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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1986

Dear Mr. Takamine:


I enjoyed meeting you in California and was glad we had an opportunity to talk.

I appreciate the position paper you gave me on H.R. 442. I have spoken with Jim Miller, Director, Office of Management and Budget about this subject and made him aware of the political sensitivity within the Asian community.

We will be researching this situation further in the days ahead, and I will monitor any developments with your viewpoint in mind.

Thanks again for bringing this matter to my attention. Please keep in touch and let me know whenever I can be of further assistance.

Best Wishes,



Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for Political and Intergovernmental Affairs

Mr. Gene Takamine
Takamine, Huang, and Gutierrez
Suite 302
701 South Atlantic Boulevard
Monterey Park, California 91754

Mrs. Toshi Yamamoto
253 South Gerhart Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90022

March 29, 1986

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President Of The United States
The Western White House
Santa Barbara, California

Dear Mr. President:

You have many many firsts in your illustrious career from the days as Mr. Ronald Reagan, the Governor and the President. Thru it all your sincerity and compassion for others have come thru vivid and clear.

As my 17 years service with State of California comes to a close I wish to thank you again for my appointment in October 1967 as the first Woman Examiner to the Board of Barber Examiners 47 years history. I thank you for the oppertubity to have served the people of California.

The appointment have enabled me to increase my political committment through the years to the Republican Party, for which I am grateful to you Mr. President.

Majority '86 has been my top priority this election year as we must give you a good Republican majority in the Senate and to that end I am deeply involved and committed. My feelings are the new Asian votes will determine the close races and of course go Republican all the way.

I have just been informed by the Volunteer Legislative Strategist of The Japanese American Citizens League - Legislative Education Committee Grant Ujifusa*that:

1. The Justice Department has a negative view and is opposing the HB 422 (Enclosed please find Fact Sheet on HB 442)
2. The Justice Department Position Paper has gone to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance.
3. Justice Department will be represented at the Committee Hearing April 28, 1986.

Grant Ujifusa is Co-Author with Michael Barone of
The Almanac Of American Politics 1986

I was one of those 120,000 internees who had to evacuate though born and raised in Seattle, Washington and never left the United States during my life. I volunteered to be one of the early contingent to Manzanar, California.


Mr. President in respect to those who fought in the 442 Regiment their relatives and family, and thousands who lost their business, homes and other properties I HUMBLY REQUEST the Administration lay aside its opposition and the negative view and take a NEUTRAL STAND AND NOT OPPOSE HB 442 .

For those of us who have been life long Republicans involved in the Republican Party all our adult lives sees the Justice Department views as most heart breaking, and unbelievable. I want to believe that you are unaware of the HB 422 and the Justice Department negative view is not that of you Mr. President.

I strongly request Mr. President for political reason take a neutral stand and do not oppose HB 442
Please don't judge this Bill on the money but on its merit at this time.

In closing I thank you and Mrs. Reagan for the invitation to The President and Mrs. Reagan's Dinner in Washington May 21 st.
I shall be there with thousand of others.

Yours truly,



Member Citizens for the Republic
Member California Republican State Committee
Patron California Republican Building Fund
Charter Member Presidential Task Force
Member Republican Senatorial Inner Circle
Charter Member Majority '86 Senatorial Committee
Vice Chrmn California Unity Fund
Republican Federated Member 30 years

Mrs. Toshi Yamamoto

253 South Gerhart Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90022

March 29, 1986

The Honorable Donald T. Regan
The White House Chief Of Staff
Western White House
Santa Barbara, California

Dear Mr. Regan:

It was my privilege to meet you at the Dinner Honoring you by the Citizen For The Republic in November 1985 and I am again honored and privileged to receive the invitation for Monday's luncheon.

I have just been informed by Volunteer Legislative Strategist Grant Ujifusa (the co-author with Michael Barone of The Almanac Of American Politics 1986) on a most important matter. Grant is with the Japanese American Citizens League - Legislative Education Committee on Redress . I serve on the Southern California Committee and work closely with him. I was told that:

1. The Justice Department has a negative view and is opposing HB 442 (Enclosed please find Fact Sheet on Hb 442.)
2. The Justice Department Position Paper has gone to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance.
3. The Justice Department will be represented at the Committee Hearing on April 28, 1986.

I have written to the President and would appreciate your forwarding the letter to him.

As the political participation has increased in recent years it is my belief that the Asian communities can be the deciding factor in the coming elections, and the accomplishment would be horrendous for the Republican Party. This can be accomplished if the Justice Department would lay aside their negative views and not oppose the HB 442.

Those of us with the Republican Party for decades and decades strongly recommend that the Administration take a NEUTRAL STAND on HB 442 and not oppose the Bill. For political reason it must be a neutral stand.

The Justice Department's view is the most heart breaking and unbelievable for us at this time. As my letter to the President states I want to believe that he was unaware of the negative view and the opposition of the Justice Department on HB 442.

In respect to those who served in the 442 Regiment, their relatives, thousands who were interned and lost their homes, properties and business a Neutral Stand by the Administration would be the acceptable concerning this Bill.

Your attention on the matter is greatly appreciated.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Tom Sawyer". The signature is written in dark ink and has a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Member-Citizens For The Republic
Member-California Republican State Committee
Patron-California Republican Building Fund
Charter Member-Presidential Task Force
Member-Republican Senatorial Inner Circle
Charter Member-Majority'86 Senatorial Committee
Vice Chairman California Unity Fund
Member Republican Federated Women 30 years.

To: Honorable Donald Regan, Chief of Staff
The White House, United States of America
From: Gene L. Takamine, Esq. and Grant Ujifusa

In Re: HR 442--Redress Bill for Japanese Americans

POSITION PAPER

It has recently come to light that the Justice Department has issued a position paper on House of Representatives Bill HR442. In recommending opposition to the Bill, the Justice Department will attend a committee hearing on the bill in the House that is to take place on April 28, 1986 and present this position. This will in effect put the White House on record as opposing the bill.

We as members of the Japanese American Community and as members of the Republican Party request that Justice Department be made to lay aside its position paper and intent to testify at the hearing.

The position taken by the Justice Department shows a complete lack of sensitivity to the Japanese American Community specifically and to all Asian Americans as a whole. The issue of the internment of Japanese American Citizens into Concentration style camps is an overwhelming case on its merits and is a black mark on the history of the United States.

