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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

RBW 2/6/2013

**File Folder** EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 04/15/1982-04/30/1982

**FOIA**

M452

**Box Number** 1

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23

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153419	MEMO	RE. ROMANIA <i>D 11/28/2017 M452/1</i>	1	4/15/1982	B1
153420	REPORT	[ATTACHED TO DOC. 153420] <i>D 11/28/2017 M452/1</i>	24	4/15/1982	B1
153423	MEMO	WILLIAM STEARMAN TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. OBSERVATIONS ON A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT <i>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</i>	2	4/21/1982	B1
153418	MEMO	LAWRENCE BRADY TO LIONEL OLMER RE. EAST EUROPEAN DIFFERENTIATION <i>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</i>	3	4/27/1982	B1
153426	PAPER	RE. U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE <i>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</i>	2	ND	B1
153429	PAPER	RE. OPTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO POLAND [W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

2709

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

April 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Primate Glemp's U.S. Trip (U)

Embassy Warsaw reports (Tab I) that Polish Primate Glemp plans to visit the U.S. this October and would like to come to Washington if U.S. leaders (i.e., the President or Secretary Haig) wished to see him. The Embassy believes the Primate would push hard for large-scale assistance to Poland in any meeting with the President or the Secretary. (C)

cc: Richard Pipes  
Norman Bailey  
Paula Dobriansky

*SS*

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Review on  
April 20, 1988

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DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *2/16/13*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01  
EOB738

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WARSAW 3639

EXDIS  
E. O. 12065: RDS-4 4/16/02 (MEEHAN, FRANCIS J.) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, PL, US  
SUBJECT: PRIMATE PLANS LATE OCTOBER U. S. TRIP

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THE PRIMATE PLANS A PASTORAL VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF OCTOBER. BISHOP ABRAMOWICZ OF CHICAGO AND AN UNIDENTIFIED DETROIT BISHOP ARE COORDINATING THE TRIP FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. BISHOP JERZY DABROWSKI WOULD ACCOMPANY THE PRIMATE.
3. THE PRIMATE AT PRESENT HAS NO PLANS TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEE NON-CLERICAL PEOPLE IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL, BUT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO REQUEST ANY APPOINTMENTS.
4. COMMENT: POL COUNSELOR, WHO OBTAINED ABOVE INFORMATION FROM BISHOP JERZY DABROWSKI, CAME AWAY FROM THE MEETING WITH A DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT THE PRIMATE WOULD BE PLEASED TO ALTER HIS TRAVEL PLANS AND COME TO WASHINGTON IF TOP U. S. LEADERS WISHED TO SEE HIM. WE ALSO HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT GLEMP WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICITY SUCH MEETINGS WOULD ENTAIL. THE EXCUSE FOR COMING TO WASHINGTON WOULD BE TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF BISHOPS, BISHOP ROCHE, WHO MAINTAINS OFFICES IN WASHINGTON. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO WEIGH THE VALUE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIMATE AND THE SECRETARY OR THE PRESIDENT, BEARING IN MIND THAT IN ANY SUCH ENCOUNTER GLEMP WOULD NO DOUBT PUSH HARD FOR LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE TO POLAND. MEEHAN  
BT

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1982

INFORMATION

Sov. P.

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: William L. Stearman *WLS*

SUBJECT: Observations on a US-Soviet Summit

Brezhnev wants a real summit in Europe (instead of a handshake in New York) in order to promote the current Soviet peace campaign and slow down US and NATO defense improvements. For this and additional reasons described below, I do not believe that a summit this year would serve U.S. interests; however, if the President wants to avoid taking a negative position on a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower's example and put a price tag on it. (C)

Beginning in 1953, Churchill pushed for a summit with the new post-Stalin Soviet leaders. Eisenhower indicated that he would agree to a summit if the Soviets would: sign a German Peace Treaty or an Austrian State Treaty or contribute to real arms control progress. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955, and a summit was held in Geneva that July. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" detente atmosphere was slowly eroding NATO's strength and cohesion when this detente was ended by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. (It should be noted that the foreign ministers conference, which followed up on the Geneva summit, produced no real results, but this fact was overshadowed by the prevailing post-summit euphoria.) (C)

The record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. In terms of U.S. interests, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to disastrous -- with the sole exception of Camp David 1959 which postponed Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no "missile gap," which fact strengthened our negotiating position. In addition to providing the Soviets an ideal propaganda platform and promoting their "super power" image, summits present other intrinsic problems. (U)

At best, summits permit only a superficial exchange of views on complex and potentially dangerous issues. There is little actual time for discussion, and this is halved by the interpreters.

