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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
File, Asia (Far East)

**Folder Title:** Japan (01/26/1981) (1)

**Box:** RAC Box 8

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (1/26/81) (1)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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1. Cable	261032Z JAN 81, 11p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #4</i>	1/26/81	<del>B1</del>
2. Letter	Ambassador Mansfield to President Reagan re US-Japan Relations, 9p <i>R " " #5</i>	1/26/81	<del>B1</del>
3. Cable	261032Z JAN 81, 10p <i>R " " #6</i>	1/26/81	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
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- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 7/19/2007

**File Folder** JAPAN (1/26/81) (1)

**FOIA**

F00-037 (F1539)

**Box Number**

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
<del>1</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>261032Z JAN 81 (F00-037/1 #4)</del>	<del>11</del>	<del>1/26/1981</del>	<del>MWH 5/21/08</del>
<del>2</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>MANSFIELD TO THE PRESIDENT, RE US-JAPAN RELATIONS (F00-037#5)</del>	<del>9</del>	<del>1/26/1981</del>	<del>MWH 5/21/08</del>
<del>3</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>261032Z JAN 81 (F00-037/1 #6)</del>	<del>10</del>	<del>1/26/1981</del>	<del>MWH 5/21/08</del>

\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP  
EOBIEA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
O 261032Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5877

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 01311NODIS  
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR  
MANSFIELD  
DEPT ALSO PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD ALLEN  
EO 120651 RDS-3 1/26/01 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, JA, US  
SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ US POLICY TOWARD JAPAN1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- FIRST, LET ME EXTEND MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS  
ON YOUR INAUGURATION AND ASSUMPTION OF THE AWESOME  
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TOUGHEST JOB IN THE WORLD. I  
ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS AGAIN TO YOU AND TO SECRETARY  
HAIG MY GRATITUDE FOR THE HONOR YOU HAVE DONE ME IN  
ASKING ME TO CONTINUE AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE IN JAPAN.  
I HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF MY BELIEF THAT OUR ALLIANCE  
AND PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN IS THE MOST IMPORTANT BI-  
LATERAL RELATIONSHIP THAT WE HAVE IN THE WORLD. TO CON-  
TINUE TO DEEPEN AND EXPAND IT WILL BE MY HIGHEST ENDEAVOR.- IT OCCURS TO ME THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF YOUR AD-  
MINISTRATION YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE MY VIEWS  
ON OUR POLICIES HERE AND MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE  
FUTURE. I HAVE KEPT THEM BRIEF AND, I HOPE, GENERAL  
ENOUGH TO PROVIDE PLENTY OF ROOM FOR FLEXIBLE ELABORA-  
TION. ALTHOUGH I HAVE CLASSIFIED THIS MESSAGE AND  
LIMITED ITS DISTRIBUTION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, I WOULD  
HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ITS BEING MADE AVAILABLE AT YOUR  
DISCRETION TO ANYONE YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INVOLVED OR\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#4BY LSJ NARA. DATE 7/24/06



DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS.

**3. INTRODUCTION**

- AFTER THREE AND A HALF YEARS IN TOKYO, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT OUR SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN NOT ONLY ENSURES RELATIVE STABILITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC BUT IS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING THE VIABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AS WELL.

- WE ALL KNOW ABOUT THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE OUT HERE WHICH, IN SPITE OF OCCASIONAL SERIOUS FRICTION IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, HAS HELPED TO MAKE JAPAN OUR LARGEST OVERSEAS CUSTOMER. BUT WE SOMETIMES OVERLOOK THE ACCOMPANYING POLITICAL MIRACLE--JAPAN IN THIRTY-FIVE YEARS HAS BECOME ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST STABLE DEMOCRACIES, UPHOLDING, IN SPITE OF ITS TOTALLY DIFFERENT CULTURAL TRADITIONS, THE SAME VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND TOLERANCE OF DISSENT WHICH INSPIRE OUR OWN NATION, AND SHARING WITH US THE SAME CONCERNS OVER HOW BEST TO DEFEND THESE VALUES IN AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

- THE VAST MAJORITY OF JAPANESE, INCLUDING MOST EMPHATICALLY PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND HIS GOVERNMENT, REGARD AN OPEN AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AS ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THESE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND A STRONG AND DYNAMIC MARKET ECONOMY HERE. THESE SAME JAPANESE ARE ALSO COMING TO REALIZE THAT JAPAN MUST SHARE WITH THE UNITED STATES A GREAT DEAL MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COPING WITH THREATS TO THESE SHARED VALUES. TO ENCOURAGE THESE TENDENCIES WE MUST CONTINUALLY GUARD AGAINST ALLOWING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS TO OBSCURE OUR INTEREST IN PRESERVING AND EXPANDING THIS VITAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH JAPAN IN A COHERENT AND INTEGRATED WAY; WE SHOULD NOT PERMIT ONE OR ANOTHER PAROCHIAL INTEREST IN EITHER COUNTRY TO DAMAGE THE BASIC FABRIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SHORT TERM GAIN OR "WIN" A CONTENTIOUS TRADE ISSUE.

- I AM WELL AWARE THAT DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE CAN OFTEN BE A FRUSTRATING AND TIME CONSUMING PROCESS, MORE SO THAN WORKING WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHO AFTER ALL SHARE A COMMON CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC HERITAGE. THEY ARE SKILLED NEGOTIATORS WHO OFTEN STRIKE A HARD BARGAIN ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THEY SEEM CONGENITALLY UNABLE TO REACH DECISIONS RAPIDLY AND OCCASIONALLY MAY EVEN USE

DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE NEED FOR CONSENSUS AS AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION RATHER THAN AS A VEHICLE FOR DECISION-MAKING. THEY OFTEN FAIL TO SEE WHY THEY SHOULD CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH ISSUES THAT DO NOT OBVIOUSLY AND IMMEDIATELY AFFECT JAPAN. THEY AVOID THE COLORFUL TURN-OF-PHRASE, THE ATTENTION-RIVETING POLICY CHANGE, AND THE SPECTACULAR INITIATIVE FOR THE

PSN: 033746

TOR: 026/191232

FTG: 201032Z JAN 81

DATE 02/03/81

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PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 261032Z JAN 81 ZPF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5678

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

SLOW, SOMETIMES LABORIOUS PURSUIT OF COMMONLY AGREED ON GOALS. NEVERTHELESS, THE END RESULT IS IMPRESSIVE. THEIR DECISIONS, THOUGH NOT SPECTACULAR, ARE RELIABLE AND DURABLE. WHILE THERE MANIFESTLY IS NO WELL-OILED "JAPAN INCORPORATED," THE JAPANESE HAVE CREATED AN EXTRAORDINARILY SUCCESSFUL SOCIETY WHICH HAS VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION LINED UP WITH US ON EVERY MAJOR WORLD ISSUE. WE MUST THEREFORE COME TO UNDERSTAND AND WORK WITH THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (AS THEY HAVE WITH OURS FOR SO LONG).

