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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

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**FOIA**

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13

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
150701	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO RR RE. HAIG'S MEMORANDUM	2	ND	B1
150702	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR RE. POLAND - WORKING WITH THE ALLIES <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	3	1/5/1982	B1
150703	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. TELEGRAM FROM LANE KIRKLAND <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	1	1/7/1982	B1
150704	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR RE. HUMNITARIAN AID FOR POLAND <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	1	1/7/1982	B1
150705	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE. HAIG'S MEMORANDUM	2	ND	B1
150706	MEMO	HAIG TO RR RE. POLAND - WORKING WITH THE ALLIES [COPY OF DOC. 150702] <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	3	1/5/1982	B1
150707	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE. POLAND: ONE MONTH UNDER MARTIAL LAW <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	2	ND	B1
150708	MEMO	ALLAN MYER TO CLARK RE. POLISH SITUATION <b>R 12/7/2016 M452/1</b>	2	1/21/1982	B1

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150709	MEMO	CLARK TO HAIG RE. INTERAGENCY STUDY <i>R 10/12/2016 M452/1</i>	1	ND	B1

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Chronology

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# Soviet and Soviet-proxy Involvement in Poland

July 1980-December 1981



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is a chronology of public Soviet and Soviet-proxy involvement in Polish events of the last year and a half with an appendix of Soviet statements on Poland. It reveals a consistent pattern of pressure, threats, and intimidation that flagrantly violates the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It does not consider the covert Soviet pressure and manipulation about which the U.S. Government has classified information not contained in this chronology.*

## July 1980

2—First strike at Warsaw's Ursus Tractor Factory began. Workers protest increased meat prices.

## August 1980

14—Labor unrest has spread. More than 50,000 workers in Gdansk went on strike.

15—TASS announced Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Baltic region and G.D.R.

20—U.S.S.R. resumed jamming of Voice of America and other Western broadcasters.

27—In the first direct Soviet criticism of the Polish strikers, TASS charged that "anti-socialist forces" were trying to undermine socialism in Poland and to push it "off the socialist road it has chosen . . . which meets the vital interests of the entire Polish people."

## September 1980

1—*Pravda* editorial by "Petrov" criticized the Polish settlement. It made no mention of the Gdansk agreement or issue of free trade unions but firmly rejected "political" demands advanced by "anti-socialist elements" to inflict "direct damage" on socialism and "violate" the crucial link between the party and working class. It reminded Poland of its obligations to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. *Izvestiya*, in addition, attacked dissidents Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik.

2—TASS and Moscow TV criticized Carter and Reagan Labor Day speeches for interfering in Poland's internal affairs and charged that money is being collected in the West to undermine Polish socialism.

8—40,000 Warsaw Pact troops begin 4-day maneuvers in G.D.R.

10—Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski, heading a government economic delegation on a 2-day visit, met with chief Kremlin ideologist Mikhail Suslov and other senior officials in Moscow.

18—A report by William Beecher in *Boston Globe* (carried by the September 19 *Washington Star*) indicated that Western intelligence had picked up over the last few days signs of unusual military activity in the G.D.R. and U.S.S.R. which could presage either an invasion of Poland or a significant show of force for intimidation purposes.

19—Another authoritative “Petrov” article in *Pravda* warned the West not to interfere in Polish affairs.

25—*Pravda* carried a “book review” citing Lenin’s castigation of any “workers’ opposition” in a socialist state as an “anarcho-syndicalist view” which threatened “party’s leading role.”

#### October 1980

7—Moscow’s trade union daily *Trud* report from Gdansk alleged that there had been attempts to discredit the official Polish unions and warned of the “serious nature” of attempts to give trade union reforms an “anti-socialist tendency.”

30—Polish party First Secretary Kania and Premier Pinkowski made a sudden “working” visit to Moscow for talks with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. Communique did not endorse Kania personally but expressed confidence in the Polish party.

East Germany “temporarily” abolished visa-free travel between the G.D.R. and Poland until, according to the East German news agency, there was progress toward “stabilization” in Poland.

#### November 1980

8—Warsaw Radio reported that maneuvers had taken place in Poland by units of the Polish Army and the Soviet Northern Group of Forces. Warsaw TV broadcast a documentary about them.

24—Communist Party Central Committee department head in charge of radio and TV, Josef Klasa, in an interview with *New York Times*, *Figaro*, and *Financial Times* of London charged that “elements” close to Solidarity seemed to be working for economic anarchy, that Solidarity had the seeds of a political entity, and that its demands were growing voraciously. He claimed that Kania told Walesa in their meeting 2 weeks ago that a confrontation between the party and Solidarity would be catastrophic and declared that the Soviets had reason to be concerned.

A TASS dispatch from Warsaw warned that a threatened railway strike in Poland “could touch on Poland’s national and defense interests,” and accused the Solidarity federation of attempting to “maintain the tense situation in the country.”

25—*Trybuna Ludu* (apparently in answer to Soviet concerns) stated that labor problems would “never make it impossible for Poland to make good on its export and transit commitments.”

27—In its strongest attack thus far, *Rude Pravo* stated that there were limits to Solidarity’s activities, and drew an ominous parallel to Czechoslovakia’s liberal upsurge in 1968 quelled by a Warsaw Pact invasion.

#### December 1980

1-5—Press reports of Soviet troop activity in western military districts and of some mobilization of reserves indicated an increased military readiness. Soviet reservists called up during summer at height of labor unrest remain on duty.

3—An official party spokesman told a press conference that Polish communists had the “right and duty” to request Soviet assistance if socialism were endangered.

4—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman charged that Western statements on Poland were exacerbating the situation; a Soviet television commentary accused President Carter and other U.S. officials of waging psychological warfare against the Polish Government.

5—The Warsaw Pact’s emergency summit meeting in Moscow expressed confidence that Poland would be able to overcome its present difficulties and pledged “firm fraternal solidarity and support” to Poland, which “has been, is, and will remain a socialist state.”

7—White House statement says: “Preparation for possible intervention in Poland appears to have been completed.”

8—The Polish information agency Interpress and the local Solidarity chapter in Kielce denied a TASS report that “counterrevolutionary groups” within Solidarity at the Kielce electrical plant Iskra had ousted official trade union representatives and replaced them with persons “who openly adhere to anti-government positions.” (Czechoslovak, East German, and Bulgarian media had carried similar reports.) (Note: This was a deliberately fabricated TASS report, never published in the Soviet press after Polish denials. It represented a warning by evoking the memory of similar fabrications as part of Soviet preparations for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.)

