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# CURRENT NEWS

## SPECIAL EDITION



27 October 1987 No. 1648

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### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Fall 1987  
Vol. 66, No. 1

Pgs. 170-188

*Foreign Affairs* is published five times annually  
by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

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#### THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS REVISITED

**T**he Cuban missile crisis has assumed genuinely mythic significance. Dean Rusk called it "the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen," the only time when the nuclear superpowers came "eyeball to eyeball." Theodore Sorensen called it the "Gettysburg of the Cold War." For Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., it was "the finest hour" of the Kennedy presidency; a moment of maximum nuclear peril traversed without catastrophe. Many people believe that the missile crisis of October 1962 represents the closest point that the world has come to nuclear war. For that reason alone, it is worth continued attention.

Since the Cuban missile crisis remains the only nuclear crisis we have experienced, it remains the great laboratory in which to study the art of crisis management. Yet there is little agreement on the lessons it holds for us today. This disagreement was brought into sharp focus at a recent meeting of scholars and former members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), the group convened by President John F. Kennedy to advise him on the matter of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.<sup>1</sup> Much of the disagreement that came to light at that meeting and in a subsequent series of interviews

<sup>1</sup> The members of the ExComm were: Dean Rusk (secretary of state), Robert McNamara (secretary of defense), John McCone (director of central intelligence), Douglas Dillon (secretary of the treasury), Robert Kennedy (attorney general), McGeorge Bundy (national security adviser), Theodore Sorensen (presidential counsel), George Ball (under secretary of state), U. Alexis Johnson (deputy under secretary of state), General Maxwell Taylor (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Edward Martin (assistant secretary of state for Latin America), Charles Bohlen (adviser on Russian affairs—he left after the first day), Llewellyn Thompson (succeed-

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with key participants revolved around two issues: the course of action that the United States should have taken in 1962; and the relevance of that debate 25 years later.

It is remarkable how little the basic parameters of the dispute about the lessons of the missile crisis have changed over the past quarter-century: either there are many lessons, chiefly emphasizing the need for flexibility, managerial precision and caution in the face of great danger; or there are no lessons, because the nuclear danger of 1962 was almost surely imaginary, a function of a failure to comprehend the pivotal significance of a favorable military balance for the United States. Part of the reason for this standoff, we believe, is due to a too-easy characterization of "hawks" and "doves"—a distinction that originated during the missile crisis itself and continues to the present.<sup>2</sup>

We should be wary of hastily dismissing this event as irrelevant to the present; certain crucial factors have not changed since 1962, or have become all the more important because of the changes in the strategic balance: the psychology of crisis decision-making; the importance of small-group politics; and the risks of inadvertent escalation. But we should also be wary of drawing generalizations that ignore important ways in which the world *has* changed, that cannot be supported by evidence from a single crisis, and that are insensitive to the fact that diplomatic or strategic successes can rarely be repeated in quite the same way. This last consideration was one President Kennedy himself understood well from his reading of Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August*.<sup>3</sup> The German leadership in 1914 had expected a repeat of Russia's backdown in the Bosnian crisis of 1909. Instead, they found themselves embroiled in the costliest war mankind had yet seen.

A useful treatment of the lessons of the missile crisis must begin, therefore, by resisting the temptations to dismiss it out of hand or to draw detailed lists of "dos" and "don'ts." It must

ing Bolton), Roswell Gilpatric (deputy secretary of defense), Paul Nitze (assistant secretary of defense), Lyndon Johnson (vice president), Adlai Stevenson (ambassador to the United Nations), Kenneth O'Donnell (special assistant to the president) and Donald Wilson (deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency).

<sup>2</sup> According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "the catchwords *hawk* and *dove* made their debut in the missile crisis," and were thrust into the public discussion of the episode soon after in an article by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett. See Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, pp. 506-507.

<sup>3</sup> Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, pp. 62, 127.

begin by identifying those important dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis that would be present in any future nuclear crisis, and by determining how they would bear on its outcome.

## II

When former policymakers from the Kennedy Administration and scholars of the missile crisis met in Hawk's Cay, Florida, in March 1987, they looked again at the seven lessons Robert Kennedy drew in his memoir of the crisis, *Thirteen Days*:

- (1) Take time to plan; don't go with your first impulse.
- (2) The president should be exposed to a variety of opinions.
- (3) Depend heavily on those with solid knowledge of the Soviet Union.
- (4) Retain civilian control and beware of the limited outlook of the military.
- (5) Pay close attention to world opinion.
- (6) Don't humiliate your opponent; leave him a way out.
- (7) Beware of inadvertence—the *Guns of August* scenario.

This list reflects a large measure of the common wisdom of classical diplomacy, and the successful resolution of the crisis is prima facie evidence of its validity. But the history of the missile crisis has not given the hawks a chance to vindicate their view that more forceful action would have led to at least as desirable an outcome. Perhaps the United States did hold all the cards and could have acted more forcefully, even with impunity. It may be an accident of history—the fact that the hawks were outvoted in the ExComm and that the president did not share their view—that has led people to accept a list of this kind, rather than another emphasizing the importance of quick and decisive military action. The latter sort of list might have had some validity if the nuclear balance, rather than the quarantine or world opinion, had been primarily responsible for the resolution of the crisis.

No one can resolve the controversy over the importance of the nuclear balance in 1962. History is an imperfect laboratory, and there were too many causes of the outcome of the missile crisis for any single factor to be definitive. But in the explanation of the dispute between hawks and doves lies a series of important lessons for future policymakers and future crisis managers. When we ask why hawks and doves have held such different views of the event and have drawn such different conclusions from it, we can identify clearly several key factors which heavily influenced its conduct and outcome. It is these

factors that can reasonably be expected to bear in any future superpower confrontation. We believe they hold unmistakable lessons, that they reaffirm the validity of Robert Kennedy's list, and that they help us to realize the ways in which the list should be updated.

## III

Nuclear war between the superpowers could break out in a variety of ways—as the result of deliberate action, accident, a third-party conflict, or escalation in a crisis. At the time of the crisis, ExComm members assigned different weights to each risk and tended to favor a particular course of action accordingly. Almost from the outset the array of options facing the members of the ExComm fell into three main categories. Being hawkish in the missile crisis meant supporting an early military action, either an air strike on the missile bases or an invasion of the island or both. Dovish views implied wishing to avoid any use of military force, even a naval quarantine, and a willingness to resolve the crisis by “trading” American Jupiter missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. A third group can be characterized as “owlish.” This group tended to prefer the quarantine, a (relatively mild) use of military force; this seemed to its proponents to allow for flexible movement—should conditions require it—toward the hawkish or dovish options. In shorthand, therefore, hawks were invaders and doves were traders; “owls” were persuaders.<sup>4</sup>

The distinguishing feature of the owlish group, which included Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, was the weight they assigned to the risks of desperate, irrational Soviet action or to inadvertent escalation—the danger that, for example, a Soviet second lieutenant in Cuba would fire the nuclear missile under his charge rather than allow it to be destroyed in an American air strike,<sup>5</sup> or that a stray U-2 over Siberia on an air sampling mission would be interpreted in the Kremlin as pre-first-strike reconnaissance. These people recognized the glaring American strategic nuclear superiority, but

<sup>4</sup> For a full discussion of these distinctions and of the interaction between rational and nonrational causes of war, see Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1986, ch. 8.

<sup>5</sup> American intelligence never confirmed that there were warheads in Cuba for the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles that were being installed, though the ExComm, quite prudently, had to assume under the circumstances that they were there.

saw in it as much danger as leverage. The fact that Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles were “soft” and required considerable time to prepare for launch made them extremely vulnerable to an American first strike, and seemed to shorten the Soviet fuse. Therefore crisis stability and the importance of assuring command and control were sources of concern to the owlish group.

In contrast, hawks discounted these risks. The following exchange between the late General Maxwell Taylor and Richard Neustadt shown on videotape at the Hawk's Cay conference illustrates this quite starkly:

*Neustadt:* Was [the final] outcome [of the crisis] unexpected to you?

*Taylor:* I was so sure we had 'em over a barrel, I never worried much about the final outcome, but what things might happen in between.

*Neustadt:* The outcome to which I'm referring is Khrushchev's acceptance of our . . .

*Taylor:* Well at some time he *had* to accept. I never expected it on that particular day.

*Neustadt:* Okay, you thought it was going to go a while longer . . .

*Taylor:* Unless he was crazy and full of vodka. But I assumed his colleagues in Moscow would take care of him.

*Neustadt:* You have written in your retrospective in *The Washington Post* on October 5, '82, as I remember—the 20th year—that you don't recall any concern about the strategic balance, or any fear of nuclear exchange in this whole period. Now some of the civilians do recall worries about the time of that second Saturday; worries that really run to two or three steps up the ladder of escalation. The Soviets don't accept our demand; there follows an air strike; the Soviets then feel impelled to strike the missiles in Turkey; the Turks call on NATO for support; we feel we have to do something in Europe; the Soviets then launch a nuclear exchange—something like that was in some of their minds. I take it not in yours?

*Taylor:* They never expressed it to a military ear, I'll say that.

*Neustadt:* That's interesting.

*Taylor:* Not at all. It's the nature of some people [that] if they can't have a legitimate worry, they create them. Apparently they had some of that in the group you're speaking of.

*Neustadt:* In your mind, there was no legitimacy in this worry?

*Taylor:* Not the slightest.

*Neustadt:* Because Khrushchev could look up that ladder . . .

*Taylor:* If he was rational. If he was *irrational*, I still expected his colleagues to look after him.

What is remarkable about Taylor's analysis is how wedded it is to the classical “rational actor” model of decision-making. Clearly, Taylor believed that the only risk of nuclear war lay in deliberate action by the Soviet leadership, and this risk was

negligible since, even if Khrushchev were irrational, it would be highly unlikely that he would be able to overrule the remaining members of the Politburo and the military, whose rationality Taylor seems never to have questioned. If all participants could be counted on to act rationally and there were no accidents or mistakes, Taylor would probably have been correct about the low level of risk. But he seems to have been completely unconcerned with the risks of accident, inadvertence, miscalculation, desperation or the breakdown of command and control procedures—on either the Soviet or the American side.

Several members of the ExComm, including Taylor, Dean Acheson, Douglas Dillon, John McCone and Paul Nitze, believed from the start of the crisis that military action against the Soviet bases in Cuba carried little risk of retaliation. The United States held all the cards; the only question in their minds was how great was the fall that the Soviets were bound to take. Some still hold this view, and they have been joined over the past quarter-century by like-minded scholars and publicists who argue that with a tougher response Kennedy could have removed Castro as well as the missiles.

Many in this hawkish group believe at the same time that the crisis holds no significant lessons for today. In their view, the reason why the Soviets capitulated, agreeing to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, and the main reason the Soviets would not have retaliated militarily even if the missiles had been removed by an air strike and (if necessary) an invasion of the island, was the overwhelming American superiority at the strategic nuclear level.<sup>6</sup> As strategic superiority is believed to have been fundamental to the outcome of the crisis, and as it has long since been lost, the missile crisis is thought to be no more (or less) relevant to present concerns than, say, the Peloponnesian Wars. For example, Douglas Dillon took a hawkish position in 1962 when he believed there was scant prospect of a Soviet response, but at Hawk's Cay 25 years later he argued, "It's a totally different world today, and as far as I can see, the Cuban missile crisis has little relevance in today's world."

To Taylor and his hawkish colleagues, any American risks in the missile crisis would have derived almost entirely from military inaction rather than, as others believed, from a decisive

<sup>6</sup> See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Meaning of the Missiles," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1982, pp. 76-82.

action such as an air strike. All were deeply concerned to avoid setting a precedent whereby the Soviets believed they might deceive the United States and then escape unpunished when caught in the lie. Dean Acheson seems to have believed this political risk was central. If the United States failed to stand up to Khrushchev in such a blatant case of deception, what gamble would he try next? Others seem to have been concerned more with what they regarded as the quite real and substantial military significance of the Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s being installed in Cuba. Paul Nitze and Douglas Dillon recall believing that McNamara was profoundly mistaken in his contention that, as he often put it, the Soviets, with their 40 or so missiles in Cuba, had merely moved from an unfavorable balance of 5,000 to 300 in nuclear missiles to one of 5,000 to 340.

The correct interpretation of the significance of the missiles, according to the hawks, was that whereas previously the Soviets in a preemptive strike could have expected to destroy only a tiny fraction of the U.S. strategic forces, they could with the addition of the Cuban missiles plan to destroy perhaps as much as 40 percent of the Strategic Air Command bomber force. Finally, the hawks were very concerned about the risks involved in what they regarded as the foot-dragging aspects of a quarantine. The missiles were discovered before they became operational and ought to be destroyed before they were made ready to fire. Moreover, if the advantage of surprise were lost, a land invasion—costly and potentially a political disaster—would almost certainly be necessary. For all these reasons, in addition to their belief that American conventional and strategic superiority would nullify any Soviet response, the hawks favored an immediate air strike aimed at taking out the Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

In the ExComm's deliberations, the hawks' view did not prevail. President Kennedy and most of his inner circle seem to have had a more expansive view of the risks involved. But more than that, they seem to have felt a fear of inadvertent nuclear war that was not shared by Taylor and the other hawks. McGeorge Bundy recently described it as "the fear of the officer in command who, having given his orders, begins to fear that he may be leading his charges into disaster." Robert McNamara voices his dread the following way:

[T]he possibility of what I call "blundering into disaster" preoccupied me during the missile crisis, not the alleged probability of this or that event.

What the missile crisis impressed upon me was that, yes, we *could* stumble into a nuclear war; that such an event, however "limited," was totally unacceptable; and thus that it must be avoided.

It would have been perfectly natural for the hawks not to feel this apprehension if they did not take the risks of inadvertence seriously. But it is also interesting to note that those who felt the fear of inadvertent nuclear war most keenly approached the crisis not merely as advisers offering their judgments and opinions, but as people who felt that they shared the president's responsibility to get the missiles out of Cuba without humiliation or catastrophe. This sense of responsibility, the resulting heightened sensitivity to the risks of inadvertence, and the associated fear seem to have reinforced each other and to have had a powerful cautionary effect on the ExComm's choices of action throughout the crisis. Together, these considerations go a long way toward explaining the way in which the crisis was eventually resolved.

