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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1988

Dear Senator Byrd:

It was good to talk recently with you about my determination to help the Afghan Mujahidin achieve rapid, complete and irreversible withdrawal of Soviet troops and freedom for the Afghan people. This was the same position I expressed forcefully to General Secretary Gorbachev during the Summit here in December and which Secretary Shultz spelled out in greater detail during talks late last month with the General Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

In view of your statement on Afghanistan before the Senate last week, I would like to bring some points to your attention which deal with the concerns you have expressed.

Since 1985, we have indicated our conditional willingness to serve as a guarantor if a satisfactory settlement was reached. Our objectives have been: prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces; restoration of Afghanistan to an independent and nonaligned status; self-determination for the Afghans; and return of refugees in safety and honor. These are the same basic points contained in the resolutions adopted overwhelmingly by eight successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. I have emphasized these points and our support for the brave Afghan Mujahidin in my meetings with Yunis Khalis in November and General Secretary Gorbachev last December.

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We have told the Soviets that to be credible for the United States, the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance and the entire free world, their withdrawal must be front-loaded (i.e. fifty-percent (50%) out within first three months), must actually begin to take troops out on the first day an agreement enters into force, and must be irreversible. If this occurs, we are confident of being able to detect and verify by our own national means whether the Soviets are acting in good faith. If not, any commitment by the United States would be off.

We have also told General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in recent months that any commitment to guarantee the Geneva instruments must be symmetrical, i.e., cessation of military or other aid to the Resistance must be matched by a cessation of similar aid to the regime in Kabul. We are confident that the above conditions, combined with the steadily increasing quantity, quality and sophistication of military equipment for the Resistance will enable them to deal effectively with military problems they might face. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee was briefed in detail on March 3 about current and programmed support from various sources for the Resistance. Contrary to erroneous reports, there have been no decisions to reduce or suspend military support and the overall rate of delivery continues to increase, although there has never been a steady, even rate of delivery from week to week and month to month. The enhanced support which the Resistance will receive over these several months, plus that already on hand, will actually strengthen rather than weaken their position vis-a-vis the remaining Soviet forces and the weak armed forces of the Najibullah regime. We, of course, wish to see that regime relinquish political power as soon as possible and be replaced by a regime which represents the vast majority rather than a small minority of the Afghan people.

Looking ahead, the Administration and Congress must be prepared to assist Pakistan, the Afghan refugees and whatever new, non-Communist government emerges in Kabul. The problems of refugee return and relief, plus reconstruction of wartime damage, will be demanding ones and will require broad international assistance. However, we must continue our own outstanding leadership role and set an example for others to follow.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Majority Leader of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Name	Date
ROWENA FITCHON	3/30/88

approval by K. Ladd 3-29-88

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1988

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R on". The "R" is large and stylized, with a long tail that loops back. The "on" is written in a cursive, lowercase style.

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Majority Leader of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The President has seen

3/11/88

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Add-on 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1988 MAR 10 AM 10

March 10, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 

SUBJECT: Your Response to Senator Byrd on Afghanistan

Issue

Whether to sign the letter to Senator Byrd. =

Fact

Senator Byrd has written to you recently regarding his concerns on Afghanistan issues.

Discussion

Last week you met with Senator Byrd and discussed Afghanistan. Since then the Senate passed a Resolution on February 29 by a vote of 77-0. Attached at TAB A is a detailed response to the issues which the Senator raised with you in the Oval Office and on the Senate floor. Office of Legislative Affairs concurs.

Recommendation

OK NO
 _____

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Byrd.

Attachments:

- TAB A Your Letter to Senator Byrd
- TAB B Incoming Letter from Senator Byrd dated February 25, 1988

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 4, 1988

**Natl Sec Advisor
has seen**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM:

ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RSO*

SUBJECT:

Response to Senator Byrd on Afghanistan

The President answered in person Senator Byrd's queries (TAB B) on a cutoff of aid to the Mujahidin. As a follow-up, I believe a letter from the President will help in view of the Senate resolution on Afghanistan which passed 77-0 (TAB II). Dissemination of the President's views is necessary given the disinformation going around about a "sellout" of the Mujahidin.

John
Fortier and Ledsky concur.
S.T.K. for
(see earlier note)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to The President at TAB I.

Approve *✓*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Your Memorandum to the President

TAB A The President's Letter to Senator Byrd

TAB B Senator Byrd's Letter to The President
dated February 25, 1988

TAB II Copy of Congressional Record (February 29, 1988)
(PP 1588 - 1608)

Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

February 25, 1988

The President
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am cautiously optimistic that recent statements by Mr. Gorbachev and his associates in the Soviet leadership concerning their intentions to terminate their occupation of Afghanistan will be implemented in practice. It would be an historic victory for the courageous and tenacious Afghan people, and we can be proud that we played some role in assisting them in their fight. Nevertheless, I have been disturbed by recent reports that indicate our aid program and political support for the Mujahadeen may be subject to some pressure in order to accommodate a Soviet settlement of their occupation on terms which might have the unintended effect of facilitating a continued Soviet presence or role in Afghanistan's future.


I believe that we should not adopt any policies which tend to reward the Soviet Union for terminating their outrageous occupation and behavior in Afghanistan over the last decade. I strongly support the uninterrupted continuation of our aid program and it should not be in any way restricted until it is clear that Soviet forces and advisors are essentially out of the country, that they show no signs of a quick redeployment, and that the Mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to elections.

In addition, I believe it is critical to continue to provide our strong support to the government of Pakistan during the upcoming round of Geneva negotiations, and there should be no pressure to make concessions to the Soviets or their puppet government in Kabul. We must be prepared for the Soviets to blame us and the Pakistanis for holding up their withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the solution is one of necessity for them, not of generosity. They should simply remove themselves as expeditiously as possible.

The President
Feb. 25, 1988
Page 2

I want to assure you of my full support for the continuation of our aid program to the Mujahadeen and support for the position of Pakistan during the critical period ahead.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert C. Byrd". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Robert C. Byrd

Vol. 134

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1988

No. 21

Congressional Record



United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE *100th* CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

United States
Government
Printing Office

SUPERINTENDENT
OF DOCUMENTS
Washington, DC 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Penalty for private use, \$300

SECOND CLASS NEWSPAPER

Postage and Fees Paid
U.S. Government Printing Office
(USPS 087-390)

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Gloucester County, the Still family has made impressive contributions to society in the fields of politics, business, social reform, athletics, and medicine. William Still, a businessman from Philadelphia, is known as the "Father of the Underground Railroad." He was responsible for the desegregation of Philadelphia's streetcars and for the appointment of the city's first black police officers. His brother, James, practiced herbal medicine during the late 1800's, and despite his lack of a medical degree, he often found cures that licensed doctors could not. James' son, James, Jr. was the second black American to graduate from Harvard's Medical School in 1871. Another member of the Still family, Ephraim Still, was the founder and first mayor of Lawnside, N.J.

The Still family has always been close-knit, even in the face of slavery. Peter Still, who was separated from his mother at the age of 6, spent more than 40 years in slavery, and only late in life was reunited with his mother and siblings. Hundreds of family members continue to live in south Jersey; others are spread throughout the United States. But their proud heritage is kept alive during the family reunions, they hold each summer.

The current generation of Stills are no less outstanding. Today, Art Still plays football for the Kansas City Chiefs; his sister, Valerie, plays basketball and holds the career scoring record at the University of Kentucky.

The division of civil rights of New Jersey's Department of Law and Public Safety has planned a program of events today to pay tribute to the Stills and their outstanding legacy. I am proud to join in this celebration to honor a great American family.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS UNTIL 12 NOON

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 12 noon today.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 11:39 a.m., recessed until 12 noon; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. SHELBY).

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, even though the resolution on Afghanistan has not yet been submitted, that the 6 hours in the agreement begin running as of 12 noon in accordance with that agreement.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Missouri has some morning business, and I ask that he be allowed to conduct that morning business at this time, though it is on another subject.

I ask unanimous consent that there be 5 minutes for morning business at this time, that it come out of the 6 hours, and that the distinguished Senator from Missouri be allowed to speak out of order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his kindness and his assistance.

(The remarks of Mr. BOND, pertaining to the introduction of legislation, will be found later in today's RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESSES

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, first, by way of explanation, the resolution which was to have been introduced at noon is still undergoing some possible modifications. Rather than keep the Senate in on a quorum, I feel that it might be better if the Senate recessed until 1 p.m. today so as to allow these modifications to be resolved.

I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 1 p.m. today, and that the time consumed in the recess be charged equally against both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Thereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Senate recessed until 1 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. DASCHLE).

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I think that we are making progress in the modification of some of the verbiage of the resolution and I would expect shortly to have that cleared.

I ask unanimous consent that the recess be extended for 20 minutes, the

time to be equally divided between both sides.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 1 p.m., recessed until 1:20 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. DASCHLE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair in his capacity as a Senator from South Dakota suggests the absence of a quorum. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I now have the resolution, which I send to the desk in behalf of myself, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. PELL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. DeCONCINI, Mr. SYMS, and Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent that any other Senators who wish to add their names as cosponsors may do so during the afternoon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I send to the desk the resolution which was referred to in the agreement that was entered on Friday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 386) regarding the policy toward Afghanistan and Soviet troop withdrawal.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. Res. 386

Whereas the Soviet Union invaded the sovereign territory of Afghanistan on December 17, 1979, and continues to occupy and attempt to subjugate that nation through the use of force, relying upon a puppet regime and an occupying army of an estimated 120,000 Soviet troops.

Whereas Pakistan has harbored more than 3 million Afghan refugees and has endured hundreds of brutal raids across its borders by Afghan and Soviet aircraft and artillery, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians;

Whereas on February 8, 1988, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could begin on May 15, 1988 if the agreements on the settlement being negotiated between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva were signed no later than March 15, 1988;

Whereas General Secretary Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union could complete the troop withdrawal within 10 months and that it could arrange the withdrawal such that during the first phase, a relatively greater portion of the Soviet contingent could be withdrawn;

Whereas Pakistan has made it clear that it will not sign any agreements with the cur-

rent Soviet puppet regime headed by Najibullah;

Whereas the Congress condemned Soviet policy toward and behavior in Afghanistan in Public Law 99-209, calling for appropriate provision of material support to the people of Afghanistan, so long as the Soviet military occupation continues; and

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a time frame based solely on logistical criteria;

Therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate hereby—

(1) reiterate its belief that the only acceptable formula for settlement of the Afghan situation is one which provides for the self-determination of the Afghan people and results in a government genuinely representative of the Afghan people, outlines a definite timetable based solely on logistical criteria for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future, and provides for the return of refugees in safety and dignity;

(2) expresses its belief that the Pakistani government should not be put under any pressure to agree to Soviet terms for a settlement and that the future of Afghanistan should not be driven by the desire or schedule for a U.S.-Soviet summit;

(3) urges the President to—

(a) support strongly a political solution in Kabul acceptable to the resistance;

(b) insist in talks with the Soviet Union that all Soviet advisers be removed from Afghanistan at the same time as Soviet troop withdrawal takes place;

(c) address the issue of the future status of the nearly 400 bilateral treaties the Soviets have made with the puppet Kabul regime;

(d) address with the Soviets the deployment of Soviet troops across the Soviet-Afghan border after the completion of the withdrawal period;

(e) stand firm on the necessity for the Soviets to terminate all forms of military assistance and logistical support to the Kabul regime;

(f) address the repatriation by the Soviet Union of the more than 10,000 Afghan children who have been forcibly deported to the Soviet Union; and

(g) ensure that international assistance to the refugees continues at least until all Soviet and Soviet bloc forces have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and peace has been restored;

(4) expresses its belief that all Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers must be removed from Afghanistan during the period of troop withdrawal;

(5) expresses its support for increased U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people both during and following the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet bloc forces from Afghanistan;

(6) expresses its support for a U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping force to help guarantee that Soviet forces can withdraw in an orderly way without being attacked on the way out and to help keep the peace in the major cities while an interim government organizes the nation's future; and

(7) expresses its strong belief that the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujahadeen is well

enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on February 8 Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union could begin withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan on May 15 if Pakistan and Afghanistan reach agreement by March 15 at the upcoming round of UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva. Mr. Gorbachev also said that withdrawal could be completed in 10 months. That is a long time, Mr. President. I cannot understand why it takes 10 months to get out of Afghanistan.

Last weekend Secretary Shultz went to Moscow to discuss details of the Soviet plan for withdrawal. Secretary Shultz came away from those meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and said he did not have the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union has decided it wants to leave Afghanistan. I must say I am not as optimistic as Secretary Shultz appeared to be. I have a feeling that Secretary Shultz is right, that the Soviet Union has probably decided that it wants to extricate its military forces from Afghanistan. But, even if the Soviets have decided they do want to get out, the important question now is: Under what terms and conditions?

I reiterate what I said in this Chamber several days ago. The United States did not create the mess, and it is not our responsibility, in any way, to reward or appear to be rewarding the Soviets for getting out of Afghanistan.

Moreover, I think it is vitally important for the Senate to go on record with a statement of policy about Afghanistan and the prospect of Soviet withdrawal. To that end, then, I am submitting a resolution which outlines the Senate's viewpoint toward Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is not the role of this Senate nor the responsibility of the Senate nor within the power of the Senate to micromanage Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Far be it from our thoughts. Nor can this Senate micromanage the administration's role in such a withdrawal. But this Senate can go on record, Mr. President. That is the purpose of this resolution; it is to put the Senate on record with the Senate's viewpoint strongly made in regard to such a withdrawal, if it occurs; and certainly the Senate's viewpoint as to where this country's honor lies in contributing to such a withdrawal.

There have been a lot of stories floating around recently, some of which have been somewhat puzzling and disconcerting, in regard to certain agreements that reportedly have been or may be made or may be signed. From the newspaper reports that I have read, and I have not read them all but I have read a few, I have been puzzled and concerned; concerned that the United States may agree to guarantee something that we cannot guarantee; concerned that the United

States may be about to agree to withdraw military assistance from the mujahadeen before the Soviets get out of Afghanistan and at a time when the mujahadeen, indeed, require further military aid in order to protect themselves in the process.

There are two things which this resolution emphasizes: support for the Government of Pakistan and the need to address a multitude of issues surrounding the withdrawal which have yet to be resolved; secondly, this resolution emphasizes—clearly, I might add—that the United States should not terminate military assistance to the Afghan resistance until the Soviets have indeed terminated their military occupation of Afghanistan.

They ought to get out. And their getting out should be for real and irreversible, not just based upon some flimsy assurances of good intent, that they are not redeploying their forces only to be injected again into Afghanistan, and that the mujahadeen is well enough equipped with arms to maintain its integrity as an effective fighting force during and throughout the delicate period of transition.

I believe these conditions are critical to a successful conclusion of the Afghanistan problem. We must be prepared for the Soviets to blame us and the Pakistanis for holding up their withdrawal from Afghanistan. But withdrawal is an option that the Soviets can exercise at this time or at any time.

We all want to see the Soviets get out of Afghanistan. When they went into Afghanistan, when they invaded Afghanistan, in December of 1979, they chose the option. They did not ask anybody else's opinion. They simply invaded.

And when they invaded Afghanistan in that instance, I called President Carter—I was majority leader of the Senate at that time—I called President Carter and asked to see him. I went to the White House and I said to the President, "Mr. President, the Senate cannot produce a supermajority of the approval of the ratification of the SALT II treaty. We do not have the votes, and we will not have the votes to approve that treaty in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So, Mr. President, it would be unwise to call up the treaty for floor debate, and it would be an act of futility."

The President agreed.

If the President had said, "Go ahead and call it up," I would not have done it. It was felt by both of us that it would be best for the President to make that announcement in view of the fact that he is the chief spokesman on the foreign policy of the United States. And so the President made the announcement.

It had more of an impact coming from the President of the United States. I wanted him to know that the Senate would not approve that treaty in the light of the Soviet invasion. The

President agreed with that view. He may well have reached that viewpoint without my advice, but I believe that Mr. Carter, the then President, the then occupant of the White House, as the leader of the Senate and leader of his party in the Senate, felt that I knew what I was talking about, and could well reflect the prospects for Senate approval of that treaty.

So it was a serious, very serious, matter. The Soviet invasion put the Salt II treaty into a cocked hat. Not a chance. Dead. The Soviet invasion sealed the treaty's doom. They did not ask our opinion about invading Afghanistan, and they certainly have the option to withdraw forthwith. They do not need the United States' approval to get out of Afghanistan. Getting out would not be an act of goodwill or altruism on the part of the Soviets. Soviet withdrawal is an option they can exercise at any time. We should not make it convenient for the Soviets to quit Afghanistan wrapped in clouds of glory or allow them to dictate the terms of their withdrawal. Their brutal occupation has not been honorable. Their defeat should not be rewarded. They should simply get out.

The world is too much with us, Mr. President. It is too easy to forget the atrocities that have been committed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They have driven millions of Afghans from their homes and from their country. They have installed a puppet government in Afghanistan, one that does the bidding of the Soviet Union. They have killed and they have maimed millions of Afghans.