## 4. OUR POLICY GOALS

I FULLY AGREE WITH WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE GOALS OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN BUT I BELIEVE THEY NEED TO BE STATED MORE EXPLICITLY (POSSIBLY IN CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS AND PUBLIC SPEECHES BY ADMINISTRATION LEADERS) THAN THEY HAVE IN THE PAST. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE WANT TO INVOLVE JAPAN EVEN MORE INTENSIVELY IN THE WESTERN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. WHETHER WE CALL IT INTERNATIONAL BURDEN SHARING, DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OR EXPANDED ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY, THE PURPOSE IS THE SAME: TO SEE JAPAN EMBRACE A MORE GLOBAL OUTLOOK. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE AND INDEPENDENT ROLE IN ASIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO EXPAND SIGNIFICANTLY ITS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. IN THE CONTEXT OF MAINTAINING THE EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESSFUL MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY SETUP, WE WANT TO STIMULATE JAPANESE DEFENSE CONSCIOUSNESS IN ORDER TO MAKE JAPAN'S MILITARY POSTURE MORE CREDIBLE. WE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WITHOUT INVITING EITHER MASSIVE OR NUCLEAR REARMAMENT OR STIMULATING A NATIONALIST BACKLASH AGAINST EXCESSIVE US PRESSURE. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE EVEN FURTHER INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY SO AS TO PERMIT EXPANDED ACCESS TO THE INTERNAL JAPANESE MARKET, GREATER JAPANESE COOPERA-



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TION IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES AND A MORE ACTIVE JAPANESE ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS. WE WANT TO BUILD EVEN FURTHER ON OUR EXTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC RELATIONSHIP BY ENCOURAGING A GREATER TWO-WAY FLOW OF TECHNOLOGY. WE WANT TO DEVELOP A TRULY COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY WHICH REINFORCES JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO ABJURE THE DEVELOPMENT OR TO FACILITATE IN ANY WAY THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- I AM VERY WELL AWARE THAT ALL OF THESE GOALS PRESUPPOSE A MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND BROADLY ORIENTED JAPANESE DIPLOMACY. THIS WILL INEVITABLY MEAN THAT, WHILE CONTINUING TO SHARE THE SAME BASIC INTERESTS WITH US, THE JAPANESE WILL DEVELOP THEIR OWN APPROACHES TO ISSUES WHICH UP TO NOW THEY HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO LEAVE TO US. WE MAY FIND OURSELVES DIFFERING MORE OFTEN WITH THEM IN TERMS OF TACTICS OR EMPHASIS. WE THEREFORE WILL HAVE TO BUILD UP A STRONGER AND WIDER NETWORK OF CONSULTATIVE FORUMS TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP. I AM BY NO MEANS SUGGESTING THAT WE NEED TO CREATE MORE FORMAL INSTITUTIONS. RATHER, I THINK A FLEXIBLE PATTERN OF CONTINUOUS CONTACTS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WHAT WE SEEK TO CREATE AND NURTURE.

#### 5. THE SUCCESSES

- IN SPITE OF ALL OF THE WELL PUBLICIZED POINTS OF CONTENTION, MAINLY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES, BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS, WE CAN BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF THE US STEWARDSHIP OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN RESOLVING IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER, OR AT LEAST IN DEFUSING, THE MAJOR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF AUTO IMPORTS. THE JAPANESE HAVE STEADILY INCREASED BEEF AND CITRUS IMPORTS, MADE IT EASIER TO SELL US TOBACCO PRODUCTS HERE, NEGOTIATED AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT ON COLOR TVS, ACCEPTED OUR SYSTEM OF TRIGGER PRICES FOR REGULATING STEEL IMPORTS, COOPERATED ON TEXTILE QUESTIONS AND ENCOURAGED ADDITIONAL JOB-CREATING INVESTMENTS IN THE US. BY AGREEING LAST FALL TO A COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM FOR NTT, THEIR QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, THEY REMOVED THE LAST MAJOR OBSTACLE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS NEGOTIATED IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (MTN).

- IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WE TOOK A GIANT STEP FORWARD WITH THE BASE COST-SHARING AGREEMENT AND WE ARE WITNESSING THE FIRST SERIOUS EFFORT AT JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING.



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PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OVERALL, THE JAPANESE HAVE CREATED THE POPULAR SUPPORT NECESSARY TO MOVE STEADILY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON DEFENSE AND, AS EVIDENCED BY BOTH THE DEFENSE AGENCY'S WHITE PAPER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S BLUE BOOK, ARE AT

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TOR: 020/19121Z

HTG: 261032Z JAN 81

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PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 261032Z JAN 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5579

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

NODIS

LAST PUBLICLY RELATING THESE EFFORTS TO THE STRATEGIC CONCERNS OF THE ALLIANCE.

- WHILE ON ANY GIVEN ISSUE MOVEMENT IN THE SHORT TERM MAY HAVE SEEMED GLACIAL, IN THE LAST DECADE THE JAPANESE HAVE COME A VERY LONG WAY INDEED DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS FULL-FLEDGED AND SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPATION IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. MORE THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE, THEY HAVE BACKED US FAITHFULLY, VIGOROUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY IN REACTING TO BOTH THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAVE ASSUMED SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT NON-MILITARY BURDENS OF THE ALLIANCE BY SUPPLYING CREDITS TO THAILAND, PAKISTAN, EGYPT AND TURKEY, BY UNDERWRITING A LARGE PART OF THE UN'S VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM, AND BY PLAYING A LEADING ROLE BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE UN IN TRYING TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA. THEY HAVE GIVEN STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKING TO ASEAN, ENCOURAGING ITS FIVE SOUTHEAST ASIAN MEMBERS TO STRENGTHEN THE LINKS AMONG THEM. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SEVEN-NATION SUMMITS FROM STRICTLY ECONOMIC CONCLAVES INTO GATHERINGS ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE APPROACHES TO THE MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES WE FACE. THEY HAVE RECOGNIZED, PERHAPS TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS HAVE YET REALIZED, THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL BUT NON-MILITARY LINK WITH THE MAJOR EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN TRIPARTITE COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US ALL.

6. THE ROAD AHEAD

- LIKE NEWTON'S FIRST LAW OF MOTION APPLIED TO PHYSICAL OBJECTS, US-JAPAN RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN A STEADY AND STRAIGHT PATH UNLESS PERTURBED OR INFLUENCED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS WHICH CANNOT BE PREDICTED OR OVER WHICH WE HAVE NO CONTROL. JAPAN'S CUR-

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RENT FORWARD MOTION COULD WELL BE SIDETRACKED OR REVERSED IF WE ADMINISTER SURPRISES TO IT, HECTOR IT WITH CHARGES OF "FREE RIDES" OR ALLEGATIONS OF UNFAIRNESS OR, WHAT I CONTINUE TO FEAR MOST, TAKE IT FOR GRANTED BECAUSE OF ITS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE POSITION AND RELATIVELY UNDRAMATIC LEADERSHIP. FOR THE FUTURE HEALTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP, I WOULD PRESCRIBE CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF ALLIANCE ISSUES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ENGAGE THE JAPANESE IN DIALOGUE ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, NOT JUST THOSE WITH AN OBVIOUS ASIAN ANGLE. IN THE DEPARTMENT'S CASE, I WOULD URGE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF BUREAU-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON EVERYTHING FROM GENERAL POLICY PLANNING AND FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES. IN A BROADER CONTEXT, WE SHOULD RE-FOCUS OUR DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS ON OUR RESPECTIVE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND HOW WE PROPOSE TO ATTAIN THEM JOINTLY. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO BACK AWAY GRACEFULLY FROM AN ESSENTIALLY UNPRODUCTIVE DEBATE OVER THE PERCENT OF JAPAN'S GNP OR NATIONAL BUDGET DEVOTED TO DEFENSE AND ALLOW THE JAPANESE TO ELABORATE TO ITS OWN PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO US JUST WHAT IT HAS IN MIND IN TERMS OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY. IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT US TO DEFINE MUCH MORE PRECISELY NOT ONLY RESPECTIVE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND PERCEIVED DEFICIENCIES BUT ALSO OUR VIEW OF HOW THE SECURITY BURDEN MIGHT BE MORE EQUITABLY SHARED.