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Review on 4/21/88

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NR 104521 #153423

BY *FW* DATE 12/1/86

US-Soviet summits engage two men with vastly different backgrounds, mentalities and objectives. (I am only being half facetious when I say that any American President should have had extensive dealings with Mafiosi in order really to be prepared for encounters with Soviet leaders.) Thus, summits can hardly result in any real meeting of minds and can easily lead to serious and even dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations. For example, I have long been convinced that the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. (C)

Since U.S. recognition of the USSR in 1933, all previous U.S. Presidents have met with Soviet leaders (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect President Reagan to avoid summitry altogether. He is bound to come under increasing pressure to have a summit. He can, however, follow Eisenhower's example and demand of the Soviets some price of admission, some earnest of their good intentions, such as: acceptance of our "zero option" proposal, withdrawal from Afghanistan or ending martial law in Poland. (C)

Richard Pipes concurs in views expressed above.





U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
International Trade Administration

April 27, 1982

To: NORMAN BAILEY  
NSC

From: Lawrence J. Brady  
Assistant Secretary for  
Trade Administration

LJB/H

Attached are my views on how the East  
European Differential exercise is  
going.

Attachment

copy to Pipes  
FYI

File 1.2

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
International Trade Administration  
Washington, D. C. 20230

31

27 APR 1932

153418

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lionel H. Olmer  
FROM: Lawrence J. Brady *LJB*  
SUBJECT: East European Differentiation Paper

You will probably be attending a SIG on Thursday, the purpose of which is to affirm the paper that has been drafted over the last few weeks. I believe this paper is flawed in many fundamental respects.

1. It is an advocacy paper and does not even attempt to lay out options, alternatives, pros and cons, etc.
2. It is a policy paper but without any assessments. It makes assertions, draws inferences and states conclusions retreaded from the Kissinger Detente period based on Detente assumptions -- strategic, political and economic.
3. Specifically, in the economic area, it would seem to me the credit exercise has raised enough issues that we should proceed cautiously in rescheduling and making more loans and grants, etc. What is the ability of the U.S. to underwrite the economic commitment implicitly assumed in this paper?
4. On the technology transfer portion of the paper, I must strongly object to any paper going into the President indicating that we will have a 1 1/4 or 1 1/2 differential for various East European countries. In my view, the whole differential concept for technology transfer is incapable of being implemented. We have had one on the books for years with very little real impact. In the final analysis, all cases must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and we simply will not be able to get interagency agreement. I think it is fraudulent to lead the President to believe that this will be done. Our experience with China, a case example where we had all the cards, where the political commitment was strong has nevertheless bogged down in technical details over what is two times, etc. We will be creating a nightmare or a quagmire, perhaps both.

The technology transfer paper paid little attention to the diversion question. This ties in with what I said earlier about the lack of assessments. Certainly, we should have a thorough assessment of the diversion risk of each of the East European countries before enunciating a policy of differentiation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M4521 #153418

BY *RW*

DATE 12/7/00



5. The MFN paper states as a goal the extension of MFN status to all East European countries, and long-term MFN status to some favored few. The criteria for extending MFN include "human rights" record and local media treatment of U.S. policies. I strongly disagree with this approach. MFN has proved to be one of the few substantive instruments of a differential policy. The fervor with which Romania and Hungary campaign for long term status proves its value. To extend MFN to all countries of East Europe as a goal unto itself is misguided. Consideration of MFN extension should be linked to substantive changes, like a more independent foreign policy course and economic reforms.
  
6. The GDR policy paper implies that the U.S. should follow the policies that the FRG has established with the GDR. The reasoning is that since GDR relations are important to the FRG, and good relations with the FRG are important to the U.S., the U.S. should, therefore, have similar relations with the GDR as does the FRG. This is circular reasoning at best. The FRG has a vested internal political interest in the GDR which we do not share. If we take this reasoning to its logical conclusion, we should extend concessional credits and MFN to GDR, as well as step up technology transfer. I disagree with this approach; our relations with the GDR should be mindful of FRG-GDR relations but should be driven by U.S. national interests. The GDR is firmly in the USSR camp, our policy approach, therefore, should be similar to those with the USSR.