With pressure building, the president sent his brother Robert to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin with what the Soviets seem to have interpreted as the final American offer to resolve the crisis peacefully. The sequence of events leading directly to the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin early in the evening of October 27, 1962, seems to have been as follows:

- 4:00 p.m.: ExComm meeting. General Taylor arrived with news that an American U-2 had been shot down over Cuba. Hawks' and doves' positions hardened. The meeting became polarized and rancorous.
- Approximately 6:00 p.m.: Meeting with the president, including Robert Kennedy, Sorensen, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and Llewellyn Thompson. According to Robert Kennedy, "At first, there was almost unanimous agreement that we had to attack early the next morning with bombers and fighters and destroy the SAM sites. But again the president pulled everyone back. 'It isn't the first step that concerns me,' he said, 'but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step—and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so.'"<sup>7</sup> It was then suggested that the United States respond to Khrushchev's offer of October 26, to trade Cuban missiles for a guar-

<sup>7</sup> Robert F. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

antee that the United States would not invade Cuba. Accounts differ as to who originally proposed this tactic.

- 7:45 p.m.: Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the United States would pledge publicly not to invade Cuba if the Soviets would pledge publicly to begin withdrawing the missiles immediately. He also said privately that U.S. missiles were going to come out of Turkey, in any event. He said that if the Soviets did not give a commitment in 24 hours that the bases would be removed, "we would remove them." "I was not giving them an ultimatum," he wrote later, "but a statement of fact." Robert Kennedy returned to the White House "not optimistic." "The expectation was a military confrontation by Tuesday and possibly tomorrow."<sup>8</sup>

There can be little doubt that Khrushchev interpreted this message as a last-ditch chance to avoid war. He took to the airwaves to accept it immediately after receiving the offer.

There remains a great deal of disagreement among the former members of the ExComm on whether Robert Kennedy "traded" the missiles in Turkey, on whether he had given the Soviets an ultimatum and on what the president's next move would have been had the Soviets rejected his terms. Rusk, for example, insists that the sweetener for the Soviets in the arrangement involved only a "piece of information" that was passed along to them to use as they wished—i.e., that the United States had plans already in place for dismantling the Turkish missiles. McNamara resists the idea that Robert Kennedy actually threatened the Soviets with an air strike and an invasion; Dillon, Nitze and Taylor have all expressed confidence in interviews that President Kennedy would have ordered the air strike and invasion within 48 hours of the deadline his brother had imposed on the Soviets; McNamara and Bundy are both convinced that the president would have continued American efforts at persuading the Soviets by "cranking up the quarantine," adding more to the list of prohibited items and perhaps also by intensifying search procedures.

Dean Rusk provided new information to the Hawk's Cay conference indicating that the president had not yet abandoned the option of a public trade of American missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. By the evening of October 27, according to Rusk:

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 108–109.

It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba. Mr. Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after a further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr. Cordier has never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step.

As McGeorge Bundy pointed out to the meeting at Hawk's Cay, this step does not necessarily mean that a policy of trading missiles would have resulted. But it may show that the president was sufficiently fearful of inadvertent nuclear war that he would eventually have been willing, in the phrase of former State Department Counsel Abram Chayes, to "buy the missiles out"—to trade publicly, even at the risk of having to pay a heavy political price, both domestically and within NATO.

We will never know for certain what President Kennedy would have done had Khrushchev not responded favorably to his last proposal. But the fact that he laid the groundwork for a public trade indicates the degree to which he was concerned about the possible unintended consequences of extending the crisis, or of an imminent air strike and invasion. It is striking how little the hawks were concerned with these risks, and it is important to note that each group's exposure to the other's views led to polarization and discord rather than convergence and consensus. As the owlish option of the quarantine began to look like a failure, and as the hawkish and dovish options began to look like the only viable alternatives, debate in the ExComm became bitter, tempers flared and positions hardened. But the owls were ultimately vindicated, and the risks of the hawkish and dovish options were successfully avoided. The trade was made, though privately, and the invasion, though threatened, never occurred.<sup>9</sup> The flexibility of the quarantine ultimately paid off.

It is important to recognize that the strategy adopted by the

<sup>9</sup> When we suggest that the trade was made "privately," we recognize that this is a figure of speech describing an action which was of no use to Soviet public diplomacy. But in conveying to the Soviets the information that the Jupiters in Turkey were scheduled for removal, the Administration's intention seems largely to have been to help Khrushchev justify the settlement to his opposition in the Politburo and the military. As George Ball puts it, the aim was to help Khrushchev with his "damage limitation."

American government for removing the missiles from Cuba was, from beginning to end, owlish to the core. The prevailing opinion in the ExComm was that there were dangerous risks in relative inaction and also in direct and decisive military action. The dovish position, exemplified first by Adlai Stevenson, held that military action was just too risky because of the danger of provoking a superpower war, perhaps even a nuclear holocaust. Hawks, as we have illustrated, saw dangers, political and military, only in the continued presence of the missiles in Cuba. The naval quarantine represented an owlish attempt to reconcile the partial truths contained in the options favored by hawks and doves. If one assumes that there were indeed risks in both action and inaction, in decisiveness and caution, then the resolution of the crisis must be seen as a masterpiece of owlish diplomacy.

What the president decided to do on October 27 was to suggest a stick more awesome than some hawks were comfortable with (because of the possibility that it might require a massive land invasion of Cuba) and a carrot no less attractive than that first suggested by Stevenson, yet—and this is the remarkable part of it—all the while reserving the option to simply continue tightening the naval quarantine. Why is this "owlish"? Because this approach recognizes a wide variety of risks; because it provides a safety net right up until the end; and because it is our judgment that, if forced, the president would have chosen to run the political risk of a trade rather than the risk of an inadvertent nuclear war. In short, we believe that President Kennedy had decided he was not going to initiate war over the missiles in Cuba, but that he would do his utmost to get them removed with the least political cost.

## IV

Before, during and at the conclusion of the missile crisis, the American leadership was perplexed by the question of Soviet intentions. The professed confusion added measurably to their fearfulness as the crisis wore on. Of all the ExComm members, none in the president's inner circle had predicted the emplacement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Once the quarantine line was in place on October 24, most of the members of the inner circle expected a dramatic Soviet countermove, probably around Berlin. But the Soviets did nothing in Berlin, nor anywhere else. On October 26 and 27, the bewilderment over Soviet thinking intensified with the arrival first of the

emotional and rambling, but still hopeful letter, obviously from Khrushchev himself, followed by a second letter which seemed to be a Soviet committee document taking a harder line.

Some, like Dean Rusk, reacted to the first letter with fear that Khrushchev had "lost his cool," and thus might begin to think irrationally and act impulsively in ways that would deepen the crisis. Others, like George Ball, recall reacting to the second letter with dismay because they feared Khrushchev might no longer be in charge and that the Soviet military or hardliners in the Politburo had assumed command. Finally, when the ExComm broke up on the evening of October 27, few of those who knew of Robert Kennedy's message to Dobrynin expected that the Soviets would agree to the American offer. Yet not only did the Soviets agree to the American terms, they did so immediately, enthusiastically and without reservation. From the discovery of the missiles to the agreement securing their removal, President Kennedy and his closest advisers found the Soviets almost entirely inscrutable.

Understanding one's adversary is crucial to managing a conflict, as every stage of the Cuban missile crisis illustrates. Consider its genesis. There might not have been a crisis at all—or at least, events might have unfolded very differently—if the Administration had anticipated the Soviet deployment. President Kennedy's public warnings to the Soviets not to deploy offensive weapons in Cuba virtually committed the two countries to a showdown once such missiles were discovered. But Theodore Sorensen offered the following interesting observation:

Let me say here that the line between offensive and defensive weapons was drawn in September, and it was not drawn in a way which was intended to leave the Soviets any ambiguity to play with. I believe the president drew the line precisely where he thought the Soviets were not and would not be; that is to say, if we had known that the Soviets were putting 40 missiles in Cuba, we might under this hypothesis have drawn the line at 100, and said with great fanfare that we would absolutely not tolerate the presence of more than 100 missiles in Cuba. I say that believing very strongly that that would have been an act of *prudence*, not weakness. But I am suggesting that one reason the line was drawn at zero was because we simply thought the Soviets weren't going to deploy any there anyway.

Of course, Kennedy's warnings were too late; the Soviet decision to deploy had been made months before, and the relevant machinery had been set in gear. Perhaps the president

would not have tolerated any Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba in any case; but if the Administration had had some reason to believe the Soviets might deploy—or if they had even given sustained thought to the possibility—then both public diplomacy and private deliberations about American responses might have led to a satisfactory outcome that avoided the atmosphere and the risks of a superpower showdown.

Subsequent scholarship has had no difficulty offering plausible explanations of why the Soviets deployed missiles in Cuba; the problem has been one of choosing among them.<sup>10</sup> The move in retrospect seems overdetermined. It is, of course, difficult to say whether such an uncharacteristically risky venture could have been easily foreseen; but it is striking nonetheless that few outside the intelligence community and none in President Kennedy's inner circle seem to have given any serious thought as to why the Soviets might deploy until after the missiles had been discovered.

Perhaps the most important dimension of knowing one's enemy is knowing his view of a crisis and what is at stake, for this largely determines which strategies are appropriate and effective, and which are not. If the adversary sees it as a zero-sum game for which he is willing to take great risks to avoid a loss, then the interaction needs to be handled differently than would be the case if he saw it as a predicament stumbled into by mistake or through stupidity, from which both sides must extricate themselves through cooperative action, avoiding either's humiliation. In these two cases, the same strategies would elicit very different responses and would carry with them very different risks. To make matters even more problematic, the "adversary" may be a contentious group whose internal balance shifts over the course of the crisis.

The quarantine option, and the owlish approach to the Cuban missile crisis in general, was successful largely because it provided the flexibility that enabled the Administration to "learn" about its adversary as the crisis progressed. McGeorge Bundy recalls that as the missile crisis wore on, President Kennedy expressed increasing curiosity about Khrushchev, and about the ways this man's personality might interact with the Soviet system and with the deep crisis they both were in to produce various Soviet actions. In asking their questions, the

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 40-56.



president and the other perplexed members of the ExComm turned most often to Llewellyn ("Tommy") Thompson, a former ambassador to Moscow, who was nearly always the only person present at the ExComm meetings who had extensive knowledge of the Soviet Union, the only one who knew in depth its language, history and culture. "Tommy Thompson," Dean Rusk recalls, "was our in-house Russian during the missile crisis." In fact, one of the few interpretations of the missile crisis that all former ExComm members support enthusiastically is Robert McNamara's claim that "Tommy Thompson was the unsung hero." Other experts consulted directly or indirectly included, inter alia, Foy Kohler, Ray Cline, Raymond Garthoff and Averell Harriman. Perhaps in no other two-week period has any American administration learned so much about the Soviet Union and its leaders as Kennedy's did during the Cuban missile crisis.

It is difficult to discover precisely what Thompson did or said to warrant the apparently unanimous verdict that his contribution was heroic. He was certainly not a member of the president's inner circle; he seems to have spoken relatively infrequently at ExComm meetings; and former ExComm members whom we have questioned about Thompson's role have few concrete recollections of anything in particular he said or did during the crisis. It seems clear that whatever Thompson's role may actually have been, the consistent portrayal of him as an almost infallible index of the "Russian soul" must be related in some considerable degree to the feeling among most of the other ExComm members that, in this most tense and dangerous confrontation, they themselves knew next to nothing that would allow them to comprehend and predict Soviet actions accurately. They felt they had to depend heavily upon Thompson, which they did. And now, with the crisis long since having been resolved successfully, they give Thompson a large share of the credit.

What seems indisputable is that all through the crisis President Kennedy and his closest associates found themselves almost continuously mystified by the Soviets, so much so that in retrospect the single member of the group who claimed familiarity with the Soviet Union is given credit for being the hero, the absolutely indispensable man during the crisis.

Some degree of mystery about the Soviet side is likely to be a feature of any superpower crisis. The next nuclear crisis is also likely to catch us by surprise, since both the United States

and the Soviet Union seek to avoid the kinds of shocking, mutual miscalculations that created this one. The next time, if there is one, we ought to expect the American president and his closest advisers to question in the most fundamental way whether they understand Soviet behavior, and to seek informed, cautious and realistic advice from those whose business it is to know the adversary.

## v

Should John Kennedy and his principal advisers have taken a tougher stance 25 years ago? Might they have toppled Castro and deterred the subsequent expansion of Soviet influence? Kennedy is reported to have believed at the time that the odds of fighting between U.S. and Soviet forces were between one out of three and fifty-fifty. With hindsight the odds seem much lower. The Americans had strategic and conventional superiority in the region. Moreover, they were defending a recognized interest, and Khrushchev had to bear the risk of escalation. The Soviets should have been amply deterred. Perhaps more could have been accomplished by a tougher stance, barring unforeseen complications.

Some of the participants at Hawk's Cay felt in retrospect that the chances of a war that could escalate into a nuclear exchange were more like one in fifty. But some felt that even one chance in a thousand of nuclear war would be too high. One Soviet warhead exploding over one American city might have killed five million people, or roughly the same proportion of the population as was killed in the Civil War. Though some believed in 1962 that Khrushchev had chosen a poor location for a crisis and had set himself up for a major fall, the view from the presidential hot seat was psychologically very different from that on the sidelines or with 25-year hindsight.

We recognize that under the circumstances at that time, it is plausible to imagine that all three courses of action—invading, trading and persuading—might have led to satisfactory conclusions, though clearly some carried greater risks and costs than others. Likewise, since the proof is primarily in the pudding, we find little reason to fault the course of action taken by President Kennedy and his advisers. Even Maxwell Taylor remarked, "I never wavered [from favoring the air strike] until my Commander-in-Chief took another decision. And I add, I'm glad he did, because it proved to be enough." But the world of 1987 does differ in crucial respects from the world of

1962. As Douglas Dillon pointed out, "if the Cuban missile crisis happened today, I'd react in much the same way as Bob McNamara, and I would like to make that absolutely clear."

