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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
131300	OUTLINE	RE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS (SIMILAR TEXT TO 131200)	4	ND	B1
131304	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: DEBT CRISIS	1	10/18/1983	B1
131306	PAPER	RE: DEBT CRISIS	4	ND	B1
131317	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: MCNAMAR MEMO	1	10/28/1983	B1
131332	CABLE	KINGSTON 10690	5	10/29/1983	B1
131333	REPORT	RE: PHILIPPINES (P. 3 ONLY)	1	ND	B1
131337	NOTES	RE: JAMAICA	6	ND	B1
131339	MEETING OUTLINE	RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	2	11/4/1983	B1
131341	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1	ND	B1

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
131343	TALKING POINTS	RE: MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER (SIMILAR TEXT TO 131341)	1	ND	B1
131345	MEMO	ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1	11/3/1983	B1
131348	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	2	ND	B1
131350	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER EDWARD SEAGA	2	ND	B1

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March 1983 to limit the necessity for France to devalue the franc, seem to make it apparent that the European currency unit is basically the German currency and not the new synthetic unit. It would be politically unattractive and difficult to leave Britain, France, Italy and Canada, members of the summit group, out of a scheme for stabilizing key currencies, and perhaps it would not be necessary if their currencies achieved greater stability during the extended period of shaking down the system of converging fixed rates among key currencies. It would be an economic mistake, however, if perhaps close to a political necessity, to defer action to stabilize the most important key currencies for the sake of the international monetary system as a whole, because of the difficulty in making arrangements for one part of it.

At Williamsburg, I would urge the most general statement of purpose of restoring order to international monetary arrangements gradually over the years ahead, and to moderate the disturbances arising from the present non-system of flexible exchange rates and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies. I would urge abstention from any action to push forward toward a greater role for the SDR or for gold, or any immediate adoption of rules for floating (such as the sliding peg or a standard source of intervention). Especially I would urge that international monetary consultation and cooperation at the level of treasuries and central banks go forward on a consistent basis to improve existing arrangements, and that isolation is strongly undesirable and perhaps impossible in an interdependent world.

VIII.
The Geopolitics of International Economic Policy

Henry Kissinger

Congressman Kemp: Ladies and gentlemen, could I have your attention for just one moment? We're moving into dessert and I did not want to interrupt. The country is in danger at this very moment—Congress is in session. There is a vote on the MX, a very close vote, on the Hill. I have to be there.

I wanted to be able to introduce Dr. Kissinger myself, but unfortunately I'm going to have to go to Capitol Hill for about 40 minutes. Professor Mundell will have the pleasure of introducing Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger has written an article in *Newsweek* that identifies many of the forces that are acting in the world today. His important article on sustaining world economic recovery and helping many of our friends and allies pay off debt was instrumental in our decision to call this meeting.

I hope you'll understand. Dr. Kissinger, we do appreciate your being here. I just wanted everybody to know how deeply grateful I am, as one of the co-chairmen, to have Henry Kissinger come and share with us his perspective on the global economic system.

Dr. Mundell: It's a very great pleasure to welcome personally and on behalf of my co-chairman, Jack Kemp, as he already has, the Honorable Henry Kissinger. The custom has been, as you may have known from the initial appearance this morning of Secretary of State Shultz, that economists make political policy now and we can anticipate with great relish the viewpoint of a political scientist who will help us economists make economic policy.

Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I must tell you I have been wondering for the last few days what possessed me to speak to a group of economists. I want to express my appreciation for your applause because I know how hard it is to applaud and shrug your shoulders at the same time.

I noticed that the Secretary of State made some comments this morning about political scientists getting involved in economics. It's something that I have been

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exposed to before, first when he was Secretary of the Treasury and then particularly his successor, Bill Simon, used to point out my shortcomings in economics. In fact, he felt they were the best argument against universal suffrage.

On the other hand, there was an occasion at the height of the oil crisis when Bill Simon called the Shah of Iran a nut, and when I remonstrated with him about it he said, "You political scientists always get too excited. I'll fix it this afternoon." That afternoon he issued a statement that he had been quoted out of context.

The poor Shah went to his grave trying to figure out the context of that.

Now, my relationship to economics has been reluctant and it took me a long time to focus on it and to become interested in it. I was driven into it by the realization, by the growing realization, that most of the foreign policy problems have an economic base, and that most of the economic problems really require fundamental political decisions.

So, I've been thinking about some of the issues that you're discussing here and I have begun writing about them.

