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File Folder CO002 (548000-558849)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 37

SYSTEMATIC

175

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84232	MEMO	MARVIN STONE TO COLIN POWELL, RE: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	1	5/20/1988	B1
		R 4/22/2019 WH GUIDELINES			

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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#9455
548931

ID # _____

C0002

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8712107

Name of Correspondent: Safiullah Subat

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: freedom of Afghanistan

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CM BOAR</u>		ORIGINATOR	<u>871215</u>	<u>TR</u>	<u>CB</u>	<u>A</u> <u>871215</u>
<u>NS Attn Ambass. Oakley</u>		Referral Note: <u>A</u>	<u>871218</u>	<u>TR</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: _____ Individual Codes: _____

Prime Subject Code: _____ Secondary Subject Codes: _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package**
- C - Copy**
- D - Official document**
- G - Message**
- H - Handcarried**
- L - Letter**
- M - Mailgram**
- O - Memo**
- P - Photo**
- R - Report**
- S - Sealed**
- T - Telegram**
- V - Telephone**
- X - Miscellaneous**
- Y - Study**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 26, 1988


Dear Mr. Subat:

Elizabeth Board of the White House Office of Media and Broadcast Relations has forwarded your letter of December 7, 1987 to our office.

I believe the enclosed copies of President Reagan's Afghanistan Day Proclamation - 1987, and his December 27, 1987 statement will fully explain the President's prolonged support of the Afghan fight for freedom.

Thank you for your interest.

Sincerely,



Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for
Near East & South Asian Affairs

Enclosures:


Proclamation - Afghanistan Day, 1987
Statement - December 27, 1987

Mr. Safiullah Subat
Editor
Pen at Jihad Service
12321 Trask Avenue #10
Garden Grove, California 92643

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

January 26, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH I. BOARD
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Media and Broadcast Relations

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY 
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Afghanistan

We suggest that if you receive further inquiries relating to the President's position on Afghanistan, copies of the enclosed proclamation and statement be forwarded directly from your office.

Thank you.

Attachments:

1. Oakley/Subat Letter of January 26, 1988
(with incoming correspondence)
2. STATEMENT - December 27, 1987
3. PROCLAMATION - Afghanistan Day, 1987

12-7-1987

548931

Mr. President !

E. Board
I beleave on what you think about Afghanistan cause, but
what i am enclosed with this short letter is the voice of
people of Afghanistan.

Mr. Ronold Reagan !

With the trust of Afghan people on your hand, please remem-
ber us at your visit with Mr. Gorbachev.

And also i present this letter to your guest honor ,

Mr. Gorbachev from a Afghan Freedom Fighter.

RECEIVED

DEC 11 1987

MEDIA RELATIONS

Sincerely



SAFIULLAH, SUBAT

Afghan Freedom Fighter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1987


Dear Mr. Subat:

On behalf of the President, I want to thank you for your letter regarding the Freedom of Afghanistan.

You may rest assured the President truly appreciates hearing from friends like you who support freedom for the Afghan people. In this regard I am referring your letter and enclosures to the attention of Ambassador Robert Oakley, Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs.

With appreciation of your interest and best wishes,

Sincerely,



Elizabeth I. Board
Special Assistant to the President and
Director of Media and Broadcast Relations

Mr. Safiullah Subat
Editor
Pen at Jihad Service
12321 Trask Ave. #10
Garden Grove, California 92643

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8709436

RECEIVED 22 DEC 87 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SUBAT, SAFIULLAH

DOCDATE 07 DEC 87

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

MP

SUBJECT: LTR RE FREEDOM OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 30 DEC 87 STATUS S

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TAHIR-KHELI

ROSS

RODMAN

ERMARTH

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 1/26	Oakley Sgt Memo		RM

DISPATCH

MC 1/26

W/ATTCH

FILE

WHB

(C)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

20 JAN 1988

✓ B 551827
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CU Da
FLD13

Mr. Lyn Nofziger
1526 Eighteenth Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PY

Dear Lyn:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Washington visit of
Afghan resistance leader General Abdul-Rahim Wardak.

I agree with your perception that the President could benefit from a visible demonstration of his resoluteness on the Afghan issue in opposing Soviet domination. Although General Wardak is an important resistance leader, and such meetings are often useful, his claims of battles and great victories against the Soviets last summer are not supported by our own information. I therefore believe that a meeting with the President or myself would not be in the best interests of our policy on Afghanistan. Alternatively, I suggest that the Afghanistan Resistance Relief Center contact Mr. Vince Cannistraro on my staff at 697-8879 to arrange other meetings at the Defense Department. Bob Oakley's staff may also be helpful in arranging a meeting at the NSC.

I appreciate your bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely,

cc: ✓ Howard Baker

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

0002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 02, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE BESS B. STINSON

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES NEWS ARTICLE FROM THE PHOENIX
GAZETTE REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
FROM AFGHANISTAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
KAE RAIRDIN		ORG	88/03/02	VP 8/02/03	
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 2201 _____

IA MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____


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*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

K. Rainkin

 Bess B. Stinson  
2618 West Pierson  
Phoenix, AZ 85017

February 18, 1988

Dear President Reagan,

The enclosed editorials make a good point, — you just can't really trust Mr. Gorbachev's statements.

He is skillful,  
He is a dedicated Communist

Please wait until the Communists are out of Afghanistan before making concessions.

Sincerely  
Bess B. Stinson  
Former State Senator

# The Phoenix Gazette

FOUNDED IN 1880

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President

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"Where The Spirit Of The Lord Is, There Is Liberty" — II Corinthians 3:17

## Editorials

These are the views of The Phoenix Gazette as an institution, thus are not signed by an individual writer.

### Time to recant an unwise promise

The continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is an embarrassment to Moscow and an obstacle to its diplomatic efforts to woo Arab states. That does not mean, however, that the Kremlin won't attempt to gain by treaty what could not be achieved by force of arms.

Yet Secretary of State George Schultz has capitulated to Soviet demands for the U.S. to end military aid to the Afghan freedom fighters simultaneously with the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal.

Schultz' action contradicts Ronald Reagan's promise that aid will continue until the Soviets are safely gone.

By way of announcing the onset of the troop withdrawal, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev boasted of Soviet "commitment to the tradition of good-neighborliness, goodwill and mutual respect which trace back to Vladimir Lenin and the first Soviet-Afghan treaty signed in 1921."

In fact, the 1921 treaty demonstrates past perfidy. Lenin promised to return Panjdeh, an Afghan territory that had been annexed by the czar in 1885, to Afghanistan. The territory was not returned, but was incorporated into the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.

The same treaty also promised independence to the Moslem states of Bukhara and Khiva. Instead, even as the treaty was being signed, these and other independent states in Turkestan were attacked by Communist forces.

The parallels to today are striking. Afghanistan supported the struggle of Soviet Moslem "freedom fighters" called Basmachi in much the same way as Pakistan now funnels U.S. aid to the mujahideen. The war, which lasted for years, ended in Soviet victory only after Afghanistan terminated support for the Basmachi.

Gorbachev's claim to sharing a history with Afghanistan that demonstrates "peaceful coexistence and equitable cooperation," is the worst kind of cynical hypocrisy.

The president should respond to recent reports from diplomatic sources in Pakistan that the Soviets and the Afghan regime are mounting a drastic effort "to expand military forces, including forced conscription and retraining," by recanting the State Department promise and reiterating continued support for the freedom fighters, pending the departure of the last Soviet soldier.

# Charades, Soviet style

The Soviet Union is responding to Western pressure to improve its human rights record — sort of.

