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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 3/2/2017

File Folder UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2/19/81-4/11/81)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 48

SKINNER

1124

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
191246 CABLE	STATE 63757	3	3/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIASIMET,DEPOL,NEA

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NLRR 748-48-21-1-1

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY LD13 NARA DATE 6/3/13

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUGMBI #0498 0500605
O P 190604Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1825

INFO SECDEF WASHDC //OSD/ISA// PRIORITY
JCS/J5 PRIORITY
USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ABU DHABI 498
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/19/87 (WOLLE, WM. D.) DR=M
TAGS: MASS TC
SUBJECT: DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
REF: (A) 80 ABU DHABI 3049
(B) 80 STATE 084751
(C) 80 ABU DHABI 313

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYID, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE AND DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER OF UAE ARMED FORCES, SUMMONED AMBASSADOR

TO HIS RESIDENCE FEBRUARY 18 FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF PRESENTING A LETTER DETAILING UAE ARMS REQUESTS. TEXT IS IN PARA 3 BELOW. ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF LT. COL. MUHAMMAD AL-BADI, THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT, TRANSLATED AS NEEDED. ESSENCE OF LETTER AND OF SHAIKH KHALIFA'S BRIEF REMARKS IS THAT UAE WANTS TO BUY ONE SQUADRON EACH OF F-16 AND F-16 AIRCRAFT, (NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PER SQDN NOT STATED - PRESENT SQDN

8 OF MIRAGE AVG 18) 12 COBRA HELICOPTERS, AN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK OF IMPROVED HAWK MISSILES (NUMBER OF BATTERIES UNSTATED, BUT THE PACKAGE TO BE BASED ON LAST SUMMER'S STUDY BY OUR AIR DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM) AND 45 TOW MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON JEEPS. THE NEED FOR THESE ITEMS WAS STATED TO BE "URGENT" THOUGH SHAIKH KHALIFA PRESENTED

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NO DETAILED RATIONALE FOR THIS URGENCY, NOR DID HE EXPLAIN WHY UAEG IS DUSTING OFF ITS US ARMS FILE JUST AT THIS TIME -- SOME 9 MONTHS AFTER OUR BASIC RESPONSES TO SHAIKH KHALIFA'S SHOPPING LIST OF A YEAR AGO. EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW BY SEPTEL IN A COUPLE OF DAYS. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF ARABIC TEXT OF SHAIKH KHALIFA'S LETTER, ADDRESSED TO AMBASSADOR, FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES

TOP SECRET (UAE CLASSIFICATION)

NO. MQ/1/1

DATE: RABIA AWAL 1404/FEBRUARY 1981

HIS EXCELLENCY WILLIAM D. WOLLE

AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO THE STATE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

ABU DHABI

WITH GREETINGS ETC.,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER DATED APRIL 2, 1980 WHICH CONTAINED CLARIFICATIONS ON THE CONTENTS OF OUR MESSAGE MQG 1/1/334 DATED FEB 3, 1980 CONCERNING THE DESIRE THE STATE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO OBTAIN WEAPONS AND MILITARY DEFENCE SUPPLIES FROM THE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR RESPECTED GOVERNMENT TO SELL IN PRINCIPLE TO THE STATE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IS AN INDICATION OF THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND I WISH TO EXPRESS MY CONSTANT AIM OF STRENGTHENING THE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH ARE BETWEEN US FOR THE BETTER. ON THIS OCCASION, I DESIRE TO MAKE CLEAR THE DESIRE OF THE STATE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSIVE STRENGTH BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT CONDITIONS WHICH BLACKEN THE REGION, AND (BECAUSE) OF THE CONTINUING THREATS WHICH ARE MANIFESTED IN THE VIOLATIONS OF OUR AIR SPACE AND THE OVERFLIGHTS WHICH THREATEN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE.

I ANNOUNCE TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS WE WISH TO PURCHASE AT THE PRESENT TIME:

1. ONE SQUADRON OF F-15 AIRCRAFT
2. ONE SQUADRON OF F-16 AIRCRAFT
3. COBRA HELICOPTERS NUMBERING 12
4. AN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK OF IMPROVED HAWK MISSILES, BASED ON THE STUDY WHICH WAS PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TEAM AS A RESULT OF ITS VISIT TO THE STATE.

5. TOW MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON JEEPS FOR INFANTRY USE
NUMBER 45.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE
ASSURANCES OF THE FRIENDLY TIES WHICH BIND OUR TWO NATIONS.

SGD LT. GEN KHALIFA BIN ZAYYID,
CROWN PRINCE AND DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER

END TEXT

4. KHALIFA HAD LITTLE TO SAY BEYOND WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THIS TEXT.
HE SAID THE UAE APPRECIATES OUR ATTENTION TO ITS MILITARY NEEDS, AND
WELCOMES THE "STUDIES" WE HAVE PROVIDED. HE NOTED THAT UAE HAS
RECEIVED "TEAMS" FROM MANUFACTURERS OF SOME OF THE ITEMS IN HIS LETTE
R.

HE SAID THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR UAE GREATLY TO IMPROVE ITS
AIRPOWER AND AIR DEFENSES, MENTIONING THAT EXISTING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
"SUCH AS THE MIRAGES" ARE GETTING TOO OLD. HE REMARKED THAT WE WOULD
NOTE FROM THE LETTER HIS GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT CONCENTRATION IN
BUYING FROM US MODERN EQUIPMENT FOR ITS AIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE
NEEDS AS AGAINST OTHER REQUIREMENTS. HE THANKED ME WHEN I
SAID WE WOULD TURN ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER AT ONCE, AND NOTED WHEN
I INDICATED THAT, AFTER STUDY, WE MIGHT HAVE SOME QUESTIONS WHICH I
FIRST OF ALL WOULD DIRECT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND IF NECESSARY
TO HIM.

