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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
45601	OUTLINE	RE ISSUES ON EAST-WEST GAS PIPELINE	3	ND	B1
45602	DRAFT MEMO	TO THE PRESIDENT RE CONTROLS ON EXPORTS	3	ND	B1
45604	PAPER	RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	2	ND	B1
45605	OPTIONS PAPER	RE CONTROLS ON EXPORTS	1	ND	B1
45606	PAPER	RE OPTIONS	4	ND	B1
45608	DRAFT MEMO	FOR THE PRESIDENT RE DECISION ON CONTROLS OF EXPORTS	1	ND	B1
45612	DRAFT MEMO	FOR THE PRESIDENT RE CONTROLS ON EXPORTS (ANNOTATED)	3	ND	B1
45613	MEMO	RICHARD PERLE TO ALLEN LENZ RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	1	8/28/1981	B1
45614	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	1	8/28/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
45615 PAPER	RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	2	ND	B1

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Norm Bailey from DJF

NATIONAL REVIEW 21 AUGUST 1981 Pages 956-958

BLACKMAIL

That Soviet Gas Pipeline To the West

MILES COSTICK

ONE OF THE POINTS President Reagan was most concerned to make at Ottawa had to do with the Soviet proposal to build a natural-gas pipeline from northwestern Siberia to Western Europe. As Mr. Reagan pointed out, this proposal presents a dangerous threat to the unity of the Atlantic Alliance, for it would bring about a) increased Western European economic dependence on Soviet energy and b) a solution of the Soviet Union's impending energy crisis. The former could lead to the Finlandization of Western Europe; the latter would mean the Soviet Union could afford to emphasize the military sector of its economy.

Although Chancellor Schmidt was not prepared to acknowledge it, there is another choice. Viable and secure alternative energy sources for Western Europe do exist. The Soviet proposal is not the only or even the most attractive option.

The Sting

The Soviet plan is to build a 3,500-mile pipeline from natural-gas fields near the city of Yamburg on the Yamal peninsula, across the northern tundra, through Eastern Europe to Austria and West Germany. There it will link up with an existing distribution network supplying natural gas to the whole of Western Europe. To finance the pipeline and the facilities needed to exploit the Yamburg gas reserves, the Soviets want to borrow from financial institutions in Western Europe and Japan. With these funds, they will purchase from their creditor nations large-diameter seamless pipe, maintenance and operation equipment, heavy-duty arctic construction equipment, and various services currently unavailable in the Soviet bloc. Upon completion of the pipeline, the Soviets will repay the loan by exporting to Western Europe a "guaranteed" 1.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas per year at whatever the prevailing prices are then on the world market.

For some time now, the Soviets have engaged in intensive negotiations with governments, financial institutions, gas utilities, and steel pipe and construction equipment concerns in West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, England, the United States, and Japan. Steel and construction firms, facing a tight world market, underutilized plant capacity, and intense international competition, are eager to enter into what appear to be lucrative supply contracts. Natural-gas distributors, eager to diversify their sources of supply, find Soviet gas exports an attractive proposition. The Western European governments, while wary of the Soviet Union's true intentions, want to lessen their dependence on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf for energy needs. The immediate boost the deal would give to key national industries and general employment figures is yet another reason to move ahead on the Soviet proposal.

While there have been protests in all these countries against the pipeline, the major roadblocks thus far have been the financial institutions that would have to come up with the hard cash. With world interest rates now between 11 and 14 per cent, bankers are not wholly enthusiastic over the prospect of loaning the Soviet Union $15 billion at 7.75 per cent, to be repaid over ten years with a grace period equal to the time necessary to build the line. The twenty-bank consortium of West Germany, responsible for $6 billion in possible loans and considered the financial community's leader in the negotiations, is balking at these terms.

Up to now, West Germany and the other governments that would be most affected by huge imports of Soviet natural gas have minimized the political and military implications of the deal. The West German government, for example, maintains that Soviet natural gas will never amount to more than 30 per cent of their gas imports. The government further maintains that Soviet natural gas will account for only 5 per cent of West Germany's total energy consumption. The same percentages, it is estimated, would pertain for Western Europe as a whole.