- THERE IS ONE SOMEWHAT NEGLECTED AREA IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH SHOULD BECOME CENTRAL TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS--ENERGY. JAPAN'S PERCEIVED VULNERABILITY TO AN OIL CUTOFF IS LIKELY TO CAST AN EVER LARGER SHADOW OVER THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. BECAUSE OF THE DRAMATIC DIFFERENCES IN THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE TWO NATIONS CAN SATISFY THROUGH DOMESTIC SOURCES THEIR OWN ENERGY NEEDS, WE WILL HAVE TO DEVISE SOME CREATIVE MECHANISMS FOR SHARING THE ENERGY BURDEN AS WELL, OR ELSE AGREE TO DISAGREE ON CERTAIN POLICIES WHICH ARE SHAPED HEAVILY BY CONSIDERATIONS OF ACCESS TO OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES. EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN OUR NUCLEAR POLICY, I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE THORN IN THE JAPANESE SIDE WHICH WE SHOULD COMPLETELY REMOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REFER TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO OPERATE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE ITS TOKAI MURA PILOT PLANT FOR THE REPROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND

~~\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO CONSTRUCT A STILL LARGER PLANT FOR THIS PURPOSE.  
GIVEN JAPAN'S LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO USING NUCLEAR  
ENERGY EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND ITS SUP-  
PORT OF OUR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS, I SEE  
NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT RESPOND MORE POSITIVELY  
TO JAPANESE WISHES ON THIS MATTER.  
- ON ONGOING OR EMERGING TRADE ISSUES, SUCH AS AUTOS

PSN: 033742

TORI 026/19119Z

RTGI 061032Z JAN 81

~~\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*~~



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 261032Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5580

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

NODIS  
THIS YEAR OR SEMICONDUCTORS IN THE FUTURE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO ABANDON THE CLICHES OF THE PAST--WHETHER THEY BE FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONIST--AND SEARCH INSTEAD FOR THOSE PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN OUR RESPECTIVE ECONOMIES AND CAUSE THE LEAST HARM TO OUR WORKERS. AS A GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WE MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE--CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM OFFICIALS WHO SEE THEMSELVES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT CONSTITUENCIES ONLY MAKE THE ROAD TO EVENTUAL SOLUTIONS THAT MUCH MORE ROCKY. THIS APPLIES WITH PARTICULAR FORCE TO THE AUTO ISSUE. IF THE USG CAN COME UP WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO ASSIST OUR INDUSTRY THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT, I AM CONFIDENT THAT JAPAN WILL PLAY ITS PART, POSSIBLY THROUGH VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS, POSSIBLY BY NEGOTIATING AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT WITH US, ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THERE ARE ON THE US SIDE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON THE MOST APPROPRIATE METHOD OF HANDLING THE ISSUE.

- OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT OR UPCOMING ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT KEEP US FROM RECOGNIZING THE URGENT NEED FOR LEADERS AND OPINION SHAPERS IN THE TWO NATIONS TO GET TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER BETTER. WE SHOULD IMPROVE THE ACCESS OF JAPANESE POLICY MAKERS TO WASHINGTON OFFICIALDOM AND INCREASE THE EXPOSURE OF AMERICAN LEADERS TO JAPANESE INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS. THIS IS CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE BROADEST SENSE. WITH THE JAPANESE IN PARTICULAR, GOOD HUMAN RELATIONS ARE THE SINE QUA NON OF A SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FIRST SIGNS ARE AUSPICIOUS. THE ATTENTION THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO JAPANESE GUESTS AT THE INAUGURATION HAS BEEN WIDELY AND FAVORABLY NOTED HERE. NEXT ON THE AGENDA WILL PROBABLY BE VISITS BY FOREIGN MINISTER ITO AND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH THEM WILL WORK

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WONDERS IN ASSISTING US IN ACHIEVING OUR GOALS HERE.  
 - FINALLY, I HOPE BOTH YOU AND SECRETARY HAIG WILL  
 GIVE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A VISIT TO EAST  
 ASIA, INCLUDING JAPAN, SOMETIME LATER THIS YEAR. FOR  
 THE SECRETARY, ATTENDANCE AT THE ASEAN MINISTERIAL  
 MEETING IN LATE SPRING MIGHT PROVIDE THE IDEAL EVENT  
 AROUND WHICH TO PLAN A VISIT TO THE AREA. NO OTHER  
 SINGLE ACTION WOULD SO DRAMATICALLY AND PUBLICLY DEMON-  
 STRATE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S INTEREST IN AND CONCERN  
 FOR AN AREA OF THE WORLD TO WHICH OUR FUTURE AS A  
 NATION IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED.

- RESPECTFULLY,  
 - MIKE MANSFIELD  
 MANSFIELD

PSN: 033740

TOR: 026/19117Z

STO: 261032Z JAN 81

W 2/1/81

RECEIVED 03 FEB 81 11

TO PRES

FROM MANSFIELD, M

DOC DATE 26 JAN 81

GREGG

27 JAN 81

ALLEN

02 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: CABLE FM MANSFIELD RE US + JAPAN RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / D )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

- 2/2

Allen sgd memo to Gregg

- 2/2

Allen sgd memo to Agency

C 2/2

Allen sgd memo to Haig

DISPATCH

done via d'kay 7:30 am 4/81

WATCH

FILE

(C)

done 7:30 am 4/81 [unclear]

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

1.65.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Mansfield's Cable to You

Sometimes we receive a thousand cables a day. Few are of sufficient importance to impose upon your time.

Ambassador Mansfield's cable (01311 of January 26, Tab A) is an exception. It merits your close attention. I would suggest that you take it with you for leisurely reading; it has no time urgency. I have had it retyped to facilitate reading.

I have responded on your behalf (Tab B) and should you wish to respond personally after reading his message, I would be pleased to discuss it with you.

Attachment

cc: Ed Meese

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

*mm  
1/9/04*



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

February 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
 THE SECRETARY OF LABOR  
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
 THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
 THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION  
 THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

The President has asked that you have a copy of a recent cable he has received from Ambassador Mike Mansfield.

The cable appraises the current state of relations between the United States and Japan, and predicts stability in the relationship for the future. Ambassador Mansfield notes several areas (defense, trade, energy) in which misunderstandings might arise, and recommends that pragmatic solutions be found.

As the cable is presented for your information, there is no need for a response.