In November of 1987 *Izvestia* reported that a new organization, the Public Commission for Humanitarian Questions and Human Rights, had been formed to "achieve conformity of Soviet legislation with the obligations assumed ... in the Helsinki Final Act and in U.N. human rights documents."

A more accurate description of the commission's purpose is that it intends to recast the terms of the human rights debate.

Andrei Grachev, a prominent member of the new group and a senior official of the Propaganda Committee of the Central Committee, has repeated General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's call for a human rights conference in Moscow. However, he insists

that the Soviet Union will only discuss political rights in conjunction with social and economic rights. The commission follows the Department for Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs organized in June of 1986. Its purpose was to limit the human rights discussion to cultural exchanges and family reunification.

The new Soviet initiative, however, is more than a clever ploy to mute Western criticism. Equating individual rights and egalitarian economic rights not only projects a false image of cooperation, by definition it brings the market economy and private property under attack.

It would be a serious error if the United States, in the mistaken hope of moving the Soviets toward more benign policies, were to participate in a conference at which Moscow defined human rights.

PRESERVATION COPY

The Phoenix Gazette

Tues, Feb 16 1988

A-6

Editorials

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

84232

Office of the Director

3836

**C.F.**



**USIA**

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FG 298

FG 006-12

May 20, 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

REC-114

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Colin L. Powell  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone *MLS-*  
Acting Director

SUBJECT: International Information Committee:  
Public Diplomacy Strategy Papers on  
Afghanistan and Central America

I am forwarding, as I noted in my May 5 memorandum to you, a public diplomacy strategy paper on Afghanistan. This is the second of two papers prepared by the inter-agency International Information Committee (IIC) under its renewed mandate from the National Security Council.

This paper has been discussed in very considerable detail at senior levels with all involved agencies including the Department of State. I am submitting the paper for National Security Council consideration even though State is unable to clear it, because the IIC members feel that it deals with matters of high-priority concern, ones which deserve immediate senior-level public diplomacy attention.

CONFIDENTIAL

OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
NARA, DATE 4/22/2019

NSC #8803836

88 MAY 20 P 4: 46

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AFGHANISTAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

## Introduction

With the conclusion of negotiations in Geneva for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. will redirect its energies towards planning for what is certain to be a protracted period of challenge and uncertainty in that country. Even assuming the most optimistic of scenarios for the withdrawal and post-withdrawal periods, the U.S., in addition to monitoring Soviet compliance with the Geneva accords, confronts the daunting prospect of the return to Afghanistan of millions of refugees currently in Pakistan and Iran and, beyond this, the task of assisting in the reconstruction of the country's war-ravaged institutions.

It is the sense of the International Information Committee that, while we will quickly address the problems of refugee repatriation and resettlement, we are not yet prepared to speak to the reconstruction effort or to the kinds of informational and cultural support it will need if it is to have much chance of success. While the complexity and fluidity of the Afghan situation demand keen sensitivity to developments not now foreseeable, an initial strategy is needed to serve as a basis for later modifications and refinements.

The International Information Committee believes that it is designed precisely to assist in the formulation of important public affairs and public diplomacy issues such as those now facing the U.S. in relation to Afghanistan. In that belief, the Committee provides information and recommendations to the National Security Council.

### I. Public Affairs: Themes for USG Media

The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Department of State is currently working on a calendar of public affairs events that began with the Secretary of State's trip to Geneva (April 14) to sign for the U.S. as co-guarantor of the withdrawal agreement. Looking beyond the immediate future covered by this calendar, U.S. policy statements on Afghanistan should focus on the following themes:

#### 1. Soviet Withdrawal

- The U.S.S.R.'s decision to remove its forces from Afghanistan represents a triumph for the Afghan Resistance and for all the people of Afghanistan. The withdrawal is a watershed, signalling the end of military efforts to extend the Soviet system beyond the borders established by World War II.

- Soviet troop withdrawal must be complete and irreversible, and must not lag behind the timetable agreed upon in Geneva (although an accelerated pullout would be welcome and is encouraged by the U.S.).

- As the President and Secretary of State have affirmed, the U.S. is determined not to leave the Afghan Resistance at a disadvantage relative to the Soviet-sponsored Kabul regime. The U.S. prefers that there be a moratorium on military assistance to all parties during the withdrawal period, but U.S. aid to the Resistance will continue in symmetry with Soviet aid to Kabul. It follows that Soviet restraint would be matched by American restraint.

Primary target audiences for the foregoing themes (in descending order of priority) are elites in the Soviet Union, Islamic countries (including Pakistan and Afghanistan), India, China, and Western Europe.

## 2. Self-determination for the Afghan People

- The U.S. seeks no strategic advantage in Afghanistan; the people of Afghanistan must determine their own form of government, free of outside interference or intervention.

- Any government that is authentically Afghan, broadly based and reflecting the will of the Afghan people, would be acceptable to the U.S.

Primary target audiences: Afghanistan, Soviet Union, Pakistan, other Islamic countries, Western Europe, China, Japan.

## 3. Return of Refugees, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, and National Reconstruction

- All Afghan refugees, including members of the Resistance, must be allowed to return voluntarily to their country in safety and dignity.

- Pakistan, which has provided food and subsistence to some three million Afghan refugees for more than eight years, has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the refugees can return safely. Pakistan merits the praise and support of the international community for resisting massive Soviet intimidation and for bearing the expense of protecting and providing for the refugees that fled across its border.

- The U.S. is prepared, in both multilateral and bilateral contexts, to participate in refugee repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation, and eventually reconstruction. Given the current magnitude of our assistance to the Afghans (\$120 million annually), other nations must also contribute significantly. International organizations are best suited to take the lead in so massive an undertaking. We fully support the appointment of a U.N. Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Relief for Afghanistan and a coordinated, cost-effective U.N. effort utilizing the experience and expertise of the relevant U.N. agencies.

Primary target audiences: Western Europe, Japan, wealthier Islamic countries, Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, other Islamic countries.

## II. Public Affairs: Monitoring USG Themes and Projects

The Secretary of State has appointed an Afghan Coordinator to ensure the coherence and consistency of all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including the communication of this policy. The Coordinator has established an Interagency Working Group on Afghanistan on which USIA is represented; one of the functions of this Working Group will be to assist the Coordinator in developing and coordinating policy guidance for the public diplomacy dimensions of an Afghan policy. What is needed, in addition, is a group to give close and sustained attention on a regular basis to what the USG is saying and doing specifically in the international public arena on the subject of Afghanistan. The updating, refinement, and possible addition and subtraction of public affairs themes will have a particular sensitivity both in the period preceding next February 15 (the theoretical completion date of the Soviet withdrawal) and in the period thereafter (with the massive movement of refugees back into Afghanistan and the beginnings of national reconstruction).

Because of the critical character of the coming months, the International Information Committee recommends the establishment of an Afghanistan Public Affairs Working Group, reporting to the IIC and functioning in consultation with the Afghanistan Coordinator. Chaired by USIA, this group should consist of representatives from agencies which are members of the IIC and should have responsibility for:

- monitoring the output of all USG media (Voice of America, USIA television, Wireless File, and embassy spokesmen) on the subject of Afghanistan to ensure conformity with current policy, and

- developing, in cooperation with the Afghanistan Coordinator, such new guidelines for the foregoing USG media as time and events may make necessary.

## III. Public Diplomacy: Assisting in National Reconstruction

Beyond Soviet withdrawal and repatriation of the refugees -- again assuming an optimistic scenario -- begins the enormous, long-term effort that will be required to assist Afghanistan in the reconstruction of national institutions destroyed by years of Soviet occupation. This effort should be led by an appropriate multilateral organization and must mobilize the resources of numerous countries if the necessary funding and expertise are to be found and properly applied.

