the return of refugees in safety and dignity;

(2) expresses its belief that the Pakistani government should not be put under any pressure to agree to Soviet terms for a settlement and that the future of Afghanistan should not be driven by the desire or schedule for a U.S.-Soviet summit;

(3) urges the President to—

(a) support strongly a political solution in Kabul acceptable to the resistance;

(b) insist in talks with the Soviet Union that all Soviet advisers be removed from Afghanistan at the same time as Soviet troop withdrawal takes place;

(c) address the issue of the future status of the nearly 400 bilateral treaties the Soviets have made with the puppet Kabul régime;

(d) address with the Soviets the deployment of Soviet troops across the Soviet-Afghan border after the completion of the withdrawal period;

(e) stand firm on the necessity for the Soviets to terminate all forms of military assistance and logistical support to the Kabul régime;

(f) address the repatriation by the Soviet Union of the more than 18,000 Afghan children who have been forcibly deported to the Soviet Union; and

(g) ensure that international assistance to the refugees continues at least until all Soviet and Soviet bloc forces have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and peace has been restored;

(4) expresses its belief that all Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers must be removed from Afghanistan during the period of troop withdrawal;

(5) expresses its support for increased U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people both during and following the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet bloc forces from Afghanistan;

(6) expresses its support for a U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping force to help guarantee that Soviet forces can withdraw in an orderly way without being attacked on the way out and to help keep the peace in the major cities while an interim government organizes the nation's future; and

(7) expresses its strong belief that the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujahadeen is well

enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.