Richard V. Allen

cc: Senator Howard Baker  
 Senator Charles Percy  
 Congressman William Broomfield

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

msh  
 1/9/84

January 26, 1981

Dear Mr. President:

First, let me extend my warmest congratulations on your inauguration and assumption of the awesome responsibilities of the toughest job in the world. I also wish to express again to you and to Secretary Haig my gratitude for the honor you have done me in asking me to continue as your representative in Japan. I have made no secret of my belief that our alliance and partnership with Japan is the most important bilateral relationship that we have in the world. To continue to deepen and expand it will be my highest endeavor.

It occurs to me that at the beginning of your administration you might find it useful to have my views on our policies here and my recommendations for the future. I have kept them brief and, I hope, general enough to provide plenty of room for flexible elaboration. Although I have classified this message and limited its distribution in the first instance, I would have no objection to its being made available at your discretion to anyone you believe should be involved or concerned, including the Congress.

INTRODUCTION

After three and a half years in Tokyo, I am more than ever convinced that our successful bilateral relationship with Japan not only ensures relative stability in Asia and the Pacific but is a major element in maintaining the viability of the alliance of industrialized democracies as well.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #5BY 101IARA DATE 7/24/06

We all know about the economic miracle out here which, in spite of occasional serious friction in certain industrial sectors, has helped to make Japan our largest overseas customer. But we sometimes overlook the accompanying political miracle -- Japan in thirty-five years has become one of the world's most stable democracies, upholding, in spite of its totally different cultural traditions, the same values of individual freedom, private enterprise and tolerance of dissent which inspire our own nation, and sharing with us the same concerns over how best to defend these values in an increasingly hostile international environment.

The vast majority of Japanese, including most emphatically Prime Minister Suzuki and his government, regard an open and constructive relationship with the United States as essential to the maintenance of these democratic values and a strong and dynamic market economy here. These same Japanese are also coming to realize that Japan must share with the United States a great deal more responsibility for coping with threats to these shared values. To encourage these tendencies we must continually guard against allowing individual issues between the two nations to obscure our interest in preserving and expanding this vital bilateral relationship. I believe therefore that we must deal with Japan in a coherent and integrated way; we should not permit one or another parochial interest in either country to damage the basic fabric of the relationship in order to achieve a short term gain or "win" a contentious trade issue.

I am well aware that dealing with the Japanese can often be a frustrating and time consuming process, more so than working with our European allies who after

all share a common cultural and linguistic heritage. They are skilled negotiators who often strike a hard bargain on economic matters. They seem congenitally unable to reach decisions rapidly and occasionally may even use the need for consensus as an excuse for inaction rather than as a vehicle for decision-making. They often fail to see why they should concern themselves with issues that do not obviously and immediately affect Japan. They avoid the colorful turn-of-phrase, the attention-riveting policy change, and the spectacular initiative for the slow, sometimes laborious pursuit of commonly agreed on goals. Nevertheless, the end result is impressive. Their decisions, though not spectacular, are reliable and durable. While there manifestly is no well-oiled "Japan Incorporated," the Japanese have created an extraordinarily successful society which has virtually without exception lined up with us on every major world issue. We must therefore come to understand and work with their decision-making process (as they have with ours for so long).

#### OUR POLICY GOALS

I fully agree with what I understand to be the goals of our policy towards Japan but I believe they need to be stated more explicitly (possibly in Congressional presentations and public speeches by administration leaders) than they have in the past. In the first place, we want to involve Japan even more intensively in the Western decision-making process. Whether we call it international burden sharing, division of responsibilities or expanded alliance diplomacy, the purpose is the same: To see Japan embrace a more global outlook. We want to encourage Japan to play a more active and independent role in Asian political and economic development



and, in this context, to expand significantly its foreign assistance programs. In the context of maintaining the extraordinary successful mutual security treaty setup, we want to stimulate Japanese defense consciousness in order to make Japan's military posture more credible. We need to accomplish this without inviting either massive or nuclear rearmament or stimulating a nationalist backlash against excessive U.S. pressure. We want to encourage even further internationalization of the Japanese economy so as to permit expanded access to the internal Japanese market, greater Japanese cooperation in resolving international economic issues and a more active Japanese role in multilateral financial institutions and arrangements. We want to build even further on our extensive scientific relationship by encouraging a greater two-way flow of technology. We want to develop a truly cooperative nuclear energy policy which reinforces Japan's commitment to abjure the development or to facilitate in any way the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I am very well aware that all of these goals pre-suppose a much more active and broadly oriented Japanese diplomacy. This will inevitably mean that, while continuing to share the same basic interests with us, the Japanese will develop their own approaches to issues which up to now they have been content to leave to us. We may find ourselves differing more often with them in terms of tactics or emphasis. We therefore will have to build up a stronger and wider network of consultative forums to manage the relationship. I am by no means suggesting that we need to create more formal institutions. Rather, I think a flexible pattern of continuous contacts at all levels of the government should be what we seek to create and nurture.

THE SUCCESSES

In spite of all of the well publicized points of contention, mainly over economic issues, between the two nations in recent years, we can be justifiably proud of the U.S. stewardship of the relationship. We have succeeded in resolving in a mutually satisfactory manner, or at least in defusing, the major bilateral economic issues, with the notable exception of auto imports. The Japanese have steadily increased beef and citrus imports, made it easier to sell U.S. tobacco products here, negotiated an orderly marketing agreement on color TVs, accepted our system of trigger prices for regulating steel imports, cooperated on textile questions and encouraged additional job-creating investments in the U.S. By agreeing last fall to a competitive bidding system for NTT, their quasi-governmental telecommunications network, they removed the last major obstacle to implementation of the accords negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).

In the military field, we took a giant step forward with the base cost-sharing agreement and we are witnessing the first serious effort at joint defense planning. Overall, the Japanese have created the popular support necessary to move steadily in the right direction on defense and, as evidenced by both the Defense Agency's white paper and the Foreign Ministry's Blue Book, are at last publicly relating these efforts to the strategic concerns of the alliance.

While on any given issue movement in the short term may have seemed glacial, in the last decade the Japanese have come a very long way indeed down the road towards full-fledged and significant participation in the Western

alliance. More than any other member of the alliance, they have backed us faithfully, vigorously and consistently in reacting to both the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They have assumed some very significant non-military burdens of the alliance by supplying credits to Thailand, Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey, by underwriting a large part of the UN's Vietnam refugee program, and by playing a leading role both in and out of the UN in trying to secure the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. They have given strong political and economic backing to ASEAN, encouraging its five southeast Asian members to strengthen the links among them. They have supported the gradual transformation of the seven-nation summits from strictly economic conclaves into gatherings attempting to coordinate approaches to the major political issues we face. They have recognized, perhaps to a greater extent than our European friends have yet realized, the need for a political but non-military link with the major European democracies in order to strengthen tripartite cooperation on issues of concern to us all.

