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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (2/4/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	040353Z FEB 81, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #12</i>	2/4/81	B1
2. Cable	040836Z FEB 81, 2p <i>R " " #13</i>	2/4/81	B1
3. Memo	Richard Allen to the President re Visit of Former FM Takeo Fukuda, 1p <i>R " " #14</i>	3/19/81	B1
4. Paper	Re Fukuda's Positions and Concerns, 1p <i>R " " #15</i>	Nd	B1
5. Memò	Alexander Haig to the President re Meeting with Fukuda, 2p <i>R " " #16</i>	3/16/81	B1
6. PAPER	2p <i>D " " #17</i>	3/12/81	B1, B3
7. Memo	Allen to the President re Meeting with Fukuda, 1p <i>R " " #18</i>	3/19/81	B1
8. Paper	Re Fukuda's Positions and Concerns, 1p <i>R " " #19</i>	Nd	B1
9. Briefing Paper	Re Meeting with Fukuda, 3p <i>R " " #20</i>	Nd	B1
10. PAPER	2p <i>D " " #21</i>	3/12/81	B1, B3
11. Paper	Fukuda's Positions and Concerns (original), 1p <i>R " " #22</i>	Nd	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHOR COMMENT:

NAN, COL VP
EOB:ECOM,EA,EURE

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8464 0350405
O 040353Z FEB 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2419

INFO UR MISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9243
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7241
BT

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 028464
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 2/3/2001 (STOESSER, WALTER J.)

TAGS: JA, UR, US

SUBJECT: PARTIAL EMBARGO ON GRAIN SALES TO USSR: JAPANESE
VIENS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. JAPANESE EMBASSY (ARIMA) CALLED BARRY (EUR) TO CONVEY,
ON INSTRUCTIONS, GOJ DESIRE TO BE KEPT ABREAST OF US
THINKING ON LIFTING GRAIN EMBARGO. ARIMA SAID THAT IN
THE ABSENCE OF ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS ON LIFTING THE EM-
BARGO, MOFA WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY PERSUADING
DOMESTIC MINISTERS TO KEEP OTHER ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
POST-AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS IN PLACE. BARRY ASSURED
ARIMA THAT WE WERE SENSITIVE TO NEED TO KEEP GOJ AND OTHER
ALLIES INFORMED OF OUR THINKING AND WOULD DO SO TO THE
BEST OF OUR ABILITY. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 500-037/1 #12
BY [signature] NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSNI 045594

TORI 035/05148Z

BTGI 040353Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOB:EA,ASIMET

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #1987 0350036
O 040036Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5921

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4244
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO #1987
NOBIS

E.O. 12865: XDS-3 02/04/81 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M

TAGS: MNVC, MARR, AS, US
SUBJECT: (S) B-52 AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRALIA
REF: (A) CANBERRA 1058, (B) TOKYO 1782, (C) STATE 24278,
(D) TOKYO 1394, (E) CANBERRA 888

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS NOTED IN REFTELS B AND D, WE AGREE WITH FORMULATION IN WHICH NUCLEAR ISSUE WOULD BE SUBSUMED IN IDEA OF MISSION, I.E., STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT AGREEMENT COVERS SURVEILLANCE AND TRAINING FLIGHTS, NEITHER OF WHICH INVOLVE CARRYING BOMBS. UPON REFLECTION, WE BELIEVE THAT STATEMENT OF THIS TYPE SHOULD NOT BE OF CONTINGENCY NATURE (REFTEL B) BUT AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY GOA STATEMENT. THAT IS, NO STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE WHICH IN ANY WAY IMPLIES THAT U.S. HAS AGREED NOT TO PLACE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THESE AIRCRAFT. ISSUE MUST BE SUBSUMED IN BROADER STATEMENT ABOUT MISSION.