Whatever one's view of the past, the next crisis is not likely to be as "easy" as the Cuban missile crisis. At the nuclear level, we no longer have superiority (whatever difference that may have made) and there is little prospect that the Soviets will allow us to regain it. Our international political standing and our ability to win the backing of the United Nations, the Organization of American States and NATO have diminished. Domestic politics and the role of the press have also changed. After Vietnam and Watergate there seems slight prospect of preserving secrecy for a week of careful consideration of the options, as Kennedy was able to do. Moreover, the system of nuclear deterrence has become much more complex. In some ways the weapons are better protected than they were in 1962, but the numbers have grown and so has the complexity of command and control systems. Finally, the Soviet Union is changing, but we will never be sure what that means in a crisis. In retrospect, it seems that Khrushchev was taking a higher risk than is normal for Soviet behavior; but what will be a "normal" level of risk in the future? And how will it vary in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf or Eastern Europe?

Given these considerations, Robert Kennedy's list of lessons looks even more perceptive than it appeared at the time. Nonetheless, hindsight enables us to supplement it. Perhaps the first lesson of an updated list would be the importance of avoiding superpower nuclear crises. Attempts to replay the Cuban missile crisis could lead to fatal mistakes. A corollary is the importance of developing measures and channels of communication that help to avert crises. In short, the most important lesson of the missile crisis a quarter-century later may be to be wary of reading from it simple lessons on crisis management. At the same time, the avoidance of crises is not our choice alone. Crises may be forced upon us as we try to defend important values.

The second lesson concerns the importance of the views of the top leaders who are elected and appointed. Each member of the ExComm brought to the Cuban missile crisis a coherent world view which determined his perceptions of the risks and of Soviet intentions. Each camp had and still has a fully specified and internally consistent account of every aspect of the crisis, ranging from an explanation of why the Soviets deployed

missiles in the first place, to what the optimal course of action was, to what (if any) the lessons of the crisis are. While the episode illustrates the extent to which some decision-makers are able to learn new information quickly, it equally clearly illustrates the importance and the dangers of rigidly preconceived world views and the effect they can have on the processing of new information.

A third lesson is closely related to the second: rational models of deterrence are not enough. Deterrence is not a game played by two players seated at a chess or poker table. It is played by small groups of people embedded in enormous complex organizations whose outlines they barely discern and whose detailed operations they scarcely control. Communication in a crisis begins to resemble trying to shake hands with boxing gloves. Robert McNamara was acutely aware of the need for civilian control and the need to manage the details so that the wrong signals were not communicated in the crisis. But he could not prevent a U-2 from overflying Soviet territory at the height of the crisis, and he was not aware until 25 years later that his orders to alert our forces were transmitted in the clear (where the Soviets could easily read them) rather than in code, as per standard procedure. Nor was he aware that the FBI possessed information on the second weekend of the crisis that the Soviet mission in New York was preparing to burn its files. In McNamara's words:

I don't think the Cuban missile crisis *was* unique. The Bay of Pigs, Berlin in '61, Cuba, later events in the Middle East, in Libya, and so on—all exhibit the truth of what I'll call "McNamara's Law," which states: "It is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of military force will be because of the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception and inadvertence." In my opinion, this law ought to be inscribed above all the doorways in the White House and the Pentagon, and it is the overwhelming lesson of the Cuban missile crisis.

A fourth lesson follows from the third. It is critical for high-level officials to prepare themselves to deal with crises ahead of time. Our country places in high office lawyers, politicians, academics and businessmen who have no experience with nuclear systems, yet they are expected to handle a nuclear crisis if one occurs. The briefings on nuclear operations that top officials receive from the professional military at the beginning of an administration's term have been described as analogous to being given a drink from a firehose. Furthermore, the

briefings come at a time when a new administration is preoccupied with the politics of transition. We need to find ways through briefings and simulations to ensure that top officials have a better grasp of the complexity of the nuclear systems they direct before a crisis occurs. On-the-job learning during a crisis is unacceptably risky.

Finally, in a world where the leaders of the two superpowers discussed the possibility of ridding the world of nuclear weapons at a summit conference, if only in sketchy and confused terms, the Cuban missile crisis may hold some lessons on the limits of current debates about nuclear deterrence. On the one hand, the Cuban missile crisis shows that a little nuclear deterrence went a long way. At least for the group of American leaders at that time, superiority did not remove the prudence that was engendered by even a low probability of a few Soviet warheads exploding over our cities.

Perhaps Soviet leaders might have reacted differently had positions been reversed; but it seems clear that nuclear deterrence had a good deal to do with the fact that Khrushchev did not respond with a Berlin blockade or pressure on Turkey, as some of the participants expected. The specter of nuclear catastrophe lurking at the end of a chain of events had a powerful cautionary effect on both sides. It fostered a caution that, as George Ball noted, would not have been present to the same degree if only conventional forces had been involved. And that is the other side of the same lesson. If a little nuclear deterrence goes a long way, some may be necessary. Talk of stable conventional deterrence may miss this important lesson of the missile crisis—at least as long as intense political competition exists between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As long as that political competition persists, the horror of nuclear weapons will have the ironic effect of producing both fear and caution. The Cuban missile crisis would appear to have had the desirable effect of reinforcing these responses, and the result has been, in the past 25 years, that we have weathered arms races, third-party wars at various global flash points, and a renewal of cold-war rhetoric without a superpower confrontation of comparable magnitude or intensity. But we cannot rely on fear and caution exclusively; the next superpower crisis will almost certainly be accidental and unexpected. We will have to learn to manage the U.S.-Soviet competition to reduce the risks we have thus far dodged. This will involve learning to avoid crises by strengthening the rules of

the road until U.S.-Soviet hostility fades. But it will also involve learning to manage crises more effectively while we strive to improve the relationship over the long run. In the meantime, we will be drawn back repeatedly to the Cuban missile crisis and the effort to understand the lessons it can teach us. Though the world of 1962 is becoming increasingly remote, some of its lessons seem timeless.

**SAF/AAR, PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20330 - 1024**

**FIRST CLASS**

**(NEWSPAPER — EXPEDITE)**

# Soviets show flexibility on cutting conventional forces

By Matthew C. Vita  
Journal-Constitution Correspondent

VIENNA, Austria — The Soviet Union is demonstrating renewed readiness to work toward reducing conventional forces in Europe. That new posture may break a 14-year impasse in non-nuclear arms control, according to West European and American diplomats involved in the negotiations.

As evidence of that new posture, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda reported Saturday that the Soviet Union is prepared to make "cardinal reductions" in the conventional weapons of East bloc forces.

"The Warsaw Pact member states are prepared to adhere to the ceilings of sufficiency necessary for defense [and] resolve the problem of asymmetries and imbalances on individual types of weapons through reducing the potential of the one who appears to be ahead," the paper's lead editorial said.

"As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared for cardinal reductions. The ball is now in the NATO countries' court."

Although the new Soviet attitude is not directly related to the recent Washington summit, diplomats said, the successful meeting

between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has created a more favorable atmosphere for the conventional arms reduction talks.

According to a Defense Department official, the Soviets have done "a 180-degree flip-flop" in talks on troop levels in seven Central European countries. They now are willing to identify and discuss disparities, he said.

In addition, the East is indicating it is prepared to accept the type of stringent verification provisions long demanded by the West. These provisions would resemble the intrusive on-site inspection regime included in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty signed Dec. 8 by Reagan and Gorbachev, according to diplomats interviewed in Vienna in the past several days.

The agreement to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe has focused Western attention on conventional arms, where the West maintains that the East has large numerical advantages, primarily in tanks and artillery pieces.

The pending removal of a significant portion of America's nuclear deterrent force has aroused concern that Western Europe will be

### Conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains

Here are the most recent conventional forces totals for the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact nations in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains

<b>Armed helicopters</b>	
	NATO 780 Warsaw Pact 1,630
<b>Active ground forces</b>	
	NATO 2,385,000 Warsaw Pact 2,292,000
<b>Combat aircraft</b>	
	NATO 3,282 Warsaw Pact 7,524
<b>Battle tanks</b>	
	NATO 22,200 Warsaw Pact 52,200
<b>Artillery pieces</b>	
	NATO 11,100 Warsaw Pact 37,000

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies

left more vulnerable to a Soviet conventional attack.

As a result, foreign ministers of the 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries said at their year-end meeting in Brussels, Belgium, this month that reaching a "stable and secure" conventional arms balance that eliminates "disparities" between the two sides is now a priority in the West's arms control strategy.

The framework for the arms control proposals is likely to be a new negotiating forum on reducing troops and armaments from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have been meeting here since February. The two sides have agreed in principle to begin formal negotiations next year, although no

FORCES...Pg. 12

# No More Nuclear Weapons?

Robert Blackwill

## The Outlook Is Grim for Conventional Arms Control

In the aftermath of the INF Treaty, attention in the West is now sensibly turning to conventional defense and arms control in Europe. After Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington, there is even a hum of optimism in the air on this subject. Such humming should stop. Significant progress in conventional arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the next several years is quite unlikely.

It is true that Moscow's rhetoric concerning conventional arms control has changed. In calling for deep reductions of conventional arms, Soviets now routinely use the phrase "reasonable sufficiency" to describe the proper objective of Warsaw Pact and NATO defenses. They call for a transformed European security system based on "new thinking" in which neither alliance has the capacity for surprise attack. They admit that the Warsaw Pact has asymmetric advantages in some conventional weapons systems such as tanks. Moreover, major cutbacks in the Red Army would certainly assist Gorbachev's efforts to reform and reinvigorate the Soviet economy. So why the pessimism?

1. The Warsaw Pact enjoys conventional superiority in Europe with no prospect that NATO

will build up its conventional forces. Moscow could well wish through an arms control agreement with the West to codify its conventional advantages at lower levels. Why should it wish to negotiate them away?

2. It is possible that the U.S.S.R. would be willing to trade some armor for Western nuclear weapons and/or dual-capable aircraft. After INF, such a deal would further the Soviet goal of a denuclearized Europe and therefore will for the foreseeable future be unacceptable to NATO. So what Moscow wants, NATO will not give.

3. Withdrawing many Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe could incite unrest there and threaten Gorbachev's hold on power.

4. Any NATO conventional arms control proposal should propose deep cuts in Soviet forces in the western U.S.S.R. as well as major withdrawals of the Red Army from Eastern Europe. James Thomson of the Rand Corp. and I have suggested elsewhere equal tank and artillery limits for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area and in Central Europe and have argued that because of the immense mass of Soviet reinforcement capability from the U.S.S.R., small reductions, even if asymmetri-

cal, would be worse than nothing. But equal armaments ceilings would require the elimination of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact and especially Soviet tanks and artillery. This would signal not just an arms control agreement but a fundamental transformation of the postwar political order in Europe. Not likely.

5. Verifying a conventional arms control agreement would be enormously difficult and would require rapid Western access to thousands of Eastern military installations as well as the Soviets' willingness to expose, through an exchange of information with the West, their order of battle down to the battalion level. To imagine such military openness—far beyond the INF verification regime—is to contemplate another sort of Soviet Union than even the most accommodating Gorbachev could likely deliver.

6. Gorbachev can reduce the size of the bloated Soviet armed forces unilaterally, thus saving money, without appreciably diminishing the military threat to Western Europe. This could include small Soviet troop withdrawals—no more than four divisions—from Eastern Europe, which would be meant to impress Western public opinion, stimulate NATO reciprocity, allow rapid reintroduction of Soviet forces in time of East European turbulence and avoid stringent verification. In fact, one could argue that if Gorbachev really wishes urgently to reduce Soviet spending on conventional forces, he cannot afford to wait for a treaty with the West that at best could take years to conclude.

WEAPONS...Pg. 13

**INTERNATIONAL MEDIA**

**JAPAN/SOVIET NAVAL BUILDUP:** Three new Soviet destroyers sailing 33 miles west of Nagasaki in the East China Sea have been photographed by Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force, Tokyo's Kyodo News Service reports. The sighting of

the destroyers closely follows that of a Soviet intelligence gathering ship, which Kyodo says indicates Moscow may be augmenting its Pacific Fleet. The 21 Dec report adds that the three destroyers are expected to be based out of Vladivostok.

**EGYPT/ISRAEL RELATIONS:** Cairo has recalled its ambassador to

Tel Aviv to protest repressive Israeli tactics being used to quell Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The London-based Al-Sharq Al-Aswat newspaper quotes Egyptian officials as saying the recall is aimed at bringing about consultations on the deteriorating

MEDIA...Pg. 13

**FORCES...from Pg. 11**

starting date has been set.

The so-called "mandate talks" here have been held in tandem with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations on cutting troop levels in seven Central European countries. The MBFR talks have dragged on without resolution since 1973 and presumably would be absorbed by the new, broader forum encompassing all of Europe.

Western officials said that in the preparatory work for the new negotiations, the Soviets have signaled their willingness to accept Western demands for asymmetrical cuts in troops and armaments, information exchanges and strict verification — issues that have created the impasse at the MBFR talks.

"Both sides have agreed that one of the objectives of the new talks will be the elimination of disparities," said Ronald Hatchett, the senior Defense Department representative to the negotiations. "The Soviets have said that to identify those disparities we must exchange information on those forces and verify that information. This is a 180-degree flip-flop from their position on MBFR.

"It's an entirely different ball game, and I think we're going to have serious negotiations," he said.

Jozef Sestak, the deputy head of Czechoslovakia's MBFR delegation, said the progress results from in-

creased confidence between East and West. "I would assume that if there are new negotiations, there will be a much stronger will to reach an agreement," Sestak said in an interview.

Western officials are divided on the reasons behind the Soviets' change in attitude, although they said Moscow may want to shift some of the resources it now allocates to the military toward its domestic economy.

