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Collection Name CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 1/22/2005

File Folder TRIP TO EUROPE, PRESIDENT'S: IRELAND, UNITED KINGDOM AND NORMANDY 06/01/1984-06/10/1984 (4)

FOIA
2000-147

Box Number 8

CLARK
138

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
3145	TABLE	TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR BACKGROUND PAPERS <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
3146	PAPER	...IRELAND <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	5/9/1984	B1
3147	PAPER	...RELATIONS <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	ND	B1
3148	PAPER	<i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	ND	B1
3149	PAPER	<i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	ND	B1
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B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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IV. BACKGROUND PAPERS

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BACKGROUND PAPERS

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

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NORTHERN IRELAND

The Northern Ireland problem centers on the question of whether Catholic nationalists should continue to remain a minority (40 percent) in Northern Ireland, or the Protestant unionists, by coercion or consent, should become a minority in a federal or united Ireland. Resolution of the problem seems as distant as any time in the last decade. However, both the Irish and British Governments, and the principal parties in the Republic, generally agree that any change in the status of Northern Ireland should come about within a democratic context, taking into account the wishes of a majority of the people in the North.

In 1972, Britain suspended majority (Protestant) rule in the North and now governs through a Northern Ireland Secretary. Successive British governments have developed proposals for a return to self-rule combined with power-sharing between the two communities. Self-rule potentially could open up avenues toward Irish unity, but all recent efforts to implement self-rule have failed. Both nationalists and some unionists are boycotting the local Northern Ireland Assembly. The future of the Assembly is in doubt.

Little fundamental in Northern Ireland has changed in recent years, although the level of violence is declining. Within the nationalist community, there has been some shift of electoral support away from the democratic constitutional nationalists (SDLP) toward the violent nationalism of Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF)--the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Prime Minister FitzGerald is alarmed by the increasing alienation of the nationalist population in the North, the continuing constitutional deadlock, the stagnation of the Northern Ireland economy, and by the swing in electoral support in the North toward violent nationalism. The Irish see the IRA/PSF as an eventual threat to democratic institutions in the Republic itself. FitzGerald has been seeking to engage Mrs. Thatcher in a process by which Catholic nationalists in the North would be able to share power and to see some movement toward the eventual integration of the island.

FitzGerald enjoys harmonious relations with London. He well understands that a precipitous British withdrawal from the North could provoke sectarian chaos and threaten the stability of the whole island. Last year, he convened in Dublin the "New Ireland Forum," a congress of four democratic nationalist parties from both parts of Ireland to study problems and practical prospects for achieving Irish unity.

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FitzGerald's aim in the Forum was first, to create a consensus among democratic nationalist parties as to how the goal of eventual Irish unity should be pursued by his government; and secondly, to shore up the credibility of John Hume's beleaguered Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) in the North--the principal representative of constitutional, democratic nationalists.

The just-issued Forum report is critical of British rule in the North and calls for unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic. The report condemns violence and has other helpful elements, including recognition of the Protestant/British identity of Northern unionists. But it recognizes also that, before there can be movement toward unity, nationalists must first win the consent of a majority of the people in the North. The British have not yet responded comprehensively to the report.

The Irish hope that the Forum report will receive serious study by the British and that the US will continue to encourage both governments to work toward a solution of the problem. Mrs. Thatcher and FitzGerald will have an opportunity to discuss Northern Ireland when they meet at the EC Summit in June. Without addressing the specifics in the report, we have said that the US hopes the Forum process and the Forum report will strengthen Anglo-Irish cooperation and aid in resolving the Northern Ireland problem and in reconciling the two communities.

The US has carefully avoided a direct role in the Northern Ireland question, convinced that the people concerned, and the Irish and British governments, should work together to promote a resolution of the problem within a democratic context. In successive St. Patrick's Day statements, the President has also emphasized our commitment to end any American links with the violence in the North by vigorously prosecuting those involved in gunrunning or other illegal activity. We have endorsed efforts by private groups, such as Cooperation Ireland, to promote reconciliation. We have encouraged US firms to consider job-creating investments in both parts of Ireland.

The bipartisan congressional "Friends of Ireland" generally supports the Administration on this issue, but explicitly endorses Irish unity. A proposal by Senator Moynihan, calling on the President to appoint a "special envoy" to Northern Ireland, is not widely supported by the Friends. None of the major parties concerned has asked that the US get in the middle of this contentious dispute.