3. WE ARE NOT SURE WE UNDERSTAND ESSENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 REFTEL A EXPRESSING DOUBT THAT GOA WILL ACCEPT USG STATEMENT FAILING TO CONFIRM PUBLIC STATEMENT BY GOA DEFENSE MINISTER ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF NUCLEAR ISSUE IS

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1 #13
BY LSJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUBSUMED IN IDEA OF MISSION, WOULD THIS BE NECESSARY?
IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR US TO CONFIRM THAT CERTAIN
TYPES OF MISSIONS DO NOT INVOLVE CARRYING ANY BOMBS.
HOWEVER, IN NO CASE SHOULD ANY USG STATEMENT GO BEYOND
NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY LINE WHEN ADDRESSING NUCLEAR
ISSUE.

--

4. IN VIEW OF SEVERAL EXCHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE
REGARDING FORMULATION OF NEW AGREEMENT (REPTELS), IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF DEPARTMENT COULD BRING THESE TOGETHER
IN A DRAFT WHICH ALL CONCERNED COULD THEN REVIEW.
MANSFIELD

PSN: 045733

TOR: 035/09113Z

HTG: 040830Z FEB 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 05 FEB 81 12

TO TYSON

FROM ALLEN

W/11/04

DOCDATE 04 FEB 81

BREMER

10 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

VISIT

FUKUDA, TAKEO

AP

BUSH, G

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ PRES FOR FORMER PRIME MINISTER 19 * 21 MAR 1981

ACTION: PREPARE SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG

TYSON

FARRAR

COMMENTS

REF#

8104005

LOG 8100223

8100261

NSCIFID

(L /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Allen	ix 2/11	FOI2 info		
	2/16	note by RVA w/comment		
Gregg	s 2/16	for further action	2/18	CT CF
Allen	x 2/18	Final Pres Decision		CD
	C 2/5	See 8100358 for final Review		

DISPATCH

WATCH FILE

PA (d) dsm

~~SECRET~~

3/19 to Rick Darman
10
1405

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *rus*

SUBJECT: The Visit of Former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo

Attached are Department of State briefing papers for your March 20 meeting with former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo. When you meet with Fukuda, he will have spent 45 minutes with the Vice President. He will be accompanied by six other Japanese Diet members, who will withdraw after a brief photo opportunity.

I have suggested to the Vice President that he be quite specific in telling Fukuda what current U.S. concerns are on the automobile and defense issues. I have also suggested that he voice opposition to the Japanese meeting with Arafat, should the subject have arisen.

The background to Fukuda's mission is spelled out in the brief outline attached to this memorandum. It is important that Fukuda take back with him a clear and accurate perception of current American positions on the defense spending and automobile issues. It would thus be appropriate for you to ask Mr. Fukuda how he perceives the two issues at the moment, and what he feels Japan should do. You are not expected or obligated to say anything in response. Anything you chose to comment on would, of course, have great impact on Fukuda.

We are basically in a very strong position in dealing with the Japanese on both key issues. Suzuki's hold on the Prime Minister's position depends upon a successful meeting with you. The more clearly Fukuda knows how we feel on the two issues, the better advice he can give to Suzuki. Fukuda is an old friend of the United States, and Suzuki was wise to send him on this important mission.

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

Review: March 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1414

BY MT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Att.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FUKUDA TAKEO'S POSITIONS AND CONCERNS

Fukuda Takeo is conducting a critical reconnaissance for Suzuki Zenko, whose ability to function effectively as Japan's Prime Minister depends upon his ability to manage the U.S. relationship skillfully. At this point, from Tokyo's perspective, prospects for Suzuki's meeting with President Reagan in May are uncertain. Suzuki feels he must obtain U.S. "understanding" for Japan's limited increases in defense spending. He also knows that Japan must do something to ease pressure on the U.S. automobile issue. He is still uncertain of what to do on either issue, and is looking for concrete advice from Fukuda. (S)

Fukuda believes that Suzuki must develop specific plans on both the defense and automobile issues that can be looked at in Washington and, if necessary, negotiated with the U.S. side before Suzuki meets President Reagan. With such plans accepted, the stage would be set for a successful meeting. Fukuda will urge Suzuki to take specific steps in the defense field, once he comes to know what the U.S. wants. He will also urge Suzuki to pass legislative restrictions, limiting Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. if the U.S. Task Force report indicates that such a step would be helpful. (S)