While the full scope of U.S. participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan lies beyond the purview of the International Information Committee, elements of that reconstruction are very much within the IIC's mandate. These, of course, include responsibility for the public affairs aspects of reconstruction; even more significantly, they include substantive contributions to be made by IIC member agencies to the rebuilding of cultural, educational, and communications institutions in Afghanistan.

To ensure that the necessary planning begins promptly, the International Information Committee recommends that a PRG be held at an early date to task relevant government agencies with producing a strategy paper specifying both the primary functions of public diplomacy in post-Soviet Afghanistan and its secondary role in support of other USG programs concerned with Afghan refugee resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

#### Recommendations

1. That the NSC mandate the establishment of an Afghanistan Public Affairs Working Group as described above, to monitor on a regular basis the output of all USG media (as specified above) on the subject of Afghanistan and to assist as necessary in the development of new themes and policy guidelines.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That the NSC approve the holding of a PRG at an early date, to include representatives of the member agencies of the IIC, to task the drafting of an interagency strategy paper setting out the role of public diplomacy in the context of USG involvement in international resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803836  
RECEIVED: 20 MAY 88 18

TO: POWELL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *ds*  
*25110*

FROM: STONE, M

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 88  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
CENTRAL AMERICA

AFGHANISTAN  
USIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INTL INFO COM RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY PAPERS ON AFGHANISTAN &  
CENTRAL AMERICA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO STEVENS TO STONE DUE DATE: 24 MAY 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CURTIN

LOGREF:

FILES: *X WH*

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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STEINER  
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HEISER  
OAKLEY  
RODMAN  
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: This paper was more than a month in the making and has now essentially been overtaken by events. USIA is integrating its public diplomacy effort on Afghanistan with Rich Williamson's group. USIA tells me that no response to Stone's memo is required. --J. Curtin

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSCTF

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 8803836  
RECEIVED: 20 MAY 88 18

TO: POWELL

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ab

FROM: STONE, M

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 88  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AFGHANISTAN  
CENTRAL AMERICA USIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INTL INFO COM RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY PAPERS ON AFGHANISTAN &  
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STAFF OFFICER: CURTIN LOGREF:

FILES: \* WH NSCIF: CODES:

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|                   | ROSS                   | OAKLEY          |
|                   | STEINER                | RODMAN          |
|                   | TAHIR-KHELI            | ROSTOW          |

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RECORD ID: 8803836

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 CURTIN  
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Z 88052018 PREPARE MEMO STEVENS TO STONE  
X 88052316 OBE PER CURTIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0002  
State

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 31, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. IHOR DLABOHA

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THAT THE 18 SOVIET SOLDIERS WHO  
DESERTED FROM THE RED ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN  
BE GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE U.S.

| ROUTE TO:<br>OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME) | ACTION      |                  | DISPOSITION  |                                     |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                         | ACT<br>CODE | DATE<br>YY/MM/DD | TYPE<br>RESP | C COMPLETED<br>D YY/MM/DD           |
| LINAS KOJELIS                           | ORG         | 88/03/31         |              | C 88/4/1 TR                         |
| Max Green<br>REFERRAL NOTE:             | A           | 88/04/04         | TR           | C 88/4/4 TR                         |
| <del>NSC-Cobb</del><br>REFERRAL NOTE:   | A           | 88/04/05         | TR           | C 88/04/02 TR                       |
| Das<br>REFERRAL NOTE:                   | R           | 88/04/08         | TR           | <del>C 88/04/06</del><br>A 88/04/20 |
| REFERRAL NOTE:                          |             |                  |              |                                     |
| REFERRAL NOTE:                          |             |                  |              |                                     |

COMMENTS:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                        | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE *       |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY *       |                      |                      | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8811186

Date April 22, 1988

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan

From: Mr. Ihor Dlaboha

Date: March 20, 1988

Subject: Requests that the 18 Soviet soldiers who deserted  
from the Red Army in Afghanistan be granted political  
asylum in the U.S.

WH Referral Dated: April 8, 1988

NSC ID# (if any): 558314

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

       A draft reply is attached.

       A draft reply will be forwarded.

       A translation is attached.


  X   An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

       Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

*for*   
Director  
Secretariat Staff



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1988

Mr. Ihor Dlaboha  
President  
United Ukrainian American Organizations  
of New York  
98 Second Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10003

Dear Mr. Dlaboha:

I am responding to your letter of March 20 to President Reagan on the issue of Soviet defectors in Afghanistan. Congressman Bill Green of New York has also contacted the State Department in connection with your query.

Reports that the United States is allegedly negotiating with the Soviet Union the involuntary return to the USSR of 18 soldiers who defected from the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in January of this year are simply not true. The United States is not negotiating with the Soviet Union over the fate of any Soviet prisoner or defector in Afghanistan.

With the signature in Geneva on April 14 of the Geneva Accords, and the agreement that Soviet forces will begin withdrawing, the question of Soviet soldiers in resistance hands takes on new urgency. The Government of Pakistan and the resistance are aware that we expect the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to apply equally to all captives in this war. We have encouraged the resistance to allow Soviet captives to seek asylum abroad if they so wish. Our position is, and will continue to be, that no Soviet soldier should be repatriated against his will.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert A. Flaten", written over a light-colored background.

Robert A. Flaten  
Director,  
Office of Pakistan,  
Afghanistan and Bangladesh  
Affairs.

8811186

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 8, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 558314

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 20, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. IHOR DLABOHA  
PRESIDENT  
UNITED UKRAINIAN AMERICAN  
ORGANIZATIONS OF NEW YORK  
98 SECOND AVENUE  
NEW YORK NY 10003

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THAT THE 18 SOVIET SOLDIERS WHO  
DESERTED FROM THE RED ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN  
BE GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE U.S.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

558-314

# United Ukrainian American Organizations of New York Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.

Branch of New York

98  
140-142 SECOND AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10003

March 20, 1988

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

L. Kojelis

I am writing this letter to you on behalf of the United Ukrainian American Organizations of New York, a coordinating body that represents more than 60 Ukrainian American civic organizations in New York City. This letter concerns the fate of 18 soliders who deserted from the Red Army in Afghanistan on Jan. 27 of this year.

This group, which includes at least five Ukrainians, has requested the United States to grant them political asylum. However, after a long delay, it has come to our attention that the U.S. government is negotiating their repatriation to the USSR in return for an equal number of Afghanistani prisoners of war. The inhumanity of such an action is beyond belief. Determining that the Soviet Union's military operation in Afghanistan is immoral, these 18 young men decided to remove themselves from this military conflagration by fleeing to the West. Rather than sending them back to an awaiting firing squad, we should welcome them with open arms and offer them refuge in this country.

If the government goes ahead with its intentions in this matter, it would be another black spot on moral integrity of the country. Coupled with the infamous Myroslav Medvid case of the Fall of 1985, refugees from totalitarianism would be hardpressed to look upon America as a friend of the downtrodden. The case is being handled by Tyrus W. Cobb, executive director of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs at the National Security Council. On behalf of our organization, I beseech you to save the lives of these 18 men by granting them political asylum in United States.

Respectfully yours,  
Ihor Dlaboha  
President

*Ihor Dlaboha*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

*CO 002*  
*needs acknowledgment*  
*that we did*  
*bring*  
*HUB 2 set*  
*4-9-8*

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 31, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. EDWIN J. FEULNER, JR.

