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Collec	tion Name	Robinson, Roger: Files		Withdrawer	
				SRN	2/21/2012
File Fo	lder	LONDON SUMMIT: 05/18/1984-06/11/1984		FOIA	
				F01-05	2/3
Box No	umber	4			OWSKI
ID	Doc Туре	Document Description	No of Pages	37 Doc Date	Restrictions
131737	MEMO	DOUGLAS MCMINN TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: WEEKLY REPORT	1	5/18/1984	B1
131740	МЕМО	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE: BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ENERGY	2	5/19/1984	B1
131743	MEMO	ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: MEMO TO PRESIDENT ON BILATERAL ENERGY DISCUSSIONS	1	5/14/1984	B1
131744	MEMO	ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: IRAN-IRAQ CONSULTATIONS	3	5/3/1984	B1
131747	MEMO	FOR W. ALLEN WALLIS RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1
131748	MEMO	FOR DAVID BURNS RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1
131749	MEMO	FOR PHILIP WILCOX RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1
131750	MEMO	FOR CHARLES PATRIZIA RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
131751	МЕМО	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT	2	4/30/1984	B1
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		ACTIVITY TO PRESIDENTIAL			
		DECISIONS ON ENERGY			
131754	CABLE	RE: SUMMIT - ECONOMIC ASPECTS	8	6/11/1984	B1

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13174	40 MEMO	2	5/19/1984	B1		
	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE:					

BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ENERGY

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IRAN-IRAQ CONSULTATIONS

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13174	47 MEMO FOR W. ALLEN WALLIS RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1

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13174	48 MEMO FOR DAVID BURNS RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1		

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1317	49 MEMO FOR PHILIP WILCOX RE: BILATERAL ENERGY CONSULTATIONS	1	ND	B1		

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1317:	51 MEMO	2	4/30/1984	B1		
	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITY TO PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON ENERGY					

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Return to Bill marthe

(Martin/Elliott) June 7, 1984 3:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1984

My fellow Americans, greetings from London. As you probably know, Nancy and I have been in Europe for 8 days -- visiting my homeland in Ireland; commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day at Normandy; and now, meeting with the leaders of the major industrialized democracies at the Economic Summit to strengthen the freedoms, prosperity, and peace we share.

Change comes neither easily nor quickly in foreign affairs. Finding solutions to critical global problems requires lengthy and sustained efforts -- the kind we've been making ever since our first Economic Summit in Ottawa, in 1981. Those efforts are paying off, as we reap the benefits of the sound economic and security policies we've pursued with dogged determination.

Think back to 4 years ago. America was weak and in trouble at home and abroad. Remember double-digit inflation, 20-percent interest rates, zero growth, and those never-ending excuses that such misery would be part of our lives for years to come? And remember how a vacillating foreign policy invited Soviet aggression and expansion in Afghanistan, Central America, and Africa? Entire countries were lost, doubts spread about America's will to defend freedom and peace, and, so, freedom and peace became less secure.

A lot has changed in 4 years. Today, America stands taller in the world. At home, we've made a fundamental change in direction -- away from bigger and bigger government, toward more

Page 2

power and incentives for people; away from confusion and failure, toward renewed progress through faith and commitment to the enduring values of Western civilization; and away from weakness and instability, toward assurance of peace through strength and our willingness to negotiate.

Together with our Allies, we've tried to adopt a similar strategy for progress abroad, guided by realism, common values and interests, and sustained by the confidence we can and will move forward toward better days, not remain prisoners of fear and a disappointing past.

Last year, we hosted the Williamsburg Summit. It had been a difficult year for Allied relations, as we grappled with economic and security problems. But we didn't dwell on differences; we crafted a peace and security statement, and a blueprint for world economic recovery. I believe history will show that Williamsburg was an unprecedented endorsement of Western values; a time when our Alliance emerged stronger and more united than ever, a time when peace and prosperity were made more secure.

Later in the year, I traveled to Japan and Korea to emphasize the importance we attach to the dynamic Pacific region. Here, too, we faced tough problems, particularly in trade with Japan. But Prime Minister Nakasone is a man of honor who has worked hard with me to iron out our differences. And we've made progress: Japan has opened up its trading and financial markets, committed itself to buy more coal, and agreed to increase its defense expenditures so vital to preserving peace and freedom in 16

the Pacific Basin. These agreements will mean more U.S. jobs and greater security for both our nations.