But there are strong reasons to believe that these figures underrate the role Soviet natural gas will play in the Western European energy picture when the pipeline is completed. Take West Germany. It will import 425 to 550 billion cubic feet per year (bcf/yr) of natural gas from the Soviet Union if the pipeline is completed. This represents as much as 7 per cent of West Germany's total demand, a small, but very important, amount. The precise percentage that Soviet natural gas would supply, however, should not be the main focus of debate: 1.5 trillion cubic feet is lots of natural gas, and there will be political consequences regardless.

The various sources of energy (natural gas, petroleum, coal, hydroelectric, and nuclear) are not readily interchangeable. West Germany's primary consumers of natural gas are the chemical, petrochemical, and steel industries. None of the alternative sources could be rapidly substituted for natural gas in the event of any significant curtailment of supply, because the power-generating facilities of these industries are not configured to use those sources. They could be modified to use some of those alternative sources, but the modification process would take at least six months to complete, and probably longer.

For all practical purposes, if Soviet natural gas were cut off for any reason, technical or political, other natural-gas supplies would have to be found. Yet no significant "spot market" for natural gas exists; 425 bcf/yr will not be available on short notice. Any adequate stockpiling of natural gas would be prohibitively expensive.

The rapid repercussions any sudden cutback of Soviet natural gas would have on West Germany's economy con-

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

Mr. Costick is president of the Institute on Strategic Trade in Washington.

SOVIET PIPELINE -- CONTINUED

tain the seeds of immense political vulnerability. The dependence of West German industries on Soviet natural gas, combined with a growing reliance of these same industries on exports to the Soviet bloc, would create a pressure point for Soviet manipulation.

Eastward, Ho

In the worst case, the Soviets could threaten to cut all economic relations between West Germany and the bloc, including exports of natural gas, and plunge West Germany into economic chaos. Far more likely, the West German leadership, understanding the extent of its dependence and vulnerability, would adopt policies more in line with the Soviet platform. In short, Finlandization. West Germany, let us remember, was unwilling to join the American-led embargo of the Soviet Union following the Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan.

Project this scenario to all of Western Europe, and what you have is a very dangerous possible future for the Atlantic Alliance. A splitting of NATO, which could result from this situation, would leave the industrial democracies without the unified will to resist Soviet aggression.

Equally serious, by helping the Soviet Union to solve inexpensively one of its fundamental long-term strategic problems—its looming energy crisis—the Western democracies would be subsidizing an otherwise inefficient economy which supports a totalitarian society bent on world domination.

Soviet reserves and production of petroleum are falling off. Increased reserves and production of natural gas are intended to replace the petroleum shortfall and provide for projected growth in Soviet energy demand, including exports. Recent studies suggest, though, that the Soviet Union faces a long-term energy shortage which stems, not from a lack of proved natural-gas reserves, but from severe deficiencies in prospecting, production, tertiary recovery, and transportation technologies.

This is particularly true of technologies to deal with adverse climatic conditions, such as those in Siberia, where most Soviet energy sources are located. The Yamal pipeline project would necessarily involve transfer from the West of the sophisticated prospecting, drilling, and pumping technologies applicable to permafrost environments. The pipeline project offers a comprehensive solution to a problem the Soviets could otherwise only solve through a massive redeployment of economic, technical, and human resources—resources now devoted to the Soviet military-industrial complex.

This two-pronged threat, economic and military, to the Atlantic Alliance must be stopped. American leadership is crucial in this regard. U.S. policy should be aimed at reimposing the Western embargo on high-technology exports to the Soviet Union instituted after the invasion of Afghanistan.

As a first step, the Reagan Administration should withdraw the validated export licenses granted to Caterpillar Tractor and International Harvester. This can be done legally under the 1979 Export Administration Act and would involve only minimal losses to those corporations, mainly administrative costs related to preliminary talks with the Soviets and the export license application process. Immediate action in this regard would put both America's allies and the Soviet Union on notice that the new President is serious about maintaining Western resolve and will pursue a coherent policy toward that end. In addition, the President should exercise his leadership in the alliance by inducing the United States' allies to reimpose their embargoes. This is what President Reagan emphasized to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Ottawa.

If . . . If . . . If . . .

This will not be an easy task. West Germany and France will be particularly difficult to persuade. But France has a history of independence from superpower influence and may come to realize that overly close ties with the Eastern economies could represent a threat to its independent position. If Japan can be convinced that other states will not simply pick up business deals Japan declines, it may return to the embargo as well. Great Britain and Canada can be counted upon so long as the United States itself follows the embargo scrupulously. If the rest of the alliance holds firm, West Germany will begin to feel isolated and may re-examine its policies.