I want to make clear, however, I do not speak here as a technical economist. I do not claim that I have the technical solution to some of the issues that I'm going to raise. You may even find that I'm in the position of the fellow who said, "The way to deal with the submarine problem is to heat the ocean and boil them to the surface," and when he was asked how to do that, he said, "That's a technical problem. I've given you the policy direction and technical implementation is up to you."

And finally, I want to say that I do not really believe that we can or we should here attempt to influence what is going to happen at Williamsburg. Anybody who has attended summit meetings will, I think, confirm that whatever isn't settled about Williamsburg today better not be attempted and that the danger of trying to put together a grand, eloquent communique or to pretend that one can settle something like the exchange rate problem or the debt problem in the time that is left before Williamsburg, the danger of that is greater than any good that can be achieved by the attempt to do so.

What can happen at Williamsburg, and what I hope will happen at Williamsburg, is that the heads of government talk in an unconstrained manner about the definition of the problems as they see them, and agree among themselves about directions they want to explore or maybe some tentative conclusions that they can reach that are not yet ripe for publication and that need some further technical study. I think that would be a greater contribution than to find formulations which will permit each head of government to claim that he is carrying out what he wanted to do in the first place, that he swayed all of his colleagues into new directions. That in previous summits led to disavowals and increasing tensions.

Now, let me state a number of issues that I take to be, from a foreign policy point of view, central to both our economic and political future, and you will

notice that for me exchange rates are just one aspect of a general problem. Let me begin with the difficulty that seems to me to exist that is produced by the gap between rhetoric and reality with respect to the international economic system in which we are operating.

Everybody avows the desirability of free trade. There is a consensus that free trade is essential for a growing world economy, and yet at any meeting of economists—and of political figures that are concerned with the issue of trade—one becomes conscious of the fact that the reality is growing measures of protectionism in various countries.

The reality is that almost every country, including the United States, is trying to manipulate the encouragement of its exports and to create difficulties for imports, especially with respect to industries that are conceived to be threatened. Now, it seems to me that there must be some explanation for this. One explanation that I believe is valid is the fact that a free trading system in a world economy has complexities that were never imagined when the free trade theory was originated.

The free trade theory was originated by economists at a time when Britain was the Saudi Arabia of energy, when it had a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly on energy, its gold, and a great advance in technology. And a superior political system.

In those circumstances, of course, free trade was of benefit to everybody because even if some industries went down, other industries would grow in the same nation. Throughout the nineteenth century, as other countries industrialized, they usually did so behind tariff barriers and entered the free trade system only after their protected industries had developed, but the number of players was relatively few.

Now we have to operate a world trading system with some 25, more or less, significant participants. Of whom many are operating across the whole spectrum of or a large spectrum of production—participants of a system, moreover, with wide cultural differences, and great differences in wage scales.

Therefore, inevitably, the pressures within the affected countries to protect those industries that must be disadvantaged by such a system become enormous. The benefits of such an arrangement do not create constituencies that are as well organized and as vocal as the constituencies that are being disadvantaged.

And so it requires, paradoxically, a very deliberate act of statesmanship and a very deliberate coordination of policies to prevent mercantilism from arising in a world that avows the free trade theology and, indeed, one would have to say, if present trends continue, not present rhetoric, but present trends continue, it is more probable that we'll live in a mercantilistic world in 25 years than in a free trade world.

I do not welcome this. In fact, I would prefer a world of freer trade, but I'm trying to look at this from the point of view of political leaders who have to make concrete decisions in a sure timeframe. I do not believe, for example, that it is possible to solve the problem of the imbalance of trade with Japan by dealing with it industry by industry on the basis of commercial criteria alone. I fear very much that we may be building up a degree of resentment that will lead to a nationalistic reaction somewhere down the road.

I believe that what we need is a comprehensive negotiation, among the various nations, and at a minimum an agreement that no new trade barriers be raised by anybody for a period of time until such a negotiation can take place.

It is futile to negotiate textile restraints or automobile restraints one industry at a time, because the experience has been that by the time these negotiations are completed they have been drained of meaning. At least that was my experience in the textile negotiations.

Now, it is in this context of a more deliberate policy that I would like to deal with the question of exchange rates.

In a world in which there are already growing obstacles to free trade, and in a world in which a kind of mercantilism is emerging, I believe it is desirable to establish some criteria that more or less impose discipline and that can be changed only by major political decisions. I agree completely with the Secretary of State that no system of exchange rates, either fixed or floating, is going to substitute or can make up for irresponsible domestic economic policies.