Last April, I returned to the Pacific region to visit China. Our relations with China have steadily improved; and our visit capped important agreements that will stimulate greater U.S. exports to China, as we help them modernize their economy.

That brings me to London, and this year's Summit. By any objective account, we've made impressive gains. In 1981, our economies had a combined growth rate of only 1 percent, but 10 percent inflation. Today, our combined growth rate has climbed to 4 percent, while inflation has been cut more than in half. Stronger growth means more jobs, with the U.S. economy leading the way. We've created more than 6 million jobs in the last 18 months.

And we're venturing into new, promising areas. Today, the other heads of state joined me in examining a model of our proposed manned space station. An international space station will stimulate technological development, strengthen our economies, and improve the quality of life into the next century.

I've stressed in London that continued progress will require new determination to carry out our common strategy for prosperity and peace. We must summon courage; we must take new steps to fight inflation by reducing unnecessary spending; spur greater growth by reducing further personal tax rates, regulation and trade barriers; and, yes, we must be prepared for peace by strengthening NATO's ability to deter war, while making clear we

Page 3

Page 4

are prepared to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically -- if and when the Soviets ever agree.

This has been a year of progress, a year when we and our friends in Europe and the Pacific set aside differences and united, as great democracies should, behind our shared vision and common values. And that progress is a great source of hope for a more prosperous and safer world.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 12, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM	FOR	LARRY SE ROBERT S JAMES RE DONALD F RICHARD STEVEN S ROGER RO	SIMS ENTSCHLI FORTIER BEAL STEINER	ER				
FROM:	~	WILLIAM DOUGLAS	F. MAR		Ma			
SUBJECT:				1		Trip	Accomplishments	

We thought you might be interested in receiving a copy of the attached talking points prepared for Bud McFarlane on the European trip accomplishments.

Attachment

Talking Points on European Trip Accomplishments

20

I. Overall (three principal results)

A Stronger Alliance

- -- Demonstrated unity of the Alliance, economically and politically.
- -- Endorsed the fundamental values industrialized countries share, and based on that strong foundation, demonstrated ability to discuss and reach accord on pressing issues of the day.

An Outward Looking Alliance for Peace Worldwide

- -- Renewed offer to solve problems with the Soviet Union, particularly in the nuclear negotiations they left.
- -- Agreed on cooperative efforts to counter terrorism and deal with a Persian Gulf crisis, should there be one.

Recognition of Key Role of Ronald Reagan

- -- Since Ottawa, the President has been expounding a consistent line in foreign policy and economics. His leadership of Western Alliance has been evident over past year:
 - o Williamsburg benchmark event. Unprecedented endorsement of Western values; blueprint for economic recovery; peace and security statement.
 - o Visits to Japan/Korea. Drew attention to emerging importance of Pacific. Despite tough trading problems with Japan, the President and Prime Minister crafted important trade, finance, energy and defense agreements.
 - o Last April, President's trip to China improved relations and will stimulate US exports as we help China modernize its economy.
 - o This visit to Europe emphasized return to roots, honored D-Day heroes, emphasized U.S. commitment to European security, and underscored Allied commitment to peace and prosperity.

II. Specific London Summit Accomplishments

-- Recognition of significant economic progress in Summit countries since 1981:

- o Average growth rose from around 1% to above 4% for 1984.
- o Average 10% inflation cut to expected 4.5% this year.

o In U.S., 6 million jobs created in past 18 months.

- -- Economic recovery in Summit countries a reflection of the basic anti-inflationary policies first advocated by the President at Ottawa.
- -- Subsequently adopted by all Summit countries.
- -- U.S. job creation and economic growth resulting from the President's policies an example not lost on our Summit partners.
- -- Thus, London Economic Summit Declaration emphasizes need to follow market-oriented policies to ensure that noninflationary recovery is sustained and spread.
- -- Three main ideas stressed are strong reaffirmation of President's policies:
 - o Market-oriented adjustment in our domestic economies;
 - o Strengthened management of debt situation; and
 - o Trade liberalization and open markets.
- -- Declaration emphasizes need for Summit economies to be flexible enough to "adapt and develop in response to demand and technological change."
 - o This includes recognition that public sectors too large in all Summit countries.
 - o Recognition that many obstacles to change government created and must be reduced.
- -- Declaration confirms current strategy on debt.
 - o Encourages more extended multi-year rescheduling of commercial debts, as well as debts to governments, where debtor countries successful in improving their own economic positions (e.g., Mexico).
 - o Encourages flow of long-term direct investment in debtor countries.
 - o Encourages closer cooperation between IMF and World Bank, and strengthening the role of the World Bank in development