Fukuda supports Suzuki as Prime Minister, and believes that he may have to serve for several years, until the "younger generation" of Japanese leaders matures. Fukuda is aware that there are other LDP factional leaders who would not be sorry to see Suzuki fail, but Fukuda feels that Suzuki is the best man available, and wants to do all possible to help him succeed. To this end, Fukuda will urge U.S. patience toward Suzuki, until the defense and automobile issues are successfully adjusted. (S)

Given the above background, U.S. interests can best be served in dealing with Fukuda by being as frank as possible in acquainting him with current realities influencing the defense and automobile issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#15


BY LIT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

STATE
PAPER

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
SUBJECT: Meeting with Takeo Fukuda, former
Prime Minister of Japan, Thursday,
March 19

I. SETTING

Fukuda's visit to Washington will foreshadow subsequent visits by Foreign Minister Ito on March 23-24, and Prime Minister Suzuki, May 7-8. His purpose is to meet the key figures in your Administration, and to sound out U.S. intentions on major multilateral and bilateral issues.

Our relations with Japan are in good working order and Japan is politically stable and economically healthy. Tokyo has provided strong diplomatic support on Iran and Afghanistan, is expanding its aid and directing it toward countries of strategic consequence. It has acknowledged its need to do more on defense, and consulted closely with us and other industrial democracies on international political and security issues (e.g. Poland).

II. OBJECTIVES

-- To reassure Japan of our interest to consult closely on international political and security issues; signal the need for all of our allies to improve their security; urge the Japanese to handle the auto issue with sensitivity to political pressures in the U.S.; and discourage an Arafat visit to Japan.

III. ISSUES (In Priority Order)

1. Basic Relationship

We are very pleased with our present relationship: Japan's political, economic, and security importance to our interests is undeniable. We intend to advance them further through full and frank consultations at all levels.

~~SECRET~~
RDS-1 3/13/87

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NLS F00-037/1#16
BY LRT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

2. Automobiles

The Administration has not adopted a position on the role, if any, of import restraints in ameliorating the plight of the U.S. auto industry. In the absence of a restraint policy, Japan can demonstrate its sensitivity to the political pressures on this issue by greater investment in U.S. auto facilities, increased purchase of auto parts, and prudence in its exports to the U.S. Japan's record on investment and purchases is not very good compared to the benefits it has reaped in our free market.

3. Arafat Visit

Yassir Arafat of the PLO has accepted "in principle" a two-year-old invitation extended by some Japanese parliamentarians to visit Japan, and may realize the trip sometime this year. If he does, Prime Minister Suzuki is committed to meet with Arafat. The Japanese Government, which first believed that the visit would enhance its image with Arab oil producers, may now be having second thoughts owing to our opposition. We believe that a reception of Arafat by Suzuki would be read as de facto recognition of the PLO achieved without any change in its objections to the principles of recognition of Israel as a state and to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

4. Defense Efforts

Japan recognizes the need to upgrade its forces for self-defense purposes, but it fell short of its goal of accelerating its planned build-up last year because of budgetary stringency. Fukuda will want to verify how specific the U.S. plans to be in requesting improved efforts under your Administration, and particularly whether we will choose to push Japan to accept a military role which impinges on its "peace" constitution. We do not intend to push Japan directly on specific budget increases, but, in view of our defense build-up, we expect all allies to do more not only on defense, but on a broad range of security interests, including the strategic application of foreign economic assistance and political/diplomatic cooperation. We will not ask Japan to assume any role that would be in conflict with its constitutional restraints.

Bio.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Att.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FUKUDA TAKEO'S POSITIONS AND CONCERNS

Fukuda Takeo is conducting a critical reconnaissance for Suzuki Zenko, whose ability to function effectively as Japan's Prime Minister depends upon his ability to manage the U.S. relationship skillfully. At this point, from Tokyo's perspective, prospects for Suzuki's meeting with President Reagan in May are uncertain. Suzuki feels he must obtain U.S. "understanding" for Japan's limited increases in defense spending. He also knows that Japan must do something to ease pressure on the U.S. automobile issue. He is still uncertain of what to do on either issue, and is looking for concrete advice from Fukuda. (S)