May 9, 1984

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SUMMIT BACKGROUND PAPER

US-EC RELATIONS

Although the European Community is in "crisis," a resolution (CAP reform, UK financial contribution, Spanish and Portuguese membership) appears probable. The Ten recently agreed on an agricultural package, including higher 1984-85 support prices, measures to curtail milk production and reform of the system fixing prices in national currencies. The remaining stumbling block is EC finances. Mrs. Thatcher is blocking a needed increase in EC revenues until and unless the issue of budgetary contributions is resolved. (Both the UK and Germany contribute more to the EC than they receive.) The Europeans hope, but are not certain, that a solution can be reached no later than the next EC Summit (June 25-26 in Fontainebleau).

The final EC package, however, will almost certainly not solve key U.S.-EC differences over agriculture, including export subsidies and other policies affecting U.S. exports of grain, poultry, canned fruit, raisins and other agricultural products. While the latest price increases are below the European rate of inflation, farm prices were raised again for the major producing countries. Reform falls far short of what is needed to end the EC's artificial stimulus to ever-larger surpluses dumped on world markets with the aid of export subsidies. As part of the package, the EC also decided to seek, through procedures under Article XXVIII of the GATT, to restrict imports of U.S. corn gluten feed, now worth over \$500 million a year. Because of size of this trade and the precedent it might create for our \$4 billion trade in soybeans and other oilseed products, we have warned them that it will be virtually impossible to agree on adequate compensation. Unilateral limitations would certainly provoke U.S. retaliation. We see corn gluten as the major U.S.-EC trade problem for the rest of 1984. Our soybean exports would be directly affected by another EC proposal, a consumption tax on vegetable fats and oils. This proposal, however, has not been approved and is not likely to be in the near future.

The Europeans are concerned about U.S. Section 201 (escape clause) cases on carbon steel and shoes due for decision this autumn, the Wine Equity Act, which the Administration opposes, and the Section 232 (national security) action on machine tools (even though this would have its greatest impact on Japan). Other active economic issues between us and the EC countries include "extraterritoriality," focusing on the perceived tightening of U.S. export control procedures, our recent antitrust and subpoena actions against UK firms and unitary taxation by states.

Potential problems might also arise from what has been termed "Europessimism", a feeling of economic malaise that focuses on two issues. One of these is concern about losing competitiveness in

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high technology to the U.S. and Japan. This could lead to "infant high-tech industry" protectionism in Europe. The other focus of pessimism has derived from current low growth and high unemployment in Europe, and led to European criticisms of U.S. macroeconomic policies. However, our divergences over macroeconomic policy have diminished as European governments increasingly realize their economic problems are of domestic origin, and that increased flexibility, and reduced government spending, should be their objectives. Even the French have come to stress these points. The recent economic upturn in Europe has also helped.

Overall, the problems in U.S.-EC relations are serious, but not critical. The size of our two-way trade (about \$90 billion) and the strategic importance of the EC member states require that both sides work to resolve our problems. Careful management, including heavy involvement by cabinet-level officials, has kept U.S.-EC differences under control. Continued efforts will be needed over the next six months if this record is to stand.

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The Middle East

The peace process remains our first priority. However, the current situation is not promising for active diplomacy or new initiatives. The parties are waiting for the elections in Egypt, Israel and the U.S.; Hussein is not ready; the Palestinians, especially the PLO, have not acted decisively to support Hussein's entry into talks; Israel continues with its settlements policy in the West Bank, and Syria remains opposed to negotiations. Despite this gloomy outlook, we want to reassure our friends that we are still committed and will be alert to opportunities to make progress. We want them to know that when the time is right, the U.S. will resume an active role as an honest broker, but we cannot impose peace or force the process until the parties concerned are ready to move forward. Direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs are the only practical approach; Hussein's entry into talks with Israel is the key.

In Lebanon, our goals remain the achievement of national reconciliation, restoration of the Government of Lebanon's authority, withdrawal of foreign forces and security for Israel's northern border. We regret the Government's decision to cancel the May 17 Agreement, and we are urging the Lebanese to enter into direct negotiations with Israel to find an alternative formula for Israeli withdrawal in a way that ensures the security of Israel's border. The ceasefire remains fragile and, as always in Lebanon, will depend on the extent of political progress. The situation in southern Lebanon continues to deteriorate. The Israelis have virtually severed the south from the rest of Lebanon and have centered their efforts to ensure the security of their border on the "Army of South Lebanon." Meanwhile, the Lebanese economy is on the verge of collapse. Only an improvement in the security situation will help. The recently announced Karami Cabinet appears to be a step toward formation of a more broadly based government and needed internal reforms. Although Karami is Syria's candidate, he is a pragmatic Lebanese politician who has previously served nine times as Prime Minister. We have worked with Karami in the past and expect we will be able to do so in the future.

