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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
File, Asia [Far East]

**Folder Title:** Japan (02/5/1981-02/19/1981)

**Box:** RAC Box 8

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:  
File Folder: Japan (2/5/81 – 2/19/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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1. Cable	061007Z FEB 81, 3p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1-23</i>	2/6/81	<del>B1</del>
2. Cable	061007Z FEB 81, 2p <i>R " " #24</i>	2/6/81	<del>B1</del>
3. Memo	Donald Gregg to Richard Allen re Japan, 1p <i>PART " " #25</i>	2/11/81	B1, <b>B3</b>
4. Cable	2p <i>D " " #26</i>	1/30/81	B1, <b>B3</b>
5. Cable	110643Z FEB 81, 5p <i>R " " #27</i>	2/11/81	<del>B1</del>
6. Cable	111643Z FEB 81, 6p <i>R " " #28</i>	2/11/81	<del>B1</del>
7. Cable	131019Z FEB 81, 2p <i>R " " #29</i>	2/13/81	<del>B1</del>
8. Cable	180826Z FEB 81, 2p <i>R " " #30</i>	2/18/81	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 737

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRIVACY  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

OO YEKOHR  
DE YEKADS #0722 C362120  
ZNY MMNSH  
ZKZK OO SOA DE  
O 052157Z FEB 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
ZEM  
UNCLAS VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS MH00722

FEBRUARY 5, 1981

FROM: RICHARD ALLEN  
TO: AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO RELAY THE FOLLOWING  
LETTER TO YOU. ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY SEPARATE  
CHANNEL.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE AND READ YOUR CABLE OF JANUARY 26,  
AND I THANK YOU FOR YOUR GOOD WISHES AND KIND WORDS.

YOUR INTERESTING AND SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF  
UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS DESERVES THE CLOSE ATTENTION OF ALL  
CONCERNED. I FOUND IT TO BE VERY INFORMATIVE, AND I AM ENCOURAGED  
BY YOUR FINDINGS THAT THE BASIC DIRECTION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP IS  
SOUND.

WE MUST FIND WAYS TO CLOSE THE "COMMUNICATIONS GAP" BETWEEN  
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE ARE DRAWN  
TOGETHER IN SO MANY WAYS, THE LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING HAS NOT PRO-  
GRESSED AS RAPIDLY AS THE EXTENT OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD SEEM TO  
DICTATE. THIS IS A LONG-TERM PROCESS, BUT ONE WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK  
TO ACCELERATE WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND I BELIEVE THAT INCREASED CON-  
SULTATION WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR.

IT IS REASSURING TO KNOW THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT  
THE UNITED STATES IN TOKYO. I HOPE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE  
YOU SOON.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 738

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION:            PRIVACY  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

          NANCY JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR VERY BEST TO MRS. MANSFIELD AND  
TO YOU.

          SINCERELY,

          /S/ RONALD REAGAN

276  
#0722  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

OP IMMED  
DE YEKADS #0722 0302120  
O 052157Z FEB 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS WH00722

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OP IMMED  
DE YEKAD8 #0722 0302120  
O 052157Z FEB 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS WH00722

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PSN:048163

RECALLED  
PAGE 01

TOR:036/21120Z

DTG:052757Z FEB 81

\*\*\*\*\* U N C L A S S I F I E D \*\*\*\*\* COPY

NANCY JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR VERY BEST TO MRS. MANSFIELD AND  
TO YOU.

SINCERELY,

/R/ RONALD REAGAN

276

PSN:048163

RECALLED  
PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:036/21120Z

DTG:052757Z FEB 81

February 2, 1981

VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO: AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

BEGIN TEXT

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I was pleased to receive and read your cable of January 26, and I thank you for your good wishes and kind words.

Your interesting and scholarly analysis of the present state of United States-Japanese relations deserves the close attention of all concerned. I found it to be very informative, and I am encouraged by your findings that the basic direction of our relationship is sound.

We must find ways to close the "communications gap" between Japan and the United States. Despite the fact that we are drawn together in so many ways, the level of understanding has not progressed as rapidly as the extent our relationship would seem to dictate. This is a long-term process, but one which we should seek to accelerate wherever possible, and I believe that increased consultation will be an essential factor.

It is reassuring to know that you will continue to represent the United States in Tokyo. I hope to have the opportunity to see you soon.

Nancy joins me in sending our very best to Mrs. Mansfield and to you.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ronald Reagan



From Richard Allen

to Ambassador Mansfield

The President asked me to relay  
the following letter to you. Original  
to Volstead by separate channel.

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP  
EOBIEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #2174 0371007  
O 061007Z FEB 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0006

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 02174  
E.O. 12805: RDS-4 02/06/01 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M  
TAGS: OYIP, JA  
SUBJECT: (B) FORMER PM FUKUDA TO VISIT U.S. MARCH 20-30  
REF: (A) TOKYO 1230, (B) TOKYO 17331. (~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FORMER PM FUKUDA ASKED EMBOFF TO CALL ON HIM FEBRUARY 6 TO INFORM HIM OF HIS PLANS TO VISIT U.S. FOR ABOUT 10 DAYS BEGINNING MARCH 20. FUKUDA SAID HE HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR OKAWARA TO SEEK APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON MARCH 20-23 WITH PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAIG AND "OLD FRIENDS" SUCH AS ARTHUR BURNS. HE THEN PLANNED TO GO TO NEW YORK TO MEET WITH FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON, DAVID ROCKEFELLER AND OTHERS AND TO BOSTON TO PARTICIPATE IN OPENING OF REFURBISHED JAPAN SECTION OF BOSTON MUSEUM. HE WOULD THEN GO TO CALIFORNIA FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON MARCH 29 TO ATTEND THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION MEETING. HE HOPED ALSO TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER AT SOME POINT WHILE CRISS-CROSSING THE U.S.