Fukuda believes that Suzuki must develop specific plans on both the defense and automobile issues that can be looked at in Washington and, if necessary, negotiated with the U.S. side before Suzuki meets President Reagan. With such plans accepted, the stage would be set for a successful meeting. Fukuda will urge Suzuki to take specific steps in the defense field, once he comes to know what the U.S. wants. He will also urge Suzuki to pass legislative restrictions, limiting Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. if the U.S. Task Force report indicates that such a step would be helpful. (S)

Fukuda supports Suzuki as Prime Minister, and believes that he may have to serve for several years, until the "younger generation" of Japanese leaders matures. Fukuda is aware that there are other LDP factional leaders who would not be sorry to see Suzuki fail, but Fukuda feels that Suzuki is the best man available, and wants to do all possible to help him succeed. To this end, Fukuda will urge U.S. patience toward Suzuki, until the defense and automobile issues are successfully adjusted. (S)

Given the above background, U.S. interests can best be served in dealing with Fukuda by being as frank as possible in acquainting him with current realities influencing the defense and automobile issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#19

BY NDT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~



S/ 8108070

465

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Vice President's Meeting with Takeo Fukuda,
former Japanese Prime Minister, 10:15 A.M.,
March 20

Transmitted herewith is a briefing memorandum for
the Vice President's meeting together with biographic
data on Mr. Fukuda.

Mr. Fukuda is travelling with the following persons
(all Liberal Democratic Party dietmen): Shintaro Ishihara,
Kichizo Hosoda, Yoshihiko Tsuchiya, Michio Ochi, Tomio
Yamamoto, and Shigetoshi Murakami. They will undoubtedly
be accompanied to the White House by the Japanese
Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission and an interpreter.
We suggest that the Vice President attempt to accommodate
the entire party at his meeting, but perhaps a smaller
group, consisting of Fukuda, the Ambassador, and the
interpreter, stay for the talk with the President
following the obligatory picture-taking. In addition to
Secretary Haig, we recommend the presence of Assistant
Secretary of State-designate John Holdridge and a State
Department interpreter.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

18-13



1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

SUBJECT: The Vice President's Meeting
with Takeo Fukuda, former Prime
Minister of Japan, March 20

I. SETTING

Fukuda's visit to Washington will foreshadow subsequent visits by Foreign Minister Ito on March 23-24, and Prime Minister Suzuki, May 7-8. His purpose is to meet the key figures in the Administration, and to sound out U.S. intentions on major multilateral and bilateral issues.

Our relations with Japan are in good working order. Tokyo has provided strong diplomatic support on Iran and Afghanistan, is expanding its aid and directing it toward countries of strategic consequence, acknowledged its need to do more in the defense, and consulted closely with us and other industrial democracies on international political and security issues (e.g. Poland).

Japan's economy is robust, as reflected in its relatively high growth rate and comparatively low rate of inflation. However, there are clouds: Japan's global current account is running about \$12 billion a year in deficit and its national budget has been 30-40% in deficit over the past few years. Its political institutions are stable, and the Government's Parliamentary margin was broadened through the Liberal Democratic Party's overwhelming lower house election victory last June.

II. OBJECTIVES

-- To reassure Japan of the high priority we assign to our relationship and to acknowledge the need for close and continuing consultations.

-- To signal the need for all of our allies, including Japan, to follow the lead of the U.S. in improving their defenses.

~~SECRET~~
RDS-1 3/13/87

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1 #20
BY hjt NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

-2-

-- To urge the Japanese to handle the auto issue with sensitivity to political pressures in the U.S.

-- To discourage an Arafat visit to Japan.

III. ISSUES

Enhanced Defense

Although Japan recognizes the need to upgrade its forces for self-defense purposes, it fell short of its goal of accelerating its planned build-up last year because of overall budget stringency. Fukuda will wish to verify how specific the U.S. will be in requesting improved efforts next year and whether we will push them to accept a military role which may impinge upon the limits imposed by its "peace" constitution.

Talking Points

-- Emphasize that we are determined to correct the East-West military balance and will increase our own defense budget by 16%.

