

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security
Decision Directives (NSDD): Records

Folder Title: NSDD 85 [Eliminating the Threat from Ballistic
Missiles] (2 of 2)

Box: RAC Box 5

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171

Box Number 91289

WESTWICK

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
25305	MEMO	BILL CLARK TO GEORGE SHULTZ, CASPAR WEINBERGER, RE: CONSULATION WITH NATO ALLIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE	1	4/5/1983	B1
25306	MEMO	BOB LINHARD/RAY POLLOCK THRU RICHARD BOVERIE TO CLARK, RE: REASSURANCE FOR THE ALLIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE	1	4/1/1983	B1
25307	PAPER	CONSULTATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE R 1/11/2008 NLRRF05-171	3	ND	B1
25308	MEMO	COPY OF #25305 WITH ANNOTATIONS	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171

Box Number 91289

WESTWICK

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
25309	MEMO	RAY POLLOCK, BOB LINHARD, GIL RYE THRU BOVERIE TO CLARK, RE: ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDD 85	2	4/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8302178

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 01 APR 83 19

*dlb
4/4/84*

DOCDATE 01 APR 83

TO CLARK

FROM LINHARD

POLLOCK

01 APR 83

BOVERIE

01 APR 83

KEYWORDS: NATO

STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBJECT: CONSULTATION W/ ALLIES RE PRES STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 04 APR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID *NSDD85* (J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C +/5</i>	<i>Clark sgd memo</i>		<i>RL, RB, PD andif</i>

DISPATCH *4/5 Cen*

W/ATTCH FILE *TH* (C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD: RECORDS

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder

NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171
WESTWICK

Box Number

91289

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

25305 MEMO

1 4/5/1983 B1

BILL CLARK TO GEORGE SHULTZ, CASPAR WEINBERGER, RE: CONSULATION WITH NATO ALLIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD: RECORDS

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder

NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171
WESTWICK

Box Number

91289

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

25306 MEMO

1 4/1/1983 B1

BOB LINHARD/RAY POLLOCK THRU RICHARD BOVERIE TO CLARK, RE: REASSURANCE FOR THE ALLIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



S/S 8308880

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
90373

83 MAR 25 PII: 54

CONFIDENTIAL

March 25, 1983
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: GAMEPLAN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S BMD
INITIATIVE

As requested in the March 23 meeting on the President's speech chaired by General Boverie, attached is a suggested approach for consultations on ballistic missile defense for interagency clearance. We have provided an information copy of this memorandum to the Department of Defense.

Charles Hill

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Draft Memorandum on Consultations

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 6/6/06

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

25307

CONFIDENTIAL

Consultations on the President's Proposal
for Ballistic Missile Defense

Other governments were informed in advance of the President's March 23 speech, and he promised in the speech that there would be further consultations on his ballistic missile defense initiative. Subsequent to the speech we provided foreign governments with additional information on the initiative. Further consultations will now fall into four categories: our NATO Allies, other concerned and friendly governments, the Soviet Union and the non-aligned.

NATO

The concerns of the NATO Allies are likely to focus on five areas:

1) The existing NATO strategy of flexible response, which holds out the prospect of nuclear escalation in order to deter a conventional attack. NATO governments, particularly the German, want to retain the threat of nuclear retaliation as the best means of preventing conventional war. They would not welcome technological developments which potentially denied NATO capacity to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear attack.

2) Closely related to the first is the concern that the U.S. nuclear guarantee -- which couples the security of Europe to our own strategic umbrella -- might be neutralized through the development of such technology.

3) Also related is concern that technology which protected the U.S. and Soviet Union from the threat of long range ballistic missiles might not provide Europe with the same degree of protection against attack from shorter range missiles and other tactical delivery systems. Thus, a nuclear conflict might be centered in Europe.

4) Nuclear Allies Britain and France would be concerned that the development and employment of such technology would undermine the credibility of their nuclear forces. Just the prospect of such technology could make securing the funds for these forces more difficult in years ahead, particularly in the UK.

5) Finally, the NATO Allies will be troubled about the potential consequences for arms control.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F05-171 #25307

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

BY CW NARA DATE 11/10/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Other Concerned and Friendly Countries

Chief among these countries are China (a nuclear power with concerns about independent deterrence similar to those of the British and French), Japan, and our ANZUS Allies. Japan and the ANZUS Allies will be concerned that whatever system we develop for the protection of our NATO Allies be available to them as well. They will also share many of the concerns noted above for NATO.