#### THE ROAD AHEAD

Like Newton's first law of motion applied to physical objects, U.S.-Japan relations will continue to operate in a steady and straight path unless perturbed or influenced by external factors which cannot be predicted or over which we have no control. Japan's current forward motion could well be sidetracked or reversed if we administer surprises to it, hector it with charges of "free rides" or allegations of unfairness or, what I continue to fear most, take it for granted because of its generally supportive position and relatively undramatic leadership. For the future health of the

relationship, I would prescribe close and continuous consultations on the whole range of alliance issues. We should continue to seek to engage the Japanese in dialogue on the widest possible range of international issues, not just those with an obvious Asian angle. In the department's case, I would urge the earliest possible resumption of bureau-level consultations on everything from general policy planning and foreign aid to Latin America and the Middle East policies. In a broader context, we should re-focus our defense discussions on our respective security requirements and how we propose to attain them jointly. This would enable us to back away gracefully from an essentially unproductive debate over the percent of Japan's GNP or national budget devoted to defense and allow the Japanese to elaborate to its own people as well as to us just what it has in mind in terms of comprehensive security. It would also permit us to define much more precisely not only respective roles and missions and perceived deficiencies but also our view of how the security burden might be more equitably shared.

There is one somewhat neglected area in the bilateral relationship which should become central to the consultative process -- energy. Japan's perceived vulnerability to an oil cutoff is likely to cast an ever larger shadow over the entire range of its domestic and foreign policies. Because of the dramatic differences in the degree to which the two nations can satisfy through domestic sources their own energy needs, we will have to devise some creative mechanisms for sharing the energy burden as well, or else agree to disagree on certain policies which are shaped heavily by considerations of access to outside energy sources. Even though it would represent



a significant shift in our nuclear policy, I believe there is one thorn in the Japanese side which we should completely remove as soon as possible. I refer to the Japanese government's wish to operate without interference its Tokai Mura Pilot Plant for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and to construct a still larger plant for this purpose. Given Japan's long-standing commitment to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and its support of our nuclear non-proliferation efforts, I see no reason why we should not respond more positively to Japanese wishes on this matter.

On ongoing or emerging trade issues, such as autos this year or semiconductors in the future, I believe we should also abandon the cliches of the past -- whether they be free trade or protectionist -- and search instead for those pragmatic solutions which will strengthen our respective economies and cause the least harm to our workers. As a government, however, we must speak with one voice -- conflicting signals from officials who see themselves representing different constituencies only make the road to eventual solutions that much more rocky. This applies with particular force to the auto issue. If the USG can come up with a comprehensive plan to assist our industry through a difficult period of adjustment, I am confident that Japan will play its part, possibly through voluntary restraints, possibly by negotiating an orderly marketing agreement with us, although I recognize there are on the U.S. side substantial differences of opinion on the most appropriate method of handling the issue.

Our preoccupation with current or upcoming issues in the relationship should not keep us from recognizing the urgent need for leaders and opinion shapers in

the two nations to get to know one another better. We should improve the access of Japanese policy makers to Washington officialdom and increase the exposure of American leaders to Japanese individuals and institutions. This is cultural exchange in the broadest sense. With the Japanese in particular, good human relations are the sine qua non of a successful institutional relationship. The first signs are auspicious. The attention that has been given to Japanese guests at the inauguration has been widely and favorably noted here. Next on the agenda will probably be visits by Foreign Minister Ito and Prime Minister Suzuki. The establishment of personal rapport with them will work wonders in assisting us in achieving our goals here. Give most serious consideration to a visit to East Asia, including Japan, sometime later this year. For the Secretary, attendance at the ASEAN ministerial meeting in late spring might provide the ideal event around which to plan a visit to the area. No other single action would so dramatically and publicly demonstrate the new administration's interest in and concern for an area of the world to which our future as a nation is inextricably linked.

Respectfully,

MIKE MANSFIELD

—

goes via  
Cray Fuller

Ken

RICHARD V. ALLEN

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1981

CABLE TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

FROM RICHARD ALLEN, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

PRIVACY CHANNELS

THANK YOU FOR SENDING ME A COPY OF YOUR CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT.  
I HAVE READ IT WITH GREAT INTEREST.

TO GIVE IT ITS PROPER IMPORTANCE, I HAVE HAD IT RETYPED  
AND HAVE PASSED IT TO THE PRESIDENT IN ITS ENTIRETY.

YOUR PERTINENT AND LEARNED OBSERVATIONS WILL, I AM SURE,  
BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HIM AND TO THE POLICY-MAKING  
PROCESS.

RECALL WITH GREAT APPRECIATION YOUR COURTESIES EXTENDED  
DURING VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT LAST AUGUST.

WITH MY ADMIRATION AND GOOD WISHES.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 0215  
 Date: February 4, 1981

Subject: Mansfield's Cable

(Include PRM, PD or DR # when applicable)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR REMOVAL  
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3/11/91

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED  
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# cys	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT (OEOB OFFICES)	1	2-5-81	10:08	[Signature]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/room 7241	1	2/5/81	9:16	[Signature]
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	1	2-5-81	0945	R-1173 Woodall
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept of State				
DIRECTOR CIA Langley, VA/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422	1			
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const/NW, Room 3422	1	2/5	3:30	[Signature]
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
DIRECTOR AID Room 5942 New State				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg	1	2-5-81	8:40	[Signature]
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.	1	2-5-81		Deborah D. Dennis
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 7531/State Dept.				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10TH/Const. NW, Room 5119	1	2/5	3:32	[Signature]
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE Exec. Sec/Room 7241				
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Second Floor/West Wing				
DIRECTOR OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, INTL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ICA) 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW	1	2/5	10:35	Nancy Harrison
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW	1	2-5	4:10	Anne Mullins
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Const Ave NW	1	2/5	1140	[Signature]
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 100 Independence Avenue, NW	1	2/5	12:23	[Signature]
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 251 7th Street SW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 100 Maryland Avenue SW (HEW)	1	2/5	11:54	ONK Byerley
OFFICE OF SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (STR) 1800 G. Street, N.W.	1			
DIRECTOR, FBI 8th & Penn. Avenue, NW				
DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE 1800 G. Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, GSA GSA Bldg, 18th & F Street, NW				
DIRECTOR, NASA 400 Maryland Avenue, SW				
DIRECTOR, IDCA Dept. of State, Room 3942				
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1717 H. Street, NW				
PRESIDENT, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK 811 Vermont Avenue, NW				

3:45 E. Fayer



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 0215  
 Date: February 4, 1981

Subject: Mansfield's Cable  
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 OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 2/1/81

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED  
 (check one)

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	# cys	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT (OEOB OFFICES)	1			
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DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept of State				
DIRECTOR CIA Langley, VA/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422	1	2/5	2 pm	R. C. ...
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const/NW, Room 3422	1			
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
DIRECTOR AID Room 5942 New State				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg	1			
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.	1			
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 7531/State Dept				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10TH/Const. NW, Room 5119	1			
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE Exec. Sec/Room 7241				
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Second Floor/West Wing				
DIRECTOR OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, INTL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ICA) 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Const Ave NW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & Human Services 100 Independence Avenue, NW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 251 7th Street SW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 100 Maryland Avenue SW (HEW)	1			
OFFICE OF SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (STR) 1800 G. Street, N.W.	1	2/5/81	2.30	T. Stinson
DIRECTOR, FBI 8th & Penn. Avenue, NW				
DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE 1800 G. Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, GSA GSA Bldg, 18th & F Street, NW				
DIRECTOR, NASA 400 Maryland Avenue, SW				
DIRECTOR, IDCA Dept. of State, Room 3942				
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1717 H. Street, NW				
RESIDENT, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK 811 Vermont Avenue, NW				

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 0215  
Date: February 4, 1981

Subject: Mansfield's Cable (CONT'D)  
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ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSES AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY:

Senator Howard Baker  
S 230 Capitol 1 \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ Steve Bushick

Senator Howard Baker  
1321 Dirksen 1 \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ Steve Bushick

Congressman William Broomfield 1  
306 Rayburn \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ W Conner

dispatched  
separately 2/18 AM  
dbrw

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Cable from Mike Mansfield

I realize you have seen the cable, but I thought you would like to know of the President's special interest in it.