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURE COPY OF ADVANCE PAPER ON THE AFGHAN  
SETTLEMENT ISSUE

| ROUTE TO:<br>OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME) | ACTION      |                  | DISPOSITION  |                           |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
|                                         | ACT<br>CODE | DATE<br>YY/MM/DD | TYPE<br>RESP | C COMPLETED<br>D YY/MM/DD |
| HOWARD BAKER                            | ORG         | 88/03/31         |              | C 88/04/13 TR             |
| REFERRAL NOTE: <i>NSDWE</i>             |             | D 88/04/14       | CSBAKIC      | 88/04/22                  |
| REFERRAL NOTE: <i>DOS</i>               |             | D 88/04/26       |              | C 88/05/12                |
| REFERRAL NOTE: <i>CS Baker</i>          |             | A 88/05/13       | TR HBA       | 88/05/23 TR               |
| REFERRAL NOTE:                          |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:                          |             |                  |              |                           |

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                        | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      | *                    | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE         | *                    | *                    | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY         | *                    | *                    | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
U.S. AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS  
1000 14th Street, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

88 APR 14 P 4: 34

\*\*\*\*\*  
TO: DIRECTOR, COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
FROM: SAC, [illegible]  
SUBJECT: [illegible]  
\*\*\*\*\*

RE: [illegible]  
DATE: [illegible]  
TIME: [illegible]

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

\*\*\*\*\*  
[illegible text]

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[illegible text]

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[illegible text]

May 23, 1988

Dear Ed:

Thank you for sending along Heritage's paper on the Afghan peace settlement. It is a thoughtful paper on a timely subject.

I want to assure you that the settlement was reached through the closest possible coordination with the Government of Pakistan, and that this coordination continues. I hope you will agree that the White House has indeed hung tough to obtain what we hope will be a workable peace settlement. The position of the Administration in guaranteeing the agreement reached at Geneva, and that of the Pakistani Government, ensure that the flow of support for the Afghan Resistance will continue and that they will not be left at a disadvantage. We expect this will lead to freedom and self-determination for the Afghan people and return of the refugees, as well as Soviet withdrawal.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.  
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
President  
The Heritage Foundation  
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

HBB/DOS/NSC/LRC/CAD/AVH/jfc 5HHBA ✓

cc: Lorraine Camarano - Rm. 61 - OEOB



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/18

Lorraine =

This seems stilted to  
me, but is sensitive & I  
don't want to fuss over it  
much.

~~Caro~~

Pat,

Ok for typing

Thanks

Lorraine

Draft

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Ed:

Thank you for sending along <sup>Heritage's</sup> ~~the Foundation's~~ paper on the Afghan peace settlement. It is a thoughtful paper on a timely subject.

I want to assure you that the settlement was reached through the closest possible coordination with the Government of Pakistan, and that coordination continues. I hope you will agree that the White House has indeed hung tough to obtain what we hope will be a workable peace settlement. The position of the Administration in guaranteeing the agreement reached at Geneva, and that of the Government, ~~of Pakistan~~, ensure that the flow of support for the Afghan Resistance will continue and they will not be left at a disadvantage. We expect this will lead to freedom and self-determination for the Afghan people and return of the refugees, as well as Soviet withdrawal.

this

Pakistani

~~with all~~ Best regards.

Hub

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.  
Chief of Staff to The President

Mr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
President  
The Heritage Foundation  
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D. C. 20002

HHB/DOS/NSC/lc/cor | [signature]

Department of State

Suggested Draft

Dear Ed:

Thank you for sending along the Foundation's paper on the Afghan peace settlement. It is a thoughtful paper on a timely subject.

I want to assure you that the settlement was reached through the closest possible coordination with the Government of Pakistan, and that coordination continues. I hope you will agree that the White House has indeed hung tough to obtain what we hope will be a workable peace settlement.

With all best regards,

The position of the Administration in guaranteeing the agreement reached at Geneva, and that of the Government of Pakistan, ensure that the flow of support for the Afghan resistance will continue and they will not be left at a disadvantage. We expect this will lead to

Howard Baker

freedom and self-determination for the Afghan people and return of the refugees, as well as Soviet withdrawal.

Mr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.,  
President,

The Heritage Foundation,

214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.,

Washington, D.C.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *PS*  
SUBJECT: Response to Letter to the Chief of Staff  
from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. President,  
The Heritage Foundation

The NSC staff has approved a State Department draft as amended (TAB B), which has been prepared in final for the Chief of Staff's signature (TAB A), to Mr. Feulner regarding the Afghan settlement issue.

Attachments:

- TAB A Chief of Staff's Response to Mr. Feulner
- TAB B State's Proposed Reply with  
Feulner/Baker Letter of March 30, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 11, 1988

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY 

SUBJECT: Response to Letter to Chief of Staff Baker  
from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., President,  
The Heritage Foundation

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum for your signature to Sally Kelley. NSC staff approves State's draft reply as amended, which we have prepared in final for the Chief of Staff's signature, to Mr. Feulner (TAB A). Mr. Feulner has written the Chief of Staff about the Afghan settlement issue (TAB B).

*WLB*: *DMC* *de*  
Ledsky, Rodman and Ross concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at TAB I to Sally Kelley.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

TAB I Your Memorandum to Sally Kelley

TAB A Chief of Staff's Reply to Mr. Feulner

TAB B State's Draft Reply (as amended) with/  
Feulner/Baker Letter of March 30, 1988

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ed:

Thank you for sending along the Foundation's paper on the Afghan peace settlement. It is a thoughtful paper on a timely subject.

I want to assure you that the settlement was reached through the closest possible coordination with the Government of Pakistan, and that coordination continues. I hope you will agree that the White House has indeed hung tough to obtain what we hope will be a workable peace settlement. The position of the Administration in guaranteeing the agreement reached at Geneva, and that of the Government of Pakistan, ensure that the flow of support for the Afghan Resistance will continue and they will not be left at a disadvantage. We expect this will lead to freedom and self-determination for the Afghan people and return of the refugees, as well as Soviet withdrawal.

With all best regards,

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.  
Chief of Staff to The President

Mr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
President,  
The Heritage Foundation  
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D. C. 20002

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8813046

Date May 6, 1988

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: Howard Baker

From: Mr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.

Date: 3/30/88

Subject: Encloses Copy of Advance Paper on the Afghan  
Settlement Issue

WH Referral Dated: 4/26/88  
NSC ID# (if any): 558845

The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

*Richard W. Marshall*  
for Director  
Secretariat Staff



RECEIVED

WHITE HOUSE

MAY 7 8 37 AM '88 MAY 7 AIO: 15

SITUATION ROOM

RECEIVED

8813046

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 26, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 558845

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 30, 1988

TO: HOWARD BAKER

FROM: MR. EDWIN J. FEULNER, JR.  
PRESIDENT  
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION  
214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E.  
WASHINGTON DC 20002

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY OF ADVANCE PAPER ON THE AFGHAN  
SETTLEMENT ISSUE

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

558845



214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. • Washington, D.C. 20002 • (202) 546-4400

March 30, 1988

EDWIN J. FEULNER, JR.  
President

Honorable Howard Baker  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Howard:

Attached is an advance copy of our paper on the Afghan settlement issue. I hope the White House will hang tough for a workable peace settlement as outlined in this paper.

Sincerely,

April 4, 1988

## A U.S. AGENDA FOR AN AFGHAN PEACE SETTLEMENT

### INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union has failed to subjugate Afghanistan despite a brutal war of attrition that has claimed more than a million Afghan lives and created five million Afghan refugees. While prosecuting a relentless war against the Afghan people since 1979, Moscow has been hinting in recent months that it is willing to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. The most important statement was Soviet Communist Party chief Mikhail Gorbachev's February 8 announcement that if a settlement could be reached in the U.N.-sponsored Geneva talks on Afghanistan by March 15, then the Soviets could begin a nine-month withdrawal process on May 15.