5. EMBASSY WILL BE PREPARING AN ANALYSIS OF THIS UAEG "INITIATIVE"
(OR MORE PROPERLY ITS RESURRECTION OF AN OLD SUBJECT) DURING OUR
PRESENT AND WASHINGTON'S COMING WEEKENDS, TO BE CABLED BY
FEBRUARY 22.
WOLLE

PSN: 013615

TOR: 050/07112Z

DTG: 190604Z FEB 81

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOB:ASIMET,NEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUMBI #0547/01 0541043
O 231042Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1040

INFO SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/ISA//IMMEDIATE
JCS/J5 IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
BT~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 0547
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/23/87 (WOLFE, WM. D.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS TC
SUBJECT: DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
REF: ABU DHABI 4081. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.2. WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE SPECIFIC ITEMS
IN CROWN PRINCE KHALIFA'S ARMS-REQUEST LETTER RECEIVED
FEB. 18.A. TOW MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON JEEPS. THIS IS
NO SURPRISE, IT WAS ON UAE'S LIST OF A YEAR AGO. THE
REQUESTED NUMBER (46) IS HIGHER THAN THE PREVIOUS 36, BUT
THIS MAY SIMPLY BE DUE TO A DECISION TO FOREGO OR DELAY
PURCHASE OF SOME TOW WEAPONS MOUNTED ON THE M113 APC, AS
EARLIER CONCEIVED. WE RECOMMEND EARLY APPROVAL.B. TWELVE COBRA HELICOPTERS. THERE WAS NO MENTION
OF THIS BEFORE, ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL SHOPPING LIST DID
SPECIFY INTEREST IN THE A-10 AS A "CLOSE SUPPORT AND ANTI-
TANK AIRCRAFT." WE UNDERSTAND THE COBRA IS A STRICTLY
DEFENSIVE ANTI-TANK WEAPON, AND BELIEVE UAE FORCES COULD
ABSORB IT FAIRLY EASILY. RECOMMEND EARLY APPROVAL.C. IMPROVED HAWK AIR DEFENSE NETWORK. A UAE REQUEST
TO BUY THIS SYSTEM HAS BEEN EXPECTED SINCE OUR AIR DEFENSE*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-212-0BY COB NARA DATE 6/3/13

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SURVEY REPORT WAS PRESENTED HERE EARLY LAST FALL. WE RECOMMEND EARLY APPROVAL. IN FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THIS, WE SHOULD NATURALLY FOLLOW THE SUGGESTIONS IN OUR OWN STUDY AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE, AS THE UAE REQUEST IS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON IT. IN OUR VIEW, THIS FIRM UAE REQUEST TO BUY THE HAWK IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD WITH REGARD TO OUR OWN VITAL US INTEREST IN BOLSTERING THE PROTECTION OF GULF OIL RESOURCES AGAINST POTENTIAL ATTACK FROM THE NORTH AND EAST.

D. 'F-15 AND F-16 AIRCRAFT'. BOTH THESE TYPES OF AIRCRAFT APPEARED ON THE UAE SHOPPING LIST OF FEB. 3, 1980. WE ARE NOT PRIVY TO THE THINKING OF KEY UAE AIR FORCE OFFICERS ON AIRCRAFT SELECTION, BUT HAVE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

(1) THE TIMING AND POSSIBLY THE CONTENT OF THE ARMS PACKAGE MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA THAT LED TO THE CHARTER OF A COUNCIL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN ARAB GULF STATES. CERTAINLY THE F-15 AS WELL AS IMPROVED HAWK REQUEST WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SAUDIS' INVENTORY. THE F-16 REQUEST, WHICH IS NOT SAUDI-COMPATIBLE, MAY SIMPLY BE AN ATTEMPT TO BUY A LESS SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT AS A COMBAT CAPABLE TRANSITION AIRCRAFT FOR NEW PILOTS TOO INEXPERIENCED TO BE PUT ON THE F-15.

(2) IN EXPLANATION OF PRECEEDING SENTENCE, EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT TRANSITION TO F-16 IS PLAUSIBLE FOR NEWLY GRADUATED PILOTS, WHEREAS F-15 IS SO SOPHISTICATED IT CAN BE FLOWN ONLY BE EXPERIENCED PILOTS. UAE MAY RPT MAY CONCEIVE THAT ITS NEWLY GRADUATED PILOTS, WHO WILL CONSTITUTE BULK OF UAE PILOTS FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS, WILL TRANSITION INTO F-16 WITH THE FEW UAE EXPERIENCED PILOTS (AND POSSIBLY SOME EXPATRIATES) MANNING F-15S AS THEY ARE RECEIVED. ULTIMATELY, F-15 WOULD BECOME MAIN FIGHTING SQUADRON OF AIR FORCE WITH F-16 SQUADRON ACCOMPLISHING TRAINING WITH SECONDARY AIR DEFENSE AND GROUND STRIKE DUTIES.

(3) BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, UAE AIR FORCE IS PRESENTLY ORGANIZED INTO TWO SQUADRONS: NO. 1 FLIES MIRAGE V AND NO. 2 FLIES MIRAGE III. ALTHOUGH BOTH AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMON AIRFRAME AND ENGINE, LATTER CARRIES SOPHISTICATED (AT TIME OF PURCHASE) ELECTRONICS AND IS ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTOR. NO. 1 SQUADRON IS DESIGNATED TRAINING/STRIKE SQUADRON AND ALL NEW PILOTS TRANSITION TO MIRAGE THROUGH THIS SQUADRON. ONCE THEY HAVE GAINED EXPERIENCE THEY THEN TRANSITION TO NO. 2 SQUADRON WHICH IS PRIMARY FIGHTING SQUADRON. GROUND STRIKE ROLE FOR NO. 1 SQUADRON APPEARS

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO BE SECONDARY TO TRAINING FUNCTION. ABOVE EXPLANATION
MAY HOLD CLUE TO UAE DECISION TO BUY TWO SQUADRONS OF
DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT.

(4) IT IS POSSIBLE UAE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE
SAUDIS TO BUY THE F-15 ON GROUNDS IT IS THE MOST AIRPLANE
THEY CAN GET IF MONEY IS NO OBJECT. WHATEVER MAY HAVE
LED TO F-15 SELECTION, THE ONE CLEAR MESSAGE IN ALL THIS
IS THAT UAE WILL NOT RPT NOT ENTERTAIN ANY US EFFORTS TO
SELL THEM A "DOWNGRADED" AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE F5G OR THE
F-16/J79. WE BELIEVE THEIR DESIRE TO GO FIRST-CLASS IS
TOO STRONG FOR THAT.

PSN: 013333

TOR: 054/11143Z

DTG: 231042Z FEB 81

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUGMBI #0547/02 0541100

O 231042Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1847

INFO SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/ISA//IMMEDIATE

JCS/J5 IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~C O N F I L~~

KGC0EBZTCVKZJTR AL SECTION OF 2 ABU DHABI 0547

3. WE WOULD WELCOME AN INDICATION OF WASHINGTON'S EARLY THINKING ON THESE UAE REQUESTS. WE OF COURSE ARE PREPARED TO GO BACK TO UAE AUTHORITIES (COS AL-BADI IN FIRST INSTANCE) WITH ANY QUESTIONS WASHINGTON MAY HAVE, OR FOR CLARIFICATIONS OR AMPLIFICATIONS OF SHAIKH KHALIFA'S FEB. 18 INITIATIVE.

