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**Folder Title:** Eastern European Policy  
(12/23/1981–12/24/1981)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

RBW 1/14/2013

**File Folder** EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY 12/23/1981-12/24/1981

**FOIA**

M452

**Box Number** 1

SHIFRINSON

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
150667	CABLE	RE. PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS <i>R</i> 12/7/2016 M452/1	14	12/23/1981	B1
150670	MEMO	ALLAN MYER TO JAMES NANCE RE. POTENTIAL MILITARY MEASURES <i>R</i> 12/7/2016 M452/1	1	12/23/1981	B1
150671	MEMO	RE. U.S. OBJECTIVES <i>R</i> 12/7/2016 M452/1	2	ND	B1
150673	CHART	RE. SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES [ATTACHED TO DOC. 150671] <i>D</i> 3/5/2018 M452/1	6	ND	B1
150675	PAPER	RE. U.S./ALLIED RESPONSES	6	12/20/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

## REVIEW & OUTLOOK

### Communism in Default

Top U.S. officials are engaged in a debate—both within the administration and with our allies—over what steps to take in reaction to the Soviet-inspired reimposition of totalitarian rule in Poland. The reaction, when it does come, should meet certain tests: that it punish the Soviets rather than the Polish people, that it serve longer-term Western interests and that it give the West more, rather than less, leverage over the Soviet bloc in the future.

What we most fear is that the current debate will lead to nothing more than a repetition of the Carter administration reaction against the invasion of Afghanistan. That is, that searching frantically about for something to do, the administration will reimpose the grain embargo it only recently lifted. When the Carter people declared a grain embargo, we branded it as a futile substitute for real action. And as we predicted, in practice it was easily evaded, becoming a nuisance for the Soviets and an embarrassment for the U.S.

Unlike the Carter administration, the Reagan administration has embarked on a serious rearmament effort. This gives its anti-Soviet stance some standing, and we could support a new grain embargo provided it were part of a package symbolizing a new page in Soviet-American relations, and carrying real costs for the Soviet bloc. We have in mind something like this:

All negotiations with the Soviets would be suspended indefinitely; our representatives would return neither to the Madrid human-rights talks nor the Geneva arms talks. Further and truly concerted efforts would be made to stop the Soviet gas pipeline deal. And to hit the Soviets where it really hurts—in their credit standing—the U.S. government should declare in default the government credits extended to Poland, and proceed to attach assets accordingly.

We think it is no coincidence that the long-prepared crackdown in Poland came only a few weeks after resumption of the Geneva arms negotiations. These negotiations are a symbol of Soviet good standing in the international community, help freeze into position the Soviet military superiority in Europe and offer a handy forum for

playing on divisive tendencies within NATO. There is of course reason to hold open some prospect of arms reductions when the Soviets are ready, but their actions in Poland manifestly suggest that time is not now. (As do their violations of existing arms control treaties by supplying chemical and biological weapons for use in Asia.) The Madrid talks, intended to follow up the Helsinki human-rights agreements, are simply a travesty in the wake of Poland.

Nor is it a coincidence that the Polish crackdown was held off until the Soviets could wrap up their gas pipeline deal with Western Europe. The deal not only will give the Soviets billions in much-needed foreign exchange, it will help them develop vital resources that the Communist economic system is incapable of developing itself. The more we learn of this transaction, the more we recognize that its collapse would be one of the most damaging single blows to the Soviet economy and military-industrial complex.

The administration should refuse export licenses to the American companies supplying machines and materials for the gas pipeline project, and study the withdrawal of U.S. government contracts for key foreign suppliers if they sell to the project. It should stress to the West German government the now-budding U.S. feeling that the European allies are not a help but a liability. And it should stress to both governments and banks the risky nature of the subsidized loans that are the heart of the pipeline agreement.

