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### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

**SMF** 

3/4/2010

File Folder

EAST-WEST TRADE [02/08/1982]

**FOIA** 

F99-078/3

**ZUBER** 

**Box Number** 5

DOX Number 5		20			
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions	
86355 PAPER	DRAFT STRATEGY PAPER RE OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT TRADE CONTROLS	4	ND	B1	
86356 PAPER	EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY	3	2/7/1982	B1	
86357 PAPER	LEGAL ANALYSIS	3	2/7/1982	B1	
86358 PAPER	ENERGY SECURITY INITIATIVE	6	ND	B1	
86359 MEMO	TO MEMBERS OF SIG ON POLAND	1	2/9/1982	B1 B3	
86360 PAPER	RE STATUS OF SIBERIAN PIPELINE NEGOTIATIONS	4	2/8/1982	B1 B3	
86361 PAPER	OVERVIEW OF PIPELINE	27	2/8/1982	B1 B3	

#### The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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System II 90065

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8203219

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

& WT.

February 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.

Chairman

Senior Interagency Group on Polish/Soviet Sanctions

SUBJECT:

Draft Strategy Paper on the Extraterritoriality

and Credit Limitation Mission

Attached is a draft strategy paper for the advanced preparation of the high-level mission to Europe on oil and gas equipment export controls and credit limitation.

Please distribute this paper to the members of the SIG.

Michael O. Wheeler Staff Director

Attachment Draft Strategy Paper

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED Sec.3.A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended 2006 White House Guidel 3/4/10-BY NARA SAL

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**B**1

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86356 PAPER

3 2/7/1982

B1

**EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY** 

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86357 PAPER 3 2/7/1982 B1

LEGAL ANALYSIS

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Impact of U.S. and Allied Controls on Western Exports to the USSR, including data on Soviet current account balance of payments, pre-existing contracts, and extra-territorial controls (\$ billion; U.S. share in parentheses)

		1979	1980	1981 est.	<u>1982 est</u> .
1(a)	Soviet exports to the West currency balance of payments	21.0 (0.9)	25.3 (.5)	26.6 (0.4)	26.5 (NK)
(b)	Soviet imports from the West (f.o.b.)	21.6 (3.6)	26.0 (1.5)	29.9 (2.4)	32.9 (NK)
(c)	Soviet trade balance	6 (-2.7)	7 (-1.0)	3.2 (-2.0)	-6.4 (NK)
2.	Composition of Soviet exports to the West				
(a)(	1) Oil	9.6 ( )	12.0 ( )	.11.5 ( )	10.5 ( )
(	2) Gas	1.4 ( )	2.7 ( )	3.4 ( )	3.5 ( )
(b)	Gold	1.6 ( )	1.8 ( )	9.0 ( )	9.0 ( )
(c)	Other	8.5 ( )	8.8 ( )	2.7 ( )	3.5 ( )
(d)	Total (Same as 1a)	21.0 (0.9)	25.3 (.5)	26.6 (.4)	26.5 (NK)
3. Composition of Western exports to the USSR					
(a)	Agricultural Products	5.8 (2.4)	8.8 (1.3)	12.0 (1.5)	13.0 (2.0)
(b)	Energy-related exports	3.4 (0.2)	NK (0.05)	NK (NK)	NK (NK)
(c)	COCOM-listed items:				
	(1) Committee review	0.2 (0.1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	(2) National discretion	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (0)
(đ)	Other	(0.5)			
(e)	Total (Same as 1b)	21.6 (3.6)	26.0 (1.5)	29.9 (2.4)	32.9 ( )

>

Impact of U.S. and Allied Controls on Western Exports to the USSR, including data on Soviet current account balance of payments, pre-existing contracts, and extra-territorial controls (\$ billion; U.S. share in parentheses)

		1979	1980	1981 est.	1982 est.
	Western denials of non- agricultural exports to the USSR				
(a)	Oil and gas equipment and technology	- (-)	0.1 (0.1)	1.0 (1.0)	NK
(b)	COCOM-listed items:				
	(1) Committee review	- (-)	0.2 (0.1)	0.2 (.01)	0.2 (.01)
	(2) National discretion	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
(c)	Other	- (-)	.3 (.9)	0.5 (0.5)	NK
	Value of denied exports subject to pre—existing contracts				
(a)	Oil and gas equipment and technology	0 (0)	- (-)	0.2 (0.2)	0 (0)
(b)	COCOM-listed items:				
	(1) Committee review	0 (0)	- (-)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	(2) National discretion	0 (0)	- (-)	0 (0)	0 (0)
(c)	Other	0 (0)	0.3 (0.4)	- (.1)	0 (0)
	Value of denied exports caught by U.S. controls on re-exports				
(a)	Oil and gas equipment and technology	- (-)	- (-)	0.2 (0.2)	0 (0)
(b)	COCOM-listed items:				
	(1) Committee review	- (-)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	(2) National discretion	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
(c)	Other	- (-)	- (-)	NK	NK