15/ Blue Ink

Richard V. Allen

SECRET ATTACHMENT

RVA  
1/10/81



RECEIVED 03 FEB 81 11

TO PRES

FROM MANSFIELD, M

DOCDATE 26 JAN 81

GREGG

27 JAN 81

ALLEN

02 FEB 81

*3/1/91*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: CABLE FM MANSFIELD RE US - JAPAN RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

*C 2/2/81*

*Allen sgd memo to Gregg*

*DG, TD*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

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*[Handwritten signature]*

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHKO #1311/01 0261049  
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O 261032Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5577

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

NODIS  
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR  
MANSFIELD  
DEPT ALSO PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD ALLEN  
EO 12065: RDS-3 1/26/01 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, JA, US  
SUBJECT: (U) US POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- FIRST, LET ME EXTEND MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR INAUGURATION AND ASSUMPTION OF THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TOUGHEST JOB IN THE WORLD. I ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS AGAIN TO YOU AND TO SECRETARY HAIG MY GRATITUDE FOR THE HONOR YOU HAVE DONE ME IN ASKING ME TO CONTINUE AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE IN JAPAN. I HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF MY BELIEF THAT OUR ALLIANCE AND PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN IS THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP THAT WE HAVE IN THE WORLD. TO CONTINUE TO DEEPEN AND EXPAND IT WILL BE MY HIGHEST ENDEAVOR.  
- IT OCCURS TO ME THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE MY VIEWS ON OUR POLICIES HERE AND MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. I HAVE KEPT THEM BRIEF AND, I HOPE, GENERAL ENOUGH TO PROVIDE PLENTY OF ROOM FOR FLEXIBLE ELABORATION. ALTHOUGH I HAVE CLASSIFIED THIS MESSAGE AND LIMITED ITS DISTRIBUTION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, I WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ITS BEING MADE AVAILABLE AT YOUR DISCRETION TO ANYONE YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INVOLVED OR CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS.

3. INTRODUCTION

- AFTER THREE AND A HALF YEARS IN TOKYO, I AM MORE

\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

RA NAN COL VP  
EOP:EA

PSN:033746 PAGE 01 TOR:026/19:23Z DTG:261032Z JAN 81

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1#6  
BY NLS NARA, DATE 7/24/08



THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT OUR SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN NOT ONLY ENSURES RELATIVE STABILITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC BUT IS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING THE VIABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AS WELL.

- WE ALL KNOW ABOUT THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE OUT HERE WHICH, IN SPITE OF OCCASIONAL SERIOUS FRICTION IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, HAS HELPED TO MAKE JAPAN OUR LARGEST OVERSEAS CUSTOMER. BUT WE SOMETIMES OVERLOOK THE ACCOMPANYING POLITICAL MIRACLE--JAPAN IN THIRTY-FIVE YEARS HAS BECOME ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST STABLE DEMOCRACIES, UPHOLDING, IN SPITE OF ITS TOTALLY DIFFERENT CULTURAL TRADITIONS, THE SAME VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND TOLERANCE OF DISSENT WHICH INSPIRE OUR OWN NATION, AND SHARING WITH US THE SAME CONCERNS OVER HOW BEST TO DEFEND THESE VALUES IN AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

- THE VAST MAJORITY OF JAPANESE, INCLUDING MOST EMPHATICALLY PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND HIS GOVERNMENT, REGARD AN OPEN AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AS ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THESE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND A STRONG AND DYNAMIC MARKET ECONOMY HERE. THESE SAME JAPANESE ARE ALSO COMING TO REALIZE THAT JAPAN MUST SHARE WITH THE UNITED STATES A GREAT DEAL MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COPING WITH THREATS TO THESE SHARED VALUES. TO ENCOURAGE THESE TENDENCIES WE MUST CONTINUALLY GUARD AGAINST ALLOWING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS TO OBSCURE OUR INTEREST IN PRESERVING AND EXPANDING THIS VITAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH JAPAN IN A COHERENT AND INTEGRATED WAY; WE SHOULD NOT PERMIT ONE OR ANOTHER PAROCHIAL INTEREST IN EITHER COUNTRY TO DAMAGE THE BASIC FABRIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SHORT TERM GAIN OR "WIN" A CONTENTIOUS TRADE ISSUE.

- I AM WELL AWARE THAT DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE CAN OFTEN BE A FRUSTRATING AND TIME CONSUMING PROCESS, MORE SO THAN WORKING WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHO AFTER ALL SHARE A COMMON CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC HERITAGE. THEY ARE SKILLED NEGOTIATORS WHO OFTEN STRIKE A HARD BARGAIN ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THEY SEEM CONGENITALLY UNABLE TO REACH DECISIONS RAPIDLY AND OCCASIONALLY MAY EVEN USE THE NEED FOR CONSENSUS AS AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION RATHER THAN AS A VEHICLE FOR DECISION-MAKING. THEY OFTEN FAIL TO SEE WHY THEY SHOULD CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH ISSUES THAT DO NOT OBVIOUSLY AND IMMEDIATELY AFFECT JAPAN. THEY AVOID THE COLORFUL TURN-OF-PHASE, THE ATTENTION-RIVETING POLICY CHANGE, AND THE SPECTACULAR INITIATIVE FOR THE  
BT

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHKO #1311/02 0261057  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 261032Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5573

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

SLOW, SOMETIMES LABORIOUS PURSUIT OF COMMONLY AGREED ON GOALS. NEVERTHELESS, THE END RESULT IS IMPRESSIVE. THEIR DECISIONS, THOUGH NOT SPECTACULAR, ARE RELIABLE AND DURABLE. WHILE THERE MANIFESTLY IS NO WELL-OILED "JAPAN INCORPORATED," THE JAPANESE HAVE CREATED AN EXTRAORDINARILY SUCCESSFUL SOCIETY WHICH HAS VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION LINED UP WITH US ON EVERY MAJOR WORLD ISSUE. WE MUST THEREFORE COME TO UNDERSTAND AND WORK WITH THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (AS THEY HAVE WITH OURS FOR SO LONG).