3. NOTING THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST U.S. VISIT IN THREE YEARS, FUKUDA SAID HIS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL ITINERARY WAS DESIGNED TO AVOID MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS JUST PRIOR TO PM SUZUKI'S VISIT. HE HAD COME UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO ATTEND TRILATERAL COMMISSION BUT DID NOT WANT TO "INTERFERE" WITH SUZUKI VISIT BY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME. WANTING HIS PARTI-

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-037/1 #23

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CIPATION IN TRILATERAL COMMISSION MEETING TO BE AS LOW-KEY AS POSSIBLE, HE HAD DECLINED INVITATION TO ADDRESS THE MEETING. WHEN EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUS WITH THAT OF FONMIN ITO, FUKUDA QUICKLY STATED THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY CHOSEN TO BE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE ITO AND THAT HIS VISIT WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ITO. ITO WOULD HOLD OFFICIAL TALKS AS GOJ REPRESENTATIVE WHILE FUKUDA WISHED MERELY TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO OLD FRIENDS. NOTING THAT HE HAD MET THREE TIMES PREVIOUSLY WITH PRESIDENT, FUKUDA SAID HE APPRECIATED PRESIDENT'S HAVING WELCOMED HIS VISIT DURING HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SUZUKI. FUKUDA SAID NOTHING ABOUT WHETHER HE WOULD BE BEARING LETTER OR OTHER MESSAGE FROM PM SUZUKI.

4. MOFA FIRST NORTH AMERICA DIRECTOR KARITA CONFIRMED TO EMBOFF THAT FUKUDA HAD APPROACHED MOFA REGARDING HIS APPOINTMENT REQUESTS. HE EXPECTED CABLE TO GO OUT TOMORROW INSTRUCTING OKAWARA TO ARRANGE THE VISIT. KARITA INDICATED THAT WHILE MOFA, OF COURSE, WELCOMED FUKUDA VISIT, THERE WAS SOME CONCERN THAT FUKUDA MIGHT EFFECTIVELY UPSTAGE ITO, WHOSE VISIT WAS CONSIDERED HIGHLY IMPORTANT IN POLICY SENSE. IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO ITO, FOR EXAMPLE, IF FUKUDA WERE GRANTED A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND HE WERE NOT. HE ADDED THAT ALL ITO DESIRED WAS OPPORTUNITY FOR BRIEF COURTESY CALL. HIS HOPE WAS THAT FUKUDA AND ITO VISITS WOULD COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER IN LAYING GROUND FOR PM'S VISIT. ASKED WHETHER FUKUDA WOULD HAVE ANY FORM OF OFFICIAL STATUS, KARITA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT FUKUDA WAS MEETING WITH SUZUKI FEBRUARY 9 TO DISCUSS VISIT. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT SUZUKI WOULD ENTRUST FUKUDA WITH AT LEAST COURTESY LETTER TO PRESIDENT.

5. COMMENT: FUKUDA QUITE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTS TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT, AND HIS STATUS AS LONG-TIME FRIEND OF U.S. AND RESPECTED FORMER PM STILL PLAYING ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN POLITICS WOULD SEEM TO CALL FOR THAT LEVEL OF TREATMENT. AT SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO ITO, THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL VISITOR TO U.S. SINCE INAUGURATION, IF HE WERE UNABLE TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO PRESIDENT. ADDITIONALLY, FROM U.S. POINT OF VIEW, ITO WILL HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MARSHALLING JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITION ON ISSUES SUCH AS POLAND, AND PERSONAL CONTACT WITH U.S. PRESIDENT WOULD BE VALUABLE BOOST TO HIS EFFECTIVENESS.

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHILE TIMING OF THE TWO VISITS IS OBVIOUSLY AWKWARD,  
WE RECOMMEND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE  
BOTH OF THEM.  
MANSFIELD

PSNI 049410

TOR: 037/10:20Z

RTG: 061007Z FEB 81

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~

8

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFICATION  
FROM ALLEN

*msn  
179/104*

RECEIVED 10 FEB 81 18

DOCDATE 07 FEB 81

TO TYSON

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

VISIT

FUKUDA, TAKEO

SUBJECT: FUKUDA VISIT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100037

8100059

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C 2/27*

*Tyson sgd memo to Bremer*

*DG*

DISPATCH

*ed by Tyson's office*

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

*[Handwritten signature]*

VIA LDX


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR:

L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Former Prime  
Minister of Japan, Fukuda

This is to confirm the President's meeting with former Prime Minister Fukuda on March 20 at 11:00 A.M. for 30 minutes. Please provide the briefing material for the President's use in the meeting no later than COB, Friday, March 13.




Charles P. Tyson

Feb 27, 1961  
WHSR SEND  
2:35 PM

**WASHFAX RECEIPT**

THE WHITE HOUSE



Jul 27 1948

B  
SM2

76

MESSAGE NO. M 961 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ No. PAGES 2

FROM [Handwritten Name] (Name) [Handwritten Extension] (Extension) (Room Number) \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Dept/Room No.</u>	<u>Extens.</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Secretary</u>		

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PA 9

MEMORANDUM

358

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES TYSON

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: Fukuda Visit

The Fukuda visit can take place in the March 20-23 time frame, I learn from cable traffic (Tokyo 2174, copy attached). Ambassador Mansfield recommends the visit.