In an election year where the Republican party has long tried to cultivate political support in the Asian Community, this stand will give the wrong signal. When the growing Asian Republican support in California can mean a crucial balance of power in the west, this position will only tell Asians whose basic values are Republican such as hard work, entrepreneurial effort, family and pro business that the Republican Administration would repay their support with insensitivity. Why open Pandora's box? The Japanese Citizens League has 20,000 California members alone. Why alienate a group so carefully cultivated by the party by a position that is not necessary at this time?

The person at Justice Department in charge is Richard Willard, the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division.

We only ask that the White House not take a position and leave resolution of the matter to a full airing of the facts and a fair debate at the proper time.

Gene L. Takamine, Esq.
Treasurer of Japanese American
Americans Citizens League

Grant Ujifusa
Legislative Strategist

Copy: Edward Meese, Attorney General
Robert Dole, Senator of United States of America



**JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE
LEGISLATIVE EDUCATION COMMITTEE**

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 1730 RHODE ISLAND AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20036 (202) 223-1240
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94115

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.R. 442 & S. 1053

H.R. 442: "Civil Liberties Act of 1985"

Introduced: January 3, 1985

Prime Sponsor: House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX)

Co-Sponsors: Introduced with 99 co-sponsors
As of 2/12/86: 121 co-sponsors (D: 106, R: 15)

Committee Referral: March 6, 1985 to Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Chair: Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS)

Members: Barney Frank (D-MA)*
George Crockett (D-MI)*
Howard Berman (D-CA)*
Frederick Boucher (D-VA)*
Harley Staggers (D-WV)
Thomas Kindness (R-OH)
Hank Brown (R-CO)
Patrick Swindall (R-GA)
Howard Coble (R-NC)

S. 1053: "To Accept the Findings and Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians."

Introduced: May 2, 1985

Prime Sponsor: Sen. Spark Matsunaga (D-HI)


Co-Sponsors: Introduced with 25 co-sponsors
As of 2/12/86: 28 co-sponsors

Committee Referral: May 1985 to Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office and General Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

Chair: Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)*

Members: Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD)
David Durenberger (R-MN)
Albert Gore (D-TX)
Carl Levin (D-MI)*

* Co-sponsors



JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE LEGISLATIVE EDUCATION COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 1730 RHODE ISLAND AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20036 (202) 223-1240
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94115

ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS FOR REDRESS

The following is a list of major endorsements for JACL's legislative campaign for redress. "Endorsement" often denotes organizational support for the recommendations made by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, including individual monetary compensation for former internees. The term may also mean that an organization has acknowledged the injustice of the internment, but has not addressed the question of redress.

CITIES

City of Cambridge (MA)
El Cerrito (CA) City Council
Chicago City Council
Marina City Council
Orinda-Lafayette-Moraga Council for Civic Unity
Orinda-Moraga Democratic Club
National League of Cities
New York City Council
Philadelphia City Council
Portland City Council
Richmond (CA) City Council
Sacramento City Council members
Salinas City Council
Seaside City Council
Seattle City Council
Watsonville City Council
U.S. Conference of Mayors

COUNTIES

Contra Costa County Supervisors
King County (Wash.) Democratic Central Committee
Placer County supervisors
Marin County Human Rights Assn.
Marin County Human Rights Assn.
Monterey (CA) Board of Supervisors
Multnomah (Ore.) County Commissioners
Sacramento County Supervisors
San Francisco City and County Supervisors
San Mateo Supervisors
Santa Clara County Supervisors
Santa Cruz (CA) Board of Supervisors

COUNTIES (cont.)

Ventura County Supervisors

STATES

California State Legislature
Hawaii House of Representatives
Minnesota State Legislature
New Jersey General assembly
New York State Assembly
New York State Senate
Oregon State Legislature
Oregon State Democratic Party
Washington State Democratic Central Committee
State of Wisconsin
Western Governors Conference

U.S.

Congressional Black Caucus
Republican Party Platform
Democratic Party Platform

CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS

Salinas Bonsai Club
Satsuma Bonsai Club

ETHNIC/CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
ACLU, Monterey County
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress, Executive Committee of N. Cal. Division
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
Chinese American Service League

Organization Endorsements for Redress, page 2.

ETHNIC/CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS (cont)

Jewish Community Relations
Council of the Greater Eastern
Bay
Jewish Community Relations
Council of Greater Philadelphia
Jewish Federation of Greater
Seattle, Community Relations
Council
League of Women Voters, Salinas
National Council of La Raza
Office of Hawaiian Affairs
Pan American Nikkei Assn.
Urban League, Portland
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
state advisory chairs

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AFL-CIO Executive Council
California Labor Federation,
executive council, AFL-CIO
International Longshoremen's
and Warehouse Union
ILWU, Calif. Auxiliary
Office and Professional
Employees, Local 29, AFL-CIO
Service Employees International
Union, Local 87 AFL-CIO

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

American Bar Association
American Federation of Teachers
American Orthopsychiatric Assn.
American Psychiatric Assn.
Assn. of Asian American Educators
California Teachers Assn., State
council
National Assn. of Social Workers
Minority Issues Conference
National Education Association
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers
State Bar of California
Conference of Delegates

VETERANS GROUPS

American Legion, Chicago Nisei
Post 1183
American Legion, 6th Dist. Council

VETERANS GROUPS (cont.)

American Legion, Dept. of Illinois
American Legion, 66th Nat'l Convention
Jewish War Veterans of the USA
34th Infantry Division U.S.A.
34th Infantry Division Assn.,
Chicago Chapter
503rd Parachute RCT Assoc. (WWII)
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Americanism
Committee, Dept. of Calif. 64th
Annual Convention
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dept.
of Calif.
Veterans of Foreign Wars, 85th
National Convention, submitted
by Depts. of Calif., Hawaii, Ohio
and Oregon
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dept. of
North Dakota

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

American Baptist Churches, U.S.A.
Buddhist Churches of America
Buddhist Temple of Salinas
Church of Brethren, general board
Congregation of Nevah Shalom
Disciples of Christ, general board
Episcopal Church, executive council
Episcopal Asiamerica Strategies
Task Force, Bay Area Convocation
Immanuel Lutheran Church Society
Japanese Presbyterian Conference
Lincoln Ave. Presbyterian Church
Lutheran Church in America, Com-
mittee of Reference and Counsel
Parkview Presbyterian Church
Presbyterian Church of U.S.A.,
1984 general assembly
Presbytery of the Cascades
Religious Society of Friends, San
Francisco
Trinity Episcopal Church, rector,
wardens & vestry
United Methodist Church, Pacific
and Southwest Conference
United Methodist Church, Board of
Church and Society
United Methodist Church, 1980
general conference

Organizational Endorsements for Redress, page 3.


RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (cont.)
United Methodist Church, U.S.A.,
 general assembly
Diocese of California
Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon
United Church of Christ, 14th
 General Synod

Kindly send any additional resolutions to JACL-LEC; 1730
Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Suite 204; Washington, D.C. 20036.

REDRESS!

THE AMERICAN PROMISE

必勝






REDRESS!

THE AMERICAN PROMISE



Legislative Education Committee
Pacific Southwest District Council
Japanese American Citizens League
Los Angeles, California

Donation: \$3.00 per copy



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1986
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THE AMERICAN PROMISE

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

In this Bicentennial Year, we are commemorating the anniversary dates of many of the great events in American history. An honest reckoning, however, must include a recognition of our national mistakes as well as our national achievements. Learning from our mistakes is not pleasant, but as a great philosopher once admonished, we must do so if we want to avoid repeating them.

February 19th is the anniversary of a sad day in American history. It was on that date in 1942, in the midst of the response to the hostilities that began on December 7, 1941, that Executive Order No. 9066 was issued, subsequently enforced by the criminal penalties of a statute enacted March 21, 1942, resulting in the uprooting of loyal Americans. Over one hundred thousand persons of Japanese ancestry were removed from their homes, detained in special camps, and eventually relocated.

The tremendous effort by the War Relocation Authority and concerned Americans for the welfare of these Japanese-Americans may add perspective to that story, but it does not erase the setback to fundamental American principles. Fortunately, the Japanese-American community in Hawaii was spared the indignities suffered by those on our mainland.


We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the battlefield and at home, Japanese-Americans—names like Hamada, Mitsumori, Marimoto, Noguchi, Yamasaki, Kido, Munemori and Miyamura—have been and continue to be written in our history for the sacrifices and the contributions they have made to the well-being and security of this, our common Nation.

The Executive order that was issued on February 19, 1942, was for the sole purpose of prosecuting the war with the Axis Powers, and ceased to be effective with the end of those hostilities. Because there was no formal statement of its termination, however, there is concern among many Japanese-Americans that there may yet be some life in that obsolete document. I think it appropriate, in this our Bicentennial Year, to remove all doubt on that matter, and to make clear our commitment in the future.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim that all the authority conferred by Executive Order No. 9066 terminated upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 2714, which formally proclaimed the cessation of the hostilities of World War II on December 31, 1946.

I call upon the American people to affirm with me this American Promise—that we have learned from the tragedy of that long-ago experience forever to treasure liberty and justice for each individual American, and resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of February in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundredth.





THE CASE FOR REDRESS

This is a story of a tragic injustice incurred upon a group of people. It is a story of the government of the United States, urged on by men of prejudice, ignoring the Constitution of the nation and the Bill of Rights, ordering the mass removal of these people from the West Coast into detention camps during World War II. All accomplished without due process of law.

This is also a story about these people who were forcibly removed—the Japanese Americans. And their quest to right this wrong.

It is a case for redress.

To fully understand the Japanese American's quest for redress, it is important to know the history of the people. To say that more than 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were forcibly removed from the West Coast and imprisoned in detention camps scattered among the Western states of the nation would, by itself, justify the call for redress by the victims. But the story of the removal and detention is not complete without a historical review of the ebb and flow of events and forces which buffeted these people for a half-century and which finally led to the tragic removal and detention of the Japanese Americans and resident Japanese aliens in 1942.

The story of the Japanese in the United States is also a part of the history of the United States. In fact, the Japanese immigrants during the first half of this century played an important role in the growth and development of the West Coast. But coupled with this was the history of anti-Japanese agitation and legislation which flour-

ished among the West Coast states during the same period.

Amazingly, the exclusion, removal and detention of the 120,000 Japanese Americans and resident Japanese aliens during the early days of World War II were accomplished by the government of the United States despite the fact that not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by those incarcerated. On the other hand, there was no mass removal and detention of American citizens of German and Italian descent.

Race prejudice? Of course. Deprived of the right to life, liberty, property and due process of law? Absolutely.

Why petition our government to redress the grievances of the Japanese Americans for those losses caused by the exclusion, removal and detention? Because the government, including Congress and the Supreme Court, failed to uphold the basic premise on which this nation was founded—a democracy whose foundation is the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

This is why redress is not a Japanese American issue. It is an American issue.

"It is immoral to turn our faces away from protecting the foundations of our great democracy so that no other group of men will ever take our laws lightly and make decisions on government action based on ancestry. Redress is morally right and just," said Grayce Uyehara, the executive director of the Japanese American Citizen League's Education Committee.

Amen!



Shortage of workers in railroad, lumber and farm industries of Far West created demand for laborers from Japan.

THE ROOT CAUSES

IMPORTED AS LABORERS, THEY BECAME FARMERS, SHOP OWNERS

On June 19, 1868, a British vessel arrived in Honolulu with 149 Japanese aboard. They were not immigrants, but contract laborers and were the first major group of people to land in Hawaii from Japan.

Hawaii was by then a major supplier of sugar to the United States, and the sugar plantations were looking for cheap labor. More important, it was the beginning of the history of the Japanese in the United States.

The initial group which landed in Hawaii was recruited illegally by the plantations, because Japan prohibited laborers from leaving the nation. Eventually, the United States pressured Japan to allow laborers to emigrate in 1884, as the agricultural and lumber industries of the Western states were facing labor shortages.

By 1900, there were 24,000 Japanese working on the West Coast farms, forests and railroads. They represented the largest non-white ethnic group on the West Coast.

Since a large percentage of the immigrants came from rural areas of Japan, many of the workers left the railroads, sawmills, farms and the canneries after saving enough money to lease or purchase land and began farming.

They reclaimed unwanted land and developed it into rich agricultural areas. They began to outproduce the white farmers in California and began to alarm the farmers and labor unions.