We have heard it said on the Senate floor today that over a million Afghans have died as a result of the Soviet invasion, over a million out of a total population of what was earlier 15 million.

Unfortunately, we have not seen enough of what really went on in Afghanistan. When the United States was in Vietnam, the television cameras were there. The Soviets have not dared let television cameras follow the atrocities, the fighting, in Afghanistan. There have been a few brave souls who have gone into Afghanistan, taking their cameras, and we have seen on the evening news and on other news broadcasts some of the fighting that was going on in Afghanistan. I compliment the news organizations for what they have been able to do under the circumstances. They have had to go in by stealth, slip in and slip out in order to get limited news pictures and stories that we have been exposed to in the course of these 8 years.

The Soviets kept a close curtain down on what was going on. They did not dare let the world see what was happening. They did not want the world to see what was happening. But the world saw enough in the few glimpses that we were permitted to see—not permitted by the Soviets but permitted to see by virtue of the resourcefulness and the courage on the

part of news organizations that were able to get a little glimpse of what was going on.

I must say that I was disappointed after Mr. Gorbachev's visit to this country. The American people seemed to hold Mr. Gorbachev almost as high as they did the President of their own country, this country. It was a great PR trick, opening the door of the armored car and stepping out on the street and shaking hands with some Americans who were on the street. I thought some of those Americans who shook hands were about to swoon, they were so overcome. They were ecstatic.

American politicians do that every day. Get out of automobiles, stop and shake hands with people on the streets. The President shakes hands with people every day. That is a common thing in this country.

But for the Soviet leader, this new-style leader of the Soviet Union, to do that just swept the American people off their feet, one might say. What a big deal that was, that the Soviet leader would get out and shake hands with some Americans standing along the streets patrolled by American policemen and with heavy guards all around.

But, Mr. President, there was something else that I saw on television. Not only did I see the Soviet leader get out of his car and reach out to the crowds that were gathered on the streets, not only did I see him reach out and grab the hands and pump the hands of the American people who stood there, but I saw something else.

I saw some Afghan children, some on crutches, with one foot, who came to present the Soviet leader with flowers. Those Afghan children did not succeed in presenting their flowers to the Soviet leader. They were not allowed to get to him.

For one reason or another, I do not know, they were not allowed to see him and present their flowers. But which of the two pictures will be etched upon the memories of the American people longer? Apparently it will be the picture of the Soviet leader reaching out to the crowds with his hands, the great PR trick. We American politicians all do that.

Mr. President, the picture of those crippled Afghan children should be the picture remembered longest by Americans and by people all over the world. Never mind the new style leadership. Never mind that. Remember what Lenin said: "We shall destroy everything, and on its ruins we shall build our temple." Is there any evidence that the new style Soviet leadership has repudiated the lessons, the teachings of Lenin? None.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, will the leader yield for a question?

Mr. BYRD. Yes, I yield.

Mr. SYMMS. Before I pose my question, I compliment the leader for the insightfulness of the point he is making. I was literally shocked when I

got to Pakistan, because I was not aware that the Soviet Union is running a state-supported terrorist operation against the civilian population of Pakistan. I would venture to say that 99.9 percent of the American people and 90 percent probably of the Members of Congress and the American Government are not aware of it.

It is not something that gets printed in the papers on a daily basis or reported on the nightly news in the United States. It occasionally gets a little glimmer here and there. But today the Soviet Union has between 1,000 and 2,000 KGB operatives working in Kabul doing nothing but training people to take bombs back into Pakistan to set them at places where people are gathered together, bus stops, shopping centers, schools, other places, and exploding these bombs.

Last year 1,000 Pakistan civilians were either killed or wounded—I think it was about a fourth of them were killed and three-fourths of them were injured—in those accidents.

This is the so-called same Soviet Union that their Trojan horse leader now comes over and wows the American people that they have a new method. I think the majority leader is making a point here in the Senate that is very important. He holds a very important position in our legislature as the leader of the Senate. I hope the remarks the majority leader just made would be carried from one end of this country to the other because I think it is significant.

The question I ask is, How many people who are polled on the streets or who make these comments like in West Germany where people think that Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev is more of a man of peace than is President Reagan, how many of those people in Western Europe and in the United States are aware that the Soviet Union runs State-supported terrorist operations as a matter of course, the typical way they do business? How many people does the Senator think know that out there in the United States?

Mr. BYRD. I do not think a great many people in the United States know that. I think perhaps the people of Europe are better aware of it than are our own people.

Mr. SYMMS. If I could, if the leader will yield further, I would like to tell him an experience I had. I made the statement in my State, and of course the young reporter doubted the validity of it so he called the U.S. State Department. I do not have the name of the person at the U.S. State Department who answered the phone, but he got someone from the U.S. State Department in Washington, DC, to give him a quote that he ran widely in the newspapers in Idaho which said that the U.S. State Department was not aware of any State-supported terrorist operation going on in Kabul.

I was briefed on this by our people in Pakistan. I asked them if it was classified or if it was something that could be talked about at home or on the Senate floor. They said, "We wish, for heaven's sake, you would talk about it on the Senate floor." The only thing that is classified is the number of KGB agents. That is why I gave the wide range. The rest of it is totally public, and in fact our station chief in Pakistan said it would be doing a great service to his duties and the furtherance of freedom and foreign policy of the United States if somehow the American people were aware that the Soviet Union is running a State-supported terrorist operation in Pakistan. It is significant in terms of the INF Treaty.

I compliment the majority leader for his comments on SALT II and the relationship of linking the SALT II Treaty with the invasion of Afghanistan. I wish that this administration would ask for the same linkage before we ratify the INF Treaty.

I do not expect that that will happen, but I wish that is what they would do. I would recommend they tie that to a Soviet exit of Afghanistan.

I thank the leader for yielding and I appreciate his leadership, again I say, in bringing this before the Senate.

My request of the Senator would be that we get clarified who Mr. Peck is speaking for when he says "we," because I find it difficult to think that that is the position of the U.S. Government. If it is, I think, as Patrick Henry said, no matter how bad the truth is, I want the bitter, unvarnished truth so we know where we are and what the situation is. I think we in the Senate are entitled to know just exactly what the position of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and the entire State Department is because I came back from Pakistan greatly encouraged by the quality of leadership of our ambassador and his entire in-country team and their dedication to what I think in a bipartisan sense this Senate would be proud to have as a foreign policy of the United States in a very troubled part of the world.

I thank the leader.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator has made reference to terrorist activities on the part of the Soviets.

Mr. SYMMS. Yes, that is right, killing and maiming innocent civilians by putting a bomb in a suitcase and setting it off so they terrorize the civilian population, so that they are frightened and terrorized in their support of the freedom fighters. It is a way to send a message to them that if they would not support the freedom fighters, who are opposing the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan, then we would not be forced to do this to you. It is a new kind of warfare which is very dangerous and damaging to the future of security and peace in the world if we accept and tolerate it as a way to carry on war. It will leave no

place in the world safe for people to gather.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, it is not a new method of doing things in the Soviet Union. Terrorism is not something that is new in the Soviet Union. We need only remember the order that was given by Lenin to kill the czar.

The Tsar, his wife, their daughters, and their son were all wiped out in one stroke of terror while being held under close arrest. Not only that, but the Tsarevich's physician, the valet, the cook, and the maidservant were also executed—all shot together, with the exception of the maidservant and one of the daughters who were clubbed and bayoneted to death. Eleven of them, in all, while being held under close arrest in the Ipatiev house at Ekaterinburg. Let me read from "The Life and Death of Lenin," page 481. This is by Robert Payne, published by Simon and Shuster in New York, copyright 1964. Speaking of terrorism:

It was never a question of shooting one man in ten, as a warning to the remaining nine. He must shoot five, or six, or seven, and go on until there are only the shreds of a man left. He practiced terror like the Romans. When the Emperor Gallienus cried out, "Tear, kill, exterminate!—Lacera, occide, concide!" he was saying no more than Lenin, who spoke of destroying "immediately, mercilessly, at whatever the cost, absolutely and irrevocably."

Lenin—continuing the quote from the book—Zinoviev: to June 1918. I will just extract a portion of his communication to Zinoviev:

It is necessary to cultivate the mass nature of the terror against counterrevolutionaries and push it forward with even greater energy, especially in Petrograd, whose example is decisive. Greetings! Lenin.

Then Lenin to Eugene Bosh, August 1918:

Your telegram received. It is necessary to organize an intensive guard of picked reliable men to conduct a merciless mass terror against kulaks, priests and White Guards;

Another communication from Lenin to the Soviet of Nizhni Novgorod, August 1918:

An open uprising of White Guards is clearly in preparation in Nizhni Novgorod. You must mobilize all forces, establish a triumvirate of dictators, introduce immediately mass terror, shoot and deport hundreds of prostitutes who ply soldiers and officers with vodka. Do not hesitate for a moment.

For Lenin, says the author, " . . . mass terror was the most useful and therefore the most desirable of weapons."

"Lenin gloried in violence."

"In principle we have never renounced, and cannot renounce terrorism," Lenin wrote in *Iskra* in 1901.

Further quoting from the book, "The Life and Death of Lenin."

Terror was to become the chief instrument of state power; and Lenin discovered to his surprise that terror was so formidable an instrument that no others were necessary.

Mr. President, I have seen no evidence that the teachings of Lenin

have been repudiated by the new leadership in the Kremlin.

Mr. President, I try to be as reasonable as I can be. But I also try to be as realistic as I can be.

The Soviet leadership has a problem on its hands. It has a new leader and he recognizes the economic problems, the agriculture problem, the problem with the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. He is trying to do something about it. He needs to do something about it. He recognizes that, not out of any act of good will toward the United States or toward the rest of the world, but he sees that dealing with this problem in an effective way is an absolute imperative for the Soviet Union and its people. I do not doubt that he seeks change in some things to bring about a better economic order in the Soviet Union. But let us not mistake for a moment that it means that the Soviet Communist Party has changed in its goals or objectives.

I say we ought to work with the leaders in the Soviet Union and always be ready to take advantage of any opportunities that are in our own good interests. I do not say we should turn the back of our hand to any opportunity to improve relations but always that we should keep in our mind's eye the history of what has gone on before, and keep in our mind's eye, and right up front, the fact that it is still the Soviet Communist State and still a "dictatorship of the proletariat," a dictatorship by a small group within the Soviet Union that makes the decisions. The decisions are not made by the people of the Soviet Union. The decisions are made by a small clique of individuals who did not have to run for office like Senators have to run for office.

We Senators are elected to a 6-year term. Members of the House have a 2-year term. The Soviet leaders in the Central Committee and the Politburo are not elected by the Soviet people or for a given term. The decisions are made by a small group of individuals who meet in secret and who make the decisions, and they do not publicize all their decisions to the world.

And we ought not take at full value everything that we think we see or hear from the leaders of that system. It is still the same system, and Lenin has never been repudiated. His teachings have never been repudiated. His goals have never been repudiated, that I know about.

One may say, "Well, what does that have to do with the Soviets getting out of Afghanistan?" I think some of us here today have been saying, and this Senate resolution is an attempt to say, the Soviets have the option of getting out. Let us not commit a dishonorable act, in any way, shape, or form, that would undermine the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, or would leave them without the equipment to protect themselves. We are going to be held accountable in the light of history for

what we do in this situation. We should continue to support the mujahadeen, as long as they need support, by providing them with the arms to regain their freedom, until such time as they do not need such arms, until such time as the Soviets are out and their military withdrawal is irreversible. That is what the Senate is saying.

Mr. President, we all love our grandchildren. Sometimes I think our grandchildren have us wrapped around their fingers more so than our children ever had.

The American people love children. That is a given. We all love children, and it seems that we especially love grandchildren. To me, it is appalling to contemplate what the Soviet invaders have done to little children in Afghanistan. The Soviets have air-dropped toys to the ground for children. Those "toys" were mines, explosives. If there is anybody anywhere in the world who is innocent in God's sight, it is children—unsuspecting, helpless, innocent children.

What kind of devilish mind could possibly think of, let alone concoct, an instrument of terror that would take off the hands, the arms, the legs of innocent children? It is repulsive. But, the Soviet Union invaders have done that to the children of the Afghans.

So let any individual who may be listening, or who may read, just stop and think for a moment: How would you feel if it were you whose child or whose grandchild or whose neighbor's child was maimed or killed by picking up what it thinks is a toy? What cruelty.

What I am saying is that this is repulsive, and the world ought not ever, ever, ever forget it.

Mr. Gorbachev has some admirable attributes—his ability to speak, his articulate eloquence. He is bright. He is trying to do something about some of his country's problems. I applaud him for that. We ought to try to help him succeed, if and when and where it is in our interest, to succeed in changing his system. But let us always keep in mind the interests of the United States and her allies and the interests of the free world, and the brave people of Afghanistan.

Basically what I am saying is, let caution be the watchword and let us never forget that, regardless of what the Soviet leadership may be attempting to say or do today in the Soviet Union, basically the system is still here. It is still the Communist system. It is still the Communist Party, and it is the daddy of all the Communist parties around the world.

Khrushchev said and I am paraphrasing, perhaps: "You may think we have forgotten Marx, Engels, Lenin, but we shall not forget Marx, Engels, Lenin until a shrimp learns to sing."

Some remember him as having said "when a shrimp learns to whistle," but, whatever, it is the same.

So the system, we must not forget, has not changed; we must hope at

some time that it will. But until it does, let us keep our eyes open and let us remember history.

I wish all Americans could read the *Life and Death of Lenin* and the *Life of Stalin*. We are better armed against our own inclinations toward wishful thinking and our own inclinations to feel that the other fellow's values are the same as our own, if we will read history.

Read this book.

The Soviets have different definitions than we do. "Democracy" to Americans means one thing. A "democratic government" to the Americans means one thing. It means something else in the Soviet lexicon.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD. I yield.

Mr. SYMMS. I think that the point that the Senator makes about semantics is one which we often fail to heed, and he is so right in his recommendations that we read history.

But I want to give the Senator and the President a quote. "The most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary."

I want to repeat that. "The most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary."

That was said by Joseph Stalin. He is talking exactly the point the majority leader is bringing to the attention of this body, and that is that when they talk about democracy and they talk about peace it is a different definition than when we talk about democracy and we talk about peace.

They use those words very loosely and it becomes very confusing to people who have not studied history to know what it is they are talking about.

They consider people in Siberia in a gulag in a state of peace and I guess you might say it is the ultimate in social security—three meals a day and a place to sleep. But it is no freedom, no opportunity, no natural state of man and his nature and in relationship to God. It is totally foreign and abnormal for human behavior to be entrapped and living in a slave camp and then to call it peaceful. It is a way of twisting the words for their achieving the goals that they are out to achieve.

I thank the majority leader for yielding.

Mr. BYRD. I will just use 2 more minutes and then I am going to yield the floor. I know the Senator wishes to speak.

But I am reading from the chapter, the Third International, in "the *Life and Death of Lenin*." I read this book several months ago. But this past weekend I spent reviewing it.

On the subject of definitions, in the chapter the Third International:

"Kautsky's work evidently touched him"—meaning Lenin—"on a raw nerve."

Kautsky had written a short book, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

and Lenin in very high dudgeon took umbrage with Kautsky.

He attacked Kautsky. His attack on Kautsky was written during his convalescence—meaning Lenin's convalescence.

Lenin had been the target of an assassination attempt and was almost killed by a woman with a hand gun. Lenin described Kautsky as a windbag "who chews rags in his sleep."

Here is what Lenin says about Kautsky:

Kautsky's definitions are wrong, he has only a limited understanding of Marx's teaching, and what little he has understood is outweighed by his intolerable misunderstandings.

So he attacked Kautsky's definitions.

Here is what the author says about Lenin's own definitions:

Lenin's arguments are all of the same kind. Employing his own definitions Lenin can argue in any direction he pleases, secure in the knowledge that no one can controvert him. In his hands "dictatorship" and "democracy" are interchangeable terms, and he can say for example that "proletarian democracy, of which the Soviet government constitutes one of the forms, has given a development and expansion of democracy hitherto unprecedented in the world." When Kautsky speaks of democracy, it is pointed out to him that he is merely referring to "the stinking corpse of democracy" as it is practiced in the West, which is far removed from the "true and pure" democracy practiced by the Soviets. We are reminded that "proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic . . ."

Get that now.

We are reminded by Lenin that "proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy, and the Soviet government is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois government."

Those are the words that are quoted in the book as being Lenin's words.

So, we have to be careful of the Soviet leaders' definitions of words. They can be quite different from our own definitions and meanings.

So, "democracy" to us means one thing; "democracy" to the Communist system means quite something else.

As we are told here in this book, the word "democracy" and the word "dictatorship" by Lenin can be interchanged quite easily.