- -- Declaration urges all trading countries to reduce barriers to trade, and to make efforts to liberalize and expand international trade.
- -- Emphasizes need for early decisions on new trade round.
- -- Importantly, Summit countries also expressed strong interest in participating in development of U.S. space station program.
- -- All believe that space station practical demonstration of how we can work together peacefully to strengthen our economies and quality of life, as we enter the 21st Century.
- -- Summit also tackled several political issues:
 - o The Declaration of Democratic Values showed a firm consensus on fundamental political and economic objectives.
 - Important relationship between the democratic values statement and the strong statments on terrorism, East-West and Persian Gulf. We agree on what is required to defend and preserve our values and to achieve our shared objectives.
 - o The Declaration of International Terrorism expresses the will of Summit governments to respond to threats posed by terrorism, especially state-sponsored.
 - We set out our common approach for dealing with the Soviet Union and share a commitment to meet the Soviets half-way, if they are ready. Building on Williamsburg we reaffirmed the need to provide for our security and called on the Soviet Union to end its boycott of nuclear arms negotiations.
 - o We all want to see the tragic Gulf war end. Our statement indicates that we are confident we can work together to respond to any cut-off in energy supplies.
 - o In sum, the political discussions showed that the leaders of the world's largest economies are confident about what we stand for, and agreed on how to achieve it.

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III. Conclusion

- -- Summit met and surpassed expectations. Unprecedented to have four political statements.
- -- Economic statement reaffirms the soundness of policies pursued by the President over the past four years. Strength of our economy leading the world into sustainable recovery.
- -- Shows Alliance is strong and like-minded. Did not agree on everything; disagreements are a natural part of any close relationship.
- -- Nevertheless the breath and depth of the agreements demonstrated that U.S. relations with our allies have never been stronger and there is a recognition that we can tackle international economic and security problems more effectively if we do it jointly.

Prepared by:

William F. Martin Douglas McMinn **Foreign Media Trends**

United States Information Agency Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research

June 26,

FOREIGN MEDIA COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

This analysis is based on media reaction reporting by USIS Posts and FBIS. The material covers the time period June 1-19, 1984.

SUMMARY

Foreign media generally judged the President's trip to Western Europe as a major success because of his stated willingness for talks with Moscow and his strong position at the Summit because of the U.S. economic recovery. The media also said the seven Summit leaders demonstrated political and economic unity. However, the Third World press expressed dissapointment because no concrete decisions were made on the debt of the developing nations. Based on Post reporting, coverage of the President's trip and the Economic Summit beyond Western Europe was heaviest in Asia and Latin America.

END SUMMARY

IRELAND, NORMANDY AND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

President Reagan visited Western Europe June 1-10, 1984 to attend the annual Economic Summit of seven industrialized nations in London. After touring his ancestral home in Ireland, the President addressed the Irish Parliament, saying the U.S. is willing to discuss Moscow's proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force. At the commemoration of the Normandy landings in France, the President reaffirmed U.S. commitments to Europe and willingness to reconcile differences with the USSR. At the Economic Summit, the western leaders issued statements on the economic problems of the industrialized and developing countries and on shared democratic values, East-West relations, the Persian Gulf and international terrorism.

PART I -- DEFENSE ISSUES IN IRELAND AND NORMANDY

Ireland: Welcoming the President Does Not Mean Welcoming All His Policies

The Irish and West European media generally viewed President Reagan's visit to his ancestral roots as part of the U.S. political campaign to woo the Irish-American vote. The media commented prominently on an Irish opinion poll which found that 56 percent of the Irish would like to see someone else elected U.S. President. Extensive coverage was also given to protest demonstrations. However, all of the major Irish media said the President should be welcomed even though "many sincere people are troubled by what they see happening in Central America and by the implications of the nuclear arms race." London's conservative Daily Telegraph summed up most of the West European press: "President Reagan takes his re-election campaign overseas, starting with a little Irish blarney, a D-Day visit to the Normandy beaches and a lead role in the London Summit."