In 1907, the United States, under pressure from California, signed a so-called Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan which barred immigration of laborers from Japan. This did not satisfy a

growing anti-Japanese movement.

In the meantime, thousands of Japanese women were arriving from Japan to join their husbands, or to marry men already here.

As families were started and children were born, the Japanese communities up and down the coast began to stabilize. Although forced to live in ghettoized areas, many opened small stores and shops in cities and towns to serve the farmers. Many of the children attended segregated schools or classes.

They were discriminated against in employment, forced to live in segregated areas, denied public accommodations, and in general, faced constant attacks from newspapers, politicians and organizations.

By 1909, about half of the Japanese population were working on the farms and three-quarters of the farm workers were in California.

The increasing success of the Japanese farmers was met with more hysterical outbursts by the anti-Japanese element. Organized groups began to clamor for more controls to hamper the Japanese competition, and they were joined by the politicians and newspapers, who took up the anti-Japanese chant.

Mob violence, including arson and forcible expulsion from farming areas, began to occur with increasing frequency as the media beat the drums and the politicians spewed anti-Japanese rhetoric.

In 1913, California passed the Alien Land Law, which prevented Asians from owning land.



Earning a living was tough enough, but ethnic Japanese faced many other barriers of discrimination (Hollywood-1920).

IT TOOK 162 YEARS TO REMOVE RACE AS BAR FOR CITIZENSHIP

In 1790, Congress passed a law which restricted eligibility for naturalization to aliens who were "free white persons." The purpose of the law at that time was to prevent Negroes who had been brought in as slaves from becoming citizens. In 1870, however, after the end of the Civil War, it was amended to allow "persons of African nativity and descent" to become citizens.

Prevented from naturalization were Filipinos, who were considered "brown" and aliens from Japan, China, Korea and other Far East nations who were considered "yellow." The infamous alien land laws passed by many Western states in the early '20s preventing Asian aliens from owning land used the ineligibility of citizenship as the basis for their racial laws.

In 1943, as a gesture of friendship to China, who were allies during World War II, the Chinese were granted naturalization. Three years later, the Filipinos were off the black list.

It was not until 1952, when the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act was passed that the Japanese alien residents were able to become citizens. The 1952 Act not only eliminated race as a bar to naturalization, but also repealed the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924, which had barred immigration from Far East nations.

In 1920, a stricter and tougher Alien Land Law was passed.

Under tremendous pressure from the West Coast states, Congress knuckled under the passed the blockbuster 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act. Primarily aimed at the Japanese, the law halted immigration of Asians from other Far East nations. It was a national insult to Japan, since it was the United States which had originally insisted on Japanese immigration in 1884.

In spite of these discriminatory setbacks, the Japanese doggedly pushed on. In many cities and towns, they built temples and churches, which were also used as community centers. Their children were admonished not only to behave in schools, but to make sure that they achieved their "A's."

Unable to become citizens, they worked to create exemplary communities up and down the coast, particularly as far as public records were concerned. They generally took care of their own problems so that the public records showed that the Japanese had hardly a person on the public welfare list or police blotters.

Due to the constant threat of the anti-Japanese factions, the application of a rigid community code of conduct was applied to the individual, the family, and finally, the community. This code of conduct was a form of security for the harassed Japanese. They thought that by keeping out of trouble, trouble would keep away from them.

But they never counted on war between the United States and Japan.



Aboard the President Wilson liner, men leave for Japan to bring back wives or find brides before Oriental Exclusion Act becomes law in 1924.



Starting out as hired hands, many saved money to become farmers and contributed to growth of West Coast's agricultural industry.

ALIEN LAND LAW WAS POPULAR IN MANY STATES

In order to drive the Japanese farmers out of business, the anti-Japanese faction came up with the ploy to deny the farmers the right to own land because they were ineligible for citizenship. Called the Alien Land Law, it was passed by the state legislators of California with only a few dissenting votes in 1913.

Not satisfied with the 1913 version due to some loopholes, the state placed an initiative on the ballot in 1920 with stricter restrictions. The voters made it official.

The anti-Japanese law, according to a state official at that time, was "to discourage the coming of the Japanese to California."

Other states with the same bent began passing their versions of the Alien Land Law. Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, Texas, Nebraska and even Delaware.

Even as late as 1948, the state of California was still filing escheat cases against the Japanese, who were returning from the detention camps.

Finally, in the *People vs. Oyama* case, the United States Supreme Court struck down the heart of the law in 1948 by declaring it unconstitutional. Other cases followed to cut the remaining portions of the law into shreds.

In 1949, the state of Oregon became the first state to repeal its alien land law. Others followed.

Since the California law was a state initiative, it took a state initiative to erase it from the books, even though it had been made inoperative due to the various court rulings. So the final chapter of the infamous Alien Land Law turned its last pages in 1956 when the state voters booted it out.



Like other Japanese, Mankichi Nakamura, a graduate of Univ. of Chicago, was not allowed to practice law because he was an alien ineligible for naturalization, so he served the community as a "legal advisor."



Boy Scout movement was popular in United States in '30s and Japanese communities were no different as they organized troops for their children. Troop 64 of Japanese M.E. Church of Los Angeles (1931).



Even though these youths lived in ghetto areas, it didn't stop them from organizing football teams to play against teams from other areas. The Oliver Club of Little Tokyo, Los Angeles (1933).



San Francisco police stack confiscated radios from Japanese who had to surrender radios and cameras after outbreak of war (1942).

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

BIGOTS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT HAVE THEIR WAY WITH JAPANESE

December 7, 1941. A day remembered by all Americans. On this day, Japanese planes bombed Pearl Harbor in Honolulu and triggered war between the United States and Japan. With a war already going full bore in Europe, the attack on Pearl Harbor expanded it to world-wide dimensions, flaming across continents and oceans.

Japanese communities from San Diego to Seattle went into a state of shock. Most did not know where Pearl Harbor was, and the eerie and surrealistic feeling that the war was not really happening evaporated as the newspaper headlines and radio broadcasts confirmed during the next few days that the unthinkable had happened.

The communities came to a virtual standstill as the FBI swooped in within 48 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor and arrested hundreds of Japanese up and down the coast. Carrying with them a blanket "Presidential warrant," the FBI agents picked up men who were board members of various Japanese associations, chambers of commerce, Japanese language and martial arts schools, farmers' co-ops, and even Buddhist ministers. The resident Japanese aliens had now become "enemy aliens."