American insistence that Western Europe withdraw from negotiations with the Soviet Union over the pipeline won't prevail unless viable alternatives can be found. With the Middle East unstable, Western Europe must diversify its sources of energy supply. Several alternatives do exist and ought to be given serious consideration: expanded nuclear power; increased exploitation of North Sea hydrocarbons, especially the Norwegian sector; and American coal.

While there are environmental risks associated with nuclear power, the man-



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SOVIET PIPELINE -- CONT.

agement of those risks is far preferable to the political risk of excessive dependence on Soviet natural gas. Illegal interference with the construction of nuclear facilities and lengthy and costly administration of regulations have held nuclear power far below its potential contribution to Western European energy consumption. American nuclear policy during the Carter Administration (e.g., refusing to reprocess nuclear fuels and discouraging exports of nuclear power facilities) further discouraged Western European nuclear programs.

Nuclear Options

Western Europe, if it were to utilize the expanded nuclear power option, would be far less vulnerable to interruptions of energy sources. Nuclear fuel supplies are needed only intermittently, and much of the reserves lie outside the Communist world. A Western European nuclear fuel reprocessing facility would further insulate Western Europe from possible future interruptions of supply.

Exploitation of North Sea carbons, including petroleum and natural gas, is another viable alternative source of supply. The Norwegian sector, in particular, is estimated to be capable of much higher levels of production. In the past, Norway has not exploited its reserves to their full potential for domestic reasons. In brief, Norwegians have feared that expanded production would change their way of life; petrodollars might bring inflation. In addition, expanded production increases the risk of oil-rig disasters.

However, Norway is a member of NATO and has responsibilities to the alliance as a whole. To the extent that Norwegian energy exports would make it less necessary for Western Europe to seek other supplies, Norway would be making a positive contribution to NATO and hence to Norwegian security. As in the case of an expanded nuclear power program, Norwegian energy supplies would decrease Western Europe's vulnerability to supply interruption.

Finally, the United States itself can offer an alternative to the Soviet gas deal. Huge reserves of coal exist in the western states. Those could be exploited and the coal transported to the East Coast via slurry pipeline or rail and then transshipped to Europe. Coal gasification plants could be built in each of the consuming nations and linked to the existing Western European pipeline network. Whereas the natural-gas reserves to be exploited at Yamburg can supply Western Europe for only thirty years, American coal supplies are sufficient for three hundred years.

The week following President Reagan's return from Ottawa, Secretary of State Alexander Haig confirmed that the Administration was giving top priority to proposals to offer the Western European allies greater access to U.S. coal and nuclear energy supplies in the hopes of averting what he called "the possibility of over-reliance" on the Soviet Union by the Atlantic allies.

This alternative plan is both technologically feasible and competitive in price with the Soviet pipeline project. Most important of all, its entire logistical infrastructure would remain in the West. With it in place, there could be no Soviet blackmail threat down the line.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 AUGUST 1981 Pg 17

SIBERIAN GAS FIELD DELAYED BY SOVIET

Deposit Earmarked for Europe Is Put Off as Nearby Giant Resources Get Priority

By THEODORE SHABAD

The Soviet Union, in a shift of its natural-gas strategy, has disclosed that it is delaying the development of a new Siberian field that was to be a major supplier of gas to West Germany and other European countries.

Instead of proceeding with development of the proposed Arctic field, known as Yamburg, Soviet planners have decided to concentrate efforts on the huge Urengoi field, 150 miles to the south.

Urengoi, the largest gas field in the world, has been producing gas since 1978. Under the five-year plan for 1981-85, its output is scheduled to rise from 1.75 trillion cubic feet last year to 8.4 trillion in 1985. If the goal is met, this single field would yield the equivalent of 40 percent of all of the United States' current output of natural gas.

It would thus meet growing Soviet domestic needs and, presumably, any additional export commitments arising out of the new European pipeline deal.

The Urengoi field was in the news in the early 1970's in connection with the plans of an American consortium to ship Soviet liquefied natural gas by tanker to the United States' East Coast. The project did not materialize, and the Soviet Union proceeded to develop the field on its own.