In addition, the diplomats said, the Soviets may have concluded that they now must focus on conventional arms control to court West European public opinion as part of their long-term objective of reducing or undermining the U.S. military presence on the continent. "They're not doing it out of charity," said one Western diplomat.

Western officials noted that the negotiations have not begun and said the test of Soviet intentions would not come until the actual bargaining gets under way.

"The conventional arms control process will be a very long one," said Jan Hein van de Mortel, the outgoing Dutch ambassador to the MBFR talks. "Up to now, the East has shown no sign at all of being interested in the issue."

"The danger is that all we may be seeing [from the Soviets] is public diplomacy from guys who really know how to play the game," Hatchett said. "Until I'm shown something concrete, I prefer to remain

skeptical."

Still, Western delegates to the mandate talks said they were encouraged by an agreement by the two sides announced Monday, spelling out the broad "objectives" of the new negotiations, an agreement in which the Warsaw Pact nations accepted most of the West's language.

"The East is so intent on getting these negotiations going that they agreed to most of the West's terms," said Klaus Citron, the West German ambassador to the talks.

Most noteworthy, Citron said, was that the two sides agreed that the negotiations would aim at strengthening stability and security through a stable balance of "conventional armaments and equipment," making no reference to nuclear arms. The Soviets previously have insisted that so-called tactical, or battlefield, nuclear weapons be included in any new conventional arms control formula.

NATO generally has opposed the idea of including tactical nuclear weapons, on the grounds that once U.S. intermediate-range missiles were removed, the tactical weapons would be the only devices that could deter the start of a conventional war.

Another Western official, who asked not to be identified, said that while the statement was a "positive development," it did not prevent the Soviets from attempting to include so-called "dual capable" sys-

tems — those that can deliver both conventional and nuclear arms — in the new negotiations.

According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the East holds a better than 2-to-1 advantage over the West in tanks in Europe and a better than 3-to-1 advantage in artillery pieces.

The institute said the Warsaw Pact has 52,200 battle tanks compared with 22,200 for NATO, and 37,000 artillery pieces compared with NATO's 11,100.

Western delegates expect the Soviets will attempt to counter their proposals for greater Warsaw Pact reductions in tanks and artillery pieces with demands that NATO reduce its combat aircraft, where the East maintains NATO has the advantage.

The Institute for Strategic Studies estimates, however, that the Warsaw Pact leads the West in aircraft as well, with a better than 2-to-1 advantage.

Western officials said the key to settling such discrepancies is a "candid and truthful" exchange of military data, something the West alleges the Warsaw Pact has staunchly refused to agree to during the lengthy Central European troop negotiations.

In addition, the West "will insist" in the new talks on "on-site inspection as a matter of right," Citron said.

**SNAFU...from Pg. 10**

that Bryen's department had been made aware of details of the transfer in the spring of 1984.

Barbara Ledeen, spokeswoman for the trade security office, also has said that Bryen had been unaware of the details until December, 1984. She said this week that Bryen was dismayed when he discovered that the CIA had bypassed his office and had been dealing instead with British intelligence.

"It's my understanding that Steve [Bryen] just went nuts when he found out about it because we could have done something about it," she said. "The agency [CIA], from its point of view, wanted to do what it could without passing it on. They thought they could handle it themselves."

Details of the CIA's role in the failure to halt the transfer comes after the Commerce oversight subcommittee complained last week that "while U.S. agencies argued among themselves about how to investigate and respond to critical information, the technology was being sold to the USSR."

The panel's comment came after it heard closed-door testimony from military, intelligence and enforcement officials. The hearing was prompted by the Newsday series last month.

The series reported that since 1978, carbon-carbon has been used on the nose tips of America's newest strategic warheads. Under proper conditions, it can triple the accuracy of those warheads compared with nose tips using the composite it replaces.

Officials of Consarc Engineering and its parent company, Consarc Corp. of Rancocas, N.J., have maintained that the transaction was legal and did not involve sensitive technology. They received confirmation from the British Department of Trade and Industry that no British export license was required to ship the equipment.

In the series, Newsday quoted an industry source as saying that the CIA by late 1983 had been asking American experts questions about the Consarc deal, orchestrated by James F. Metcalf, director of Consarc Engineering. According to industry and U.S. officials, it was known that the Soviets were attempting to purchase vacuum induction furnaces and other equipment useful in the making of carbon-carbon and other composite materials.

Bryen's office met with British officials in the late fall and winter of 1984 in attempts to have the shipments stopped.

The British government did not act until Feb. 8, 1985, when it belatedly embargoed the machines already sent and seized a final, small shipment of what experts described as relatively low technology.

That seizure annulled the contract between the Soviet Union and Consarc Engineering. Therefore British national insurance, which had insured the contract, was compelled to pay most of the \$11-million contract for equipment already sent.

Lent said that the subcommittee would continue to investigate the transaction as a case study of problems in the government's efforts to stem the transfer of critical technologies.

"The next steps for the subcommittee," he said, "is a more thorough review of interagency coordination."

He also said that the panel will study "the attitudes of our allies towards controls [of sensitive technology] and how well COCOM works." COCOM is the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, a Paris-based organization of western allies and Japan that establishes common guidelines for restricting sales of sensitive technology to the East bloc.

# ad hoc Coalition to Protect America From Nuclear Attack

c/o 214 Massachusetts Ave., Suite 360  
Washington, DC 20002

FOR RELEASE AFTER 3 PM EST  
OCTOBER 19, 1987

Contact: John Kwapisz  
547-5607

100+ ORGANIZATIONS ASK REAGAN TO WITHDRAW  
FROM CONTROVERSIAL ABM TREATY AND BUILD SDI

*Arms Control*

WASHINGTON, DC, October 20, 1987. In a letter delivered to President Reagan today (Tuesday October 20), 107 organizations, including ethnic, religious, veterans, conservative, and Republican groups, have asked the President to withdraw the United States from the controversial Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which went into effect fifteen years ago this month.

The Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviets bans the deployment by either country of a general defense to protect its people from nuclear missile attack--specifically, interceptor missiles or other weapons that could destroy attacking nuclear missiles.

The groups' letter says that "increasingly adverse strategic conditions and Soviet violations of the Treaty now make it positively harmful to the safety and interests of the American people." Therefore, they urge the President to "exercise America's legal right to withdraw from the Treaty 'in the supreme interests' of the American people."

The letter tells the President that

"the greatest legacy you can leave future generations of Americans is protection from a nuclear attack, which could occur regardless of arms reduction agreements. By withdrawing from the Treaty and getting on with SDI you can help secure that achievement, and you will forever have a place of honor and gratitude in the hearts of all Americans."

Either nation can withdraw from the Treaty after 6 months notice if it determines that its "supreme national interests" are being threatened by continued adherence to it.

The letter's mention of "adverse strategic conditions" refers to the Soviet achievement of a dangerous "first strike" advantage over the U.S. since the signing of the Treaty—a development not envisioned by the U.S. when it agreed to the Treaty in 1972.

The "Soviet Violations" refer, among others, to the building of certain new Soviet radars and the testing and development of interceptor missiles that have a capability to intercept some nuclear ballistic missiles--things prohibited by the terms of the Treaty. The U.S. government has said that the various violations in the aggregate indicate that, "the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) defense of its territory."

The organizations that are Republican Party affiliated include the Slavic American Republican Federation, the Polish American Republican Federation, Teen-Age Republicans, the Vietnamese American Republican Association, the Romanian-American Republican Clubs, and the College Republican National Committee.

Among the other groups are the National Alliance of Senior Citizens, High Frontier, The Pro Family Forum, AMVETS, American Coalition for Traditional Values, The Center for Peace and Freedom, Sons of the American Revolution, and National Association of Uniformed Services, and the German American National Congress.

A number of the participating organizations are in the process of forming a more formal "Coalition to Protect America from Nuclear Attack."

Earlier this month, three candidates for the Republican Presidential nomination also called for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: Representative Jack Kemp, former Delaware Governor Pete DuPont, and the Reverend Pat Robertson.

#END#



October 19, 1987

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

We agree with you that strategic defenses are the best hope for freeing the world from the threat of nuclear missiles, and are necessary as an insurance policy to protect us against Soviet cheating on arms agreements.

To make SDI a reality, something must of course be done about the notorious ABM Treaty, which prevents America from being protected from enemy nuclear missiles. Increasingly adverse strategic conditions and Soviet violations of the Treaty now make it positively harmful to the safety and interests of the American people.

Now, on this 15th anniversary of the implementation of the harmful ABM Treaty, we urge you to exercise America's legal right to withdraw from the Treaty "in the supreme national interests" of the American people.

In the interests of the American people, the U.S. should proceed vigorously with the development and deployment of SDI regardless of whether the Soviets agree to a mutual deployment plan.

Mr. President, the greatest legacy you can leave future generations of Americans is protection from a nuclear attack, which could occur regardless of arms reduction agreements. By withdrawing from the Treaty and getting on with SDI you can help secure that achievement, and you will forever have a place of honor and gratitude in the hearts of all Americans.

Sincerely,

American Coalition for Traditional Values  
AMVETS  
Pro Family Forum  
Polish American Republican Federation  
German-American National Congress  
American Defense Lobby  
Council for National Defense  
Americans for a Sound Foreign Policy  
Witness for Freedom  
National Association of Pro-America  
Catholic Study Council  
National Center for Public Policy  
Research  
Coalition for Jobs, Peace, and  
Freedom in the Americas  
American Conservative Union  
Free the Eagle  
Americans for the High Frontier  
Coalitions for America  
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation

Freedom Worldwide  
U.S. Business and Industrial Council  
Conservative Alliance  
National Alliance of Senior Citizens  
Center for Peace and Freedom  
National Association of College and  
University Students  
High Frontier  
John Locke Foundation  
Accuracy in Academia  
Committee to Prevent Nuclear War  
Liberty Institute  
American Conservative Coalition  
Leadership Foundation  
American Studies Center  
Citizens for Educational Freedom  
Eagle Forum  
American Studies Center  
Lithuanian-American Council  
Americans for Good Government

LETTER TO REAGAN URGING WITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY  
CONTINUED

October 19, 1987

American Federation of Small Buisness	Ethnic American Council
Coalition for Religious Freedom	L.I.M.I.T.
National Committee to Restore Internal Security	Americans for Tax Reform
The Conservative Caucus	Slavic American Republican Federation
Independent American Ethnics For Reagan	American Military Retirees
National Conservative Foundation	Dougherty Communications Associates
Council for the Defense of Freedom	National Conservative Political Action Committee
Committee for a Free Afghanistan	Federation of American Afghan Action
Ukranian Congress Committee of America	Ed Lozansky, Free University*
Students for America	Congressional Majority Committee
Dr. Jane Orient, President, National Association of Physicians*	Jefferson Education Foundation
Conservative Victory Fund	Freedom Federation
National Defense Council Foundation	Sons of the American Revolution
American Defense Foundation	National Traditionalist Caucus
We the People, Inc.	Teen-Age Republicans
Military Order of the World Wars	The Slavic World Congress
Mozambique Research Center	Ron Robinson, Young America Foundation*
S. Dennis Hoffman, American Freedom International*	Coral Ridge Ministries
U.S. Defense Committee	Bulgarian National Front
Romanian-American Republican Clubs	U.S. Defense Foundation
National Council for Better Education	Congress of Russian Americans
College Republican National Committee	Young Americans for Freedom
U.S. Global Strategy Council	Association of Naval Aviation
Committee for the Free World	Christian Voice
Heritage Groups Council for Citizenship Education	Mid-America Conservative PAC
Solzhenitsyn Society	Contact America
World News Institute	Order of St. John of Jerusalem
Conservative Leadership PAC	American Freedom Crusade
Joint Baltic American National Committee	United for a Stronger America
Sons of Liberty	Vietnamese American Republican Association
Free Congress Association	POMOST
704th Tank Destroyer Battallion Association	Lithuanian-American Congress
Women for a Secure Future	International Security Council
Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow	American Hungarian Federation
	Saint Joseph Foundation
	American Czech Republican Clubs
	National Association of Uniformed Services
	Forum for Contemporary Issues
	U.S. Conservative PAC
	Women for Constitutional Government

\*For identification purposes only.

Cons  
Control

# Why Compromise Our Deterrent Strength in Europe?

By Bernard W. Rogers

**M**ONS, Belgium  
ilitary strength and political will are both necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter aggression, but the alliance has also long recognized the need for dialogue with the Soviet Union. A central element of NATO's approach is arms control.

NATO's strength, however, is threatened by a recent proposal in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The plan would eliminate the longer-range missiles in this category and reduce short-range weapons on each side. Such a move would harm the credibility of our deterrence, the ability to prevent aggression.

I have held that position for six years, since the plan was first put on the negotiating table. Arms control must not be an end in itself, and political leaders should guard against the natural tendency to seek short-term political success at the price of increasing military risk in the long run.

Deterrence is in the mind of the beholder — the Soviet Union. The Russians must perceive that any aggression against the West will result in more pain than gain for them.

NATO decided to deploy land-based, long-range I.N.F. missiles in 1979 to fill a gap in our spectrum of deterrence. The gap existed because American F-111 aircraft based in Britain were then the last remaining part of the theater nuclear system that could reach Soviet soil, provided the aircraft could penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses. The fact that the Russians began deploying SS-20 missiles in 1977 made the NATO decision more urgent.

Removing the land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces now would return NATO to its weak, pre-1979 posture. In fact, because the Russians have continued to improve their conventional and nuclear forces, NATO would be in an even worse position now.

To establish credible deterrence, two capabilities, listed in NATO's guidelines for using nuclear weapons, are vital: the ability to strike, with certainty, targets deep in the Soviet homeland (only Pershing 2 missiles meet this requirement), and a number of nuclear escalatory options be-

tween conventional forces and the use of strategic nuclear forces.

The proposed I.N.F. agreement would eliminate the Pershing 2 missiles and thereby remove the first capability. It would also eliminate a crucial escalatory option. The result would be a reduction in the credibility of NATO's deterrence.

Nonetheless, the I.N.F. proposal has been promoted by NATO political officials for the last six years, even though a number of them recognized, after the Reykjavik summit meeting, the folly of having done so.

