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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR LONDON PARVIN

FROM: DAVE GERGEN *DG*

SUBJECT: MX Remarks to CEOs

The Air Force has just provided us with this analysis of the economic impact of the MX package, saying that it will create over 150,000 jobs a year (annual average, 1984-88) and will add \$33 billion to industrial output. This strikes me as a good candidate for inclusion in the President's remarks to the CEOs on Monday (will be covered by the press).

Will you please check with NSC, John Roussetot and other relevant parties about making these points? The study itself, of course, will also have to be checked out.

Many thanks.

cc: Bud McFarlane  
Bob Sims  
Mort Allin  
Aram Bakshian  
Ken Duberstein  
John Roussetot

ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT  
IMPACTS OF ICBM MODERNIZATION

The ICBM modernization program recommended by the Scowcroft Commission and endorsed by the President calls for a phased approach. First, 100 Peacekeeper missiles will be deployed in existing silos. Concurrently, engineering design of a small missile and silo superhardening, hard mobile, and deep basing technology development will be pursued. These latter efforts will support potential follow-on deployments, dependent upon future strategic and technical considerations.

The total program would require appropriations of \$19.9 billion<sup>1</sup> over the FY 1984-88 period, which corresponds to the 5-year period of the FY 1984 FYDP.<sup>2</sup> The funds appropriated in a given year are usually not all spent in that year, but rather over several years. Therefore, in determining ICBM expenditures, the portion of FY 1983 and earlier appropriations that will not be spent until the FY 1984-88 period must be considered. Additionally, the pattern of spending for the FY 1984-88 appropriations must be determined. Some of these funds will not be spent until FY 1989 or later. Given the pattern of spending for ICBM appropriation funds, \$18.0 billion will actually be spent over the FY 1984-88 period.<sup>3</sup>

A. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IMPACT ESTIMATES

The ICBM modernization expenditures will have significant economic impacts throughout the nation. Industrial sales and

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<sup>1</sup> All figures are in FY 1982 dollars.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 1983, p.22.

<sup>3</sup> Based on distribution among 3600, 3020, and 3300 funds provided in Peacekeeper Cost Review, USAF, 11 April 1983, and OSD expenditure patterns.

employment will grow considerably in missile-related industries. Our preliminary analysis of the impact on industrial output indicates that there will be a total increase of industrial output valued at \$33.0 billion over the 1984-88 period. This equates to an annual average increase of \$6.6 billion in sales for various industries across the nation. The effect of such an increase will be an annual average employment creation of over 158,700 jobs over the 1984-88 period, with peak-year (1987) employment of 182,500 workers.

The largest increase in output resulting from the proposed program will be posted by aerospace and support industries such as aircraft, electronic components and scientific instruments, complete guided missiles, ordnance, and communications equipment. The gains in output and employment will also be shared by service industries such as wholesale and retail trade, real estate, transportation, and business and professional services. Eighty percent of the increase in sales potential is registered by high-technology, durable manufacturing industries.

The total employment creation consists of three components: direct, indirect, and induced employment. Direct and indirect employment effects are related to missile development, production, and deployment. The induced employment effects are the result of consumption activities stimulated by the income generated in the process of implementing the ICBM modernization program. The breakdown of employment changes is shown in Table 1.

Direct employment from the recommended program would amount to about 45,660 jobs a year for the 1984-88 period, consisting of 43,835 jobs in missile development and production industries and 1,825 construction jobs in the deployment

area. Indirect employment would average 23,010 jobs in industries related to missile development and production and 1,575 construction-related jobs throughout the nation. The income generated from the total of 70,250 direct and indirect jobs for missile development, production, and deployment would lead to induced employment of an additional 88,500 jobs annually. Thus, when all of the employment effects-- direct, indirect, and induced--are considered, the ICBM modernization program will have resulted in the creation of 158,700 jobs per year during the 1984-88 period.

B. REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION

Although the employment and income effects associated with ICBM modernization are spread throughout the nation, they are not uniformly distributed. Regions with a large concentration of missile and related aerospace and support industries will be major beneficiaries of research, development, and procurement outlays. Twenty-eight states will benefit from direct research, development, and procurement employment, while almost every state in the nation will benefit from employment in support industries. The eight states with the greatest proportion of prime contracts are California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. The economic benefits accruing to these states include increased output and employment in industries involved in missile development and production.

Available data indicate that in 1982, 16,139 workers were directly engaged in Peacekeeper research and development. Of these, 75 percent, or 12,260, were located in the eight states mentioned above. The balance was spread throughout an additional 20 states.\*

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\* Data provided by M-X Associate Contractors.

Based on the 1982 statewide distribution of direct employment in the Peacekeeper missile development and production industry, preliminary estimates of annual employment creation due to the ICBM modernization plan for the period 1984-88 are presented in Table 2. The estimates do not include indirect employment in missile support industries nor employment due to construction. The table shows that an annual average direct employment of 43,835 jobs is generated and spread throughout the nation. California is the largest beneficiary of ICBM modernization employment impact, followed by Massachusetts, Colorado, Utah, Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida.

ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT CHANGES\*  
 DUE TO ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM,  
 FY 1984-1988  
 (ANNUAL AVERAGE NUMBER OF JOBS)

<u>ICBM Program Categories</u>	<u>Outlays** 1982 \$ in Millions/Year</u>	<u>Direct Employment</u>	<u>Indirect Employment</u>	<u>Induced Employment</u>	<u>Total Employment</u>
100 M-X in Silos:					
RDT&E	989	12,435	6,530	23,895	42,860
Procurement	1,561	19,630	10,300	37,710	67,640
Milcon	106	1,825	1,575	4,280	7,680
Small ICBM Development	936	11,770	6,180	22,610	40,560
<hr/>					
Total	3,592	45,660	24,585	88,495	158,740

\* Changes in the number of jobs refer to additions to the current level of jobs in the missile industry.

\*\*Outlays do not include expenses due to operation, maintenance, and support activities.

ESTIMATES OF DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION DUE  
TO SCOWCROFT COMMISSION'S ICBM MODERNIZATION PLAN

(Annual Averages for the Period FY 1984-88)

<u>STATE</u>	<u>DIRECT INVESTMENT (MILLIONS OF 1982 \$)*</u>	<u>DIRECT EMPLOYMENT (NUMBER OF JOBS)**</u>
Alabama	13.9	220
Arizona	41.8	660
California	1,743.0	19,720
Colorado	338.1	3,640
Connecticut	13.9	175
Delaware	7.0	45
Florida	115.0	1,710
Illinois	10.5	130
Maine	7.0	45
Maryland	7.0	130
Massachusetts	470.6	6,750
Michigan	0.1	20
Minnesota	3.5	90
Missouri	0.7	45
Nebraska	17.4	260
Nevada	20.9	310
New Hampshire	48.8	745
New Jersey	10.5	260
New Mexico	27.9	480
New York	122.0	1,930
Ohio	13.9	220
Oklahoma	20.9	220
Oregon	3.5	45
Pennsylvania	132.4	1,230
Texas	13.9	310
Utah	251.0	4,030
Virginia	17.4	260
Washington	13.9	130
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b><u>3,486.0</u></b>	<b><u>43,835</u></b>

\* Investment includes annual average outlays for Peacekeeper missile RDT&E, procurement, and follow-on technology development of small missiles, superhardness, deep basing, and a deployment option. It does not include expenditures for construction.

\*\* The figures do not include indirect or induced employment in Peacekeeper missile and small missile support industries, or employment related to construction activities. The estimates for the period FY 1984-88 are based on similar state distribution of employment that prevailed in 1982.