Although no specific charges were filed against these men, they were arrested because "the enemy aliens would be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States," according to government officials. Most of them did not know why they were arrested, and

neither did their families. Taken away without notice, the men were secretly shipped to one of 26 detention camps scattered in 16 states. Some of the families did not learn for years what happened to their husbands or fathers.

Stripped of their community leaders, the people had no one to provide them with the guidance and leadership they desperately needed during those troubled days. Their children, the Nisei, who were American citizens, were mostly in their teens.

In the meantime, the festering anti-Japanese element on the West Coast came out in full dress with flags flying. The war hysteria, together with rumors of espionage and sabotage by the Japanese in Hawaii, raised the level of anti-Japanese agitation to a higher pitch.

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox added more fuel to the volatile situation with a statement to the effect that there was sabotage and espionage by the Japanese in Hawaii. The government knew, however, that this was not true and yet, did nothing to rectify it. Thus the country was falsely led to believe that both American citizens of Japanese descent and their alien parents were disloyal and a threat to American security.

State-wide organizations such as the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the Joint Immigration Committee, the American Legion, the State Grange, all of whom had been agitating against the Japanese since the '20s, joined the clamor. As the newspapers and the



The FBI rounded up schoolteachers, Buddhist ministers, leaders of farm associations and other organizations at outbreak of the war and placed them in special detention centers. This action stripped Japanese communities of advice and guidance as they faced numerous government edicts aside from constant threats by anti-Japanese groups.

radio stations began beating the drums to “do something with the local Japs,” many public officials took up the cry, including California’s Governor Culbert Olson, Attorney General Earl Warren and Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles.

In the meantime, many of the Japanese families were facing difficulties since the breadwinners were hustled out by the FBI, others were fired from their jobs, many stores would not sell anything to them, and along with a curfew placed on all Japanese by the government, the community was in chaos.

Many of the families had sons already serving in the United States Army; but nobody cared. No Japanese American or resident alien was charged with any act of espionage or sabotage, but nobody listened. Most of the resident aliens had lived in the United States for more than 20 to 40 years, contributing to the growth and economy of the country, but nobody knew.

As the war entered the third month, sinister plans were being hatched against the Japanese people, citizens and aliens alike, on the West Coast. It was to shatter the lives of more than 120,000 persons.

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066.



Model airplane enthusiast Kiyomi Eguchi, who had lived in the United States for 45 years, is questioned by FBI agents about airplane models found in his home. Terminal Island (1942)



San Francisco Examiner’s gleeful sounding headline of pending evacuation.



Detention camps were usually located in lonely and bleak areas. This is Heart Mountain, Wyoming, camp which held more than 10,000 persons.

THE INCARCERATION **MORE THAN 120,000 PERSONS WERE FORCED INTO CAMPS IN '42**

When President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, it set into motion an event many now call an "American Tragedy." It affected the lives of more than 120,000 innocent people who were herded into detention camps ringed with barbed wires and guard towers.

Incarcerated were the elderly, the middle-aged, the teenagers, the young tots, aliens and citizens alike.

No one was charged with any crime. But they had one thing in common—they were all of Japanese ancestry.

Prior to the President signing the executive order, which was about two months after the war started, there was intense politicking by racists and the misinformed to "get rid of the Japs."

Congressman Leland Ford of California was demanding that "all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps." He also stated that if the Nisei were loyal, they could "contribute to the safety and welfare of this country" by going to camp.

Attorney General Earl Warren admitted that there were no acts of sabotage or fifth column acts in California, but added that the absence of such activities by the Japanese Americans was confirmation that such actions were planned for the future.

John Edgar Hoover, the FBI chief, stated to government officials that there was no sabotage committed in Hawaii, but it fell upon deaf ears.

Things started to get out of hand as Congress joined the act. Senator Tom Stewart of Tennes-

see declared that, "the Japanese are cowardly and immoral. They are different from Americans in every conceivable way, and no Japanese should have the right to claim American citizenship."

Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi went further. "This is a race war . . . I say it is of vital importance that we get rid of every Japanese whether in Hawaii or on the mainland. . . . Damn them! Let us get rid of them now!"

The coalition of the Southern members of Congress with those from the Western states was not the only group in the capital pushing the President to remove the Japanese from the West Coast.

There was also the War Department. The most vociferous was Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, the commanding general of the Western Defense Command. In recommending exclusion, he wrote that "the Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted . . . It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese extraction, are at large today."

The FBI and the Navy knew that the Army was overreacting to the issue and recommended that nothing more than careful watching of suspicious individuals were called for by existing conditions. They were, however, ignored.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson, without

insisting on a clear military justification for Gen. DeWitt's proposal to clear the West Coast of the Japanese, finally recommended that the exclusion measure be carried out and President Roosevelt signed the executive order.

Nobody seemed to care that martial law had not been declared on the West Coast. Executive Order 9066 gave broad powers to any military commander to exclude any person from any area. Although it did not specifically mention the Japanese Americans or aliens, the document was primarily prepared to remove and incarcerate them.

Very few voices were heard from others to protest this unconstitutional and unnecessary act of the government. The bewildered and helpless Japanese Americans and their alien parents were left alone to meet their fate.

The Constitution and the Bill of Rights were bent out of shape. Prejudice, ignorance, fear and greed had won.

Gen. DeWitt, who was one of the strongest advocates of the evacuation and detention order, did not, however, have a plan ready to implement it. Suddenly realizing the huge logistical problem and perhaps to lighten the load on the Army, he first urged the Japanese to "voluntarily" leave the military zone and move inland.

It never worked. Aside from the fact that only about 10,000 tried, many were met at the state borders by hostile vigilantes. It also didn't help to have the governors of the interior states complaining about their state becoming a "dumping ground" for the unwanted Japanese. Only about 2,000 persons moved out.

Gen. DeWitt quickly dumped his "voluntary" program and instead, placed all Japanese, both aliens and citizens, under curfew along with German and Italian aliens.

In March, 1942, Gen. DeWitt announced that all Japanese would be removed from the West Coast and interned in detention camps.