-- Indicate that while we do not propose to engage our allies in a debate about specific budget increments, we expect all to do more. We do not, however, intend to press Japan to assume overseas military security responsibilities.

Auto Imports

The Administration has not adopted a position on the role, if any, of import restraints in ameliorating the plight of the U.S. auto industry. In the absence of a restraint policy, we have asked Japan repeatedly with only mixed results to invest more in plants in the U.S. and to buy U.S. auto parts.

Talking Point

-- More plant investment here, increased auto parts purchases, and continued prudence will be evidence of Japan's sensitivity to the political issues involved.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

China

Japan is pleased by the present equilibrium existing among the PRC, Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan, but has registered some concern about U.S. policies which may upset the status quo.

Talking Points

-- We envisage continued efforts to normalize our relationship with the PRC as a strategic imperative. It has overriding importance to international stability and world peace. We will adhere to the Shanghai communique.

-- We also visualize a nonofficial status with the Taiwanese people based on adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act.

Arafat

Yassir Arafat has accepted "in principle" a two-year old invitation extended by Japanese Diet members to visit Japan, and Prime Minister Suzuki is committed to meeting with him "unofficially" if the visit occurs. We have opposed the idea of the visit in talking with the Japanese officials.

Talking Points

-- We oppose Arafat's visit and we believe this reception by Prime Minister Suzuki would be read as de facto recognition of the PLO achieved without any change in its objections to the principles of a peace settlement.

~~SECRET~~

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ (UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT) *MSA
2/11/104*

March 17, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Visits of Former Prime Minister Fukuda
with the Vice President, the President
and You

You will be having breakfast with former Prime Minister Fukuda on March 19. The following day at 10:15 he meets with the Vice President. At 11:00 they move to the Oval Office for a 30-minute meeting the the President.

ATTENDEES

*No - See Chuck Tyson
for procedure.*

Fukuda is travelling with six LDP Diet members, all of whom have asked to meet the President. State's suggestion, with which I concur, is that the Diet members be allowed to sit in on the meeting with the Vice President. At 11:00 they will be introduced to the President in the Oval Office, have their picture taken, and withdraw. This would leave a much smaller group for the meeting with the President, including Fukuda, the Vice President, Amb Okawara, you, the interpreters, and anyone else you wanted to stay.

*S2207 ?
fave !*

STATE BACKGROUND PAPERS

The State papers for both the Vice President and the President stress the same three issues--defense, automobiles and the possible Arafat visit. The papers do not focus at all on Fukuda's position, or the concerns he brings with him to Washington. I have prepared a short paper on Fukuda, his positions and his concerns, that I think should be useful background. The paper is attached for your use at breakfast (Tab I). I have incorporated the same points into the covering memoranda from you to the Vice President and the President, forwarding the State background papers.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached papers to the Vice President and the President (Tabs A and B).

~~SECRET~~ (UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT) *MSA*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FUKUDA TAKEO'S POSITIONS AND CONCERNS

Fukuda Takeo is conducting a critical reconnaissance for Suzuki Zenko, whose ability to function effectively as Japan's Prime Minister depends upon his ability to manage the U.S. relationship skillfully. At this point, from Tokyo's perspective, prospects for Suzuki's meeting with President Reagan in May are uncertain. Suzuki feels he must obtain U.S. "understanding" for Japan's limited increases in defense spending. He also knows that Japan must do something to ease pressure on the U.S. automobile issue. He is still uncertain of what to do on either issue, and is looking for concrete advice from Fukuda. (S)

Fukuda believes that Suzuki must develop specific plans on both the defense and automobile issues that can be looked at in Washington and, if necessary, negotiated with the U.S. side before Suzuki meets President Reagan. With such plans accepted, the stage would be set for a successful meeting. Fukuda will urge Suzuki to take specific steps in the defense field, once he comes to know what the U.S. wants. He will also urge Suzuki to pass legislative restrictions, limiting Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. if the U.S. Task Force report indicates that such a step would be helpful. (S)