-	W. Miller	4	W. Walker
-	Boland	-	Gray
=	Walters	-	Draper
-	N. Smith	-	Ratford
-	Adams	0	Baker
-	Long	0	Hoyce
-	Yates	-	Carr
-	O'Leary	-	Meezek
-	Roybal	10	
-	Stokes	3	
+	Burd	-	Porte
+	Chappell	+	W. Wade
+	O'Leary	+	Edwards
+	Merritt	+	Myers
-	Foster	+	Robinson
-	Geary	+	Miller
+	W. Miller	0	Cooper
+	W. Miller	+	Young
+	W. Miller	+	Kearney
+	W. Miller	+	Regan
-	W. Miller	+	O'Brien
-	W. Miller	+	Smith
+	W. Miller	+	Zuid
-	W. Miller	+	Bussell
-	W. Miller	+	Edwards
+	W. Miller	+	Livingston
+	W. Miller	-	Green
-	W. Miller	+	Wattles
-	W. Miller	+	Lewis
-	W. Miller	+	Walter
-	W. Miller	+	Peters
-	W. Miller	17	

-	Waters	+ 0	Watkins
-	Beland	-	Epdy
0	Nashua	-	Dwyer
-	W Smith	-	Ritchford (H)
-	Aldabro	-	Boner
-	Long	0	Hayer
-	Lyster Dent	-	Carri
-	Obey	-	Mazze
-	Roybal	10 <sup>th</sup> 3	
-	Stoker	-	Conte Deuloh
+	Bovill	+	W' Dede
+	Chappell	+	Edwards
+	Alexander	+	Myers
+	Murtha	+	Robinson
-	Paster	+	Midea
-	Geary Dent	0	Coughton
+	Rosen Pa	+	Young
+	Lynn	+	Kneif
+	Dick	+	Regula
-	Stoughton	0	O'Brien
-	Ichman	+	Smith
+	Hyatt	+	Rudd
-		+	Bussell
-		+	Edwards
+	Perry	+	Livingston
-		-	Green
-		-	Kestler
-		-	Linn
-		-	W. H.
-		+	Rogers

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION BRIEFINGS, May 16-17

Briefing to CEOs of Business

Time and Place: May 16: 4-00-5:00 p.m., Briefing in  
East Room; 5:00-5:30 p.m., Reception in  
State Dining Room

Sequence of Events:

- 4:00-4:10 The President. Pressing need for Congressional approval of program; impact of modernization on deterrence and arms reductions; need for bipartisan consensus and active support from CEOs. (Full press coverage.)
- 4:10-4:13 Press departs. (Remainder of program is without press coverage.)
- 4:13-4:15 Faith Whittlesey. Thanks to CEOs for attending and introduction of speakers.
- 4:15-4:25 John H. Lyons, Commission member and VP, AFL-CIO. Discussion of elements of Commission Report, the fact of unanimity, and why entire package makes sense and deserves bipartisan support.
- 4:25-4:35 Nicholas F. Brady, Commission member and former United States Senator. Discussion of remaining elements of Commission Report and why Commission arrived at unanimous conclusions and recommendations.
- 4:35-4:50 Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Specifics of the strategic modernization program and linkage to arms control.
- 4:50 Faith Whittlesey. Introduction of the Vice President.
- 4:50-5:00 The Vice President. Need for active support, M-X part of overall effort to forge lasting national consensus on full range of national and foreign policy issues.
- 5:00-5:30 Reception in State Dining Room.

Briefing to Senior Washington Area Business and Trade  
Representatives

Time and Place: May 17, 2:00-3:00 p.m., Room 450, OEOB

Sequence of Events:

- 2:00-2:05 Faith Whittlesey. Welcoming remarks.
- 2:05-2:15 William P. Clark. Remarks will key on pressing need for passage of program and impact of modernization on deterrence and arms control.
- 2:15-2:35 John M. Deutch, Commission member and Dean of Science, MIT. Discussion of Commission Report, the fact of unanimity, and why entire package deserves bipartisan support.
- 2:35 Faith Whittlesey. Introduction of the Vice President.
- 2:35-2:45 The Vice President. Remarks focused on need for active support by Washington area representatives.
- 2:35-2:45 Faith Whittlesey. Closing remarks; questions and answers (with Brigadier General Gordon Fornell, USAF M-X/Peacekeeper office.)



*June Stotte*

NATIONAL PRESIDENT

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
AMERICAN LEGION AUXILIARY

777 N. MERIDIAN ST.  
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204



**JUANITA MARTIN BRYANT**

INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT

GENERAL FEDERATION  
OF WOMEN'S CLUBS

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036  
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T. Hall  
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G. Long  
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Shelby  
Fuqua  
MacKay  
Mica  
Volkmer  
Bob Young  
Annunzio  
Bryant  
R. Coleman  
Frost  
Kazen  
Patman  
Anthony  
Synar  
McNulty  
Kogovsek  
Coelho  
Matsui

Mineta  
Martinez  
Mavroules  
Mrazek  
Gaydos  
A. Murphey  
Yatron  
Byron  
Hoyer  
Boucher  
Hatcher  
Jenkins  
Rowland  
Zablocki  
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Natcher  
Eckart  
Weber  
Rahall  
Roemer  
Tauzin  
Cooper  
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Pepper  
Huckaby  
Durbin  
Russo  
Brooks  
de la Garza  
Gonazlez  
Reid  
Swift  
Hefstel  
Akaka

Carney (NY-1)  
Bereuter (NE-1)  
Boehlert (NY-25)  
Coats (IN-4)  
C. Evans (IO-3)  
Gunderson (WI-3)  
McKinney (CT-4)  
Molinari (NY-14)  
P. Roberts (KS-1)  
Roukema (NJ-5)  
V. Smith (NE-3)  
Sundquist (TN-7)  
V. Weber (MN-2)  
Coughlin (PA-13)  
Goodling (PA-19)  
Leach (IO-1)  
Tauke (IO-2)  
Conte (MA-1)  
Forsythe (NJ-13)  
Green (NY-15)  
Chandler (WA-8)  
Gilman (NY-22)  
Horton (NY-29)  
N. Johnson (CT-6)  
Lent (NY-4)  
McKernan (ME-1)  
Snowe (ME-2)  
Schneider (RI-2)  
Whittaker (KS-5)  
Zschau (CA-12)  
Clinger (PA-23)  
Fish (NY-21)  
Gekas (PA-7)  
Gregg (NH-2)  
Jeffords (VT-At Large)  
McGrath (NY-5)

L. Martin (IL-16)  
Paul (TX-22)  
Petri (WI-6)  
Ridge (PA-21)  
C. Smith (NJ-4)  
B. Smith (OR-2)  
Rinaldo (NJ-7)  
Gene Snyder (KY-4)  
Larry Hopkins (KY-6)  
Stan Parris (VA-8)  
Hank Brown (CO-4)  
Don Young (AK-At Large)  
Broomfield (MI-18)  
Frenzel (MN-3)  
Roth (WI-8)  
Gradison (OH-2)  
Regula (OH-16)  
Shuster (PA-9)

## GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

ACCEPT AND NO RESPONSE

NAME

NAME

BRIEFING ON MODERNIZATION OF  
AMERICA'S STRATEGIC FORCES -  
Monday, May 16, 1983/4:00 p.m.  
SW Gate/Telegrams  
Contact: Social Office x7787  
THE PRESIDENT

Bush, Vice President George	A
Butler, Owen B. (Mr.)	A
Byrne, Joseph W. (Mr.)	
Caditz, Clement (Mr.)	A
Campbell, Lee (Mr.)	A
Campion, Robert T. (Mr.)	
Cashen, Henry (Mr.)	A
Clark, William P. (Hon.)	
Collins, Michael (Mr.)	A
Cruz, John III (Mr.)	
Currieo, James R. (Mr.)	A
Dachs, Charlotte (Mrs.)	
Datt, John (Mr.)	A
Davis, Donald W. (Mr.)	A
DeBaca, Fernando (Mr.)	
DeFiore, Leonard (Dr.)	A
De Bruyne, Dirk (Mr.)	
Deaver, Michael K. (Hon.)	
Dechant, Virgil (Mr.)	A
Dickens, Sam (Mr.)	A
Dixon, John W. (Mr.)	A
Dodd, Edwin D. (Mr.)	A
Dolan, John T. (Mr.)	A
Donley, Edward (Mr.)	A
Dougherty, Russell (Mr.)	A
Erickson, Evans W. (Mr.)	A
Evans, James H. (Mr.)	A
Falwell, Jerry (Dr.)	
Fery, John B. (Mr.)	
Fierst, Herbert A. (Mr.)	A
Figgie, Harry E. Jr (Mr.)	A
Fisher, John (Mr.)	A
Flannery, Joseph P. (Mr.)	A
Friedersdorf, Max (Mr.)	
Frohling, Edward (Mr.)	A
Galvin, Robert W. (Mr.)	
Garrison, U. Edwin (Mr.)	A
Gelman, Norman (Mr.)	A
George, W. H. Krome (Mr.)	
Giacco, Alexander F. (Mr.)	A
Girard, Stephen A. (Mr.)	
Glant, Douglas (Mr.)	