How can allied governments now tell their people that they made a mistake, that they did not expect the Russians to agree to the reductions? Right or wrong, there will most likely be an agreement (assuming verification procedures are worked out) on eliminating long-range I.N.F. weapons. Political credibility — admittedly important — of governments, parties and national leaders will thus have assumed a higher priority than the credibility of our deterrence. What NATO must do now is to bolster that credibility.

A solution aimed toward that objective would include three points: linking the elimination of the remaining longer-range I.N.F. weapons to a satisfactory agreement on conventional and chemical weapons; reaching a lower and balanced level of shorter-range weapons by converting Pershing 2 missiles to shorter-range Pershing 1B's; retaining the 72 Pershing 1A's and their warheads in West Germany to balance the 600 Soviet Scud missiles aimed at Europe.

Although the elimination of our Pershing 2 missiles would prevent NATO from attacking Soviet targets quickly and with certainty, at least the Pershing 1A's and 1B's would let us strike targets located in western Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Some people may assert that what I have suggested is infeasible. But if the Russians are as fearful of the Pershing 2's as it appears, and if they are prepared to pay the price to eliminate them, why should we pre-emptively concede that they won't accept such proposals? At least, let's try.

Throughout the arms control debate, I have been concerned by glib rationales presented by people who try to justify the so-called zero-zero plan, which would eliminate some intermediate-range and short-range weapons.

One rationale is, "Aren't the 4,600 warheads in Europe enough for ade-

quate deterrence?" (This number was mandated at a NATO defense ministers meeting in 1983. Often overlooked is the fact that NATO has reduced its nuclear warheads from 7,000, unilaterally, since 1979.)

That is the wrong question. It should be, "Once the 572 long-range I.N.F. warheads are eliminated, what is the composition of the remaining warheads?" They consist of a few maritime depth charges (range 0), many artillery shells (9.5 miles), 95 Lance missiles (72 miles), 72 West German Pershing 1A's (450 miles) and bombs for dual-capable aircraft, which can carry conventional and nuclear bombs.

Given the necessity to set artillery and the Lance missile systems well behind the forward edge of the battle in order to protect them from enemy fire, only the West German Pershing 1A's can strike with certainty deep into non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory. Our aircraft are limited in the range they can travel and by Warsaw Pact air defenses.

So it is more than just numbers of warheads involved. The real questions are: "Does NATO have the appropriate systems to hit targets we need to hold at risk, and do the Soviets know we can do it?"

Another rationale often heard is, "Since the Russians are giving up more warheads than NATO, this has to be a good deal for the West." Again, it is not numbers that matter. The Russians would lose only a very small fraction of their capability to strike Western Europe since every one of the thousands of Soviet warheads remaining, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, can still reach Western European soil.

On the other hand, the I.N.F. agreement would deny NATO the very weapon most feared by the Soviet Union — the Pershing 2 — and thus the most effective deterrent, thereby reducing the credibility of our overall deterrence and creating zones of unequal security in the alliance.

A third rationale is, "NATO can use the submarine-launched ballistic missiles committed to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe." While this is technically feasible, I believe it is politically infeasible today, as it was in 1977 to 1979, when NATO governments protested strongly against using "strategic" weapons for theater nuclear purposes. Moreover, al-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## The Hill's Ship-Watchers

The Soviet transport *Agostinho Neto*, carrying an estimated 5,000 tons of war supplies, arrived unannounced in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto last week—increasing the probability that the Democratic-controlled Congress will continue military funding for the contras.

The ship carried peanuts compared with the \$580 million in war materiel the Soviet Union and its satellites gave the Marxist Sandinista regime in Managua last year. But it makes prophetic a classified U.S. intelligence estimate that total Soviet-bloc war goods expected to be shipped this year will set a new record, along with a roughly equal amount of nonlethal goods.

Combining that estimate with realities of presidential politics, the Democratic Party is not about to use its control of Congress to terminate U.S. aid (now running at perhaps 15 percent of the Soviet rate). On the contrary, political reality dictates that Congress may well break new ground and vote aid for 18 months, bridging the first six months of the new administration.

The man-bites-dog prospect of the Democratic Congress suddenly giving an embattled President Reagan's contra policy a break contradicts conventional wisdom inside the Washington Beltway. But its hard foundation of

political reality is grounded in a transformed political atmosphere.

A major element in that transformation was the retirement of Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, removing from Democratic power a highly emotional contra foe whose approach was implacable stonewalling. His hatred of the contras was so consuming that he refused even to hold routine meetings of Democratic leaders on the subject.

O'Neill's successor, Speaker Jim Wright, is not saying much about Nicaragua beyond wanting "diplomatic" approaches. However, close friends insist that secretly he may favor aid because of genuine concern about communist gains in Central America and the inevitable Soviet influence that comes with it—major concerns in his own state of Texas.

But what should worry Wright more is another factor in the transformed atmosphere: political danger to his party if another aid cutoff snuffs out the contras. This time, in the wake of the Iran-contra affair, there would be no back-room money deals with foreign governments and rich American conservatives to sustain the anti-Sandinista guerrilla army.

Former Virginia governor Charles S. Robb, chairman of the mainstream Democratic Leadership Council, poignantly stated the case for continued military aid in a recent Manhattan

talk to the Foreign Policy Association: "Turning on aid one year and off the next is tantamount to playing with their [the contras'] lives."

He wants a multi-year aid package to guarantee "constant pressure" on the Sandinistas. If Congress will not make a "clear and continuing" commitment to aid, "it should terminate the program altogether—and be prepared to accept the consequences."

Polls show no increase in voter opposition to the contras despite the unending, acrimonious Iran-contra hearings.

Each Soviet vessel that arrives with more MI 25 "flying tank" helicopters and other lethal arms to fight off the U.S.-backed contras raises the political question: Can the United States sit back and watch? The administration has not yet decided either how much to ask when the current \$100 million funding runs out at the end of September or when the right moment will come to send the request to Congress.

But pressures are increasing for a request of at least \$125 million a year for either 18 months or two years. That's in line with what one high official calls "contra reality," which gets a little stronger each day as new Soviet arms pour into Nicaragua.

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### NATO...CONTINUED

ar. What we can do is to make our own war plans and deploy our forces on the assumption that it would never be in the interest of NATO to initiate the use of nuclear devices.

We can deploy the nuclear weapons in a separate command so that devices are available to retaliate for Soviet use or in the unlikely event that NATO seeks to initiate their use. The regular military forces would be trained and equipped only for sustained conventional war, rather than having forces that seek to be dual-capable. This change in doctrine would enhance NATO's conventional capability with no increase in defense spending. Deterrence would thereby be more credible.

At the same time we would recognize that what effectively deters the Kremlin is the credible threat that a war in Europe means a large war with the United States that we will fight to win. As long as no events in Western Europe threaten vital Soviet interests, the Russians are unlikely to attack in this situation.

Having recognized that nuclear devices are not weapons and are no substitute for an adequate conventional capability, we can have a serious debate about whether current NATO forces are adequate to deter a Soviet attack. My own sense is that with modest improvements they are surely sufficient. Those who think not should

be making the case for the needed improvements and not misleading us into thinking that we can rely instead on nuclear weapons if only we reject the current Soviet proposal.

It is time for realism in the alliance. That must begin by recognizing that nuclear devices are not weapons. Agreements to cut them back cannot threaten our security. What can is the false belief that we can rely on them to deter or defeat conventional threats.

*Morton H. Halperin, a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Johnson administration, is the author of the recently-published "Nuclear Fallacy."*

# Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

September 1987

*ans control*

## Introduction

Even as public attention is focused on the negotiations to eliminate U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, the United States is continuing its efforts in another forum to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The United States seeks particularly to reduce and to place sublimits on those weapons that are most dangerous and destabilizing—ballistic missiles, especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles.

The United States believes that such a treaty could be completed in short order, if the Soviets are willing to apply themselves with the same seriousness as the United States. As a concrete step toward a START treaty, the United States presented a draft treaty text at the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva on May 8, 1987. This draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement on strategic arms reductions reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last October at Reykjavik and provides for roughly 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms.

The United States has made every effort to build on the agreements reached at Reykjavik and to facilitate a START agreement, including important compromises—to meet Soviet concerns—on sublimits that we made shortly after Reykjavik. For example, we offered to raise the ballistic missile

warhead sublimit from 4,500 to 4,800 and to make increases in two other sublimits. The Soviets have not demonstrated similar flexibility on this key outstanding issue.

The Soviets responded to the U.S. initiative by presenting a draft treaty text of their own on July 31. The Soviet text is a welcome departure from previous Soviet practice of proposing only highly generalized documents containing basic principles. It is similar in structure to the U.S. draft text and contains some common language. This will facilitate preparation of a joint draft treaty text.

However, the Soviet draft offers no movement on the major outstanding issues, including the need for sublimits on the most dangerous missile systems. In addition, it continues to hold hostage strategic offensive arms reductions to restrictions on strategic defense that would go beyond those limitations already in the ABM Treaty—a clear Soviet effort to cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The President has made clear that he cannot and will

not accept measures which would kill SDI—a research and technology development program that holds great promise for enhancing the future security of the United States and its allies and ensuring a stable strategic balance over the long term.

Although the Soviet draft reflects no movement on the major outstanding issues, Soviet presentation of their treaty was a necessary step in the process of negotiating a START agreement. With U.S. and Soviet draft treaties now on the table, the two sides can explore remaining differences and begin finally to develop a joint draft text which would facilitate negotiation of those differences.

The United States is doing its part to bring about, for the first time in history, real reductions in strategic offensive arms. It is necessary for the Soviets to demonstrate similar resolve and join with us to complete a strategic offensive arms reductions treaty rapidly.

## Prospects

At the beginning of the current round of negotiations in May, the President said that a START agreement could be negotiated even this year. We believe that the possibility of completing a START agreement by the end of this year could still be realized but only if the Soviets decide now to join vigorously in serious efforts to resolve outstanding issues. The two sides have made considerable progress: at Reykjavik

### Acronyms

ABM—antiballistic missile  
ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile  
INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces  
LRINF—longer range INF  
NST—nuclear and space talks  
SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative  
SNDV—strategic nuclear delivery vehicle  
SRAM—short-range attack missile  
START—strategic arms reduction talks

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reached agreement in principle on fundamental aspects of an agreement on strategic arms reductions. Since Reykjavik, further progress was made at the negotiating table in Geneva. Now, both sides have a draft treaty on the table. The United States believes that the basic outlines of a mutually beneficial START agreement are now clear to both sides. What is required is for the Soviets to demonstrate flexibility and determination comparable to that already shown by the United States to resolve the outstanding issues.

### U.S. Draft START Treaty

The draft treaty presented by the United States:

- Calls for a roughly 50% reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner over 7 years from the date the treaty comes into force;
- Specifies a 1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on those delivery vehicles;
- To ensure strategic stability and place effective limits on the most dangerous missile systems, establishes within the 6,000-warhead limit a sub-limit of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, of which no more than 3,300 can be on ICBMs, of which no more than 1,650 can be on permitted ICBMs other than silo-based light or medium ICBMs with 6 or fewer warheads;
- Seeks limits to codify and sustain a 50% reduction in current Soviet throw-weight level;
- Bans mobile ICBMs because of stability and verification concerns;
- Counts each heavy bomber as one SNDV; each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit; and
- Includes a comprehensive verification regime providing for the exchange of data both before and after arms reductions take place, onsite inspection to verify the data exchange and to observe the elimination of weapons, and an effective onsite monitoring arrangement for facilities and remaining forces following the elimination of weapons; provides for noninterference with national technical means of verification.

### Obstacles to an Agreement

**Soviet Insistence on Linking START to Other Issues.** The Soviets continue to insist that an agreement on strategic arms reductions is contingent upon

resolution of issues in the defense and space forum of the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The Soviets, who long have had their own very extensive strategic defense programs underway, seek to link a START agreement to measures which would constrain the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative beyond the provisions of the ABM Treaty. This is unacceptable to the United States. The President has made clear that he cannot and will not accept measures which would kill or cripple SDI—a program that holds great promise for enhancing Western security and ensuring future strategic stability.

**Soviet Refusal To Accept Sublimits.** Another important issue remaining to be resolved is the need to place sublimits on different categories of ballistic missile warheads. Such sublimits prevent the concentration of weapons on the most dangerous and destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles—and thus enhance stability by reducing the capability of conducting a first strike. The U.S. draft treaty calls for three sublimits: 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, of which no more than 3,300 can be on ICBMs, of which no more than 1,650 can be on permitted ICBMs other than silo-based light or medium ICBMs with 6 or fewer warheads.

The Soviets had previously proposed their own sublimits. In 1986, for example, they proposed to limit ballistic missile warheads to 80%–85% of the total number of warheads. Following Reykjavik, we raised our proposed warhead sublimit from 4,500 to 4,800—or 80% of 6,000 in order to align the U.S. position with the Soviet proposal. Similarly, in our ICBM warhead sublimit, we have proposed to split the difference between our previous proposal for a 3,000 ICBM warhead sublimit (which was already raised from our original proposal for a limit of 2,500 ICBM warheads) and the 3,600 implied by a Soviet proposal that no more than 60% of all warheads be allowed on a single kind of system under a 6,000-weapon limit. In addition, while the Soviets have proposed to cut in half the number of their heavy ICBMs, this offer would address only one of the concerns embodied in our proposed 1,650 sublimit and cannot substitute for it.

The Soviets now claim that the price for their agreement at Reykjavik to the bomber-counting rule—counting bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs as one warhead under the 6,000 aggregate—was the dropping of any ballistic missile warhead sublimits. This is simply untrue; the United States and

U.S.S.R. agreed upon the bomber counting rule, and the United States continued to emphasize that sublimits must be part of the agreement.