4. EMBASSY CONSIDERS THAT THIS UAE ARMS REQUEST REPRESENTS A POSITIVE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. BY BECOMING A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME, WE WILL ENHANCE OUR BILATERAL RELMIONSHIP WITH AN EXTRAORDINARILY WEALTHY AND VERY STRATEGICALLY PLACED ARAB STATE, AND WILL IMPROVE CHANCES OF REALIZING EVENTUALLY OUR GOAL OF A COORDINATED GULF AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM. WE WILL BE RESPONDING TO A UAE INITIATIVE THAT EITHER ALREADY HAS, OR ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL WIN, THE SUPPORT OF OUR KEY SAUDI PARTNERS IN DEFENDING THIS REGION.
WOLLE

PSNI 013335

TORI 054/11144Z

RTGI 231042Z FEB 81

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT;
EOB: NUCUN, NEA, SICK
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-213-9

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

BY KOB NARA DATE 29/13

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUMBI #0724 0671117
O 081110Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1925

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2798
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 1629
BT~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 724NO DIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/8/87 (WOLLE, WM, D.) OR-M
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON IRAN/IRAQ
REF: STATE 9577241. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OIL MINISTER OTAIBA, THE KEY MAN IN ANY SUCH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN ABU DHABI ON PROSPECTS OF RENEWED IRAQI OR IRANIAN PRODUCTION, WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME THE KIND OF DISCUSSION (AND ATTENTION) SUGGESTED IN REPTEL. HE IS CURRENTLY VISITING JORDAN, BUT HE WILL TRY TO GET A LINE ON HIS MARCH 16-24 SCHEDULE. IN DUE COURSE, WE MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO INVOLVE SHAIKH SUROOR, HEAD OF PRESIDENTIAL COURT AND A KEEN AND ACTIVE UAE POLICY-MAKER WITH RESPECT TO ALL GULF REGIONAL MATTERS, IN SUCH A PRESENTATION/EXCHANGE. SUROOR WAS HIGHLY INTERESTED LAST FALL IN ALL ASPECTS OF IRAQ-IRAN STRUGGLE, INCLUDING THE DAMAGE THEIR OIL FACILITIES WERE SUSTAINING.

ABU DHABI 0724

DTG:081110Z MAR 81 05N: 031226
TOR: 067/12572

DATE 03/11/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. I WOULD WELCOME KNOWING A LITTLE MORE SPECIFICALLY THE PURPOSES OF THIS EXCHANGE -- ALTHOUGH FROM EMBASSY STANDPOINT SUCH AN OPERATION, INVOLVING AS IT WOULD A WASHINGTON VISITOR HERE SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRIEFING HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS, WOULD BE A REAL PLUS SINCE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN THE UAE AS AN OIL PARTNER. WOULD WE BE AIMING MAINLY TO REDUCE FUTURE SUPPLY UNCERTAINTIES BY ASSURING THAT SAUDIS, KUWAITIS AND EMIRIANS BASE THEIR OWN PRODUCTION POLICIES ON BETTER KNOWLEDGE OF EXACTLY WHAT IRAQ AND IRAN CAN OR CANNOT DO TO SUPPLY SIDE OF MARKET? OR IS IT PARTLY A POLITICAL EXERCISE AIMED AT MORE ACCURATE CALCULATION OF JUST WHEN AND HOW THE WAR MIGHT END? (IF THE LATTER, WE WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO INCLUDE SHAIKH SURDOOR).

4. WILL ADVISE SOONEST ON OTAIBA'S LIKELY AVAILABILITY.
WOLLE

ABU DHABI 0724

DTG:001110Z MAR 81 50N1 031200
TDR: 067/1257Z

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 3/2/2017

File Folder

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2/19/81-4/11/81)

FOIA

F03-002/5
SKINNER

Box Number

48

1124

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
191246	CABLE STATE 63757	3	3/13/1981	B1

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SIT207 R

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: NJCUN
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 18-48-21-5-7

BY COOB NARA DATE 5/29/13

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #5154 0730301
R 140245Z MAR 81 ZPFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 9831

INFO WHITE HOUSE 8347
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 065154
NOOTIS
ABU DHABI PASS DUBAI
E.O. 120651 3/13/87 (GEORGE S. HARRIS)

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: GRUMMON TRIP TO UAE

REF: STATE 063757

1. SINCE GRUMMON HAS NEVER VISITED THE UAE, WE PROPOSE THAT HE REMAIN FOR A FEW DAYS CONSULTATION AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS BRIEFING MISSION. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO EXPAND HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE LOWER GULF AREA.

2. GRUMMON WOULD APPRECIATE BRIEFINGS FROM THE MISSION ON THE UAE, TO INCLUDE ASSESSMENTS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS, MAJOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES ISSUES CONFRONTING THE UAE, AND LEADING PERSONALITIES.

SECSTATE WASHDC 5154

DTG: 140245Z MAR 81 08N: 030437
TOR: 073/0301Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

1A

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. GRUMMON WOULD ALSO BE MOST ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF

--CURRENT UAE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE THREE ISLANDS DISPUTE WITH IRAN

--ACTIVITIES AND INFLUENCE OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN THE UAE

--ATTITUDES OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY TOWARD THE KHOMEINI REGIME (HE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN MERCHANT ATTITUDES); AND

--THE EXTENT OF UAE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

GRUMMON IS PREPARED TO BRIEF POST ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ AND IRAN.

4. IF POSSIBLE, GRUMMON WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL WITHIN THE UAE. HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO OIC IN DUBAI AND TO SEE SHARJA. HE IS ALSO PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SEEING SOME OF THE LESS WELL-KNOWN SHAIKHDOMS; IF AT ALL FEASIBLE TO DRIVE TO PUJEIRAH. SHOULD THAT NOT PROVE POSSIBLE, A TRIP TO AL-AYN WOULD BE OF INTEREST. GRUMMON WOULD DEFER TO YOUR BEST JUDGMENT ON TRAVEL PROSPECTS. HAYG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5154

DTG:140245Z MAR 81 SSNI 039437
TOR: 073/0301Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

RONALD REAGAN LIBRARY
TRANSFER/PARALLEL/OVERSIZE FILE SHEET

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PRESERVATION CLASSIFICATION COLLECTION RD/FRD NATO SAP

FROM:

Collection Exec. Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Series _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # _____

United Arab Emirates (2/19/81-4/11/81)

Box Number 48

Description of Material:

Cable State 066175, 3/15/81, 2p.