The pipeline loans, like the Polish loans now at dire risk, are far from strictly economic deals subject to the normal credit processes of Western banks. The German banks, in particular, were dragged into them by a Bonn government intent on "detente" at all costs. The banks' implicit calculation is that if such loans cannot work economically they will be bailed out by governments—by the Soviet government, and failing that, by the Western governments. The perceived risklessness of these loans has assured the Soviet bloc of a ready supply of cheap credit; nothing would hurt those countries as much as cutting off this free ride.

Declaring a default on Polish credit from the U.S. government would trigger a general default on the \$27 billion of loans accumulated by Western governments and banks in the last decade. American banks hold about \$1.7 billion of this debt, could absorb the loss and have already made handsome profits on the loans. West German banks, with upwards of \$4 billion in debt, would be in more serious trouble, but surely the Bundesbank and Fed could shore up the severely threatened, though it might be good to allow an exemplary hanging or two.

In any event, declaring a default would simply acknowledge what everybody knows to be a fact—that there is no realistic prospect of Poland paying its debt. From the standpoint of the Polish people, the burden of the debts would be off their back. This default would raise the price of capital to the faltering Soviet bloc; indeed, we doubt you would see much Western capital flowing to finance the development of the Soviet Union. This would be a punishing price. Its creaky economy can no longer feed the country's people and must depend on Western technology for what little productivity it can muster.

Short of the repression in Poland itself, nothing has been more reprehensible these last few weeks than the sight of Western bankers cheering on the Communists in their "austerity" program in the hopes that slave labor will bail out their ill-advised loans. Ironically, the most important single thing we can do to punish the Soviet Union is to get our bankers to behave like bankers. If they charged a price commensurate with the real risk we now see in Poland, Western capital would no longer be siphoned into the Eastern bloc, and the Communist economy would creak into bankruptcy not only in Poland and Romania but in the Soviet Union itself.

## REVIEW & OUTLOOK

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PRESERVATION COPY

*Baird*

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Allen	
Nance	C
Colson	C
Poindexter	C
<b>NSC S/S</b>	C

01 25 20 10:12

*WHSR  
4/25/20  
Baird*

C = Copy

O = Original

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

84 DEC 23 P 6: 12

MESSAGE NO. 001021 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 14

FROM: AL ADAMS S/S 28448 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO ANATO RE POLAND: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS

TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO: Extension Room No.

NSC ADMIRAL NANCE 456-2255

NSC ALLAN LENZ 395-3044

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: WE ARE SUBMITTING THE ATTACHED TO THE SECRETARY AT  
THIS TIME (5:55PM)

S/S Officer: A [Signature]

**crosshatch**

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

150667

~~SECRET~~

EUR/RPM:VLEHOVICH  
12/23/81 EXT. 21627 2777M  
THE SECRETARY

EUR:HAHOLMES  
NSC:  
S/SO:

EUR:JSCANLAN  
S/S:LPBREMER

IMMEDIATE ANATO, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE, MADRID IMMEDIATE, TOKYO  
IMMEDIATE, WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE  
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WARSAW IMMEDIATE

NODIS  
USEEC (INFO) ALSO FOR EMBASSY

RDS-1 12/23/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

AMH  
VL

PL, UR, PINT, NATO

HAH

POLAND: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY BY ACTION ADDRESSEES TO HOST  
COUNTRY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. POSTS PLEASE SUPPLY  
PROPER SALUTATIONS AND ADJUST CONCLUDING SENTENCE  
NOTING OTHER RECIPIENTS. USNATO SHOULD SHARE MESSAGE  
WITH SYG LUNS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4521 150667  
BY FW NARA DATE 12/21

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR :

AS WE ARE BOTH AWARE, EVENTS IN POLAND ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT WHERE POLAND'S FUTURE ABILITY TO ATTAIN THE DIVERSITY, LIBERALIZATION AND RENEWAL WHICH WE SO STRONGLY WISH ARE IN THE BALANCE. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO BOTH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE USSR -- WHICH IS DEEPLY COMPLICIT IN RECENT TRAGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND -- THAT THE REPRESSIONS MUST CEASE AND THAT LEGITIMATE POLISH ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY, MUST BE PART OF A GENUINE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO PUT BOTH WARSAW AND MOSCOW ON NOTICE THAT OTHERWISE, THERE WILL BE SEVERE COSTS.

