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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM: Files

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File Folder: MISSILE PROLIFERATION ~~9A~~ 91844
Box

Date: 2/27/98

CUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (7456)	Peter Rodmn to Colin Powell, 3p	10/2/88	P5 , P1
2. memo (5510)	Tyrus Cobb to Powell re study, 1p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF 96 108, # 4</i>	7/29/88	P1
3. memo (5510)	Paul Scott Stevens to Melvy Levitsky re Terms of Reference, 2p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF 96 108 #5</i>	n.d.	P1
4. memo	re ideas for Armacost, 6p	n.d.	P5 , P1
5. report	re Strategy, 45p	n.d.	P5 , P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 29, 1988

TO: Bob Oakley, Jim Kelly, Bob Linhard

FROM: TY COBB

SUBJECT: Missile Proliferation Study

Please provide comments/concurrences on the attached to
Ty Cobb, X3491, Rm. 348, by 1:00 p.m., July 29.

Bob Ball

- I doublechecked
this w/ state - PM.
They're completely
satisfied.

Comments:

I need the
directive over
sent to Vlad
Lehovich -- he appreciates
your words of caution.

Ty,

I find this a bit

strange. The NSC is ~~to~~
tasking State (PM) to do a
study which State (P) already
tasked State (PM) to do, and
which PM has done - at
least a first draft. If I
know in State, I would
resent this - unless you
already have them lined up -
Pat

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 29, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*
SUBJECT: Missile Proliferation Study

The proliferation of ballistic missiles to countries that are not now major military powers represents a potential challenge to U.S. national security interests. Today, the number of Third World countries producing or able to produce ballistic missiles is growing and will reach at least 12 by the late 1990's; the number of potential suppliers is also growing. Proliferators will be capable of arming their missiles with nuclear, chemical and/or biological warfare warheads. The transfer of ballistic missiles and components to the Middle East is the most visible manifestation of this trend, posing a potential threat to regional stability.

On July 8, a NSC-only meeting of senior directors agreed with your recommendation that this problem should be accorded a high priority in the remaining months of this administration. Following consultation with General Burns and Alan Holmes, I chaired a Missile Proliferation IG to discuss the development of a strategy to determine how we might best implement the President's directive to move forward in curtailing this proliferation. The IG concluded that an urgent study of the problem of ballistic missile proliferation was required, and that the study should be concluded before a series of high level exchanges between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and China took place in mid to late September. Accordingly, we agreed that State/PM should take the lead in drafting the study to be sent to the NSC by August 12.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Paul Stevens to send the memo at Tab A to the Department of State tasking the preparation of a study on the problem of ballistic missile proliferation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Bob Oakley, Jim Kelly and Bob Linhard concur.

Attachment

Tab A Stevens to Counterparts Memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F96-108 #4
BY *dlh* NARA, DATE 5/18/02

T
A
B
A

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5510

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Analysis of Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (S)

On July 27, an NSC-chaired Missile Proliferation IG determined the need for a study that would lead to the adoption of a policy directive defining the administration's position regarding the destabilizing nature of ballistic missile proliferation. We would appreciate it if the Department of State would prepare an in-depth analysis of the problem of global missile proliferation with recommendations for specific policy initiatives. The study should be coordinated with the departments on the distribution list, and should contain dissenting and differing views where applicable. (S)

The terms of reference should include, inter alia, the scope of the problem, the elements of a U.S. strategy for preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles, a description of the policy instruments available to the U.S. to influence successfully the problem of missile proliferation, an analysis of the suppliers and demanders of ballistic missiles and related missile technology, and the leverages available to the U.S. towards the suppliers and demanders. It should also address the role the Missile Technology Control Regime can and should play in such a strategy. As appropriate, the related problems of chemical weapons and cruise missile proliferation should be integrated into the study. Finally, the study should treat how other nations, including adversaries such as the Soviet Union, as well as our Allies, can contribute to a positive solution to the problem. (S)

The study should be submitted to the NSC by August 12. (S)

PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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NLS 596-108 #5

BY dlb NARA, DATE 3/16/00

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE
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SECRET

-2-

cc: COL WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DONALD A. DANNER
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. WILLIAM B. STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. JONATHAN F. THOMPSON
Executive Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy

MR. HENRY E. CLEMENTS
Executive Officer
National Aeronautics and Space Administration