A Question of Efficiency

Urengoi is the second of the giant Siberian fields to be developed. The first, Medvezhye, started up in 1972 and now produces 2.5 trillion cubic feet a year.

The change in development strategy was reported Aug. 1 by the new Minister of the Gas Industry, Vasily A. Dinkov, in Sovetskaya Rossiya, the newspaper of the Russian Republic, in which the Siberian gas fields are situated. Mr. Dinkov, 56 years old, took over the helm of the gas industry from Sabit A. Orudzhev, who died in April at the age of 68.

Mr. Dinkov said the new five-year plan originally envisaged raising gas output through the development of both Urengoi and Yamburg, the latter being advertised as the main source of additional gas for Western Europe.

The Gas Minister said detailed studies showed, however, that construction capacity would be used more effectively by concentrating on Urengoi, with only some preliminary work planned for Yamburg until 1985. Mr. Dinkov said this would save a billion rubles. In the current five-year plan, investment in the gas industry, most of it in Siberia, is to be 20 billion rubles ($26 billion), twice the amount invested in 1976-80.

Gas Becomes More Important

Natural gas, a rapidly growing Soviet energy source in the 1970's, has assumed ever greater significance because oil production has leveled off and a stagnating coal industry has been unable to substitute coal for oil, as originally envisaged by Soviet planners.

The expectations are that natural gas will play a more important role not only in the Soviet domestic fuel mix but also as an earner of foreign exchange. The share of natural gas in the Soviet fuel mix is expected to rise from 27 percent last year to 35 percent by 1985.

The main problem facing Soviet industry is to install the pipelines needed to move the gas from the producing region astride the Arctic Circle to the European part of the Soviet Union and on into Eastern and Western Europe.

A transmission capacity of 5 trillion cubic feet a year was in place last year as West Siberia produced one-third of the Soviet natural gas output of 15 trillion cubic feet. By 1985, the Siberian fields, mainly on the strength of Urengoi, are to yield some 12 trillion cubic feet of gas, or 55 percent of the projected Soviet output of 22 trillion cubic feet.

The transmission of 7 trillion more cubic feet of gas a year from Siberia will call for an intensive pipelaying effort, involving six pipelines 56 inches in diameter totaling some 12,000 miles with 174 compressor stations.

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

4

West Germans set on Soviet gas

By Victoria Pope
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

The Reagan administration will find little — if any — support in Bonn for an alternative energy package aimed at wooing West Germany from a proposed $9.5 billion gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union.

If West Germany signs a contract for the construction, the controversial partnership would represent the biggest business deal ever between the capitalist and communist world.

The United States is concerned that such a deal would make Western Europe — particularly West Germany — too dependent on the Soviet Union for energy supplies.

Financial experts predict that the expected counterproposal from the United States would offer a combination of coal and enriched uranium. But both energy sources are loaded with political implications in West Germany and not likely to upset the rhythm of West German-Soviet negotiations, which are reportedly moving at a steady pace.

West Germany's vocal antinuclear lobby would quickly lash out against any consideration of atomic power for energy, and coal would be similarly judged as environmentally harmful. Faced with widespread criticism of the United States' neutron bomb decision, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government isn't looking for another volatile issue. "We have enough anti-Americanism as it is," said one international businessman specializing in energy.

For West Germany, agreement on the pipeline goes well beyond relief for its energy problems. Faced with a sluggish economy and rising unemployment, Bonn welcomes the possibility of new contracts for its ailing industries. Well before West German consumers would use gas to heat their homes, German manufacturers may stoke their shrinking coffers with contract money for pipes, compressors, and other equipment.

The giant project, in the works since 1978, would mean that natural gas would be pumped from the frozen wastes of Siberia more than 3,000 miles to the Bavarian frontier, where it would tie into a European energy grid. At first, the pipeline would meet only 5 percent of West Germany's energy needs, but by the end of the decade, the nation would be dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 40 percent of its supply. With an estimated annual import of 24 billion cubic meters of gas from the Soviet Union, it would become the largest gas-importing country in the world.

Washington has argued that the deal would give the Soviets the Western technology they desperately need, and free capital for building up defense. A counterargument, voiced by several international traders in Bonn, is that the deal provides Western leverage against actions such as an invasion of Poland.