It is clear that discipline in domestic economic policies is essential if any exchange system is going to work. The issue before us, it seems to me, however, is which system is more likely to evoke such discipline. I believe that it has been proved that the floating system is really a free float, that the theory that it works automatically because overvaluation reduces exports and undervaluation generates inflationary pressures, has not, in fact, worked out this way in practice.

Governments have had an opportunity to manipulate the exchange rate for a maximum competitive advantage. The practical result of it is that no amount of increases in American productivity have been able to make up for the changes in the exchange rate with respect to the yen. It is this uncertainty which contributes, in my view, to a kind of trading system in which speculation is encouraged, currency translations become an increasingly important element in the profits of some corporations, and the system as a whole tends to be drained of liquidity.

Now, I do not criticize the decisions of 1971. They were taken by an administration in which I served, though I was not a participant in those decisions. But still it is probably the case that the crisis that started in 1973 might have been even more acute under a system of fixed exchange rates, and I, therefore, do not wish to diminish in any sense either the contribution made by those who created the floating system, nor by the system itself to get us through a period of transition.

I also do not maintain that we can return immediately to fixed parities, but I think we should make that an objective, perhaps by beginning with parities with fairly wide bands, but the floating system as such, under present conditions, probably becomes one element of competitiveness and contributes to international economic instabilities.

Now, let me talk about another issue, which it seems to me is related to it, which is the problem of international debt.

For those of us who were in office in the 1970s, it is an interesting phenomenon that the request then of the developing nations for a new economic order based on the transfer of resources from the industrialized countries to the developing countries was not met by the governments of the time, and yet the private banking system has transferred an amount of resources to the developing countries that not even the wildest liberal of the period and not even the most radical developing country would have dared to suggest as a means of achieving the new economic order.

There are many explanations for this: the explosion in oil prices; the need to recycle petrodollars; the desirability of economic development—coupled with the fact that where no bank would lend to a domestic debtor without finding out what other debts he is incurring, no such rules seem to be applied to sovereign countries.

Foreigners could borrow with nobody knowing exactly how much the country was borrowing elsewhere. Indeed, when the crisis occurred in a number of countries last year, one of the problems those who dealt with them had was to find out the exact level of international debt.

Now, this has produced a situation in which the repayment of debt becomes an enormous challenge for both creditors and debtors, because the equity of so many financial institutions in the creditor countries is threatened by the threat of default and the politics of so many debtor countries is overshadowed by the problem of repayment.

Last year the IMF, through some heroic efforts, overcame an incipient crisis. But I would like to stress two dangers that I see. If I understand the solution that is being attempted, it is based on two premises. One is that the debtor countries practice austerity, reduce their imports, increase their exports, improve their balance of payments and thereby become more credit worthy. In this sense it is described as a liquidity crisis and not a sovereignty crisis.

Secondly, the private financial institutions are being encouraged to increase their lending in order to improve the liquidity of the debtor countries, to enable them to repay their debts, their rescheduled debts, and to get the system moving again.

I would like to raise questions about both ends of that spectrum, without attacking what happened last year, which was necessary. I'm talking about the middle-term future.

First, austerity is a very important prescription for one country—if one country is in crisis. It could be gravely dangerous for the international economic system if exposed to before, first when he was Secretary of the Treasury and then particularly his successor, Bill Simon, used to point out my shortcomings in economics. In fact, he felt they were the best argument against universal suffrage.

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I would like to raise questions about both ends of that spectrum, without attacking what happened last year, which was necessary. I'm talking about the middle-term future.

First, austerity is a very important prescription for one country—if one country is in crisis. It could be gravely dangerous for the international economic system if

15 countries are practicing it simultaneously. It is not possible for everybody to decrease imports and increase exports simultaneously, and indeed, since such a growing percentage of the exports of the OECD countries are going to developing countries, it will even retard recovery in the developed countries.

Secondly, I wonder whether it is, in fact, true that private institutions will increase their lending for the time required to restore financial health and, indeed, all indications are that they probably are not doing it to the requisite extent.

Even in terms of the assumptions of the crisis management, there are some questions to be asked. But I would like to raise two additional political problems.

The first is that austerity for developing countries is an even graver political problem than it is for developed countries. It is something that can be carried out for a brief period of time, but if it threatens the institutions that we are trying to preserve, if the practical consequence is to create enormous political instability, the cure could be worse than the disease, and indeed, a situation may arise in which the political incentives of several developing countries may run quite counter to the economic incentives. Economists may know that they should practice austerity, but political leaders may feel that the way to rally their public and to gain public support is to attack the financial institutions in the name of which these exactions are being attempted.