18—*Pravda* accused NATO of trying to deny Poland’s leaders the right to call on allies to help in dealing with the crisis.

25-26—Foreign Minister Czyrek made an “official, friendly visit” to Moscow, where he met with Brezhnev and Gromyko. He reaffirmed that Poland “was, is, and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the common family of socialist countries.”

#### January 1981

6—Polish-Soviet Friendship Society called on its members “to fight the political forces that are trying to turn the renewal into an . . . anti-Soviet trend.”

13—Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Viktor Kulikov made surprise visit to Waraw, met with Kania and Polish defense chiefs.

Chairman of Polish-Soviet Friendship Society Stanislaw Wronski arrived in Moscow.

14-21—A delegation headed by Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) International Information Department head Leonid Zamyatin met with editorial boards of Polish media and expressed displeasure over Polish coverage of developments since August.

23—*Krasnaya zvezda* reported a recent joint training exercise of Soviet and Polish troops in Poland, but did not specify date or place. Polish military officials denied that exercises were taking place.

28—*Krasnaya zvezda* accused NATO of attempting to detach Poland from Warsaw Pact.

29—Polish Government declaration issued a barely veiled threat to invoke a state of emergency or martial law. This coincided with a TASS item from Warsaw alleging that, since January 24, opposition anti-socialist forces had been more active in Poland and that Solidarity was “veering to the right, opposing efforts of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party—the Communist party] Central Committee and the Polish Government to normalize the situation and safeguard the vital interests of the people.” Leaders and extremist elements of Solidarity were said to be resorting to blackmail, provocation, and physical force and were making more and more political demands, putting Solidarity in political opposition to the state and party authorities.

#### February 1981

2—TASS said that many Poles expect that “measures will be adopted to resist counterrevolution.”

8, 10—Pentagon and intelligence sources said Soviet troops alerted for crisis in December (altogether 26 divisions) remain in high state of readiness on Poland’s border.

17—Jaruzelski met with Soviet and Warsaw Pact ambassadors to Poland.

23—Brezhnev addressed CPSU Congress and reasserted the Brezhnev Doctrine. (See appendix, February 24, 1981.)

**24**—Kania tells CPSU Congress that Polish leaders are able and willing to “prevent a counterrevolution in Poland.” He added that “the situation in Poland and around it is directly connected with the security of all socialist states. The socialist community is indissoluble and its defense is not only the affair of each state, but of the entire coalition as well.”

**24-28**—Crescendo of Soviet media attacks culminating in charges that Solidarity had seized radio stations, blocked highways, and committed other illegal acts in preparation for a takeover.

### March 1981

**4**—Kania, Jaruzelski, and other Polish leaders held talks in Moscow with Brezhnev and other senior Soviet Politburo members. The communique said the Soviets expected the Poles “to turn the course of events.” It also said that the defense of socialism is a concern of “the entire socialist community.”

**5**—U.S.S.R. announced plans for Warsaw Pact maneuvers in March in the area from the Polish-Czech border north to the Baltic.

**19**—The Polish News Agency (PAP) reported Warsaw Pact “Soyuz-81” maneuvers in Poland, G.D.R., U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia, stressing that the Polish Army with Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces would fulfill its duty to defend socialism.

**22**—Deputy Premier Rakowski informed Solidarity leaders that the Warsaw Pact exercise “Soyuz-81” was to be extended “because of the situation in Poland.” He warned Solidarity that its actions could bring in Soviet tanks.

**29**—Secretaries Haig and Weinberger described the “heightened state of readiness” of Soviet troops postured near Poland.

### April 1981

**2-3**—The Western press reported more on military movements in and around Poland. Meanwhile, Soviet press commentary appeared aimed at providing a justification for possible Soviet action.

**6**—At Czech party congress with Brezhnev present, President Husak reaffirmed the right of the Warsaw Pact to intervene to preserve Poland’s socialist system.

**7**—State Department reported unusual levels of Warsaw Pact military activity, increases in Soviet troops near Poland, the establishment of a Soviet communications and command network, and supply stockpiles in Poland.

**9**—U.S. officials reported that Soviet transport helicopters, planes, pilots, and technicians were flown to Soviet military headquarters in southwest Poland on March 3.

**10**—Speaking before the *Sejm* [parliament], Jaruzelski asked for a suspension of the right to strike for 2 months. He said Poland’s current chance to work out its problems on its own was “not repeatable.”

State Department reported that the U.S.S.R. had sent even more transport aircraft to Poland.

**11**—At the G.D.R. party congress, Party Chief Honecker declared that Poland “was, is, and will remain socialist.”

**23-24**—Soviet Politburo ideologist Mikhail Suslov arrived in Warsaw unexpectedly to hold talks with members of the Polish Politburo. The Polish News Agency reported that the talks stressed the need to “remove the dangers to the gains of socialism.”

**25**—TASS attacked “revisionist elements” within the Polish party, the first such accusation in the Soviet media, reflecting the poor outcome of the Suslov visit.

### May 1981

**4**—Following a report in the April 29 Solidarity bulletin that Soviet troops “landed” in southeast Poland on April 22, Western military sources revealed that Soviet troops in that region were constructing military communications.

**28**—The party youth newspaper *Sztandar Mlodych* published an appeal by an obscure “Katowice party forum” for “decisive action” by Poland’s leaders against “counterrevolution” and “revisionism.” (Although widely condemned in Polish party circles, the appeal was favorably reported by Czechoslovak radio on May 31, by Soviet TASS on June 1, by *Pravda*, and by Soviet TV on June 2.)

**30**—Kania and Jaruzelski met in Warsaw with Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Marshal Kulikov in what was described as a “friendly” atmosphere.

### June 1981

**5**—The Soviet party sent a seven-page “warning” letter to the Polish party Central Committee. The letter accused the Kania-Jaruzelski leadership of incapacity to deal with “counterrevolution.” (See appendix, June 12, 1981.)

Notwithstanding the widespread opposition in Poland to the Katowice forum’s harsh criticism of Kania’s policies, TASS carried a lengthy and favorable report on the forum.

**9-11**—The 11th plenum of the Polish party Central Committee, convened to deal with the June 5 CPSU letter, developed into an open power struggle between Kania and his moderate supporters and the Moscow-backed hardliners led by Grabski. Kania survived the challenge, but acknowledged that Soviet concern over developments in Poland was “fully justified.”