We will have to sort out the Ito visit since Mansfield recommends he see the President, too. See especially paragraph 4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 2/7/81

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997  
By MJH NARA, Date 02/19/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



O 261007Z FEB 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0006

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 02174

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 02/06/01 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M  
TAGS: CYIP, JA  
SUBJECT: (B) FORMER PM FUKUDA TO VISIT U.S. MARCH 20-30  
REF: (A) TOKYO 1230, (B) TOKYO 1733

1. (~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

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\* \* \* \* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \* \* \* \*

NAN COL VP  
EOB:EA

PSN:048913 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:037/10120Z DTG:061007Z FEB 81

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOO-037/1 #24  
BY ADJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

TO BE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE ITO AND THAT HIS VISIT WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ITO. ITO WOULD HOLD OFFICIAL TALKS AS GOJ REPRESENTATIVE WHILE FUKUDA WISHED MERELY TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO OLD FRIENDS. NOTING THAT HE HAD MET THREE TIMES PREVIOUSLY WITH PRESIDENT, FUKUDA SAID HE APPRECIATED PRESIDENT'S HAVING WELCOMED HIS VISIT DURING HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SUZUKI. FUKUDA SAID NOTHING ABOUT WHETHER HE WOULD BE BEARING LETTER OR OTHER MESSAGE FROM PM SUZUKI.

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MANSFIELD  
BT

PSN:048913

RECALLED  
PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:037/10:20Z

DTG:061007Z FEB 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED E/CLOSURE(S)  
FROM ALLEN *mjn 11/1/04*

RECEIVED 10 FEB 81 18

TO TYSON

DOC DATE 07 FEB 81

NEWELL, G

06 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AP

FUKUDA, TAKEO

VISIT

SUBJECT: FUKUDA VISIT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100284

8101013

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

	<i>a 3/10</i>	<i>rec'd approved</i>		<i>Copies to ✓</i>
		<i>Pres activity</i>		<i>Gay ✓</i>
				<i>Leley ✓</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

NSC# 358  
Action 9 MAR 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

DATE 3/6/81

TO: RICHARD ALLEN  
FROM: GREGORY J. NEWELL  
SUBJ: Approved Presidential Activity

Please take the necessary steps to implement the following and confirm with Helene von Damm, ext. 2699. The appropriate briefing paper should be submitted to Dick Darman by 3:00 p.m. of the preceding day.

Meeting: with former Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan

Mrs. Reagan Participation: No

Date: March 20                      Time: 11:00 am                      Duration: 30 mins

Location: Oval Office

Press Coverage: Press photo

Purpose: To be covered in briefing paper

Note: Following the President's meeting, please submit a confirmed list of actual participants, including staff or Administration attendees to me. Include full names and business titles for non-White House participants.

CC: Michael Deaver	Elizabeth Dole
James Brady	Craig Fuller
David Gergen	Peter McCoy
Joseph Canzeri	Nina Wormser
David Fischer	Jennifer Fitzgerald
Richard Darman	Helen Donaldson
Richard Williamson	Mabel Brandon
Ken Khachigian	Edward Hickey
Larry Speakes	WHCA

RECEIVED 11 FEB 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM POATS

DOCDATE 10 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

IMPORT CONTROLS

AMAYA, NAHIRO

ENERGY

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR ALLEN MTG W/ MITI VICE MINISTER ON 10 FEB

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with MITI Vice Minister Amaya  
(4:00 p.m., February 10, 1981)

Amaya is reported to have three main items on his Washington agenda: automobile trade, coal, and the joint SRC-II coal liquefaction project. In general, he wants to establish contacts on trade and energy policy with the Reagan Administration.

Autos. Rashish and Hormats will urge Amaya to maintain government pressure on the Japanese auto industry to "act with prudence in marketing automobiles in the United States." This means no increase in shipments, no diversion of cars from other markets to the United States, no predatory marketing practices. Amaya will cite MITI's agreement with the Japanese auto industry to hold shipments to the US in the first quarter to "less than 450,000 units" as proof that Japan is putting a cap on its auto sales here at about the 1980 level. (The pending Danforth-Bentsen bill would require the USG to negotiate a "voluntary restraint agreement" at 1.6 million units -- a small rollback and freeze until the US industry can compete.

Talking Points

-- We welcome Japan's initial step to set a limit at about 1980 levels of exports to the US.

-- We urge continuing MITI action to preclude imprudent Japanese marketing practices.

-- The USG's position on whether to support auto import restraints will be developed in the context of a broad study of the automobile industry just getting underway (Lewis's working group).

-- Japan's plans for expanding its auto export capacity and any reduction of Japanese auto exports to Western Europe will affect US attitudes toward legislation to set import restraints.

SRC-II. Stockman wants to cut this joint US-German-Japanese coal liquefaction demonstration project in West Virginia out of the FY 82 budget, despite its long history of international negotiation

and the advantages of 50% foreign financing. Stockman's fallback position is to shift the burden of US funding out of the DOE budget and on to the plate of pending projects for the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to consider supporting (with a budget that Stockman also wants to cut sharply). If the Corporation picked up the project, the shift might add six months or more to the time required to get the project underway. Meanwhile, the German Government is considering backing out for budgetary reasons but has been urged by Edwards and State to stay in. Edwards and Stockman were to meet at mid-day today to try to settle the US position. I may hear the outcome in time to supplement this note.

### Talking Points

-- Our commitment to fiscal retrenchment and to minimizing the government's role in energy development has created uncertainty about the SRC- II project.

-- OMB Director Stockman and Energy Secretary Edwards are discussing SRC-II currently, and I may not be current on their views or decisions.

-- We are very conscious of the history of negotiations with Japan and Germany on this project, and we do not wish to be an unreliable partner. We continue to value the potential contributions of this project to our joint energy security interests.

-- Secretary Edwards should be able to give you the current US position shortly, possibly while you are in Washington.

Coal. We have been encouraging the Japanese electric power industry to plan for substantial dependence on US steam coal as its shift of power generation from oil to coal proceeds. This will require major investments in development of western US coal resources, rail and slurry lines and at least one major west coast coal port. (A Canadian-Japanese deal is already well advanced.) A US governors' planning organization, WESTPO, has been working with DOE, me, the National Coal Association and the transportation companies concerned on the scope of a joint US-Japanese study to define the most efficient set of investments needed to serve Far Eastern coal markets. The study outline is to be presented to the Japan Coal Development Corporation, which is the coal buyer for the Japanese electric power industry, at a meeting in Tokyo next month.