Gorbachev apparently hopes that Washington will help Moscow win favorable terms for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. This seems to be what Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was demanding last month in his inconclusive Washington talks with Secretary of State George Shultz. In particular, Moscow would like the United States to press Pakistan to make key concessions. Moscow's goal is to coerce Pakistan into striking a deal over the heads of the Afghan freedom fighters that will preserve a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

**Cosmetic Withdrawals.** The latest Soviet peace offensive, however, cannot be taken at face value. Despite Gorbachev's soothing rhetoric, Soviet forces continue to fight brutally against the Afghan resistance. Moscow has staged sham "withdrawals" in the past and has ordered cosmetic changes in its Afghan puppet regime to defuse international opposition to its policies.

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This is the tenth Heritage Foundation study on Afghanistan. Previous studies included: *Backgrounder* No. 552, "Updating U.S. Strategy for Helping Afghan Freedom Fighters," December 22, 1986; *Backgrounder* No. 236, "Afghanistan Three Years Later: More U.S. Help Needed," December 27, 1982; *Backgrounder* No. 101, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Quagmire," October 25, 1979.

Gorbachev clearly is attempting to salvage, not abandon, the huge Soviet political, economic and military investment in subduing Afghanistan. Because of the rising military costs of the war and declining prospects of an outright military solution, Gorbachev is searching for a diplomatic solution that will perpetuate a pro-Soviet regime at the lowest possible cost to Moscow. Unable to eliminate the Afghan resistance through military means, he seeks to isolate it, deprive it of external support, divide it, demoralize it and eventually strangle it in a diplomatic "settlement."

**Excluding the Resistance.** Efforts at finding a settlement in Afghanistan have been undertaken by the United Nations for the past five years. These U.N.-sponsored peace talks are seriously flawed because they: 1) exclude the Afghan resistance; 2) fail to address the central issue of the war, Afghan self-determination; 3) propose a drawn-out timetable for Soviet withdrawal which poses unacceptable risks to the resistance; 4) call for suspension of U.S. and other aid to the resistance at the start of the Soviet withdrawal; 5) fail to demand a reciprocal suspension of Soviet aid to Afghan communists; 6) create enormous loopholes; and 7) include weak provisions for verification of compliance.

The U.S. and Pakistan should not make concrete concessions in return for ill-defined Soviet promises. Washington must not agree to act as guarantor of a Geneva settlement unless the accords guarantee Afghan self-determination and do not become a smoke screen for continued Soviet domination. Given the sordid record of communist regimes ignoring and betraying the commitments made in 1945 at Yalta regarding Eastern Europe, in 1962 regarding Laos, and in 1973 regarding Vietnam, the U.S. in 1988 cannot give the Soviet Union the benefit of any doubt in Afghanistan.

As such, the U.S. should:

**1) continue sending its military aid to the Afghans until the last Soviet soldier has exited Afghanistan.** The U.S. goal should be to force a total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a strategic stepping stone to the Persian Gulf and a geopolitical lever for influencing and possibly dismembering Iran and Pakistan. It is not the U.S. goal simply to "bleed" the Soviets. This would only prolong the agony of the Afghans.

**2) work for a settlement that creates a neutral Afghanistan, just as the 1955 Austrian State Treaty created today's neutral Austria.**

**3) not allow Moscow to engineer a settlement that transforms Afghanistan into another Lebanon, doomed by a lack of national consensus to chronic civil war.** This would give Afghan communists the chance to subdue a splintered resistance. Worse, it could breed instability that invites Soviet re-intervention.

## THE MILITARY SITUATION

Approximately 120,000 Soviet troops, backed up by more than 30,000 support and combat personnel nearby in the Soviet Union, have failed to crush the elusive Afghan *mujahideen* — or holy warriors. The *mujahideen* are estimated at up to 200,000 strong.

Always courageous and indefatigable fighters, in the long course of the war they have been bolstered by more effective organization, better training in some groups, modern arms, and growing foreign support. Gradually there has been improved operational coordination between the seven major resistance groups.<sup>1</sup> A "natural selection" process has produced a class of battle-hardened field commanders whose claim to leadership is based on proven performance rather than traditional or tribal connections.<sup>2</sup>

The *mujahideen* control more than 80 percent of Afghanistan and are supported by the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people. The Soviets control the major cities, air bases and primary roads. Though the *mujahideen* harass Soviet supply lines and besiege isolated garrisons, they have been unable to destroy major Soviet bases because of a lack of heavy weapons and mine clearing equipment.

**Indiscriminate Bombing.** The Afghans have paid dearly for their fierce resistance. Some 1.24 million Afghans, roughly 9 percent of the prewar population, have been killed in the fighting since the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a coup in 1978.<sup>3</sup> Most of those killed were civilians slaughtered in indiscriminate Soviet bombing and artillery attacks designed to depopulate resistance strongholds. Today the Afghans comprise the world's largest refugee group, with roughly 3.5 million displaced Afghans in Pakistan and more than one million in Iran.

The Soviets have suffered an estimated 36,000 casualties, with half of the total killed.<sup>4</sup> Estimates of the annual economic cost of the war to Moscow range from \$5.5 billion<sup>5</sup> to \$12 billion.<sup>6</sup> These costs have risen steeply in the past two years.

**Forcing Gunships to Fly Low.** Last year the *mujahideen* at last gained an effective air defense due to the arrival of limited numbers of U.S.-supplied *Stinger* and British-supplied *Blowpipe* anti-aircraft missiles. By one estimate, 150 *Stingers* were supplied to the *mujahideen* in late summer 1986 and 600 in early 1987.<sup>7</sup> The *Stingers* initially scored an impressive 80 percent kill ratio, bettering the results of U.S. army field tests. The *Stingers* blunted Soviet air power and air assault commando forces that had been the cutting edge of Soviet counterinsurgency efforts. The *Stingers* forced Soviet warplanes to drop their bombs from higher altitudes, thus with much less accuracy. The U.S.-supplied missiles also forced the Soviets' dreaded Mi-24/25 HIND helicopter gunships to fly at low altitude and at night. By last summer, the Soviets were losing an average of 1.3 to 1.4 aircraft a day. Even after

---

1 The resistance coalition consists of four fundamentalist groups: the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Islamic Party of Mohammed Yunis Khalis and the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan; and three moderate/traditionalist groups: the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement and the Afghanistan National Liberation Front.

2 See Almerigo Grilz, "Afghanistan: The Guerilla Is Changing," *Military Technology*, June 1987.

3 Survey of the Gallup organization's affiliate in Pakistan, cited by *The Washington Times*, December 9, 1987.

4 Statement of Vincent Cannistraro, Department of Defense, Before the Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 25, 1988.

5 *Strategic Survey 1986-1987*, p. 134.

6 Nake Kamrany and Leon Poullada, *The Potential of Afghanistan's Society and Institutions to Resist Soviet Penetration and Domination*, Modeling Research Group, Los Angeles, 1985.

7 *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1987, p. A14.

cutting back their sorties, the Soviet and Afghan air forces lost about 200 aircraft during the year.

The *Stingers* reduced *mujahideen* casualties and hampered the Soviets' ability to interdict supply caravans from sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran. *Stingers* also gave the Afghans an enormous psychological boost, providing tangible proof that the Afghans had significant foreign support and had not been abandoned by the outside world.