We do not plan special talks with China on this issue and there are no trips of appropriate senior U.S. officials planned at this time. If the Chinese express concern, we would offer them a special briefing in Washington to their Embassy personnel. Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz will be prepared to respond to Japanese questions during his visit there next week and we could agree to discuss the issue at the next Security Commission talks if the Japanese desire. We plan to touch briefly on the issue later this month in the U.S.-Australian Politico-Military talks in Canberra, at which New Zealand will be represented.

The USSR

We plan no special explanation for the Soviets beyond Ambassador Hartman's March 24 discussion with Korniyenko. Our Embassy and arms control delegations have the agreed background material on which to draw. They may also note that what the President has initiated is a program similar to research in which the Soviet Union has been involved for many years.

Other Nations

Other nations, largely the non-aligned, have been briefed using the background material sent to all diplomatic posts. That material may have to be elaborated for use in other international conferences and fora such as the Committee on Disarmament.

Conclusion

In the short run, we will work to allay any concerns, by emphasizing the long-range nature of the President's initiative and its focus on ballistic missiles. We have already prepared Qs and As to this effect for use with Allied and friendly governments. We will stress these same points publicly here and abroad. We also will be developing more detailed material, for use by our Missions abroad, which would outline the President's intentions and respond to host government concerns.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Over the longer term, we will want to ensure that foreign -- and particularly Allied -- concerns are reflected in the study the President has directed, while at the same time we influence foreign views on ballistic missile defense in a positive direction. We are considering whether, at some stage, visits by senior officials to selected capitals and NATO Headquarters would contribute to this end.

The first step will be early preparation of detailed material on the structure and objectives of the projected research into ballistic missile defense, the content of which will be aimed at allaying Allied concerns. A second step will be the preparation of presentations for the Secretaries of Defense and State to their NATO colleagues at the June NAC and DPC Ministerial meetings. A possible third step, to be considered in the coming months, would be the dispatch of a team of senior officials to selected Allied capitals and NATO Headquarters for more detailed consultations.

CONFIDENTIAL

**National Security Council
The White House**

604

83 APR 7 P 7: 38

Package # 2178

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8390373

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

db 6/6/04

RECEIVED 26 MAR 83 11

DOCDATE 25 MAR 83

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBJECT: GAMEPLAN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON PRES BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
INITIATIVE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES IFD O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BOVERIE

COMMENTS

REF# 8308880

LOG 8390276

NSCIFID NSDD0085 (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD: RECORDS

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder

NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171
WESTWICK

Box Number

91289

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
25308	MEMO COPY OF #25305 WITH ANNOTATIONS	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

2/5/87 Originals for file
Documents destroyed
by: H.S. West

No. NSDD 84

COPY WH CHIEF OF STAFF

SYSTEM II 90318

Signed: 3/11/83

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390417

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 04 APR 83 12

dlb 6/6/06

TO CLARK

FROM POLLOCK

DOCDATE 04 APR 83

LINHARD

04 APR 83

RYE

04 APR 83

KEYWORDS: ABM

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NSDD

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES RE IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDD 85

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFD O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8290273

8390276

NSC IFD NSDD0085

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C Yes

Clark approved recon #2

PO, RL, RY, KI

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

605

National Security Council The White House

Package # 90417

1200
APR 04 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u>M</u>	<u></u>
Jacque Hill	<u></u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u></u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>Person</u>	<u>6</u>	<u></u>	<u>A wepl</u> <u>03 1</u>



SYSTEM II
THE WHITE HOUSE 90417
WASHINGTON

4/5

Ray Pollock,

When we get agency
Comments back on
WSSD, put in
an administrative
paragraph that covers
this.

J

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSDD: RECORDS

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2006

File Folder

NSDD 85 [ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F05-171
WESTWICK

Box Number

91289

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------

25309 MEMO

2 4/4/1983 B1

RAY POLLOCK, BOB LINHARD, GIL RYE THRU
BOVERIE TO CLARK, RE: ORGANIZATIONAL
ISSUES CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF
NSDD 85

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 26 MAR 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER *dib 6/6/04*

DOCDATE 25 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBJECT: GAMEPLAN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON PRES BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES IFD O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BOVERIE

COMMENTS

REF# 8308880

LOG 8390276

NSCIFID NSDD0085 (B 1B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C APR 07 1983 Action completed by ~~90373~~ 2178

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

SENSITIVE

System II
90444

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

April 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the United
States Representative to the
United Nations

Colonel George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. John Tierney
Acting Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency


Dr. George A. Keyworth
Director
Office of Science and Technology
Policy

SUBJECT: Strategic Modernization Announcement, April 12

The attached draft remarks have been prepared for the President's announcement on strategic forces modernization in the East Room on April 12.