### Talking Points

-- Our common interests in energy security point to close US-Japanese cooperation in the development of US western coal resources for use in Japan's electric power and other industries.

-- We believe a joint study of the production and logistical requirements and investment opportunities is the way to develop this partnership. Consequently, I am glad to hear that your Coal Development Corporation and MITI are talking with our Energy Department, the Western Governors organizations and others here on plans for such a systematic study.

-- We will welcome Japanese investment in all aspects of this development.



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RECEIVED 13 FEB 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*WASH 1/10/81*

DOC DATE 11 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

ECONOMICS

WATANABE, MICHIO

SUBJECT: REPORTING ON WATANABE REACTION TO HIS US TRIP

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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*Allen*

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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February 11, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*  
 SUBJECT: Japanese Finance Minister (S)

Attached is [REDACTED] giving Japanese Finance Minister Watanabe's generally favorable reactions to his U.S. trip. Watanabe says he felt more U.S. interest in automobiles than in Japanese defense spending, that he was disappointed that U.S. officials did not have a clearer understanding of Japan's monetary and fiscal problems, and that he was somewhat skeptical about our ability to cut taxes and reduce government spending at the same time. (S)

I am sending this along since you met with Watanabe. The Vice President might also be interested in this report, if you cared to send it along. (S)

*No need.  
2/16/81*

Attachment

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (3)

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Derivative C1 by CIA  
 Review on January 30, 2001

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RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 5040  
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 3586  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5672  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2925  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3428  
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RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3639  
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E.U. 120651 GDS 2/11/87 (IMMERMAN, R.) DR=P  
TAGST PEPR, JA  
SUBJECT: ( ) AMBASSADOR'S FEB. 11 MEETING WITH  
PM SUZUKI

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN 45-MINUTE MEETING AFTERNOON FEB. 11, PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED NEED FOR GREATER JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING, JAPAN'S PLANS TO INCREASE ITS FOREIGN AID AS MEANS OF CONTRIBUTING TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF WESTERN ALLIANCE, BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES (PARTICULARLY AUTOS) AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S VERY POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE OVERALL US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP, PRIME MIN EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT'S COURTESY TELEPHONE CALL IMMEDIATELY AFTER INAUGURATION, WELCOMED AMBASSADOR'S REAPPOINTMENT AND REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE TO VISIT WASHINGTON AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH PRESIDENT. END SUMMARY.
3. IN RAISING DEFENSE ISSUE, AMB NOTED THAT SECRETARIES HAIG AND WEINBERGER HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED DURING SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AND IN SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCES THEIR INTENTION TO PURSUE FRANK PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS

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BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

WITH ALLIES, INCLUDING JAPAN, ON SPECIFICS OF OUR RESPECTIVE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, RATHER THAN APPLY PUBLIC PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN PERCENTAGES. AMB SAID THAT THIS NEW APPROACH, WHICH HE PERSONALLY HAD LONG RECOMMENDED, SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS SIGN OF DIMINISHED USG INTEREST IN IMPROVEMENTS IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE POSTURE; RATHER AMERICANS FEEL STRONGLY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE MUST DO MORE IN VIEW OF INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY POLISH CRISIS. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS INDICATED IT WILL REQUEST SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN MILITARY BUDGET AND GIVEN MOOD IN U.S., CONGRESS WILL CERTAINLY VOTE ITS APPROVAL. AMB EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT JAPAN, AS IT HAS OVER LAST 10 YEARS, WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS ON ITS OWN. PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY WAY IN WHICH NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD ALREADY DISPLAYED UNDERSTANDING THAT GOJ, EVEN WITH BUDGET PROBLEMS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND A NERVOUS PUBLIC WAS MAKING UTMOST EFFORTS TO DO MORE IN DEFENSE FIELD SO AS TO ASSURE SMOOTH OPERATION OF OUR BILATERAL MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PRIME MINISTER ASKED THAT WE WATCH CLOSELY UPCOMING DIET DEBATE ON FY 81 DEFENSE BUDGET. OPPOSITION WILL CHARGE THAT GOJ'S REQUESTED INCREASES VIOLATE SPIRIT OF CONSTITUTION, CONTRADICT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PUBLIC DEBT BURDEN AND ARE AT EXPENSE OF NEEDED SOCIAL WELFARE BOOSTS. PRIME MINISTER WAS CERTAIN THAT IN SPITE OF SHARP OPPOSITION PARTY AND POSSIBLY EVEN MEDIA ATTACKS, BECAUSE NECESSARY PUBLIC CONSENSUS NOW EXISTED DIET WOULD APPROVE HIS TWO-PRONGED LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR FY 81 STRENGTHENING JAPAN'S DEFENSE POSTURE WHILE AT SAME TIME RESTRUCTURING GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL BASE.

4. PRIME MIN SAID JAPAN, AS PEACE LOVING NATION, SAW ITS DEFENSE MEASURES AS ONLY ONE MEANS OF CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS PLAN TO DOUBLE BY 1985 THE AVERAGE AMOUNT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID IT EXTENDED OVER LAST FIVE YEARS. HE INDICATED HE WISHED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH U.S. LEADERS ABOUT OUR RESPECTIVE AID EFFORTS. IN AID CONTEXT, PRIME MIN REFERRED TO THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM AS ONE OF THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THIS COMING DECADE. FROM WHAT HE SAW AS WELL AS FROM HIS TALKS WITH ASEAN LEADERS ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE AREA, HE FOUND SOUTHEAST ASIA TO BE ONE OF THE BRIGHT SPOTS. ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND STRONGLY MOTIVATED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, WHICH EMPHASIZE WHAT THESE NATIONS CAN DO THROUGH THEIR OWN EFFORTS BUT WHICH HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED

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THAT THEY CAN MAKE GOOD USE OF FOREIGN AID, ASEAN  
LEADERS ARE ALSO TRYING VERY HARD TO LIMIT AND EVEN-  
TUALLY ELIMINATE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, THEY

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RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 5041  
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 3587  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5673  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2924  
RUBHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3429  
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2345  
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3640  
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ALL ASKED THAT WHEN HE MET WITH PRESIDENT, HE EXPRESS  
ON THEIR BEHALF STRONG WISH THAT U.S. DISPLAY GREATER  
INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND HE PROMISED TO DO SO.