The Iran-Iraq war still has a dangerous potential for widening in the Gulf, threatening the security of other Gulf states, international navigation, and access to oil. Given Iran's intransigence, we believe that ending arms sales to Iran is the most promising way of bringing that country to

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negotiate. We have urged all western governments to do so, with mixed success. We remain formally neutral in the war, but we have taken a number of steps to bolster Iraq's ability to resist. We do not believe direct U.S. military aid would be beneficial.

The threat to the Gulf is not immediate, but it is a real danger. We have made contingency plans to intervene militarily, if needed and if diplomacy fails, should Iran try to close the Strait or stop exports from the lower Gulf. Among our allies, the UK has agreed, in principle, to cooperate, but France remains opposed to multinational planning. We have consulted with the Gulf states and anticipate their cooperation in case of a crisis. However, they are wary of U.S. constancy and have not agreed to the kind of access and prestockage we need to meet our obligations most effectively. Keeping the Gulf open and minimizing damage to oil markets will also require western states and Japan to cooperate in ways they can. One need will be for a coordinated energy strategy to prevent panicky reactions. Besides our political/military exchanges with the UK and France, we have had energy consultations with the UK, France, the FRG, Italy and Japan.

Iran may be considering developing a chemical warfare capability in response to Iraq's CW attacks. We are encouraged that the UK and the Dutch have controlled exports of CW materiel to both countries, as we have, and that the EC Ten have agreed to join this effort. We hope the Ten will move forward to implement controls on chemical exports.

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CENTRAL AMERICA - OVERVIEW OF US POLICY

Our goals: Promote democratic institutions; assist in improving living conditions and economic development; provide friendly governments security assistance to meet the threat posed by expanded Soviet bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion; and encourage dialogue for national reconciliation within and negotiations among countries to resolve regional problems.

The Bipartisan Commission reported in mid-January that Central America is a vital national security interest and concluded: further communist guerrilla warfare success there will mean that we would have to either substantially increase our defense capabilities along our southern border or sharply reduce our commitments to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Regional Issues: The U.S. commitment to negotiating has not diminished; we are strongly committed to Contadora, which deserves the understanding and support of our allies. Ambassador Shlaudeman has visited every country involved with Contadora to encourage the process. Democratic elections in El Salvador, and coming elections in Guatemala will leave Nicaragua the only non-democratic country in Central America. We hope our allies hold Nicaragua to the same standards they apply to the rest of Central America.

Nicaragua: Relations with Nicaragua are seriously strained as a result of Sandinista support for subversion of its neighbors and the GRN's close alignment and security ties with Cuba and the USSR. We do not seek to overthrow or destabilize the GRN; we do believe the Sandinistas only respond positively to pressure.

Our policy has four purposes: (1) implementation of Nicaragua's democratic commitments to the OAS; (2) termination of its export of subversion; (3) reduction of its military apparatus to a point of equilibrium with the rest of the region; (4) termination of its military and security ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. We maintain a dialogue with the GRN, and are prepared to respond to meaningful efforts in the areas we have identified to the GRN as critical to us.

Nicaraguan elections scheduled for November 4 are a potential opportunity for national reconciliation, but Sandinista efforts to block fair elections, e.g., denying access to the media, continuing the state of emergency, and excluding armed opposition leaders from the elections, will make this difficult.

El Salvador: The massive turnout of voters in El Salvador in two elections shows strong desire of Salvadorans for democracy. We are prepared to work closely with the new government headed by Christian Democrat Duarte. The communist guerrillas tried and failed to disrupt the elections. We will continue to support El Salvador in its efforts to combat

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communist terrorism.

Costa Rica: We look to Costa Rica as a model of social and political development for the region. It is an important regional force for peace and democracy. Our policy objectives are to preserve its independence and sovereignty in the face of Nicaraguan aggression and subversion. Recent Nicaraguan attacks have alarmed the GOCR; it has requested additional security assistance. We have agreed on a formula for providing this, and assured Costa Rica we will be responsive if the situation deteriorates further.