I AM THEREFORE SENDING LETTERS TO BOTH GENERAL JARUZELSKI AND TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WHICH WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE BROADER STAKES AT ISSUE IN POLAND TODAY. I WANT YOU TO BE AWARE OF THE CONTENT OF THESE LETTERS, WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.



AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THESE MESSAGES, I BELIEVE WE ARE AT THE POINT WHERE A FIRM STANCE AND STRONG ACTION ARE NECESSARY. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, AT PRESENT, I DO NOT ENVISAGE PUTTING ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES AT HAZARD AMONG THE STEPS WITH WHICH THE USSR MUST RECKON. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, WE ARE -- AS I AM INFORMING PRESIDENT BREZHNEV -- CONSIDERING THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING OUR RELATIONSHIP.

I BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL FOR US AND OTHER FRIENDS AND PARTNERS TO ACT IN HARMONY TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR PEACEFUL EVOLUTION IN POLAND, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCERTING OUR ACTIONS AND THE SIGNALS WE SENT TO BOTH WARSAW AND MOSCOW. I HOPE, THUS, THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ACT TOGETHER IF THE SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN POLAND DOES NOT SOON CEASE.

I AM SENDING PARALLEL LETTERS TO ALL OF OUR COLLEAGUES IN NATO, SPAIN, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND NEW ZEALAND.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN.

LETTER TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI

-- EXPRESSION OF DEEP CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, INCLUDING IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, ARRESTS OF THOUSANDS OF WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS, AND REPORTS OF BEATINGS AND EVEN KILLINGS. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RECONCILING THESE VIOLATIONS WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE UN CHARTER.

-- RECOGNITION THAT POLAND HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE EXTERNAL PRESSURE TO ROLL BACK REFORMS OF THE PAST 16 MONTHS, AND STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. CANNOT IDLY IGNORE THE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND, SINCE TO DO SO WOULD MAKE US A PARTY TO THE REPRESSION.

-- A STATEMENT OF U.S. DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO POLAND, INCLUDING SUSPENDING CONSIDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; WITHHOLDING OF UNDELIVERED SALES OF COMMODITIES; SUSPENSION OF RENEWAL OF EXPORT INSURANCE BY THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK; NOT EXTENDING EXISTING BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES BEYOND

EXPIRATION OF MARCH 31, 1982; NO ALLOCATION TO POLAND  
IN 1982 OF U.S. FISHERIES STOCKS; AND CONSIDERATION OF  
FURTHER STEPS WHICH COULD HAVE A SEVERE IMPACT ON  
MUTUAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE.

-- HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BE FORCED TO TAKE  
SUCH DECISIONS, BUT THE NEED FOR A FULL REVIEW OF U.S.  
POLICY TOWARD POLAND IF REPRESSION CONTINUES.

-- U.S. READINESS TO RECONSIDER THESE ACTIONS ONCE  
THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN CONCRETE STEPS TO END  
REPRESSION, FREED THOSE DETAINED, AND BEGUN A SEARCH  
FOR RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATED ACCOMMODATION WITH  
THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL OF THE SOCIAL,  
SPIRITUAL, AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF POLISH SOCIETY.

-- URGING JARUZELSKI TO TAKE STEPS TO MOVE POLAND  
TO GENUINE COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATION.

END SUMMARY OF LETTER TO GENERAL JARUZELSKI

LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

-- RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND HAVE FILLED THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH DISMAY. SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE ELEMENTARY RIGHTS OF POLISH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VIOLATED DAILY, WITH MASSIVE ARRESTS, INCARCERATIONS IN OVERCROWDED JAILS, SUSPENSION OF RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND BRUTAL ASSAULTS BY SECURITY FORCES ON POLISH CITIZENS.

-- RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND ARE CLEARLY NOT AN "INTERNAL" MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY INTERVENED IN POLISH AFFAIRS IN RECENT MONTHS. THE JUNE 5 CPSU LETTER TO THE POLISH LEADERSHIP WARNED THAT INTERNAL POLISH DEVELOPMENTS WERE INTOLERABLE TO THE USSR. THIS AND NUMEROUS OTHER SUCH COMMUNICATIONS PLACED PRESSURE ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A STEADY BARRAGE OF MEDIA ASSAULTS, MILITARY EXERCISES ON POLAND'S BORDERS AND WARNINGS OF INTERVENTION UNLESS POLISH CIVIL LIBERTIES WERE RESTRICTED.

. -- THESE ACTIONS ARE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF MANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

. -- SINCE AFGHANISTAN, NOTHING HAS SO OUTRAGED U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AS THE PRESSURE AND THREATS EXERTED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON POLAND TO STIFLE ITS FREEDOM.

. -- ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE POLISH PEOPLE, EITHER BY POLISH FORCES UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, OR THROUGH MORE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET FORCE, WILL NOT BRING ABOUT STABILITY AND COULD UNLEASH A PROCESS WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.

. -- THE ONLY SOLUTION IS TO ALLOW THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE NOW TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION. THIS CANNOT BE DONE IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR, ARRESTS, AND BLOODSHED. SPIRITUAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES IN POLAND MUST BE PART OF A NEW NATIONAL DIALOGUE. THIS IS AS ESSENTIAL TO SOLVE POLAND'S MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS IT IS TO HEAL THE POLITICAL WOUNDS.

. -- THE SOVIET UNION CAN EITHER ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR THIS PROCESS OR CONTINUE TO PREVENT IT. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OF THESE COURSES FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP ARE CLEAR.

. -- OVER THE COURSE OF 1981, WE HAD BEGUN TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE OUR RELATIONS IN THE YEARS TO COME. WE HAD SET FORTH A CONCRETE AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CRITICAL REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. WE HAVE BEEN EXPECTING TO BUILD A BETTER RELATIONSHIP AND INCREASED COOPERATION.

. -- THE SOVIET UNION MUST DECIDE WHETHER WE CAN MOVE AHEAD WITH THIS AGENDA OR NOT. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE USSR FOR REPRESSION IN POLAND UNDERMINES THE BASIS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF DICTATING A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL FORCES IN EUROPE. WE RECOGNIZE THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION IN A STABLE POLAND. BUT RECONCILIATION AND MODEPATE REFORM IN POLAND ARE NO THREAT TO THE USSR.

. -- THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACQUIESCE IN SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S LEGITIMATE DESIRE FOR A PROCESS OF RENEWAL. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION PURSUE THIS COURSE, THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE PROMPT STEPS AFFECTING OUR RELATIONS, IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS.

. -- WE BEAR A MUTUAL OBLIGATION TO DEMONSTRATE WISDOM, MODERATION AND RESTRAINT. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO JOIN IN HELPING HEAL POLAND'S WOUNDS AND TO MEET ITS REAL NEEDS IF THE USSR RECIPROCATES.

. -- A CALL ON THE USSR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO MAKE CLEAR ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION IN POLAND.

. END SUMMARY OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

. LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV (SECOND VERSION).

. -- RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND HAVE DISMAYED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE MOST FLEMENTARY RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE ARE BEING VIOLATED BY MASSIVE ARRESTS

WITHOUT LEGAL PROCEDURES, INCARCERATION OF UNION LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN OVERCROWDED AND FREEZING CONDITIONS, SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, AND BRUTAL ASSAULTS BY SECURITY FORCES ON CITIZENS.

-- THESE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY POLITICAL PARTIES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM, INCLUDING MOST OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF EUROPE.