TO:

Collection: Exec. Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Series: _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # India (3/2/81-4/28/81)

Box Number: _____

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SIT178 R

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

17

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: NUCUN, NEA
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-4821-7-5

BY WJB NARA DATE 6/5/13

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUQMBI #0800 0750700
R 160631Z MAR 81 ZPF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1953

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 800

NO DIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/16/87 (WOLLE, WM. D.) OR-M
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJECT: GRUMMON TRIP TO UAE
REF: STATE 065154

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POST WELCOMES GRUMMON STAY FOR FEW DAYS CONSULTATION. NATURE OF HIS PARTICULAR INTERESTS WILL REQUIRE A COUPLE OF DAYS IN DUBAI/SHARJAH FOLLOWING A FULL DAY IN ABU DHABI. A DAY'S DRIVE TO FUJAIRAH IS ALSO FEASIBLE, AND WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT RATHER THAN TRIP TO AL-AIN. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER WILL BE TOM DOWLING, OIC AT DUBAI BRANCH OFFICE (AMBASSADOR WILL COORDINATE ABU DHABI EMIRATE END OF THE VISIT.)
WOLLE

ABU DHABI 0800

DTG: 160631Z MAR 81 SSN: 041074
TOR: 075/1019Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

SIT172 R

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

18

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-21-8-4

BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUQMBI #0811/01 0760602
R 170545Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1956

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 ABU DHABI 011

~~NO 18~~
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 3/16/2001 (WOLFE, WM. D.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR TC US XF
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT FORD'S MEETING WITH SHAIKH ZAYID
REF: ABU DHABI 790

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE UAE PRESIDENT PROVIDED MR. FORD AN EXCELLENT RECEPTION. HE STRESSED TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IS THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL IN THE REGION AND THAT AREA LEADERS HAVE HIGH HOPES PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE IT FAIRLY. HE CASTIGATED THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME AND EXONERATED IRAQ FOR WAR RESPONSIBILITY. HE FEARED FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. MR. FORD STRESSED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S NEW, TOUGHER LINE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS CONCERN TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES AGAINST IT. HE ASKED SHAIKH ZAYID SOME HARD QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS WOULD LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL IF OFFERED A FAIR SETTLEMENT, AND RECEIVED SOME REASSURING ANSWERS FROM HIS HOST. BOTH AGREED ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUED SOVIET EFFORTS TO STIR UP TROUBLE IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MARCH 16 FORMER PRESIDENT FORD TALKED WITH UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID FOR 90 MINUTES AT MUSHRIF PALACE

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG: 170545Z MAR 81 PBN: 043216
TOR: 076/122Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN ABU DHABI. THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY LUNCH HOSTED BY SHAIKH ZAYID AT SAME LOCATION. PRESENT THROUGHOUT WERE ALL MALE MEMBERS OF MR. FORD'S PARTY, ALONG WITH SHAIKH SURDOOR BIN MUHAMMAD, CHAMBERLAIN OF PRESIDENTIAL COURT, AND AHMAD AL-SUNWAIDI, EX-FOREIGN MINISTER AND STILL A CLOSE ADVISER OF SHAIKH ZAYID. AMBASSADOR HOLLE ALSO ATTENDED THROUGHOUT. ALL TRANSLATION WAS DONE (SUPERBLY) BY ZAKI NUSEIBEH OF PRESIDENTIAL COURT.

4. AT THE OUTSET, CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS SPENT BY SHAIKH ZAYID IN WELCOMING REMARKS AND STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF FRANKNESS AMONG FRIENDS. MR. FORD THEN SAID HE HAD TWO MISSIONS, FIRST TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S DEEP INTEREST IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND ITS DESIRE TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UAE, AND SECOND TO HEAR SHAIKH ZAYID'S RECOMMENDATIONS -- PLEASANT OR UNPLEASANT -- AS TO WHAT USG SHOULD BE DOING IN THIS REGION. MR. FORD SAID THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SEES TWO THREATS IN THIS AREA:

- A. THE EXTERNAL THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WE NOW PERCEIVE AS BEING STRONGER THAN IN MANY YEARS.
- B. THE INTERNAL THREAT IN SOME COUNTRIES, WHICH POSES ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT MAY IMPACT UPON NEIGHBORING STATES AND OUTSIDE WORLD. MR. FORD ASKED SHAIKH ZAYID'S VIEWS ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENDING IT.

5. THE UAE PRESIDENT RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF DIS-INTEGRATION IN THE REGION. THIS IS "THE CANCER, WITH ITS TENTACLES EVERYWHERE". ALL ARAB STATES AND PEOPLES IN THE REGION AGREE UPON THIS, HE SAID. THEY HAVE WAITED AND WAITED FOR A JUST SOLUTION TO BE WORKED OUT BUT IT HAS NOT HAPPENED. THE PROBLEM WAS ALLOWED TO GROW AND SPREAD ITS DISEASE INTO ASIA AND AFRICA. THROUGH THIS PROBLEM, THE UAE GRADUALLY BEGAN TO LOSE ITS FRIENDS. SOME ARAB STATES WERE WEANED AWAY FROM IT. ALL THE TIME, HE SAID, THE ENEMY IS WINNING, AND AWAITING FOR NEW LANDS AND NEW PRIZES TO FALL INTO ITS LAP.
- B. SHAIKH ZAYID SAID HE DOES NOT WANT ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS BECAUSE IF IT OCCURRED, THE UAE ALONG WITH OTHERS WOULD BE RUINED. YET AMERICAN POLICIES OFTEN ARE FORMULATED WITHOUT DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE PEOPLES

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG: 170545Z MAR 81 SSN: 043216
TOR: 076/1222Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE NEAR EAST. SHAIKH ZAYID STRESSED THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WANT TO BE PARTNERS IN RESPONSIBILITY AND IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICIES. THEY WANT TO BE CONSULTED, AND THEY WISH FOR MORE COORDINATION, MORE COOPERATION.