Impact of U.S. and Allied Controls on Western Exports to the USSR, including data on Soviet current account balance of payments, pre-existing contracts, and extra-territorial controls (\$ billion; U.S. share in parentheses)

		1979	1980	1981 est.	1982 est.
	Western denials of agricultural exports to the USSR				
(a)	Value	N/A (N/A)	N/K (\$3.2 billion)	N/K (N/K)	N/A (N/A)
	Volume	N/A (N/A)	9 MMT (18 MMT)	N/K (N/K)	N/A (N/A)
(b)	Value of denied agricultural exports subject to pre- existing contracts	N/A (N/A)	0 (\$2.4 billion	. ,	N/A (N/A)
(c)	Value of denied agricultural exports subject to extraterritorial controls on reexport.	N/A	N/K	N/A	N/A

#### Notes to the above tables:

1(a) and (b) figures refer to Soviet hard currency trade with non-Communist countries.

Symbols: a dash (-) means less than \$50 million; 0 means zero; NA means not applicable; NK means not known

#### Soviet exports:

Soviet oil and gas exports (2a): The largest Western European import from the USSR is now oil; this is expected to switch to gas in 1986. U.S. imports under this heading are mostly fuel oil. Western export controls have heretofore had, and are expected in 1982 to have, only a marginal impact on Soviet oil and gas production and exports.

Soviet gold sales (2b): Gold sales are included in the Soviet export figures (1a). For the most part the USSR sells gold to obtain foreign exchange with which to finance imports from the West.

Other Soviet exports (2c): This covers a wide variety of items from chemicals to automobiles.

#### Oil and gas equipment and technology

Western exports (3b): In value terms, the largest item is wide diameter pipe. Total exports for pipe and other equipment for the gas pipeline, most of which would take place after 1982, are estimated at about \$10 billion.

Western denials (4b): No country other than the United States controls oil and gas equipment and technology. Some dual-use COCOM items have oil and gas applications. France has apparently approved computer systems for the gas pipeline in circumvention of normal COCOM review procedures. The French have asked a Canadian firm to supply software for these computers, to replace a U.S. firm which had the contract subject to receipt of an export license.

Although the United States denied no licenses in 1978 and 1979, the controls led the USSR to buy from U.S. firms only as a last resort. One known effect since 1978, is that the Soviets have purchased several hundred millions of dollars worth of French gas-lift equipment rather than U.S. subsmersible pumps. There were no similar clear-cut clases in 1979.

During 1980 the post-Afghanistan tightened licensing policy was the basis for revoking Dresser's license for a drill bit plant. The technology had already been delivered; but the Soviets are withholding a final payment of \$14 million pending receipt of training and start-up assistance.

14

In 1981 the U.S. denied several other cases involving technology, e.g. for gas separation plants. On December 30, 1981, issuance of licenses was suspended for 200 Caterpillar pipelayers (\$88 million), Fiat Allis technology for tractors (\$631 million), GE rotors (\$175 million), and pressure sensitive tape (annual sales about \$25 million).

Pre-existing contracts (5a): Before the Dresser license was revoked, the drill bit plant was subject to a contract pursuant to a previously issued export license. The GF rotors were subject to sales contracts before these items were put under control on December 30, 1981. The Fiat-Allis tractor technology contract was subject to receipt of an export license pursuant to comprehensive technical data controls in effect for many years. However, Commerce had recommended approval before December 29. Senators Percy and Dixon and Congressman Findley maintain that this is low rather than high technology and that the Commerce suspension of license issuance for this technology is, therefore, at variance with the intent of the President's December 29 directive to suspend licenses for high technology.

Reexport controls 6(a): The GE rotors are subject to re-export controls.

#### COCOM exceptions

Western exports (3c(1)): COCOM normally approves exports for civil use which marginally exceed embargo limits.

- The figures exclude exports discouraged merely by the existance of the controls.

Western denials (4c(1)): As the only Allied agreed Afghanistan trade sanction, COCOM has, on a de facto basis, observed a policy of granting no-exceptions to the USSR since early 1980. No exports requiring Committee review have been approved except in extraordinary cases such as health and safety. In the absence of this policy, the 1979 level of exceptions might have continued (mostly computer equipment). Other COCOM members have also reacted positively to the December 23, 1981 U.S. suggestion for a similar no-exceptions policy on exports to Poland. In 1981, exceptions approved for Poland totalled only about \$7 million, of which about \$6 million came from the United States (mostly computer equipment).

Pre-existing contracts (5b(2)): In 1980 the United States suspended shipments under already issued licenses and subsequently revoked some of the licenses. The December 30, 1981, suspension of licensing for national discretion cases did not affect pre-existing firm contracts.

