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CAS 12/2/2009

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 81077 | PAPER | RE GRENADA | 1 | 2/4/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 81078 | MEMO | AMB. BOSWORTH TO AMB. ENDERS R 7/23/2010 M257/2 | 2 | 2/9/1982 | B1 |
| 81079 | PAPER | RE GRENADA POLICY REVIEW R 7/23/2010 M257/2 | 5 | 2/9/1982 | B1 |
| 81080 | CABLE | RE GRENADA POLICY REVIEW R 7/23/2010 M257/2 | 4 | 2/9/1982 | B1 |
| 81082 | PAPER | RE GRENADA R 7/23/2010 M257/2 | 1 | 3/12/1982 | B1 |
| 81083 | PAPER | RE GRENADA P. 3 ONLY | 1 | 4/24/1982 | B1 |
| 81085 | PAPER | RE GRENADA P. 3 ONLY | 1 | ND | B1 B3 |
| 81088 | PAPER | RE GRENADA P. 3 ONLY | 1 | 9/8/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 81090 | PAPER | RE GRENADA P. 3 ONLY PAR 6/19/2013 M257/2 | 1 | 9/13/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 81092 | PAPER | RE GRENADA P. 3 ONLY | 1 | 12/1/1982 | B1 B3 |

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

81078 N

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: ARA - Ambassador Enders

Prud' ok.
JB

FROM: ARA - Ambassador Bosworth

SUBJECT: Grenada Policy Review

In your absence, I chaired the February 3 meeting of a small in-house group (CAR, PPC, S/P, AID/LAC, INR/IAA) to review our Grenada policy.

We concluded that our low-profile distancing policy has encouraged Grenada's isolation in the Caribbean while remaining sensitive to the views of Caribbean democracies critical of the PRG but opposed to totally isolating Grenada. After considering pros and cons of taking new, more drastic measures, particularly the negative impact a unilateral stand would have on the CBI and on the possibility of developing cooperative security efforts, we determined that for the time being, we should stay on the present course, but take these new actions:

how?

- Go back to the EC and EC capitals with our concerns about the airport and EC financial support for it (using Strachan statement cautiously).
- Examine ways to provide an informational counterweight to Radio Grenada (expected to begin regional broadcasts soon).
- Establish a record of willingness to talk with Grenada by permitting mid-level (Howard) exchanges (in which we would lay out our concerns with regard to PRG conduct).
- Step up efforts to educate third countries on the nature of the Bishop regime (brief key CARICOM states and others on U.S. concerns, evidence of Cuban/Soviet presence and military efforts, results of our discussions with PRG).

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BY KML NARA DATE 8/2/10

While not discussed at the meeting, we will also develop a list of contingency options that could be used should the situation deteriorate.

A policy paper reflecting our discussions is attached. A telegram reporting the results of the review is also attached for your approval.

Attachments

1. Policy Review Paper - Grenada
2. Telegram

Drafted:ARA/PPC:JWSwigert JWS
2/4/82 20296

Cleared in draft:S/P:JGlassman
AID/LAC:GHill
INR/IAA:RDubose
ARA/CAR:RHoward
ARA/CAR:JBaker } JWS

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GRENADA POLICY REVIEW

Since the April 21, 1981, IG on Grenada, we have followed a low-profile policy of distancing ourselves from the PRG as outlined below. We need to review that policy in view of current realities. Given Grenada's close links with Cuba, the results of this review should be consistent with and supportive of our policy toward Cuba.

Current Conditions

Grenada's ties with Cuba and the Soviets have grown steadily over the past year. According to intelligence reports, the Grenadians and Soviets have engaged in military talks. In recent weeks a PRG minister stated publicly in Kingston that the new Point Salines airport will be available to the Cubans for military purposes and "due to its strategic location" could also be used by the USSR. Construction of the airport, a large military base, and possibly a naval facility continue with extensive Cuban assistance.

There are no signs that the PRG is planning to return to constitutional rule and set a date for elections. While the PRG did release twenty-four political prisoners in late December, Embassy Bridgetown believes that possibly over a hundred remain under detention. The PRG continues to muzzle the press. Organization of the "People's Militia," several thousand strong, appears to be following the Cuban model of block informers and is a further measure to install totalitarian conformity.