**14-16**—Walesa embarked on a cross-country campaign to urge Solidarity chapters to refrain from confrontations and to concentrate on union activities. His efforts coincided with the defacement of a Soviet war memorial, which he denounced as a provocation designed to implicate Solidarity and destabilize an already tense situation.

**20**—Chief Kremlin spokesman Zamyatin declared on Soviet TV that “the time has come for decisive action” by Polish leaders “to avert a national catastrophe.”

**22**—Soviet military paper *Krasnaya zvezda* carried Warsaw Pact Chief Kulikov’s article denouncing Polish “counter-revolutionary forces.”

**23**—*Pravda* said any change in Poland’s status would weaken a key link in the Warsaw Pact, threatening the entire balance of post-World War II Europe. TASS accused Solidarity of seeking to pack the Polish party congress with delegates who would seek to challenge the Marxist-Leninist character of the party.

**25**—The Polish News Agency reported joint Polish-Soviet military exercises in Silesia.

**29**—Polish TV reported that Polish-Soviet military exercises extended to the northwest province of Pomerania.

**30**—*Neues Deutschland* reported military maneuvers in G.D.R.

### July 1981

**3-5**—Gromyko conferred in Warsaw with the Polish leadership on eve of PZPR Ninth Congress.

**3**—Soviet troops in western Ukraine on Polish border resumed 2-day intensive training for full mobilization, according to sources in Moscow.

**7**—Western sources reported that the U.S.S.R. was preparing yet another major military exercise near Poland.

19—Brezhnev sent a terse message of congratulations to Kania on his reelection. The message lacked any praise or statement of confidence in Kania's leadership.

21—Brezhnev and Tikhonov cabled congratulations on the anniversary of the Polish People's Republic. The message noted that the party congress "has set the task of stabilizing the situation" and that the Polish party is "capable of rallying all the working people . . . to resolutely rebuff anarchy and counterrevolution."

#### August 1981

8—Polish Premier Jaruzelski held talks with visiting Warsaw Pact Chief Kulikov.

13—The Soviet Union announced that it would hold major land and sea maneuvers in the western U.S.S.R. on September 4-12.

14-15—Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski flew to the Crimea for a "short working visit" with Brezhnev and other senior Soviet leaders.

#### September 1981

4-12—U.S.S.R. hosted "Zapad-81" military exercises.

8—TASS announced that, at the invitation of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, the defense ministers of all Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam were attending the "Zapad-81" exercise in the U.S.S.R.

10—Polish News Agency reported that Kania received Soviet Ambassador Aristov, who, it is speculated, presented Kania with a warning letter from the Kremlin. (See September 17, 1981, and appendix, September 18, 1981.)

17—Following a report that Soviet Ambassador Aristov had been received by Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski, the Polish News Agency disclosed that the Soviet leadership had reminded Warsaw in a letter that the "growth of anti-Sovietism in Poland . . . has reached dangerous limits" and had called for resolute action to halt such activities. (See appendix, September 18, 1981.)

22—Soviet Gen. Gibkov, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, met with Polish Prime Minister Jaruzelski on "problems of training and combat readiness of the detached [Polish] troops which form part of the Joint Armed Forces."

22-26—Soviet Deputy Premier and Planning Chief Baybakov discussed Polish-Soviet economic relations in Warsaw amid rumors that the Soviets were considering the use of economic leverage to bring Warsaw to heel.

23—On the eve (September 26) of the Solidarity congress's second session, TASS criticized the Polish leadership for not acting against the union leaders or halting what it called preparations for a takeover of power.

26—TASS indirectly criticized the Polish leadership by carrying an appeal of the hardline "Marxist-Leninist Seminar" in Katowice that Warsaw "use all existing means" to defend socialism.

#### October 1981

13—*Pravda* carried an authoritative "A. Petrov" commentary criticizing Solidarity for seeking the destruction of Polish socialism and taking over political power. The article contained an implied threat of intervention. (See appendix, October 13, 1981.)

14—Suslov made a speech emphasizing "imperialist" attempts to weaken Polish socialism through overt and covert assistance to "counterrevolutionary" forces. He promised Poland "the fraternal solidarity and support of the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact."

17—Premier Jaruzelski replaced Kania as Communist party chief.

#### November 1981

Early November—Press accounts reported that the Soviets had warned the Poles that Soviet economic assistance to Poland would be reduced and that Moscow would insist on a trade balance beginning in 1982.

27-28—The Polish sixth party plenum adopted a resolution authorizing the government to seek enabling legislation in the *Sejm* for the restoration of social peace, including special emergency powers.

#### December 1981

7—Polish press intensified criticism of Solidarity, publishing excerpts from tape recordings of Solidarity meetings in Radom; TASS replayed the Polish attacks.

11—In one of its sharpest attacks in some time, TASS charged that counter-revolutionary forces have expanded their struggle against the Polish Party, citing various extreme actions which "justly anger the Soviet people." (See appendix, December 11, 1981.)

13—Another TASS report attacking Solidarity concocted a virtual invitation by "patriotic forces" in Poland for the imposition of military repression. (See appendix, December 13, 1981.)

Radio Moscow reported the imposition of martial law in Poland, the internment of "extremists" of Solidarity, the formation of a military ruling council, and the reaffirmation of Polish-Soviet ties.

14—A TASS statement called the martial law a "purely internal affair."

23—President Reagan denounced the public and secret Soviet pressure on Poland. He then revealed that Marshal Kulikov and other senior Red Army officers were in Poland while the martial law was being initiated and that the martial law proclamation issued 10 days before was printed in Moscow in September.

Late December—A Soviet lecturer, speaking to a public audience in the Soviet Union shortly after the declaration of martial law, stated that martial law had been in preparation for a month (i.e., well before Solidarity's call on December 3 at Radom for free elections—the supposed reason for the imposition of martial law) and said that it had been "brilliantly conspired."

#### APPENDIX

##### Soviet Statements on Poland

##### December 6, 1980—*Pravda*

Statement by Warsaw Pact leaders meeting in Moscow:

Socialist Poland, the Polish United Workers Party and the Polish people can firmly count on the fraternal solidarity and support of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Representatives of the Polish United Workers Party stressed that Poland has been, is and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the common family of the countries of socialism.