There are a number of other papers where specific comments are warranted but, quite frankly, they are too numerous to itemize. In short, before any decision is made to continue the previous administration's differentiation policies we should assess:

- the contribution of East-West economic integration to the growing neutralist movement in Western Europe;
- whether East-West trade in the 1970's, on balance, weakened or strengthened Soviet control in Eastern Europe;
- whether free market principles are threatened by the growing influence of Communist nations in the global economy (i.e. Soviet role in the Law of the Sea Conference);
- whether Western nations can afford to increase defense budgets to compensate for new transfers of capital and technology to the Warsaw Pact;
- whether Western markets can absorb increases in NME's exports that must occur if new expansion of West-East trade is to evolve;

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- whether the West would just, be "throwing good money after bad" in Eastern Europe if these regimes do not undertake broad scale reforms;
- whether Western investment reduces the pressure on East European Communist parties to decentralize the economy, experiment with free enterprise, etc.;
- whether the West's ability to use economic and trade sanctions against the USSR is diminished by the high level of economic interdependence between East and West Europe;
- whether Eastern Europe's economic situation -- absent any significant Western assistance -- would constitute a serious drain on Soviet resources in the 1980's.

I am also attached a copy of some earlier comments on the preambular or overview section of the paper which my staff provided Ray's people. There was no disagreement in Commerce, however, State ignored all of it.

cc: R. Waldmann  
B. Denysyk

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD  
EASTERN EUROPE

Comments on Preambular Statement

Add new paragraphs in Section II. A Policy of Non-Differentiation:

Proponents of non-differentiation point out that East-West trade in the 1970's may have strengthened the centripetal rather than the centrifugal forces within COMECON. For example, the Orenburg natural gas pipeline from the USSR to several Eastern European nations was built in the mid-1970's with their cooperation and with U.S. equipment and financing. The pipeline, however, greatly increased Eastern Europe's dependence on Soviet natural gas, worsened Eastern Europe's terms of trade, and freed Soviet oil for export to the West to earn hard currency. The second strand of the Urengoi pipeline would most likely have the same impact. Joint ventures between Western multinational companies and Eastern European firms may actually facilitate economic integration within COMECON.

It can also be argued that the Warsaw Pact nations have not abandoned their stated goal of world socialism. The integration of Communist countries into Western economic institutions could gradually erode free market principles, concepts, and practices. Current negotiations over the Law of the Sea Treaty provide us the best indication of COMECON's economic strategy.

Finally, East European nations which seek to stimulate economic growth must choose between:

1. undertaking internal political and economic reforms; or
2. relying upon the West for inputs of resources.

Additional investment by the West in Eastern Europe may actually discourage these nations from moving in the direction of internal reform.

- p.4 p.1 The reference to Solidarity's alleged efforts in Poland to "destroy the Communist Party's leading role" or to "take a country (Poland) out of the Warsaw Pact" reflects Soviet propaganda allegations and should be deleted.
- p.4 p.2 These countries are also in a position to seriously hurt the West if we do not continue to bail them out. It can be argued that the debtor nations of the East have greater leverage over the West than we have over them.

Classified by: L.J. Brady  
Declassify on: 4/20/88

DECLASSIFIED

- p.5 p.1 This argument makes sense, but it probably cannot be extended beyond the countries mentioned, i.e. to Hungary. It should also be recognized that trade also tends to pull Western nations toward the USSR.
- p.5 p.3 We should not attempt to "isolate" Eastern Europe. Rather, we need to (1) recognize the limits of our ability to use trade to produce positive change in the region and (2) constrain the growth of the Warsaw Pact's "civilian" support industries. Further, many of our allies are beginning to worry about trade competition from the NME's in the 1980's.
- p.5 p.4 With the exception of Hungary, it cannot be argued that any country in Eastern Europe has more freedom today than it did 10 years ago. Indeed, Poland and Romania have the greatest amount of trade dependence on the West -- as well as the worst human rights records.
- p.6 p.1 Eastern European governments are responsive to the dictates of the USSR, not to popular pressure.
- p.6 p.2 The policy of trade differentiation in the 1970's enabled Warsaw Pact forces to modernize their industrial infrastructure with borrowed capital. The West needs to evaluate the cost of how much more it must spend on defense in the 1980's before we make any major new investments in Eastern Europe.