I know the phrase that countries never go broke, but creditors sometimes go broke. And in any event, the issue is put in much too simple-minded terms. There are many steps between total default and total meeting of even the rescheduled obligations. There could be quasi-defaults in which governments gear their debt service to their export earnings in some fixed percentage or other formulas, and I don't really care what the formula is. The danger that I see is that radical governments may come into power, demand a rescheduling of their debts, impose them, and thereby reward radicalism throughout the developing world.

And can one really say that among all the major debtors it could not happen in one? It is true that to set up crisis machinery now may make the crisis more likely. It is also true that many of these schemes for transforming short-term debt into long-term debt will then make it unavoidable, that it will have to be done for everybody. All of this is, no doubt, correct.

But it seems to me also highly possible that what happened last year was not the end, but the beginning of a financial crisis. It seems to me essential to transform the debt problem from a financial problem into a development and growth problem. It seems to me important to find criteria by which political leaders of the developing world can associate themselves with the health of the international economic system in terms other than simply repaying interest. Capital isn't being repaid anyway, for the time being, by many of the major countries.

How to do this? It seems to me one of the topics that could be and should be discussed by the heads of government in the privacy of their meetings. And it seems to me especially important to do this in a way that does not generate the crisis but also that doesn't trivialize the danger.

We have, it seems to me, this fundamental political problem with respect to international economic policy: We believe in free trade; it is imperative to encourage world economic growth; but it is also important to establish first some criteria and methods and rules that impose some discipline and, secondly, some policies that deal with those matters that do not get addressed automatically.

We cannot wait on the issue of debt for a crisis. We have to face the fact that in the free trade world the people who are made to be unemployed by foreign competition will not be, necessarily, the same that are re-employed by the alternative industries that international competition may make available to us. Industrial policy is often a dirty word for conservatives, and insofar as it suggests that the government should solve all the problems, it, of course, assigns to the cause of the difficulties or the cause of many difficulties their solution.

Still, it seems to me that in the field of employment and in the field of energy it may be that the incentives of the pure market will not produce the necessities of our long-term future and that it would be, therefore, highly important to deal with this in the field of energy, for example.

The fact is that if one looks at the possible political evolution in the Gulf area, it would be rash to say that before this century is over one could not see another price explosion. Many of the very people who are now projecting permanently falling oil prices were projecting permanently rising oil prices two or three years ago.

How to deal with this problem and how to create incentives to overcome a long-range danger which does not yet produce its short-term market incentives? That seems to me another topic.

So, to sum up, I have not come before this group as an economist. In fact, it took a great deal of persuasion by the Chairman to get me to speak here at all. I am speaking to you as somebody with some experience in foreign policy management. I have tried to indicate the areas in which it seems to me that the present system, if analyzed on purely economic terms, may create political instabilities, or else where only decisions by political leaders can create the economic framework for the direction in which we have to go.

I want to repeat what I said at the beginning. I am not here as a technical expert on implementing what I have discussed. But then the heads of government in Williamsburg are also not going to be technical experts on the subjects that are before them. The best they can do is to agree on a philosophy of what they want to achieve, on the direction in which we are to go, on some purposes we are to try to fulfill.

That, I think, could be an important result of the conference. That is still within their capacity and within the time schedule and in this sense we can only wish the heads of government every success and I want to express my own personal confidence that our leadership, I'm sure, is aware of the direction in which I think we should go.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Mundell: We greatly appreciate the Secretary's thoughtful remarks and we now adjourn our luncheon meeting.

IX.

Bretton Woods: A Journalist's Impression

John Davenport

Dr. Mundell: We want to resume our discussion now. We've gotten into the situation where we've had discussions by different people and it's not possible to really summarize very conveniently what has been said. We do have to recognize that there is opposition, as we know, to the idea of a fixed exchange rate system. There's a great deal of support that still exists and probably will for a long time for a floating or flexible exchange rate system.

I just want to put something in perspective here, that whatever system we're going to have, it's going to be a mixed fixed and flexible exchange rate system. There's never been a completely fixed exchange rate system in history, except within a single common currency area. That's one of the reasons, of course, why economists disagree on the issue. Some look at those areas where we know there's going to be flexible exchange rates and others look at those areas where there is fixed exchange rates and we want to see that area extended.

Even under the gold standard, as historians among you would realize, the whole world was not on the gold standard when Britain started the gold standard in 1717, perhaps, when Newton made the mathematical error and overvalued gold a bit. So, by Gresham's Law gold drove out silver in Britain. Then in the Napoleonic period France went on a bimetallic standard in 1803. We had a mixed bimetallic system for a good part of the 19th century, at least until the 1870s when the price of gold went off on its own and silver went off on its own.