##### February 24, 1981—*Pravda*

Brezhnev speech to CPSU Congress:

In fraternal Poland . . . the enemies of socialism, with the support of outside forces, are creating anarchy and endeavoring to turn the development of events into a counter-revolutionary channel. . . . A threat to the foundations of the socialist state has arisen. . . . We will stand up for socialist Poland, fraternal Poland, and will not leave her in the lurch. . . . Communists have always boldly met the attacks of the adversary and won out. This is how it was and how it will be, and let not one have any doubt about our common determination to secure our interests and defend the peoples' socialist gains.

**March 5, 1981—Pravda**

Statement on Brezhnev-Kania meeting in Moscow:

The Polish comrades spoke about . . . the measures taken to overcome the serious threat to the Polish people's socialist gains. The PZPR and the Government of the Polish People's Republic . . . will steadfastly press for fully overcoming anarchy and disarray, for strengthening the socialist system. . . . Imperialism and internal reaction hope that the economic and political crisis in Poland will result in a change in the alignment of forces in the world, in a weakening of the socialist community, the international communist and the entire liberation movement. This makes particularly pressing a firm and resolute rebuff to such dangerous attempts. The socialist community is inseparable; defense of it is the cause not only of each state but of the entire socialist coalition. . . . Poland was and will be a reliable link of the socialist community.

**June 12, 1981—Pravda**

Letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party:

A deep crisis has broken out in Poland, which has encompassed the entire political and economic life of the country.

. . . From the very first days of the crisis we considered it important that the party should resolutely repulse the attempts by the enemies of socialism, to take advantage of the difficulties which have arisen in their far-reaching aims.

But this was not done. Endless concessions to the anti-socialist forces and their solicitations have brought about a situation in which the PZPR was retreating step by step under the onslaught of the internal counter-revolution, which relies on the support of imperialist subversion centers from abroad.

Today the situation is not just dangerous. It has brought the country to the critical point. . . . The enemies of socialist Poland . . . are engaged in a struggle for power, and are already capturing it. They are gaining control of one position after another. . . .

The extremely serious danger, which is hanging over socialism in Poland, is a threat also to the very existence of the independent Polish state.

. . . Stanislaw Kania, Wojciech Jaruzelski and other Polish comrades expressed agreement with our considerations on all issues, which were brought up for discussion. But in fact everything remains unchanged. No corrections have been made in the policy of concessions and compromises. One position after another is being surrendered. . . .

The offensive by the hostile anti-socialist forces in the Polish People's Republic threatens the interests of the whole of our community, its cohesion, integrity and security of borders. Yes, our common security. . . .

The point is to mobilize all the healthy forces of society. . . . This requires in the first place revolutionary determination of the party itself, its activists and leadership. Yes, leadership. Time is not waiting. The party can and must find the strength in itself to change the course of events. . . .

**September 18, 1981—Warsaw**

**Domestic Radio**

Statement of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, delivered to the Polish leaders by the Soviet ambassador to Warsaw:

An acute and unbridled campaign against the Soviet Union and its foreign and domestic policy is manifestly being extensively waged in the country and it is going unpunished. These are not isolated, irresponsible attacks but the coordinated action of enemies of socialism with a precisely determined political thrust. . . .

Threats are appearing against soldiers of Soviet Army units, which are standing guard over the western boundaries of the socialist community. . . . The anti-socialist forces are aiming at evoking an atmosphere of extreme nationalism in Poland, giving it a distinctly anti-Soviet character. . . .

This cannot but give rise to this question in our country: Why, on the part of official authorities in Poland, have no decisive steps been taken up to now to put an end to the hostile campaign against the U.S.S.R. . . . ?

All this gives rise to profound indignation among Soviet people. . . . The Soviet people . . . have a full moral right to demand that an end be put to the anti-Soviet impudence in the Polish People's Republic.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government consider that further tolerance of any kinds of phenomena of anti-Sovietism causes tremendous damage to Polish-Soviet relations and is in direct contradiction with the commitments based on alliance taken on by Poland, and to the vital interests of the Polish people. We expect that the leadership of the PZPR and the Government of the Polish People's Republic will without delay take resolute and radical steps in order to stop the malicious anti-Soviet propaganda and acts which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

**October 13, 1981—Pravda**

*Pravda* article over "Aleksey Petrov" pseudonym:

The situation in Poland is growing more acute, increasingly alarming the Polish communists, the patriots of socialist Poland and all its friends. . . . The socialist foundations of Polish society are being eroded under the flag of the so-called "renewal."

The antisocialist forces are using Solidarity as a battering ram to destroy the foundations of the public ownership of the means of production with a view to switching the country onto the rails of the restoration of capitalism. . . .

The enemies of socialism operating in Solidarity have disclosed the ultimate scheme of the imperialist circles, namely, the shattering of the socialist community by beginning with Poland. The preservation of the revolutionary gains of the Polish people is not only their domestic question. It is a question directly affecting the vital interests of all the peoples and states which have chosen the road of socialism. All this places special responsibility on the Polish working people and on the party and government leadership

of the country. Awareness of this responsibility, as many Polish communists stress, should be translated into an effective rebuff to counterrevolution and its imperialist inspirers and into the strengthening of the positions of socialism in Poland.

**December 11, 1981—Pravda**  
TASS report on Poland:

The counterrevolutionary forces are broadening the front of their open struggle against the PZPR, the government and socialism. . . . The leaders of local Solidarity organizations have begun setting up commando units at enterprises. Every strike unit includes up to 250-300 members. Theft of weapons and explosives from State storehouses has been recorded.

Leaflets have been disseminated in the Szczecin, Radom and some other voivodships [provinces] announcing December 20 to be "a Sunday of crushing the PZPR." Slogans are called out to do away with communists. . . . Mazowsze's leader, Bujak, said that they were planning to take over the premises of the central television and radio of Poland on December 17.

Attacks on Poland's relations with its allies are being stepped up and demagogical demands are being made for Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and for using the lines of communications passing through Polish territory to pressure Poland's allies. Individual provocative elements question the existing Soviet-Polish border and maliciously smear the history of the liberation of Poland from the Hitler invaders by the Soviet Army. All this justly angers the Soviet people.

**December 13, 1981—Pravda**  
TASS report on Poland:

. . . Solidarity and counterrevolutionary elements operating within it are preparing for direct seizure of power.

Precisely this is evidenced by a session of the All-Poland Solidarity Commission currently underway in Gdansk. Most of its participants favor a general strike, which would fully paralyze the country, and transition to activate operations with a view to overthrowing the socialist system.