Dublin and Normandy Speeches Described As "Conciliatory To Moscow."

President Reagan's offer to discuss with Moscow its proposal to ban the use of force was applauded throughout Western Europe "as an olive branch in the direction of the Kremlin." Italy's leftist La Repubblica was impressed, saying that "Reagan belied the prejudice that he is an intransigent man, without weakening the firmness of his position." Switzerland's highly influential Neue Zuercher Zeitung said "Reagan reaffirmed that he was striving earnestly for an understanding with Moscow." However, some of the press called the President's proposal "a token gesture." Sweden's conservative Svenska Dagbladet editorialized that "meaningful talks between Washington and Moscow are not possible at present...therefore it is safe for Reagan to make sweeping announcements if he thinks they would be beneficial to his election campaign." Conservative West German Frankfurter Allgemeine said *catchwords like security, peace and disarmament in which Reagan and Chernenko indulge are not worth listening to...only specific statements merit our attention."

On the Normandy remarks, the West European press quoted the President extensively on the firmness of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the willingness to reach out to the USSR in the spirit of reconciliation. Centrist Corriere della Sera of Milan was typical, saying the commemoration "dispelled the doubts of the Europeans and perhaps the illusions of the USSR. There can be no division between the Western Allies and the U.S. This security, accepted by all, can be the basis for a resumption of the dialogue (with Moscow)."

In a number of countries around the world, media coverage was substantial but comment was sparse on the President's Dublin and Normandy remarks. As in the European media, the anti-nuclear demonstrations in Ireland and later in Britain received extensive coverage. Substantive comment usually centered on the President's conciliatory tone toward the Soviets. The Japanese media noted that "Reagan's (Dublin) speech was aimed at easing criticism of the President's hard line toward the USSR, with due consideration for this fall's Presidential election." Papers in Hong Kong, Egypt, Brazil and Venezuela said typically that the rhetoric was meant for the anti-nuclear protesters, the European public and the U.S. voters -- to show that Moscow's attempt to portray him as a trigger-happy nuclear cowboy is untrue.

Moscow Says "There's Nothing New"

Soviet media said the President's speech contained no new proposals, and that, in <u>Pravda's</u> words, President Reagan "did not succeed in concealing his main purpose -- that Washington will continue to pursue its confrontational course." Moscow Radio repeated the Soviet line that "the USSR is for constructive talks, but the U.S. must first remove the new missiles from Western Europe." An <u>Izvestia</u> article said "the President's claim concerning 'the diabolical Soviet threat' is not disputed by his partners..." Soviet media generally called the President's trip "a pompous election show." A barrage of stories belittled the role of the Western Allies in World War Two and said the Soviet forces were decisive in defeating Nazi Germany. The stories charged that the Normandy commemoration was aimed at minimizing the Soviet role in the fighting.

PART II -- POLITICS AND ECONOMICS AT THE LONDON SUMMIT

The Summit "Is Expected To Achieve Very Little"

Influential newspapers across the political spectrum in most countries were almost unanimous in the opinion that not much should be expected from the seven-nation summit. However, they were just as unanimous in saying that summits are useful even if no agreements are reached because they bring world leaders together. The independent London Times said that "anyone who thinks the London Summit is a waste of time should compare the way international relations are conducted in the 1980's with the way they were misconducted in the 1930's." The papers said that summits of recent years have acquired major political importance and that issues such as East-West relations and the Iran-Iraqi war may play an important part in this one.

The Papers Say Economic Recovery And Reduction Of Third World Debt Are The Major Objectives

Independent papers generally identified the Summit's objectives as how to sustain economic recovery without reigniting inflation, how to deal with the huge debt of the developing countries and how to force the U.S. to curb its budget deficit. On the left, Britain's liberal <u>Guardian</u> said "the truth is the summitteers have no clear strategy." Others said the meeting is taking place on top of the "international debt mountain" and that something must be done about it.

The debt of the developing countries was considered of prime importance. France's independent <u>Quotidien</u> said: "Those (in London) who control half the world's wealth must try to resolve one of the world's most critical problems: to keep the international financial system from exploding because of hundreds of billions of dollars in Third World debts."