The world was divided, then, between a gold bloc and a silver bloc, with the gold bloc being the major industrial countries of the time, the imperial states of metropolitan Europe. An increasingly large area—many of the less developed countries—were on the silver bloc. There are always floating rates between the gold and silver blocs. Under Bretton Woods, countries had quasi-fixed exchange rates, but they were really variable exchange rates. However, our focus of attention is on where the mainstream of the world economy is and what's happening principally to those countries that involve the bulk of international trade, which


Western Banks Loans to LDCs and Eastern Europe
BILLION US $
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
EASTERN EUROPE
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982 *
*MID-YEAR 1982
YEARS

Growth of LDC and East Europe Debt Service



8

Index of Real Commodity Prices
1975=100

LDC and East European Debt, 1982

$775 BILLION



US Bank Exposure by Region

$349.3 BILLION




US Banks Outstanding Loans to Major LDC and East European Borrowers
AFRICA
EASTERN EUROPE
OPEC
ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80

2

US Bank Exposure in Latin America, by Size of Bank



13.


LDC and East Europe: Official and Private Debt
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
BILLION US $
1967
1972
1982
YEARS
Legend
PRIVATE
OFFICIAL
TOTAL

GDP Growth Rates, LDCS and Industrial Countries


Global Inflation
PERCENT
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
YEARS
LDCs
Industrial Countries
Legend
LDC
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
LDCS PROJECTED
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTED

16

Figure 6 7

Interest Rates vs. Inflation

* 1st half

17

INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: DIRECTION OF EXPORTS 1970–1982

ALL COMMODITIES

UNITED STATES



JAPAN



WESTERN EUROPE



MANUFACTURES

1981



$157 BILLION

1981



$144 BILLION

1981



$195 BILLION

FTC = Financially Troubled Countries; the top 25 LDCs with severe debt repayment problems.

8

Exports to Financially Troubled LDC Group



During this period the FTCs accounted for
17 percent of US export growth

During this period the FTCs accounted for
8 percent of Japanese export growth

During this period the FTCs accounted for
4 percent of West European export growth

FTC = Financially Troubled Countries; the top 25 LDCs with severe debt repayment problems.

Direction of LDC Exports



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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131300	OUTLINE RE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS (SIMILAR TEXT TO 131200)	4	ND	B1

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ID	*Document Type* / *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131304	MEMO NORMAN BAILEY TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: DEBT CRISIS	1	10/18/1983	B1

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ID	*Document Type* / *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131306	PAPER RE: DEBT CRISIS	4	ND	B1

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131317	MEMO NORMAN BAILEY TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: MCNAMAR MEMO	1	10/28/1983	B1

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

7738

30

October 27, 1983

30 OCT 27 P3:59

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM : R. T. McNamar R.T.M.

SUBJECT : Brazilian Wage Law Decree

It appears that the leadership of the Brazilian majority party (PDS) has reached an agreement on the Brazilian wage-indexation decree law that can be passed by the Congress. If our understanding of the current draft is correct, the revised wage decree law (2065), which will be published Friday, will be regarded as a compromise by the government, a political victory for the moderate opposition, and should be acceptable to the IMF.

Although additional fiscal and monetary measures will need to be negotiated between Brazil and the IMF next week, this action will hopefully break the political log jam and keep the Brazilian financial package on target for IMF and bank approvals during the last two weeks of November. If this scenario follows, it will substantially lessen the current international apprehensions over Brazil at a time when the transition by the civilian government in Argentina is creating additional concerns in the international financial community.

In short, this may be a major step forward in Latin America.

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131332	CABLE KINGSTON 10690	5	10/29/1983	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131333	REPORT RE: PHILIPPINES (P. 3 ONLY)	1	ND	B1

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131337	NOTES RE: JAMAICA	6	ND	B1

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Robinson

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The White House

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83 NOV 3 P 1:44

System # I

Package # 7988

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	J	
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4		A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information   A = Action   R = Retain   D = Dispatch   N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other ______

COMMENTS   Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)

Bud / JP: ① Meeting has ~~been~~ changed to 2:00 pm
② We have also alerted VP's office
③ We are awaiting letter from State.

(Copy in Rcm folder)

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131339	MEETING OUTLINE RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	2	11/4/1983	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131341	TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1	ND	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
131343	TALKING POINTS RE: MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER (SIMILAR TEXT TO 131341)	1	ND	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131345	MEMO ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1	11/3/1983	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131348	MEMO GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MEETING WITH DAVID ROCKEFELLER	2	ND	B1

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
131350	LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER EDWARD SEAGA	2	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.