Abernathy, K. Brooks (Mr.)  
Adam, Ray C. (Mr.)  
Adelstein, Stanford (Mr.)  
Adler, Kenneth (Mr.) A  
Agee, William M. (Mr.)  
Alexander, Norman E. (Mr.)  
Amitay, Morris (Mr.) A  
Anderson, Robert (Mr.)  
Anderson, Roy A. (Mr.) A  
Anderson, T. A. (Mr.)  
Anderson, Warren M. (Mr.)  
Andreas, Dwayne O. (Mr.) A  
Andrews, William F. (Mr.) A  
Angevine, George B. (Mr.) A

Baker, James A. III (Hon.)  
Barnes, Earle B. (Mr.)  
Barr, Noreen (Ms.) A  
Bere, James F. (Mr.) A  
Berenzweig, Stanley (Mr.)  
Berkman, Marshall L. (Mr.) A  
Berman, Julius (Mr.)  
Beyster, John Robert (Dr.) A  
Biddle, James E. (Mr.) A  
Binstock, Dorothy (Ms.) A  
Bluhdorn, Charles G. (Mr.)  
Blumberg, Marvin (Diane) (Mrs.) A  
Blumberg, Marvin (Mr.) A  
Bowers, Jack (Mr.) A  
Brady, Nicholas (Hon.) A  
Brewer, Gerald (Mr.) A  
Bricker, William H. (Mr.) A  
Brody, David (Mr.) A  
Bronfman, Edgar M. (Mr.)  
Brook, Douglas (Mr.) A  
Browning, Bernard (Mr.) A  
Brown, Harold (Hon.) A  
Bryant, Juanita (Mrs.) A  
Bryen, William (Mr.)  
Busch, August A. III (Mr.)



## GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING = 5/16/83

ACCEPT AND NO RESPONSE

NAME		NAME	
Glenn, Gary (Mr.)	A	Lenon, Richard A. (Mr.)	A
Godwin, Ron (Dr.)	A	Lenz, Dorothy (Ms.)	A
Golden, Nathan (Mr.)		Levine, Jacqueline (Ms.)	
Goldmann, Robert (Mr.)		Levitt, Arthur (Mr.)	
Graham, Gen. Dan	A	Levy, Richard (Mr.)	
Graham, William B. (Mr.)		Lewis, David S. (Mr.)	A
Greeb, Kinsey (Dr.)		Lewis, Frieda (Mrs.)	
		Littlefield, Bryan (Mr.)	
Hall, John R. (Mr.)		Ludington, J.S. (Mr.)	
Hammer, Armand (Mr.)	A	Luke, David L. III (Mr.)	A
Heckel, Jack L. (Mr.)	A	Lyons, John (Mr.)	A
Helms, Richard (Hon.)	A		
Henderson, John B. (Mr.)	A	Makris, Anthony (Mr.)	A
Henske, John M. (Mr.)	A	Malott, Robert H. (Mr.)	
Hess, Leon (Mr.)		Marquard, William A. (Mr.)	
Hetu, Herbert (Mr.)	A	Marshner, Connie (Mrs.)	
Hill, Adm. Clarence A. (Mark)	A	Martinez, John (Dr.)	A
Hockenberg, Harlan (Mr.)		Matthews, Kimberly (Mrs.)	A
Hollenbach, Robert (Mr.)	A	McDonnaughy, John E. (Mr.)	
Holmes, Thomas A. (Mr.)	A	McFarlane, Robert (Hon.)	A
Holt, Cooper (Mr.)	A	McGraw, Harold W. Jr (Mr.)	A
Hoopman, Harold D. (Mr.)	A	McKinney, J. A. (Mr.)	
Horst, Deena (Mrs.)		McSwiney, James W. (Mr.)	A
Houston, John (Mr.)		Meese, Edwin III (Hon.)	
Hueter, Joan (Mrs.)	A	Messing, Andrew (Mr.)	A
		Meyers, Father John	A
Jacobs, Harold M. (Mr.)		Milder, Myron (Mr.)	
Jefferson, Edward G. (Mr.)		Milstein, Seymour (Mr.)	A
Jenkins, Woody (Hon.)	A	Mohler, Harold (Mr.)	A
Johnson, Wilson (Mr.)	A	Moorefoeld, James L. (Mr.)	A
Jones, Col. Phelps	A	Moritz, Amy (Ms.)	A
Jones, Thomas V. (Mr.)	A		
		Norris, William C. (Mr.)	
Kaminsky, I. Samuel (Mr.)			
Keller, Al Jr (Mr.)		O'Green, Fred W. (Mr.)	A
Kendall, Donald M. (Mr.)	A	Olsen, Kenneth H. (Mr.)	
Klemow, Marvin (Mr.)			
Klopman, William A. (Mr.)		Pantaleo, Ted (Mr.)	A
Knoell, William K. (Mr.)		Parkinson, J. David (Mr.)	
Kraft, Gerald (Mr.)	A	Parsons, Jack (Mr.)	A
Kriebel, Robert (Mr.)	A	Payne, Torrence P. B. (Vasilia) (Mrs.)	A
		Pepper, Richard (Mr.)	A
LaHaye, Beverly (Mrs.)	A	Perry, William (Dr.)	A
LaHaye, Timothy (Mr.)	A	Phillips, Howard (Mr.)	A
LaPierre, Wayne (Mr.)		Pilliod, Charles J. Jr (Mr.)	
Ledeem, Michael (Mr.)		Pope, Albert (Mr.)	
Lee, James E. (Mr.)	A	Posnick, Adolph (Mr.)	A

so0516a1 .

## GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

## ACCEPT AND NO RESPONSE

NAME

NAME

Rabinowitz, Rabbi Stanley  
 Rauth, J. Donald (Mr.)  
 Reed, Thomas (Hon.)  
 Rendel, Betty J. (Mrs.)  
 Resnick, Alleck A. (Mr.)  
 Reynolds, David P. (Mr.)  
 Roberts, Gen. Milnor  
 Rolnick, Susan (Ms.)  
 Roth, William G. (Mr.)  
 Rowan, Robert D. (Mr.)  
 Ryter, Lyle (Mr.)

Sachs, Betty (Ms.)  
 Sanders, David (Mr.) A  
 Schifter, Richard (Mr.)  
 Schlee, G. Michael (Mr.) A  
 Schoellhorn, Robert A. (Mr.) A  
 Sears, Earl (Mr.) A  
 Selig, Marvin (Mr.)  
 Sheffey, Col. John A  
 Smith, VADM Levering A  
 Spiers, Edward (Msgr.) A  
 Sprague, Peter J. (Mr.) A  
 Stern, Saul I. (Mr.) A  
 Stevinson, Charles (Mr.) A  
 Stiritz, William P. (Mr.)  
 Stolte, June (Mrs.) A  
 Stranahan, R. A. Jr (Mr.)  
 Stroum, Samuel (Mr.)  
 Swearingen, John E. (Mr.) A  
 Fannenbaum, Ms. Bernice A  
 Phayer, Paul (Mr.)  
 Rimken, William Robert Jr. (Mr.) A  
 Rittle, Richard (Mr.)  
 Townall, Thomas G. (Mr.) A  
 Jhl, Edward G. (Mr.) A  
 Viguerie, Richard (Mr.) A  
 Vollum, Howard (Mr.)  
 Vallner, Harry (Mr.)  
 Valther, Henry (Mr.) A  
 Vathen, Thomas (Mr.)  
 Vatts, George (Mr.) A

Weikel, M. Keith (Dr.) A  
 Weissman, George (Mr.)  
 White, Berta (Mrs.)  
 Whittlesey, Faith Ryan (Hon.) A  
 Widder, Robert (Mr.)  
 Williams, Earle C. (Mr.) A  
 Williams, L. Stanton (Mr.)  
 Williams, William J. (Mr.) A  
 Wilson, Thornton A. (Mr.) A  
 Wood, Quentin E. (Mr.) A  
 Woolsey, James (Hon.) A  
 Wyatt, Oscar S. Jr. (Mr.) (CALL BAKER A  
 Zwaik, Stanley (Mr.)

so0516a1

REPORT DATE: 16 MAY 1983

GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

ACCEPT AND NO RESPONSE

NAME

NAME

---

Total Accepts/ No Response    221

## GATE LIST

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FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