US Assistant Secretary of State Robert D. Hormats is due in the West German capital the first week of October, and senior White House officials have expressed hope he will have with him a workable alternative to the Soviet pipeline, which would transport about 40 billion cubic meters a year to Western Europe. Besides West Germany, the nations of Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland have all shown interest in receiving the natural gas.

But the West Germans are making their own plans. Count Otto Lambsdorff, the West German minister for economic affairs, will head a delegation due to arrive in Moscow Sept. 24, East-West banking sources say. And it is likely that the pipeline will be at the top of his agenda.

Preliminary approval of the project early this year was spurred by soaring interest rates on the continent and Moscow's insistence on lower-than-market-level financing. But by the end of July, the West German consortium of 14 banks had established another "preliminary" agreement which the banks called "a necessary precondition for concluding contracts" for West German equipment. Banking sources in Bonn said that the high interest rates may be buried in the price of the equipment to resolve the financing logjam.

But the price of the gas itself is yet another stumbling block, and the West German gas importing firm, Ruhrgas, has refused to accept a Soviet proposal that the price be in parity with oil.

Though the supplying of pipes is no longer being discussed in the main credit negotiations, several West German companies stand at the front of the line for contracts. The pipeline manufacturer Mannesmann, in deep financial trouble, has already extended a credit of about 5 billion deutsche marks (about $2.1 billion) to the Soviets, and signed an agreement in April to supply the Soviet Union with 550,000 tons of pipe.

By the end of the decade, West Germany would be dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 40 percent of its gas supply.

The official Soviet news agency Tass announced the formal exchange of papers on the deal Aug. 25, stating a "major new contract" had been closed. But a Mannesmann spokesman in Düsseldorf said that the order for steel pipes was part of the April contract, with no direct link to the pipeline deal.

But Moscow's trumpeting of last spring's contract showed that the Russians are anxious to keep the issue in the spotlight.

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E-W.T.

The New York Times - August 26, 1981

5

Energy In Europe

By Joseph Barnea

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. — There is a growing dispute between the United States and the countries of Western Europe, in particular West Germany, about the sources and supply of energy to those countries.

The United States objects to Western Europe's plans to import large amounts of Soviet natural gas and to participate in building an expensive gas pipeline from Siberia for that purpose. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. has offered replacements in the form of coal and nuclear power to be supplied by the United States. Mr. Haig's response reveals not only a failure to understand that West Germany is eager to reduce unemployment by keeping its steel factories busy turning out pipeline sections but also, and more important, the State Department's lack of information on Western Europe's energy potential, particularly its natural gas potential.

In addition to gas, Western Europe has many other energy resources, including light crude oil, which has been explored and partly developed only during the last 20 years, and heavy crude oil, which is known to exist in many European countries and offshore but has not been explored and is almost totally undeveloped.

Coal, lignite and brown coal, the historical resources, have been partly abandoned, as in France, or have to be mined from deeper seams at higher cost. Only in Britain has there been much modern exploration for coal, and there it has resulted in the discovery of significant low-cost coal resources.

Oil shale resources are largely unexplored, and geothermal resources are at a very early stage, although before World War I Italy became the first country in the world to produce geothermal electricity.

We know today of at least 14 sources of natural gas, and most of them exist in Western Europe. The two conventional sources are associated gas, so called because it is produced in association with light or conventional crude, and nonassociated gas found in gas fields. With the growing production of conventional crude, especialy in the North Sea, this source of associated gas is expanding. Nonassociated gas, including more than 60 gas discoveries off the Netherlands coast, is found in many gas fields in the North Sea, although most of them have not been opened for development. Recent gas discoveries off Norway are of giant size, and gas fields are also found in other offshore areas.

A large potential for gas also exists on land. This January, the Austrian national oil company found a rich source of gas at a depth of 24,000 feet, demonstrating the existence of deep gas in Western Europe. Small and shallow gas wells, a rapidly growing source in the United States, including upstate New York, are still unexploited in Europe because all underground resources belong to the state, and independent oil and gas companies are almost unknown there. Gas in tight sandstone, already produced in substantial quantities in the United States, is still unexplored in Europe. Gas in Devonian shale, which is produced in the United States, is also unexplored. There is gas occluded in coal and lignite. Gas in geopressure zones is known to exist in the North Sea and some other parts of Europe. Finally, Europe also has gas hydrates, a huge resource for the future.