#### 4. OUR POLICY GOALS

- I FULLY AGREE WITH WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE GOALS OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN BUT I BELIEVE THEY NEED TO BE STATED MORE EXPLICITLY (POSSIBLY IN CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS AND PUBLIC SPEECHES BY ADMINISTRATION LEADERS) THAN THEY HAVE IN THE PAST. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE WANT TO INVOLVE JAPAN EVEN MORE INTENSIVELY IN THE WESTERN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. WHETHER WE CALL IT INTERNATIONAL BURDEN SHARING, DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OR EXPANDED ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY, THE PURPOSE IS THE SAME: TO SEE JAPAN EMBRACE A MORE GLOBAL OUTLOOK. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE AND INDEPENDENT ROLE IN ASIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO EXPAND SIGNIFICANTLY ITS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. IN THE CONTEXT OF MAINTAINING THE EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESSFUL MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY SETUP, WE WANT TO STIMULATE JAPANESE DEFENSE CONSCIOUSNESS IN ORDER TO MAKE JAPAN'S MILITARY POSTURE MORE CREDIBLE. WE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WITHOUT INVITING EITHER MASSIVE OR NUCLEAR REARMAMENT OR STIMULATING A NATIONALIST BACKLASH AGAINST EXCESSIVE US PRESSURE. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE EVEN FURTHER INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY SO AS TO PERMIT EXPANDED ACCESS TO



THE INTERNAL JAPANESE MARKET, GREATER JAPANESE COOPERATION IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES AND A MORE ACTIVE JAPANESE ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS. WE WANT TO BUILD EVEN FURTHER ON OUR EXTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC RELATIONSHIP BY ENCOURAGING A GREATER TWO-WAY FLOW OF TECHNOLOGY. WE WANT TO DEVELOP A TRULY COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY WHICH REINFORCES JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO ABJURE THE DEVELOPMENT OR TO FACILITATE IN ANY WAY THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- I AM VERY WELL AWARE THAT ALL OF THESE GOALS PRESUPPOSE A MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND BROADLY ORIENTED JAPANESE DIPLOMACY. THIS WILL INEVITABLY MEAN THAT, WHILE CONTINUING TO SHARE THE SAME BASIC INTERESTS WITH US, THE JAPANESE WILL DEVELOP THEIR OWN APPROACHES TO ISSUES WHICH UP TO NOW THEY HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO LEAVE TO US. WE MAY FIND OURSELVES DIFFERING MORE OFTEN WITH THEM IN TERMS OF TACTICS OR EMPHASIS. WE THEREFORE WILL HAVE TO BUILD UP A STRONGER AND WIDER NETWORK OF CONSULTATIVE FORUMS TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP. I AM BY NO MEANS SUGGESTING THAT WE NEED TO CREATE MORE FORMAL INSTITUTIONS. RATHER, I THINK A FLEXIBLE PATTERN OF CONTINUOUS CONTACTS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WHAT WE SEEK TO CREATE AND NURTURE.

##### 5. THE SUCCESSES

- IN SPITE OF ALL OF THE WELL PUBLICIZED POINTS OF CONTENTION, MAINLY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES, BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS, WE CAN BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF THE US STEWARDSHIP OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN RESOLVING IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER, OR AT LEAST IN DEFUSING, THE MAJOR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF AUTO IMPORTS. THE JAPANESE HAVE STEADILY INCREASED BEEF AND CITRUS IMPORTS, MADE IT EASIER TO SELL US TOBACCO PRODUCTS HERE, NEGOTIATED AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT ON COLOR TVS, ACCEPTED OUR SYSTEM OF TRIGGER PRICES FOR REGULATING STEEL IMPORTS, COOPERATED ON TEXTILE QUESTIONS AND ENCOURAGED ADDITIONAL JOB-CREATING INVESTMENTS IN THE US. BY AGREEING LAST FALL TO A COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM FOR NTT, THEIR QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, THEY REMOVED THE LAST MAJOR OBSTACLE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS NEGOTIATED IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (MTN).

- IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WE TOOK A GIANT STEP FORWARD WITH THE BASE COST-SHARING AGREEMENT AND WE ARE WITNESSING THE FIRST SERIOUS EFFORT AT JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING. OVERALL, THE JAPANESE HAVE CREATED THE POPULAR SUPPORT NECESSARY TO MOVE STEADILY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON

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DEFENSE AND, AS EVIDENCED BY BOTH THE DEFENSE AGENCY'S  
WHITE PAPER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S BLUE BOOK, ARE AT  
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LAST PUBLICLY RELATING THESE EFFORTS TO THE STRATEGIC CONCERNS OF THE ALLIANCE.

- WHILE ON ANY GIVEN ISSUE MOVEMENT IN THE SHORT TERM MAY HAVE SEEMED GLACIAL, IN THE LAST DECADE THE JAPANESE HAVE COME A VERY LONG WAY INDEED DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS FULL-FLEDGED AND SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPATION IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. MORE THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE, THEY HAVE BACKED US FAITHFULLY, VIGOROUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY IN REACTING TO BOTH THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAVE ASSUMED SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT NON-MILITARY BURDENS OF THE ALLIANCE BY SUPPLYING CREDITS TO THAILAND, PAKISTAN, EGYPT AND TURKEY, BY UNDERWRITING A LARGE PART OF THE UN'S VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM, AND BY PLAYING A LEADING ROLE BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE JN IN TRYING TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA. THEY HAVE GIVEN STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKING TO ASEAN, ENCOURAGING ITS FIVE SOUTHEAST ASIAN MEMBERS TO STRENGTHEN THE LINKS AMONG THEM. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SEVEN-NATION SUMMITS FROM STRICTLY ECONOMIC CONCLAVES INTO GATHERINGS ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE APPROACHES TO THE MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES WE FACE. THEY HAVE RECOGNIZED, PERHAPS TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS HAVE YET REALIZED, THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL BUT NON-MILITARY LINK WITH THE MAJOR EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN TRIPARTITE COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US ALL.

6. THE ROAD AHEAD

- LIKE NEWTON'S FIRST LAW OF MOTION APPLIED TO PHYSICAL OBJECTS, US-JAPAN RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN A STEADY AND STRAIGHT PATH UNLESS PERTURBED OR INFLUENCED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS WHICH CANNOT BE PRE-



DICTIONED OR OVER WHICH WE HAVE NO CONTROL. JAPAN'S CURRENT FORWARD MOTION COULD WELL BE SIDETRACKED OR REVERSED IF WE ADMINISTER SURPRISES TO IT, HECTOR IT WITH CHARGES OF "FREE RIDES" OR ALLEGATIONS OF UNFAIRNESS OR, WHAT I CONTINUE TO FEAR MOST, TAKE IT FOR GRANTED BECAUSE OF ITS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE POSITION AND RELATIVELY UNDRAMATIC LEADERSHIP. FOR THE FUTURE HEALTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP, I WOULD PRESCRIBE CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF ALLIANCE ISSUES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ENGAGE THE JAPANESE IN DIALOGUE ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, NOT JUST THOSE WITH AN OBVIOUS ASIAN ANGLE. IN THE DEPARTMENT'S CASE, I WOULD URGE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF BUREAU-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON EVERYTHING FROM GENERAL POLICY PLANNING AND FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES. IN A BROADER CONTEXT, WE SHOULD RE-FOCUS OUR DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS ON OUR RESPECTIVE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND HOW WE PROPOSE TO ATTAIN THEM JOINTLY. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO BACK AWAY GRACEFULLY FROM AN ESSENTIALLY UNPRODUCTIVE DEBATE OVER THE PERCENT OF JAPAN'S GNP OR NATIONAL BUDGET DEVOTED TO DEFENSE AND ALLOW THE JAPANESE TO ELABORATE TO ITS OWN PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO US JUST WHAT IT HAS IN MIND IN TERMS OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY. IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT US TO DEFINE MUCH MORE PRECISELY NOT ONLY RESPECTIVE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND PERCEIVED DEFICIENCIES BUT ALSO OUR VIEW OF HOW THE SECURITY BURDEN MIGHT BE MORE EQUITABLY SHARED.