Fukuda supports Suzuki as Prime Minister, and believes that he may have to serve for several years, until the "younger generation" of Japanese leaders matures. Fukuda is aware that there are other LDP factional leaders who would not be sorry to see Suzuki fail, but Fukuda feels that Suzuki is the best man available, and wants to do all possible to help him succeed. To this end, Fukuda will urge U.S. patience toward Suzuki, until the defense and automobile issues are successfully adjusted. (S)

Given the above background, U.S. interests can best be served in dealing with Fukuda by being as frank as possible in acquainting him with current realities influencing the defense and automobile issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#22

BY LDI NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA LDX


March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Former Prime
Minister Fukuda of Japan

The Vice President will meet with former Prime Minister Fukuda on Friday, March 20, for 45 minutes, prior to the President's meeting with Fukuda at 11:00 A.M. Would you please provide talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use no later than COB Monday, March 16.



Charles P. Tyson

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke *MBD*

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Former Prime
Minister Fukuda of Japan

The Vice President will meet with former Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan on Friday, March 20, from 10:15 - 11:00 a.m. in his White House West Wing office and will then proceed with the former Prime Minister to participate in the President's meeting with him at 11:00 a.m. May we please have recommended talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use by close of business, Wednesday, March 18. Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

February 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
 FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
 SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Former Prime
 Minister Fukuda of Japan

Former Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan will be in Washington on March 19-20, and has asked to meet with you. Fukuda retains great influence in Japan, and is a solid friend of the United States. I thus recommend that you meet with him for 30-45 minutes if your schedule permits. A meeting with Fukuda would allow us to raise matters of current concern in U.S.-Japan relations. Fukuda would be certain to pass such points along to Prime Minister Suzuki, who will be coming in May.

If you are able to see Fukuda, we will be pleased to prepare talking points for use in the meeting.



Approve

Disapprove

To: Dick Allen

3 MAR 1981

The Vice President will be pleased to meet with Former Prime Minister Fukuda on ~~Tuesday~~^{Friday}, March ~~19~~²⁰ at 10:15 - 11:00 a.m. He then would proceed with the Former Prime Minister to meet with the President.

J. Fitzgerald

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard V. Allen
FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*
SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between Former Prime Minister
Fukuda and Vice President Bush

At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the Vice President suggesting that he meet with Mr. Fukuda during the latter's visit to Washington on March 19-20. If the Vice President accepts, I will be glad to provide talking points.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the memo at Tab A to the Vice President.

RVA Signed 2/19/81

485

S/S 8104570



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for An Appointment with the Vice President
by Former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda

The Japanese Embassy has officially requested an appointment with the Vice President for former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during his stay in Washington, March 19-20. Mr. Fukuda is also seeking an appointment with the President for a courtesy call in addition to several cabinet level meetings.


In addition to being a prestigious and respected elder statesman, Fukuda remains a power in Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy. He has also been a close and constant friend of the United States for over three decades and will continue to be so. A meeting with him would assist our foreign policy objectives by underscoring the importance of our relationship with Japan and enlisting Fukuda's support for the new initiatives which the administration may develop.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

WASHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE

7/MS/5:
B



198 JAN 2 PM 4 43

03

COM

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS No. PAGES 1

FROM Charles P. Tyson *return to* _____ (Extension) _____ (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Vice President's Meeting with Former Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan.

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
STATE	Paul Bremer III		

REMARKS: _____

S/S
S/S-5
SWID - info.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 FEB 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

*M20
17 6/104*

DOCDATE 14 FEB 81

BREMER

14 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AVP

FUKUDA, TAKEO

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ VP BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER MARCH 19 - 20

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO VP DUE: 20 MAR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG

TYSON

FARRAR

LENZ

COMMENTS

REF# 8104570 8108070 LOG 8101231 8100485 NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Allen</i>	<i>3/18</i>	<i>joined by</i>	<i>0485 0710</i>	
<i>X</i>	<i>3/18</i>	<i>send to [unclear] of VP for info</i>		
<i>C</i>	<i>3/19</i>	<i>RVA send memos to P & VP</i>		<i>DO, CT</i>

DISPATCH *3/19 by JCP* W/ATTCH FILE *PA (C) [unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
FROM BREMER