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*P*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1982 APR 30 PIA 1 59

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S/S #

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LDX MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ No. Pages 15

FROM: Donald E. Grabenstetter EUR/EE 632-3191 5221  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Options for Humanitarian Assistance to Poland

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Harvey Shapiro</u>	<u>566-5637</u>	<u>4450</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Paula Dobriansky</u>	<u>395-3912</u>	

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

S/S Officer: *DM*  
*E. Grabenstetter*

*Bailey*

152709  
37  
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OPTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO POLAND

I. Humanitarian Food Aid to Poland in FY-82

Last September in response to the continued economic deterioration and shortages evident in Poland, you authorized up to \$50 million in humanitarian food aid for distribution directly to the Polish people through private charitable agencies. CARE and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) subsequently developed programs to distribute \$30 million of food aid to about 3.3 million beneficiaries. The full \$50 million was not used due to uncertainties at that time regarding the strength of the delivery infrastructure.

Following the imposition of martial law on December 13, all official U.S. Government credits to Poland were suspended. However, humanitarian assistance was continued both on the evidence of need (presented by CRS, CARE, the Polish Catholic Church, and our Embassy in Warsaw) for such assistance and on political and foreign policy grounds:

Our assistance is widely visible in Poland, undermining regime propaganda and providing material evidence of Western support for Solidarity and the Church. Our assistance would help refute European criticism of sanctions and the view that Poland is a screen for a U.S. policy of confrontation with the Soviets. Our assistance also undermines Soviet propaganda portraying themselves as the only true friends of Polish workers.

Poland's economic situation is continuing to deteriorate under martial law with our sanctions exacting an increasingly heavy toll. Poland's GNP declined by about 14 percent in 1981 and signs point to an acceleration of the decline in living standards (the Warsaw regime predicts a 25 percent fall in 1982). The regime's 300-400 percent increases in food prices appear to have brought demand and supply into closer balance. The increases have placed many food items out of reach of the average Polish consumer. The outlook is for continued economic decline in Poland. An exceptionally good harvest could provide some relief of staple food shortages such as wheat, but there is no way to judge the harvest this early in the year. Despite the gloomy economic situation and outlook, a decision to provide additional Title II food is a political one since Poland's situation is not so poor as that it would meet the normal criteria for granting of such aid.

FUNDING OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE IN FY-82

The US Government has provided CARE with \$15 million in PL-480 Title II food supplements for 2.2 million children and elderly persons in pre-school, day care, and health facilities under CARE and Polish Ministry of Health supervision. At the



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current recipient level food supplies will last through October 1982. Additional funds must be committed by July, however, if we decide to continue CARE's program uninterrupted into FY-83 because of the lead time for food procurement.

The CRS program was initially designed to provide food supplements to 1.1 million persons, with \$15 million in US Government donated PL-480 Title II food. The CRS program uses the extensive infrastructure of the Polish Catholic Church to identify needy individuals and distribute food to them through charity committees in each church parish. Over 250,000 volunteers are involved in this task. CRS assistance is targeted toward the elderly, handicapped, invalid, infants and small children, and large families with young children. Because charity committees were given the task of identifying beneficiaries, and these Committees identified others they considered needy, CRS expanded its program from the original 1.1 million recipients to 1.8 million albeit without seeking prior approval from the US Government. But at this faster rate of delivery, food supplies will run out in July instead of October as originally planned.

Consequently, CRS has requested funding for additional food to keep its program going through October, when the harvest is completed. CARE also has requested \$10 million additional in FY-82 to expand its program. Funding of this request is not recommended. Because of procurement lead time, a funding commitment will be necessary by ~~July~~ <sup>11.4</sup> for CRS if we decide to continue its program uninterrupted into FY-83. Sufficient flexibility currently exists in the PL-480 Title II budget to fund CRS' request for an additional \$11.2 million to continue its program through October. There is a consensus of all concerned agencies and the NSC in favor of funding this CRS request.

at the  
current  
distribution  
level.

OPTIONS:

A. Notify CARE and CRS that no further funds will be made available in 1982. this would force CRS either to cut its level of recipients from 1.8 to 1.1 million persons or to reduce ration levels in order to stretch its program through the end of the harvest season in October .

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*It would also mean that the total level for this fiscal year is 41.2 million for which within the 50.8 million available approved by the President*

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

*#4.4*

*179*

B. Grant CRS request for \$11.2 million in additional PL-480 Title II funds for FY-82. Deny CARE's \$28 million request. This would permit continuation of the present program level through October. The \$11.2 million could be funded from the Title II reserve without additional budget authority.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

II. Extension of Humanitarian Food Assistance into 1983

The beneficiaries of both CARE and CRS programs are those who are unlikely to be able to fend for themselves even after the October harvest. Further, the economic outlook given the effects of Western sanctions and martial law is for continued deterioration and declining food supplies. Consequently, both CARE and CRS are requesting authority to continue their food aid into 1983.