5. PRIME MINISTER WELCOMED NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT  
OF MOST BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES OF LAST FEW YEARS,  
SUCH AS NTT PROCUREMENT AND TOBACCO IMPORTS. HE SAID  
THAT GIVEN SHEER MAGNITUDE OF THE TWO WAY TRADE  
BETWEEN US, "RIPPLES" WILL OCCASIONALLY OCCUR. AMBASSADOR  
EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE ONE MAJOR REMAINING ISSUE,  
JAPANESE AUTO EXPORTS, COULD ALSO BE RESOLVED IN MANNER  
WHICH WOULD NOT HARM OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  
PRIME MIN RECOGNIZED DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH  
U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY CURRENTLY FINDS ITSELF AND SAID HE  
WANTED TO WORK OUT SOLUTION WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY  
TO BOTH USG AND THE INDUSTRY. AMBASSADOR THANKED  
PRIME MIN FOR MEETING RECENTLY WITH AFL-CIO PRESIDENT  
LANE KIRKLAND, WHO HAD EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION  
WITH OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED HIM TO CONVEY VIEWS OF  
U.S. ORGANIZED LABOR ON AUTOS AND OTHER TRADE ISSUES  
DIRECTLY TO TOP LEVELS OF GOJ AND WHO DEPARTED WITH  
BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANIS PROBLEMS IN THIS  
REGARD.

6. PRIME MIN SAID HE PERSONALCY WAS VERY PLEASED WITH  
PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ASK AMBASSADOR TO REMAIN IN

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JAPAN AND KNEW JAPANESE PUBLIC AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT  
WELCOMED NEWS. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED  
THAT HE COULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR GREATER UNDER-  
STANDING BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN.

7. COMMENT: MEETING WAS SET UP ON EXTREMELY SHORT  
NOTICE IN RESPONSE TO AMB'S DESIRE TO DELIVER PERSONALLY  
TO PRIME MIN LETTERS OF APPRECIATION FOR JAPANESE  
COOPERATION ON IRAN AND OTHER MAJOR ISSUES FROM EX-  
PRESIDENT CARTER AND FORMER VP MONDALE. BOTH PRESS  
AND TV GAVE IT EXTENSIVE COVERAGE, HIGHLIGHTING  
DISCUSSION ON DEFENSE AND INTERPRETING IT AS EVIDENCE  
THAT REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO URGE  
JAPAN TO STEP UP ITS DEFENSE EFFORTS. END COMMENT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

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MESSAGE:

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/10/11 (BARRY, R.)

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: POLAND: NATO CONSIDERATION OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

REF: STATE 04781

, ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AMBASSADOR/CHARGE SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL TO DELIVER THE PAPER (BEGINNING PARA 7 BELOW) REGARDING POSSIBLE WESTERN RESPONSES IN THE EVENT OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE POLISH REGIME. THIS PAPER WAS PRESENTED IN NATO ON FEB 6 AND WILL BE DISCUSSED THERE THIS WEEK. THE INITIAL REACTION BY NATO PERMREPS WAS GENERALLY FAVORABLE.

3. YOU SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR UTTER DISCRETION, LEST THESE CONTINGENCY DISCUSSIONS CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND.

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DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. AT THE MEETING YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

• -- THE NEED FOR SECRECY AND THE AVOIDANCE OF ANY  
LEAKS REGARDING THESE CONSULTATIONS;

• -- THAT WE ARE NOT ENCOURAGING PUBLIC ALLIED  
STATEMENTS AT THIS TIME;

• -- THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS INITIAL DISCUSSION  
TO GO INTO DETAIL REGARDING POSSIBLE WESTERN RESPONSES;

• -- THAT WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER COMMENTS FROM  
CAPITALS.

• -- THAT WE WILL CONVEY THE GENERAL THRUST OF NATO  
DISCUSSION ON THE PAPER AFTER THIS WEEK'S MEETING.

5. IN INTRODUCING THE PAPER YOU MAY NOTE THAT:

• -- THE CYCLE OF TENSION AND COMPROMISE IN POLAND  
IS COMPLEX AND HOPEFULLY CAN LEAD TO AN EQUILIBRIUM  
THAT ALLOWS THE POLES TO DEAL PEACEFULLY WITH THEIR  
OWN PROBLEMS. PRUDENCE SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT WE  
SHOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF POSSIBLE POLISH  
GOVERNMENT STEPS TO SUPPRESS THE WORKERS MOVEMENT AND  
THE APPROPRIATE WESTERN POSTURE TOWARDS ANY SUCH  
DEVELOPMENTS. WITH THIS IN MIND THE US HAS INTRODUCED  
THE ATTACHED PAPER, WHICH REPRESENTS TENTATIVE USG  
THINKING, INTO THIS PRIVATE PERHAPS DISCUSSION.

• -- MEANWHILE, WE WILL GO FORWARD SEPARATELY WITH  
OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A PACKAGE OF MEASURES FOR  
POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF A LARGE-SCALE SOVIET  
INTERVENTION.

FURTHERMORE, AS THE TEXT OF THE ATTACHED PAPER MAKES  
CLEAR, WE DO NOT WANT ANY ACTIONS WE MAY TAKE TO  
BECOME PART OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE BY  
MAKING THEM SUFFER OR BY MAKING IT APPRECIABLY EASIER  
FOR THE SOVIETS TO RATIONALIZE AN INTERVENTION.