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG:170545Z MAR 81 SSN: 043216
TOR: 076/1222Z

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DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUQMBI #0811/02 0760615
R 170545Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1957

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 ABU DHABI 811

NO018

C. REFERRING TO THE QUESTION ABOUT THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, SHAIKH ZAYID SAID THIS HAD HAPPENED BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE SHAH. WHILE THE SHAH MAY HAVE HAD SOME DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR, HE WAS A SANE PERSON AND FOLLOWED SANE POLICY. WHAT DO WE HAVE NOW? AN IRAN WHICH IS ENTIRELY CONFUSED, DEEPLY DIVIDED AND A TREMENDOUS WORRY TO ITS NEIGHBORS. THE PRESENT WAR, SAID SHAIKH ZAYID, WAS PROBABLY INHERENT IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION WHICH HAS BEEN A MOVEMENT INTENT ON CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR SUCH NEIGHBORS AS SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND EVEN SAUDI ARABIA. THIS PRECEDED THE WAR. HE EXCUSED IRAQ FOR TAKING UP ARMS, SAYING IRAQ WAS REACTING TO IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO STIR UP TROUBLE AND THAT THOSE WHO BLAME IRAQ FOR BEGINNING THE FIGHT ARE INCORRECT.

D. MOVING TO AFGHANISTAN, SHAIKH ZAYID SAID THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER IS YET TO COME IN THAT NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN IS NOW CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO POWERS THAT ARE HOSTILE TO IT, I.E. INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE ASSERTED THAT FOR MANY YEARS FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN HAD SAT AROUND AND ALLOWED CONDITIONS THERE TO WORSEN, WHICH HAD CLEARED THE WAY FOR THE SOVIET INVASION. AS TO EGYPT, ITS SEPARATION FROM ITS ARAB FRIENDS IS A MISFORTUNE. THE UAE, HE SAID, LIKE SAUDI ARABIA, DEPENDS ON ITS FRIENDS IN AMERICA FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT, YET THE MEDIA IN THE REGION ATTACK IT IF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S. IS SHOWN TOO OPENLY.

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG:170545Z MAR 81 BBN: 043188
TOR: 079/1229Z

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. WHEN SHAIKH ZAYID PAUSED, MR. FORD MADE SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE SOME NEW POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. THIS SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND "WASHINGTON" HAVE A NEW ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. WE INTEND TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSES, TO PUT THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE THAT THEY MUST NOT MEDDLE HERE AND THERE, AND TO STRENGTHEN OUR TIES WITH MILITARY ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDS. HE REFERRED TO SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, IN ETHIOPIA AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, AND TO THEIR POTENTIAL FOR TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION IN IRAN DEPENDING ON WHAT DEVELOPS THERE. HE ALSO NOTED WASHINGTON'S CONCERN ABOUT THE CLOSE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND QADHAFI IN LIBYA. THESE NEW AMERICAN POLICIES AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS DERIVING FROM THEM MAY IMPACT UPON THE MIDDLE EAST, SAID MR. FORD.

B. HE TOLD SHAIKH ZAYID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE LATTER'S VIEW OF THE CENTRALITY OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND THAT IT HAS BROAD RAMIFICATIONS. HE POSED THE SPECIFIC QUESTION: IF THE PALESTINIANS WERE TO BE GIVEN A STATE OF THEIR OWN, SAY FOR EXAMPLE THE WEST BANK, WOULD THEY FOREGO TERRORISM, LIVE AND LET LIVE, AND PLAY A PEACEFUL AND HELPFUL ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

7. SHAIKH ZAYID RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. IF THERE IS A FAIR SOLUTION, HE SAID, THERE WILL BE TOTAL RAPPORT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BREAK DOWN ANY BRIDGE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ARAB COUNTRIES, AND WOULD MEAN THAT REAL PEACE HAS ARRIVED. THE SOVIET ACCESS TO THE REGION TODAY, HE SAID, DERIVES FROM THEIR USE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI PROBLEM. HE ASKED A RHETORICAL QUESTION: WHO SUPPORTS THE PALESTINIANS? THEIR REAL FRIENDS, HE SAID, ARE NOT THE LOUD TALKING, RADICAL STATES LIKE LIBYA OR SYRIA BUT THE MODERATE ARABS LIKE THE UAE. WE SUPPORT THEM, HE DECLARED, BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IN THE JUSTICE OF THEIR CAUSE. ONCE THEY HAVE A STATE, WE WILL HELP SEE TO IT THAT IT IS A PEACEFUL STATE.

8. SHAIKH ZAYID STRESSED THAT IN HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS, SEVERAL HAD EMPHASIZED THEIR HIGH HOPES THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON WOULD DEVOTE ITSELF TO FINDING A SOLUTION ON PALESTINE. THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IMMEDIATE PROGRESS MIGHT NOT BE FEASIBLE,

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG: 170545Z MAR 81 ZENI 043188
TOR: 075/1229Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT ALL WERE ANXIOUS FOR REAL MOVEMENT SOON.

9. FORMER PRESIDENT FORD NOTED THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH SHAIKH ZAYID THAT AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION ON PALESTINE WOULD CUT THE SOVIETS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO STIR UP TROUBLE IN THE AREA AND TRY TO KEEP IT IN TURMOIL. HE AGREED THEY ARE USING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT, WITH NO IDEOLOGICAL INTEREST AS SUCH IN THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. HE ASKED SHAIKH ZAYID A FURTHER QUESTION: WAS HE TO UNDERSTAND FROM ZAYID'S STATEMENTS THAT IF THERE IS A SETTLEMENT, THE PALESTINIANS AND THEIR ARAB FRIENDS WOULD RECOGNIZE THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS?

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG:170545Z MAR 81 58N: 043188
TOR: 076/1229Z

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DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUQMBI #0011/03 0760037
R 170545Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1950

~~S E C R E T~~ FINAL SECTION OF 3 ABU DHABI 811
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10. IN REPLY, SHAIKH ZAYID SAID HE MAY HAVE BEEN MISUNDER-
STOOD. OF COURSE THE SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO BUILD OTHER
BRIDGES, TO DEVELOP OTHER ANGLES, TO KEEP A HAND IN THE
REGION. THEY WOULD TRY TO FIND FERTILE TERRAIN FOR THEIR
EFFORTS. WITHOUT REPLYING DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF
RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE BELIEVED IT
INEVITABLE THAT ONCE THE "STRONGER PARTY" (MEANING ISRAEL)
RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS OF THE "WEAKER PARTY" (MEANING THE
ARABS), THE REVERSE WOULD TAKE PLACE. BUT ONE CANNOT EX-
PECT THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DEFEATED AND WHOSE RIGHTS HAVE
BEEN TRAMPLED UPON TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP.