Why, then, is Western Europe importing gas and preparing to import so much more? Apart from the purely economic reasons, governments and the public in Western Europe are almost completely ignorant of the energy and specifically of the gas potential of Europe. They believe their proven reserves are the last gas they have and that they must stretch them out into the future. Governments appear to have a deliberate policy of slow development of gas. Energy companies, which certainly must know about these potential energy sources, show no great zeal in going after them. An American oil company that years ago found gas fields off the Dutch coast was recently told that one field would be allowed to produce starting in 1986.

In addition, there are very few oil- and gas-producing companies operating in Western Europe. We estimate their number, including both national and private companies, at fewer than 50. By comparison, there are more than 15,000 independent private companies in the United States. Since all underground resources in Western Europe belong to the state, which is the only authority to grant exploration rights, there is no active competition for gas supplies, and the oil companies cooperate with the government rather than pressing them for action.

Given the present institutional structure, the present policy of governments and the small number of oil and gas companies — all factors based on monopoly positions — the best and quickest solution would be to open all lands to exploration and development, either by allowing landowners to drill on their own land or by other similar measures. In addition, if independent American companies could be induced to assist in the formation of independent European companies, competition would grow in the exploration and development of underground resources. This is the most important contribution Mr. Haig could make to the increase of energy supplies in Western Europe.

Joseph Barnea, an energy specialist, wrote this article in collaboration with William Epstein, a nuclear specialist. Both are special fellows at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

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5001 a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Bailey

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MP 11/14/07

August 26, 1981

E-W T.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. L. Paul Bremer III
Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
Ms. Jean Jones
Mr. Jay Rixse
Lt Col Edward Bucknell
Mr. David Pickford
Mr. David Macdonald
Mr. Peter Borre
Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Amb Harvey Feldman

SUBJECT: Draft of Options Paper on Oil/Gas Controls

Attached is a draft of the options paper concerning controls on oil and gas equipment and technology.

Since the memorandum contains little new material it is anticipated that further editing will be minimal.

However, comments and suggestions received by close of business Thursday, August 27, can be considered for incorporation in the final memorandum.

Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

Attachment
Draft Memo to President with Options Paper

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INTERNAL MEMO FROM SECRETARIES HAIG, WEINBERGER AND BALDRIGE AND AMB BROCK -- NOT AVAILABLE TO THE AGENCIES

NSC STAFF PREPARED SUMMARY

CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO THE USSR OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

Issue: What licensing policy should the United States adopt on controlling exports to the USSR of equipment and technology for the exploration and development of Soviet oil and natural gas? Implicit in this decision is whether the U.S. should treat oil and gas production equipment and technology as strategic commodities.

The U.S. Policy on Soviet Energy Development

The State options papers do not directly examine the basic question, "Is it in the interest of the U.S. and the Western industrial democracies to assist energy development in the Soviet Union?" The major arguments are:

Yes

- Developing Soviet energy helps them overcome potential energy and hard currency shortages and reduces their motivation to aggression in the Persian Gulf Oil area.
- Increases the world oil supply and keeps the Soviets from purchasing on Western oil markets, reducing pressure on world oil prices.
- Maintains a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union in an important economic area to offset the competitive relationship in military sectors.
- Results in substantial export and employment benefits for U.S. and Allied countries.

No

- It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will ever become dependent on the world market for oil imports; if it decides to intervene in the Persian Gulf, it will do so for reasons other than to obtain oil; e.g., to deprive the West of oil.
- Western equipment and technology reduces the costs of energy development to the Soviet Union and frees resources for application in the Military Sector.

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- Western assistance contributes to an expansion of Soviet energy exports to the West and to Eastern Europe and increases their dependency on the USSR.
- It is inconsistent to seek increases in defense expenditures while making it easier for the Soviets to devote resources to their military.

Current U.S. Policy

The Carter Administration imposed special licensing requirements on exports of oil and gas related items in 1978, and tightened controls in early 1980 as part of the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980 policy, currently in force, sets a general presumption to deny exports of technology for the manufacture of oil and gas equipment, but retains the presumption to approve exports of end use equipment not subject to multilateral COCOM controls.

We need to clarify or modify current policy on oil and gas equipment and technology -- a key element in our overall export control policy -- to inform U.S. business, our European Allies, and the Soviets of our intentions and to provide a framework for U.S. actions concerning the Siberian Pipeline.