The PRG is maintaining close contacts with Eastern Caribbean radicals, and is providing them with some financial assistance -- ultimately from Cuba. Numerous "solidarity" meetings of Eastern Caribbean radicals were held in Grenada in 1981. Radio Free Grenada is expected to commence soon regional propaganda broadcasts on its new 75 KW transmitter.

Grenada's economic outlook is bleak. In 1981, GDP declined for the second consecutive year due to depressed prices for reduced exports, diminishing tourism, a standstill in private investment, the exodus of foreign retirees, and epidemic disease in the banana industry. Grenada already is postponing payments to the IMF. Grenada will have to meet its balance of payments deficit with foreign aid. Contributions from Eastern European countries have not materialized

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BY KML NARA DATE 8/2/10

as expected, although there is promise of greater aid from Cuba. The airport project, short of funds by perhaps as much as \$40 million, is consuming the bulk of foreign assistance. Along with Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the OPEC fund are providing funds for the project. The PRG has boasted on several occasions that the EC Development Fund is providing funds, possibly \$6.5 million, for the airport. Canada may provide \$30 million for rehabilitation of the tourist industry.

Over the past year, Grenada's isolation in the Eastern Caribbean has increased. In the sub-region, although Grenada still participates in sub-regional organizations, the PRG has good relations only with Guyana and Suriname. CARICOM leaders have continued to press Bishop to schedule elections and criticize him publicly for his failure to do so. Leaders of Trinidad and Tobago recently indicated they view Grenada with concern as their "Cuba." While distancing themselves, the Caribbean democracies have been careful to keep the door open, as has Venezuela. Mexico's COPPAL and the Socialist International have gone farther and accepted Bishop's New Jewel Movement as a member party, giving the PRG a certain degree of international respectability. Mexico has promised to extend economic assistance to the PRG, although it has not yet done so. Venezuela has contributed small funds for development projects but has been careful to avoid supporting the airport.

Prospects for a change in government in the short-term are not good. The PRG continues to build a large army and militia under Cuban direction. The charismatic Bishop is still popular among Grenadian urban youth, but has lost the support of most other sectors. However, through coercive measures like the establishment of militia, the New Jewel Movement is extending its political control. Dissatisfaction with the PRG should rise over time as the economy continues downward, but it is questionable whether such dissatisfaction could unite and organize itself into a potent enough force to either topple the government or change its direction.

Current U.S. Policy

Our current low-profile policies are designed to contain and isolate the Bishop regime. Since the April 1981 IG, we have:

- Continued to deny PRG request for a high-level dialogue while maintaining contact via Embassy Bridgetown and Dessima Williams as necessary.

- Continued to deny agreement to Grenada's Ambassador and not accredit Ambassador Bish to the PRG.
- Encouraged countries in the region to take the lead in isolating Grenada.
- Informed other countries about the PRG and the threat it poses.
- Avoided counter-productive, concerted public attacks on Grenada by U.S. officials.
- Excluded Grenada from new regional AID programs to the extent possible and ended bilateral capital transfers to the PRG.
- Encouraged the IMF to require strict compliance with all requirements on bankers' terms.

U.S. assistance strategy toward Grenada has been designed to permit continued support to regional organizations to strengthen the economic viability of the other islands. We are seeking to develop new channels of regional assistance distribution that allow us to exclude Grenada and are examining bilateral aid options. Regional assistance programs which strengthen Grenada's private sector will be approved. Projects should not, however, involve a capital transfer to the PRG. If PRG involvement is essential to transmit benefits to recipients, AID will determine that the Grenadian government does not benefit politically through such transfers.

Alternatives

Although the PRG's harsh rhetorical attacks on the U.S. have subsided for the moment, and PRG officials have requested confidential talks through several channels, the PRG has continued to move closer politically and militarily to the Cuban/Soviet camp and appears determined to maintain itself in power by coercive and authoritarian means. Absent any credible indication that the PRG is prepared to address U.S. concerns, there is no persuasive rationale for warming relations.