I thank the Senator for his patience in waiting, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I once again want to compliment the very thoughtful comments that the majority leader has just made and would add to that by saying that the definition of "peace" that Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev when they are talking about peace they are talking about when they finally have control of the whole world and they do not have anybody to conflict with their rulership. That is what they are talking about.

Notwithstanding that they had some problems with their Communist brethren in the People's Republic of China, they still ultimately drive toward a world where they have their Soviet style communism in place, and that is what their definition of "peace" is all about. That is what they are talking about.

When we talk about peace we talk about peace and freedom and we think that is inseparable and it is inseparable. They talk about peace where they have the Politburo be able to organize, operate, and manage the country without interference from any people that might object to what it is they are trying to do.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMMS. I am happy to yield to the majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his cosponsorship of this resolution.

Let me make clear for the Record what the Senator from West Virginia is saying. I am saying that we must study history, but we must not be blinded by the lessons of history. We must not be blinded to the possibilities that may exist for change in the Soviet Union. We must not be blinded by the somber and tragic lessons of history to the possibilities toward change that may be there in the Soviet system. We should always be eager to seize opportunities that will be in our own best interest and it may be that those same opportunities will also be in the best interest, as they view it, of the Soviet Union.

So it is not impossible that we may be on the same line of approach at times. Take, for example, the INF Treaty. I happen to believe that that INF Treaty is in our best interest. I believe it is one that is verifiable and I believe that the verification regime is such that we can be assured that it is in our best interest. The Soviet leadership says that treaty is in its best interest. So I do not advocate that we should let history blind us to what may be opportunities that are in our best interest. I do not think we ought to avoid opportunities that come whereby we may improve our relations with the Soviet Union.

I simply say that we must remember history. And I am not a teacher of history, but I believe that history may provide the light by which our feet may be guided and may help us better to seize whatever potential for good that is within our reach at a given time. The Soviets are not always going to act in ways that are necessarily detrimental to our own interests.

So let us be ready. Let us try to seize those opportunities. Let us recognize the fact that Mr. Gorbachev is a new type of leader; that he is trying to change his system. But let us be careful that we do not fall prey to our own wishful thinking.

I do not turn my face like flint toward the Soviet Union at all times

and say, "We will have nothing to do with them." But I do turn my face toward the Soviet Union and try to keep in mind some of the lessons that we should have learned from history and from our own dealings with the Soviet Union. Let us remember that glasnost is not freedom of the press and freedom of speech as the Western World understands those freedoms.

As we vote on the resolution today, and as we deal with the INF Treaty, and as we deal with future treaties, let us do our best to educate ourselves, as much as we can educate ourselves, as to the history of the Soviet system and of Soviet leaders. We will be better prepared not only to evaluate the opportunities that may come, but we will also be less likely to fall prey to our own wishful thinking.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the majority leader for those comments. I agree with much of what he just said here today. I think that this is, as I have said earlier, a most important resolution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator WALLOP be added to the list of cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I first want to say that I am pleased to be an original sponsor of this resolution, and I want to commend the majority leader, Senator BYRD, for his cooperation—when I brought this matter up to him last week—and for his willingness to work out this resolution. And I want to commend our distinguished colleague, Senator HUMPHREY, from New Hampshire, for his efforts in working with the majority leader to come up with what I consider to be a very, very fine resolution that all Senators, I think, should be comfortable in supporting.

I also ask unanimous consent to have Senator DOLE added as a cosponsor of this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. I want to say that Senator HUMPHREY has given timeless, countless hours of leadership supporting the Mujeheddin, the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. And, Senator BYRD has also spoken on the floor on numerous occasions. I think they are both to be commended because the freedom that the Afghan Mujeheddin freedom fighters are fighting for is not just their own freedom. They are fighting for freedom for all mankind. It is significant that we are winning that struggle in Afghanistan today. When I say "we," I mean free peoples all over the world are winning a battle that is being fought by some very fierce and very brave people in Afghanistan.

The Soviets have made comments that they are considering withdrawing from Afghanistan. I think we have to be cautious. I state this based on my recent travels to Pakistan and visiting

with mujeheddin leaders. Yunis Khalia, and many others, visiting with the Pakistani leadership, President Zia, his Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and other leaders and military leaders in Pakistan. In the conversations I had with these individuals there is one underlying fear that comes through. That is that somehow we will make some superpower level deal between the United States and the Soviet Union, and allow the Soviet Union to gain politically what they have not been able to gain militarily.

I think it is significant to note that they are not leaving Afghanistan because they want to. They are leaving Afghanistan because they are literally having their tail handed to them on a platter because of the ability of the mujeheddin to carry the war to them. This is after countless suffering.

I think we in this country have a hard time recognizing the suffering that has gone on in Afghanistan. It is a country of 14 million people. It is a tough, hard, rocky country. At least 10 percent of the people have been killed. Most of those people have been killed by Soviet bombing with white phosphorus, napalm, antipersonnel bombs, CPU's, and so forth. They paid a terrible, terrible price in their country. They started fighting and they kept fighting. They resisted, and they had old Enfield rifles with only two or three rounds per soldier. Gradually, through the years, they started getting rifles from the Soviets which they would ambush and take their supplies with. They armed themselves.

Finally, the free world came to their assistance after 2 or 3 years and started helping them with basic minimal means of support. As you know, we have a fairly big problem in Afghanistan now, and with the addition of the Stinger missiles to the equation, they have now been able to deny the Soviets the freedom of the air space they had prior to that. They are shooting down airplanes any time they get in range of them. The Soviets have a choice—either go down close or stay way high with their fighter bombers out of range of the Stinger. When they do that, they cannot hit anybody on the ground. So they are no threat to them. If they go down close, they shoot them down with the Stinger. If they go down on the treetop level with the helicopters and jets, they are in range of small arm fire. I talked to one person who had been in the country that saw a Soviet helicopter shot down with an RPG. Apparently, the guy shot it through the door of the helicopter because they were flying so close to the ground.

So they are really doing a service. I would repeat again the freedom that they are fighting for is not just the freedom of Afghanistan. It is for freedom of all mankind. We are talking about reversing the Brezhnev doctrine. What the United States has to do is be

the leader in this and not make any accommodation. When the Soviets say they want accommodation to leave the country, all the Soviet Union has to do is leave the country on the same highway that they came in on. It took them about 3 days to bring in some 100,000 troops. All they have to do is reverse the trucks, load the troops up and start heading out of the country and evacuate.

I visited Khyber Rifles, in Pakistan, and the Khyber Rifles is a military unit that guards the Khyber Pass. It has a great, proud tradition that goes back to the last century. When we were there, some Soviet aircraft overflew and they opened up with their antiaircraft weapons. They were too high for them to hit them. But they at least were trying to protect their own country. The Soviets, as a matter of fact, constantly overfly into Pakistan. That is a point many people in the world are not aware of. They constantly bomb and injure innocent Pakistanis with their aircraft along the borders.

The other thing that is happening while Mr. Gorbachev receives the great accolades of Time magazine for being the man of the year—he is now being treated as our new partner in peace by this administration. That may be well and good but I think it is a Trojan horse operation. But that is my opinion.

Mr. Gorbachev's own KGB, which reports directly to him, has a huge operation in Kabul. And they are ordering the bombing of innocent people in Pakistan, trying to terrorize the Pakistanis. While he is getting awards for being the man of the year in Time magazine, while there are votes being taken even in public opinion polls that somehow he is a bigger man at peace than the leaders of the Western democracies. I think it is interesting that his own KGB in Pakistan injured 1,000 innocent Pakistani civilians last year by setting off bombs in shopping centers, and in areas where people gather at bus stops and so forth. It is a constant occurrence.

I visited some of the places where these bombs have recently gone off. I think it is important that we put this in perspective. That is why I really want to say again that I think that the authors of this resolution, although I had one prepared and inserted in the Record last week, is even better and has built upon the one that we had. It is strong language. It speaks for itself. It is an opportunity for the United States Senate through the sense of the Senate resolution, to send a message around the world that we are going to stand beside the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, until the last vestige of Soviet influence is out of Afghanistan.

Mr. President, the Soviets are in a position in Afghanistan where there is no way they can win that war. If they wanted to put in 500,000, it will not work at this point because of the ter-

rain being what it is, the countryside being what it is. They simply will continue to pile up casualties and pile up losses. The casualties now are running about 10 to 1 against the Soviet army. I think it is important that they get their troops out of there so they can stop the needless bloodshed of the fine Russian young people that are victims of this situation. They are not in Afghanistan because they want to be. They are in Afghanistan because they live in a dictatorship and they do not have any say-so about what the dictators in the Politburo decide. If Gorbachev wants to send them into Afghanistan, he sends them in. If you are a young Russian teenager and the army grabs you and drafts you, they send you to Afghanistan. They really have little choice. So it is very sad to see. I have in my office for any of the colleagues who are interested a Soviet uniform that I purchased in Peshawar. It is Soviet equipment. It is on sale everywhere. This is coming off fine young people who are innocent victims of this war as much as are the Afghans. This is pure and simple Soviet hegemony, and they need to be pushed back out.

On February 25, before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Beck said:

We would be prepared if completely satisfied with the overall agreement to prohibit U.S. military assistance to the Afghan resistance.

This line of thinking from the State Department is totally unacceptable and contrary to President Reagan's policy. In fact, President Reagan said in an interview on December 3, 1987:

You can't suddenly disarm the mujahideen and leave them prey to the other government.

Mr. President, I believe there are two reasons why the Soviet Union has begun considering the withdrawal of their forces. No. 1, as I mentioned, is the will and strong determination of the anti-Marxist resistance in their fight for freedom and independence; and, No. 2 the assistance the United States has provided to the freedom fighters.

Clearly, the Afghan resistance is winning the war, but if the United States discontinues its assistance before or during the withdrawal, we will literally be snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. That would allow the dictator, Gorbachev, to then take credit for withdrawing his army, but still leaving a Soviet influence government in place. That is exactly what we should not allow to happen.

Such a compromise would allow the Soviets the ability to continue the war and leave the mujahideen vulnerable to Soviet noncompliance. Regardless of the weapons the mujahideen may have stored or hidden, the Communist-backed regime has infiltrated the ranks of the resistance and could easily destroy the remaining equipment.

Because the State Department has taken the position of ending assistance, it is very important that the Senate go on record opposing an aid cutoff. This will send a clear message to the resistance movement in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, that the United States is committed to the Reagan doctrine and will back the freedom fighters, who are pursuing peace, freedom, and independence.

Mr. President, with respect to all this talk about glasnost, if one would really examine what glasnost is all about, one would see it is doomed to failure before the start. The Soviet Union is really not a union like the Union of the United States, where we are one Nation; a country that has 50 sovereign States, but we are all in the Union.

The Soviet Union is like a colonial empire, and the reason they have picked up one country and another country and another country through the growth of their empire is that they have the whip, the guns, and the Kremlin backing them up to force these people into line.

If we can throw them out of Afghanistan, that puts them on the defensive, so many other people would be emboldened to stand up to the tyrants, the dictators, and the oppressors. Once they get on the defensive, their empire will have all kinds of trouble from the inside and will pose less of a threat to those of us outside the Soviet empire.

I think it is most important that we not rush for an agreement. President Zia said to me, "We need to be patient. We need to be firm." But you must remember, Pakistan is a poor country; Pakistan is a country of 93 million people. They are under tremendous pressure to get this settled. They have 3 million refugees in the country.

They are running those refugee camps better than any refugee camps I have visited. I was very impressed with the Paks, with the quality of their soldiers, the demeanor and measure of efficiency, thoroughness, and compassion with which they run those refugee camps.

We saw no one hungry in the refugee camps. It is costing \$1 million a day to keep 3 million refugees in refugee camps. The United States is spending about \$250,000 a day to help on that effort; Saudi Arabia, about \$250,000 a day, but the Pakistan Government is coming up with a half-a-million dollars a day in expenditures. That is a lot of money, and I hope we would be as generous. If we do not wake up with respect to what is happening in Central America—because I see those two issues somewhat similar—we may be put to a test of what we are going to do when we get 16 to 20 to 30 million refugees in Texas, in New Mexico, in Arizona, in California, and anywhere else in this country, as these refugees start voting with their feet and moving north, if the revolu-

tion expands from Nicaragua into the surrounding countries.

We may be put to a test to see if we would be as generous as these Pakistani people and the Pakistan Government.

So I think they need our support. I think it is a cause the United States citizens can be very proud we are participating in, and I think we should be very careful, as Jeane Kirkpatrick said, "to be too eager for any agreement."

We should have one goal in mind—that is, when the last Soviet soldier leaves the border, crosses back home to Russia. That should be our goal. When the last Russian soldier leaves, and that means they are leaving no advisers and no vestiges of Soviet influence.

It is true, there is a great deal of effort being made by the Soviets to politicize the people that are left so they will then represent what it is the Soviet Union wants in Afghanistan. But I think the one way we fall in our ivory tower thinking is that sometimes people say—our State Department and people from other countries—that we have to have some kind of compromise and a coalition government.

I met with the elected leader of the mujahideen. This was a fierce warrior at one time in the early part of this war. He was in country and led troops and fought the Soviets. He was quite renowned among his troops for his bravery, his tenacity, and his willingness to fight. But at this point, he is an older man. He is 68 years old. He is out of the country. Even he cannot make a deal on what kind of a government they are going to have. The truth of it is that people who are in the country leading the mujahideen troops, the troop leaders, will be the makeup of a new government. Whether we like it or not, we should face that reality.

Our job is to get the Soviets out. All they have to do is load the troops on the trucks and the armored personnel vehicles and start an airlift. Fly these people out the same way they flew them in and get their tanks on the highway and head them back to the Soviet Union. If they start an armored column out of the country, they would probably be surprised how fast their route of exit would be opened for them to leave.

So I do not buy the argument that we should disarm the resistance. The only reason they are leaving is that they are losing the war. The word is getting out, even in the Soviet Union, because there are so many young Russian boys who have been sent there that by word of mouth the word is getting out that they are being defeated on the battlefield.

I had one story told to me where 80 speznick soldiers surrendered en masse. The Russian army is not quite the indomitable army they would like the world to believe. Their morale is down. They are literally under pressure and being forced out of Afghani-

stan, and we should help them make that decision to get out of Afghanistan to stop the bloodshed.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mrs. Kirkpatrick's article in today's Washington Post be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMMS. She makes the point that by now everyone has heard that the Soviets want to withdraw from Afghanistan. She makes the point also that the Soviet dictatorship leaves—and that is my word, not hers. I think we should remember that it is a dictatorship. This love in we witnessed here last fall before Christmas with Mr. Gorbachev makes me wonder if we have taken leave of our senses. We welcome these people in here and treat them as though they are the moral equivalency of the people of the United States in terms of government standing and the officialdom of our Government where we are elected by the people. We have a government that works for the people and is told by the people what we are supposed to do. In the Soviet Union it is just the opposite. There about 3 percent of the people who control all the whips and guns that make the people do what it is that they want them to do. Whether they like it or not they have to comply. They rule them by oppressing them, terrorizing them, and scaring them in making them do what it is they want them to do.

I am one person who finds it very repugnant to have Gorbachev in town. If we had not been having votes on the Senate floor, I would have taken leave of this city and gone to my home State and found some tranquility away from the television. I found it so nauseating to see a dictator who leads an empire who managed to kill 500 people a day on the average since 1917. They have on average been killing 500 people a day, to keep themselves in power. Now I do not believe we should not talk to the Soviets. In fact, I encourage the United States and Soviet dialog. However, we give them such great credibility in this country by signing treaties with them that they do not comply with. Then we turn around and want to sign another treaty with them that we know they will not comply with. They have never changed their goal, and that is world domination. That is their goal and they act like they still intend to do it if they can use Gorbachev as a Trojan horse. We should not be fooled by that.

The reason they are pulling out of Afghanistan is that they are losing the war and that is why this resolution is so important. It does two things. It will give our negotiators some backbone to know that the American people are supporting them to take a strong stand; and, second, it gives a message around the world that we do not believe the Brezhnev doctrine. We do not believe that it is the word. It is

not going to happen. In other words, it is not a self-fulfilling prophecy that the Brezhnev doctrine should become true. There is no mandate from Heaven that says the Brezhnev doctrine is sent from the Almighty, and that is the way things are going out.

We have the ability to support the resistance movement—to roll back the borders of communism, and expand the frontiers of freedom. That more people can live in freedom and opportunity instead of less people, as the Brezhnev doctrine is mandated to do.

I think it is important to note what Pravda said. Reporting from the Mrs. Kirkpatrick article:

The Afghan problem has been used from year to year to block peace initiatives. Hawks across the ocean say "Afghanistan first regional conflicts first!" Until they are settled, it is pointless to talk about the cardinal problems of war and peace or to embark seriously on nuclear disarmament.

That is Pravda saying that.

I think that is a rather interesting point to make. So maybe they do have an incentive they think they can pull out of Afghanistan and say, "We are the good guys, we are getting out of there."