## REGRETS AND SUBSTITUTES

NAME

NAME

BRIEFING ON MODERNIZATION OF  
AMERICA'S STRATEGIC FORCES -  
Monday, May 16, 1983/4:00 p.m.  
SW Gate/Telegrams  
Contact: Social Office x7787  
THE PRESIDENT

De Lancey, William J. (Mr.)	S
Dee, Robert F. (Mr.)	R
Delano, Robert (Mr.)	S
Dempsey, Raymond (Mr.)	R
Deutch, John (Dr.)	R
Dibner, David (Mr.)	R
Dicker, Richard (Mr.)	R
Dickey, C. D. Jr (Mr.)	R
Dingman, Michael D. (Mr.)	R
Dugan, Robert Jr (Mr.)	R
Duval, Albert F. (Mr.)	R
Ekstrom, Norris K. (Mr.)	R
Evans, Thomas M. (Mr.)	R
Fallon, Walter A. (Mr.)	R
Ferguson, James L. (Mr.)	R
Feulner, Edwin Jr. (Mr.)	R
Fickling, William Jr. (Mr.)	R
Fitzgerald, William (Mr.)	R
Flavin, Joseph B. (Mr.)	R
Flowerree, Robert E. (Mr.)	R
Furland, Richard M. (Mr.)	R
Garvin, C. C. Jr (Mr.)	R
Gary, James F. (Mr.)	R
Gates, Charles C. (Mr.)	R
Gee, Edwin A. (Mr.)	R
Gelb, Richard L. (Mr.)	R
Gill, Daniel E. (Mr.)	R
Glasser, James J. (Mr.)	S
Gousseland, Pierre (Mr.)	R
Grace, J. Peter (Mr.)	R
Gray, Harry J. (Mr.)	R
Gregory, Vincent L. Jr (Mr.)	R
Hahn, P. Marshall Jr (Mr.)	R
Haig, Alexander M. Jr (Hon.)	R
Hanley, John W. (Mr.)	R
Hannan, Most Rev. Philip M.	R
Hartley, Fred L. (Mr.)	R
Haselton, William R. (Mr.)	R
Heineman, Ben W. (Mr.)	R
Heinz, Henry J. II (Mr.)	R
Henneback, Ralph L. (Mr.)	R
Hennessy, Edward L. Jr (Mr.)	R
Hobbe, Lottie Beth (Mrs.)	R

Affleck, James G. (Mr.)	R
Allen, Fred T. (Mr.)	R
Anderson, Robert O. (Mr.)	R
Araskog, Rand V. (Mr.)	R
Atkins, Marvin (Dr.)	R
Atwater, H. Brewster Jr (Mr.)	R
Auerbach, Herschel (Mr.)	R
Aweida, Jesse I. (Mr.)	R
Barber, Charles F. (Mr.)	S
Bialkin, Kenneth J. (Mr.)	S
Bierwirth, John C. (Mr.)	R
Billings, William (Mr.)	R
Binns, James H. (Mr.)	R
Blumenthal, W. Michael (Hon.)	R
Boeschenstein, William W. (Mr.)	R
Boyd, Joseph A. (Mr.)	R
Bradshaw, Thornton F. (Mr.)	S
Bright, Bill (Dr.)	R
Buckley, Robert J. (Mr.)	R
Burke, James E. (Mr.)	R
Burtis, Theodore A. (Mr.)	R
Byrom, Fletcher L. (Mr.)	R
Calder, Alexander Jr (Mr.)	R
Caldwell, Philip (Mr.)	R
Campbell, Robert (Mr.)	R
Carney, Dennis J. (Mr.)	R
Carter, Harlon (Mr.)	R
Carter, William (Mr.)	S
Cary, Frank T. (Mr.)	R
Cathcart, Silas S. (Mr.)	R
Clements, William (Hon.)	R
Coker, C.W. Jr (Mr.)	R
Cole, Elliott H. (Mr.)	R
Coors, William K. (Mr.)	R
Cunningham, James E. (Mr.)	R
Davidson, Ralph P. (Mr.)	R
Davis, Robert (Mr.)	S

sb051.6a1

## GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

## REGRETS AND SUBSTITUTES

NAME

NAME

NAME		NAME	
Houghton, Ambory Jr (Mr.)	R	Neuharth, Allen H. (Mr.)	R
Iacocca, Lee A. (Mr.)	R	Nevin, John J. (Mr.)	R
Jaicks, Frederick G. (Mr.)	R	O'Keefe, Bernard J. (Mr.)	R
James, John V. (Mr.)	R	O'Neil, M. G. (Mr.)	R
Jensen, Harry A. (Mr.)	R	Ong, John D. (Mr.)	R
Keller, G. M. (Mr.)	R	Owen, Nathan R. (Mr.)	R
Kerr, William A. (Mr.)	R	Packard, David (Mr.)	R
Ketelsen, James L. (Mr.)	R	Patt, Raymond M. (Mr.)	R
Kilkenny, W. H. (Mr.)	R	Pearson, John E. (Mr.)	R
Kirby, Robert E. (Mr.)	R	Perot, H. Ross (Mr.)	R
Knight, Charles F. (Mr.)	R	Petersen, Sidney R. (Mr.)	R
Koske, Otis F. (Mrs.)	R	Phillips, Thomas L. (Mr.)	R
Kraja, Mylio (Mr.)	R	Platts, John H. (Mr.)	R
Krikorian, Robert V. (Mr.)	R	Porter, Milton (Mr.)	R
Larson, Reed (Mr.)	S	Procknow, Donald E. (Mr.)	R
Lefkowitz, Rabbi Shmuel	R	Ray, Oakley (Mr.)	R
Lehr, Lewis W. (Mr.)	R	Richman, John M. (Mr.)	R
Leisenring, E. B. Jr (Mr.)	R	Robertson, Pat (Dr.)	R
Loucks, Vernon R. Jr (Mr.)	R	Roderick, David M. (Mr.)	R
Love, H. M. (Mr.)	S	Ross, Steven J. (Mr.)	R
Lyet, J. P. (Mr.)	R	Sammet, R. (Mr.)	R
Madden, Richard B. (Mr.)	R	Santry, Arthur J. Jr (Mr.)	R
Magowan, Peter (Mr.)	R	Schaeberle, Robert M. (Mr.)	R
Maier, Cornell C. (Mr.)	R	Schlafly, Phyllis (Mrs.)	R
Marshner, Connie (Mrs.)	R	Scifres, Robert E. (Mr.)	R
Martin, W. F. (Mr.)	R	Scott, Isadore M. (Mr.)	R
McColough, C. Peter (Mr.)	R	Scowcroft, Brent (Hon.)	R
McDonnell, Sanford N. (Mr.)	R	Sellers, Rick (Mr.)	S
McGee, Dean A. (Mr.)	R	Shepherd, Mark Jr (Mr.)	R
McGowan, William (Mr.)	R	Shumway, Forrest N. (Mr.)	R
McKee, J. W. Jr (Mr.)	R	Singleton, Henry E. (Mr.)	R
McKinley, John K. (Mr.)	R	Smith, Barbara (Mrs.)	R
McKone, Don T. (Mr.)	S	Smith, Darwin E. (Mr.)	R
McManus, James R. (Mr.)	R	Smith, Leslie E. (Sir)	R
Mettler, Ruben F. (Mr.)	R	Smith, Roger B. (Mr.)	R
Meyer, Russell W. Jr (Mr.)	R	Sparks, Capt. Bennett S.	R
Mitchell, David W. (Mr.)	R	Spencer, Edson W. (Mr.)	R
Moore, Gordon E. (Mr.)	R	Spratling, B. B. Jr (Mr.)	R
Morgan, Chuck (Mr.)	R	Sticht, J. Paul (Mr.)	R
Morgan, Graham J. (Mr.)	R	Straetz, Robert P. (Mr.)	S
Morley, H. Barclay (Mr.)	R	Strichman, George A. (Mr.)	R
Munroe, George B. (Mr.)	R	Stuart, Robert (Mr.)	R

## GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

## REGRETS AND SUBSTITUTES

NAME

NAME

NAME	
Sutker, Phyllis (Ms.)	R
Teets, John W. (Mr.)	R
Thomas, Robert E. (Mr.)	R
Tippett, W. Paul (Mr.)	R
Trautlein, Donald H. (Mr.)	R
Tuttle, Edwin E. (Mr.)	R
Verity, William (Mr.)	R
Waidelich, Charles J. (Mr.)	R
Waldrip, William J. (Mr.)	R
Wang, An (Mr.)	R
Warner, Rawleigh Jr (Mr.)	R
Welch, John F. Jr (Mr.)	R
Weyerhaeuser, George H. (Mr.)	R
Weyrich, Paul (Mr.)	R
Whitehouse, Alton T. Jr (Mr.)	R
Willis, Shelby K. (Mr.)	R
Wilson, Bill (Mr.)	R
Wright, Paul (Mr.)	R

Total Regrets/ Substitutes 182

GATE LIST

FOR EVENT: BRIEFING - 5/16/83

NAME

NAME

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	TOTAL	=	ACCEPTS	NORSVP	REGRETS	SUBS
INVITEES:	395	=	110	91	182	12
GUESTS:	8	=	8	0	0	0
TOTALS:	403	=	118	91	182	12

Possible Attendance as of 16 MAY is 221

May 19th, 1983

Faith Ryan Whittlesey  
Assistant to the President for  
Public Liaison  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mrs. Whittlesey:

It was my pleasure to be included in the briefing on Modernization of America's Strategic Forces which was held at The White House on Monday, May 16th, 1983.

As would be any American, I was delighted to see both the President and the Vice President of the United States and want to compliment you on the very effective program that was presented. My favorable impressions of this meeting have been conveyed to Dirk Van Dongen, President of our association, and he has assured me that we are totally in support of the President's position in this matter.

Hopefully, we will have an opportunity to meet in the near future and would appreciate your using the lofty influence of The White House to see that it doesn't rain the entire day again.

Again, my compliments on a fine presentation.

Sincerely yours,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WHOLESALER-DISTRIBUTORS

Kenneth Adler  
Chairman of the Board

KA/jh



**WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

DATE: May 21, 1983

10:00 A.M. MONDAY

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: May 23, 1983

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS RE MX FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL DINNER

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	GERGEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HARPER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY →	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VON DAMM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	BRADY/SPEAKES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>Bakshian</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
			<u>Fischer</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Remarks:

These draft remarks have gone forward to the President. Please provide minor edits directly to Aram Bakshian, with a copy to my office, by 10:00 a.m. Monday, May 23.

Thank you.

Richard G. Darman  
Assistant to the President  
(x2702)

*No comments.*  
*MJJ*  
*5/23*  
*9:15*

Response:

(Bakshian)  
May 21, 1983  
Noon

PRESIDENTIAL MX REMARKS: CONGRESSIONAL DINNER  
MONDAY, MAY 23, 1983

Thank you all for being here. I know the heavy legislative workload each of you has to deal with and the many other demands on your time. I wouldn't have asked you here tonight if I weren't convinced that the subject of this gathering is one of overriding importance.

Now I know that the debate on the MX Peacekeeper missile, and the whole issue of strategic modernization, has been going on for a long, long time. And when a debate runs on and on as this one has, the tendency is to think that we've already heard everything on the subject that's worth hearing. Certainly, we've all been subjected to the paper equivalent of saturation bombing on this issue. The long-winded arguments have been thrown at us from every side. But I can't help wondering if the very intensity and length of the debate may have made it harder to see the forest for the trees.

Here we are tonight, just hours away from the House and Senate votes -- votes which I deeply believe may be among the most important that the Members of both chambers will be called upon to make in their entire careers. So, in these final hours before the decision is made, I very much wanted a chance to meet with those of you, of both parties, who still have an open mind on the question -- who are still struggling to reach the right decision, the decision that will be best for the people you represent, and for our country, now and tomorrow.

We all know what the vote will be about. The specific legislative proposal is to approve flight testing of the MX Peacekeeper missile and the work necessary for basing it in existing Minuteman silos. Implicit in this vote is approval of the production of the missiles. And this is the first essential step toward deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles beginning in 1986, and for the development of a new, small, single-warhead ICBM which would be mobile.

The terms of the question are clear enough. What is perhaps less understood is why it is such an important question. My answer to that is two, simple words: arms reductions -- balanced, verifiable arms reductions that can make the world of tomorrow a safer place for all the Earth's people. And that, I am convinced, is a goal we all share -- an issue that cuts across liberal-conservative and Democratic-Republican lines and should unite us as Americans and as members of the human family.

When I endorsed the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, I did so because I felt they balanced three elements indispensable to our country's present and future well-being: modernization, deterrence, and arms control. All are important, but the key is that they are also interdependent. Modernization programs -- like the MX Peacekeeper -- go hand-in-hand with deterring nuclear war and achieving arms control.

Make no mistake. The MX and other modernization measures will be invaluable in helping us to strengthen the peace by seeking arms reduction agreements -- agreements that make for more security and stability by reducing overall force levels

while permitting the modernization of our forces needed to maintain a credible deterrent.

The Scowcroft Commission proved that this is not a partisan issue. Its members, drawn from both parties, several previous administrations, and a wide range of technical experts, showed that it's possible to grasp a complex, emotional issue of immense importance, to rise above politics, and to achieve a bipartisan consensus.

The members of the Commission agreed on the need to build and deploy the MX, and to build the smaller, single-warhead missile, not so we can fight a war or add more useless tonnage to the nuclear arsenal. They agreed because they are convinced, as I am, that their recommendations, if followed, will persuade the Soviets that it is in their interests, too, to agree to deep arms reductions. And that's something we all want.

The question now before us is whether the Congress can also reach a consensus, a consensus that will unite us in our common search for ways to strengthen our national security, reduce the risk of war and, ultimately, reduce the level of nuclear weapons. Such a consensus is not just desirable. It is crucial to America's future -- indeed, to the future of all the civilized values we hold dear and seek to protect from mass destruction.

If we can build that legislative consensus now, it can be sustained from one administration to the next, from one party to another, and lay the groundwork for steady progress toward arms reduction and a more peaceful and secure world.

When I say this is a bipartisan issue, I mean it. In fact, I want to close by quoting a liberal Democratic Member of the

House, Dan Glickman of Kansas, who explained why he had changed his mind and decided to back the MX a few days ago in the pages of the Washington Post. Here is what he said:

"To kill the MX now, I have come to believe, may indeed reduce the Soviets' inclination to 'give' on their giant land-based missiles, which is the heart of what we want in an arms control agreement. I have come to the conclusion that the basic question is this: Will the funding for MX help or hurt our ability to reach an ultimate reduction in nuclear weapons arsenals? It is a very close question but, on balance, I believe that we are closer to an agreement and to a reduction . . . if we proceed -- at least initially -- on funding for the missile."

Thank you, Dan Glickman.

I was not being over-dramatic when I said that this may be one of the most important votes any of you will ever be called on to cast. For that very reason, I respect you for taking a long, hard look at the issue before making up your minds. But I'm convinced that, as we reach the eleventh hour, the choice is clear: A vote for the MX is a vote for what all of us want for our country and for posterity -- a better chance for peace, for security, and for a real beginning toward arms reductions.

I can't think of any higher goal for us to work for together and I urge you think hard on this one from the perspective of our Nation's future and the kind of world our children will inherit.

Thank you all for coming this evening, and God bless you.

POINT PAPER  
MX PEACEKEEPER

The President's bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces recommended a package of actions, including deploying 100 MX missiles in existing silos and commencing work on a small missile. The President has endorsed the Commission's recommended package.

Background

Specific recommendations of the President's program follow:

- Proceed with immediate production of the PEACEKEEPER missile, and deployment of 100 such missiles in existing Minuteman silos.
- Start work on a small, single-warhead ICBM -- full scale development in 1987 and deployment in the early 1990's are contemplated.
- Continue to pursue ambitious and objective arms reduction negotiations with a goal of agreements that are balanced, promote stability, constitute significant force reductions, and are verifiable.
- Improve strategic command, control, and communications; continue with the Trident submarine, D-5 missile, the bomber and air-launched cruise missile efforts as planned.
- Expand research into, and undertake the most vigorous examination of, all forms of defense against ballistic missiles.
- Undertake a specific program on hardness, and a study of fratricide and research on different types of land-based vehicles and launchers.