• -- ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN THE POLISH  
GOVERNMENT SINCE OUR PAPER WAS MADE AVAILABLE IN NATO,  
WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS REMAIN  
ESSENTIALLY VALID.

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. FOR CANBERRA: PAPER WAS DISCUSSED BY DAS BARRY WITH AUSTRALIAN DCM BIRCH IN MEETING TODAY (2/10).

7. BEGIN TEXT:

POLICY RESPONSES TO USE OF FORCE BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE POLISH PEOPLE:

• WE HAVE STRESSED TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN PAST MONTHS THE VALUE WE PLACE ON ITS ASSURANCES THAT FORCE WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST THE WORKERS, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE WORKERS WOULD SEVERELY AFFECT THE CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

• WHILE CONTINUING TO EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN OCCASIONAL WILLINGNESS DURING JANUARY'S CONFRONTATIONS TO USE THE POLICE TO END SIT-INS. THE POSSIBILITY OF STRONGER APPLICATIONS OF FORCE WILL INCREASE IF, AS NOW APPEARS LIKELY, THE UNIONS CONTINUE TO PUSH THE GOVERNMENT INTO MORE HUMILIATING BACKDOWNS OR IF VITAL TRANSPORTATION LINES ACROSS POLAND ARE THREATENED.

• WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO DISSUADE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FROM RESORTING TO FORCE. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS COMMUNICATED ITS OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO SUPPRESS THE WORKERS THIS PAST WEEK TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER. OTHER ALLIES MIGHT SEEK TO FIND OPPORTUNITIES TO PRIVATELY PASS SIMILAR MESSAGES.

• THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MAY NEVERTHELESS BY CHOICE OR BY PERCEIVED NECESSITY USE FORCE AGAINST THE WORKERS. IN PREPARING OUR RESPONSES, WE WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, INCLUDING EVEN SOME IN WHICH THE USE OF FORCE MIGHT BE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO CHAOS. IDEALLY, AS FOR A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, WE SHOULD HAVE READY A LIST OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES FROM WHICH WE COULD PICK AND CHOOSE, DEPENDING UPON THE ACTUAL SITUATION.

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 004

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

- IN DECIDING UPON OUR RESPONSE, WE SHOULD CONSIDER FACTORS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE EXTENT OF PROVOCATION. AT ONE END OF THE SCALE MIGHT BE A GRATUITOUS AND BRUTAL SHOW OF FORCE DESIGNED TO SUPPRESS SOLIDARITY AND THE DISSIDENTS. AT THE OTHER END MIGHT BE INSTANCES IN WHICH POLICE WERE USED TO QUELL DISTURBANCES THAT HAD ALREADY LED TO BLOODSHED.

2. THE AMOUNT OF FORCE USED. THIS MIGHT RANGE FROM THE ASSIGNMENT OF POLICE AND/OR ARMY UNITS TO KEEP TRANSPORTATION AND/OR OTHER VITAL SERVICES IN OPERATION, THROUGH THE NON-VIOLENT USE OF FORCE TO BLOCK DEMONSTRATORS OR TO STOP SIT-INS IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS (AS IN BYDOGOSZCZ AND NOWY SĄCZ IN JANUARY,) TO FIRING UPON INNOCENT, UNARMED CIVILIANS.

3. ACCOMPANYING MEASURES. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE USE OF FORCE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MEASURES INDICATING A CRACKDOWN ON SOLIDARITY UNIONS AND DISMANTLING OF THE POST-AUGUST REFORMS. IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE MEASURED APPLICATION OF FORCE ACCOMPANIED BY A RENEWED EXPRESSION OF COMMITMENT TO THE POST-AUGUST REFORMS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY IN WHICH THOSE REFORMS AND THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE NATION MIGHT BEST PROSPER.

4. THE MAKEUP OF THE LEADERSHIP. IF THE USE OF FORCE WERE INSTITUTED OR FOLLOWED BY A NEW LEADERSHIP DOMINATED BY ELEMENTS INTENT ON PLEASING THE SOVIETS, OUR REACTION SHOULD BE HARsher.

5. THE DEGREE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. IF IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A HAND, OVERTLY OR COVERTLY, OR THAT THE USE OF FORCE HAD BEEN STAGED AS A PRETEXT FOR GREATER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN POLAND, OUR REACTION SHOULD BE HARsher. AND SHOULD ESSENTIALLY BE DIRECTED AT THE SOVIETS AS IN OTHER WORST-CASE SCENARIOS.

AS LONG AS THE SITUATION PROMISED HOPE OF CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL REFORMS AND A START TOWARD ECONOMIC RECOVERY OR, IN THE CASE OF A TEMPORARY OR

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 005

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

PARTIAL PULLBACK FROM THE REFORMS, SOME HOPE OF REVERSIBILITY, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ACTION WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR INFLUENCE ON POLISH GOVERNMENT. IN SUCH INSTANCES, WE MIGHT CONCENTRATE ON STATEMENTS AND POLITICAL ACTIONS THAT WOULD BE EASILY AND QUICKLY REVERSIBLE. IN MOST CASES, WE WOULD WANT TO AVOID PERMANENT DAMAGE TO OUR CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES THROUGH WHICH WE MAINTAIN ACCESS TO IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF POLISH SOCIETY.

IN CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND WE NEED TO BE MINDFUL THAT OUR PUBLICS WOULD REACT IN THEIR OWN FASHION. WE MIGHT EXPECT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME OF OUR LABOR MOVEMENTS MIGHT CONSIDER SOME TYPE OF BOYCOTT OF POLISH SHIPPING, THOUGH THERE WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD DEAL OF CONCERN FOR THE SUFFERING OF THE POLISH PEOPLE.