Solidarity's attempts to mask their offensive on the PZPR and the government by slogans of "moderation" and lull the authorities' vigilance cannot delude those who are fully resolved to defend the Polish socialist state against encroachments from the class enemies. Patriotic forces of Polish society increasingly more resolutely demand that a rebuff be given to the enemies of socialism, the rebuff which they deserve for their criminal actions. Fraternal countries of socialism side with the Polish people in this just struggle against counterrevolution. ■

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Editor: Colleen Sussman





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DTG 010210Z JAN 82

ROUTINE

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TO: LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM NANCE, WASH, D.C.

010221Z JAN 82

2. DAVE GERGEN, WASH, D.C.

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

AS PER DICK DANMAN, A COPY OF THIS IS WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT WITH A NOTATION THAT YOU TOO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED A COPY.

*Q*

CC: THE VICE PRESIDENT

MR. MEISE

*62*

217 31 PG: 28

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**Telegram**

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01 DLY UG WASHINGTON, D.C. DECEMBER 31, 1981  
PMS THE HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN  
C/O AMBASSADORE WALTER ANNENBERG  
PALM SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA

URGENT

DECEMBER 31, 1981

RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
THE WHITE HOUSE

FORM 1201-27 (12-80)

**Telegram**

1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

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DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE NOW OCCURRING THERE.

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HEAVILY UPON THE POLISH PEOPLE THAN UPON THE RULING GOVERNMENT  
UNLESS MEASURES ARE TAKEN AT THE SAME TIME TO ASSURE THAT EMER-  
GENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ARE CHANNELLED TO THE GENERAL POPULACE.

5  
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WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, ARE CONVINCED THAT A WIDE CROSS SECTION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CONCUR IN OUR THINKING THAT IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY FOOD AID IS THE MOST VITAL THING THAT CAN BE DONE.

W.U. 1201-SP (RS-00)

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AMERICAN WORKERS, FARMERS AND OTHER CITIZENS ARE JOINING TOGETHER IN RAISING OUR VOICES IN PROTEST AGAINST THE DESTRUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND. WE WILL GIVE MORAL SUPPORT IN EVERY WAY WE CAN.

THE POLISH NATION, NOW A THOUSAND YEARS OLD, HAS SURVIVED

A 1201-SF (16-68)

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SINCERELY,

LANE KIRKLAND  
PRESIDENT  
AFL-CIO

GEORGE W. STONE,  
PRESIDENT,  
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

1201-SF (16-68)

**Telegram**

ARCHBISHOP JOHN F. BOACH,  
CHAIRMAN,  
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF  
CATHOLIC BISHOPS

DAVID PREUSS,  
PRESIDENT,  
AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH

RABBI ALEXANDER SCHINDLER,  
PRESIDENT  
UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW  
CONGREGATIONS

W.L. 1201-SF (RS-68)

**Telegram**

EDWIN J. WESELY,  
CHAIRMAN,  
COOPERATIVE FOR AMERICAN RELIEF  
EVERYWHERE, INC. (CARE)

NNNN

W.L. 1201-SF (RS-68)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED with  
~~SECRET~~ Attachments

January 6, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*  
 JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JMR*

SUBJECT: Haig's Memorandum "Poland -- Working with the  
 Allies"

Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) provides NSC Staff commentary and recommended follow-up concerning the game-plan Al Haig outlines for securing Allied support in the Polish crisis (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*WJ*  
 Stearman, Shoemaker, Bailey, *MB* Lenz and Nau concur.

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
 Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum  
 of January 5, 1982

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*Rv*  
*1/14/82*

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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150702

January 5, 1982  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
SUBJECT: Poland -- Working with The Allies

Dynamics

As you know, we are facing statements and moves by Jaruzelski designed to show movement toward compromise. At the same time, the Soviets have charged the West with interfering in Poland and the US with damaging East-West relations. This two-track approach is designed to make our Allies temporize and drive a wedge into the Alliance. It will pose us some problems, especially if Jaruzelski gets the Church and Walesa engaged in discussions.

But broader dynamics are working for us. Public opinion in France, the UK, Canada and elsewhere is ahead of governments and will pressure them in a direction closer to ours. A key to the European dynamic is the ability of ourselves and other Allies to move the Germans toward a harder position. Several Allies -- e.g., Denmark and Norway -- are hiding behind German inaction. The Schmidt visit has already gone very far in closing the gap between Bonn and Washington and will provide a strong Washington, Bonn, London and Rome axis for the Ministerial.

Objectives

Our immediate goals are to maximize Western outrage and to back up the words with actions. Looking ahead, we need to keep a false sense of progress in Poland from dissipating the Western reaction. But most important -- for it will underlie everything we do -- we need to fashion a common overall policy framework within the Alliance to provide a basis for more

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/2/16

effective joint action over the longer haul. Schmidt and others should be made aware that without such joint action, public criticism of the Allies will be increasingly hard to contain.

What We Are Doing

We have been pushing in NATO and bilaterally for a firm response which pins the blame on Moscow as well as Warsaw. We have briefed a number of Allies on Soviet complicity and collusion between the Polish General Staff and the Kremlin. We have generated wide support for calling an emergency session of CSCE in Madrid -- though, as you know, this will almost certainly not occur since the East will oppose meeting before the agreed February 9 resumption date. (I will shortly be sending you my recommendations on what to do about CSCE beyond calling for an emergency session.) We have Alliance agreement to hold a special NATO Ministerial next week.

The Special NAC on Poland

Ideally, this meeting will enable us to pry loose some Allied sanctions against Poland and the Soviets. But equally if not more important, we should use the event to create a common overall policy for the longer haul -- i.e., a framework with as much specificity as possible. The outcome we want is not a rhetorical declaration but a calm and sober agreed policy containing the following elements:

Common assessment:

- events in Poland are intolerable;
- we hold the USSR and Polish Junta responsible for oppression in Poland;
- blatant violations of the Helsinki Act are occurring;
- better East-West relations depend on improvement in the Polish situation.

Common current policy approach:

- the basis for progress in arms control could be endangered (but the onus must always rest with USSR, not the U.S. or the West);
- humanitarian aid will continue (or grow) based on agreed Western provisions for monitoring;

- but, absent genuine movement, economic intercourse with Poland and the USSR will not continue as before; and will decrease as a result of specific, discernible actions.
- and political relations, too, will be affected.