Soldiers in Jeeps appeared in various areas up and down the coast where there were concentrations of Japanese residents and began posting signs on utility poles. The signs defined the zones, usually covering an area with about 250 families, to be evacuated, the date of the evacuation and the place to assemble prior to being transported to temporary assembly camps. After the notices were put up, the people were given only about a week before evacuation.

This process went on week after week for months and created havoc with the communities.



While soldiers stand by, Japanese drug store in Los Angeles desperately tries to clear its shelves of goods before owner leaves for detention camp (1942).



Escorted by Army troops, Japanese residents of Bainbridge Island in Washington cross bridge to ferry on their way to confinement in detention camps. They were one of the first to be evacuated from their homes by Army evacuation orders.



Under guard towers looming around them, a group of evacuees enter Tule Lake, Calif., detention center. The Army built ten such camps scattered in seven Western states to confine 120,000 Japanese Americans and aliens.



Daily meals were served in mass "dining halls." With little privacy, family structure and discipline were strained.



With shoes neatly placed by Army cot, nursery school children take nap at Tule Lake, California, detention camp.

Since they were only allowed to take what the family could carry, including bedding and linen, change of clothes, toilet articles, eating utensils and other personal articles, it was an impossible situation for everyone.

Furniture and appliances had to be sold at giveaway prices or abandoned, farmers had to lease their land, cars had to be sold, businesses had to be disposed of, inventories had to be sold, stored or abandoned, and in effect, it was total chaos.

Buddhist and Christian churches, owned by the communities, stored many of the belongings of the members and then locked up. The irony of the situation was that no one knew if they would ever return.

Under the watchful eyes of soldiers with guns, the evacuees boarded buses or trains that took them to one of 15 temporary assembly centers or to two of the permanent detention centers under construction by the Army—Poston in Arizona and Manzanar in California.

Many of the temporary assembly centers were race tracks or fairgrounds and the whitewashed horse stalls were used to house the people.

All of the assembly centers held an average of about 5,000 Japanese with the exception of the Santa Anita racetrack camp near Los Angeles, which crammed in about 19,000 evacuees.

During the turmoil and panic the people faced in preparing for the actual evacuation ordered by the government of the United States, the people in most cases were confused and too busy to concern themselves with what the ominous evacuation and detention meant to them as individuals and also as a group. It was as though it was not really happening.

However, once the people were led to their small barracks room or the repainted horse stalls and sat down on the army cots with their families for the first time in the assembly centers, the reality of their situation hit them like a ton of bricks. Many cried and others were numb with disbelief.

A proud people, many of the elders had lived in the United States anywhere from 20 to 40 years, worked hard, stayed out of trouble, were good citizens although denied naturalization, and made their children toe the line to become good Americans. Now, it was all gone.

From these assembly centers, the Japanese were shipped in old trains, escorted by the military, to the ten detention camps built on government land. Most were located in desolate



Tar-papered wood barracks, where families lived in a single small room, were typical of all camps. This is Manzanar, California, detention center.

areas in the states of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Arkansas and California.

The people lived in tar-papered barracks with families living in a single room. The only furniture was the Army cots. Eating was in a "mess hall" with hundreds of other evacuees. Bathroom facilities were all centered in a common area. Privacy was impossible.

It was cold in Heart Mountain, Wyoming; it was hot in Gila, Arizona; it was wet in Rohwer, Arkansas; it was dusty and hot in Poston, Arizona. But life went on in the detention camps.

Behind the barbed wire fence and the watch-towers, the various churches reorganized, mimeographed newspapers were published, and the schools were being staffed from the ranks of the evacuees. Nothing was normal, and there were a myriad of problems, but the people were determined to make the best of a tragic situation.

But they were still held captive inside the detention camps. And the world outside of the camps did not like them, did not care about them and did not trust them.



Although equipment and facilities of schools in camps were primitive in the early years of detention, it did not deter the enthusiasm of these students in a Rohwer, Arkansas, detention camp elementary school.



When the Army announced the formation of an all-Japanese American military unit, these young men volunteered from Heart Mountain, Wyoming, detention camp.

RESPONSE TO PREJUDICE

NISEI IN CAMPS VOLUNTEER FOR MILITARY SERVICE BY HUNDREDS

When the war in the Pacific broke out, Japanese Americans already in the Army were either discharged or transferred to other units doing less sensitive work. There were about 3,500 Japanese Americans in uniform at the time. Others who were registered for the draft were reclassified as not wanted by the Army.

In Hawaii, the Japanese American soldiers were discharged from the Territorial Guard. On the other hand, due to a shortage of troops for the defense of the islands, Japanese Americans with the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiment were kept in service. Such are the inconsistencies in policies during the war.

The discharging of the Nisei from the Territorial Guard in Hawaii had a catastrophic effect upon the Japanese community. They comprised 37 percent of the population in Hawaii, and although the Japanese on the islands were not removed and incarcerated like the Japanese on the mainland, they were now positive that the government did not trust the local Japanese population.

Hurt by the discharge, the young men decided that the only way they could show the loyalty of the Hawaiian Japanese community was to serve in the Army.

In early 1942, those discharged petitioned Lt. Gen. Delos Emmons, the military governor of Hawaii, to allow them to serve in the Army to prove their loyalty.

In the meantime, the Japanese American Citizens League, the only national organization representing the interests of the Japanese, met in Salt Lake City and passed a resolution to petition

the War Department to restore Selective Service for the Nisei.

Mike Masaoka, the Washington D.C. representative of the JACL, reasoned that with Japanese in concentration camps, military service by the Japanese Americans would not only help blunt the anti-Japanese attitude which questioned the loyalty of the Japanese, but could possibly aid the return of the people back to normal life after the war's end.

While all this was going on, the War Department ordered the formation of a special battalion for combat purposes. From the 299th Infantry Regiment in Honolulu, 1,300 Japanese Americans were organized into the Hawaiian Provisional Infantry Battalion. This group was later redesignated as the 100th Infantry Battalion.

In February 1943, the War Department was asked by President Roosevelt to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent.

President Roosevelt, in ordering this proposal, wrote that "the principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed, is that Americanism is a matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry."

Answering the call, more than 10,000 Nisei volunteered for service from Hawaii and, amazingly, 1,500 from the concentration camps on the mainland. The Army selected 2,700 from Hawaii and 1,500 Nisei from the camps. These volunteers were all sent to Camp Selby in Mississippi for training. It was designated the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.