Request your review and comments/concurrence not later than 5:00 p.m., April 8. If we have not received your comments at that time, concurrence will be assumed.

Considering the sensitivity of these remarks, particularly in regard to timing formal notification to the Congressional leadership, and briefings to foreign governments, distribution must be held to an absolute minimum.



Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment
Draft Remarks

SENSITIVE

1st Cut: Draft Remarks
Strategic Forces Announcement

The end of World War II a generation ago, left the world with two terrible and wholly unacceptable views of the future: Hiroshima and Auschwitz.

These two places, totally obscure 40 years ago, now symbolize the twin dangers we face. Modern mass destruction and modern totalitarianism can only be understood together since our challenge is to avoid both.

Our words, policies, and actions should all make clear the deeply held American conviction that nuclear war of any scale would be a tragedy of unparalleled scope for humanity. It is this fundamental belief that drives our strategy of deterrence and arms control.

Several weeks ago in Los Angeles, I discussed our efforts to limit and reduce the danger of nuclear weapons through reliable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms control agreements. The arms control path runs parallel to our policy of deterrence. Both seek to prevent conflict and reduce the risk of war. If we are to pursue deterrence successfully, we must have a strong and militarily effective strategic posture.

Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff. In order for

deterrence to be effective we must not merely possess weapons, we must be perceived to be able and prepared, if necessary, to use them. While we seek to achieve arms control agreements that reduce instabilities and channel strategic weapons modernization of both sides toward stabilizing developments and reductions, we cannot forego the imperatives of deterrence.

It was against this background that I established a Commission on Strategic Forces last January and directed that it review the strategic program for United States forces with particular emphasis to be given to the intercontinental ballistic missile systems and associated basing alternatives. The distinguished group of Americans who served on the Commission and their senior counselors have vast experience in national security matters and technical know-how. This bipartisan group came from six Administrations. Their common bond was unquestioned competence and a complete dedication to their country.

During the past three months the Commission held dozens of formal meetings and numerous smaller conferences, talked to over 200 technical experts, and consulted closely with the leadership and other interested members of Congress.

The Commission has completed its work and, last week, submitted its report to me. I am pleased to announce that the members have unanimously agreed on a number of important conclusions and recommendations. As you know, after I met with the National Security Council yesterday, the report was released to the

public.

I endorse the Commissioner's recommendations and as a result, this morning, I met with the leadership of the Congress to advise them of my conclusions.

These conclusions are as follows:

First, we should continue our strategic modernization program that I recommended to Congress in October 1981 with specific emphasis on improving the command, control and communications for our strategic forces, and continuation of our bomber, Trident submarine, and air launched cruise missiles programs.

Second, we should modernize our ICBM forces in two ways. We should immediately produce and deploy 100 MX missiles, in existing Minuteman silos at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Due to the long lead times involved, "immediate" in this case means a first deployment in December 1986, with the deployment complete by the end of the decade.

At the same time we should begin engineering design of a small, single warhead missile. If strategic and technical considerations warrant, such a missile could be ready for full scale development in 1986 and potential deployment in the early 1990's.

The reasons for these missile decisions are complex, but in

summary, the ICBMs we have are old, obsolete, and wearing out. We cannot safely allow our ICBM force to wither away in the face of Soviet actions over the past two decades, and action on our part is necessary as an incentive to arms reduction agreements. Some large rockets are necessary in our forces, but in the longer run smaller, less valuable missiles could be more stable in time of crisis.

Survivability of the deterrent, not any one pilot, crew, or leg of the TRIAD is what really counts, and cost is an important consideration. This ICBM plan will reduce my 1984 budget request by \$1.5 billion, and the 1985 and 1986 request by even more.

Since both of these ICBMs are solid propellant rockets, planned to replace Minuteman, and capable of placement in Minuteman silos, I have decided to name them Minuteman IV and Minuteman V respectively.

Third, we should conduct major research into, and the most rigorous examination of, all forms of ballistic missile defense.

Fourth, we must proceed with a thorough study of the whole concept of major improvements in hardening silos for land-based missile systems.

I urge the Congress to join me now in this bipartisan effort to settle on a modernization plan for our strategic forces. For

more than a decade each of four Administrations has made proposals for arms control and modernization that have become embroiled in political controversy. The members of the Commission, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and I have all had to take fresh looks at our previous positions. Despite the range of views these groups have held in the past, we are presenting to you a unanimous view on this vital issue. Your support for this consensus can unite us in making a major step forward in our common search for ways to ensure national security.