Common plans, if events turn for the better or worse:

- sanctions will be reversible;
- increased suppression or Soviet involvement will lead to more serious Western steps;
- an invasion will trigger sharp measures affecting trade and credits (ranging from a cut-off on new agreements, as foreseen in Allied planning, to a broader embargo).

Arms Control

Agreement on this framework will not easily be achieved. We will now launch intensive consultations to maximize our prospects. One of the most important tools we have with our Allies is our determination not to break off arms control negotiations. We may find that, in exchange for continuing with INF negotiations and opening the START process in early 1982, we can secure greater Allied vigor in the economic area. We will thus have to convince the Allies that their support for the actions we are taking will make it less necessary for us to contemplate more severe unilateral steps, including the Polish default (tank) issue or, in extremis, putting the brake on arms control.

All in all, the key to success will be to stay far enough in front of the Allies to bring them along without doing so much so fast that we give rise to concerns that our real aim is confrontation, with the Polish situation only a pretext. You have thus far accomplished just that, despite anticipated frictions.

# Reagan-Schmidt Dialogue Mirrors True Policy Toward Poland

No, President Reagan did not bring up the subject of the Siberia-to-Europe natural gas pipeline with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

No, the chancellor did not bring up the subject of continuing U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union.

That's what made the encounter between the two leaders so edgy—and so futile as far as Poland is concerned.

Neither one dared challenge the other to impose the one sanction that might make a difference to the Soviet Union.

Their meeting was a standoff, with marginal domestic political benefits to both—and none for Poland.

Reagan has been hard-pressed by his right wing to do something to the Soviets for what they are doing to Poland. So it was useful for him to have at his side the personification of NATO's resistance to his call for sanctions. Schmidt illustrates the business-as-usual mentality that has made it impossible for Reagan to appear as the leader of the Western world in the wake of the suffocation of Poland.

The chancellor gave lip-service to the

president's mild sanctions as a "strong, clear signal." But he has no intention of matching them.

Obviously, Schmidt has figured out that if Reagan really wanted to do the Russians in, the president would strike at their greatest vulnerability, their inability to feed their own people. Reagan could reimpose the grain embargo—the action, incidentally, of Jimmy Carter, an American president against whose waffling Schmidt often privately railed.

In the crowded press conference that he held, half in English, half in German, after his White House luncheon meeting, Schmidt was pleased to report that the embarrassing grain sales had been mentioned to him by two high officials of the Reagan administration, who plainly wished to deflect any discussion of it between the two principals.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. had told him, Schmidt said in the measured tones he used throughout his exceptional visit, "that the president had a promise to keep"—a promise not to reimpose the grain embargo.

Vice President Bush, Schmidt said, also referred to the "promise" problem and said the chancellor should understand that "it was necessary for the credibility of the United States."

That rather opaque phrasing from the

Mary McGroary

## FUTILE

vice president was understood perfectly by the leader of West Germany, who lectured at some length about "economic pressures"—such as those that make it unthinkable for him to cancel his part in the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline.

If the president of the United States, he seemed to be saying, can put a promise to farmers above the plight of the Poles, why can't the chancellor of West Germany put his country's energy needs above the moral

indignation—in which he has belatedly joined—over the Soviet crackdown?

Poor Reagan, the most anti-Soviet president the United States has ever had, is in the excruciating position of feeding the Soviets and starving the Poles. He is, under the present policy—of continuing the shipment of 20 million tons of grain to Russia and suspending food shipments to Poland—helping the perpetrators and punishing the victims.

In that context, it was a victory for him to wrest from Schmidt a declaration, in a joint statement, that "they both noted the responsibility of the Soviet Union for developments in Poland."

Schmidt rather testily insisted that he has always known the Soviets did the deed in Poland, and blamed unnamed reporters for the "mess" of misunderstanding. The record does not bear him out.

For his part, he was able to demonstrate to his constituency that he stood up to Reagan amid White House hints of an "American backlash" for his initial rhetorical limpness. Germans, like other West Europeans, have marched and wept for the

brave Poles. If they want their governments to go beyond hand-wringing, they have not made it clear.

Some in Washington believe still that, with Western help, Poland could rise up against her oppressors and claw open a crack in the Iron Curtain that would bring it crashing down.

Europe's leaders, however, are following Schmidt's "realpolitik." Its elements were put forth in an ice-cold analysis by Ronald Steel, the biographer of Walter Lippmann, in last Sunday's New York Times. "For better or worse, the status quo [in Europe] serves both superpowers," he observed.

And that is why Reagan, who aches for the Poles, who burns for the destruction of the Soviet system, keeps up the arms negotiations, contemplates meeting Brezhnev and lets the grain go through.

Poland's fate was sealed over 30 years ago at Yalta, where spheres of influence were defined, and was resealed in Helsinki in 1975. It has meant tyranny for the satellites—and also a peace that Europe is reluctant to disturb. Reagan's words deny the fact; his actions, like Schmidt's, affirm it.

~~SECRET~~

150703

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MEMORANDUM

0048/0053

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 7, 1982

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Telegram from Lane Kirkland, et al

The President was sent a telegram (Tab I) signed by Lane Kirkland and other labor, Church and charity figures suggesting an airlift of surplus agricultural products to the Polish people, to be distributed through private (presumably mostly Church) channels.

In accordance with the decision of the SSG meeting of January 2, 1982, the State Department has been looking into the matter and Secretary Haig has written a memo to the President (Tab II).

It should be pointed out that we already have such a program in place in accordance with a Presidential decision at an NSC meeting of September 15, 1981. This program was specifically exempted from the sanctions against the Polish government recommended by the SSG on December 19, 1981 and approved by the President, and a substantial portion of these commodities have not yet been shipped. It is our understanding that both Catholic Relief and CARE are stretched to the limit already distributing food, medicine, etc. from us, Europe and elsewhere.

This being the case, announcing a big new program might have some propaganda value, but would have little or no effect on the actual situation, particularly since, as Secretary Haig points out, Congressional action would be necessary.