Unmindful of the rain, President Harry Truman salutes color guards of the 442nd Regimental Combat Unit after awarding Presidential Unit Citation.

THE SAGA OF THE NISEI SOLDIER

THEIR COURAGE, DEEDS MADE ALL EVACUEES PROUD

Maj. Gen Charles Ryder, the commander of the 34th Division, strode into the command post of the 100th Infantry Battalion. It was June, 1943, and the Allied Army was pushing off from the Anzio beachhead in Italy after being stalled for months by the tough and stubborn German defense. In a coordinated attack, the Allied forces surprised the Germans and broke out from the beachhead.

Two regiments (about 6,000 men) had been attacking a pass for days without success, and the American forces had to capture the pass for the offense to continue.

"We need to take it by tomorrow. It is essential that we capture it," Gen. Ryder emphasized to the officers of the 100th, the all-Nisei outfit. "I know you men could do it, and I am asking you to do it."

The plans for the attack were formulated that evening, and the 100th Battalion, 1,000 men strong, went into action. By noon, the Nisei soldiers had captured the pass and were on their way up to take the mountain when artillery shells

from the American forces began falling among them and forced them to stop their advance.

The artillery command post could not believe that the 100th could in a half a day wipe out the German defenses that a larger unit could not after days of trying.

Called by many of the top officers of the Fifth Army as the "finest offensive combat unit" in the Italian theater of operations, the 100th had done it again.

The all volunteer 442nd Regimental Combat Team joined the 100th later the same year in Italy. Together, they compiled one of the outstanding military records of World War II. They fought in Italy, in France, and back to Italy where they helped end the war in Italy.

The 442nd was in France when Gen. Mark Clark of the Fifth Army in Italy requesting the all-Nisei unit for a critical mission. It was March, 1945, and the 442nd was shipped to Italy in secret. The 442nd was already well known among the German command as one of the top offensive combat teams, and their movement to

another sector would alert them to wonder, "Hey, something is coming up in Italy."

The Allied Army was stalled by strong fortifications the Germans had built in the rugged mountains of the Apennines, and they had stopped the Allied 92nd Division for five months.

The 442nd attacked the mountain in a frontal assault. Climbing a steep 3,000 foot mountain, the Nisei soldiers surprised the Germans and captured the position within 32 hours. This broke the back of the defense, and the Allied Army raced through the gap. The war in Italy ended a month later.

For their action and successful operation, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the Allied Armies, commended the Nisei outfit.

"The successful accomplishment of this mission turned a diversionary action into a full-scale and victorious offensive . . . an important part in the destruction of the German armies in Italy," said General Eisenhower.

Called the most decorated unit of its size in the



The 442nd's 2nd Battalion moves forward to the battle front in the winter mud of the Vosges Mountains in France.

“THE U.S. OWES A DEBT TO THESE MEN ... WHICH IT CAN NEVER REPAY.”

U.S. Army, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team hauled in awards like it was going out of style. They received seven Presidential Unit Citations, a Congressional Medal of Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 588 Silver Stars and 9,486 Purple Hearts.

The large number of Purple Hearts was due to many of the men being wounded more than once.

In the seven major campaigns fought by the unit, 680 men were killed in action.

The Japanese American soldiers were also serving in the Pacific campaign. There were 3,700 Nisei members in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) who served with the Allied forces in the Pacific until the cessation of the war in August, 1945.

They were at Guadalcanal, Attu, India, Burma, New Guinea, the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and at other far-flung places where the Allied forces were fighting the Japanese army and navy.

They translated captured documents, interrogated prisoners, monitored radio transmissions,



A Japanese American Army interrogator questions a wounded Japanese soldier in the South Pacific.

and helped break the Japanese military code.

Probably Col. Sidney Mashbir, who headed the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) said it best in tribute to the Nisei soldiers:

“I want to make an unequivocal statement in regard to the Americans of Japanese ancestry who fought by our side in the war. Had it not been for the Nisei, that part of the war in the Pacific which was dependent upon intelligence gleaned from captured documents and prisoners of war would have been a far more hazardous long drawn-out affair.

“The United States owes a debt to these men and to their families which it can never fully repay. At a highly conservative estimate, thousands of American lives were preserved and millions of dollars in materials were saved as a result of their contribution to the war effort.”

On December 30, 1944, Sgt. Frank Hachiya parachuted behind the enemy lines in the Philip-

pines on an intelligence mission. As he was returning to the American lines, he was mistaken for a Japanese soldier and shot. He delivered the maps of the Japanese defenses he had captured. He died three days later.

In the meantime, the American Legion post of his home town, Hood River, Oregon, had the names of 14 Japanese Americans, including Hachiya's, removed from the town's honor roll.

When the Army announced that Hachiya was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously, it was an embarrassed town that restored the names.

The Japanese Americans went to war to fight for democracy and at the same time, to prove to their country that they were loyal Americans. Many were killed in action, and when their parents were notified of their death, many of the fathers and mothers were still in the detention camps.



An elderly patient from a camp hospital is lifted onto a train for his return to the West Coast.

THE RETURN HOME

INTERNEES ON LONG ROAD BACK TO PICK UP PIECES OF TORN LIFE

On January 2, 1945, the Supreme Court ruled that the confinement of Japanese Americans was a violation of their constitutional rights. Anticipating this ruling, the government had earlier announced that restrictions against Japanese Americans were being lifted, including the West Coast.

It had been three long years since the Japanese Americans were exiled from the West Coast. They could have returned earlier, if government and military officials had the courage to make decisions based upon facts and hard opinions rather than political reasons.

For example, the officials of the War Department had known since May, 1943, that the exclusion of loyal Japanese from the West Coast no longer had any military justification, but they never made it public.

Some members of President Roosevelt's administration later learned the same thing, but no one took any action because of the strong and vocal opposition from the West Coast. The fear of political repercussions from the rabid anti-Japanese factions forced government officials to put their heads in the sand on this issue. And so the sham continued until the Supreme Court ruling a year and a half later.

When the exclusion order was finally rescinded, about half of the original 120,000 persons were still in the detention camps. Aside from the young men serving in the military, the others had left the camps under the relocation program of the War Relocation Authority, the agency

responsible for the administration of the camps.