**Isolated Outposts.** Invigorated by its *Stingers*, Chinese-supplied rocket launchers, and an improved logistical infrastructure, the *mujahideen* held the battlefield initiative through much of 1987. They compelled the Soviets to withdraw from isolated outposts and overwhelmed several Afghan army garrisons.<sup>8</sup> At the end of the year the *mujahideen* massed around the besieged Afghan army base at Khost. The Soviets responded by launching the largest winter offensive of the war, eventually lifting the siege.

By this, the Soviets also lifted the sagging morale of the Kabul regime. It strengthened the Soviet bargaining position at the impending Geneva talks by confirming that the Soviets still had the upper hand in the fighting. Finally, it forced the *mujahideen* to deplete their war supplies at a time when they should be stockpiling supplies as a safeguard against a one-sided settlement that could deprive them of external assistance.

Further *mujahideen* military gains, however, are possible this year. Newly arrived heavy mortars and mine-clearing equipment will enhance *mujahideen* ability to attack Soviet and Afghan government bases and airfields. These long-awaited supplies give them for the first time a capability to destroy, rather than merely harass, Soviet fortified positions.

## THE SOVIET STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

Moscow now finds that it must pay a growing military price to contain, let alone defeat, the *mujahideen*. Pouring more troops into Afghanistan would strain what is surely an already overburdened Soviet logistical infrastructure dependent on Afghanistan's rudimentary road system.

To win the war in Afghanistan, Moscow has tried to make an end run through Pakistan, which has offered sanctuary to the *mujahideen*. Gorbachev buttonholed Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq at the 1985 Moscow funeral of Konstantine Chernenko and warned of dark consequences if Pakistani "aggression" persisted. Gorbachev then launched an escalating war of nerves against Pakistan. The Soviet press has castigated Pakistan as a "colonial creation." Pakistani separatist and terrorist groups have been armed and trained in base camps inside Afghanistan. The KGB-controlled Afghan secret police, the KHAD, has fomented uprisings among dissident Pushtun tribes straddling the border. Pakistani border towns have suffered increasing numbers of air attacks and cross-border artillery bombardments.

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<sup>8</sup> See: David Isby, "1987: The War Swings in the Afghans' Favor," *Free Afghanistan Report*, January/February 1988.

The KGB, through the KHAD, has orchestrated one of the largest state-sponsored terrorist campaigns ever mounted, assassinating Afghan exiles and planting bombs that have killed Afghans and Pakistanis alike. About 500 people have been killed by terrorist bombs in Pakistan since mid-1987.<sup>9</sup> In addition to signalling the Afghans that they cannot escape communist terror, these terrorist bombings are meant to sap Pakistan's willingness to aid the *mujahideen*. Moscow and Kabul hope to strike a deal with Islamabad over the heads of the Afghans.

**Najib the Bull.** The Soviets have attempted to undermine the political base of support of the *mujahideen* within Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan. In May 1986, the Soviets discarded Babrak Karmal, the quisling puppet whom they had installed in December 1979. They replaced him with the ruthless head of the KHAD, Najib, known as "the Bull." At Soviet prompting he has proclaimed a policy of "national reconciliation," seeking to lure war-weary Afghan political figures into a sham coalition government that the communists control. "The Bull" has made cosmetic changes in the Kabul regime. He has promulgated a new constitution, changed the national flag and has even changed his own name to Najibullah to pay lip service to his Islamic heritage. Yet he has failed to overcome the revulsion of his countrymen; last November his own brother defected to the *mujahideen*.

The backbone of the regime is the KHAD, which Najibullah is trying to expand from 30,000 to 70,000 members. KHAD agents permeate all government bureaucracies. A state within a state, KHAD has its own armed forces, intelligence and covert action organs, and spearheads the extensive "Sovietization" program that seeks to transform Afghan political, economic and cultural life.<sup>10</sup>

**Maintaining Control.** The Soviet strategy for Afghanistan is not solely military; it integrates political, coercive, and diplomatic policies with military control. Although the Soviet Union has been unable to crush the *mujahideen* militarily, it now hopes to defeat them through diplomacy. It seeks a negotiated settlement that would deprive the *mujahideen* of external support while allowing massive Soviet aid to continue to flow to a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. It seeks to end outside support for the resistance while maintaining effective control over the Afghan government and retaining its options to intervene covertly or overtly in the future.

## THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE

Gorbachev's latest peace gambit is a continuation of longstanding Soviet policy regarding Afghanistan — diplomatic initiatives aimed at defusing international criticism, reducing external support for the *mujahideen*, driving wedges between resistance groups, and buying time to crush the resistance. As early as February 1980, less than two months after their invasion, Soviet officials hinted that Moscow was eager to withdraw, but could not do so until "external intervention" had ceased. In the Soviet view the problem was not the Soviet invasion but resistance to the invasion. Soviet diplomacy consistently has attempted to

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<sup>9</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 16, 1988, p.9.

<sup>10</sup> See: Rasul Amin, "The Sovietization of Afghanistan," in Rosanne Klass, *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (New York: Freedom House, 1987).



deflect attention from the Soviet presence, reject the legitimacy of the *mujahideen*, and focus on non-Soviet "intervention" in internal Afghan affairs. The United Nations General Assembly has made it easier for Moscow to do so by refusing to condemn the Soviet Union by name for invading Afghanistan.

Gorbachev escalated the peace campaign in a July 28, 1986, speech at Vladivostok in which he promised to withdraw six Soviet regiments as a gesture of good faith in the U.N. peace process. His announcement came three days before the resumption of the Geneva talks and the "withdrawal" was executed with a flourish in October 1986, shortly before the U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik. The much-heralded event, like a previous "withdrawal" staged before the 1980 Moscow Olympics, turned out to be a propaganda exercise. The units withdrawn, some of which had been introduced into Afghanistan shortly beforehand, were replaced by forces more suitably equipped to fight a guerrilla war.<sup>11</sup>

**Pressuring Pakistan.** Then this February 8, Gorbachev announced a possible start of a Soviet withdrawal on May 15 if a settlement were reached at Geneva by March 15. As previous Soviet peace offensives, the February 8 statement is well timed. By suddenly announcing a date for withdrawal after more than five years of desultory talks at Geneva, Moscow is pressuring Pakistan to accede to the vague wording of the Soviet proposal now on the table. When the March 15 deadline passed without an agreement, Moscow complained about Pakistani and American footdragging.

By fixing the start of proposed withdrawal at May 15, shortly before the next U.S.-Soviet summit, the Kremlin apparently is confident that the State Department, always eager to make "progress" at a summit, and the Reagan Administration, eager to make the summit a success in domestic political terms, will acquiesce to an Afghanistan settlement tailored to Soviet needs.

## THE SOVIET DESIGN FOR A FALSE SETTLEMENT

Although Western diplomats tend to conceive the Geneva talks as a diplomatic "endgame," the Soviets consider the negotiations to be "the first move in the next phase of that continuing game."<sup>12</sup> Moscow is not merely seeking an exit. After all, the Soviet Union could withdraw its troops without an agreement. Instead, the Soviets want the U.S. and Pakistan to help create conditions in which Moscow can withdraw its overt military presence after "winning," while using its covert KGB/KHAD network to retain control over the government left behind. Warns a Western diplomat based in Kabul: "The Soviets want you by diplomatic means to help them stay in Afghanistan... Beware of a kind of Munich."<sup>13</sup>

Above all the Soviets seek an agreement that seals the Pakistani border and thus terminates foreign aid to the *mujahideen*, while leaving Moscow a free hand to bolster the Kabul government with aid and advisors. A cutoff of external aid would undermine the *mujahideen's* political unity and military strength. It would weaken the seven political

11 State Department Special Report No. 155, "Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupation," December 1986, p. 10.