Comments Suggest U.S. Budget Deficit Could Harm World Economy

The U.S. budget deficit and climbing interest rates came under sustained attack in West Europe and elsewhere. The papers editorialized that President Reagan will be strongly criticized at the Summit for his economic policies, but that he is not expected to make concessions. Most of the influential papers in London, Paris and Bonn agreed that the U.S. budget deficit may cause great harm to the world economy. West Germany's liberal <u>Frankfurter Rundschau</u> echoed many: "Although Reagan would like to exploit the trip for re-election, he should not be spared...the deficit is the result of Reagan's arms policy and his refusal to raise taxes."

The media acknowledged that "there has been a major economic recovery in the U.S.," but added that "Americans continue to live in high style... while things remain complicated for their allies and all the others." They said the U.S. promotes free trade, but abandons it when its own industries are imperiled. Canada's only nationwide newspaper, the <u>Toronto</u> Globe and Mail, said the U.S. has to recognize "the seriousness of rising interest rates which are limiting growth in the industrialized nations, holding down world trade and putting developing countries in a serious plight."

Third World Media Skeptical Of The Summit

The major media in the Third World expressed skepticism that the Summit would result in any benefits to the developing countries. In India, the independent Hindu of Madras said "if previous summits are any guide, the participants have (usually) ignored the conclusions and pursued policies suited to their own national interest." Brazil's independent Jornal da Tarde said "the Third World nations have little hope unless the Latin American debt crisis pressures the leaders to adopt some measures."

Thailand's independent (English-language) <u>Bangkok Post</u> summed up the views of most of the Third World media: "We are not members of this exclusive club and our views are not going to get top priority. If there is to be a global recovery, then it will only come about when the industrialized and developing countries recognize how dependent they are on each other."

The Soviets: The West Wants To Stay Together In The Face Of Common Troubles

Commenting on the impending London Summit, the Soviet media said the capitalist nations are trying to stick together because of common problems. <u>Pravda</u> offered the opinion that "the forum was devised to soothe over the inter-imperialist contradictions in economics and is now being turned into a political mechanism for elaborating a global anti-Soviet western strategy." And TASS added: "The U.S. will continue its tactic of power pressure to fasten its partners more securely to its course of confrontation with the USSR. In the economic sphere, Washington will try to solve its own problems at the expense of other countries."

Most Of The Media Say The Summit Ended On A Note Of Optimism

As the London Summit ended, the media of the seven countries generally termed the meeting a success despite settling for what some of the papers called the lowest common denominator of platitude and pious aspirations. The papers said "differences over the U.S. economy were voiced in a conciliatory fashion. Italy's <u>Corriere della Sera</u> stressed that the Summit "issued a clear invitation to the USSR to end its hibernation." The media said the declarations issued at the -6-

end of the Summit suggested that all conflicts are under control or at least can be brought under control and that nobody was the loser -- there was unity in the choice of topics and the results.

Disappointment was voiced over lack of a major decision on the Third World debt problem. However, France's liberal <u>Le</u> <u>Monde</u> noted that "everyone knew no (such) decision would be made. The participants said their strategy was to approach the issue on a case-by-case and country-by-country basis." The press of the Latin American countries was especially disap- pointed. The Argentine media was critical of the Summit's decision to help those countries that make an effort to improve their own situation, commenting that economic belt- tightening foments political revolutions.

Three European left-wing papers suggested the Summit had produced a "Directorate of the Seven." France's Liberation said "it was in fact a consecration of the existence of a sort of a political directorate of the Western world." In Spain, <u>Pais</u> said it confirms the trend toward integration of NATO and Japan under a single strategy." In Italy, <u>Avanti</u> added that "Europe was pleased the U.S. was willing to move toward dialogue and detente, while the same cannot be said about the Soviet Union."

The Japanese media hailed the Summit because it stressed the importance of dialogue with the Soviet Union. Moderate Yomiuri expressed satisfaction that the meeting "did not adopt a tough posture."

The Soviets Dismiss Calls For Dialogue

In Moscow, the Soviet media dismissed the Summit's call for a dialogue with the USSR, with <u>Pravda</u> quoting the Kremlin leaders that "the meeting rubber-stamped provisions which run counter to the interests of detente, disarmament and peace. That type of dialogue (would be) a screen to cover up the transformation of the territories of some West European countries into a launching pad for new U.S. missiles." <u>Pravda</u> also claimed that "the London meeting became a scene of bitter verbal battles," and said it "showed once again that the Western leaders are unable to work out a common approach to the problems confronting them."