- THERE IS ONE SOMEWHAT NEGLECTED AREA IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH SHOULD BECOME CENTRAL TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS--ENERGY. JAPAN'S PERCEIVED VULNERABILITY TO AN OIL CUTOFF IS LIKELY TO CAST AN EVER LARGER SHADOW OVER THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. BECAUSE OF THE DRAMATIC DIFFERENCES IN THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE TWO NATIONS CAN SATISFY THROUGH DOMESTIC SOURCES THEIR OWN ENERGY NEEDS, WE WILL HAVE TO DEVISE SOME CREATIVE MECHANISMS FOR SHARING THE ENERGY BURDEN AS WELL, OR ELSE AGREE TO DISAGREE ON CERTAIN POLICIES WHICH ARE SHAPED HEAVILY BY CONSIDERATIONS OF ACCESS TO OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES. EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN OUR NUCLEAR POLICY, I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE THORN IN THE JAPANESE SIDE WHICH WE SHOULD COMPLETELY REMOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REFER TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO OPERATE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE ITS TOKAI MURA PILOT PLANT FOR THE REPROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TO CONSTRUCT A STILL LARGER PLANT FOR THIS PURPOSE. GIVEN JAPAN'S LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO USING NUCLEAR

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ENERGY EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND ITS SUPPORT OF OUR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS, I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT RESPOND MORE POSITIVELY TO JAPANESE WISHES ON THIS MATTER.

- ON ONGOING OR EMERGING TRADE ISSUES, SUCH AS AUTOS  
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5530

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 01311

NODIS  
THIS YEAR OR SEMICONDUCTORS IN THE FUTURE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO ABANDON THE CLICHES OF THE PAST--WHETHER THEY BE FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONIST--AND SEARCH INSTEAD FOR THOSE PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN OUR RESPECTIVE ECONOMIES AND CAUSE THE LEAST HARM TO OUR WORKERS. AS A GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WE MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE--CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM OFFICIALS WHO SEE THEMSELVES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT CONSTITUENCIES ONLY MAKE THE ROAD TO EVENTUAL SOLUTIONS THAT MUCH MORE ROCKY. THIS APPLIES WITH PARTICULAR FORCE TO THE AUTO ISSUE. IF THE USG CAN COME UP WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO ASSIST OUR INDUSTRY THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT, I AM CONFIDENT THAT JAPAN WILL PLAY ITS PART, POSSIBLY THROUGH VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS, POSSIBLY BY NEGOTIATING AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT WITH US, ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THERE ARE ON THE US SIDE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON THE MOST APPROPRIATE METHOD OF HANDLING THE ISSUE.

- OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT OR UPCOMING ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT KEEP UP FROM RECOGNIZING THE URGENT NEED FOR LEADERS AND OPINION SHAPERS IN THE TWO NATIONS TO GET TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER BETTER. WE SHOULD IMPROVE THE ACCESS OF JAPANESE POLICY MAKERS TO WASHINGTON OFFICIALDOM AND INCREASE THE EXPOSURE OF AMERICAN LEADERS TO JAPANESE INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS. THIS IS CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE BROADEST SENSE. WITH THE JAPANESE IN PARTICULAR, GOOD HUMAN RELATIONS ARE THE SINE QUA NON OF A SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FIRST SIGNS ARE AUSPICIOUS. THE ATTENTION THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO JAPANESE GUESTS AT THE INAUGURATION HAS BEEN WIDELY AND FAVORABLY NOTED HERE. NEXT ON THE AGENDA WILL PROBABLY BE VISITS BY FOREIGN MINISTER ITO AND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH THEM WILL WORK  
WONDERS IN ASSISTING US IN ACHIEVING OUR GOALS HERE.

- FINALLY, I HOPE BOTH YOU AND SECRETARY HAIG WILL  
GIVE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A VISIT TO EAST  
ASIA, INCLUDING JAPAN, SOMETIME LATER THIS YEAR. FOR  
THE SECRETARY, ATTENDANCE AT THE ASEAN MINISTERIAL  
MEETING IN LATE SPRING MIGHT PROVIDE THE IDEAL EVENT  
AROUND WHICH TO PLAN A VISIT TO THE AREA. NO OTHER  
SINGLE ACTION WOULD SO DRAMATICALLY AND PUBLICLY DEMON-  
STRATE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S INTEREST IN AND CONCERN  
FOR AN AREA OF THE WORLD TO WHICH OUR FUTURE AS A  
NATION IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED.

- RESPECTFULLY,  
- MIKE MANSFIELD  
MANSFIELD  
BT



27 JAN 1981

*Handwritten initials and signature*  
E RVA

MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH ~~SECRET~~  
ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

January 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD ALLEN  
FROM: DON GREGG *DG*  
SUBJECT: Mike Mansfield's Tour d'Horizon

The attached cable is Mike Mansfield at his best. It embodies, in his usual succinct style, all the enduring aspects of US/Japan relations. It can be read by you or the President as usefully in six months as now.

I am in substantial agreement with Mike's approach to US/Japan relations. I have one major concern, which he refers to in the second section of paragraph 6 -- "Japan's perceived vulnerability to an oil cutoff is likely to cast an ever larger shadow over the entire range of its foreign and domestic policy." In this sentence Mike strikes at the heart of an essential problem that we have with Japan which is that Japan's perceptions of itself -- as isolated, vulnerable, fragile, and in some ways weak -- runs so deeply counter to external perceptions of Japan which conjure visions of an economic juggernaut willing and able to put masses of US workers into the unemployment lines. For there to be true stability in US/Japan relations, these internal and external perceptions of Japan must be brought into closer alignment. For this to happen, Japan must come to grips with all the implications of its economic strength and its military weakness. It is beginning to do this, but much remains to be done. The consensual process is slow, and we need to keep nudging it along, without blatant applications of pressure.

The Mansfield message speaks for itself, and I will say no more. Keep the message and read it when you have time.

Attachment

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*Handwritten initials and date*  
MAG  
1/29/81



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1981



Mr. Allen,

I know that you have already seen the attached cable. I thought you would also like to see the staff officer's comments.

Kay

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON GREGG  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RV*  
SUBJECT: Cable from Mike Mansfield

Thanks for your memorandum of January 27.

The Mansfield cable caught my attention via another route, and after reading it I had it retyped for easier reading and gave it to the President. His reading led to further actions, one of which will be to distribute the cable to the Cabinet and to other key policy people.

You are indeed correct about the dichotomy between Japan's view of itself and the external view. This is the essence of the "communications gap" that has existed for so long, and which shows every sign of worsening.

As we progress from one sectoral trade crisis to another, we'll find that the domestic cries for "doing something" in the case of the Japanese will mount. I would not be surprised to see a very substantial assault on Japan develop within the first months of 1981. It is to this threat that we should direct our attention.