-- EVENTS IN POLAND ARE CLEARLY NOT AN "INTERNAL MATTER." THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY INTERVENED IN POLISH AFFAIRS IN RECENT MONTHS. A PROOF OF THIS IS THE LETTER OF JUNE 5, 1981, FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU TO THE POLISH LEADERSHIP, WARNING THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT TOLERATE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. THERE WERE NUMEROUS OTHER COMMUNICATIONS WHICH PLACED PRESSURE ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND DEPICTED THE REFORMS THERE AS A THREAT TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MEDIA BARRAGES AND MILITARY EXERCISES ALONG POLAND'S BORDERS, AND COUPLED WITH WARNINGS OF INTERVENTION UNLESS THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RESTRICTED THE RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS.



-- ALL THESE ACTIONS WERE VIOLATIONS OF MANY SOVIET INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS --- TO NAME ONLY ONE, THE PROVISION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN WHICH THE USSR AGREED TO REFRAIN "FROM ANY INTERVENTION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE IN THE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FALLING WITHIN THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS."

-- IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGUE THAT SOLIDARITY, THE OBJECT OF THESE REPRESSIVE MEASURES, IS "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY." SOLIDARITY'S 10 MILLION MEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS MUST MAKE UP AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POLISH NATION. IF THE WORD "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY" HAD ANY APPLICABILITY, IT IS TO THOSE WHO ARE NOW TRYING BY BRUTE FORCE TO SUBDUCE THE MAJORITY AND REVERSE THE COURSE OF HISTORY.

-- SINCE AFGHANISTAN, NOTHING HAS SO OUTRAGED PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. AS THE PRESSURES AND THREATS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGAINST POLAND.

. -- ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE POLISH PEOPLE, EITHER BY POLISH FORCES UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, OR BY MORE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET FORCE, WILL NOT BRING ABOUT STABILITY AND COULD UNLEASH A PROCESS WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.

. -- THE ONLY SENSIBLE SOLUTION IS TO ALLOW A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION NOW BETWEEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. THIS CANNOT BE DONE IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR, ARRESTS, AND BLOODSHED. SPIRITUAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES MUST INITIATE A NEW NATIONAL DIALOGUE. THIS IS AS ESSENTIAL FOR SOLVING POLAND'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS FOR HEALING ITS POLITICAL WOUNDS. IT IS THE ONLY PATH TO LONG-TERM STABILITY IN POLAND, AND THEREFORE IN EUROPE.

. -- THE SOVIET UNION CAN EITHER ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR THIS PROCESS, OR CONTINUE TO PREVENT IT. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OF THESE COURSES FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CLEAR.

. -- WE HAD BEGUN, IN 1961, TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK FOR OUR RELATIONS IN YEARS TO COME. WE HAD SET FORTH A

CONCRETE AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CRITICAL REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE AND INTENTION TO TRY IN 1982 FOR PROGRESS ON THAT AGENDA.

. -- THE SOVIET UNION MUST DECIDE WHETHER WE CAN DO THIS OR NOT. THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR REPRESSION IN POLAND THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE RECOGNIZE SOVIET INTEREST IN A STABLE POLAND. BUT RECONCILIATION AND MODERATE REFORM IN POLAND IS NO THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S LEGITIMATE DESIRE FOR A PROCESS OF RENEWAL, PARTICULARLY UNDER EXTERNAL PRESSURE. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION PERSIST IN CONTINUED SUPPRESSION, THE U.S. WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE CONCRETE MEASURES AFFECTING THE FULL RANGE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

. -- SOVIET ACTIONS WILL DETERMINE OUR DECISIONS. WE BEAR A MUTUAL OBLIGATION FOR WISDOM, MODERATION, AND RESTRAINT. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO JOIN IN HELPING HEAL POLAND'S WOUNDS AND TO MEET ITS REAL NEEDS IF THE USSR RECIPROCATES.