Do not forget that they are getting out of there because of the Stinger missiles and Kalynkof rifles provided, both in the Afghans getting them and coming from out of the country, a lot of antitank weapons and RPG's and wherewithal that it takes food, boots, and so forth, to win a struggle such as this and stand up against a very powerful army that invaded the country.

An extremely interesting article in a recent issue of Moscow's Literary Gazette is said to constitute the recommended interpretation of the Afghan experience. Termining the current Afghan policy one of "national reconciliation" and "an expression of the new political thinking on the Afghans' side," the Literary Gazette recalls the euphoria in the Soviet Union when the April 1978 "revolution" in Kabul was announced. The writer remembers the pleasure at hearing "that we might find ourselves with a socialist neighbor on our border to the south," and later recalls "disaster . . . threatened the red flag over Kabul." There was outside interference—American, Chinese, British and Pakistani guns appeared to threaten the regime. So, naturally, in response to the Afghan state's call for help, "We sent in the troops" to offset "the mighty presence from abroad."

The Literary Gazette recalls how, in the early happy days, everyone assumed "the victorious party [the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] would be able to create an effective structure covering the whole country, the whole territory and all the social strata of the society, and stability would prevail."

It did not happen.

The PDPA "offended against tradition." It "turned into violence and repression." It fell into factionalism. Afghanistan turned out to be a "medieval melting pot." Everyone could see that some accommodation was required with traditional culture and Islam. The process of compromise began.

Mr. President, it is interesting that the Soviets failed to study history

when they did make the decision to invade Afghanistan. Our friends the British, from whom we have had a great and long and lasting tradition from some of their values, in about the year, it was either 1867 to 1873, they decided when they were in what is now Pakistan, which was old India under the colonial system, that they did not like the king that was in power in Afghanistan. They sent a regiment in the country of 4,000 British troops and they marched through a Khyber Pass and into Kabul. They took the king out that was in power and replaced him with one of their choice. This was in the fall of the year. As the winter came, they noticed that the Afghanistan people kept coming around and they kept looking out in the hills and they saw there was more and more Afghan people around those hills and decided that they should reduce the size of their garrison. So they rapidly dispatched 2,000 soldiers to leave. They did this after they had only been in the country about 6 weeks to 2 months.

Then by spring, they had noticed the constant buildup around Kabul. They decided they should head for the Khyber Pass with their remaining regiment, with the remaining 2,000 people and leave the king that they had put in power in power.

They started out on that march to the border with their horses and equipment, and so forth. Of course, they were very well armed compared to the Afghan people at the time.

The story is that in the Khyber Pass, there was one person they could see coming on a horse. After a few days, they heard nothing from their column, no messages, no means of communication, no signals, and the regimental doctor—I think his name was Brighton—appeared through the binoculars. They could see him from the outpost on the Khyber Pass. The Afghans had let the regimental doctor go so there would be one person left alive from the regiment to tell the British not to come back again, that the remaining part would be buried in Afghanistan.

The Soviets should have recognized this. Although they probably recognized the fierceness of the Afghanistan people, and the willingness to fight, they were counting on the rest of the world to do nothing. They were not counting on the likes of Senator HUMPHREY to be fighting every day in the U.S. Senate to get support for the freedom fighters and not counting on Ronald Reagan to be elected who would impose the Reagan doctrine. They were counting on us to continue to retreat from communism as though it was inevitable that they would expand their empire.

So I think we have a unique opportunity now in history to reverse the inevitability theory that the Soviet dictators operate under. If we do so, Mr. President, I believe we will find that the world will be a much more peace-

ful place so that the Soviets will not be so adventuresome in further activities. They will not be so willing to try to bully themselves around to force their will on other peoples in other places. It is my personal opinion that it is not beyond my hope that once we kick them out of Afghanistan then they will start a revolution in the surrounding perimeters of the Soviet Union. We should support resistance movements anywhere. That ought to be the policy of the United States. We should be supporting resistance movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Poland. Anywhere behind the Iron Curtain that people want to resist the dictators of the Soviet Union we should be willing to help them.

I think we would find that we would not have to have a \$300 billion a year defense budget and not be threatened with nuclear missiles and not be threatened with massive backfire bombers, because the Soviet Union would have their hands full internally. It is an ideology that we are confronting. If we could just bomb the Soviet Union with Sears catalogs, it would be a big advantage over what we are doing so that the people in that country would know what it is that their Government denies them from having.

This is the best thing that has happened in a long time, to have the Soviet Union being defeated on the battlefield in Afghanistan so people will wake up in this propaganda war. They shoot people when they leave their country. When they crawl over the wall anywhere across Europe, you get shot. You have to get through mine fields, claymore mines, machine gun nests, and barbed wire entanglements. It is incredible what they have to do to escape the country. They will shoot you on the barbed wire as you are passing over.

We are passing laws in this country to try to keep people out, and we allow ourselves to lose the propaganda war and give the dictators an absolutely free address in the U.S. and the Western media. I find it almost incredible.

So I just want to say again, as Mrs. Kirkpatrick says:

It is inconceivable that the administration of Ronald Reagan would accept a deal that leaves a residual Soviet presence in Afghanistan, a Communist government in Kabul aided by Moscow, while cutting off the flow of assistance to the Afghan resistance.

It could not be.
If there is to be an end to "outside interference" in Afghanistan it must be applied equally. Cut off of aid must include a cutoff of Soviet assistance to the Kabul puppet government.

So what we are saying here in this resolution today is we are giving our Secretary of State, George Shultz, a statement and we are giving President Reagan a statement that we in the U.S. Senate—the Democrats, the Republicans, Americans one and all—are going to stand together. We want to see this thing through to the end and

we want to see freedom prevail over tyranny.

It is a black-and-white issue. It is so important that we get a good strong vote on this. I hope every Senator will come to the floor and cast their vote for freedom and support this.

The majority leader is quite correct in doing this. Senator HUMPHREY is quite correct in his efforts in it. I am happy that I brought this up with the majority leader last week and started this off by introducing a resolution, because we need a strong statement to the whole world that freedom is going to have the support of the people in the United States of America.

I will just say, in closing, Mr. President, that the freedom we are talking about in Afghanistan is not just freedom in Afghanistan. It is freedom for all mankind.

I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

"TOO EAGER FOR ANY AGREEMENT" ON AFGHANISTAN

(By Jeane Kirkpatrick)

By now, nearly everyone has heard that the Soviets want to withdraw from Afghanistan. Secretary of State George Shultz has said he does not doubt it, though some remain skeptical. More important, however, the carefully worded pronouncements from Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet officials leave critical questions unanswered.

Will all Soviet troops depart? Do the Soviets intend to leave a permanent presence? How will the next government be chosen? Will refugees and their leaders be permitted to participate? How much Soviet aid will there be for the puppet government in Kabul?

What did Pravda say? "The Afghan problem has been used from year to year to block peace initiatives. . . Hawks across the ocean say 'Afghanistan first, regional conflicts first.' Until they are settled, it is pointless to talk about the cardinal problems of war and peace or to embark seriously on nuclear disarmament."

An extremely interesting article in a recent issue of Moscow's Literacy Gazette is said to constitute the recommended interpretation of the Afghan experience. Termining the current Afghan policy one of "national reconciliation" and "an expression of the new political thinking on the Afghans' side," the Literacy Gazette recalls the euphoria in the Soviet Union when the April 1978 "resolution" in Kabul was announced. The writer remembers the pleasure at hearing "that we might find ourselves with a socialist neighbor on our border to the south," and later recalls "disaster . . . threatened and later recalls 'the red flag over Kabul.' There was outside interference—Americans, Chinese, British and Pakistani guns appeared to threaten the regime. So, naturally, in response to the Afghan's call for help. "We await in the troops" to offset "the mighty presence from abroad."

The Literacy Gazette recalls how, in the early happy days, everyone assumed "the victorious party [the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] would be able to create an effective structure covering the whole country, the whole territory and all the social strata of the society, and stability would prevail."

It did not happen.
The PDPA "offended against tradition." It "turned into violence and repression." It fell into factionalism. Afghanistan turned

out to be a "medieval melting pot." Everyone could see that some accommodation was required with traditional culture and Islam. The process of compromise began.

"State feruwas were introduced by mullahs' prayers. The flag ceased to be red and acquired a green Islamic stripe." The party proclaimed its pluralism. It proclaimed a "policy of national reconciliation" and "unprecedented compromise with enemies," and a readiness to "see them not as enemies but as patriots, colleagues in a future traditionally Islamic society."

Now, the Literary Gazette tells us, the original aim of the revolutionary government "has been renounced by the government itself." Everyone now has come to realize that the "experts were wrong in their assessment. Errors were made."

The departure of our troops is not a defeat," the Literary Gazette explains, adding the soldiers will leave as "the vector of politics changes into reverse and the army follows that vector."

It will all happen "if the pens in Geneva sign the peace agreements." Gorbachev has decided to withdraw, but the decision, the Soviets explain, is not unconditional.

What must the pens in Geneva sign? The terms of the proposed agreement have not been made public, but reports have circulated for weeks. According to these reports, the Soviet Union—which now claim 90,000 troops in Afghanistan—will begin withdrawal by May 15 if the agreement is completed by March 15 and will complete withdrawal within 10 months.

But, and it is a very large but, the United States must cease all assistance to the Afghan *mujaheddin* as soon as the Soviet Union begins its troop withdrawal. The Pakistanis must dismantle the *mujaheddin* base camps, and the existing Afghan government will remain in place. That this government calls itself a government of national reconciliation does not change the fact that it was installed by the Soviet Union and is maintained by Soviet troops.

Obviously the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is intensely desirable. Eight long years of war have left 1.25 million Afghans dead, 4 million in exile and the country devastated.

However, Afghan resistance leaders fear they have already been betrayed by an American government that seems too eager for any agreement.

It is inconceivable that the administration of Ronald Reagan would accept a deal that leaves a residual Soviet presence in Afghanistan, a Communist government in Kabul aided by Moscow, while cutting off the flow of assistance to the Afghan resistance.

It could not be.

If there is to be an end to "outside interference" in Afghanistan it must be applied equally. Cutoff of aid must include a cutoff of Soviet assistance to the Kabul puppet government.

George Shultz should make it clear to the Soviets that it takes more than a change of name or make a government a "national reconciliation."

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CONRAD). Who yields time?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Parliamentary inquiry: Is here a time agreement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a time agreement; 3 hours on each side.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I yield such time to Senator HUMPHREY as he may need. I would just say, Mr. President, that I think that the agreement is that Senators who wish to speak may come to the floor and speak. Sen-

ator Byrd has divided the time, but he has said that his time will be made available to any Senator who wishes to speak. I do not think there is any opposition, so there is really no division of who gets the time.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized for such time as he may need.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Idaho for spearheading this effort to make known the sentiment of the Senate on the subject of the various agreements applying to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The Senator has performed more than a useful service. He has performed probably a historic service for reasons I will outline in the course of my remarks.

I, likewise, commend the majority leader and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for their cooperation and their longstanding enthusiasm and help for the cause of Afghan independence.

Mr. President, as the Senator from Idaho has stated, the resolution before the Senate is, in effect, an expression of sentiment; in effect, counsel for the benefit of the administration. And let us hope that the administration takes it to heart, because there is very strong unity in this body—and I suspect when it comes to a vote there will not be a dissenting vote in the adoption of this resolution—there is strong bipartisan unity across the philosophical spectrum for not only supporting the Afghan cause all of these years, but for ensuring that whatever agreement the parties come to for securing the independence of Afghanistan be an agreement which is decent and which is prudent and which ensures, to the maximum possible extent, that the Soviet withdrawal will be complete and that there can be no doublecross accommodated by any such agreement.

At long last, the Soviets do appear genuinely interested in withdrawing from Afghanistan. The expression of wishes to withdraw is nothing new, but what is new is the recent statement of the Foreign Minister and the General Secretary to the effect that they no longer insist upon preconditions with respect to a surviving government; that they are now willing to withdraw without insisting upon leaving in place their puppet regime set up 8 years ago.

That is an important change. That is a watershed event that may show whether the Soviets are sincere in their wish to leave. Because what is clear is this: either they are sincere or they are insincere. And if they are insincere and they have deceit and doublecross in mind, we have to tailor an agreement which will not accommodate doublecross and deceit and insincerity. And if they are sincere, then they will find, I think, an agreement

that facilitates the safe withdrawal from Afghanistan of their forces.

We do not want an agreement which in any way endangers the gains won by the Afghans at such enormous costs. We should bear in mind, the administration should bear in mind, the extra responsibility it bears in view of its negotiating on behalf of the Afghan people. The Afghans are not a direct party to these negotiations, unfortunately; not likely to be, in a meaningful sense. Therefore, it is all the more incumbent upon this Government to take even more seriously the very great responsibility it has in negotiating the future of others and especially in light of the enormous sacrifice the Afghans have made these last 8 years.

The Senator from Idaho said that Afghanistan is a country of 14 million people. That is not quite true. It is a country of about 10 million people. It used to be a country of 15 million people prior to the Soviet invasion.

What happened to 5 million people, well, a million-and-a-quarter of them are dead—dead; d-e-a-d—as a result of the Soviet invasion; a million-and-a-quarter out of 15 million. That is 7 percent.

If you apply that 7 percent to the American population, Mr. President, it equates to about 17 million dead Americans—17 million, if you can imagine such a catastrophe. There would scarcely be a family untouched—children dead, parents dead, grandparents dead; almost every family would have suffered the loss of loved ones. That may be difficult for us to imagine, but for the Afghans it is not a matter of imagination. It is a matter of daily reality. And the State Department ought to be bearing that terrible fact in mind daily and hourly as it negotiates the fate of Afghanistan and moves toward an agreement which will either secure the gains of that sacrifice or throw them away, throw away at the bargaining table what the Afghans have won at the battlefield.

It is a pretty sobering thought, sobering responsibility. And yet I have a great deal of unease, shared by many in this body and shared by many in the realm of public policy, in Government and out, that the State Department has very carelessly, at least foolishly, at least imprudently, so far conducted these negotiations.

The agreements, as best we can learn of them, are not prudent, not safe, not decent, and not just. And I will come in a moment to the particular points of criticism.

It seems to me that we ought to be approaching this responsibility with a set of criteria for an agreement which we can rely upon to ensure the success of the Afghan cause. We are at a critical juncture, it would seem. The U.N.-sponsored talks resume next month. There is a great urgency in some quar-

ters to make this round of talks the last.

That would be fine, providing the talks yield an agreement which secures the gains of the Afghan people and in no way endangers them or exposes them to doublecross.

But if it takes more than one round to secure a just and decent and prudent agreement, then so be it.

Any agreement is not good enough. We should have a few criteria. The first is that outside assistance to the Afghan resistance can continue until the Soviets are completely withdrawn from the country or at least until it is crystal clear that they are so far withdrawn that they cannot return.

Unfortunately, under terms earlier agreed to by the State Department, the United States has agreed to cut off all assistance at the beginning. Not at the end, or not three-quarters of the way through, but on day one of the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets need only withdraw a few hundred men, let us say, and that triggers immediately a complete cutoff of American assistance and the assistance of other countries to the Afghan resistance.

If the Soviets are insincere and if they have doublecross in mind, what more generous term could they hope for than for the United States and other interested countries to leave the Mujahadeen, the resistance, twisting in the wind for 10 months while Soviet forces and those of the puppet government they set up are continuously and generously supplied. If they intend a doublecross, what more generous term could they wish than that to which the State Department apparently already agreed; namely, cutoff of assistance on day one of a Soviet withdrawal? It is absurd; it is irresponsible and if it were permitted to stand, it would be tragic.

So our first criterion must be that outside assistance to the resistance upon which they are entirely dependent—entirely—must continue as long as there are significant numbers of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

A rather odd bit of history attaches to this point. Prior to the Washington summit President Reagan stated that the United States would never cut off assistance to the Afghans at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal. However, several days later, after that fine statement, senior State Department officials reiterated to the press that the United States would in fact be prepared to cut off all assistance at the outset, at the beginning, on day one of the Soviet withdrawal. So there you have the State Department contradicting the White House, contradicting the President.

We now know why the administration was forced to execute an about-face in this critical matter for, a few days later, the New York Times reported that:

An American commitment in 1985 to end the military aid to the Afghan guerrillas at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal

was made without the knowledge or approval of President Reagan.

Imagine that.

On so cardinal a point as this the State Department has agreed to foolish terms not only without the approval of the President but, indeed, without his knowledge, if the New York Times can be believed. And I believe it in this case because I know the details and it is true. The President was blindsided. That is outrageous.

The Congress, unlike the administration, has spoken with one voice on this issue of Afghanistan over the years. Congress has continually pressed the administration to increase military and humanitarian assistance, year in and year out. We have increased the appropriations over those requested by the administration, so determined has been the Congress to stand with the people of Afghanistan.

We have not only provided material assistance, we have many times expressed our sentiments, as we will today, again, in a moment.

Example: In the last Congress, Public Law 99-399:

The United States, so long as Soviet military forces occupy Afghanistan, should support the efforts of the people of Afghanistan to regain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their nation through the appropriate provisions of material support.