12 Marin Strmecki, "Gorbachev's New Strategy in Afghanistan," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1987, p. 33.

13 Cited by Lally Weymouth, "Tough Talk From Najibullah," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 1988, p. C2.

parties based in Peshawar, Pakistan, that have served as conduits for aid, would increase the political independence of regional field commanders inside Afghanistan and would make it easier for Moscow to win through divide-and-rule tactics.

Najibullah already has appealed by name to eight *mujahideen* field commanders, offering to pull Soviet troops out of their sectors if they agree to a separate peace.<sup>14</sup> Covert KGB/KHAD operations undoubtedly will be mounted to fan the flames of suspicion between rival resistance groups. The February 11, 1988, assassination in Peshawar of Professor S.B. Majrooh, a respected figure who worked tirelessly to promote Afghan unity, may have signalled the start of a campaign of assassinations to decapitate and fracture the resistance.

**"Lebanonizing" Afghanistan.** Moscow presumably is reckoning that a splintered resistance weakened by internal infighting and an aid cutoff would be unable to defeat decisively the Soviet-backed communist regime that controls the city-state of Kabul, but not much else. Moscow may attempt to enhance the survivability of a pro-Soviet "Kabulistan" by replacing Najibullah with an Afghan military figure similar to Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who would head a relatively non-ideological regime that could hope to establish local alliances with dissident *mujahideen* groups. The short-term Soviet goal seems to be the "Lebanonization" of Afghanistan — plunging the country into anarchy by driving wedges between rival resistance groups in an effort to preserve a weak central government.

Moscow meanwhile will continue attempting to integrate northern Afghanistan into a Soviet economic and political sphere. Soviet influence is strongest in the north because the relatively flat terrain is ill-suited for guerilla warfare, a disproportionate number of the 2,000 Afghan children taken each year to the Soviet Union for "education" come from this area and many of the Soviet advisers stationed there are members of the Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups that straddle the border.<sup>15</sup>

**Northern Soviet Security Zone.** The Soviets are grooming a northern militia commander, Sayed Naseem Shah, as a regional leader who may be able to survive even if the Kabul regime collapses. In that event, Moscow may try to construct a northern security zone manned by local militias backed by long-range Soviet artillery and air power. Soviet military forces then could be inserted into Afghanistan covertly to stiffen the spine of pro-Soviet forces. There is a precedent for such a covert intervention: in 1929 Soviet troops disguised as Afghans were deployed to aid King Ammanallah.<sup>16</sup>

## FLAWS IN THE GENEVA DRAFT ACCORD

Since June 1982 indirect peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been held in Geneva under United Nations auspices. These talks have produced a framework for an agreement based on four "instruments": 1) "non-interference" in Afghan and Pakistani internal affairs; 2) international guarantees of the bilateral agreement; 3) the safe and

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<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, December 1, 1987, p. A13.

<sup>15</sup> See: *Afghan News*, Bulletin of Jamiat Islami, September 1, 1987, and Elie Krakowski, "Afghanistan and Soviet Global Interests," in Klass, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> See: Thomas Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 14-18.

honorable return of Afghan refugees; and 4) "interrelationships" specifying the linkage between the first three instruments and Soviet withdrawal.

Nearly five years ago, U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez of Ecuador proclaimed that the draft agreement was "95 percent" complete. Little progress was made after that as Moscow refused to specify a time frame for Soviet withdrawal. This might have been changed by Gorbachev's February 8 offer to begin Soviet withdrawal by May 15, yet it is still too early to tell.

**Ignoring Self-Determination.** The most glaring flaw in the Geneva draft accord is that the Afghan resistance has been barred from the negotiations. Yet if Geneva does not address Afghan concerns, Geneva cannot end the war. The *mujahideen* will continue to fight the Afghan communists during any Soviet withdrawal, just as they fought them before the Soviet invasion. Moscow may use this as a pretext to halt its pullout or to intervene at a future date. If Moscow wants a cease fire during its proposed withdrawal, then it should talk directly to the resistance.

The central issue of Afghan self-determination is ignored in the Geneva draft. In fact, the agreement favors the current communist regime by affording it tacit recognition, denying the *mujahideen* any political status, and ignoring the legitimacy of the resistance. By failing to link Soviet military disengagement to a political settlement, Geneva enables Moscow to retain control of the Afghan government. Moreover, the absence of agreement on a transitional Afghan government gives Moscow the opportunity to play one *mujahideen* group against another. Political, ideological, and personal rivalries long submerged by common hostility to the Soviets will emerge as the Soviets lower their profile.

**Wearing Down the Resistance.** Pakistan's justifiable concern is that by ignoring Afghan self-determination, the Geneva draft would perpetuate the kind of turmoil in Afghanistan that would discourage the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Already, Pakistan's economy and social fabric are strained from hosting almost four million Afghan refugees, with their three million head of livestock. They compete with Pakistanis for scarce water, grazing rights, firewood, and jobs.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan's President Zia, who served as an adviser to the Royal Jordanian Army during the 1970 "Black September" civil war with the Palestine Liberation Organization, is acutely aware that the highly politicized Afghan refugee community could become a volatile destabilizing force within Pakistan, particularly if it sensed a diplomatic sellout.

Another major weakness of the Geneva draft accord is the one-sided prohibition of external assistance. Aid to the *mujahideen* from the West, China, and the Muslim world is slated to stop at the outset of the Soviet Union's withdrawal, no matter how leisurely the pace of the Soviet departure may be. This would give Moscow a chance to wear down the resistance. Moscow, moreover, claims the right to continue to aid Afghan communists even after a withdrawal. This puts the *mujahideen* at a disadvantage and partially negates their hard-won gains on the battlefield.

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<sup>17</sup> See: Tom Rogers, "Afghan Refugees and the Stability of Pakistan," *Survival*, September-October 1987.

A Pentagon study concludes that the Soviets could withdraw within 30 to 40 days, based strictly on logistical considerations. The Geneva proposals assume that Moscow would withdraw within three to four months. Yet the Soviets demand nine months for their pullout, enough time to batter the *mujahideen*, deplete their supply stockpiles, and provoke friction between rival *mujahideen* groups by selectively attacking certain groups and offering others a tacit cease fire. The KHAD, which is believed to have penetrated some resistance groups, would have ample time to find and destroy secret arms caches.

**Elastic View of Self-Defense.** Although Soviet officials have promised to fight only in self-defense and to front-load the pullout by recalling half of its forces in the first three months, such pledges are of questionable value. The Soviet Union has taken an extremely elastic view of self-defense, as the devastating attack on Korean airliner KAL 007 confirmed. Furthermore most of the Soviet offensive operations are performed by the airborne, air assault, and *spetsnaz* (special forces), who comprise less than 20 percent of the Soviet occupation force.<sup>18</sup> Such units might also be assisted by air and commando units stationed on the Soviet side of the border.

To make matters worse, the Geneva accords are vague on whether Soviet military and political advisors can remain in Afghanistan. The "second army," the 9,000 strong contingent of Soviet and East Bloc advisers that currently dominates the Afghan government, is an important lever of control that cannot be permitted to remain. It also is suspected that the giant military infrastructure that the Soviets have established would be turned over to the Kabul regime and would not be dismantled. Left unanswered too are such important issues as the return of Afghan children taken to the Soviet Union and the payment of war reparations. A particularly important question is the status of the more than 300 treaties that Moscow has signed with Kabul. If allowed to stand, the Soviets would have a "legal" pretext to remain involved at the "request" of the communist regime.