Honduras: Honduras is the bulwark of our Central American security policy. It is essential to our regional interests that Honduras continue to strengthen its democratic institutions. Our programs of economic and military assistance are designed to support it in this vital effort. Honduras is the site of the regional military training center - and consequently an important force in our security assistance to El Salvador - and of bilateral military exercises. Honduran support for the FDN is fundamental to our policy of bringing pressure on Nicaragua.

Guatemala: A stable democratic Guatemala fully involved in solving regional problems remains a key but elusive goal. With Central America's largest population, potentially strongest economy and proximity to Mexico, Guatemala has been a prized target for Marxist insurgents since the early 1960's. Reduction of political violence against noncombatants (from 300 deaths/month to 40/month) and commitment to constituent assembly elections July 1 show officials recognize change must come. We will encourage them through discussion, a significant infusion of economic assistance, and modest military assistance.

Panama: 75 percent of traffic through the Canal is to or from the U.S.; our private investment in Panama is third in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil. The Canal will remain important to us indefinitely, and we will defend our interests there. We want to continue use of our military bases there. Panama has played a moderately helpful role in regional efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation. We strongly supported its return to full democratic government, and have successfully avoided appearance of favoritism. We will continue to provide adequate economic and military assistance.

Belize: We support a peaceful resolution satisfactory to both parties of democratic Belize's border dispute with Guatemala. FOR UK ONLY: Withdrawal of the British garrison in Belize in the absence of a resolution of the territorial dispute would dangerously increase instability in an area of central concern to the U.S. There is no adequate alternative to the British presence.

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US-EUROPEAN SECURITY RELATIONS BACKGROUND
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East-West Relations

Your speech of January 16 underscored the US desire for a more constructive relationship with the USSR based on realism, strength and dialogue. Vice President Bush conveyed this message to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko in February. In his January meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Secretary Shultz stressed his desire to move ahead on the full range of the East-West agenda: 1) arms control; 2) bilateral affairs; 3) human rights; and 4) regional issues. Our allies appreciate the moderate tone of our policy, but remain anxious about East-West tensions.

The new Soviet leadership took a relatively moderate tone in its initial approach to US-USSR relations, particularly in Chernenko's public statements following Andropov's death and in his meeting with the Vice President. Since then, however, the Soviets have increasingly been taking a harsh line in public statements and private comments. Moscow has been especially rigid on START and INF, with the Soviets insisting on withdrawal of US INF deployments as a precondition to resumption of these two negotiations.

On lower-profile issues, the Soviets have been careful not to exclude possibilities for progress, and have shown willingness to discuss a range of bilateral and non-nuclear arms control issues. In part to deflect attention from its rigid stance on nuclear arms reductions, the USSR has emphasized Soviet initiatives on outer space arms control and "nuclear norms" (declarations of no-first-use and non-use of force). In April, the USSR returned to the MBFR talks, and is also participating in the CDE process.

The Soviets recently underscored their tough rhetoric with two harsh actions: withdrawal from the summer Olympics and sharply increased pressure on the Sakharovs. In the latter case, the Soviets have refused to allow Dr. Sakharov's wife to go abroad for medical treatment, and have as well threatened her with imprisonment. Dr. Sakharov, in response, has begun a life-threatening hunger strike. This hard Soviet line reflects Moscow's hope that intransigence in US-Soviet relations will damage the Administration's reelection efforts and help sow divisions between the US and its European allies. There is also continuing Soviet resentment over the failure to block INF deployments -- a defeat that compounded the acute embarrassment of KAL 007 -- as well as residual tensions within the Soviet leadership as Chernenko tries to consolidate his position and others maneuver for the next transition of power.

There has been no real flexibility in Soviet positions on regional issues, including Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America, Southern Africa, or the Middle East. We have, however,

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restated our willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the Soviets on these topics, as well as on a variety of other issues. On the bilateral front, we have put forward a number of initiatives, including talks on New York and Kiev consulates, a new cultural agreement, and revitalization of scientific and technical exchanges. Late April saw the latest round of US-Soviet hotline improvement talks, as well as the Moscow visit of Ambassador Goodby for discussions on CDE.