Re-export controls (6b(2)): Over the years, other COCOM members have been particularly critical of U.S. denials of re-exports from their countries of items which the United States agreed in COCOM were approvable at national discretion. The June 25, 1981, waiver of U.S. re-export controls does not apply to such cases.

#### Other Exports

Western exports (3d): This covers primarily low technology industrial items not controlled by any Western country. However, the United States controls all unpublished technical data for industrial processes, regardless of the degree of sophistication, and the United States also unilaterally controls some commodities.

Western denials (4c): After Afghanistan, the United States denied exports for a steel mill, for an aluminum smelter, for phosphates, for transactions related to the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, and for an Ingersoll-Rand diesel engine assembly line for the Kama River truck plant. No other Western country imposed similar controls. Indeed, the French replaced a U.S.-Japanese consortium for the steel mill and the Germans replaced the U.S. portion of a U.S.-German consortium for the aluminum smelter. Thus, the U.S. share of the 1980 denials was greater than the total denied by the West.

The 1981 figure is the value of license applications returned without action pursuant to the December 30, 1981, suspension of all licensing (less amount shown in 4a and 4b(2)).

Pre-existing contracts (5c): The steel mill, phosphate,
and Olympic denials affected pre-existing contracts.

Extra-territorial controls (6c): Our Allies have been critical of U.S. extra-territorial controls on non-COCOM listed items; but prior to the current controversy concerning gas pipeline related exports, celebrated cases concerned U.S. exports to destinations other than the USSR. This was primarily because, until 1980, U.S. denials of exports to the USSR were primarily of COCOM items or of items the U.S. was seeking to put on the COCOM list and none of the major cases affected by U.S.-Afghanistan measures involved reexports, licensees, or subsidiaries.

Denial totals - The totals exclude trade discouraged by the existance of controls. Virtually the only Allied cooperation in either Afghanistan or Polish export control sanctions has been the no-exceptions policy on exports to the USSR and to Poland of items requiring COCOM review. The dollar value effect of this cooperation has been smaller than the magnitude of Western replacements of U.S. denials of, e.g., grain, steel mill, and aluminum smelter sales. Therefore, the total Western denial to the USSR has been less than the U.S. share of that denial. If the Europeans find ways to circumvent U.S. denials of gas pipeline related equipment, this trend will continue in the years beyond 1982.

Pre-existing contracts 5(c): The United States has not he sitated to deny exports under pre-existing contracts, e.g., grain, Dresser drill bit plant, GE rotors, steel mill. Japan went along with stopping the Armco-Nippon Steel deal at first, but in view of the Creusot-Loire replacement contract, is unlikely to repeat such cooperation without firm European assurances. No other Western country has considered restricting pre-existing contracts.

Re-export controls (6c): The principal current controversy is the GE rotors.

### Agricultural exports 7(a)(b)(c) - Fiscal Year: October-September

1979-81 figures for agricultural exports (3a) are for the calendar year. It includes US, Ec, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina. Other important supplies of agricultural products include Brazil (soybeans), Thailand (rice, corn, manioc) and India (rice). Total Soviet agricultural imports in 1980 were \$16.8 billion.

\$3.2 billion; however, this does not provide a satisfactory basis for estimating the cost of replacing these exports to the USSR. In 1980, this would ignore price effects due to changes in the world price caused by the U.S. embargo and premiums paid by the USSR to attract replacements. For 1981, such comparisons are even more difficult because, in addition to price effects, substitution and displacement effects have an important effect on the amount denied by the U.S. (e.g. from the amount the USSR would have bought in the absence of the 1980 partial embargo) and from the rest of the world (e.g. the amount the Soviets would have imported, less the amount supplied by the U.S.), reflecting the move from the U.S. as the primary supplier to the U.S. as a residual supplier.

During the embargo Soviet imports from non-U.S. suppliers offset progressively greater amounts of the agricultural products subject to the U.S. partial grains embargo. Major grains exporters (Australia, Canada and Argentina) all increased their exports to the USSR to record levels for the period. EC exports, although not large, stayed in the traditional range. By late 1981, there was little effect on Soviet grain imports due to the partial grains embargo.

In the absence of the embargo, U.S. agricultural product exports to the USSR would have reached significantly higher levels by now, although those estimated by the USDA (e.g., 35 million tons of grains) are extremely questionable.

7b - About 13 million tons beyond the 8 million tons of grains guaranteed annually in the US-USSR Long Term Agreement were under contract when controls were imposed, as well as soybean contracts for an additional 1 million tons.

7c - No known exports of products incorporating U.S. embargoed agricultural products were halted. Most agricultural products are shipped direct in bulk; however, wheat may be processed into flour and soybeans crushed for cake and oil. Significant displacement and substitution may occur as well.

18

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ID	Document Type
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No of Doc Date Restricpages

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86358 PAPER

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**B**1

**ENERGY SECURITY INITIATIVE** 

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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**NEGOTIATIONS** 

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**B**3

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OVERVIEW OF PIPELINE

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