### Throw-weight and Mobile ICBMs.

Important differences remain between the two sides on the issue of throw-weight (payload a missile can carry over a given range)—the Soviets continue to refuse to accept codification in an agreement of a 50%-reduction obligation in the throw-weight of the Soviet ballistic missile force, which is about three times that of the United States. In addition, the United States and U.S.S.R. differ on mobile missiles: the U.S. proposal would ban them because of the serious verification difficulties posed by mobile missiles, particularly in a closed society such as the Soviet Union, and the potential for covert deployment and refire. The Soviets refuse to accept the U.S. ban on mobile missiles.

**Verification.** For any START agreement to contribute to strategic stability and reduce the risk of war, it must include an effective verification regime which would give each side confidence that the other is abiding by the agreement. The United States has proposed such a regime. The Soviets have agreed in principle to certain important aspects of the U.S. verification proposals, but some key aspects of their position remain vague. Much hard bargaining remains to reach agreement on the specific verification provisions necessary to achieve an effectively verifiable agreement.

### Background

Since the earliest days of his Administration, the President has established as his highest priority the achievement of deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Such reductions would reduce the risk of war. Consequently, the United States proposed the strategic arms reduction talks which began in Geneva in the summer of 1982.

At the end of the fifth round of the START negotiations in December 1983, the Soviets—in an effort to bring pressure on the United States and its allies not to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s by proceeding with LRINF missile deployments in Europe—refused to agree to a date for resuming the talks. The Soviet tactic failed, and after more than a year, they returned to negotiations on strategic arms in the context of the nuclear and space talks.

Talks at the NST then were stalled for nearly a year by Soviet insistence on a ban on what they call "space-strike arms" as a precondition to progress in the strategic arms area. When the Soviets finally presented a START proposal in the fall of 1985, it contained a number of extremely one-sided elements, such as counting certain U.S. intermediate-range systems as "strategic," while excluding from limits an even greater number of comparable Soviet systems. Their position, however, did accept for the first time the principle, long advocated by the United States, of deep reductions in strategic offensive forces.

At the November 1985 summit in Geneva, the two leaders agreed to accelerate work in areas where common ground already existed, such as 50% reductions in START. However, the Soviets did not follow through at the Geneva START negotiations.

In Round V (June 1986) of the NST talks, the Soviets presented a new "interim" proposal which called for less than the 50% reductions agreed to at the 1985 summit but contained some constructive elements. The President cited the Soviet proposal as positive, although he emphasized that we could not accept the proposal without changes. The United States responded

in Round VI (fall 1986). We made clear that the U.S. 50%-reduction proposal remained on the table and remained the outcome which we strongly preferred. However, in order to accommodate the Soviet idea of taking interim steps to 50% reductions, we also tabled substantial changes to our proposals.

In October 1986, the President and Mr. Gorbachev met at Reykjavik, Iceland. In this meeting, the United States sought to narrow differences, where possible, between the U.S. and Soviet START positions and to lay the groundwork for more productive negotiations. Additionally, the focus shifted back to immediate reductions of 50%. Specifically, the sides agreed to reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,600 for each side, with no more than 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. The Soviets also agreed to reduce their heavy ICBMs by half, and there was agreement on counting rules for bomber weapons.

After the Reykjavik talks, the United States promptly presented in Geneva new proposals reflecting the progress made in Iceland. The United States also said it would accept higher sublimits on the different categories of ballistic missile warheads in a compromise effort to meet Soviet concerns, while still meeting the goal of ensuring

strategic stability. On November 7, the Soviet Union presented proposals at the NST talks that only partially reflected the headway made at Reykjavik.

During NST Round VII (January 15-March 6, 1987), the United States sought to narrow further the differences between the two sides. Progress was made in clarifying differences when the sides agreed to develop a joint working document which specified the points of agreement and disagreement on key issues. This document was useful to the United States in developing a draft START treaty text. The United States presented this treaty text on May 8, 1987, at NST Round VIII. The Soviets responded to the U.S. proposal by presenting their own draft START treaty on July 31. With both draft treaties now on the table, the two sides can develop an agreed joint draft text which would facilitate negotiation of the remaining differences.

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Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • September 1987  
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# NST

Also  
consider

## Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

September 9, 1987

### UNITED STATES



### SOVIET UNION



#### START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

<b>General Approach:</b>	50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force. Agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations.	50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms within five years, with subsequent negotiations for additional reductions. Agreement on 50 percent reductions within five years contingent upon the resolution of Defense and Space issues.
<b>SNDVs:</b>	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). SNDVs include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>Warheads:</b>	6,000 warhead ceiling, to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>Warhead sublimits:</b>	Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.	The Soviets reject the concept of warhead sublimits and have withdrawn their earlier proposals for sublimits of 80-85 percent of warheads on ballistic missiles and 60 percent of warheads on any one leg of the Triad. (Triad refers to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.)
<b>heavy ICBMs:</b>	There must be substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBM warheads would be included in the 1,650 sublimit.	50 percent reduction from current level of heavy ICBM launchers.
<b>throw-weight:</b>	50 percent reduction from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.	The Soviets claim that an approximately 50 percent reduction in their throw-weight level would result from their overall proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.
<b>mobile ICBMs:</b>	Banned.	Permitted.
<b>heavy bombers:</b>	Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit. Each long-range ALCM would count as one warhead in the 6,000 ceiling.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>verification of compliance:</b>	Exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons, and an effective on-site monitoring arrangement for facilities following the elimination of weapons. Use of, and non-interference with, National Technical Means (NTM).	Agreement in principle to many aspects of the U.S. proposal for verification of compliance, but the Soviets have yet to give their position on some key details.

## INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

<b>LRINF Missiles:</b>	<p>Global elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range land-based INF (LRINF) missiles (1,000-5,500 kilometer range) through phased reductions during three-year period from treaty entry into force.</p> <p>Agreement on INF reductions not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside INF negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva Summit.</p>	<p>Global elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range land-based INF (LRINF) missiles (1,000-5,500 kilometer range) through phased reductions during five-year period from treaty entry into force.</p> <p>Same as the U.S. position.</p>
<b>IRINF Missiles:</b>	<p>Global elimination within one year of treaty entry into force of U.S. and Soviet shorter-range land-based INF missiles (500-1,000 kilometer range, to include the Soviet SS-23 and Scaleboard) as an integral part of an INF agreement. (The U.S. has no missiles deployed in this range.)</p> <p>These negotiations are bilateral and it is unacceptable to include third-country systems in a U.S./Soviet treaty or to affect established U.S. patterns of cooperation with its allies.</p>	<p>Global elimination of U.S. and Soviet short-range land-based INF missiles (500-1,000 kilometer range, to include the Soviet SS-23 and Scaleboard) as an integral part of an INF agreement. (The U.S. has no missiles deployed in this range.)</p> <p>Treaty should provide for elimination of U.S. warheads associated with West German Pershing 1A missiles.</p>
<b>Verification of Compliance:</b>	<p>Detailed exchange of data on INF missiles and launchers and associated support facilities; notification of movement of missiles and launchers; baseline inspection to verify number of missiles and launchers; on-site inspection to verify elimination of missiles and launchers; short-notice inspection of declared facilities until missiles are eliminated; short-notice inspection of certain missile-related facilities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at which illegal missile activity is suspected.</p>	<p>Agreement in principle to many aspects of the U.S. proposal for verification of compliance, including exchange of data, baseline inspection and on-site inspection to confirm elimination of systems, but have yet to provide details. Propose that U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads be stored in central locations in each of the two countries during the reduction period; missiles and launchers could operate freely in the deployment areas. Also, propose that criteria be developed for inspecting any U.S. military base or exhibition sites outside manufacturing plants, public or private, throughout the world.</p>

## Defense and Space

<b>Strategic Defenses:</b>	<p>Following Secretary Shultz's meetings in Moscow in April, 1987, the U.S. proposed a mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty; and during that period to observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.</p> <p>Such a commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions to 1,600 SNDVs/6,000 warheads in strategic offensive arms over seven years from entry into force of a START agreement.</p> <p>Either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.</p> <p>The right is preserved to withdraw from the proposed treaty for reasons of supreme interests or material breach of this treaty, START or the ABM Treaty.</p> <p>To enhance predictability in the area of strategic defenses, U.S. also proposed an annual exchange of data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, visits to associated research facilities, and establishment of procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.</p> <p>Alternatively, two previous U.S. proposals remain on the table:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• At Reykjavik the President proposed a mutual commitment, through 1996, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This commitment would be contingent upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996. Either side would be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.</li><li>• In his July 25, 1986, letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan proposed that the sides agree not to deploy advanced strategic defenses for a period through 1991. Thereafter, if either side wished to deploy such defenses, it would present a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and eliminating ballistic missiles. The plan would be subject to negotiation for two years. If, at the end of two years, the sides were unable to reach agreement, either side would be free to deploy defenses after giving six months' notice.</li></ul>	<p>Mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years from entry into force of this agreement while strictly observing all the treaty's provisions; space-related ABM research permitted only at ground-based laboratories, ABM test ranges and factories; sides would agree on a list of space-based devices which would not be allowed to be put into space in the course of research.</p> <p>Agreement in Defense and Space is a precondition for strategic offensive force reductions. If a side decided to begin "practical development" of a prohibited ABM system, the other side would be released from START Treaty obligations.</p> <p>Before the end of 10-year commitment of non-withdrawal, the sides would begin negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further; Soviet position does not provide for the right to deploy in absence of an agreement.</p>
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0720  
28 Aug

August 26, 1987

TO: Bob Linhard  
Lint Brooks  
Don Mahley  
Sven Kraemer  
Bill Heiser  
Will Tobey  
Fritz Ermarth  
Nelson Ledsky  
Rudy Perina  
Dave Matthews

FROM: Steve Steiner

FYI--our final package on ~~Pershing developments~~ Already used by FCC on the West Coast. Dan Howard said it went well.

  
Chancellor Kohl *off*

STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN

As you know, Chancellor Kohl has made a statement concerning the future status of the German Pershing IA missiles.

We strongly support his reaffirmation that the German Pershing IAs have not been and will not be a matter for discussion in US/Soviet negotiations, which are bilateral.

We have emphasized at the same time that the disposition of these missiles is a matter for the FRG to decide, in consultation with NATO. We therefore understand and support the statement on future disposition of the Pershing IAs which was made today by the Chancellor. As we understand it, the conditions for not modernizing, and eventually dismantling, the Pershing IAs include the following key elements:

-- US/Soviet agreement on global elimination of US and Soviet INF missiles;

-- Resolution of outstanding INF verification issues in a satisfactory way for all concerned;

-- Ratification and entry into force of the US/Soviet INF agreement; and

-- Actual elimination of these US and Soviet INF missiles in accordance with the agreed US/Soviet timetable.

With respect to nuclear forces of less than 500 km range (SNF), I wish to reaffirm U.S. support for the NATO position--as reflected in the June 1987 NAC Communique of NATO Foreign Ministers--concerning the priorities for arms control negotiations. As the Communique from that meeting indicates, and as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe--General Galvin--has emphasized, NATO must retain a robust, modern and survivable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.

August 26, 1987

Q/As ON KOHL ANNOUNCEMENT

On Pershing IA status:

1. Did Kohl get in touch with the President prior to his announcement?

A: Yes. He informed the President by telegram last night.

2. Did the President respond?

A: Yes. A response was sent to the Chancellor last night as well.

3. What did the President say in response?

A: We are not going to discuss the substance of the President's diplomatic exchanges with the Chancellor.

4. Was Kohl also in touch with other Allies?

A: I do not know. You will have to ask the FRG.

5. Was the U.S. in touch with other Allies concerning the German statement?

A: No.

6. Did the US have any role in the German announcement, direct or indirect?

A: No.

7. Did the FRG consult in any NATO forum concerning the announcement?

A: Not yet. I would point out, however, that the implementation of the German action would be conditioned upon a number of events which have not yet occurred. We therefore would expect the FRG to discuss this issue in NATO prior to implementation.

8. Had the Soviets intervened recently with the FRG on this issue?

A: I don't know; you would have to ask the FRG.

9. Had the question of a German statement, or an approach along these lines, been discussed by the Soviet Union and the U.S.?

A: No. As I said earlier, German Pershing missiles--which are part of an existing program of cooperation between the US and FRG--are not a subject for discussion in US/Soviet negotiations.

10. Does the U.S. support the Chancellor's position?

A. -- The U.S. and our Allies have long held and Chancellor Kohl reaffirmed in his statement that the only subjects of U.S./Soviet negotiations are systems that belong to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This is a fundamental principle that we have observed since SALT I began in 1969. Therefore, German P-IAs are not part of U.S./Soviet INF negotiations.

-- We have not negotiated and will not negotiate on third country systems. Nor will we allow existing programs of cooperation with our Allies, such as the FRG Pershing IA, to be part of our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

-- For twenty years, FRG Pershing I missiles have played an important role in NATO's deterrent strategy of forward defense and flexible response.

-- The U.S. will respect and fully consider Chancellor Kohl's position as NATO consultations proceed on it and the overall modernization program mandated by the 1983 Montebello decision.

11. Do you expect an INF agreement with the Soviets to materialize quickly now?

A: We and our Allies have always agreed that Soviet efforts to make the German Pershing IAs an issue were completely artificial. But there are some difficult and important issues remaining to be resolved, above all verification. While there is a lot of work to be done, we are prepared to work on the remaining issues expeditiously. It is now up to the Soviets to demonstrate whether they want a stabilizing INF reductions agreement.

12. Will you be notifying the Soviets of this development?

A: No.

SNF:

13. Do you support Kohl's call for the Soviet Union and its allies to desist from modernization of their short range nuclear forces (SNF) in return for non-modernization of the Pershing IAs and his call for negotiations on SNF?

A: As I indicated in my statement, we fully support the NATO Alliance position, as expressed at the Reykjavik NAC meeting, on negotiations other than those currently underway in Geneva. We are strongly committed to Alliance maintenance of a robust, modern and survivable nuclear deterrent, and to the Alliance strategy of flexible response.

14. Does that mean you do not support Kohl's position on SNF?

A: Our position is as I have stated, and I have indicated how it relates to Alliance policy. It is our view that the position expressed today by the Chancellor on SNF is not fully in accord with the NATO policy enunciated at Reykjavik in June.