More drastic U.S. measures (e.g. discourage IFI programs and vote against PRG in MDB's; exclude Grenada from all AID programs; trade and travel restrictions; etc.) could increase Grenada's economic woes, but -- if pursued in isolation -- could push potential Caribbean allies into an embarrassing position. Although the Caribbean democracies are slowly moving toward more

active opposition to the PRG, they perceive Grenada's isolation as resulting from its own actions and want to keep the door open to allow Bishop to return to the fold. More drastic U.S. measures, if triggered by the establishment of Cuban/Soviet bases in Grenada or definitive evidence that the PRG is training Caribbean revolutionaries, would probably be acceptable to the Caribbean democracies and defensible in the U.S. But concerted, harsh rhetoric or precipitous U.S. actions would be counter-productive now by:

- Arousing sympathy for Grenada (David and Goliath) thus fostering more support, e.g., in the European Community.
- Embarassing supportive Caribbean democracies and probably checking, for the time being, efforts of Adams and Seaga to further isolate Grenada.
- Raising suspicions about the CBI before it gets off the ground.
- Dividing the U.S. from hemispheric democracies after having developed a strong degree of consensus in the OAS on Central America.
- Setting back incipient regional security cooperation with Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago as Caribbean states might feel publicly compelled to maintain a distance from the U.S.

Conclusion

Our present low-profile distancing policy still is the best course for achieving the objectives identified in the April 1981 IG. In order to contain any more active security threat from Grenada we should continue:

- to devote more intelligence resources to monitoring PRG relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Caribbean radicals.
- to be sensitive to the views of Caribbean democracies on isolating Grenada;
- to make concerted efforts to ease these small countries toward greater regional security cooperation;
- to address their economic and social vulnerabilities through the CBI.

Since future PRG actions could demand a strong U.S. stance, we need to position ourselves to be able to move to a harder position if necessary. Specific measures we should take now are:

1. Step up efforts to educate others on the nature of the Bishop regime and its links to the Cuban/Soviet bloc by sharing intelligence with others such as Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
2. Go back to the EC with our objections to the airport and EC financing of it (using Strachan statement in Kingston cautiously).
3. Examine ways to provide an informational counterweight to Radio Grenada.
4. Establish a record of willingness to talk with Grenada by permitting mid-level (Howard) exchanges (in which we would lay out our concerns with regard to PRG conduct).

Dick Howard would offer to meet with Dessima Williams, indicating that if she wishes to exchange views --per the PRG's repeated declarations -- he is available. Should such meetings occur, Howard would lay out principal U.S. concerns --evidence of budding military ties to Cuba/Soviet Union; hostile anti-American rhetoric; denial of due process and unwillingness to return to constitutional rule--and hold out prospect of progress toward more normalized relations should the PRG take concrete steps to address U.S. concerns. We would indicate that we might consider taking specific steps (accrediting ambassadors) in response to concrete Grenadian moves (e.g., PRG commitment that Cuba and the Soviet Union would not be allowed to use airport or other facilities for military purposes or for transfer of personnel to other countries; a pledge not to train, support or encourage subversives; agreement to permit IAHR and UNCHR visits to Grenada; etc.) We would then brief Caribbean democracies on these exchanges and be prepared to go public, if necessary, to answer domestic critics who charge that U.S. uncommunicativeness is driving Grenada toward Cuba.

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ARA/PPC: JWSWIGERT
2/9/82 20296
ARA: TOENDERS

ARA: SWBOSWORTH
ARA/CAR: JBAKER {DRAFT}
AID/LAC: GHILL {DRAFT}
S/S-0:

ARA/CAR: RHOWARD {DRAFT}
S/P: JGLASSMAN {DRAFT}
INR/IAA: RDUBOSE {DRAFT}

NSC (desired distribution-per Jswigert)
IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN

PRIORITY PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON PRIORITY, CARACAS PRIORITY