We have been especially mindful of the need for high-level dialogue: Ambassador Hartman has met with Gromyko on several occasions for talks on a wide range of issues, while Dobrynin has had a number of exchanges with Secretary Shultz. And of course your letters to Chernenko are our most explicit statements of commitment to a real improvement in relations. The US has made it clear that we do not seek to threaten Soviet security and that we are prepared to engage in serious discussions on START and INF, as well as on the full range of issues which engage our countries.

One persistent problem in East-West relations is the unsatisfactory human rights situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In particular, emigration from the USSR remains at exceptionally low levels, and the crackdown on dissent in the USSR shows no sign of abating. Following last September's conclusion of the Madrid CSCE review meeting -- which advanced human rights standards beyond the Helsinki Final Act -- the US has worked to maintain allied pressure for an improvement in Communist human rights performance.

Since the NATO Ministerial last December, NATO allies have been engaged in a major review of East-West relations. Our goal has been to strengthen alliance consensus on this central issue and point the way to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Shortly before the start of your trip, NATO foreign ministers will have approved the classified study and issued a public statement at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington May 29-31.

United States East-West economic policy is largely determined by our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, and heavily influenced by the Afghanistan and Poland sanctions and by our policy of "differentiation" toward the countries of Eastern Europe. We have been working closely with our allies to strike a consensus for a comprehensive and prudent economic relationship with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Key elements of this approach include: 1) no subsidization of the Soviet economy through preferential trade or financing; 2) curbs on militarily-significant exports to the Warsaw Pact; and 3) avoidance of dependence on the USSR as an energy supplier.

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STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

START

The Soviets have refused to return to the START negotiations since Round V ended on schedule in December 1983 without agreement to a resumption date. At that time, the Soviets stated that the U.S. LRINF deployments had so changed the strategic situation as to require a full review of their START position.

During the last round their approach, with few exceptions, remained one of wholesale condemnation of the U.S. position. The only positive development was the establishment of a working group on confidence building measures. With respect to a merger of INF and START, we continue to believe that a merger would complicate the negotiations and impede progress; however, we are ready to consider any serious Soviet proposal for resuming the nuclear arms control dialogue.

INF

On November 24, 1983, Andropov announced a unilateral suspension of the INF talks. Chernenko maintains the Soviet formula that their walkout is irreversible unless NATO demonstrates readiness to reverse deployments. The Soviet walkout is regrettable and unjustified, since their SS-20 deployments continued without pause for two years while the U.S. pursued a negotiated solution with the Soviets. The U.S. believes that all the elements for an agreement are on the table; the U.S. is willing to resume the INF talks at any time and place, however, without preconditions. In the absence of a concrete agreement, deployments of U.S. LRINF missiles are moving ahead on schedule.

MBFR

The negotiations resumed on March 16 after an unusually long break (three months) brought about by Soviet refusal last December to continue the talks. With our NATO Allies, we created and tabled a new proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock. We are hopeful that the East will respond constructively in the next round which begins May 24.

CDE

The West has proposed Confidence and Security Building Measures which would make military activities in Europe more open, and therefore harder to use for surprise attack or intimidation. Our measures would also reduce the danger of war from accident or miscalculation.

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The Soviets have offered declaratory measures -- non-use of force, etc. Their measures sound more ambitious than NATO's, but they only reiterate existing pledges in the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Final Act, which often have been violated. Our challenge is to achieve agreement on NATO's more modest but concrete measures which would do more for European confidence and security than agreement on Soviet proposals would do.

CW Arms Control

On April 18, Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The draft treaty proposes a comprehensive and global ban on CW development, production and stockpiling, under effective international verification (including challenge inspections). The U.S. recognizes that verification of such a ban is a difficult task, therefore, conclusion of an effective CW agreement will take some time to achieve.

Arms Control Compliance

The U.S. has determined that the USSR is violating or probably violating several arms control agreements. Soviet non-compliance calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. The U.S. will continue to press its compliance concerns with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and insist on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time, the U.S. will continue to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements, and will ensure that future arms control agreements contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

Outer Space Arms Control/SDI

A comprehensive ban on ASAT's appears impossible to verify, but the U.S. is continuing to review other approaches that could be effectively verified and that would enhance NATO security interests. With respect to the strategic defense initiative, the research program is completely consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations.