Richard *R* Pipes, Paula Dobriansky *PD* and William Stearman *W* concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Telegram from Kirkland, et al
- Tab II Memo from Haig to the President

~~SECRET~~

Review January 7, 1988

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NLRR M45211 #150703

BY *HW* NARA DATE *12/9/86*

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# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 82/01/05

Name of Correspondent: Lane Kirkland

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: writes concerning the crisis in Poland. Urges that emergency food aid be sent to Poland. Suggestions re same

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>L. Boni</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>82/01/06</u>	<u>NAN</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>82/01/06</u>
<u>USNANC</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82/01/06</u>			<u>1 1</u>
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#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

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- Code = "A"
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01 DLY UG WASHINGTON, D.C. DECEMBER 31, 1981  
PMS THE HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

DECEMBER 31, 1981

RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 - 356-697

18

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SINCERELY,

LANE KIRKLAND  
PRESIDENT

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 - 356-697

**GEORGE W. STONE,  
PRESIDENT,  
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION**

**ARCHBISHOP JOHN R. ROACH,  
CHAIRMAN,  
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF  
CATHOLIC BISHOPS**

**DAVID PREUSS,  
PRESIDENT,  
AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH**

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**RABBI ALEXANDER SCHINDLER,  
PRESIDENT  
UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW  
CONGREGATIONS**

**EDWIN J. WESELY,  
CHAIRMAN,  
COOPERATIVE FOR AMERICAN RELIEF  
EVERYWHERE, INC. (CARE)**

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
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BY LW NLRR M4521 #150704  
NARA DATE 12/7/10

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

82 JAN 8, P 3: 25  
January 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.   
SUBJECT: Humanitarian Aid for Poland and the Kirkland Proposal

The suggestion by Lane Kirkland and others for more food aid to the Polish people is timely. We have been thinking along the same line. Our international objectives would be served by balancing our sanctions against the Polish government with an offer of additional humanitarian assistance. This would, inter alia, undercut European criticism of the U.S. sanctions against Poland and help get them on board with us. Kirkland's telegram confirms that there would be domestic support for such an offer.

It would have been a nice political touch to have converted the \$100 million CCC credit for the Polish government, which we put on hold December 23, into food assistance to the Polish people, but this is legally impossible. To provide food assistance through voluntary agencies to the Polish people -- our firm policy during the crackdown -- we will have to use PL 480, Title II and other humanitarian assistance. For political impact, \$100 million is the notional amount we should offer. This will require a supplemental; reprogramming is not possible.

The voluntary agencies we use now say their delivery capacity is strained. We will have to look for ways to increase that capacity and seek participation of other appropriate private and international agencies, including the Polish Church. You should make a public statement offering such assistance but indicating that it is contingent on the resolution of logistical and monitoring problems, some of which could be alleviated if the Polish Government provided the agencies more facilities.

Recommendation

That you agree to the preparation and submission of appropriate legislation and, at the same time, that State, working with the Department of Agriculture and A.I.D. explore with the voluntary and other agencies ways in which delivery capacity can be enlarged. We would, of course, consult very closely with the Congress on our intentions after it returns on January 25. At some point, assuming your approval of this recommendation, you should issue a statement on our intentions.

~~SECRET~~

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 12, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Haig's Memorandum: "Poland -- Working with the Allies"

Attached at Tab I is an updated memorandum from you to the President forwarding Secretary of State Haig's memorandum (Tab A) outlining the strategy for securing Allied support in the Polish crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Rentschler, Stearman, Shoemaker, Bailey, Lenz and Nau concur.

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum of January 5, 1982.

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*rw*  
*1/14/83*

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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150706  
WHITE HOUSE  
January 5, 1982  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
SUBJECT: Poland -- Working with The Allies

Dynamics

As you know, we are facing statements and moves by Jaruzelski designed to show movement toward compromise. At the same time, the Soviets have charged the West with interfering in Poland and the US with damaging East-West relations. This two-track approach is designed to make our Allies temporize and drive a wedge into the Alliance. It will pose us some problems, especially if Jaruzelski gets the Church and Walesa engaged in discussions.

But broader dynamics are working for us. Public opinion in France, the UK, Canada and elsewhere is ahead of governments and will pressure them in a direction closer to ours. A key to the European dynamic is the ability of ourselves and other Allies to move the Germans toward a harder position. Several Allies -- e.g., Denmark and Norway -- are hiding behind German inaction. The Schmidt visit has already gone very far in closing the gap between Bonn and Washington and will provide a strong Washington, Bonn, London and Rome axis for the Ministerial.

Objectives

Our immediate goals are to maximize Western outrage and to back up the words with actions. Looking ahead, we need to keep a false sense of progress in Poland from dissipating the Western reaction. But most important -- for it will underlie everything we do -- we need to fashion a common overall policy framework within the Alliance to provide a basis for more

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/16

effective joint action over the longer haul. Schmidt and others should be made aware that without such joint action, public criticism of the Allies will be increasingly hard to contain.

#### What We Are Doing

We have been pushing in NATO and bilaterally for a firm response which pins the blame on Moscow as well as Warsaw. We have briefed a number of Allies on Soviet complicity and collusion between the Polish General Staff and the Kremlin. We have generated wide support for calling an emergency session of CSCE in Madrid -- though, as you know, this will almost certainly not occur since the East will oppose meeting before the agreed February 9 resumption date. (I will shortly be sending you my recommendations on what to do about CSCE beyond calling for an emergency session.) We have Alliance agreement to hold a special NATO Ministerial next week.

#### The Special NAC on Poland

Ideally, this meeting will enable us to pry loose some Allied sanctions against Poland and the Soviets. But equally if not more important, we should use the event to create a common overall policy for the longer haul -- i.e., a framework with as much specificity as possible. The outcome we want is not a rhetorical declaration but a calm and sober agreed policy containing the following elements:

##### Common assessment:

- events in Poland are intolerable;
- we hold the USSR and Polish Junta responsible for oppression in Poland;
- blatant violations of the Helsinki Act are occurring;
- better East-West relations depend on improvement in the Polish situation.

##### Common current policy approach:

- the basis for progress in arms control could be endangered (but the onus must always rest with USSR, not the U.S. or the West);
- humanitarian aid will continue (or grow) based on agreed Western provisions for monitoring;

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-- but, absent genuine movement, economic intercourse with Poland and the USSR will not continue as before; and will decrease as a result of specific, discernible actions.

-- and political relations, too, will be affected.

Common plans, if events turn for the better or worse:

-- sanctions will be reversible;

-- increased suppression or Soviet involvement will lead to more serious Western steps;

-- an invasion will trigger sharp measures affecting trade and credits (ranging from a cut-off on new agreements, as foreseen in Allied planning, to a broader embargo).