So, as recently as the last Congress, the Congress stated that we should continue to provide such material assistance, "so long as Soviet military forces occupy Afghanistan."

In other words, we should not give away the store up front. We should resort to some shrewd Yankee bargaining for a change, but unfortunately the State Department was not listening, apparently.

In this Congress, last year, we adopted House Resolution 277 that came to us unanimously from the House on the same point. Congress has never agreed to cutting off the support for the Afghan resistance at the outset, the beginning of the Soviet troop withdrawal. Why not? Because such an agreement, such a term is foolish on its face. Along these lines I would urge my colleagues to take a few moments to read the wise remarks of the majority leader delivered on the floor just last Tuesday. Commenting on Mr. Gorbachev's assertion that the United States must end all aid to the Mujahadeen at the outset, Senator BYRD spoke for many of us when he said:

American aid should stay in place until it is absolutely, indubitably and unquestionably clear that the Soviets are mainly out and that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and the the Mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.

Mr. President, the junior Senator from Massachusetts and I are circulating a letter to the President on this subject now, signed by 29 Senators, I might add which says:

To agree to cut off all aid to the Afghan resistance while Soviet troops remaining are generously and continually resupplied, and while the puppet government they set up is likewise resupplied, is unwise on its face. Let it never be said that the United States threw aside the sacrifice of the Afghan people.

Let it never be said that we threw away the blood of a million and a quarter of the Afghan people and 4 million more who are refugees, and the suffering of 4 million more who have injuries and disease as a result of this war and whose future has been substantially diminished by the hardship brought about by Soviet occupation.

Let it never be said that this enormous, almost unprecedented sacrifice, was thrown away by the United States. And yet there is a substantial danger that the State Department will do just that.

With respect to that letter, now signed by 29 U.S. Senators, we have been joined in its by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of the Intelligence Committee as well and I urge my colleagues, likewise, to add their signatures.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would be happy to yield to the majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding. I compliment the Senator for the leadership that he has consistently shown in this subject area over a period of a great many years. I compliment him on his statement today. I have not been able to listen to all of it.

I have been looking over a statement titled "Testimony of Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 25, 1988," last week. This is Congressman SOLARZ' Asian Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have not had a chance to read all of the statement but my staff has just called my attention to a portion of the speech that was prepared for delivery by Mr. Peck before that subcommittee.

I do not know whether there were any modifications made in that statement at the time it was delivered or what may have evolved through the process of questions and answers in that hearing. But I read the following extract from the prepared statement of Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, before Mr. SOLARZ' subcommittee.

We and the Soviet Union would agree to the same basic commitment regarding non-interference and nonintervention. We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the overall agreement, to prohibit U.S. military assistance to the Afghan resistance.

"We would expect"—and here I would underline the word "expect"—"the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva accords in

stopping military support for the Kabul regime instrument on guarantees. We will, of course, continue non-military humanitarian assistance and assume the Soviets will do the same. The commitments of all the parties would enter into effect on an agreed date following signature; at the present time, this is expected to be at the end of 60 days."

Mr. President, is the Senator aware of this statement that was made by Mr. Robert A. Peck on behalf of the State Department before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian Affairs?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I respond by saying that the staff called it to my attention. I did not know about it, no.

Mr. BYRD. What does this tell the Senator:

We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the overall agreements, to prohibit U.S. military assistance to the Afghan resistance. We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva Accords in stopping military support for the Kabul regime instrument on guarantees.

Does this mean that the State Department under this administration is getting ready to drop its military assistance to the Afghan resistance on the basis of some agreement, some promise by the Soviets, that they are going to get out of Afghanistan?

Would I understand this to mean that, as soon as the Soviets sign on the dotted line, they are going to withdraw from Afghanistan and that they will not interfere or intervene any further in the political affairs, the government in Afghanistan, and that we are going to basically lean upon or depend upon the so-called good "intentions" of the Soviet Government, and that we are going to shut off aid as soon as the Soviets sign a reciprocal restraint agreement; that we are going to cut off military aid to the Afghanistan resistance at that point?

It says:

The commitments of all the parties would enter into effect on an agreed date following signature; at the present time, this is expected to be at the end of 60 days.

Are we saying that, when the Soviets sign on the dotted line, that 60 days thereafter, the United States will end its aid, its military aid to the Afghan resistance?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, that is the agreement as now stated. To the extent this Senator is aware, and I have never had access to the agreements—I have asked for them, but I have not been able to see them—to the extent that I am aware from a number of sources, the agreement as now constituted requires the United States to cut off assistance to the Afghan resistance at the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal. Nothing in the agreement as now constituted requires the Soviets to exercise any restraint whatever in resupplying of its own forces or that of the puppet government which is set up.

Mr. SYMONS. Will the Senator yield for a point? Who has the floor?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yielded to the majority leader.

Mr. SYMONS. I just wanted to share with my colleagues that when I was in Pakistan in January, the State Department team that we have in the country did not agree with it, or if they knew about the agreement, they did not mention it to me. I cannot speak for them, but I was very proud of the United States team in Pakistan, the State Department, our military advisers, and other people we have there. I was very proud of all of them. This is where I got so excited about this proposition because they are concerned about this very thing. The head of the mujahadeen is concerned about this. The military leadership of Pakistan, the Pakistan President, they are all concerned about this, this very point. They sense that something is in the making at the highest levels of the State Department. I did not get that from our Ambassador or our people in the other offices in Pakistan. They think exactly as we are saying, that we should stay right on the track of doing what we are doing, not have any impatience on our part, we should just be patient in doing what we are doing and keep telling the Soviets that the way out is the same way they came in and "Turn your tracks around and get your troops out with the Soviets on them."

I have a copy of the statement by Mr. Peck. I find it very, very alarming to see this statement, given as recently as last week, coming out of the high levels of the State Department when this was inconsistent with what our policy was in Pakistan.

When you were off the floor, Mr. Leader, I said I appreciated so much your willingness to bring this before the Senate. I think this is an important resolution. As Senator HUMPHREY said, this may be a historic resolution that we agree to here today because we have to get the attention of the State Department and the President. I cannot believe that President Reagan would agree with this statement. I would have to have him say so before I would believe so.

Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am shocked at the language.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator should be shocked.

Mr. BYRD. I am not only shocked, I am stunned.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator should be stunned.

Mr. BYRD. This does not comport with what Secretary Shultz and the President have said to me. It may be that there are two ships passing in the night here, from what I thought I heard in talking with Secretary Shultz and the President and perhaps in what they thought they heard in talking with me. This would be a sellout by

the United States of America, if I understand it correctly.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. BYRD. And it would be a shameful sellout.

Mr. President, when is this agreement supposed to be signed?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is the function of what happens in the next round of negotiations which will begin in a few days. But we are led to believe that there is a strong push underway to conclude the agreement in the next few days.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I can only say that I would like to know, and I think the Senate would like to know, what is in any agreement affecting the Afghan freedom fighters before our Government signs its name on the dotted line.

I would like to know what is in any such agreement which we intend to sign before I call up the INF Treaty.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I urge the Senator to use the leverage.

I think it is a tremendous idea.

Mr. BYRD. It is not leverage. I support the treaty. But I hope the administration will let this Senate know what is in any agreement on Afghanistan that we intend to sign so that the Senate has a full understanding as to whether this administration is going to unwittingly sell the Afghan resistance down the river.

I hope to be very careful about what I say and the way I say it. I am not making any accusations of the administration. I discussed this briefly with the Secretary of State last week in my office. Only last week I discussed it briefly with the President at a meeting which was also attended by Senator NUUN, Senator PELL, Senator BOREN, and Senator WARNER—I did not get the impression in listening to the President—or when I heard Secretary Shultz—that this is what we are about to do.

So I make no accusations. But I simply have to say that if something is going on here that we in the Congress have not been told about, and which, in effect, would sell out the Afghan resistance on the basis of the so-called good "intent" of Mr. Gorbachev and/or the others in the high leadership of the Soviet Union or on the basis of some other promise, even though it is in writing, if we are going to prematurely cut off military aid to those resistance fighters, the Senate and House ought to know about it. The Congress and the people should be told just what we are talking about doing. The Senate must not be kept in the dark. I hope that this resolution today will speak loudly for the Senate to that effect.

I hope that if that is what is in the cards, the passage of this resolution will send a clear message that the Senate wants no part of that kind of an agreement. And I read again the words from the prepared testimony. I have not seen the printed hearings. I

do not know what questions or answers followed the presentation of this prepared statement or whether it was changed before it was given. This statement is, "The obligation which the United States would undertake as a 'guarantor' would relate exclusively to our own policies and actions. We would bear no responsibility for the actions of others."

We have to bear a responsibility for the actions of others. We cannot "guarantee" much in that part of the world; we all know, except as we guarantee our own actions. But to say we would bear no responsibility for the actions of others, we will bear a responsibility for the actions of others if we act in a way that sells the resistance fighters down the river. We have a responsibility not to do that and we have a responsibility not to depend only upon the good "intentions" of Soviet leadership. We should have learned through the lessons of history that we cannot depend upon the good intentions of the Soviet leadership.

This statement by Mr. Peck goes on to say, "We and the Soviet Union would agree to the same basic commitment regarding non-interference and non-intervention."

We could keep our part of the agreement, but what assurance do we have that the Soviet Union would keep its agreement?

I continue to read: "We would be prepared, if completely satisfied." What does that mean, "if completely satisfied"? Who is to be completely satisfied? What is meant by complete satisfaction? Are we just going to take the word of the Soviet leadership? How dumb, how silly, how stupid can we get?

"We would be prepared." Who is "we"? "We would be prepared." For whom is Mr. Peck speaking? "We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the overall agreement."

Would the Senate be prepared? We. Who in the State Department is "we" other than Mr. Peck? "We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the overall agreement, to prohibit U.S. military assistance to Afghan resistance." Are the leaders of the Afghan resistance going to be a part of this agreement?

I am asking rhetorical questions, but the Senator may respond anytime he wishes. I continue now to read. Now, who is "we"? "We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint." Suppose they do not show reciprocal restraint. Then what are "we" going to do about it? "We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva accords in stopping its military support for the Kabul regime instrument on guarantees."

"We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint." What does that mean? The Soviets didn't show any restraint when they invaded Afghanistan.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, will the leader yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from New Hampshire has the floor, believe it or not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has the floor.

Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will yield to me, Mr. President, I will finish in 2 minutes, I assure you.

"We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva accords in stopping its military support for the Kabul regime instrument on guarantees. We will, of course, continue non-military humanitarian assistance and assume"—assume. Get that word—assume. We will assume—that the Soviets will do the same. The commitments of all the parties would enter into effect on an agreed date following signature. At the present time this is expected to be at the end of 60 days.

"We may be on the threshold of an historic achievement. We place the highest priority on seizing the opportunities inherent in the present situation to reach an early settlement. At the same time we are determined that it must be a good settlement, a settlement which gets Soviet forces out, results in the return of the refugees, and which restores the independence and nonalignment of Afghanistan and the right of the Afghanistan people to self-determination. All of our diplomatic efforts are bent toward this result."

Now that paragraph, I think, is on the right track. But how can we so assuredly believe that that paragraph will be a natural follow-on to what Mr. Peck was saying in the paragraph preceding it?

I thank the Senator for yielding. I again thank him for the leadership he has shown in this matter. I would be happy to hear his reaction, and the reaction of any other Senator.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the majority leader has raised some very decisive and important questions, the answer to which I think can be secured only by looking at the agreements, the agreements which the State Department so far at least with respect to this Senator has refused to share. I encourage the Senator's determination to get to the bottom of this matter in the way that only he can. And I urge him to use all reasonable leverage to secure the answers to those questions.

Mr. BYRD. What is the basis for the refusal of the people in the State Department to show the Senator from New Hampshire the words in the agreement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Diplomats are never anxious to share anything with Senators.

Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia, the majority leader, has focused on a very important passage in the testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State just a few days ago.

Diplomats used their words very carefully. If you read them carefully you will see what kind of game they are playing. Let me just read the two sentences on which the Senator dwelled a number of times.

We would be prepared—

The United States for its part—

if completely satisfied with the overall agreement to prohibit U.S. military assistance to the Afghan resistance.

Plain language translation: we have already agreed, we agreed 2 years ago, to cut off outside assistance to the resistance on the first day of the Soviet withdrawal. So for our part we are already bound unless these agreements can be modified and perfected as I hope they will and indeed they must be.

The next sentence says:

We would expect—

Key word "expect"—

the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva accords in stopping its military support for the Kabul; that is, puppet regime.

We would expect, and that is all we have a right to do is expect because there is nothing in the agreements to the best that I can find out, to the best of my knowledge, and ability to find out, that requires any such reciprocity on the part of the Soviets, and that is essentially the point.

This is a one-sided deal. We are going to cut off the resistance on day 1 and the Soviets are perfectly free under the agreements as they are now constituted to continually and generously supply their own troops and that of the puppet regime which they have shored up.

If the Soviets have the intent to deceive and doublecross, they could not hope for a more accommodating agreement than those which now exist.

The Senator has come right to the nub of the matter. I hope that he can get an answer. I think I have expressed the answer he will find when he finally gets his hands on those documents. That is the point of all of this today, frankly, to bring pressure to bear on the administration to modify these agreements to secure a decent agreement, one that will bring independence to Afghanistan without jeopardizing the sacrifice that people have made in these last 8 years.

If the Soviets are sincere this agreement will work fine. If they are insincere and mean to doublecross these agreements as they are now standing, it will accommodate them genuinely, and even if they are sincere now and simply change their mind later in response to changed circumstances, again it will be accommodated in the thwarting of the wishes of the Afghan people.

Mr. SYMMS. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to yield.

Mr. SYMMS. Has the Senator talked personally with Secretary Shultz about this?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No.

Mr. SYMMS. As the Senator knows, I have not been a cheerleader for Secretary Shultz. But I made the statement here earlier that I find it hard to believe that Ronald Reagan would agree with this, and I find it hard to believe that the Secretary of State, George Shultz, would agree with this. I agree with the majority leader. I would like to know who Robert Peck is speaking for, and if he is speaking for Secretary Shultz then he should tell the majority leader what is in that agreement so we know what we are doing here.

What scares me—and I say this to the majority leader and to the President—if you analyze what the State Department is trying to do in Angola, it is a similar pattern. We have spent a lot of blood, sweat, and tears, and a lot of young people that are out there on the firing line have lost their lives in Angola also. And we just cannot have the credibility of the great United States of America on the line helping people who are dying where it is not some kind of a training exercise. They are firing live ammunition out there. As the Senator said, the 3 million people are refugees which I visited, and another 1.5 million are killed. We cannot put our credibility for future freedom and peace for mankind and the future, if the United States agrees to some kind of an arrangement like this. No one would be willing to risk their lives, and there would be nothing left that one could trust.

So I think if this agreement is there, we ought to demand that the Secretary of State bring it down and at least with the majority leader. I can see the reasons for some secret negotiations occasionally. But there was one great American in the past who talked about secret covenants secretly arrived at. I think this may be one of those.

We need to know this in advance because if this is the case, what about the young mujahadeen, the ones that are going out there today and fighting and risking their lives? Are we going to jerk the rug out from under them? If they do it to them, then who would want to join with us in a conflict in the future? Who will protect our freedom if we cannot be relied upon as a credible ally in the situation like this? This is very, very I think important even though this is just a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, a very important sense-of-the-Senate resolution because we are trying to put our credibility on the line that we want to stand with the freedom fighters.

As I said, because of my conversations with the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, I do not believe this. If it is, he certainly did not relate that to me. And our team in Pakistan is saying we have to be patient, we have to see this thing through to the end. We cannot

abandon ship halfway across the river. We have to get clear to the other side.

I thank the Senator. I thank the leader.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, Senators and others having a difficult time believing that our Government, our State Department, could possibly have agreed to terms which require us to cut off aid on the first day of the Soviet withdrawal while on the other hand permitting the Soviets to continually and fully continue to supply their own troops and that of the puppet regime. I can understand our Senators, even ambassadors, would have a difficult time believing such an agreement has been made because it is so preposterous, because it is such a travesty, because it is a sellout. That is precisely where we stand today to the best information available to this Senator.

Two years ago, without the President's approval and even without his knowledge, the State Department agreed to that first part; we would cut off aid at the outset on the first day.

We have acquired so far in these agreements no reciprocity on the Soviets to cut off the aid to the puppet regime on the same basis. It is a sellout. It grossly and grievously endangers the gains and sacrifices of the Afghan people, and will generously accommodate Soviet deceit if that is what they have in mind.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, of course.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that half the time that is being used by the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire in the colloquy in which I participated be charged to this side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, does the Senator have any feeling that the administration may be so eager to come to an agreement with the Soviets on a START Treaty, so eager for a summit, that the administration may be about to enter into an agreement detrimental to the interests of the Afghan resistance?