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Extraterritoriality

With the increasing integration of the world economy, strong regulatory and enforcement interests necessitate application of U.S. law (e.g., antitrust laws, re-export controls, compelled disclosure of offshore documents) to persons or conduct outside U.S. territory. While the U.S. is not alone in applying its laws in this manner (West Germany, Sweden and the European Commission also do so to a lesser extent), we are in a decided minority. The U.K., Canada and most others oppose this "extraterritorial" application of law to persons or conduct in their territories, which they view as intruding upon their sovereignty. They are most disturbed when they think the U.S. is attempting to control activities in their territory in accordance with U.S. interests and without regard to their own distinct interests. The U.K., Australia and others have adopted domestic legal measures to block such actions.

This has led to confrontations over specific cases and to heavy pressure on the U.S. to address this issue bilaterally and multilaterally. We have discussed it separately with the Canadians and British and multilaterally with the OECD. In these meetings, some allies argue that the interests of the territorial sovereign predominate over the interests of all others. The U.S. has countered that more than one state may have jurisdiction concurrently, and that the real need for measures reaching outside a state's own borders precludes any simple solution, such as a commitment to "territorial primacy," in deciding which of these states can properly exercise jurisdiction in a specific case. Rather, we have urged use of a balancing of interests approach through which other states would recognize the authority of the state with the greatest interest in conduct to exercise jurisdiction in that case.

The U.S. has also urged focusing on managing and mitigating the problem by accommodating the interests of all involved governments when possible. This would be achieved by (1) establishing an internal USG mechanism through which foreign interests in proposed conduct can be identified and taken into account (a mechanism for notice to State is presently under study by the SIG/IEP), and (2) creating procedures, such as those now in place for antitrust enforcement, through which other governments would be notified and consulted, in advance when feasible, about proposed actions which might affect their interests. This approach would also promote intergovernmental cooperation in lieu of unilateral action.

While our allies continue to express their opposition to U.S. assertion of extraterritorial authority as a matter of principle, they have indicated willingness to explore our conflict management approach, as indicated by recent negotiation of an OECD recommendation supporting this approach, adoption of antitrust consultation arrangements with Australia and Canada, pending negotiation of law enforcement assistance agreements with Canada and West Germany, and recent U.K. interest in exploring this approach generally.

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Normandy Events

The greatest amphibious landing in the history of war took place on the morning of June 6, 1944, when elements of nine Allied divisions (five American, four British-Canadian) landed on the coast of Normandy. For reasons of communications security, the time and place of the landing were not communicated to General de Gaulle in London, and he never forgave the Allies for this. As a consequence the Normandy landings have traditionally been commemorated only by the Allies and by local French committees.

President Mitterrand decided to correct this historical anomaly and give to the Normandy commemoration this year the importance and national recognition it deserves in view of its historic importance for France. This is all the more important because the generations that actually remember D-day in Normandy will soon be passing on. Mitterrand wanted to establish a new tradition of French national celebration of the D-day anniversary. The coincidence with the London Economic Summit this year enables the extraordinary presence on June 6 of the heads of state or government of all the participants in the Normandy landings.

While the French landed only a commando battalion on D-day, the French Forces of the Interior played an important role in disrupting enemy lines of communication and harassing the movement of Wehrmacht reinforcements to the battle zone.

Commemoration of the American role in the Normandy landings will focus on three main events:

(1) Pointe du Hoc. This is a jut of land west of Omaha beach, a high cliff scaled by the Second Ranger Battalion. Its mission was to put out of action a heavy enemy gun battery which was a dangerous threat to troops landing on both Omaha and Utah beaches. The memorial site has been maintained by local residents and was only recently ceded to the United States Government. The commemorative plaque is being installed for dedication on June 6.

(2) Omaha beach. Combat teams of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions, comprising the Fifth Corps commanded by General Gerow, landed along this three-mile stretch of beach in the most costly of the D-day battles. British and Canadian forces landed at three beaches to the east of Omaha. President Mitterrand, after first participating in ceremonies for French and British war dead at Bayeux, is to proceed to the American Military Cemetery at Omaha beach for the French-American ceremony,

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(3) Utah beach. Regimental combat teams of the 4th Infantry Division, under the Seventh Corps commanded by General Collins (who will be present on June 6) landed along this stretch of sand dunes to the west of the Carentan marshes. They linked up with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions which had been dropped inland just after midnight. President Mitterrand will speak at this site, in the presence of all the Allied leaders. He is later to attend additional ceremonies at Canadian and French cemeteries east of Omaha beach.