11. AT LUNCH, THERE WAS SOME FURTHER CONVERSATION ON
SEVERAL POINTS. IT DEVELOPED THAT THE UAE HAS JUST LEARNED
OF GADHAFI'S PLANS TO VISIT ABU DHABI SOON. ACCORDING TO
SHAIKH ZAYID, THIS MATERIALIZED OUT OF A RECENT EXCHANGE
IN WHICH ZAYID DECLINED AN INVITATION TO VISIT TRIPOLI.
SHAIKH ZAYID EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT SIGNIFICANT IN-
TERNAL OPPOSITION TO GADHAFI'S RULE HAS DEVELOPED WITHIN
LIBYA. HE DESCRIBED GADHAFI AS A VERY PUZZLING PERSON,
ONE WITH WHOME HE HAS HAD MANY LONG TALKS BUT WHOSE
MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS HE STILL CANNOT PREDICT OR
FATHOM. ANOTHER LUNCH TOPIC WAS YEMEN, THE BURDEN OF
SHAIKH ZAYID'S REMARKS BEING THAT WHAT HAPPENS BETWEEN

ABU DHABI 0011

DTG: 170545Z MAR 81 JSN: 043191
TOR: 076/1230Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE TWO YEMENS, AND WITHIN THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON SAUDI ARABIA'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS THERE AND ON THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND STATESMANSHIP THE SAUDIS SHOW. WHEN THE QUESTION OF UAE RELATIONS WITH OMAN WAS RAISED BY MR. FORD, SHAIKH ZAYID SAID THAT "OF COURSE" THEY ARE EXCELLENT, "AS THEY MUST BE"; HE CONFINED HIMSELF TO THAT GENERALITY. WHEN MR. FORD ASKED IF THERE WERE A SPECIFIC MESSAGE HE COULD TAKE BACK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE NEEDS OF THE UAE, SUCH AS IN THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR COOPERATION FIELD, SHAIKH ZAYID REPLIED HE DID NOT WISH TO TAX MR. FORD WITH ANY SUCH DETAILS. -- THEY WERE BEING DISCUSSED NORMALLY THROUGH THE EMBASSY.

12. COMMENT: MARCH 18 LOCAL PRESS ATTENTION TO THE VISIT EMPHASIZES THAT THE TALKS WERE FRIENDLY, THAT SHAIKH ZAYID STRESSED THE PERVADING CENTRALITY OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND THAT HE TOLD MR. FORD THE UAE WOULD NEVER CONSIDER ALLOWING U.S. BASES ON ITS SOIL. THE LATTER POINT, WHICH IS STRESSED IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PAPERS AS WELL AS OTHERS, SHOULD BE SEEN AS POLITICAL POSTURING DELIBERATELY AIMED AT POTENTIAL LOCAL AND REGIONAL CRITICS, FOR IT DID NOT FIGURE AT ALL IN THE TALKS UNLESS IT WAS DURING THE FEWER THAN FIVE MINUTES IN WHICH SHAIKH ZAYID AND THE FORMER PRESIDENT WERE OUT OF MY EARSHOT.

WOLLE

ABU DHABI 0811

DTG: 170545Z MAR 81 ESN: 043101
TOR: 076/1230Z

***** S E C R E T *****

26

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR 748-48-21-9-3

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY

BY 1003 NARA DATES 29/13

O P 101659Z APR 81 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2084

INFO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 2341

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1001

NO DIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM BUCKLEY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/10/01 (TWINAM, J.) DR-11

TAGS: MU PEPR OVIP OTRA (BUCKLEY, JAMES)

SUBJECT: VISIT TO OMAN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET FOR ALMOST 2 HOURS WITH SULTAN QABOOS IN SALALAH APRIL 9. FOREIGN MINISTER ZAWAMI WAS PRESENT AT THIS CORDIAL MEETING AND FLEW WITH ME FROM MUSCAT TO SALALAH AND BACK, GIVING OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE DISCUSSION. THE SULTAN WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, SOLICITOUS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, AND RESPONSIVE TO YOUR DESIRE TO HAVE ACCEPTED HIS INVITATION TO VISIT OMAN HAD SCHEDULING PERMITTED ON THIS TRIP.

3. I LAID OUT THE APPROACH OF OUR ADMINISTRATION, EMPHASIZING THE NEW SPIRIT IN THE COUNTRY OF ACCEPTING OUR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION'S ALERTNESS TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE, OUR DETERMINATION TO REBUILD OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY, STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMY AND TO DEAL STEADILY AND COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THE TASK OF IMPROVING OUR STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THAT OF OUR FRIENDS. I NOTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF YOUR GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST ON YOUR FIRST OFFICIAL TRIP ABROAD, EMPHASIZING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM TO REGIONAL SECURITY, AND EXPLAINED THAT OUR DETERMINATION TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE TO THE REGION IN NO WAY LESSENS THE HIGH PRIORITY WE ATTACH TO WORKING TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE. I THANKED THE SULTAN FOR HIS DETERMINATION

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

(RA) NAW CDE VP
NEA
CHECKLIST

PSN: 019985

DTG: 101659

TOR: 1002017

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO WORK WITH US TO IMPROVE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ASSURED HIM THAT WE UNDERSTAND FULLY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEEDING IN A WAY THAT MINIMIZES OMAN'S EXPOSURE TO REGIONAL CRITICISM. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT IN ADDRESSING BOTH SECURITY AND PEACE ISSUES IN THE REGION WE FULLY INTEND TO CONSULT WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE TRUE MEANING OF THAT WORD. THE SULTAN RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO THIS PRESENTATION. (ZAWAWI EARLIER HAD SAID THAT HE RETURNED FROM MEETING WITH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON CONVINCED THAT THERE IS INDEED A NEW SPIRIT IN THE UNITED STATES AND A CONSTANCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION FROM WHICH OUR FRIENDS ABROAD CAN DRAW CONFIDENCE.)