A Personal Political Triumph For President Reagan

Almost unanimously, the press in Western Europe and elsewhere saw the Summit as a personal victory for President Reagan and his policies. Centrist La Stampa of Turin was typical: "Reagan returns to Washington as a President who was able to maintain and strengthen Western solidarity without worsening economic disagreements. He was treated with regard because he represents an economically revived United States. Europeans hope to attach themselves to this revival." Other papers noted that the President won backing for his East-West policies and was only mildly criticized for his budget deficit and high interest rates. The press said that Europeans had to choose whether to close their eyes to reality and lose touch with the U.S. locomotive or admit that Reaganomics had finally worked out. At the same time, the European press also suggested that President Reagan was satisfied because the others, while opposing some of his policies, did not want to embarrass him in an election year.

Disappointment In The Third World

The press in the developing countries, especially Africa and Latin America, was disappointed with the outcome of the London Summit. Kenya's independent Daily Nation was typical: "Apart from vague promises of increased assistance to the Third World and increased willingness to reschedule their debts, the seven leaders came away with nothing to cheer about." In New Delhi, the influential Times of India said "all the nagging imbalances that have troubled the global economy for so long remain." In Mexico, the leftist Unomasuno said "the Summit was foreseeably useless because it was disappointing to European and Third World countries. The only winner was Ronald Reagan." Similar comments came from the major press in Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Pakistan and the Philippines. In Nigeria, the state-owned Daily Star reflected the comments of many: "The Summit's purpose was...for the Western leaders to cheer themselves and not what actually concerned the world's people -- the Third World."

Among the few positive comments were that of South Korea's independent <u>Joongang Ilbo</u>: "...the seven leaders showed deep concern for the problems of poor nations...It is fortunate the U.S. responded favorably to recommendations to reduce its financial deficits, thus lowering interest rates." In Cairo, the English-language Egyptian Gazette said the Summit's message to the Third World was hopeful, that "while it held out no prospects of big aid flows, it did pledge a friendlier approach to countries ready to tighten their own belts."

PART III -- CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. Is Willing To Talk With Moscow

The media across the political spectrum of Western Europe and Japan described President Reagan's speeches in Dublin and Normandy as conciliatory toward Moscow and stressed that he is not "an intransigent man." However, many called it a gesture aimed at moderating the President's tone for the fall election. The papers also said the Normandy remarks dispelled any doubts of divisions in NATO and that this security can be the basis for resuming the dialogue with Moscow.

The Summit Was Dull But Useful

After initial claims that not much is expected from the Summit, the press generally agreed that there were "low-key" achievements despite some differences and that the seven leaders "demonstrated political and economic unity." All agreed that it did not generate major news. France's influential <u>Le Monde</u> was typical: "The Tenth Economic Summit was more dull than the former ones, but it was also more comforting...there was real improvement in the harmony of views and clarity of conclusions." The press noted that with four political texts and one economic declaration, there was special satisfaction for all -- "London was satisfied with the declaration on terrorism, Mitterrand with the East-West statement."

After predicting before the Summit that the United States would come under strong criticism for its economic policies, the media throughout Europe and elsewhere was in general agreement that the biggest winner was President Reagan. Among the reasons cited were his willingness for dialogue with the Soviet Union, the U.S. economic revival, the mild criticism by the others of the U.S. budget deficits, and the care the others took not to damage his chances for re-election.

The media expressed disappointment in Western Europe and the Third World that no concrete decisions were made to deal with the eight billion dollar debt of the developing countries. After initially calling the debt "one of the major issues of the Summit," many European papers acknowledged that no major decisions would be made.

The Soviet media stuck to its unyielding line throughout the President's trip, dismissing all Western calls for resumption of arms reduction talks until the new U.S. missiles are

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removed from Western Europe. On the Summit, the Soviet media said it was being turned into a vehicle for developing a global western anti-Soviet strategy.

The press of the seven summit countries was almost unanimous in saying that such summits are useful because they bring world leaders together -- even if no agreements are reached. However, some of the West European liberal media were critical of the London Summit's outcome, calling it "world theater" that issued "meaningless political declarations." West Germany's <u>Die Zeit</u> said "next year it is Bonn's turn to host the event...it should make sure the summit will not conclude on the dead-end road of non-committal statements."

Prepared by: Vello Ederma (P/R: 485-7116)

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