Before the Senator answers, I want to say that Secretary Shultz and I had a discussion about this very point last week.

I was reassured with the Secretary's response to me on that, indicating that the U.S. Government not only was not being so influenced but also would not be influenced by a desire to reach a START agreement to any such extent—in other words, that the United States would not do anything or enter into any agreement or accede to any understanding that would in any way undermine the Afghan resistance in order to advance a summit on START or an agreement on START.

I have confidence in the integrity of the Secretary of State, his forthrightness, and his honesty. The response I got from him reassured me on that point.

Does the Senator from New Hampshire wish to comment?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I do not know what causes us to find ourselves in this bind, but we do. We find ourselves in a bind. The President finds himself in a bind. Maybe it was just a bureaucratic snafu that some underlings, without the knowledge or approval of the President, negotiated these decidedly one-sided terms as they now exist on this day. Maybe that was a bureaucratic snafu. Maybe it is the mind set. Maybe it is another manifestation of what I would call the casino-style negotiating, tied up in the INF thing, and now there is this intention to make the START Treaty yet another extravaganza.

I do not know if it is related. Perhaps it is not. The fact of the matter is, we face a very bad situation and will have to do something very soon or the sacrifice of the Afghan people will be grievously in danger.

The bottom line fact is we are required on our part to cut off aid on day one. The Soviets have no such requirement in the agreement as it stands now.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this resolution on which the Senate will vote, it seems to me, represents a clean, sharp break on the part of the U.S. Senate from any such idea, or any such thought.

If that is the idea or the thought on the part of the administration, or anybody in the State Department—lower level, mid level, anywhere else—it seems to me that this Senate resolution clearly makes a clean, sharp break on the part of the Senate with any such idea, and it should be a caution light to the administration.

I read from the top of page 2 of the resolution, if the Senator will allow me.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Of course.

Mr. BYRD. "Therefore, be it resolved that the Senate hereby"—here is the paragraph, number 7:

Expresses its strong belief that the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.

If that is not strong enough, I would like to make it even stronger, if the Senator has any suggestions as to how that might be done.

It is alien to my thinking that the United States of America, through its Government, in any way, shape, or form, would even contemplate, much less sign on the dotted line, any agreement that would cut off aid to the Afghan freedom fighters as long as they need military aid, to repel the Soviet invaders, now or in the future.

and I hope we are not about to take such a reprehensible and tragic step as that. I hope that things are really not what they seem.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his incisive comments. He has taken a good deal of time in addressing this matter, a good deal of his valuable time, because of the critical importance of the matter, the critical importance of the terms of the agreement.

Just any agreement is not good enough. It has to be one that ensures the gains of the people of Afghanistan and ensures against any treachery or doublecross on the part of the Soviets.

As the agreement now stands, they do not ensure against doublecross. There is not much time left, if we believe the press accounts, but there is time if the President and the Secretary of State will involve themselves. There is time to modify these agreements and to make them decent and to make them just, but it will take the involvement of the President and the Secretary of State.

The majority leader is right. We have not finalized anything yet. We may be 95 percent of the way there; we may be 99 percent of the way there; but until we cross that 100-percent mark, it is all open to modification.

Mr. BYRD. Are the Soviets saying that if we do not sign these agreements they will not withdraw?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No, I have not said that.

Mr. BYRD. I say, are the Soviets in essence saying that?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think implicit in some of the comments in recent weeks is that the United States had better agree now because it might lose its opportunity for an agreement.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Soviets get out of Afghanistan, they will not be getting out because of an act of good will or altruistic motives.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think not.

Mr. BYRD. They will be getting out because they want out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BYRD. Because the Afghans are making it pretty hot for them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. BYRD. It is costing them more than they anticipated.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Exactly.

Mr. BYRD. In terms of treasure and in lives, I would call their bluff on that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is right.

Mr. BYRD. If they are saying, "If you don't sign, we won't withdraw," I would hope we would give the Afghans more aid than we are giving them now.

The Soviets must not be rewarded for getting out of Afghanistan, and certainly we have our own honor to think of as we look down the many years ahead. This country ought to be very careful that it does not commit a dishonorable act to accommodate the

Soviet Union. They ought to just turn tail and get out.

They did not ask our advice when they went in.

Now, after 8 years they intend to get out, we hear. They would probably like to get out, but they would like to get out with honor. They would like to be rewarded for getting out. They probably would like to have the Nobel Peace Prize.

Mr. HUMPHREY. They probably will get it.

Mr. BYRD. I hope not.

But they want out.

I guess they would like for the United States to help them get out under the appearance of honor, that it will appear noble of them to withdraw, an act of goodwill. They want the world to believe that they are peace-loving. They can do it simply by heading north out of Afghanistan.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his yielding to me, and I thank him again for the strong support that he has evidenced on many occasions for the Afghan fighters.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his kind words.

I would simply respond to them that we are indeed on the verge of committing, to use his term, a dishonorable act unless the agreements are modified before they are finally concluded.

We may well have exposed the Afghans unconscionably to a doublecross and significant if not total loss of the gains they have made through enormous sacrifice.

Mr. President, the Soviets act out of self-interest or at least as they perceive their self-interest. They are not leaving Afghanistan because of noble sentiments. They are leaving because the Afghans have raised the cost of occupation to a point the Soviets are no longer willing to pay. It is clear. It is that simple just as we for our part as Americans raised the cost of the British occupation of our country, the colonies, to a point which they were no longer willing to pay. We did not defeat the Redcoats except at Trenton and Yorktown and other places. We defeated the Redcoats because they were not willing to pay the price and they left.

The same is true of the Afghans. They have not defeated the Red Army in the classical sense of the word, the literal sense of the word, but they have raised the cost of treasury and international public opinion to the point the Soviets are not willing to pay.

That is why they are leaving. That is why they leave in good order and make good on the agreement to withdraw, if we structure that agreement in such a way that it is in their interest to get out and start out, and that is to say to provide continued aid to the resistance until it is indelibly clear that the Soviets are gone and cannot possibly return.

In order to have such an agreement, Mr. President, I want to conclude my

remarks by addressing a few further points, listing a few further criteria which must be in any agreement for such an agreement to constitute decent and just agreement and one that safeguards the cause of Afghan independence.

The first point is we have to continue to supply the resistance.

The second point is if at some point we begin to reduce assistance, let us say in a phased basis commensurate with a Soviet withdrawal, the Soviets likewise have to phase out their assistance to the puppet regime.

There are a number of other important points, a number of other criteria, Mr. President, although not all of them listed in the resolution.

An agreement must address the repatriation by the Soviet Union of the more than 10,000 Afghan children who have been forcibly deported to the Soviet Union. One of the great under-reported stories of this decade, the Soviets have been kidnaping, taking children from their parents without consent, kidnaping children from Afghanistan, the brighter ones, taking them off to the Soviet Union for periods of months ranging to years for "education."

It is hard to think of words strong enough to condemn such practice. Yet our dandies in the diplomatic corps have not seen fit to raise this issue as far as we can tell in these talks. Certainly there is no provision in these agreements for the return of these 10,000 children, more than 10,000 children to their parents, to their families, to their country.

That ought to be in a decent agreement, but it is not in this agreement.

And furthermore, interested parties should be free to continue humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people both during and following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

Mr. President, this is an outstanding comprehensive resolution which speaks with great clarity for the Senate, putting this body on record implicitly with respect to the agreements that now stand and explicitly with respect to the agreements as we believe they should stand if they are to do justice to the Afghans and to their sacrifice and to the responsibilities that fall on our shoulders inasmuch as we are negotiating for these people. They are not at the bargaining table unfortunately. We are representing them.

Mr. President, a columnist, A.M. Rosenthal, wrote an important incisive piece on this matter published a few days ago in the New York Times. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, earlier I alluded to a letter signed by 29 Senators, including the chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee and

the Intelligence Committee, a letter to the President calling upon the President to ensure that any agreement of which we are a party does not require us to cut off assistance to the Afghans while any Soviet troops remain in the country. I ask unanimous consent the letter be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, one last insertion. Last year about this time, almost exactly a year ago, this Senator asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to conduct a study to determine how long it would take the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan based on logistical criteria, since our criteria for the length of the timetable has been logistics only, to use the word of Secretary Shultz. So I asked DIA to conduct such a study, and the report concludes it would take the Soviets 30 to 40 days to execute such a withdrawal, one that would be orderly and safe and which would accommodate the removal of the considerable equipment which they have in Afghanistan. Thirty to forty days.

Now, it appears that the United States is ready to agree to 10 months. It is almost 10 times longer than the Defense Intelligence Agency said is necessary for withdrawal based on the criteria which Secretary Shultz said logistics only. We are going to give them 10 months to do that, maybe six or eight times at least more than they need, proposing to cut off assistance to the resistance at the outset, leaving them twisting in the wind for 10 months while the Soviets are perfectly free to continuously and generously resupply their own forces. If they have a mind, during those 10 months to destroy the resistance, they will certainly have an opportunity to do so.

I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record this DIA study.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. HUMPHREY. These agreements are dangerous as they stand. They must be modified and perfected. There is time to do that. They may be well along. But there is time and unless the President does that I believe the United States will have failed miserably in its responsibilities to freedom in Afghanistan and indeed around the world.

Mr. President, finally I want to thank and pay special tribute to a member of my staff who has worked fulltime on this issue of Afghanistan now for 3 years. He has done a remarkably fine job. That is Tom Kleine.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

(From the New York Times, Feb. 26, 1988)

A LITTLE TIME LEFT

(By A.M. Rosenthal)

There is still time for President Reagan to make sure that a great victory in the

making does not become a tragedy. But not much time.

The Soviet Union has agreed in theory to pull its troops out of Afghanistan. This can be a smashing political, military and moral triumph for the Afghan resistance fighters, for Pakistan, which gave them refuge for a decade, and for a strong bipartisan American policy of military and economic support to the resistance.

But there is a critical debate taking place in Washington to which neither the President nor the country has paid enough attention. It did not rate a Presidential statement or even a question at his news conference.

The debate in Congress, the State and Defense Departments, the White House and among intelligence specialists is not among political caricatures—war-minded hawks and mushy-headed peaceniks. On both sides are rational people who range from mildly radical to devoutly conservative.

The heart of the debate is this:

Will the pullout mean that Afghans will be able to choose their own government or is the Soviet Union planning and the U.S. falling for a withdrawal plan that will keep Moscow's puppet Government in power in Kabul?

Two specific questions are involved:

Will the U.S. cut off aid to the resistance while Moscow openly or covertly supplies the Kabul Communist regime with arms and economic assistance?

Should the U.S. accept the Soviet determination to leave the Kabul regime intact and in power after the pullout or should we insist on an interim government in which the Afghan resistance, which fought not only against the Russians but their Kabul satellites, has a dominant role as the fruit of its victory?

In Congress and the Administration, there is a strong inclination to make the pullout deal quickly, to insure Soviet troop withdrawal. As for aid cutoffs, they say, we will make the best deal possible. It doesn't matter that much, anyway; once the Red Army is out, the Kabul regime will soon be torn apart by the Afghan resistance.

But there are also Congressmen and specialists convinced that the Administration's eagerness for agreements with the Russians can turn an anti-Communist victory into a Communist triumph.

They believe it is naïve, self-deluding and pantingly optimistic to assume Moscow will not keep up the struggle for Afghanistan. So do I. The Russians will leave behind a well-armed Kabul government that will fight from fortified cities. Moscow will keep supplying the Afghan Communists after we cut off aid to the resistance.

The resistance forces will indeed triumph over Kabul one day. But we owe it to them and ourselves not to leave them with a clap on the back and very best wishes as they face more years of war against a Soviet-backed Kabul government.

There is confusion and double-talk about what the United States has promised or hinted at. In a day or two, the President will get a letter from at least 29 senators of almost every political shading urging him to step in and clear things up. They want him to make sure himself that aid to the resistance is not cut off until all Soviet troops leave Afghanistan and Moscow ceases aid to Kabul.

The letter is signed by conservative Republicans like Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire, one of the strongest backers of the resistance, and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. It also has signatures of the Democrats Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York and Christopher Dodd of Connecticut. Alfonse D'Amato of New York and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, Republicans, have

signed and so have the Democrats Joseph Biden of Delaware and Dennis DeConcini of Arizona.

So it is now up to the President to call a meeting of the National Security Council, find out what has been committed and decide what he is willing to stand by.

But that's not enough. The next round of talks starts in Geneva on March 1. The agreements should be made public before the United States commits its power and honor to them.

The U.S. need not agree with the resistance on every point nor satisfy every demand. But at least the President should pay attention to the last sentence in the letter he will be getting from the senators of both parties:

"We have no right to endanger the gains the Afghans have made at a terrible price to their nation."

Then let's hear from the President fully, openly and soon. Secret diplomacy is now unjustified. Whatever Washington tells Russians is exactly what it should tell Afghans, Pakistanis and Americans.

EXHIBIT 2

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, December 16, 1987.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We were encouraged by your statement preceding the Summit that the United States would not agree to end all outside assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters prior to the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Your statement that we could not do "anything of that kind because the puppet government that has been left there has a military" was an accurate statement of the obvious.

Consequently, we are deeply concerned with reports today that U.S. assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters would in fact be cut off at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal. To accede to General Secretary Gorbachev's demand that U.S. support be ended at the outset, is to gravely endanger the gains purchased by the Afghan people at very great cost: a million and a quarter dead—the equivalent of 20 million dead Americans.

To agree to cut off all aid to the Afghan resistance, while Soviet troops remaining are generously and continually resupplied, and while the puppet government they set up is likewise resupplied, is unwise on its face. Let it never be said the United States threw away the sacrifice of the Afghan people.

Mr. President, we strongly agree with your assessment that we "can't suddenly disarm them and leave them prey to the other government." We have no right to endanger the gains the Afghans have made at a terrible price to their nation.

Sincerely,

Larry Pressler, Dan Quayle, Chic Hecht, Rudy Boschwitz, Pete Wilson, Don Nickles, John McCain, Steven Symms, David Durenberger, Dennis DeConcini, Strom Thurmond, Joe Biden, Gordon Humphrey, John P. Kerry, Alfonse D'Amato, Bill Armstrong, Chuck Grassley, Thad Cochran, Daniel Moynihan, Mitch McConnell, Christopher J. Dodd, Jim McClure, Malcolm Wallop, David K. Carnes, Richard Shelby, Bob Graham, Claiborne Pell, David L. Boren, David Pryor, and Richard Lugar.

EXHIBIT 3

DOD LOGISTICS STUDY, 10 FEBRUARY 1987

Background Paper for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Subject: Hypothetical Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.

1. Purpose: The Senate Armed Services Committee requested an estimate of the period of time required for the Soviet forces to execute a rapid, effective, and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.

2. Points of major interest:

a. The assessment was developed from the following assumptions:

The timetable is based solely on logistic considerations.

No major interference is expected from the Mujahedin.

The order of unit withdrawal would provide continuous security for the Soviet forces within Afghanistan.

Sequencing of the withdrawal would be as follows:

40 percent of combat ground forces;
80 percent of combat air forces;
70 percent of rear services;
50 percent of army headquarters (forward);

40 percent of combat ground forces;
30 percent of rear services;
50 percent of army headquarters (rear);
20 percent of combat air forces;
20 percent of combat ground forces.

b. Timing of the withdrawal includes movement preparation, e.g., repair of deadlined equipment, uploading of materiel, closing of facilities, and transfer of certain supplies and facilities to the Afghan military. Movement times were calculated based on reports and lines of communication capacity.

c. Soviet logistic operations in Afghanistan do not depend on the incountry infrastructure or Afghan support, except for the road network. Thus, withdrawal from Afghanistan would not involve new Soviet logistic responsibilities requiring additional resources.

d. Based on the above assumptions, the estimated time required to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan is 30-40 days. Unforeseen administrative requirements involved in the Soviet departure could increase withdrawal times by as much as 20 percent.

Coordination: None.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I think the majority leader brought out some very important points about what the motivation of the Soviet Union is and also what the motivation of the United States on behalf of freedom and the Afghan freedom fighters on behalf of freedom is and should be. But I think when we look back at history, I would agree with the majority leader that we should not be blinded by history. I would also agree with his point that we must not see the world the way it is by the way we wish it were.

We cannot be blinded by hope. We have to look at what the Soviet actions are in Afghanistan. In Nicaragua, in Angola, arms shipments have gone up. They have gone up, they have not gone down since Gorbachev became the leader. In Angola, the Soviet Union sent over \$1 billion in military arms under his new leadership. Under glasnost, they sent over \$1 billion in arms to try to subvert freedom and subdue freedom in Angola. It

is more in 1 year than any other year under any other Soviet leader.

In Nicaragua last year, they sent \$600 million. And that is the same year that the United States House decided that we should not send any aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

But, Mr. President, I think a little bit of history—and I appreciate so much the fact that the majority leader brought the book, which he has obviously read very carefully and some underlying points in the book, on Lenin and pointed out some of those very important statements.