15. Are you concerned that the Soviets may ask reciprocal non-modernization restraint concerning NATO SNF?

A: I don't want to speculate on how the Soviets might respond.

ABF \_\_\_\_\_

August 25, 1987  
5:00 p.m.

TO: Grant Green  
Bill Courtney  
Bob Linhard  
Lint Brooks  
Don Mahley  
Sven Kraemer  
Bill Heiser  
Will Tobey  
Fritz Ermarth  
Rudy Perina  
Nelson Ledsky  
Roman Popadiuk  
~~Dave Matthews~~

FROM: Steve Steiner }

SUBJECT: Guidance on Washington Post Story on INF Verification -  
Final Version

As promised, attached are the interagency-cleared statement on  
INF made by State today, along with the Q/As.



## STATEMENT

August 25, 1987

Today at the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Geneva, the United States presented its views on verification of an INF treaty that provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles -- the so-called double global zero. The United States has long told the Soviets that an agreement to eliminate all INF missiles would make it possible to simplify the verification provisions of an INF accord. These new U.S. proposals reflect this belief.

The U.S. has not "softened" its INF verification inspection measures. Previous US verification proposals were predicated on the assumptions that the US and the Soviet Union would retain 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles and that modernization and production of such missiles and missile flight-testing would be permitted. Our new verification proposals are intended to deal with a different set of circumstances.

Specifically, these proposals are based on:

- o The elimination of all shorter-range INF missile systems within one year and the elimination of all longer-range INF missiles within three years; and
- o A ban on modernization, production and operational test flights of those missiles.

Based on agreement to those conditions, the key elements of our new verification proposals will include:


- o A detailed exchange of data, updated as necessary, on the location of missile support facilities, the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities and technical parameters of those missile systems;
- o Notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities;
- o A baseline inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at declared facilities;
- o On-site inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers;
- o Short-notice inspection of declared facilities until the missiles are eliminated to verify residual levels; and
- o Short-notice inspection of certain facilities in the US and USSR at which illegal missile activity is suspected.

The regime we seek will have the most stringent verification of any arms control agreement in history. The regime includes on-site inspection and challenge inspection of suspect sites. Effective verification of an INF agreement is essential to ensure that the agreement makes a lasting contribution to peace and stability. The U.S. verification proposals are an important step in this direction. However, much work remains to be done. The United States looks forward to serious discussions with the Soviets on these verification requirements.

Drafted:PM/SNP:DMozena  
8/25/87 Ext. 647-3861

Wang 9621C

Clearances:PM:RHarrison  
PM/TMP:JWalker  
EUR/RPM:MStorella  
S/ARN:MStafford  
S/ART:FShaheen  
ACDA:SRiveles  
OSD:BSymington  
JCS:MHearney  
NSC:SSteiner

A handwritten signature in black ink is written over the list of clearances. The signature is stylized and appears to be 'Wang'.

U.S. VIEWS ON INF VERIFICATION

Q. Why did the US change its suspect site inspection proposal?

A. -- THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ILLEGAL MISSILE ACTIVITIES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED WHEN AN ENTIRE CLASS OF MISSILES AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED.

Q. Why did the US drop its requirement for perimeter/portal monitoring?

A. -- THE PERIMETER/PORTAL MONITORING SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED TO MONITOR THE FLOW OF MISSILES FROM PRODUCTION AND FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITIES. WITH A PRODUCTION BAN AND THE ELIMINATION OF ALL INF MISSILES WITHIN THREE YEARS, IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY.

-- PERIMETER/PORTAL MONITORING IS PART OF OUR VERIFICATION REGIME IN START SINCE ALL STRATEGIC MISSILES WILL NOT BE ELIMINATED AND MODERNIZATION, PRODUCTION AND FLIGHT-TESTING WILL BE PERMITTED.

Q. Will the change in our suspect site inspection proposals in INF lead to a change in our challenge inspection proposals in CW?

A. -- WE ARE ENGAGED IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES AND PREFERRED OUTCOMES. THE VERIFICATION REGIMES IN EACH NEGOTIATION ARE DESIGNED TO PERMIT US TO VERIFY EFFECTIVELY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. PROVISIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR ONE AGREEMENT MAY BE UNNECESSARY FOR ANOTHER.

Q. According to press reports, various agencies within the USG had problems with the previous U.S. position on verification and that this is the real reasons why the U.S. is changing its position on verification. Can you comment on this?

A. -- I WOULD ONCE AGAIN STRESS THAT PREVIOUS US VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WERE PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RETAIN 100 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WARHEADS AND THAT MODERNIZATION, PRODUCTION AND MISSILE FLIGHT-TESTING WOULD BE PERMITTED. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED AN UPDATED VERIFICATION PACKAGE.

-- I ALSO WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN WORKED WITHIN THE USG COMMUNITY -- AS WELL AS WITH OUR ALLIES -- AND REPRESENT OUR BEST JUDGMENT AS TO HOW TO MEET OUR

VERIFICATION NEEDS AND LIMIT POTENTIAL RISKS TO U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY.

-- I ALSO WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR NEW VERIFICATION PROPOSALS ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT MUST BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE IF IT IS TO MAKE A LASTING CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- I WANT TO ADD THAT OUR NEW PROPOSALS - EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN SIMPLIFIED - REPRESENT THE MOST STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME OF ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN HISTORY AND STILL INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF SUSPECT SITES.

Drafted:PM/SNP:JBlackwell  
8/25/87 Ext. 647-3861 (Dan Mozena) Wang 9623C

*Mozena*

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S/ART:FShaheen  
ACDA:SRiveles  
OSD:SHorn  
JCS:MHearney *no response*  
NSC:SSteiner/DMahley

*dyfr*

INF Negotiations: Key Themes

WE'VE COME A LONG WAY . . .

The Soviet Union has now accepted US proposals in three key areas of the negotiations in Geneva on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). This Soviet movement is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to real arms reductions and Allied solidarity in support of these objectives.

o Longer-range INF Missiles (LRINF): Since formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, the United States has sought to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems. This was President Reagan's original "zero option" proposal. In July 1987 the Soviets finally agreed to eliminate these systems.

o Shorter-range INF Missiles (SRINF): Since the negotiations began, the U.S. has insisted that an INF agreement would need to constrain U.S. and Soviet shorter-range INF missiles at equal global levels to prevent circumvention of an accord on LRINF missiles by a Soviet buildup of the shorter-range systems. In June 1987 the U.S. presented in Geneva its proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles as an integral part of an INF agreement. In July the Soviets accepted this proposal.

o Reductions on a global basis: The U.S. has long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both categories of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, known as "global double zero."

. . . BUT WE STILL HAVE A WAY TO GO.

-- Fundamental and difficult issues remain, particularly verification. Verification is not just a technical issue; effective verification is essential to ensure that any agreement makes a lasting contribution to peace and stability.

-- Prior to Soviet acceptance of global double zero, we presented a serious verification proposal in Geneva and will soon put forward an updated, detailed verification regime now that the Soviets have accepted our double zero proposal. The U.S. is determined to resolve remaining issues; we hope the Soviets share this determination.

-- At the eleventh hour, the Soviets raised a new demand--that the long-standing US program of cooperation with the Federal Republic for West German Pershing IA missile systems be eliminated in connection with an INF agreement. This demand created an artificial obstacle to an agreement on eliminating US and Soviet INF missiles.



o The U.S. and our Allies have long held, and Chancellor Kohl reaffirmed in his statement of August 26, that the only subjects of US/Soviet negotiations are systems that belong to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This is a fundamental principle.

o We support the position on Pershing IAs taken by Chancellor Kohl, in which he laid out FRG conditions for not modernizing, and eventually dismantling, the Pershing IAs. These conditions include the actual elimination of all US and Soviet INF missiles under a verifiable US/Soviet agreement and in accordance with an agreed US/Soviet timetable.

-- It is time now for the Soviets to demonstrate whether their rhetorical position is backed by a serious commitment to an effectively verifiable agreement eliminating US and Soviet INF missiles.

-- It is important to note at the same time that INF is only part of the arms reduction agenda. President Reagan has long been seeking deep cuts in strategic offensive arms in the START negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets have accepted the US concept of 50% reductions and should apply themselves now to working out with us the other essential components of an agreement, such as sublimits on the most dangerous missiles. (See separate themes: on START.)

Footnote on Missile Ranges:

SRINF:	500 - 1000 kilometers (land-based)
LRINF:	1000 - 5500 kilometers (land-based)
Strategic arms:	5500 kilometers and above

START: Key Themes

-- Despite the attention currently focused on the INF negotiations, we should not overlook our continuing efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms, particularly those that are most destabilizing--ballistic missiles, especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).

-- The U.S. believes that such a treaty could be completed even this year, if the Soviets are willing to apply themselves with the same seriousness as the U.S.

-- As a concrete step toward this end, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. This draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last October at Reykjavik and provides for roughly fifty percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- The U.S. draft treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement. Among other things, it provides for:

-- U.S. and Soviet reductions to a maximum of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with no more than 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits, over a period of seven years, after the treaty enters into force;

-- Specific sublimits on fast-flying ballistic missiles, and particularly ICBMs, the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems of all;

-- A 50 percent cut in ballistic missiles throw-weight from the current Soviet level to a limit which would apply to both sides;

-- A ban on mobile ICBMs due to the serious verification problems they raise and their inherent suitability for reloading and refire; and

-- An extensive verification regime designed to ensure with the highest possible confidence that each side is complying with the agreement.

-- The U.S. has made every effort to facilitate a START agreement, including making important compromises on sublimits shortly after Reykjavik in order to meet Soviet concerns. The Soviets have not demonstrated similar flexibility.

-- The Soviet draft treaty text presented on July 31 is a welcome departure from previous Soviet practice of proposing only highly generalized documents containing basic principles. It is similar in structure to the U.S. draft text and contains some common language. This will facilitate preparation of a joint draft treaty text.

-- However, the Soviet draft offers no movement on the major outstanding issues, including sublimits on the most dangerous missile systems. In addition, it continues to hold hostage strategic offensive arms reductions to restrictions on strategic defense that would go beyond those limitations already in the ABM Treaty--a clear Soviet effort to kill or cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

-- The President has made clear that he cannot and will not accept measures which would kill or cripple SDI--a research and technology development program that holds great promise for enhancing the future security of the U.S. and its Allies and for ensuring a stable strategic balance over the long term.

-- Nonetheless, Soviet presentation of their treaty was a necessary step in the process of negotiating a START agreement. With the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties now on the table, the two sides can explore remaining differences and begin finally to develop a joint draft text which would facilitate negotiation of those differences.

-- The U.S. is doing its part to bring about, for the first time in history, real reductions in strategic offensive arms. It is necessary for the Soviets to demonstrate similar resolve and join with us to complete a strategic offensive arms reduction treaty rapidly.

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PRESS STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF  
PART III OF THE ABM TREATY STUDY

Today, the Administration is providing to the Senate a classified study of United States and Soviet practice under the ABM Treaty, and is releasing publicly an unclassified version of the report and its conclusions. This is the third and final study requested by the President on the legal aspects of the ABM Treaty. The other two studies, made available to the public in May, deal with the Treaty negotiating record and the Senate ratification proceedings.

The study being released today details the conduct, bilateral agreements, exchanges, and public statements of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union between 1972 and 1985 relating to future ABM systems. The study makes clear that the record of subsequent practice fails to establish a domestic or international legal obligation binding the United States to the restrictive interpretation.

As the President has said on many occasions, he will continue to consult with Congress and our allies before reaching any decision to restructure the SDI program. This study, and the prior studies issued, represent the Administration's intention to make our consultations meaningful and informed. At the same time, however, Congress is also obligated to weigh in good faith the full record of evidence concerning the ABM Treaty interpretation.

UNCLASSIFIED

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NSCS:  
D:JTIMBIE

IMMEDIATE ANATO, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE,  
TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE, SEOUL IMMEDIATE, NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY ALLDP, ALL P PRIORITY

PASS TO PAOS

DECL: OADR

PRM, SDI

CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC RELEASE OF STUDY OF  
ABM TREATY SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE

REF: STATE 145043

1. UNCLASSIFIED -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE ADMINISTRATION IS TODAY PROVIDING TO THE SENATE A CLASSIFIED STUDY OF U.S. AND SOVIET SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE UNDER THE ABM TREATY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER AND RELEASING PUBLICLY AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE REPORT AND ITS CONCLUSIONS. THIS IS THE THIRD, AND FINAL, STUDY REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABM TREATY; THE TWO OTHER STUDIES, ON THE THE TREATY NEGOTIATING RECORD AND SENATE RATIFICATION PROCESS, HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED. REFTEL PROVIDES SUMMARY AND

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TALKING POINTS ON THOSE STUDIES, WHICH POSTS SHOULD ALSO DRAW ON AS APPROPRIATE. THE CONCLUSION OF THIS STUDY IS THAT THE RECORD FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION BINDING ON THE US OR THE USSR TO FOLLOW THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW ON THE TALKING POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND THE QS AND AS IN PARAGRAPH 4 IN ALERTING MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL, THAT THIS MATERIAL WILL BE RELEASED. IN ALERTING MFA, ASSURE THEM CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE ON THE SDI PROGRAM PRIOR TO ANY PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON RESTRUCTURING THE PROGRAM. COPIES OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PART OF THIS STUDY WILL BE PROVIDED TO EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON AND POUCHED TO POSTS AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY

3. BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS ON ABM STUDY PROCESS:

-- THE ADMINISTRATION IS TODAY PROVIDING TO THE SENATE A CLASSIFIED STUDY OF U.S. AND SOVIET SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE UNDER THE ABM TREATY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER AND RELEASING PUBLICLY AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE REPORT AND ITS CONCLUSIONS. THIS IS THE THIRD, AND FINAL, STUDY REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABM TREATY; THE TWO OTHER STUDIES, ON THE THE TREATY NEGOTIATING RECORD AND SENATE RATIFICATION PROCESS, HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED.