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 2/9/02 {ENDERS, THOMAS O.}

TAGS: PEPR, GJ, US

SUBJECT: GRENADA POLICY REVIEW

REF: BRIDGETOWN 548 {NOTAL}

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. ARA CHAIRED A SMALL IN-HOUSE MEETING FEBRUARY 3 TO REVIEW OUR POLICY IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE APRIL IG. WE CONCLUDED THAT OUR LOW-PROFILE DISTANCING POLICY HAD ENCOURAGED GRENADA'S ISOLATION IN THE CARIBBEAN WITHOUT GETTING OUT IN FRONT OF THE OTHER CARIBBEAN STATES. AFTER CONSIDERING PROS AND CONS OF TAKING NEW, MORE DRASTIC MEASURES, PARTICULARLY THE NEGATIVE IMPACT A UNILATERAL STAND WOULD HAVE ON THE CBI AND ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE SECURITY EFFORTS, WE DETERMINED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING, WE SHOULD PURSUE THE PRESENT POLICY WITH ONLY A FEW MODIFICATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. PRG TIES TO CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE GROWN OVER THE PAST YEAR. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN THE SHORT TERM ARE NOT GOOD. THE PRG CONTINUES TO BUILD A LARGE ARMY AND MILITIA UNDER CUBAN DIRECTION.

Handwritten initials and checkmarks:
WJOE
JWS
SWB
RH
JB
JG
GH
RD

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CHARISMATIC BISHOP IS STILL POPULAR AMONG GRENADIAN URBAN YOUTH. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PRG, HOWEVER, SHOULD RISE OVER TIME AS THE ECONOMY CONTINUES DOWNWARD. ABSENT ANY CREDIBLE INDICATION THAT THE PRG IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS U.S. CONCERNS, THERE IS NO PERSUASIVE RATIONALE FOR WARMING RELATIONS. MORE DRASTIC U.S. MEASURES MIGHT INCREASE GRENADA'S ECONOMIC WOES, BUT COULD HAVE SERIOUS NEGATIVE FALLOUT. SHOULD GRENADA BECOME A MORE IMMEDIATE SECURITY THREAT TO THE REGION OR CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE AND EXPLOITATION OF GRENADA BECOME A GREATER PROBLEM, U.S. POLICY TOWARD GRENADA WILL BE REVIEWED ONCE AGAIN.

4. IF TRIGGERED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN/SOVIET BASES IN GRENADA OR DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE PRG IS TRAINING CARIBBEAN GUERRILLAS, HARSHER U.S. POLICIES WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO CARIBBEAN DEMOCRACIES AND SUSTAINABLE IN THE U.S. BUT CONCERTED, HARSH U.S. RHETORIC OR PRECIPITOUS U.S. ECONOMIC ACTIONS COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE NOW BY:

-- AROUSING SYMPATHY FOR GRENADA {DAVID AND GOLIATH} THUS FOSTERING MORE SUPPORT, E.G., IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

-- EMBARRASSING SUPPORTIVE CARIBBEAN DEMOCRACIES AND PROBABLY CHECKING, FOR THE TIME BEING, EFFORTS OF ADAMS AND SEAGA TO FURTHER ISOLATE GRENADA.

-- SETTING BACK INCIPIENT REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH BARBADOS AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AS CARIBBEAN STATES MIGHT FEEL PUBLICLY COMPELLED TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE U.S.

-- RAISING SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE CBI BEFORE IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

-- DIVIDING THE U.S. FROM HEMISPHERIC DEMOCRACIES AFTER HAVING DEVELOPED A STRONG DEGREE OF CONSENSUS IN THE OAS ON CENTRAL AMERICA

5. IN ORDER TO CONTAIN ANY MORE ACTIVE SECURITY THREAT FROM GRENADA, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR OVERALL STRATEGY OF:

-- DEVOTING MORE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES TO MONITORING PRG RELATIONS WITH CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION AND CARIBBEAN RADICALS.

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13

-- REMAINING SENSITIVE TO THE VIEWS OF CARIBBEAN DEMOCRACIES WHICH ARE CRITICAL OF THE PRG BUT ARE NOT ADOPTING A TOTAL ISOLATION POLICY.

-- MAKING CONCERTED EFFORTS TO EASE THESE SMALL COUNTRIES TOWARD GREATER REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION.