I wish to add a little bit to that, just to put this in perspective, of what is happening in Afghanistan and how it relates to world peace and freedom and how it relates to the security and the opportunities for Americans so that we will not be asking our sons and grandsons to be sent to some foreign country to fight; that we can be successful in these efforts for people to achieve their own freedom and their own self-determination as to what our goal is in Afghanistan.

But, Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that no matter what anyone may think about Mr. Gorbachev, communism has cost the lives of 160 million people in the last 70 years. That is right. I am not talking about countless people that have been deprived economic opportunity and have lived in poverty and lived in abject subsistence-type economies due to the fact that the Soviet Union tries to run everything through a bureaucracy.

I have said this many times, and I have said it on the floor before. If the Soviet Union would turn the farms over to the Russian people instead of trying to run them by the Soviet bureaucrats, the Soviet Union would be the biggest producer and exporter of food in the world. They have twice as much irrigable land as we have in the United States. They produce most of their produce, vegetables, and fruit crops from little private tracts that make up a very, very small percentage of the property in their country. It is very interesting. I am told, if you look down the fence row from the private field to the Government field, that, on one side, it is clean, it is beautiful, the crops are growing well; on the other side, it is a weedpatch, it is barren, it is deprived of any nurture and cultural growth, and the field looks bad. And their answer is, of course, that the weather is bad.

I have said many times, one of the reasons why we do not always have crop failures is we get our weather from the Almighty. In the Soviet Union, they get their weather from Pravda, and it is bad weather. That is what the paper says. That is their excuse for their ineptitude in running their farms.

So, in addition to the people who have lived poorly, I think it is interesting to note that just the people I am talking about are people that have been killed by Communist dictator-

ships and it has averaged 2.3 million people a year since 1917.

The Soviet Union is not responsible for all of those, but they are responsible for an estimated 69.7 million of them. Refugees from the Soviet-sponsored aggression is staggering. From Afghanistan, there are 3 million refugees; the resolution we are talking about today. From Ethiopia, where statecontrolled food distribution and collectivism has created mass starvation, there are 1 1/4 million refugees.

When we pulled out of Vietnam, millions of people became boat people to flee the tyranny of communism. The Soviets killed over 20 million people after their revolution.

In his book, "The Great Terror," British scholar Robert Conquest quotes the philosophical father of modern day communism, V.I. Lenin who said: "Not a single revolutionary government can dispense with the death penalty for the exploiters"

And when Lenin spoke about exploiters, Mr. President, he is talking about the capitalists and the landlords, those people who are in the position of leadership in the infrastructure of a democratic society.

Lenin, chastized those who objected to the use of terror in a Communist Party meeting in June, 1918, saying: "This is unheard of. The energy and mass nature of terror must be encouraged."

Then there is the famous "terror-famine" in the Ukraine where the Soviets cut off the supply of grain and food to the area to kill off those objecting to communism.

Of course, today, people will say that can not happen, but is happening in Ethiopia. The use of Western food aid to depopulate areas that are revolting against the Marxist Leninist government.

They are notorious for stopping the food going to the people who want it because they are objecting to the Communist government. There again, you get back to the object of peace. A hard-nosed Marxist-Leninist thinks that peace is the condition where they run their government without interference from pockets of people who do not agree with the Communists.

"Communist governments are still executing non-believers"

In Mozambique, Frelimo, the Soviet backed Marxist-Leninist government uses the death penalty as a means of crushing dissent and intimidating the population.

Ex-Frelimo member Jose A. Francisco, now a U.S. citizen testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations African Subcommittee saying:

The Frelimo defense chief to ex-President Samora Machel, Alberto Chipande, personally executed his own father in the presence of 1,000 Frelimo cadres as an example for establishing the "new order." This public murder was committed by stabbing his father in the stomach and ripping upwards until he died.

Mr. Francisco witnessed mass executions. He said in his testimony:

"Young Prelimo cadres returning from indoctrination in Russia and other East-bloc countries were secretly identified by their instructors as being either converted communists or unconverted. The unconverted were met at the airport in Dar es Salaam with orders for special missions. They were transported into the operational area of Cabo Delgado only to find themselves in a detention center. Here they were executed by bayonet, first being sexually dismembered. This was a regular occurrence; the largest single massacre I witnessed involved 120 individuals.

Mr. President, it is clear that Communist regimes around the world are following Lenin's advice, that "Not a single revolutionary government can dispense with the death penalty for the exploiters—that is the capitalists and landlords."

That is exactly the point.

Mr. President, I will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a few statements that came out of a Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist semantics that was put together by the editor, Raymond S. Sleeper, "Semantic Subversion of Words." He makes the point that the majority leader was making so well. Lenin said, "The most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary." There is a famous story about Lenin, when he was leaving by train in Europe to get back across into the Soviet Union. Someone asked him if he had his gun. He said: No, I have my pen. It is much more powerful.

They have twisted the words to fool the West whenever possible.

There are three or four articles. I would just like to read them and then have them printed in the RECORD.

PEACE MOVEMENT AND PURPOSE OF IT

(1) To deprive the enemy, i.e., the Western democratic countries, of their masses, without which no modern army can exist (revolt and revolution). (2) To lay hands on valuable raw materials (control of sources by force or cunning). (3) To slow down the development of armament industry (activating systematic sabotage). (4) To place its dependence on the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, this is exactly what it appears to me that Mr. Gorbachev does. He makes no bones about it. They have Soviet tentacles across into the treasure house of minerals in Africa. That is why they are in Angola. That is why they are in Mozambique. That is why they have been exerting their influence in Zimbabwe and Zaire. That is why it is important that we support those freedom fighters in Angola so that they cannot control the resources and force us to have to go to the Soviet Union to get them. That is why they are in Afghanistan. It is so that they can get one step closer to Iran and control the Strait of Hormuz because through the Strait of Hormuz goes the oil that nurtures the Western economies. Without it we would not have the oil to run the economies of all our trading partners in Japan, the Pacific rim, in Western Europe. That is why the Soviets always fish out of troubled waters and

stir that pot. They know what they are doing.

Peaceful coexistence. Listen to what Khrushchev had to say about peaceful coexistence.

I have always believed that coexistence with the Soviet Union was something like the same kind of agreement that the farmer has with the turkey. It works really well right up until Thanksgiving.

Khrushchev had this to say:

We must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to the grave.

He is talking about the capitalists and the Communists.

We do not want to go to the grave. They do not want to go to their grave either. So what can be done? We must push them to their grave.

Peace, the definition of peace. Marxism, incompatible with pacifism.

Marxism is not pacifism. It is necessary to fight for a speedy end of the war. But only through a call to revolutionary struggle will the peace demand gain proletarian content. Without a series of revolutions the so-called democratic peace is a petty-bourgeois utopia.

Mr. President, another definition that they use from the semantic dictionary, the book of Marxists-Leninists semantics: Peace, democratic.

A democratic peace can be concluded only by proletarian governments after they have overthrown the rule of the bourgeoisie and begun to expropriate it.

PEACE STRUGGLE

The struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence does not slow down the revolutionary process but on the contrary, creates more favorable conditions for it. That is why the Marxist-Leninist parties, in elaborating their general line, have put forward the struggle for peace as the paramount task of the communist movement.

G. Glezerman, "The Great Significance of Lenin's Ideas of the Struggle for Democracy and Socialism," Pravda (Moscow), 21 Jan. 1965.

"The struggle for peace is inexorably intertwined with the revolutionary process. To curb the aggressive drive of U.S. imperialism is to create the most favorable conditions for the further development of revolutionary change. And each revolutionary advance, by weakening imperialism, reinforces the struggle for peace. In the broad historical sweep, the struggle for peace is objectively a struggle to facilitate the transition from capitalism to socialism" with the catastrophic devastation of nuclear war.—New Program of the Communist Party USA (May: 1970), pp 37-38.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of these comments be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks, including an editorial entitled "U.S. Communists Prepare Peace Offensive," from the October 30, 1987, issue of Washington Inquirer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, the United States must show the importance of freedom and resolve in Afghanistan, guided by Soviet action, not Soviet words. When the Soviets have

left, then we can stop sending arms and then we will probably have to send some help to help them rebuild their infrastructure and their society. But we are putting the policy and the credibility of the United States on the line, and if and when the Soviets leave, then we can stop our aid. Any stopping of our aid prematurely to that action would be a mistake.

Mr. President, that is why this resolution is an important resolution. I thank my colleagues for their support on this resolution and I urge my colleagues to vote for this resolution so that a message of strength and solidarity for resistance movements may be understood loud and clear from this country.

EXHIBIT 1

A LEXICON OF MARXIST-LENINIST SEMANTICS (Raymond S. Sleeper)

PEACE STRUGGLE

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New Program of the communist Party USA (May: 1970), pp 37-38.

PEACE AND REVOLUTION, COMPATIBILITY OF

It is absurd to say that world peace and world revolution are incompatible. The socialist revolution will score a gradual victory in countries one by one as a result of internal factors in these countries' societies, the people's consciousness, and efforts and due preparations they have made for revolution . . . The stronger the socialist camp becomes, the greater the development of the world people's revolutionary movement; the more countries that win revolutionary victory, the greater safeguard there will be for world peace.

Red Flag (Peking), Oct. 1960, pp 1-2.

The CPSU . . . views peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle developing in the political, economic and ideological spheres on the international arena. By fighting against the outbreak of another world war, and organizing and leading the worker, national liberation, and all-democratic movement, the communists . . . pave the way to the triumph of socialism in the whole world. Scientific Communism, A Glossary (Moscow: 1975), p 180.

(From the Washington Inquirer, Oct. 30, 1987)

U.S. COMMUNISTS PREPARE PEACE OFFENSIVE

The organ of the U.S. Communist Party, the People's Daily World, reported the following on October 16, 1987:

As many as 1,000 peace activists from around the country are expected to participate in the various activities of the U.S. Peace Council's Fifth National Conference in Detroit next month, organizers said this week.

Their deliberations, at the Pontchartrain Hotel, Nov. 13-15, will center on how to build the USPC and strengthen it organizationally, as well as how the Council can work most effectively to help mobilize the peace majority in this country to achieve nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.

"Our conference comes at a propitious moment because we're entering the final year of the Reagan presidency," USPC Executive Director Michael Myerson told the PDW Tuesday. Peace forces are registering major achievements—such as the Central American peace plan, the defeat of Bork and an arms agreement with the USSR almost complete—over the opposition of the Reagan administration, he said. "What we want to do at the conference is to lay out a strategy for the coming year, of increased mass actions leading through next summer's Third UN Special Session on Disarmament, into the November 1988 elections. We hope to send to Washington a Congress and administration which reflect the views of the peace majority in the country," Myerson said.

High on the agenda at the conference will be the Campaign for Disarmament and Common Security by 2000, launched at a conference of some 40 organizations in New Jersey last June.

A "workshop of the whole" on Saturday, Nov. 14, will concentrate on the role of labor and oppressed minorities in the struggle for peace.

On Friday, Nov. 13, a reception at the hotel will honor Detroit city officials who are leaders in the peace and justice movements. Among these will be City Council President Erma Henderson and longtime City Council member and USPC board member Maryanne Mahaffey. Also honored will be Detroit members of Congress John Conyers and George Crockett.

THE ROLE AND AIM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

As the leader and organizer of the proletariat, the Communist Party of the U.S.A. leads the working class in the fight for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the establishment of a Socialist Soviet Republic in the United States.

(Reprinted from *The Communist Party—A Manual on Organization*, By J. Peters.)

PEACE MOVEMENT, PURPOSE OF

(1) To deprive the enemy, i.e., the Western democratic countries, of their masses, without which no modern army can exist (revolt and revolution.) 2.) To lay hands on valuable raw materials (control of sources by force or cunning.) 3.) To slow down the development of armament industry (activating systematic sabotage.) 4.) To place its dependence on the Soviet Union (ruki poshvan'—or stand at attention.)

Ketrzynski, *Slowo Powszechnie* (Warsaw), 16 Nov 1950.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, ETERNAL

We must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to the grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They do not want to go to their grave either. So what can be done? We must push them to their grave.

N.S. Khrushchev, "Speech," United Polish Workers' Party (Warsaw), Apr 1955.

PEACE, MARXIST, INCOMPATIBLE WITH PACIFISM

Marxism is not pacifism. It is necessary to fight for a speedy end of the war. But only through a call to revolutionary struggle will

the peace demand gain proletarian content. Without a series of revolutions the so-called democratic peace is a petty-bourgeois utopia. Only such a program showing that we declare a life and death struggle against capitalism, would sooner or later secure for us the sympathy of the real proletarian masses.

V.I. Lenin, "Reconstruction of the International," (1914), *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1930), Vol. 18, p 248.

PEACE, DEMOCRATIC

A democratic peace can be concluded only by proletarian governments after they have overthrown the rule of the bourgeoisie and begun to expropriate it.

V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (1917), Vol. 23, p 302. (V)

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution. It is a symbol of the bipartisan spirit that is at the core of the Nation's policy toward the people of Afghanistan and against the brutal Soviet occupation of that country. It reaffirms our support for the resistance—despite what I am concerned may be State Department attempts to cut aid to the democratic resistance before the Soviets have completely left Afghanistan and without assurances that the interim government formed is acceptable to the resistance.

Mr. President, this resolution makes clear that this Senate will not, and this Government should not, support a cosmetic solution to the fate of the Afghan people. It demonstrates that we are bipartisanly in favor of a solution that truly represents the legitimate hopes and aspirations of the Afghan people: to live free, governed by leaders of their own choosing, and without interference from Communist or Communist-supported forces.

Mr. President, this resolution is also significant for what it avoids doing. We are all hopeful that the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev will accede to the only acceptable solution to this conflict: complete and total withdrawal of all Soviet and Soviet-backed forces from Afghanistan and support for an interim government acceptable to the resistance. But we have all too often succumbed in our optimism to praising Soviet words only to find that Soviet deeds were not forthcoming. This resolution resists that natural temptation. We can hope that all turns out well, but we cannot know the final outcome of this process yet. It would be counterproductive for the Senate to support or condemn Soviet actions at this time. We can only set out, as we have in this resolution, what policy this country ought to be guided by so that in dealing with the Soviet ruler on this matter the President and the Secretary can be assured where the Senate stands: firmly behind a free Afghanistan.

Mr. President, I compliment the majority leader and his staff for their work on this resolution as well as Senator SYMS and his staff, who I understand played a key role in its coming before this body today.

AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in recent weeks, Mr. Gorbachev and other prominent Soviet leaders have repeatedly voiced their intention to begin a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. After more than 8 years of war in that country—war which has left over 1 million Afghans dead and 4 million as refugees—we must welcome and encourage this Soviet opening to an end to the carnage in Afghanistan. At the same time, however, we must stand firm in our insistence that the Mujahadeen resistance will play a leading role in shaping the Afghan Government that will replace the current regime in Kabul. I believe that this resolution clearly expresses the sense of the Senate that while we support the progress of negotiations on a Soviet withdrawal, the United States must not allow the future of the Afghan resistance to be compromised.

Secretary of State George Shultz returned last week from a trip which included talks with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. Mr. Shultz was encouraged by the discussions on Afghanistan. He is confident that the Soviets genuinely want to withdraw and intend to do so.

This is the best news to come out of Moscow in regard to Afghanistan throughout the whole course of the Soviet occupation. The withdrawal of Soviet troops would mark the end of one of the most brutal wars the world has seen in this decade. The withdrawal would allow millions of Afghans who are living as refugees to return home. The withdrawal would signal a victory for the Afghan resistance forces which have struggled against the Soviet occupation since the 1979 invasion, and would allow the Afghan people to exercise their fundamental rights to self-determination and democracy.

I welcome the Soviet openings to ending the war in Afghanistan. But I maintain that we must not let our eagerness to see the Soviets withdraw compromise our continued support for the Afghan resistance.

Mr. Gorbachev has stated that he intends to begin moving Soviet troops out of Afghanistan on a large scale by May 15. This pledge is contingent, among other things, on an agreement by the United States before March 15 to end all assistance to the Afghan mujahadeen as soon as the Soviets begin to withdraw. I believe that this condition is unacceptable.

Cutting off assistance to the mujahadeen might encourage a peace process if the conflict in Afghanistan were one between opposing forces within the country. If that were the case, the popular support of the Afghan people could determine the outcome of the peace process. But bringing peace and democracy to Afghanistan is not a

matter of resolving a conflict between opposing factions within Afghanistan.

The fact is that Afghanistan was invaded, and has been brutally occupied by the Soviet Union—by 130,000 members of the most powerful army in Asia—for over 8 years. Afghanistan will not be able to begin the process of political reconstruction until the Soviet military presence is withdrawn; and the resistance which has fought against the Soviet invasion must be maintained until that time. To end support for the resistance before the Soviets are out of Afghanistan would be to risk all that the mujahadeen have fought for.