4. I REVIEWED BRIEFLY FOR THE SULTAN YOUR MEETINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EMPHASIZING THE DESIRE IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEEP AWARENESS OF EACH GOVERNMENT OF THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS TO THE SECURITY OF THE REGION. I NOTED THE EGYPTIAN, JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INFLUENCE ON SYRIA, CONCERNS ABOUT QADHAFI, AND KING HUSSEIN'S DESIRE TO BE OF HELP TO THE GULF STATES. I NOTED OUR RESTRAINING EFFORTS WITH ISRAEL RE LEBANON AND OUR EFFORTS WITH THE SAUDI'S TO RESTORE ORDER. I MENTIONED JORDANIAN AND SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SITUATION IN YEMEN. I NOTED THAT JORDANIAN AND SAUDI EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH PALESTINIAN QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

5. IN A VERY FRANK AND SOMETIMES PHILOSOPHICAL REPLY AND IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS THE SULTAN EXPRESSED FIRM INTEREST IN WORKING WITH US ON THE REGION'S SECURITY, SAYING THAT HE WOULD NOT PERSONALLY BE SO CONCERNED ABOUT KEEPING OUR PRESENCE "LOW PROFILE" EXCEPT FOR THE NERVOUSNESS OF HIS NEIGHBORS. HE SUGGESTED THAT OUR APPROACH SHOULD BEST BE "FIRM BUT DISCREET".

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PAGE 180 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY

Q P 101659Z APR 81 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2085

INFO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 2342

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1091

NOBIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM BUCKLEY

HE DID TAKE A POLITE SHOT AT OUR NEED TO DEAL WITH SECURITY PROBLEMS THROUGH A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND WITH A ROBUST PRESS. HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE FRUSTRATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS (AND THE ARABS GENERALLY) IN TERMS OF THEIR OBSTRUCTION OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE PLO. HE TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE THREAT SOUTH YEMEN POSES TO OMAN, NOTING THE PLO HAS BECOME MUCH STRONGER MILITARILY SINCE THE DHOFAR INSURGENCY, THAT THE REGIME IS SEEKING TO DESTROY THE NATURAL ORDER OF THE SOCIETY AND SUGGESTING THE NEED TO "GET RID OF" THIS MARXIST GOVERNMENT, IN FACT SUGGESTING THAT SAUDI'S SHOULD ORGANIZE A FIFTH COLUMN, IF IT NOT TOO LATE. HE EXPRESSED, AS HAD ZAWAWI EARLIER, REAL CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT MAKES THE YAR TICK BUT NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE A DISASTER SHOULD NORTH YEMEN AT SOME POINT FALL INTO THE SOVIET CAMP AND SUGGESTING THAT THE COMPLEX SITUATION THERE REQUIRES OUR VERY CAREFUL AND DELIBERATE STUDY. HE WAS VERY RESPONSIVE TO MY DESCRIPTION OF OUR INTENT TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN AND SUGGESTED WE IGNORE MRS. GANDHI'S SAYING WHAT SHE HAS TO SAY ABOUT THIS. HE ALSO WELCOMED OUR SUPPORT FOR SUDAN. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ETHIOPIA POSES FOR THE REGION AND WENT ON AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE DANGERS OF QADHAFI. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IRAQ IS MOVING AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS AND TOWARD SOME HARMONY WITH GULF ARABS. (ZAWAWI WAS SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS ON THE LATTER POINT.)

6. THE SULTAN TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES

PSN:019988

DTG:101659

TOR:1002019

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE GULF STATES ARE HAVING IN ADDRESSING THEIR SECURITY SITUATION, LAMENTING THE DOUBLE STANDARD WHICH MAKES IT ACCEPTABLE FOR RADICAL ARABS TO BRAG ABOUT SOVIET ASSISTANCE BUT DIFFICULT FOR MODERATES TO WORK OPENLY WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GULF COOPERATIVE COUNCIL BUT COMPLAINED THAT WHILE OTHER MEMBERS SUPPORTED, OR EVENTUALLY WOULD GO ALONG WITH, A SECURITY ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL, THE KUWAITIS REMAIN A REAL BARRIER IN THIS REGARD. (ZAWAWI EARLIER TOLD ME THAT BOTH THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRINCE SAUD HAD QUESTIONED OMAN'S SECURITY COOPERATION WITH US DURING THE LAST GULF COUNCIL MEETING BUT HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT BOTH KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE RECONCILED TO OUR COOPERATION AND TO A SECURITY ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL IN TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY ZAWAWI POINTED OUT THAT KUWAITI, AND TO A DEGREE SAUDI, SKITTISHNESS ABOUT WORKING WITH US DERIVES FROM THEIR PERCEPTION THAT ARABS ARE CONVINCED THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT ISRAEL TO THE DETRIMENT OF ARAB INTERESTS. ZAWAWI ALSO SAID THE SAHRAVIS HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN THE GULF MEETING ON ADDRESSING SECURITY COOPERATION AND HAD TAKEN THE LEAD IN REQUESTING THAT OMAN PREPARE FOR THE COUNCIL A REGIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT, WHICH HE PROMISED TO SHARE WITH US. (I BELIEVE THEY MIGHT WELCOME OUR DISCREET HELP IN THIS REGARD.)

7. ON THE RETURN FLIGHT ZAWAWI TALKED ABOUT SAUDI PRINCE SAUD, NOTING THAT SAUD RECENTLY SEEMS TO BE MORE ARAB NATIONALIST IN HIS ATTITUDES, REFLECTING PERHAPS CONCERN THAT ARABS HAD SEEN HIM AS TOO PRO-AMERICAN IN THE PAST.

8. BUD MACFARLAND AND I BOTH FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS IN OMAN MOST INSTRUCTIVE AND I BELIEVE OUR VISIT WAS USEFUL IN CARRYING THE ADMINISTRATION'S MESSAGE OF CLOSER COOPERATION AND BOLSTERING CONFIDENCE.

9. OMAN FOR AMBASSADOR WILEY. YOU MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON THIS MESSAGE.

10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

11. SECRETARY'S PARTY MAY WISH TO PASS TO JIDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, KUWAIT, OMAN, AND MANAMA.

MOLLE

BT

SENSITIVE

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP
EOB: NEA
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUQMBI #1108 1011300
O 111245Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABINLRR 48-48-21-10-1
BY ICAB NARA DATE 6/3/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2091

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1108NOPI
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUCKLEY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/11/01 (TWINAM, J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR OYIP OTRA TC (BUCKLEY, JAMES)
SUBJECT: VISIT TO UAE1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ABU DHABI APRIL 11 I MET WITH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER RASHID ABDULLAH FOR OVER AN HOUR AND THEN HAD A LUNCHEON MEETING WITH HEAD OF THE ROYAL COURT SHAIKH SUROOR AND A NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICIALS, NOTABLY PLANNING MINISTER (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON) SA'ID GHUBASH. AS I FILE THIS I AM STILL AWAITING WORD ON POSSIBLE MEETING WITH UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ME DEPARTURE FOR SAHRAIN.