Additional Background:

Need MX deployment to resolve four major issues:

- Aging Force (Titan 1962, MM II 1965, MM III 1970)
- Ineffective prompt capability against targets most important to Soviets (Military and leadership installations - many of which are hardened and time-urgent)
  - Influences Soviet perceptions
- Arms control leverage
- NATO theater nuclear modernization

Cost for President's program less than previous ICBM programs.

- \$10B less than Closely Spaced Basing (CSB) and \$30B less than Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS)
- Saves \$1.4B in FY 84, more in later years.

Arms reductions supported by President's program:

- MX gives near-term arms reduction leverage
  - Encourage Soviet participation in reduction talks (historical evidence: successful negotiations of 1972 ABM Treaty)
- Small missile development gives opportunity for US/Soviet agreement to deploy more stable, low value systems.

MX, then, is required now to bolster deterrence and support near term arms reduction endeavors, while small missile supports longer term prospects for mutually stabilizing force structure.

**The PEACEKEEPER:  
Some Questions and Answers**

**May 1983**



## President's Commission

**Q. What was the purpose of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces?**

**A.** The Commission was established to review the modernization program for United States strategic forces, with particular emphasis on the intercontinental ballistic missile force and basing alternatives for that force and provide appropriate advice to the President, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense.

**Q. Who were the members of the Commission?**

**A.** The Commission was composed of the following eleven members who were selected because of their particular knowledge and expertise concerning national security, strategic forces or foreign relations of the United States. In addition, seven senior counselors provided advice to the Commission.

### THE COMMISSION

**Brent Scowcroft**, Chairman, Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**Nicholas F. Brady**, Former Senator from New Jersey

**William Clements**, Former Governor of Texas and Deputy Secretary of Defense

**John M. Deutch**, Dean of Science at MIT and former Director of Research at the Department of Energy

**Alexander Haig, Jr.**, Former Secretary of State and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

**Richard Helms**, Former Director of Central Intelligence Agency

**John H. Lyons**, Vice President of the AFL-CIO and Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of its Executive Council

**William J. Perry**, Former Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering

**Thomas C. Reed**, Special Assistant to the President and former Secretary of the Air Force

**Levering Smith**, Former Director of Special Projects for the Navy

**James Woolsey**, Former Under Secretary of the Navy

### SENIOR COUNSELORS TO THE COMMISSION

**Harold Brown**, Former Secretary of Defense

**Lloyd Cutler**, Former Presidential Counselor

**Henry A. Kissinger**, Former Secretary of State

**Melvin R. Laird**, Former Secretary of Defense

**John McCone**, Former Director of Central Intelligence Agency

**Donald H. Rumsfeld**, Former Secretary of Defense

**James R. Schlesinger**, Former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy

**Q. What was the scope of activities by the President's Commission?**

**A.** The Commission was established on January 3, 1983. During the ensuing months they held 28 full meetings and numerous smaller conferences. They talked to over 200 technical experts from Government and Industry and they also consulted closely with members of Congress. They presented their report to the President on April 11, 1983.

**Q. What did the President's Commission recommend?**

**A.** The Commission made the following modernization recommendations:

- As first priority, vigorous programs should continue to improve the ability of the President to command, control and communicate with strategic forces under conditions of severe stress or actual attack.
- The Trident submarine construction program and the Trident II (D-5) ballistic

missile development program should continue.

- No changes are recommended in the bomber and air launched cruise missile programs.
- Initiate engineering design of a single warhead, small ICBM.
- Deploy 100 Peacekeeper missiles in existing Minutemen silos.
- Undertake a specific program to resolve uncertainties regarding silo or shelter hardness. Proceed with vigorous investigation on different types of land based vehicles and launchers, including hardened vehicles.
- Continue vigorous pursuits of arms control.

**Q. What support has the Commission's Report received?**

**A.** The Commission's report, which was unanimously supported by all of the Commission members, has received full endorsement from the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. The President accepted the Commission's recommendation and conveyed his approval to Congress on April 19.

**Q. On previous occasions, the Congress has voted down placing Peacekeeper missiles into Minuteman silos. Why should the Congress be expected to vote for such a basing mode now, as has been recommended by the Commission?**

**A.** The Congress should be expected to support the recommendations of the President's commission for four specific reasons. First, the immediate actions recommended by the commission redress the growing imbalance between US and USSR strategic forces and the unstable situation which results from this imbalance. The immediate revitalization of our ability to deter Soviet aggression, to include the possibility of nuclear war, is of paramount importance. Second, deploy-

ment of Peacekeeper will upgrade an aging force of Minuteman missiles and alleviate concerns about the long term reliability of our ICBM force. Third, initiation of the Peacekeeper production line will provide powerful arms reduction negotiating leverage for the United States by demonstrating to the Soviets that we are intent on maintaining a balance, and the best means of achieving that balance is through a mutual reduction of forces. Fourth, continuation of Peacekeeper will show our allies that the United States has the national will to retain a credible strategic deterrent and will encourage them to continue with their own deterrent policy.

## Deterrence

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**Q. Why do we need a Triad of strategic forces?**

**A.** Throughout the nuclear age, the United States has depended upon a Triad of strategic forces to maintain peace by deterring aggression and the possibility of nuclear attack. Each element of the Triad in its own way contributes to the overall survivability and capability of the Triad itself. Taken together, the strengths of each are enhanced while any vulnerabilities or weaknesses of an individual component are compensated for. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are the most survivable; manned bombers are most flexible in terms of recall capability and utility; and land based missiles possess the capability for prompt response to an attack, a very high alert rate, excellent command and control, and high reliability. The three elements of the Triad are complementary; one element cannot be attacked without giving warning to others. Because of this, the Triad provides maximum deterrence, and the security of the United States is guaranteed.

**Q. Why do we need the Peacekeeper missile?**

**A.** We need the Peacekeeper missile, now, for two specific reasons:

- a. We must address the unstable imbalance of strategic forces which the Soviets have created with their continued deployment of new missile systems. The Soviets have thousands of high quality weapons capable of attacking the hardest of U.S. targets; we have modest deployments of weapons with significantly less capability. The Soviets have devoted substantial resources to protecting their strategic assets, and our current ICBM force cannot adequately counter the growing number of Soviet hardened installations. Consequently, our missiles are vulnerable to a potential first strike attack and cannot threaten Soviet high value assets. This situation erodes the prospects for deterrence and for stability.
- b. We must modernize our aging ICBM forces, now comprised of the Minuteman and Titan missiles. These weapon systems represented the state of the art when they were deployed, but as with any weapon system, cannot be expected to last forever. The Peacekeeper missile incorporates the latest advances in technology, and thus has more range, payload, accuracy and flexibility than do the older missiles.

Immediate deployment of the Peacekeeper as recommended by the President's commission addresses both of these problems.

**Q.** Isn't Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos just as vulnerable as the Minuteman?

- A. Yes, it is true that the individual Peacekeeper missile will be just about as vulnerable as is the Minuteman, although in some technical aspects the Peacekeeper missile itself is more survivable than the Minuteman. But the Peacekeeper does address the immediate need to overcome the existing destabilizing imbalance of strategic forces, and it does modernize our aging ICBM force. While this near-term deployment does not significantly improve the survivability of the individual missile, the longer term recommendations of the President's commission do address what must be done about survivability should we not be

successful at strategic arms reductions. Further, one should not view this deployment as if it had to face the threat of all Soviet strategic forces independently. Our bombers, submarines and ICBM's, when deployed as a Triad, each contribute to the survivability of the entire force, and thus ensure that we have deterrence adequate to prevent nuclear war.

**Q.** Don't we have enough land based ICBM's now?

- A. "Enough" can only be measured on a relative basis. To be certain that we will deter a possible nuclear attack on the United States we must ensure that we have "enough" ICBMs to survive a Soviet first strike with the ability to retaliate effectively so that no Soviet advantage can be gained from attack. Our requirement for additional ICBMs is driven by the Soviets as they deploy more and better attacking weapons which are survivable to U.S. response. We need immediately the improved capabilities which result from the initial deployment of the Peacekeeper, and unless we are successful in negotiating significant strategic arms reductions with the Soviets, we may need the survivability enhancements called for in the report by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

## Arms Control

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**Q.** What are the arms control implications of the strategic forces modernization program recommended by the President's Commission?