Soviet Energy

The Soviet Union needs to expand its gas production and increase oil exploration and drilling to offset anticipated declines in oil productions. Without such development it may be increasingly difficult to meet domestic and East European energy requirements, let alone to generate hard currency earnings by exports of oil and gas. The Soviets plan to use Western equipment in developing their resources, since it is substantially more efficient than Soviet equipment.

U.S. Technological Leverage

U.S. based firms are the sole source suppliers of certain advanced types of equipment and technology and generally dominate the world market in these areas. However, opinions differ widely on the quality and availability of substitutes for these items and on the effectiveness of unilateral U.S. restrictions. It is generally agreed, however, that Allied restrictions would have much more significant long-term effects on Soviet production than unilateral U.S. efforts.

Western European Perspective

Western European leaders generally favor unrestricted exports of oil and gas equipment and technology to the USSR and do not

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currently control exports in this area. Some see the Soviets as a more secure source than the Middle East and as a means to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil. They recognize that energy purchases from the Soviets will be spent in their own economies, and see substantial political benefits from trade with the USSR. A number of West European leaders also see development of domestic Soviet energy resources as mitigating Soviet adventurism in the Persian Gulf. They are thus likely to resist a restrictive approach to East-West energy trade.

Soviet Hard Currency Earnings

Oil exports currently provide about 50 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings. If Soviet oil production declines as CIA predictions indicate, the Soviets will be forced to discontinue oil exports by the end of this decade. Loss of this major source of hard currency could constrain Soviet ability to maintain current levels of imports form the West unless natural gas exports can be increased significantly.

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45605	OPTIONS PAPER RE CONTROLS ON EXPORTS	1	ND	B1

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45606	PAPER RE OPTIONS	4	ND	B1

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FROM DASD/IETSP/ISP OFFICE/DESK Dr. Steve Breyn PHONE NBR 697-9347

SUBJECT Decision on Controls on Exports of Oil and Gas Equipment and Technology to the USSR (S)

CLASSIFICATION ______ PAGES 1

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

[ ] HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

[XXXX] IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY.

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AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	Allen Lenz	SD/NSC	376A/OEOB	395-3044
NSC	Norman Bailey	Planning & Evaluation	373/OEOB	395-4985
	JP NAN Col NSC			

REMARKS: Attached is the Department of Defense's substitute draft for the NSC paper on oil and gas.

S Bryen

S. Bryen
DASD/IETSP

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
45608	DRAFT MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT RE DECISION ON CONTROLS OF EXPORTS	1	ND	B1

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NARA 1/12/07

KEYWORDS: USSR | EXPORT CONTROLS

COCOM | OIL

GAS

E-W T.

SUBJECT: DRAFT OF OPTIONS PAPER ON OIL & GAS CONTROLS

ACTION: LENZ SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES | DUE: | STATUS C | FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO	
		PIPES	Stearman
		WEISS	Bailey
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		NAU	

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft of Options Paper on Oil/Gas Controls

The State Department has reviewed the subject NSC Options Paper and concurs fully with the attachments to it, Tabs A through D.

With regard to the covering draft memorandum to the President, the Department offers the suggestions shown on the attached mark-up of the text.

The Department appreciates the promptness and efficiency with which the NSC prepared the subject papers for circulation.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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45612	DRAFT MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT RE CONTROLS ON EXPORTS (ANNOTATED)	3	ND	B1

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FROM DASD/IETSP/ISP OFFICE/DESK Dr. Steve Bryen PHONE NBR 697-9347

SUBJECT "...drop Option V from the Statement of Options...."

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES One

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

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NSC	Norman Bailey	Planning & Evaluation	373/OEOB	395-4985
	NANCE, COLSON			
	POINDEXTER			

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45613	MEMO RICHARD PERLE TO ALLEN LENZ RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	1	8/28/1981	B1

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Bailey

KEYWORDS: USSR EXPORT CONTROLS

COCOM OIL

GAS

E-W T.

SUBJECT: DRAFT OF OPTIONS PAPER ON OIL & GAS CONTROLS

ACTION: LENZ SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: 31 AUG 81 STATUS S FILES PA

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45614	MEMO FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	1	8/28/1981	B1

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45615	PAPER RE STATEMENT OF OPTIONS	2	ND	B1

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Colson	E	
Poindexter	E	
Jean	O	
NSC S/S		

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