3. IN BOTH SESSIONS I ELABORATED OUR ADMINISTRATION'S NEW APPROACH IN SOME DETAIL, PLACING SOME EMPHASIS ON THE ECONOMIC MEASURES WE ARE TAKING INCLUDING REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ENERGY. I PUT SPECIAL STRESS ON OUR ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO WORK CLOSELY WITH AND SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS ABROAD AND TO CONSULT WITH THEM ON COMMON PROBLEMS IN A MEANINGFUL WAY. BOTH RASHID ABDULLAH AND SUROOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS MESSAGE, THE FORMER REMARKING SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE UAE "FEELS SAFER" NOW THAT OUR ADMINISTRATION IS IN OFFICE.

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4. ON EACH OCCASION I BRIEFED ON YOUR VISITS IN THE FOUR MIDDLE EASTERN CAPITALS, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE YOU HAD PLACED ON THE CONSULTATIVE NATURE OF YOUR VISIT, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MUTUALLY REINFORCING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROGRESS IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND REGIONAL SECURITY AND OUR DETERMINATION TO PRESS ON WITH THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREAT PRIORITY, AND OUR CONCERN NOT ONLY FOR THE RESOURCES OF THE REGION BUT FOR THE STABILITY OF ITS PEOPLES AND WELFARE AND SURVIVAL OF THE EXISTING POLITICAL ORDER. I NOTED THE CONCERN YOU HAD FOUND IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS WITH THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY -- THE SOVIETS, THE LEBANESE SITUATION, THE SOVIET ROLE IN SYRIA AND IN SOUTH YEMEN, AND QADHAFI. I MENTIONED HUSSEIN'S SUPPORT FOR THE GULF COUNCIL AND HIS OFFER OF HELP TO GULF STATES AND HIS AND THE SAUDIS RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU HAD TOLD BOTH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS THAT WE SINCERELY INVITE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN THE MEANTIME ON MOVING AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. I ALSO NOTED OUR DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE SAUDI F-15 ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE, INCLUDING THE AWACS.

5. I ALSO FILLED RASHID ABDULLAH IN ON MY TALKS IN OMAN, NOTING PARTICULARLY THE SULTAN'S ENTHUSIASM FOR THE GULF COUNCIL, HIS DESIRE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH US ON REGIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS, HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT OF PDRY AND THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO SAUDI ARABIA'S DEALING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE SITUATION IN NORTH YEMEN. RASHID ABDULLAH SAID THE UAE FELT IT SHOULD LEAVE THE NORTH YEMEN PROBLEM PRIMARILY TO THE SAUDIS IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH IT BUT THAT HE AND THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER WILL SOON BE VISITING SOUTH YEMEN TO URGE PDRY TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH OMAN AND POINT OUT THAT THE GULF STATES ALL BACK OMAN SHOULD TENSIONS CONTINUE.

6. I ALSO GAVE RASHID ABDULLAH THE RESPONSE TO UAE EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN CERTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN STATE 84472 AND INDICATED AMBASSADOR WOLLE WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH SHAIKH KHALIFA AND APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY.

7. IN BOTH SESSIONS I TRIED TO DEVELOP A CLEAR UAE PERCEPTION OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IN TERMS OF WORKING TOGETHER TO MEET THE REGION'S SECURITY THREAT, STRESSING REPEATEDLY THAT THIS EFFORT REINFORCED RATHER THAN DETRACTED FROM OUR DETERMINATION TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, BUT THAT THERE ARE CLEAR THREATS TO THE REGION UNRELATED TO THIS ISSUE WHICH WE MUST BEGIN TO ADDRESS

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IN AN ORDERLY, COOPERATIVE MANNER. I NOTED OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE MUST WORK QUIETLY BUT POINTED OUT THAT IF WE ARE TO BE OF SUPPORT TO THE REGION'S SECURITY WE MUST BE ABLE TO BRING OUR CAPABILITY TO BEAR IN AN EMERGENCY. I MENTIONED HOW SECURITY COOPERATION AMONG THE GULF STATES COULD TIE IN WITH OUR OWN ROLE IN SAUDI ARABIA TO DEVELOP A MORE EFFECTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY CAPABILITY. RASHID ABDULLAH SEEMED TO WELCOME THIS GENERAL CONCEPT, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDIS, VOICING HOPE THAT THE GULF COUNCIL WILL DEVELOP A SECURITY ASPECT IN THE FUTURE, AND ASSERTING THE BEGINNING OF A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UAE AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN SLOW ON REGIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS BUT SEEMED TO BE BEGINNING TO MOVE. HE SAID THE UAE LOOKED FORWARD TO WORKING WITH US BUT THAT ITS FIRST PRIORITY IN THE SECURITY FIELD MUST BE TO DEVELOP ITS OWN CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THE UAE REGARDS PROGRESS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE THE KEY TO MEETING THE THREAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE WELCOMED OUR SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN AND FOR PAKISTAN AND TURKEY, AND OUR SUPPORT FOR SADAT AT A TIME WHEN LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE PREVENTS THE UAE FROM HELPING EGYPT.

8. WHILE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SHAIKH SUROOR EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH OUR OWN APPROACH, HE WAS MUCH LESS FORTHCOMING IN HIS RESPONSE THAN RASHID ABDULLAH. ABETTED BY SA'ID GHUBASH, HE RETURNED CONSTANTLY TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND STRONGLY ASSERTED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE WOULD REMOVE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE REGION AND THAT THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IS A MORE MORE DIRECT THREAT TO THE REGION'S SECURITY THAN THE SOVIETS. WE WENT BACK AND FORTH BUT POINTEDLY ON WHETHER OR NOT THE REGION IS THREATENED BY SOVIET AND OTHER PRESSURES NOT RELATED TO PALESTINE. TO HIM AFGHANISTAN SEEMS FAR AWAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM CLOSE TO HOME.

9. I AM CONVINCED THIS VISIT WAS USEFUL. THE FACT THAT I AM THE FIRST DEPARTMENT PRINCIPAL TO VISIT SINCE THE UAE'S INDEPENDENCE WAS FULLY NOTED. MY UAE INTERLOCUTORS CLEARLY INDICATED A DESIRE FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE SOME DISTANCE AWAY FROM FEELING COMFORTABLE IN WORKING WITH US ON REGIONAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THAT WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO IF WE ARE TO WIN THEIR FULL CONFIDENCE. THE KEY HERE WILL BE DEMONSTRATING SOME PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

10. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO KUWAIT, JIDDA, DOHA,

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MANAMA, MUSCAT, AMMAN, SANA, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO.
WOLLE

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