Declines in agricultural commodity costs and shipping expenses have left substantial amounts of unallocated funds in the PL-480 FY-82 budget. These carryover funds could be used to sustain CARE and CRS programs for Poland in FY-83 without seeking new budgetary authority. ~~Alternatively, a supplemental or budget amendment could be sought to fund FY 83 humanitarian assistance, except possibly in the case of Option C below which might require a partial allocation from other programs.~~  
OPTIONS: In the FY 1983 P-480 appropriation..

A. Provide no FY-83 funding. CARE and CRS would have to be notified immediately to plan for termination of their US Government funded programs when they run out of food. Treasury supports this option.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

B. Fund CARE and CRS programs at one half their current level of recipients in FY-83 at an estimated cost of \$25 million. We would need to inform them now of the cuts so that they could plan gradually to cut back their U.S. funded programs. ~~Agriculture supports this option.~~

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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The 40.2 million level to complete this program will require a reduction in either the number of recipients or national duration. The final three quarters of FY 83.

C. Fund CARE and CRS programs at current levels of recipients (CRS - 1.8 million, CARE - 2.2 million) through the first quarter of FY-83 using \$12.5 million of carryover Title II funds. Give CARE and CRS a commitment to fund their programs through the rest of FY-83 at a level not to exceed \$40 million. The appropriate program level to be determined after the Polish harvest is gathered, permitting accurate assessment of food needs. Any unused portion of the \$40 million set aside for Poland would be reprogrammed to other priority uses. State, AID, Commerce, and NSC support this option.

40  
Total cost for the fiscal year

Agriculture

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

ESF Funding

The FY 1982 Foreign Assistance appropriations bill earmarked \$5 million in ESF for humanitarian food and medical assistance to Poland to be provided through private voluntary agencies. CARE, CRS and Project HOPE have made proposals for the use of these funds as follows:

CARE : requests \$345,000 for repackaging and administrative expenses in FY-82 and an identical sum for FY-83.

CRS: requests \$3.5 million for additional food and provision of sanitary and infants supplies and agricultural supplies. Of this, \$1.5 million is for packages of infant food, diapers, and soap. Transportation and administrative costs are included. Certain items in the proposal are not recommended for funding: agricultural supplies (pesticides) food packages for old age centers (duplicates CARE's effort) and whole milk (not cost effective).

PROJECT HOPE: requests up to \$5 million for disposable medical supplies, drugs, surgical sutures, and sterilization supplies to alleviate life-threatening shortages of these items in Polish obstetric and pediatric hospitals. HOPE has an agreement with the Polish Government and the Catholic Church to permit church monitoring of distribution of medical supplies to 16 such hospitals (proposal attached tab A). Although this program would expand Humanitarian assistance into the health area, it appears consistent with your policy and with the intent of the legislation authorizing ESF funds for Poland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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Options for ESF Allocation:

A. Reprogram to uses other than in Poland. This would require prompt notification of Congress in order to seek a waiver. Substantial congressional opposition is likely. Treasury supports this option.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

B. Allocate \$345,000 to CARE for FY-82, and an additional \$345,000 for FY-83 if decided to fund CARE program in FY-83, \$4,650,000 to PROJECT HOPE for Poland.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

C. Allocate \$350,000 to CARE (or \$700,000 as per II above), \$1.5 to CRS, and \$3,150,000 to PROJECT HOPE for Poland. State, Commerce, Agriculture, AID, and NSC support this option.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

CARE proposals for agricultural assistance:

CARE has submitted a proposal for US Government funding of a program to provide \$100 million in feed grains to private farmers in Poland as a form of humanitarian assistance. Provision of this funding would require a radical redefinition of humanitarian aid not in accordance with your current policy or with legislative guidelines for such aid. Distribution of the grain would be monitored by CARE, and CARE would undertake to monitor distribution of some of the chickens and eggs produced with the grain. CARE has submitted an initial proposal for funding 120,000 tons of feed grain worth about \$20 million.

The most feasible option for USG financing of the grain would be a supplemental appropriation which would require your support to pass quickly. But you would need to see substantial Polish progress toward meeting our three political conditions before lending support to the supplemental budget request. This form of humanitarian assistance would also require a considerable educational effort on the Hill and to the American

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