- A. The implications are profound for the near and short term outlook for progress in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. As the Commission stated, Soviet willingness to enter into arms control agreements that will enhance strategic stability is heavily influenced by ongoing programs. This reality of arms control negotiations makes the recommendation to deploy 100 Peacekeeper missiles in existing silos especially important. The deployment

would provide a strong incentive to the Soviets to negotiate reductions in their ICBMs that currently provide the most destabilizing aspect of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms imbalance. The Commission's recommendation to pursue development of a small, single-warhead missile marks a turning point in U.S. arms control initiatives by encouraging the Soviets to follow us in land-based missile deployment that further enhances stability.

**Q. What role does the President's decision on the Peacekeeper missile play in arms control goals?**

**A.** The President's decision on the Peacekeeper missile will have an immediate role in the current START negotiations by providing a strong incentive for the Soviets to negotiate reductions in land-based missiles. Because of the unprecedented Soviet build up in heavy, MIRVed ICBMs, the resulting imbalance of U.S.-Soviet missiles with the capacity to destroy hardened targets is a major threat to strategic stability. The U.S. must redress this imbalance to maintain deterrence against a Soviet attack on our nation or our allies. Failure to deploy the Peacekeeper would tell the Soviets that we are unable to neutralize this advantage in multiple-warhead ICBMs. The Peacekeeper has been supported by the last four administrations; over \$5 billion has been invested on its research and development; and the missile is ready for flight testing. We have learned in the long history of arms control negotiations that the Soviets negotiate most seriously when the U.S. is firmly committed to arms modernization. Abandoning the Peacekeeper, the only new U.S. ICBM that can be deployed in this decade, would greatly reduce the chances of an arms control agreement with the Soviets that would enhance stability.

**Q. How does a small missile fit into our arms control goals?**

**A.** Plans to pursue development of a small missile is a key element in the effort to

achieve stability in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. Our time-tested policy of deterrence is based on our adversary's assurance that an attack on the U.S. or our allies would be unsuccessful. In the effort to maintain that deterrence, we also seek to raise the nuclear threshold by increasing arms stability on both sides, thus reducing the chance that the Soviet Union would attack either in times of world crisis or because of miscalculation. A small, single-warhead ICBM would greatly contribute to this goal of increased stability. It would provide a less tempting target than the large, multiple-warhead ICBMs developed by both sides over the last decade. It also would provide a variety of basing options, including mobility, that would increase survivability. Developing a small missile marks the future of arms control aimed at greater stability.

**Q. Why not freeze now at existing levels of nuclear weapons?**

**A.** Advocates and opponents of a nuclear freeze agree that our goal is prevention of nuclear war. They disagree sharply, however, on the best means to achieve this goal. Clearly a freeze would increase rather than reduce the chances of nuclear conflict. Such a move would freeze the dangerously large and unstable levels of nuclear forces, particularly the imbalance in large, multiple-warhead ICBMs that now favors the Soviet Union. It would eliminate the chances for arms control negotiations to achieve large-scale reductions in nuclear forces proposed by the Reagan Administration. It would prevent U.S. modernization of aging strategic forces needed to enhance stability. And in all likelihood it would not be verifiable. The prevention of nuclear war depends on strategic force stability and a reduction of forces on both sides, not a confirmation of the status quo.

**Q. Is the Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos a first strike weapon?**

**A.** No. The United States bases its policy of deterrence on defense. This policy, which

has helped to maintain world peace for a generation, assures our chief adversary, the Soviet Union, that any conventional or nuclear attack on our nation or our allies would fail. U.S. strategic force modernization is designed to safeguard this deterrent. The Peacekeeper missile would contribute an essential element to this policy by redressing the current imbalance in U.S.-Soviet ICBMs capable of placing valuable assets at risk. The current imbalance, which has resulted because of a Soviet build up in large, multi-warhead ICBMs, has created a severe instability in U.S.-Soviet forces, thus increasing the chances of conflict in times of crisis. Deployment of the Peacekeeper is the only way to reduce this instability in the next decade and maintain the deterrence that protects the U.S. and our allies.

**Q.** How will Congressional action on the Peacekeeper affect our START negotiations?

**A.** Congressional action on the Peacekeeper is a key to success in the START negotiations. Support for Peacekeeper funding will show U.S. resolve to maintain its policy of deterrence over the next decade by redressing the imbalance in U.S.-Soviet ICBMs. What is more, it will provide a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate deep reductions in nuclear forces. We know from experience in arms control negotiations that the Soviets negotiate seriously when they know the U.S. is committed to a course of action. This commitment is shown best by Congressional funding of special weapon systems. A case in point was the U.S. commitment to proceed with the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, a commitment that led to the ABM treaty. Similarly, U.S. commitment to the Peacekeeper will encourage the Soviets to seriously negotiate arms reductions proposed by the Reagan Administration in the START negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

**Q.** Isn't the Peacekeeper just a bargaining chip for START negotiating purposes?

**A.** Modernization of U.S. strategic forces shows a firm resolve to maintain our policy of deterrence as well as a strong incentive to negotiate arms reductions. Our arms control effort aimed at reducing the levels of nuclear arms, an effort designed to provide stability that reduces the chance of nuclear conflict, does not require that we abandon unilaterally specific weapon systems such as the Peacekeeper. On the contrary, the objective is to provide modern systems within reduced levels. The Peacekeeper will serve a crucial function in our effort to enhance U.S.-Soviet stability by redressing the present imbalance in large, multi-warhead ICBMs that favors the Soviet Union. The Peacekeeper is the only U.S. ICBM program that can redress this imbalance in the next decade. At the same time, the Peacekeeper will encourage the Soviets to negotiate reductions, knowing full well that we intend to neutralize their advantage in ICBM capability. Thus, we will not build the Peacekeeper as a bargaining chip but as an integral part of our strategic force modernization program.

**Q.** How does the President's recently announced position to switch from an offensive retaliation to a defensive strategy affect the Peacekeeper decision? Do we still need the Peacekeeper now that this change is being made?

**A.** The President's initiative is a dramatic proposal that would encourage a mutual U.S.-Soviet policy of defense. It will take many years to refine and develop this policy, perhaps as long as 20 to 30 years given the technological requirements and foreign policy implications. In the meantime, the U.S. must adhere to its proven policy of deterrence. This policy is based on the premise that U.S. strategic forces are defensive. They exist solely to deter attack on the U.S. and our allies. The Peacekeeper, the cornerstone of ICBM modernization over the next decade, will greatly enhance our deterrent by redressing the present imbalance in U.S.-Soviet ICBMs that now favors the Soviet Union. We need the Peacekeeper to maintain U.S. deterrence.

Abandoning the Peacekeeper now would only increase nuclear force instability and would undermine the nation's deterrent capability that has helped to keep the peace for more than a generation.

**Q. What are the views of our NATO allies who are considering Pershing II and GLCM, concerning the Peacekeeper?**

**A.** Throughout the nuclear age, the U.S. policy of deterrence has been designed to prevent an attack by the Soviet Union on our allies as well as the United States. With particular regard to the NATO alliance, this policy has been the centerpiece of our success in keeping the peace in Europe for a generation. Our NATO allies are particularly sensitive to the depth of our commitment to maintain our deterrent capability; this makes deployment of the Peacekeeper missile particularly important. Our willingness to modernize our land-based ICBM force sends a strong signal to the NATO alliance, especially because of the planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. We cannot expect our allies to deploy modern land-based missiles on their soil if we refuse to do the same. The credibility of our time-proven deterrent requires such mutual effort.

**Q. Does Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos violate existing arms control agreements?**

**A.** Deployment of Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos is compatible with existing agreements. Both SALT I and SALT II allow modification and modernization of existing fixed silo launchers. SALT II also allows for deployment of one new ICBM. Both the modifications required to the existing silos and the size of Peacekeeper are well within the limits imposed by these agreements.

### **ICBM Modernization Program**

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**Q. What specifically did the President's Commission recommend about land based ICBMs?**

**A.** The Commission recommended:

**a.** For the near term, prompt deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos in order to remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability, to help deter the threat of Soviet attack, and to encourage the Soviets to move toward a more stable regime of deployments and arms control.