RECEIVED 16 FEB 81 09

DOC DATE 14 FEB 81

TO ALLEN

1/19/04

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AVP

FUKUDA, TAKEO

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ VP BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER MARCH 19 - 20

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO VP DUE: 18 FEB 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG

TYSON

FARRAR

COMMENTS

REF# 8104570

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>RA</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>La Signature</i>	<i>2/21</i>	<i>CF</i>
<i>d</i>	<i>2/19</i>	<i>RVA sgd memo</i>		<i>CF, DG, CT</i>
<i>d</i>	<i>3/5</i>	<i>CT sgd memo to Bremer</i>		<i>DG</i>
<i>-</i>	<i>3/16</i>	<i>Recd 8/5 8108070</i>		<i>CT</i>
<i>Guess</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Prepare memo Allen to VP</i>	<i>3/19</i>	

DISPATCH *2/19 by jp (via VP folder in Sit room)* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES TYSON

FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Former Japanese
Prime Minister Fukuda

Attached at Tab A is a Schedule Proposal for the visit to Washington of former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan. Mr. Fukuda will be in Washington March 19-20. I understand that the time for his meeting with the President is already on the President's schedule as a tentative appointment.

As of today, State will get back to us with new dates for both the Suzuki and Ito visits to Washington.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab A.

THE WHITE HOUSE SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

WASHINGTON

DATE:

FROM: Richard V. Allen

VIA: Appointments Secretary

MEETING: Visit to Washington of Former Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda of Japan

DATES: March 20, 1981, 11:00 a.m. (tentative)

PURPOSE: Mr. Fukuda will be carrying a message to
the President from the Prime Minister.

Mr. Fukuda will also call on the Vice President,
at the Vice President's invitation.

FORMAT: - Oval Office, 20-30 minutes
(Interpreting will be necessary.)

- Secretary Haig
Dick Allen
Others to be determined

CABINET
PARTICIPATION: Secretary of State Haig

SPEECH
MATERIAL: Talking points for the meeting will be provided.

PRESS
COVERAGE: Standard press photo opportunities, including
the Japanese press pool, and White House
photographer

STAFF: Dick Allen

RECOMMEND: Dick Allen

OPPOSED: None

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: President met in Tokyo, April 1, 1978.

BACKGROUND: The President, when speaking with
Prime Minister Suzuki on January 21, told
Suzuki he is looking forward to seeing
Mr. Fukuda when he is here.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
VIA: CHARLES TYSON
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Japanese Visitors

This note makes sense to me in that it places former Prime Minister Fukuda in a higher priority position than current Foreign Minister Ito. I can comment from previous Japanese Foreign Ministers' visits that they are pleased as punch if they are able to be squeezed in for a photo opportunity with the President.

I agree.

*But there is less of a potential for Ito.
Fukuda is coming as Suzuki's representative.*

What are the dates — ?

*RVA
16 Feb 81*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8104005

Add-on 0284

February 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: President's Meetings with Former Prime
Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Ito

Assuming that former Prime Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Ito are in Washington at approximately the same time, and the President has time to see only one of them, we recommend that he meet with Fukuda in view of his past position and his residual influence within the governing party. We understand that Vice President Bush has already extended an invitation to the Foreign Minister for a meeting and suggest that possibilities be explored for at least a photo opportunity with the President in conjunction with that meeting.

L. Paul Bremer, III
- 2 L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

284 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
VIA: CHARLES TYSON
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Japanese Visitors

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8104005

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Add-on 0284

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 10, 1981

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: President's Meetings with Former Prime
Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Ito

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L. Paul Bremer, III
for
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Visit of Former Prime Minister of
Japan Takeo Fukuda

This is to alert you to the upcoming visit to Washington of Takeo Fukuda, the former Prime Minister of Japan. Mr. Fukuda will be in Washington March 19-21, and at that time would very much like to call on you in response to the invitation you extended to him during your visit to Tokyo last summer.

We are recommending that the President see him for a brief meeting.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *g*

SUBJECT: Scheduling of Former Prime Minister
Fukuda's Visit

Attached at Tab A is a Schedule Proposal for the visit to Washington of former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan.