~~SECRET~~

24

. -- A CALL ON THE USSR TO MAKE CLEAR IN COMING DAYS  
AND WEEKS THAT IT UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR  
RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. THE ALTERNATIVE IS IN NO  
ONE'S INTEREST.

. END SUMMARY OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV.

END TEXT.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

YY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

December 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER *oam*

SUBJECT: US Objectives and Potential Military Measures  
in Response to Polish Situation

The attached information paper and matrix are intended to provide a basis for analyzing potential military measures in the event of Soviet military intervention in Poland. That military intervention could take the form of direct introduction of Soviet forces or could be the result of confirmed Soviet military command and control of Polish martial law forces.

The selection of military actions needs to be judged against desired outcomes. The attachments provide an integrated perspective of the broad range of military options that could be made available to the US and NATO leadership.

In coordination with Dennis Blair, will pursue similar effort to link non-military measures to objectives, to include risk assessment.

*Pipes* and *Shoemaker* concur.

Attachments

- TAB I Information Paper
- TAB A Matrix

cc: Pipes  
Blair  
→ BAILEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~  
Review 12/23/1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M4521 #1506TD  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *12/11/00*



~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: US Objectives in Response to Polish Situation

1. Overarching Objective of Military Response in the event of Soviet military intervention in Poland:

- In conjunction with political, economic, and diplomatic initiatives, to promote positive change in Eastern Europe. In turn, to accelerate internal pressures within the Soviet Union for positive change.

2. In order to achieve the overarching objective, military measures are designed to support the following SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:

- Develop a stronger, more cohesive US-led Atlantic Alliance.
  - Soviet actions serve as catalyst to:
    - Improve capability to defend against/deter further Soviet aggression in Europe.
    - Promote US leadership role in NATO.
    - Reach agreement on unresolved Alliance issues.
    - Bolster Western European morale (which could be shaken by Soviet military intervention).
  - NATO actions serve to preclude Soviet miscalculation of NATO resolve during period of increased tensions.
- Eliminate specific NATO military deficiencies. Soviet actions serve as catalyst to:
  - achieve improvements in specific short-term areas.
  - set in motion the process necessary to achieve long-term improvements.
- Secure closer cooperation of selected Third World governments with the United States.
  - Prevent Soviet intimidation.
  - Promote Western orientation and regional cooperation.
- Discourage continued Soviet reliance on military force as an instrument of foreign policy.
  - Raise costs through punitive actions.
  - Raise costs to Soviet allies/clients.
- Prevent instabilities outside Europe, instigated by other anti-Western governments.
  - Preclude opportunistic actions by North Korea/Libya/Cuba/others, initiated in hopes of catching West while preoccupied in Europe.

BY AW  
 NARA DATE 12/16  
 REF ID: M4521 #150671  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

- Promote reliability of US as security partner.
- Improve United States military capabilities.
  - Soviet actions serve as catalyst to:
    - Improve ability to respond to worldwide threats to security.
    - Improve ability to mobilize US-based assets and infrastructure.
  - Enhance public support of increased defense budget.

3. The matrix at Tab A keys specific military measures to supporting objectives.

Attachment

TAB A Matrix

~~TOP SECRET~~





# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
150673	CHART  RE. SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES [ATTACHED TO DOC. 150671]	6	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Nance	C
Colson	C
Poindexter	C
PIPES	C
BAILEY	C
VP	C
NSC S/S	C

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MESSAGE NO. 001047 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 6

FROM: LPBremer S/S 22540 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bremer-Nance: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Adm. Nance	456-2255	
DOD	Col. Stanford	697-8388	
JCS	Gen. Granger	697-8591	
CIA	Bob Gates - for the Director	351-4086	

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:

S/S Officer:

*Handwritten signature and initials*  
BT for LPBremer



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520


December 21, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting

Attached is a paper for discussion at this morning's  
NSC meeting.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

Ⓢ RDS-1,3 12/21/01

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY RW NARA, DATE 1/14/3

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150675	PAPER  RE. U.S./ALLIED RESPONSES	6	12/20/1981	B1

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