#### Arms Control

Agreement on this framework will not easily be achieved. We will now launch intensive consultations to maximize our prospects. One of the most important tools we have with our Allies is our determination not to break off arms control negotiations. We may find that, in exchange for continuing with INF negotiations and opening the START process in early 1982, we can secure greater Allied vigor in the economic area. We will thus have to convince the Allies that their support for the actions we are taking will make it less necessary for us to contemplate more severe unilateral steps, including the Polish default (tank) issue or, in extremis, putting the brake on arms control.

All in all, the key to success will be to stay far enough in front of the Allies to bring them along without doing so much so fast that we give rise to concerns that our real aim is confrontation, with the Polish situation only a pretext. You have thus far accomplished just that, despite anticipated frictions.

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Bailey

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 14, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Poland: One Month Under Martial Law

The memorandum attached at Tab I for your signature to the President is a self-explanatory update on the situation in Poland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Norman Bailey  
Bill Stearman  
Allen Lenz  
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

UNCLASSIFIED with  
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*rw*  
*1/14/82*

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON.

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: Poland: One Month Under Martial Law

As the initial shock of December 13 dissipates, the intentions of Poland's military government are becoming increasingly clear. (S)

The purpose of Jaruzelski's coup was not merely to stamp out the nation-wide opposition that has arisen in 1980-81, but also to ensure, through a complete revamping of the entire system, that Communist authority will never be challenged again. This military dictatorship is the classic embodiment of the counterrevolution. As the counter-reforms are put in place, the junta intends gradually to relax its grip on the country and turn power over to a new, restructured Communist Party. The process is likely to take years rather than months, and its outcome is far from certain. (S)

Judging both by the actions and statements of the Polish junta, its objective is to transform Poland politically on the Czech model and economically on the Hungarian one. This means the restoration of totalitarianism with a certain amount of carefully controlled decentralization and self-management in the economic sphere. (S)

- The Polish Government is moving quickly and ruthlessly to destroy all vestiges of political reforms introduced in 1980-81. The democratic processes introduced into the party in July 1981 have been abrogated and strict centralism is being restored. Trade union activity has been outlawed. Statutes ensuring university autonomy have been abolished. In short, all independent associations and democratic procedures are being done away with.
- The Polish Communist party, which in the first days of the new regime disappeared from view, is energetically reconstituting itself. The party is, for all practical purposes, a skeletal organization and must begin from scratch. Widespread purges are conducted to eliminate both ordinary bureaucratic profiteers and ideological "revisionists". The party that will emerge from this purge will be leaner and more pliant. (S)

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Review January 14, 1988.

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 12/7/16

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These political moves point toward the ultimate objective of a totalitarian state of the kind now in place in Czechoslovakia. However, the Polish economy is in such ruin that it cannot be reconstituted by Stalinist methods. For this reason, the junta has committed itself to the adoption of the Hungarian "New Economic Mechanism". State enterprises will be required to show profitability instead of meeting preordained production quotas; marginal sectors of the economy will be transferred into private hands; and limited trade union activity, under strict party supervision, will be allowed. (S)

For this economic plan to work, Jaruzelski requires help from foreign lenders as well as from the mass of Polish workers and peasants, neither of which he is likely to obtain. (S)

- According to a statement by a Polish Deputy Prime Minister on January 9, Poland will require in the coming year a rescheduling of \$10 billion in foreign obligations (principal and interest) as well as an "absolute minimum" of \$6.0 billion in additional hard currency credits with which to buy essential raw materials and components for its industries. Lacking that new capital, he warned, Poland will be forced to "shut down factories".
- The industrial working class is overwhelmingly hostile to the new regime: not a single senior Solidarity leader has defected to it. All indications are that workers are engaging in passive resistance. Farmers are refusing to deliver food and slaughter livestock. (S)

The Government thus faces a very bleak economic prospect: the looming economic catastrophe may well undermine its entire ambitious political plan. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union, with its own economic and financial problems, can rescue its Polish client. The junta hangs in the air, uncertain what to do and how to get out of its economic predicament, for repression has its limits. A firm Western stand may well in time compel a change of course in Poland. (S)

SECRET

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jan 21

Norm Balling  
Dennis Blair  
Dick Pipes

Attached paper is a redo of  
an earlier that you saw and concurred  
with.

Can I assume that your concurrence  
still holds.

Thank you.

Al Myer

S do.  
MB

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 21, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER

SUBJECT: Interagency Study Effort on Military  
Implications of the Polish Situation

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NLRR M4521 #750708  
BY EW NARA DATE 12/7/16

The current period of calm in Poland is more apparent than real, and we may soon be faced with renewed crisis. While current and projected sanctions do not include military measures, it is essential that military implications, of which there are many, be comprehensively analyzed. Potential actions and Soviet countermoves could increase tensions and result in a significant probability for miscalculation in an environment with high risk. The military component deserves careful attention; we should not wait until the next crisis.

We have both the means and opportunity to undertake a measured interagency study effort. Administratively, this effort could be handled in three ways:

- o NSDD-3, Crisis Management, tasks the Special Situation Group to formulate contingency planning in anticipation of a crisis. NSDD-3 also tasks you to convene interagency working groups as appropriate.
- o NSDD-2 directs that Regional IGs establish full-time working groups to deal with specific contingencies and to support NSC crisis management operations. A Poland working group is functioning.
- o NSDD-2 tasks Regional IGs to conduct contingency planning to deal with potential crises and to conduct interagency policy studies. Since the proposed effort would not deal with the development of military options for the employment of forces, State lead would be appropriate.

Given the current state of play, it would be inappropriate to undertake the proposed study effort within a crisis management framework. Although a previous parallel effort chaired by State (Pol-Mil) last year was unsuccessful, there is no reason to believe that we cannot be successful now.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review Jan. 21, 1988

Concurrences: Pipes, Bailey, Blair, and Shoemaker

RECOMMENDATIONS

That State chair an interagency study effort to produce a paper on the military implications of the Polish situation.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
The Secretary of StateSUBJECT: Interagency Study Effort on Military  
Implications of the Polish Situation

Given the current state of play in the Polish situation, might this not be a good time to renew last year's study effort which explored the military implications of our Polish actions?

I would appreciate it if you would renew this effort. We have prepared a draft paper on this subject and will forward it to the IG for consideration as a vehicle for discussion.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

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Review Jan. 21, 1988DECLASSIFIED  
NLRB M452/1 #150709  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/12/16