I think it is important to make clear that in supporting this resolution, we are not abandoning the path of negotiation on a peace settlement for Afghanistan. Rather, by reaffirming our support for the resistance, we are ensuring that all the parties involved in the conflict will be heard in Geneva.

The alliance of resistance groups in Afghanistan put forth a proposal last week for the establishment of an interim government to oversee the transition to democracy in Afghanistan. The interim government would rule during the Soviet withdrawal, and until national elections are held. This proposal marks the first time the Afghan resistance alliance has recognized the legitimacy of the peace talks in Geneva and has actively sought to negotiate on the terms of the Soviet withdrawal. The alliance's proposal, along with the Soviet proposal, will be discussed in Geneva when peace talks reopen there on Wednesday.

Mr. President, this resolution states clearly that the Senate supports the recent progress toward the resolution of the war in Afghanistan, but not at the expense of the resistance we have supported for the past 8 years. The mujahadeen resistance in Afghanistan has provided an example of what a popular movement fighting against an unpopular regime can accomplish. While overwhelmingly outgunned and outmanned, the mujahadeen have unquestionably enjoyed the full support of the Afghan people.

With popular support, the mujahadeen have been able to execute consistently successful actions against the Soviet occupation forces and the Kabul regime throughout the course of the war. With popular support, the mujahadeen have been able to control vast sections of the Afghan countryside. With popular support, the mujahadeen have effectively convinced the Soviets that their invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake, and that their withdrawal is inevitable.

Now, as the resistance has entered the process of negotiating a resolution to the war, we must support them more strongly than ever. I ask my colleagues to join me in support for Senate Resolution 386, which will clearly express the confidence of this body in continuing with a policy that

has been executed consistently and successfully.

Mr. BYRD. I am merely trying to get some idea as to when the Senate can vote.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I can be done in 5 more minutes.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator will need 5 minutes. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee will be speaking for 5 minutes. I understand that the distinguished acting Republican leader is agreeable to a final vote any time?

Mr. SPECTER. Is it possible to vote at 10 of 5?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the resolution occur at 10 minutes until 5. That allows 5 minutes each for Mr. Symms and Mr. Pell. Is that agreeable?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, that will be the order.

Mr. BYRD. All right. At 4:50 p.m., Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the order.

Mr. BYRD. I thank all Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I am glad to cosponsor this resolution on Afghanistan. With the Geneva negotiations resuming on March 2, it is appropriate for the Senate to address the American position on the prospective agreement.

We can be hopeful that the Soviet Union will actually withdraw from Afghanistan. Soviet statements have been becoming increasingly definitive with regard to their intention to withdraw and the timeframe for such a withdrawal.

While we welcome stated Soviet intentions, we should not rely on them. Nor should we expect the Afghan mujahideen, many of whom have paid the ultimate price, to rely on these promises.

Inevitably, the time period for Soviet withdrawal poses risks for the freedom fighters. This resolution is designed to minimize these risks. It insists that assistance not be cut off at the beginning of the withdrawal period but continue until the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is terminated. It also makes clear that President Reagan should not, in a rush for a successful United States-Soviet Summit in May, sacrifice the vital interests of the freedom fighters.

Equally important, the resolution calls for increased humanitarian assistance to the Afghan resistance. Perhaps the greatest threat to the Afghan resistance at this stage is inadequate food, clothing, and financial support. Without outside humanitarian and financial assistance, the mujahideen armies may simply go home. The next 10 months could be the Valley Forge of the Afghan resistance;

it is essential that we do our part to keep the mujahideen armies intact.

A Soviet withdrawal will result in the rapid collapse of the Communist regime in Kabul. Of this there can be no doubt. It was the imminent collapse of the Communist regime in late 1979 that prompted the Soviet invasion. In 1988 the resistance is stronger and the regime even weaker. We should not allow the debate over the composition of an interim government to delay the Soviet withdrawal because this could not only prolong the conflict but also the life of the Kabul regime.

In the 8 years of Soviet occupation over 1 million Afghans have been killed. Bombing, nepalming, and massacres have taken a terrible toll of innocent men, women, and children. Nearly 5 million Afghans—almost one-third of the country's population—have been driven from their homes into refugee camps in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

A Soviet withdrawal is the essential in order to end the holocaust that has engulfed Afghanistan. We must be sure, however, that any withdrawal agreement does not compromise the successes that have been achieved at untold human cost by the Afghan freedom fighters. This is the purpose of this resolution. I strongly urge its adoption.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, as I recall, the order that was entered provided that this be a 15-minute rollcall vote and that the call for the regular order be automatic at the expiration of 15 minutes. Am I correct in my recollection?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is correct.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. I hope that our respective cloakrooms will remind Senators so that they will all make the rollcall within the 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this will be the only rollcall vote today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 4:50 p.m. having arrived, the question is on agreeing to Senate Resolution 386. The yeas and nays have

been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Montana [Mr. BAUCUS], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. BREAUX], the Senator from Florida [Mr. CHILES], the Senator from California [Mr. CRANSTON], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. DASCHLE], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. FOWLER], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUE], the Senator from New York [Mr. MOYNIHAN], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from Colorado [Mr. WIRTH] are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] is absent because of illness.

Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ARMSTRONG], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. COCHRAN], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. DOLE], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. DURENBERGER], the Senator from Utah [Mr. GARN], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. HEINZ], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. KARNES], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. NICKLES] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. DURENBERGER] would vote "yea."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ADAMS). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 77, nays 0, as follows:

(Rollcall Vote No. 32 Leg.)

YEAS—77

Adams	Hatch	Fell
Bentsen	Hatfield	Fressler
Bingaman	Hecht	Proxmire
Bond	Hefflin	Pryor
Boren	Helms	Quayle
Boschwitz	Hollings	Reid
Bradley	Humphrey	Riegle
Bumpers	Johnston	Rockefeller
Burdick	Kassebaum	Roth
Byrd	Kasten	Rudman
Chafee	Kennedy	Sanford
Cohen	Kerry	Sarbanes
Conrad	Lautenberg	Sasser
D'Amato	Leahy	Shelby
Danforth	Levin	Simpson
DeConcini	Lugar	Specter
Dixon	Matsunaga	Stafford
Dodd	McCain	Stevens
Domenici	McClure	Symms
Evans	McConnell	Thurmond
Eron	Melcher	Trible
Ford	Metsenbaum	Wallop
Glenn	Mikulski	Warner
Gramm	Mitchell	Weicker
Grassley	Murkowski	Wilson
Harkin	Packwood	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—23

Armstrong	Dole	Karnes
Baucus	Durenberger	Moynihan
Biden	Fowler	Nickles
Breaux	Garn	Nunn
Chiles	Gore	Simon
Cochran	Graham	Stennis
Cranston	Helms	Wirth
Daschle	Inouye	

So the resolution (S. Res. 386) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution, with its preamble, read as follows:

S. Res. 386

Whereas the Soviet Union invaded the sovereign territory of Afghanistan on December 7, 1979, and continues to occupy and attempt to subjugate that nation through the use of force, relying upon a puppet regime and an occupying army of an estimated 120,000 Soviet troops;

Whereas Pakistan has harbored more than 3,000,000 Afghan refugees and has endured hundreds of brutal raids across its borders by Afghan and Soviet aircraft and artillery, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians;

Whereas on February 8, 1988, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could begin on May 15, 1988, if the agreements on the settlement being negotiated between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva were signed no later than March 15, 1988;

Whereas General Secretary Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union could complete the troop withdrawal within ten months and that it could arrange the withdrawal such that during the first phase, a relatively greater portion of the Soviet contingent could be withdrawn;

Whereas Pakistan has made it clear that it will not sign any agreements with the current Soviet puppet regime headed by Najibullah;

Whereas the Congress condemned Soviet policy toward and behavior in Afghanistan in Public Law 99-399, calling for appropriate provision of material support to the people of Afghanistan, so long as the Soviet military occupation continues; and

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a time frame based solely on logistical criteria: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate hereby—

(1) reiterates its belief that the only acceptable formula for settlement of the Afghan situation is one which provides for the self-determination of the Afghan people and results in a government genuinely representative of the Afghan people, outlines a definite timetable based solely on logistical criteria for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future and provides for the return of refugees in safety and dignity;

(2) expresses its belief that the Pakistani government should not be put under any pressure to agree to Soviet terms for a settlement and that the future of Afghanistan should not be driven by the desire or schedule for a United States-Soviet summit;

(3) urges the President to—

(A) support strongly a political solution in Kabul acceptable to the resistance;

(B) insist in talks with the Soviet Union that all Soviet advisers be removed from Afghanistan at the same time as Soviet troop withdrawal takes place;

(C) address the issue of the future status of the nearly 400-bilateral treaties the Soviets have made with the puppet Kabul regime;

(D) address with the Soviets the deployment of Soviet troops across the Soviet-Afghan border after the completion of the withdrawal period;

(E) stand firm on the necessity for the Soviets to terminate all forms of military as-

sistance and logistical support to the Kabul regime;

(F) address the repatriation by the Soviet Union of the more than 10,000 Afghan children who have been forcibly deported to the Soviet Union; and

(G) ensure that international assistance to the refugees continues at least until all Soviet and Soviet bloc forces have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and peace has been restored;

(4) expresses its belief that all Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers must be removed from Afghanistan during the period of troop withdrawal;

(5) expresses its support for increased United States humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people both during and following the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet bloc forces from Afghanistan;

(6) expresses its support for a United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping force to help guarantee that Soviet forces can withdraw in an orderly way without being attacked on the way out and to help keep the peace in the major cities while an interim government organizes the nation's future; and

(7) expresses its strong belief that the Government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to.

Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there will be no more rollcall votes today.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent there be a period for morning business not extending beyond 15 minutes and that Senators may speak therein for not to exceed 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 387—EX-PRESSING GRATITUDE OF THE SENATE TO THE U.S. WINTER OLYMPICS TEAM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send a resolution to the desk and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BYRD. What is the request, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request by the Senator from Connecticut is to send a resolution to the desk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 8801563
DATE 11 MAR 88

SUBJECT: PRES LTR SEN BYRD RE AFGHANISTAN ISSUES
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

BYRD, ROBERT C
MAJORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE
UNITED STATE SENATE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20510

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

3/11/88 3:35 E. Houser

COPY: 1

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____
Package # 1563
DOCLOG AK A/O _____

MAR 11 AM 11:50

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>5</u>	<u>Bob</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
John Negroponte	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>R-12</u> <u>3/11</u>	<u>D</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other JDN

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Please give
copy of this
package to
JDN per attached
note.

Bob

Alexander
Jones
AC
3/11

**National Security Council
The White House**

me

System # I
 Package # 1563
 DOCLOG me AIO §

88 MAR 4 P 6:47

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>RPB</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>JDN</u>	<u>D</u>
John Negroponte			
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>CP</u>	
Paul Stevens			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JDN 3/10</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

.....

WWD -
 JDN wants a copy of this pkg, when it comes back from the President -

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8801563
RECEIVED: 29 FEB 88 12

TO: BYRD, ROBERT C
FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 MAR 88

ORIGINAL SUBJECT:
SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS TO TERMINATE
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN
DOCUMENT SUBJECT:
PRES LTR SEN BYRD RE AFGHANISTAN ISSUES

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR
STATUS: C FILES: X *Wt* CODES:
STAFF OFFICER: OAKLEY

DUE DATE: 03 MAR 88

D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
FORTIER
LEDISKY
OAKLEY
TAHIR-KHELI

COMMENTS:

OPENED BY NSRCB
CLOSED BY NSRCB

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8801563
RECEIVED: 29 FEB 88 12

TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: BYRD, ROBERT C

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 88

ORIGINAL SUBJECT:
SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS TO TERMINATE THEIR
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
STATUS: S FILES: WH
STAFF OFFICER: ERMARTH

DUE DATE: 03 MAR 88

CODES:

D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

~~ERMARTH~~

RODMAN

J. Kelly
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE

FORTIER

ROSS

TAHIR-KHELI

ERMARTH

FOR INFO

KELLY, B

DANZANSKY

COMMENTS:

OPENED BY
NSRCB

CLOSED BY

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 08, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. ROBERT H. KRIEBLE

SUBJECT: CRITICAL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT ACCURATELY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
POLICY REGARDING APPROVAL OF A U.S.
SPONSORED PEACE PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD	ORG	88/02/09	AHA	88/02/11 TR
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>K. SHEPHERD</i>	A	88/02/11	C	88/03/07 TR
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>99465</i>	D	88/02/16	C	88/02/25 TR
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>K. SHEPHERD</i>	B	88/02/29	C	88/03/07 TR
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: NO CODE

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *                       OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *                       CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *                       OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

March 7, 1988

Dear Dr. Krieble:

I am responding on behalf of the President to your letter of February 1 concerning the upcoming U.N.-sponsored negotiations on Afghanistan and your concerns over cessation of U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance.

For over eight years, the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan has been a key objective of U.S. foreign policy. We have insisted that the Soviet withdrawal be prompt and complete, with a significant portion of the troops leaving early in the process. Any decision about an end to assistance to the Afghan resistance will be deferred until we are satisfied that our goal of freedom for Afghanistan is assured. As Secretary Shultz has noted, our aid will continue until it is no longer needed.

The cause of a free and independent Afghanistan is a top foreign policy priority of this Administration. We will continue to work toward this important goal.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Correspondence

Dr. Robert H. Krieble
Robert H. Krieble Associates
15 Lewis Street, Suite 401
Hartford, CT 06103

AVH/DOS/CV/AVH/ckb

(pc2-c)

amb/DOS/Ked

Department of State
Suggested Draft Letter from a White House Staff Member
to Dr. Robert Krieble

Dear Dr. Krieble:

I am responding on behalf of the President to your letter of February 1 concerning the upcoming UN-sponsored negotiations on Afghanistan and your concerns over cessation of U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance.

For over eight years, the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan has been a key objective of U.S. foreign policy. We have insisted that the Soviet withdrawal be prompt and complete, with a significant portion of the troops leaving early in the process. Any decision about an end to assistance to the Afghan resistance will be deferred until we are satisfied that our goal of freedom for Afghanistan is assured. As Secretary Shultz has noted, our aid will continue until it is no longer needed.

Dr. Robert H. Krieble,
Public Affairs,
Robert H. Krieble Associates,
15 Lewis Street, Suite 401,
Hartford, Connecticut.

The cause of a free and independent Afghanistan is a top foreign policy priority of this Administration. We will continue to work toward this important goal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be the initials 'AMB'.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8804265

Date February 25, 1988

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan

From: Dr. Robert H. Kriebel

Date: February 1, 1988

Subject: Critical of the State Department's failure to implement accurately the President's foreign policy regarding approval of a U.S. sponsored peace plan for Afghanistan

WH Referral Dated: February 16, 1988

NSC ID# (if any): 542956

 The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

 X A draft reply is attached.

 A draft reply will be forwarded.

 A translation is attached.

 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

 We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

 The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Lisa Kubiske
for

Director
Secretariat Staff :

UNCLASSIFIED

8804265

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

FEBRUARY 16, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 542956

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. ROBERT H. KRIEBLE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ROBERT H. KRIEBLE ASSOCIATES
SUITE 401
15 LEWIS STREET
HARTFORD CT 06103

SUBJECT: CRITICAL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT ACCURATELY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
POLICY REGARDING APPROVAL OF A U.S.
SPONSORED PEACE PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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*Use Kriebel
for*

Director
Secretariat Staff :

UNCLASSIFIED

8804265

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REFERRAL

FEBRUARY 16, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

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WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

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MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ROBERT H. KRIEBLE ASSOCIATES
SUITE 401
15 LEWIS STREET
HARTFORD CT 06103

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(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

CK

DRAFT/Date March 7
RR / DAS/CV / AK
(Drafter) (Rev. I) (Rev. II)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosures: 
Other:

AVH / _____ / _____

Dear _____

avh/dos/ked

Department of State
Suggested Draft Letter from a White House Staff Member
to Dr. Robert Krieble

Dear Dr. Krieble:

The cause of a free and independent Afghanistan is a top foreign policy priority of this Administration. We will

30
ROBERT H. KRIEBLE

542956

8804265

Public Affairs

15 Lewis Street
Suite 401
Hartford, CT 06103
Telephone: 203-527-4864

300 Metropolitan Square
655 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington DC 20005
Telephone: 202-639-4052

February 1, 1988

K.S.
The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I learned from Congressional friends that the State Department negotiators appear already to have approved a United States sponsored peace plan for Afghanistan calling for a cut in U.S. military aid simultaneous with the Soviet withdrawal, which is to say before all the Soviet troops have left. I noted that you told the press last month that it would be a serious error to end aid before a complete Soviet withdrawal. Your Department of State once again fails to accurately carry out your clear definition of your foreign policy in this regard.

Mr. President, this is but one of many examples of the failure of the State Department to implement accurately your foreign policy over this whole second term. I fail to understand how you can tolerate any staff which is either so insubordinate or so incompetent.

Yours truly,



RHK/ed

c: The Honorable Jack Kemp
Mr. Paul Weyrich