IN ANY EVENT, ALLIES SHOULD FIND AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THAT THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO SUPPRESS THE WORKERS WOULD PROBABLY ESCALATE AND BRING GREAT SUFFERING AND PROBABLY USHER IN A PERIOD OF EVEN GREATER DANGER. AT A MINIMUM IT WOULD PROBABLY MAKE FURTHER WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IMPOSSIBLE. MOREOVER, WE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO CONDITION ANY NEW ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ON NON-VIOLENCE.

IN CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE IT MUST ALSO REMAIN A PARAMOUNT CONCERN THAT WESTERN ACTIONS NOT MAKE THE SITUATION SO DIFFICULT WITHIN POLAND THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES FEEL THEY HAVE NO OPTIONS BUT TO CALL FOR SOVIET HELP, NOR THAT OUR POSTURE BE OBVIOUSLY MANIPULABLE TO PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION.

IF SIGNIFICANT FORCE IS USED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER CHOOSING AMONG THE FOLLOWING MEASURES AS APPROPRIATE:

-- ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT DEPLORING THE USE OF FORCE, THE TONE DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- CALL IN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, THREATENING A SEVERE CUTBACK IN THE ECONOMIC AREA.

-- INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES.

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 000

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA, THE VATICAN AND OTHERS. ONE OBJECTIVE AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE A PARAL APREAL FOR CALM.

.. PRIVATE MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS BY THE US AND ITS ALLIES ADVOCATING CONTINUED RESTRAINT AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

.. STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE US AND ITS ALLIES URGING AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

.. RAISE ISSUE IN OSCE, AT ILO, AND AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

WE WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, WANT TO CONSULT IN NATO ON APPROPRIATE ALLIED RESPONSES.

.. RECALL OUR AMBASSADOR FOR CONSULTATIONS.

.. ENTER INTO URGENT CONSULTATIONS AT NATO ON OTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO INFLUENCE POLISH BEHAVIOR AND DETER SOVIET INTERVENTION.

END TEXT HAIG

PSNI 056132

TORI 042/031002

BTG 111643Z FEB 81

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOB:EA,EEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
 DE RUEHKO #2589 0441019  
 MCN NAB  
 O 131019Z FEB 81 ZPP-4  
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6204

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO #2589

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 2)

EO 12065: RDS-1 2/13/11 (SHERMAN, W.C.) OR-M

TAGS: NATO, PEPR, JA

SUBJECT: POLAND; NATO CONSIDERATION OF RECENT  
 - DEVELOPMENTS; SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FONMIN

REF: (A) STATE 356201 (B) STATE 35763

1. ~~(B)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BECAUSE OF AMBASSADOR'S PRIOR COMMITMENT, DCM CALLED ON MOFA DEPUTY VICE MINISTER KATORI FEBRUARY 12 TO DELIVER PAPER CONTAINED REF A AS WELL AS LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER TRANSMITTED REF B. DCM URGED THAT FACT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS BE AS CLOSELY HELD AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE LEAKS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING TENSIONS IN POLAND AND WITH USSR. DCM EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE NOT SEEKING AT THIS TIME TO OBTAIN FROM MOFA DETAILED LIST OF WHAT THEY MIGHT DO BUT THAT WE WOULD WELCOME MOFA REACTION TO OUR PAPER. WE PROMISED TO BRIEF THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS AT NATO MEETING THIS WEEK.

3. KATORI EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR OUR CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ON POLAND. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT JAPAN'S REACTION TO SITUATION WHERE POLISH GOVERNMENT USED FORCE AGAINST ITS PEOPLE WOULD NECESSARILY BE DIFFERENT FROM SITUATION WHERE SOVIETS INTERVENED

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-0371-#29

BY LOI NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MILITARILY. TO JAPANESE, LATTER CASE WOULD CLEARLY BE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEREBY COMPLETELY JUSTIFYING RESPONSE FROM OTHER NATIONS INCLUDING, OF COURSE, JAPAN. KATORI ADDED THAT US AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPEANS COULD RELY ON HELSINKI ACCORDS, TO WHICH JAPAN WAS NOT A PARTY, FOR ANY STEPS WE TAKE TO COUNTER POLISH GOVERNMENT'S USE OF FORCE BUT HE BELIEVED JAPAN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO EXPLAIN ITS RESPONSES, IF ANY, SOLELY ON BASIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARGUMENTS.

4. KATORI ASKED WHETHER US WOULD EVENTUALLY SEEK TO OBTAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS IN COMMON IN VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES OR WAS MAINLY INTERESTED IN TESTING REACTIONS OF ITS ALLIES TO VARIOUS POSSIBLE UNILATERAL US RESPONSES AND DETERMINING WHAT STEPS ITS ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE. KATORI ALSO ASKED IF NATO REMAINS PRIMARY SITE OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS, HOW US CONTEMPLATED BRINGING AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN INTO MORE DETAILED PLANNING. KATORI REQUESTED A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF FORCE AND, AFTER SCANNING LIST OF POSSIBLE MEASURES AT END OF PAPER, ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER IT COULD BE READ TO INCLUDE ACTUAL SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

5. KATORI PROMISED A MORE THOROUGH MOFA REACTION TO PAPER BY LATE NEXT WEEK. IN MEANTIME, HE ASKED US TO CONSIDER ADVISABILITY OF EXPEDITING ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AS ONE MEANS OF ALLEVIATING INTERNAL TENSION AND THUS LESSENING POSSIBILITY THAT POLISH GOVERNMENT WOULD RESORT TO FORCE.  
MANSFIELD

PSN: 004360

TOR: 047/041322

RTG: 131010Z FEB 81



\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

NAN COL VP  
 FOR IEA, THOMSON, EUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
 DE RUEHKO #2762 #49#826  
 O 180026Z FEB 81  
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6291

INFO USMISSION USNATO #679  
 RT

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 22762

EXDIS  
 EO 12065: RDS-1 2/18/11 (SHERMAN, W.C.) DR-M  
 TAGS: PL, US, JA  
 SUBJECT: (S) POLAND: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN  
 MINISTER ITO  
 REF: (A) STATE 35763; (B) TOKYO 2589