**b.** For the longer term, initiation of engineering design of a small, single warhead ICBM leading to possible full scale engineering development in 1987, and deployment with an initial operating capability in the early 1990's and investigation of hardened silos or shelters and mobile launchers for these missiles; and a specific test and evaluation program to resolve the uncertainties regarding silo or shelter hardness leading to later decisions on hardening Peacekeeper missiles in silos and/or deploying small ICBMs in hardened silos or shelters. It suggested vigorous investigation to resolve these uncertainties.

**Q. What will basing 100 Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos cost, and how does that compare to the cost of CSB?**

**A.** The Air Force estimates that it will cost about \$16.6B to deploy 100 Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos. That compares with the previous CSB cost estimate (in FY 82 dollars) of \$26.4B.

**Q. How much has been spent on the Peacekeeper program to date, and how much will be required in the FY 84 budget?**

**A.** About \$5B has been spent on the Peacekeeper program from its inception to the present time. The revised modernization program has resulted in a reduction of the FY 84 budget by some \$1.4 billion. The new requirement includes \$4.7 billion for Peacekeeper in existing silos and another \$600 million for technology development programs.

- Q. What is the schedule for basing Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos?**
- A.** The Air Force is proposing start of full scale engineering development of the Peacekeeper silo basing mode upon Congressional approval of the plan. Initial operational capability for the first missiles so deployed is scheduled for late CY 86 with full operational capability by late CY 89.
- Q. Where will the Peacekeeper be deployed?**
- A.** The Peacekeeper will be deployed in the 400th and 319th Strategic Missile Squadrons located near Francis E. Warren AFB, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
- Q. What will be the environmental impact of this deployment?**
- A.** Environmental impact of this deployment will be minimal since Peacekeeper missiles will be placed in Minuteman silos which already exist. Only minor modification to the silos will be required, and the Air Force estimates that 1500 to 2000 people will be needed (during the peak year) to accomplish construction and deployment activities. A work force of this size can easily be assimilated into the local social and economic environment. Upon completion of deployment about 350 personnel will be added to the work force at Warren AFB to operate and maintain the missiles.
- Q. Will an environmental impact statement be required for this recommendation?**
- A.** No. The Jackson Amendment to the FY 83 Appropriations Act. P.L. 93-377, exempted the report and recommendations from the National Environmental Policy Act. However, the Air Force intends to complete an environmental impact statement on Peacekeeper deployment so that the interests of the states and local communities impacted will be protected to the maximum degree.
- Q. Is any land other than that presently utilized by the Minuteman sites required for the Peacekeeper?**
- A.** No. However, temporary easements of some additional land may be needed during deployment to accomplish required road and bridge upgrades and for minor silo modifications during the deployment activities.
- Q. What is really involved in replacing a Minuteman missile with a Peacekeeper in a Minuteman silo?**
- A.** The interior of the silo must be expanded in size to allow the larger ICBM in its canister to be inserted. This involves removing the existing liners, shock isolation system and some equipment, then replacing it with new, like items. These modifications are deemed minimal to allow the silo to accommodate Peacekeeper and retain present hardness levels.
- Q. Wouldn't it be more cost effective to simply upgrade the Minuteman missiles than to replace them with the Peacekeeper?**
- A.** The Commission assessed this possibility and felt that it would not. It would take two to three years longer than deployment of the Peacekeeper and would not redress the perceived imbalance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities. They also felt that the wisdom of placing new guidance systems on the front ends of aging 1960's-era missiles is highly questionable. In addition, the Minuteman would not provide the increased throw-weight needed to hedge either against Soviet ABM improvements or against the need to launch satellites in an emergency. Most importantly, a Minuteman modification program would not provide the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate which would be provided by production and deployment of the M-X.
- Q. Years ago the Air Force recommended basing the Peacekeeper in widely spaced**

shelters, and more recently recommended basing it in closely spaced silos. Now it is recommending that we put it in Minuteman silos. How can we be sure that this is now the correct solution?

- A. In the opinion of administrations at the times those other basing methods were proposed, they were considered to be the best solutions. Each of them had significant advantages and disadvantages. The President's commission has recommended a strategic forces modernization package which takes advantage of many of the attributes of previously proposed deployment modes while eliminating some of the significant disadvantages, such as excessive requirements for land. After consideration of all previously proposed basing modes, the commission considered Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos as the most feasible method when considering political, environmental, costs and all other factors.

Q. What will the research and development programs recommended by the President's Commission involve?

- A. The programs will involve:
- a. Engineering design and research and development of a small ICBM which could be used to either supplement or replace further Peacekeeper deployment after the initial 100 Peacekeeper have been deployed in Minuteman silos.
  - b. Accelerated tests and evaluations to see if significantly higher levels of hardness can be achieved to make missile silos and shelters more survivable against the effects of possible nuclear attack.
  - c. Vigorous investigation and research and development on different types of land based vehicles and launchers, including hardened vehicles, for possible future deployment of small ICBM's on mobile launchers.

Q. What would a small missile be like and when would it be available?

- A. The small missile is a lightweight two or three stage solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile. It will probably be about 35-40 feet long, about 4 feet in diameter, and weigh about 30,000 pounds.

Major emphasis will be required on development of guidance techniques and command, control and communications to ensure the same highly reliable, time sensitive effectiveness and communications capability as we will have with our Peacekeeper force.

The small ICBM may be based in fixed or mobile launchers, or both, and initial operating capability could be achieved by the early 1990's.

Q. What will these research and development programs cost?

- A. Current Air Force estimates of the costs of these R&D programs in FY 82 dollars are:
- a. Superhard silo validation — \$450M
  - b. Small missile engineering design — \$600M
  - c. Hard mobile transporter development — \$150M
  - d. Deep basing definition — \$100M

Q. When will these research and development programs be completed?

- A. Superhard silo validation and the hard mobile transporter development program are scheduled for completion by the middle of 1986. The small missile engineering design should be completed in early fall 1986, and the deep basing concept definition should be complete by early 1985.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mary Jo -

Could you prepare letters?

Thanks -

Breihan

6/2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN VIPOND

FROM:

LYNN SKOLNICK *L. Skolnick*

SUBJECT:

Thank You Letters/Calls on the MX

Attached please find a letter addressed to Bud Poe, currently detailed to Legislative Affairs to assist us on MX coordination. The letter suggests that Presidential letters or letters from Judge Clark be sent to the Chamber of Commerce to thank them for their hard work. The Chamber has been very helpful and we would fully endorse any recommendations that you may make for Presidential letters or calls to both Ed Dodd and Dick Breault.

Thanks.

*May go - your thoughts?*

*DO THIS*

*JV - I think this is a great idea. I also think some of our helpers would appreciate thank-you's from the President.*

*lyj*

# Smith & Harroff, Inc.

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(202) 546-1150

May 20, 1983

Brig. Gen. Eugene Poe  
National Security Council  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

As you know, the Chamber's "endorsement" of the Commission's recommendations represents a major departure from its policy of not endorsing specific weapons systems. Only through the support of its new Chairman, Ed Dodd, and the legwork of Dick Breault at the Chamber, did the Executive Committee agree to bend the rules and approve use of the Chamber's support publicly.

Given their efforts, it would be nice if letters of thanks for the Chamber's support could be written to the following people from Judge Clark and, if possible from the President:

Edwin D. Dodd  
Chairman of the Board  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
1615 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20062

Richard L. Breault  
Group V.P. Policy  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
(same)

Please let me know if and when the letters could be arranged.

Thanks, Bud.

Sincerely,



Mark R. Harroff

MH/vg

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

: mx

June 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MARY JO JACOBI

FROM:

DEE JEPSEN *DY*

SUBJECT:

THANK YOU LETTERS FOR MX SUPPORT

The following individuals actively supported the President's MX proposal.

Mrs. Joan Hueter, President  
National Association of Pro-America  
3133 N Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20007

Miss Kimberly Matthews, President  
Christian Women's National Concerns  
P. O. Box 2462  
Fort Worth, TX 76118

Mrs. June Stolte, President  
American Legion Auxiliary  
777 North Meridian Street  
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Mrs. Berta White  
President, Women's Activities  
American Farm Bureau Federation  
Baily, Mississippi 39320

Robert Delano, President  
American Farm Bureau Federation  
600 Maryland Avenue, S.W. Suite 800  
Washington, D. C. 20024

Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, President  
Eagle Forum  
68 Fairmont  
Alton, Illinois 62002

Dr. and Mrs. Tim LaHaye  
Family Life Seminars  
2100 Greenfield Drive  
El Cajon, CA 92021