-- THE SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE STUDY DETAILS THE CONDUCT, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, EXCHANGES, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF BOTH PARTIES RELATING TO SYSTEMS BASED ON "OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES" (OPP) BETWEEN 1972 AND 1985. WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF U.S. CONDUCT EXISTS, EVIDENCE OF SOVIET CONDUCT AND INTERNAL POSITIONS IS LARGELY UNAVAILABLE.

-- THE STUDY MAKES CLEAR THAT, SUBSEQUENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND THROUGHOUT THE 1970'S AND UP TO 1985, THERE WERE THOSE WITHIN THE USG WHO ARGUED STRENUOUSLY AGAINST THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ACCEPTED SUCH RESTRICTIONS, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT REQUIRED BY THE TREATY.

-- AT NO TIME DURING THE 1970'S DID THE SOVIETS ASSERT THAT THE TREATY BANNED DEVELOPMENT OR TESTING OF MOBILE SYSTEMS DESCRIBED IN THE TREATY AS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES ("OPP"). IN A NUMBER OF EXCHANGES, THEY EMPHASIZED THE VIEW THAT THE TREATY REGULATED TRADITIONAL ABM COMPONENTS (I.E., ABM INTERCEPTORS,

LAUNCHERS, AND RADARS} EXCLUSIVELY.

-- ALTHOUGH BETWEEN 1978 AND 1985, HOWEVER, THE USG DID COMMUNICATE TO CONGRESS AND THE SOVIET UNION A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH ACCEPTED THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION, E.G. FY 1979 AND SOME SUBSEQUENT ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, THESE STATEMENTS WERE MADE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A RIGOROUS STUDY OF THE ISSUE.

-- THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINUED TO ADHERE IN PRACTICE TO THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON SDI IN MARCH 1983.

-- THE SAME ANNOUNCEMENT CAUSED A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN SOVIET ATTENTION.

-- SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SDI PROGRAM IN 1983, THE SOVIETS HAVE RESORTED TO A VARIETY OF OTHER FORMULATIONS TO IMPLY THAT U.S. ACTIONS HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY IN THEIR EFFORTS TO KILL OR CRIPPLE THE SDI PROGRAM. SOVIET PROPOSALS SUCH AS THAT MADE AT REYKJAVIK TO "STRENGTHEN" THE ABM TREATY THROUGH A BAN ON "SPACE STRIKE" WEAPONS ARE DESIGNED TO IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE MORE CONSTRAINING THAN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. SOVIETS HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION, AND THEIR RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK IS A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY.

-- THE CONCLUSIONS OF THIS PART OF THE STUDY ARE:

-- THE RECORD OF SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES FROM 1972 TO 1985 FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION BINDING ON THE U.S. TO FOLLOW THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION.

-- AT NO TIME DID THE U.S. AND SOVIET VIEWS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY TO OPP SYSTEMS COINCIDE.

-- THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT, WHILE THERE WERE PERIODS WHEN BOTH PARTIES WOULD HAVE PROHIBITED THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE OPP FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONSISTENT OR CONCLUSIVE PATTERN OF MUTUAL STATEMENTS OR ACTIONS WHICH WOULD EVIDENCE ANY COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF ABOUT HOW TO TREAT SUCH SYSTEMS.

-- NOTHING IN THE RECORD OF SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE BINDS THE PRESIDENT AS A MATTER OF DOMESTIC LAW TO THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION.

-- SOME EXECUTIVE BRANCH STATEMENTS TO CONGRESS BETWEEN 1978 AND 1985 ACCEPTED THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. THE PRESIDENT IS REQUIRED TO WEIGH SUCH REPRESENTATIONS IN MAKING HIS DECISION, AND THEY ARE ONE REASON THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO INVOLVE CONGRESS FULLY IN CONSULTATIONS CONCERNING PLANS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE SDI PROGRAM.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, CONGRESS IS ALSO CONSTITUTIONALLY OBLIGATED, IN EXERCISING ITS POWERS, TO WEIGH IN GOOD FAITH THE FULL RECORD OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, THE RATIFICATION PROCESS, AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, AND TO DEFER TO REASONABLE EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF TREATIES.

-- THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, THE RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS, OR SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES TO CONCLUDE THAT, AS A MATTER OF DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES IS BOUND TO THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION.

-- A SUMMARY OF ALL THREE OF THESE STUDIES IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS, THE ALLIES, AND THE PUBLIC.

-- THE PRESIDENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO CONTINUING OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND OUR ALLIES BEFORE REACHING A FINAL DECISION WITH REGARD TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE SDI PROGRAM.

#### 4. Q5 AND A5

Q1. HAS THE PRESIDENT MADE A DECISION TO RESTRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAM?

A1. NO, THE PRESIDENT HAS ONLY NOW RECEIVED ALL THE STUDIES ON RESTRUCTURING OF THE SDI PROGRAM WHICH HE REQUESTED IN FEBRUARY. NO DECISION WILL BE MADE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW ALL OF THE STUDIES IN DETAIL AND TO CONSULT WITH CONGRESS AND THE ALLIES.

Q2. SENATOR NUNN ARGUES THAT THE ABM TREATY WAS RATIFIED BY THE SENATE IN 1972 BASED ON THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. HOW DOES THE ADMINISTRATION ANSWER SENATOR NUNN ON THIS POINT?

A2. AS PART II OF JUDGE SOFAER'S STUDY CONCLUDED, THE SENATE RATIFICATION RECORD FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE



SENATE'S CONSENT TO RATIFICATION WAS BASED ON A GENERALLY HELD UNDERSTANDING OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION -- NAMELY THAT THE TREATY PROHIBITED THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF MOBILE OPP DEVICES. AS WE HAVE NOTED, HOWEVER, WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH CONGRESS AND OUR ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE MAKING A DECISION TO RESTRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAM.

Q3. THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE CONSIDERING LEGISLATION THAT WOULD BIND THE UNITED STATES TO THE NARROW INTERPRETATION? DOES THE PRESIDENT STILL INTEND TO VETO SUCH LEGISLATION IF PASSED?

A3. ATTEMPTING TO LEGISLATE US ADHERENCE TO THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY RAISES SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES IN MAKING AND INTERPRETING TREATIES. IF ENACTED, THIS WOULD UNILATERALLY RESTRICT THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM, WHILE LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION'S EXTENSIVE PROGRAM IN STRATEGIC DEFENSES FREE FROM SUCH CONSTRAINTS, AND WOULD UNDERMINE OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA. IT WOULD ALSO DENY THE US THE OPTION TO RESTRUCTURE THE PROGRAM TO BE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS COSTLY AND CAPABLE OF PROVIDING IMPROVED RESULTS MUCH SOONER. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT IF HE IS CONFRONTED WITH LEGISLATION CONTAINING SUCH AMENDMENTS, HE WILL EXERCISE HIS POWER OF VETO.

Q4. WHAT IS THE IMPACT ON THE SDI PROGRAM OF REMAINING WITHIN THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY?

A4. AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER HAS STATED, MOVING TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WOULD REDUCE COSTS SIGNIFICANTLY AND ALLOW FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY IN THE PROGRAM. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTIMATES THAT IT WOULD SAVE TWO YEARS IN THE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND AT LEAST THREE BILLION DOLLARS IN ESTABLISHING THE FEASIBILITY OF AN INITIAL DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. 444

## TALKING POINTS

-- The Administration is today providing to the Senate a classified study of U.S. and Soviet subsequent practice under the ABM Treaty prepared by the Department of State Legal Adviser and releasing publicly an unclassified version of the report and its conclusions. This is the third, and final, study requested by the President on legal aspects of the ABM Treaty; the two other studies, on the the Treaty negotiating record and Senate ratification process, have already been completed.

-- The Subsequent Practice Study details the conduct, bilateral agreements, exchanges, and public statements of both parties relating to systems based on "other physical principles" [OPP] between 1972 and 1985. While substantial evidence of U.S. conduct exists, evidence of Soviet conduct and internal positions is largely unavailable.

-- The study makes clear that, subsequent to the ratification of the ABM Treaty and throughout the 1970's and up to 1985, there were those within the USG who argued strenuously against the restrictive interpretation of the Treaty, pointing out that the Soviets had not accepted such restrictions, and that they were not required by the Treaty.

-- At no time during the 1970's did the Soviets assert that the Treaty banned development or testing of mobile systems described in the Treaty as based on other physical principles ["OPP"]. In a number of exchanges, they emphasized the view that the treaty regulated traditional ABM components [i.e., ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars] exclusively.

-- Although between 1978 and 1985, however, the USG did communicate to Congress and the Soviet Union a number of public statements which accepted the restrictive interpretation, e.g. FY 1979 and some subsequent Arms Control Impact statements, these statements were made without benefit of a rigorous study of the issue.

-- The Executive Branch continued to adhere in practice to the restrictive interpretation after the President's speech on SDI in March 1983.

-- The same announcement caused a dramatic increase in Soviet attention.

-- Since the announcement of the SDI program in 1983, the Soviets have resorted to a variety of other formulations to imply that U.S. actions have been inconsistent with the ABM Treaty in their efforts to kill or cripple the SDI program. Soviet proposals such as that made at Reykjavik to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty through a ban on "space strike" weapons are designed to impose obligations that are more constraining than the restrictive interpretation. Soviets have not specifically endorsed the restrictive interpretation, and their radar at Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the Treaty.

-- The Conclusions of this part of the study are:

-- The record of subsequent practice of the parties from 1972 to 1985 fails to establish an international legal obligation binding on the U.S. to follow the restrictive interpretation.

-- At no time did the U.S. and Soviet views on the application of the Treaty to OPP systems coincide.

-- The record demonstrates that, while there were periods when both parties would have prohibited the development, testing or deployment of mobile OPP for different reasons, there was never any consistent or conclusive pattern of mutual statements or actions which would evidence any common understanding of how to treat such systems.

-- Nothing in the record of subsequent practice binds the President as a matter of domestic law to the restrictive interpretation.

-- Some Executive Branch statements to Congress between 1978 and 1985 accepted the narrow interpretation. The President is required to weigh such representations in making his decision, and they are one reason that the President has undertaken to involve Congress fully in consultations concerning plans for the structure of the SDI program.

-- At the same time, Congress is also constitutionally obligated, in exercising its powers, to weigh in good faith the full record of evidence concerning the negotiating record, the ratification process, and subsequent practice, and to defer to reasonable Executive interpretations of treaties.

-- There is no basis in the negotiating record, the ratification proceedings, or subsequent practice of the parties to conclude that, as a matter of domestic or international law, the Soviet Union or the United States is bound to the restrictive interpretation.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. WILLIAM M. MATZ  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

RADM JOSEPH C. STRASSER  
Office of the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. WILLIAM R. STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR  
Executive Secretary  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Themes on Defense and Space

I am attaching interagency-cleared themes on the Defense and Space forum of the Geneva NST negotiations, which we would appreciate your making available for the use of your Principal Officers, Spokespersons and senior arms control officials. These new themes complement those on START and INF, which I circulated by memorandum of August 27.

Grant S. Green, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Defense and Space Themes

September 27, 1981

## Defense and Space Talks: Key Themes

-- U.S. seeks a more secure and stable world - one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against offensive ballistic missiles.

-- In our ongoing research into strategic defense [Strategic Defense Initiative - SDI], the U.S. is seeking to establish the feasibility of comprehensive defenses protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

-- At the D&S Talks we have endeavored to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offense and defense. We are also seeking to discuss how, if we establish the feasibility of effective defenses, the U.S. and USSR could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons. We are also expressing our concerns about Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

-- In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviets in D&S, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals. Our most recent proposal in the D&S Talks includes the following elements:

- o A mutual U.S./Soviet commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses.

- o During this period the U.S. and USSR would observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

- o This commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive arms over seven years from entry into force of a START agreement.

- o Either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chooses, unless the parties agree otherwise.

-- In response to expressed Soviet concerns, the U.S. has also offered proposals to enhance confidence and predictability regarding each side's exploration of advanced strategic defense technologies.

-- Our proposals in this regard include annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on our respective strategic defense programs and reciprocal visits to laboratories conducting SDI research, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

-- On the other hand, the objective of Soviet proposals in D&S Talks has been to kill or cripple the U.S. SDI program. The U.S. cannot -- and will not -- accept any measures which would cripple the SDI program, which is being conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and which is so important to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, as well as to ensuring a safe strategic balance over the long term.

-- Despite their rhetoric, the Soviets have been deeply involved for years in extensive programs in strategic defense, investigating many of the same technologies as SDI. In addition, the Soviets have deployed -- and are currently upgrading -- ABM defenses around Moscow. These are the world's only ABM deployments. Also, the Soviets are violating the ABM Treaty by construction of a large, phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. The West simply cannot afford to leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly in strategic defense, as this would undercut the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which keeps the peace.

-- The Soviets have proposed changes to the ABM Treaty which they claim would "strengthen" it. This is clearly an effort to amend the ABM Treaty, making it more restrictive than the provisions to which the Soviets agreed in 1972. Changing the Treaty won't strengthen it; Soviet compliance with it will.

-- Both sides must fulfill the premise and promise of the Treaty. In 1972 when we signed the Treaty, we agreed that the restrictions it placed on defense were premised on the necessity of achieving significant reductions in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals. Fifteen years have now passed, and the Soviets still have not agreed to offensive reductions. It is time to get on with those reductions without additional conditions.

-- The Soviets have recently presented a draft D&S treaty text. While their draft contains new details, it does not make any substantive changes in the Soviet position -- the Soviets remain intent on crippling SDI.

-- The basic outline for a treaty to reduce strategic offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent to equal U.S./Soviet levels has already been agreed to by the U.S. and the USSR. We believe that a treaty could be concluded in short order if the Soviets dropped their artificial linkage of strategic arms reductions to SDI and were willing to negotiate seriously on the remaining issues, such as the need for sublimits on the most dangerous weapons -- especially fast flying intercontinental ballistic missiles.