-- ADDRESSING THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITIES THROUGH THE CBI.

-- SEEKING TO GENERATE MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO SUBVERSIVE THREATS THROUGH FACILITATION OF INTER-ISLAND SECURITY FORCE TRANSPORT {E.G., OUR FY 82 BARBADOS AND TRINIDAD MAP GRANTS} AND WORK TO BUILD A REGIONAL COAST GUARD.

WE SHOULD MAINTAIN CURRENT U.S. ASSISTANCE STRATEGY {81 STATE 288428} AND CONTINUE TO NOT ACCREDIT AMBASSADORS.

6. SINCE FUTURE PRG ACTIONS COULD DEMAND A STRONG U.S. RESPONSE, WE NEED TO POSITION OURSELVES TO BE ABLE TO MOVE TO A HARDER POSITION, IF NECESSARY. SPECIFIC MEASURES WE SHOULD TAKE NOW ARE:

-- STEP-UP EFFORTS TO EDUCATE OTHERS ON THE NATURE OF THE BISHOP REGIME AND ITS LINKS TO THE CUBAN/SOVIET BLOC BY SHARING INTELLIGENCE WITH APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND VENEZUELA.

-- GO BACK TO THE EC WITH OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE AIRPORT PROJECT AND EC FINANCING OF IT.

-- EXAMINE WAYS TO CREATE INFORMATIONAL COUNTERWEIGHTS TO RADIO GRENADA.

-- ESTABLISH A RECORD OF WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH GRENADA, EXPRESSING AGAIN OUR SERIOUS CONCERNS OVER PRG CONDUCT.

7. WE ARE PREPARED TO OFFER CONTINUING MID-LEVEL {DIRECTOR, ARA/CAR} EXCHANGES WITH DESSIMA WILLIAMS IN WASHINGTON. SHOULD PRG WISH TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THIS CHANNEL, WE WOULD LAY OUT ONCE AGAIN SPECIFIC U.S. CONCERNS. SHOULD EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE, WE WOULD PLAN TO SHARE THE RESULTS WITH KEY CARIBBEAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS.

8. AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING TEAM WILL TRAVEL SOON TO PORT OF SPAIN TO BRIEF GOTT LEADERS AS DISCUSSED

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DURING RECENT BOSWORTH VISIT. WE ARE CONSIDERING
ADDITIONAL BRIEFINGS ELSEWHERE. DEPARTMENT WILL BE
IN TOUCH WITH YOU FURTHER ON MEASURES WE MAY TAKE
TO PROVIDE INFORMATIONAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO RADIO GRENADA.
YY

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STATE

SUMMARY

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7. GRENADA: PROPAGANDA TRANSMITTER OPERATING

The Cuban Embassy in Grenada has announced that the new "Radio Free Grenada" transmitter, built by Cuba, began operations on March 10. The station will initially be staffed by Cubans, but they hope that the Grenadians can take over within a year.

INR Comment: This 75 KW medium wave transmitter is the largest in the Caribbean (our Antigua VOA transmitter is 50 KW). We expect a barrage of Cuban-style propaganda but also more sophisticated material produced by a group of bright, communist journalists who went to Grenada from Jamaica after Prime Minister Seaga fired them from the government media. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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of public indignation by appointing a senior policeman as high commissioner with extraordinary powers to conduct an anti-Mafia campaign. However, according to a senior Carabinieri officer, the government's goal is to "contain," not destroy, the Mafia, terming the latter "an impossible task." ~~(SECRET)~~

6. GRENADA: MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM CUBA

A Cuban vessel bound for Angola stopped in Grenada August 25 and, under tight security, discharged approximately 60 heavily loaded military trucks, [redacted]. The trucks were driven to the recently completed military camp on the south of the island.

INR Comment: This is by far the largest delivery of military equipment from Cuba, which has been steadily arming Grenada since Maurice Bishop took over in a coup in 1979. The shipment, [redacted]

[redacted] suggests that the Cubans are preparing to base a military contingent on the island. To date there have been only a handful of Cuban military trainers present. ~~(SECRET)~~ [redacted]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
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