**False Withdrawals.** Any Afghan peace settlement must have strong and effective verification provisions. After all Moscow already has staged two false withdrawals. The Soviets could disguise their annual May rotation of troops, which normally involves one-fourth to one-third of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, as the beginning of a pullout. Yet as soon as the world's attention strayed and the U.S. was distracted by its presidential election campaign, Moscow could halt the withdrawal and continue the war more covertly, assuming that Washington would lack the will to respond to violations of the agreement, just as it failed to respond to violations in Laos and Vietnam. Moscow already seems to have prepared to undermine the accords. In fact there are reports that Soviet personnel of Central Asian descent operate within the Afghan armed forces in Afghan uniforms.<sup>19</sup> This indicates that the Soviets will seek to maintain a covert military presence after a "withdrawal." The Geneva draft agreement reportedly provides for only 50 observers to verify Soviet compliance. This is far too few — and they probably will have far too limited powers.

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18 Statement of Alexander Alexiev before the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, February 18, 1988.

19 Statement of Rosanne Klass before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 17, 1988.

## UNITED STATES POLICY

The U.S. must not be stampeded into a quick fix solution that allows Moscow to prop up the Kabul regime while weakening the *mujahideen*. The Soviet Union was wrong when it invaded in 1979 and its occupation remains unacceptable today. It should not be allowed to extract strategic advantages in return for vague promises to reduce its illegitimate presence.

Washington probably must help the Soviet Union leave Afghanistan, but should do so only in a manner that: 1) ends the fighting 2) insures that the Soviets do not return at a later date and 3) insures that the *mujahideen* are not left vulnerable to attack if a negotiated settlement unravels.

A genuine settlement must:

### Assure Afghan Self-Determination

There can be no true peace in Afghanistan until the puppet communist government is replaced by a legitimate government enjoying popular support. The central issue of Afghan self-determination must be explicitly guaranteed through the formation of an interim government that will hold elections. The KGB/KHAD coercive apparatus must be dismantled.

Warns *mujahideen* leader Abdul Haq: "What is important is not that the Soviets leave but what they leave behind."<sup>20</sup> It is for this reason that Pakistan, seeking a settlement that will encourage Afghan refugees to return home, is demanding a neutral transitional government to prepare for elections to determine Afghanistan's future. Washington should support Pakistan's demand and not press the Pakistanis to bend. Although some State Department officials argue that "We would not want to miss the bus,"<sup>21</sup> it would be preferable to wait for the next "bus" rather than to board one that denied seats to the Afghan refugees. Too often State Department professionals care only about getting on "the bus" and care little about what kind of "bus" it is or where it is heading.

### Maintain U.S. Aid

U.S. military aid has been provided to help Afghans resist Soviet occupation and should continue until that occupation has ended. To abandon the *mujahideen* before a total Soviet withdrawal would repudiate the Reagan Doctrine and abandon a victim of direct Soviet aggression. A premature aid cutoff would weaken the resistance, leave it vulnerable to Soviet attack and give Afghan communists the opportunity to split and outlast a divided, demoralized resistance. Once Pakistan shuts the aid pipeline, it will be difficult to reopen. Not only will the *mujahideen* harbor resentment toward Pakistan, but the Pakistani opposition will serve as a brake on Islamabad's willingness to assuming risks on behalf of the Afghans.

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20 *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 18, 1988, p.10.

21 *The New York Times*, February 24, 1988, p. A14.

U.S. military aid should phase down only in direct proportion to the withdrawal rate of Soviet troops. This will give the Soviets an incentive to accelerate their departure rather than stretch it out to consolidate the power of the Kabul regime. U.S. humanitarian aid must continue unabated to help the Afghans rebuild their shattered lives and nation. Although Moscow will drag its feet before accepting a settlement that includes continued U.S. aid, it eventually will relent when it realizes the alternative is an increase in U.S. military aid to the *mujahideen*.

### **Require Rapid and Total Soviet Withdrawal**

The U.S. negotiated at Geneva on the assumption that a Soviet withdrawal would take two to three months. Pakistan has indicated it would accept a nine-month timetable if the Kabul regime is replaced by a transitional government. Moscow rejects the transitional government but still wants nine months to depart. Washington should back Pakistan. If Moscow continues to balk on the transition government, then the U.S. should demand the three-month timetable.

Regardless of the timetable, the withdrawal should be front-end loaded in terms of equipment and troops. Powerful helicopter gunships, ground attack aircraft, and other strike weapons should be withdrawn early in the schedule. Withdrawal, moreover, must include all Soviet civilian and military advisors, not just Soviet troops. Soviet bases should be dismantled and prohibited by treaty. The number of treaty verification observers should be greatly increased. Equally important, the U.S. should specify that violations of the accord would result in rapid restoration of U.S. military aid to the resistance.

### **Abrogate One-Sided Treaties**

Moscow has signed more than 300 treaties with its Kabul clients that codify Soviet domination. The 1978 Friendship Treaty was invoked by the Soviets to justify their invasion. Moscow also is suspected of concluding a secret treaty under which Kabul ceded to the Soviet Union the Wakhan Corridor in the northeast. If such treaties are allowed to stand, the Soviets will have a pretext to remain involved in Afghan affairs or even to re-intervene at the "request" of the communist regime. All previously concluded Soviet-Afghan treaties should be declared null and void.

### **Require Soviet War Reparations**

Should the Soviet Union withdraw from Afghanistan tomorrow, the Afghans will suffer the devastating consequences of the Soviet invasion for decades to come. Moscow should be required to pay war reparations to be determined by an impartial international commission. The thousands of Afghan children transported to the Soviet Union, moreover, should be repatriated.

All that the Soviet Union should gain from its Afghan adventure is safe passage for its troops and Afghan surrogates, and guarantees of a neutral Afghanistan free of foreign bases.

## Ensure Freedom of Choice for Soviet POWs

Some 200 captured Soviet soldiers are being held as prisoners of war by the *mujahideen*. Up to 50 more have defected and joined the *mujahideen* to fight against the Soviet army. Repatriated Soviet POWs from other wars faced harsh punishments or execution when they returned home. There is no reason to believe today's POWs would fare differently. Those POWs and defectors who do not want to return to the Soviet Union must not be compelled to do so. Some State Department officials, however, are believed to be ready to press the *mujahideen* to force the Soviet POWs to return to the USSR.



To attain the above goals, Washington must coordinate its policies with Pakistan, which has made tremendous sacrifices on behalf of the Afghans. Close Pakistani-American relations are the strongest guarantee against the creation of a Soviet satellite regime in Afghanistan.

## CONCLUSION

After years of obstructing a negotiated settlement the Soviet Union suddenly wants to wrap up the Geneva peace talks in a rush. Moscow is pressuring Pakistan to agree to a one-sided deal, replete with loopholes, that would undermine the *mujahideen* by weakening their military strength and eroding their political unity. Pakistan is holding out for a neutral transitional government that would end the fighting, not just make it easier for Moscow to cut its losses while assuring it control over Kabul.

**Sacrificing Too Much.** The U.S. should stand by its friends, not pressure them into a false settlement. The *mujahideen* and Pakistan have sacrificed far too much to be shunted aside in a short-sighted rush to an Afghanistan peace in time for the May superpower summit. Ronald Reagan should continue to honor his public commitments to aid the Afghans until a total Soviet withdrawal is completed and Afghan self-determination is assured.

If the Soviets resist a genuine settlement then pressure should be increased, not relaxed. Gorbachev's celebrated "new thinking" on Afghanistan was prompted by Afghan *mujahideen* steadfastness and American *Stingers*, not diplomatic niceties. If the Soviets prolong their brutal occupation then more *Stingers* will be needed to prompt "newer thinking."

James A. Phillips  
Senior Policy Analyst

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