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA EUROPEAN BUREAU DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DONOWAKI TOLD POLCOONS FEB 17 THAT THERE MIGHT BE CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN FORMULATING AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO SECRETARY HAIG'S FEBRUARY 10 LETTER RAISING QUESTION OF JAPANESE APPROACHING EUROPEANS ON UTILIZATION OF EC MECHANISM FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON POLAND. IN FACT, REPLY MIGHT NOT BE READY UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON LATE NEXT MONTH. DONOWAKI ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MOFA FULLY RECOGNIZED NEED TO AGREE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON PROCEDURES FOR BRINGING JAPAN INTO CONSULTATIONS SINCE EVENTS MIGHT WELL COME TO A HEAD BEFORE ITO'S VISIT. IN THIS CONNECTION, DONOWAKI RE-EMPHASIZED NECESSITY OF A NON-NATO-RELATED MECHANISM AS WELL AS DESIRABILITY OF THE EC FORMAT, AND WELCOMED CONTINUED "INFORMAL" DISCUSSIONS WITH US SINCE THEY DID NOT REQUIRE CLEARANCES OUTSIDE OF MOFA.

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#30BY 107, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. DONOWAKI SAID MOFA HAS HEARD FROM AUSTRALIANS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY UK AND FRG AMBASSADORS TO NATO IN BRUSSELS ON MODE OF CONSULTATIONS AND THAT NEW ZEALANDERS MIGHT ALSO BE CONTACTED IN BRUSSELS. DONOWAKI CAUTIONED AGAINST EVEN US RAISING POLAND WITH JAPAN IN NATO CONTEXT BECAUSE THIS WOULD SPARK OPPOSITION PARTY UPROAR AND LIMIT GOJ'S ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE FULLY LATER ON IN ANY JOINT COUNTERMEASURES. HE ALSO WORRIED THAT IF NATO MEMBERS CONTINUED TO DISCUSS CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN BRUSSELS, JAPAN WOULD BE EMBARRASSINGLY ISOLATED.

4. IN VIEW OF DEPARTMENT'S RECENT INSTRUCTION REGARDING NODIS-CAPTIONED TRAFFIC, WE ARE SENDING THIS MESSAGE EXDIS. AS THE INFORMATION HEREIN IS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE, IT SHOULD BE TREATED WITH DISCRETION AND DISCUSSED ONLY WITH US OFFICIALS AT THIS STAGE.  
SHERMAN

PSN: 006906

TOR: 049/13103Z

BTG: 180826Z FEB 81

DATE 02/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

ROB:EA, FARRAR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
 DE RUEHC #2471 0510011  
 O 192049Z FEB 81  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2897

UNCLAS STATE 042471  
 E.O. 120651 N/A

TAGS: PDIP, US, JA

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM LDP  
 SECRETARY GENERAL SAKURAUCHI

' WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SAKURAUCHI:

QUOTE:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WASH, DC.

AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LDP I HEARTILY AND DEEPLY CON-  
 RATULATE TO INAUGURATE THE 40TH PRESIDENT IN USA. I WISH  
 YOU GREAT SUCCESS ON YOUR ACTIVITIES. YOSHIO SAKURAUCHI,  
 SECRETARY-GENERAL, LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. UNQUOTE.

' FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD BE DE-  
 LIVERED TO SAKURAUCHI:

QUOTE:

HONORABLE YOSHIO SAKURAUCHI, SECRETARY GENERAL, LIBERAL  
 DEMOCRATIC PARTY, TOKYO, JAPAN.

DEAR MR. SAKURAUCHI:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE

DATE 02/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE OCCASION OF MY INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. UNQUOTE.

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT  
WISHES TO DO SO. HAIG

PSN: 009234

TOR: 051/01139Z

ATO: 192049Z FEB 81

DATE 02/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOBIEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #2472 0802321

O 192049Z FEB 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2801

UNCLAS STATE 042472

E.O. 12065IN/A

TAGS: PDIP,US,JA

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMEITO  
CHAIRMAN YOSHIKATSU TAKEIRI1. WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM TAKEIRI:  
QUOTE:

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC  
 WE HEARTILY CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR INAUGURATION AS 40TH  
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ALSO EXTEND OUR DEEPEST  
 RESPECT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. THE CONSTRUCTION  
 OF GREAT AMERICA, WE BELIEVE, WILL INEVITABLY BRING ABOUT  
 FURTHER PROSPERITY AND REALIZATION OF PEACE IN THE WORLD  
 NOT ONLY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BUT TO THE NATIONS IN THE  
 WHOLE WORLD. DURING YOUR PRESIDENCY, WE HOPE, THE PARTNER  
 SHIP OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES MUST BE FURTHER PROMOTED AND  
 TIGHTENED. OUR PARTY KOMEITO IS WILLING TO DO ITS BEST TO  
 SETTLE THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
 JAPAN. AGAIN WE EXTEND YOU OUR BEST WISHES. JANUARY 21,  
 1981, YOSHIKATSU TAKEIRI, CHAIRMAN OF KOMEITO, TOKYO, JAPAN.  
 UNQUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD BE  
 DELIVERED TO TAKEIRI:

DATE 02/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

QUOTE:

HONORABLE YOSHIKATSU TAKEIRI, CHAIRMAN, KOMIITO, TOKYO,  
JAPAN.

DEAR MR. TAKEIRI:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL GREETINGS UPON  
MY INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I  
ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE YOUR SENTIMENTS OF FRIENDSHIP AND  
LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN PURSUIT OF OUR  
MUTUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR ALL PEOPLE.  
SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. UNGQUOTE.

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT  
WISHES TO DO SO. HAIG

PSN: 009180

TOR: 051/00159Z

HTO: 198049Z FEB 81