At Tab B is a memorandum for your signature alerting the Vice President to Mr. Fukuda's visit and his desire to call on the Vice President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab A and sign the memorandum to the Vice President at Tab B.

na CRT
2/9/81

CRT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES P. TYSON
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*
SUBJECT: Visit of Former Prime Minister
Fukuda of Japan - March 19 - 21

Former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda will visit Washington March 19, 20 and 21. The President, when speaking with Prime Minister Suzuki on January 21, told Suzuki he is looking forward to seeing Mr. Fukuda when he is here.

Mr. Fukuda will carry a message from the Prime Minister.

He will also call on the Vice President, who invited him to do so when the Vice President visited Tokyo last summer. We will need a separate memorandum for the Vice President's schedule.

Mr. Fukuda's visit takes precedence over Foreign Minister Ito, and may make an Ito call on the President unnecessary.

Let's get this one scheduled this week.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *mm* NARA, Date *2/19/04*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 4, 1987

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE:

FROM: Richard V. Allen *RA*

VIA: Appointments Secretary

MEETING: Visit to Washington of Former Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda of Japan

DATES: March 19-21, 1981

PURPOSE: Mr. Fukuda will be carrying a message to
the President from the Prime Minister.

Mr. Fukuda will also call on the Vice President,
at the Vice President's invitation.

FORMAT: - Oval Office, 20-30 minutes
(Interpreting will be necessary.)

- Secretary Haig
Richard V. Allen
Others to be determined

CABINET
PARTICIPATION: Secretary of State Haig

SPEECH
MATERIAL: Talking points for the meeting will be provided.

PRESS
COVERAGE: Standard press photo opportunities, including
the Japanese press pool, and White House
photographer.

STAFF: Richard V. Allen

RECOMMEND: Richard V. Allen

OPPOSED: None

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: ~~None~~ *John F. Kennedy President met in Tokyo Apr. 1 1978*

BACKGROUND: The President, when speaking with
Prime Minister Suzuki on January 21, told
Suzuki he is looking forward to seeing
Mr. Fukuda when he is here.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES P. TYSON
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *gut*
SUBJECT: Visit of Former Prime Minister
Fukuda of Japan - March 19 - 21

Former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda will visit Washington March 19, 20 and 21. The President, when speaking with Prime Minister Suzuki on January 21, told Suzuki he is looking forward to seeing Mr. Fukuda when he is here.

Mr. Fukuda will carry a message from the Prime Minister.

He will also call on the Vice President, who invited him to do so when the Vice President visited Tokyo last summer. We will need a separate memorandum for the Vice President's schedule.

Mr. Fukuda's visit takes precedence over Foreign Minister Ito, and may make an Ito call on the President unnecessary.

Let's get this one scheduled this week.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MTA NARA, Date 1/9/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 4, 1987

~~SECRET~~

#0485

3/19 via Sit Room
folder 1355

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Former Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo

Attached are the State briefing papers for your March 20 meeting with Fukuda. These papers focus on the key issues of defense spending by Japan, and measures necessary to ease pressure on the U.S. automobile industry. The State paper also urges that a negative position be taken with regard to a possible visit to Japan by PLO leader Arafat.

I am also attaching a short paper on Fukuda himself, covering the positions and concerns he brings with him to Washington.

So that there will be a sense of progression in Fukuda's meetings with you and the President, I am suggesting that you be quite forthcoming in setting out current U.S. views and positions on the defense spending and automobile issues. I believe that the more clearly Fukuda knows how we feel, the better advice he can give to Prime Minister Suzuki. Suzuki is still not certain what to do on either key issue, so that Fukuda's views will be crucial.

In the Presidential meeting, I am suggesting that Fukuda be asked to describe what he has learned about U.S. positions relative to the defense spending and automobile issues. The President may or may not respond directly, but the way will be open to underline any central points made by you in the earlier meeting.

Fukuda knows his mission is a sensitive one. He is an old friend of this country, and what he learns here should be invaluable in helping the Japanese to develop clear-cut positions before the May meeting between the President and Suzuki.

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

Review: March 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 #18

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~