Those who had relocated settled mostly in the Rocky Mountain and Midwestern states, since the West Coast was off limits at the time.

Those who remained in the camps when the Supreme Court decision was made were primarily the elderly and the very young. For some of the Issei, the Japanese aliens, the closing of the detention camps meant that they would have to leave the security of the camps and go out into a hostile world, which made them reluctant to leave camp.

It didn't help matters any when the West Coast agitators started to get active again as the Japanese began their long road back to the towns and cities in which they had lived most of their lives prior to their ouster.

As the returnees began to trickle back to the West Coast, some were met by their old neighbors with open arms of welcome and helped with their resettlement problems.

On the other hand, widespread violence met other returnees. There were bombings, nightrider shootings at farmhouses, assaults and other terrorism committed. And many merchants proudly had "We don't serve Japs" signs on their windows.

Many found the farms and orchards they had leased in ruins. The churches and temples where they had stored their belongings had been ransacked. It was a dismal return for many of the Japanese.

Mary Masuda had returned to Santa Ana



Takeo Miyama (arrow) recently returned evacuee, listens as San Francisco municipal bus mechanics protest his employment. Police join the discussion with other officials to mediate the situation.

from the Gila River, Arizona, detention camp and was threatened by local bullies to leave the area. Her brother, Sgt. Kazuo Masuda, had been killed in Italy. He deliberately sacrificed his own life so that his men could return safely from patrol. For this act of bravery, Masuda was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The presentation of the nation's second highest award was made to Mary a few weeks after she had been threatened. The ceremony was held in front of the Masuda home with Gen. "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell, one of the outstanding generals of the Pacific war, making the presentation.

Stillwell said, "The Nisei bought an awful big chunk of America with their blood. You're damn right those Nisei boys have a place in the American heart, now and forever. We cannot allow a single injury to be done them without defeating the purpose for which we fought."

After the strong statement from Gen. Stillwell, Mary Masuda was never bothered again.

Housing for families was almost impossible to arrange since many places refused to rent to Japanese. As a consequence, the Christian and Buddhist churches, which the returnees reclaimed, were used as temporary hostels for hundreds of families. Many white Christian churches also provided housing for the Japanese.

With all of these problems, the returnees had another hurdle to face. They had to start rebuilding their lives from scratch. After being exiled for more than three years and losing almost everything in the process, it was not easy to begin a new life. Especially when the average age of the Issei was about 50.

With characteristic determination, patience and hard work, the Japanese began their slow climb back to normalcy. Despite continued harassment and agitation from anti-Japanese factions, the former residents were just glad to be back.



The Takahashi family inspects a window broken by a thrown stone, missing flag showing a brother's war service. This Seattle incident in 1945 was one of many incidents which greeted returning evacuees.



After years of being denied naturalization, hundreds of Japanese aliens pledge the oath of allegiance at the Hollywood Bowl. Most in their sixties and seventies, they had lived most of their lives in the United States.

JUSTICE OWED, BUT EARNED

ISSEI GRANTED CITIZENSHIP AS RACIST LAWS FALL

The war was over. The people were back on the West Coast except those who had relocated to Midwestern and Eastern states from the detention camps and chose to remain there. And the young men who went to war were returning.

The Japanese Americans and their Issei parents continued their struggle to rebuild their lives. There was, however, other important work to be done as well.

There were still anti-Japanese laws, remnants of the '20s and '30s, that were in force on federal and state books. Thus, the major goal of the national Japanese American Citizens League in the immediate postwar period was to eliminate all of these racist laws.

For example, three years after the cessation of the war, California was still filing escheat cases against the Japanese under the 1920 Alien Land Law. Other states also had similar alien land laws, which were patterned after California's law.

It was finally wiped off the books in 1949 after a series of separate cases were filed in the courts to fight the racist law, which prevented Japanese aliens from owning land. The courts ruled it

unconstitutional.

The big job was to gain naturalization rights for the Japanese aliens. They were the only group denied the opportunity to become naturalized citizens under federal law.

The 1790 law specified that only "free white persons" were eligible for naturalization.

Determining eligibility by color such as "brown" and "yellow," many races had originally been denied the privilege of becoming citizens. Over the years, however, the law had been amended many times to allow aliens of different races to become naturalized.

Chinese aliens were finally granted rights in 1943, and the Filipinos were allowed to become naturalized in 1946. Only the Japanese aliens were left out.

After a few heartbreaking efforts by the Japanese American Citizens League, they finally achieved their goal when a number of bills were spliced together in Congress into the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act and passed.

The legislation primarily restructured the nation's immigration laws, which previously barred

immigration from Far East nations and gave them token quotas. But it also eliminated race as a bar to naturalization. It was 1952.

By then, most of the Japanese aliens were in their sixties and seventies, but they diligently went to American history and government classes organized by local churches and organizations. And by the hundreds, they took and passed the citizenship examination and finally stood before federal judges and took the oath of allegiance.

They were the newest citizens of the United States. They had immigrated from Japan 30 to 50 years earlier, suffered harassment and even violence continuously from organized hate groups. Their character and loyalty were questioned and attacked, and they were forcibly removed and confined in detention camps unjustifiably and unnecessarily for three years, losing in the process everything they had worked hard for.

Who else would, or even could, continue to have faith in a nation that had treated them so shabbily for so long? They would—and they did.

FEDERAL COMMISSION FINDS EVACUATION NOT JUSTIFIED

In 1980 Congress passed an Act creating a Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), which was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter. Organized in February, 1981, the Commission conducted hearings in nine cities across the country, heard testimony from more than 750 witnesses and examined more than 10,000 documents.

In February, 1983, the Commission issued its report and found that military necessity did not exist in fact to justify the evacuation and exclusion of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast.

It also determined that the evacuation and exclusion was the result of "race prejudice, war

hysteria, and a failure of political leadership."

The Commission also confirmed that the excluded ethnic Japanese suffered enormous damages and losses, both material and intangible. In addition to disastrous loss of farms, homes and businesses, there was disruption of many years of careers and professional lives as well as the long-term loss of income, earnings and opportunity.

In areas where no compensation has been made, the Commission estimated the total loss of ethnic Japanese in 1983 dollars was between \$810 million and \$2 billion. Further analysis made by an independent firm has established the economic losses from \$2.5 million to \$6.2 million.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF FEDERAL COMMISSION

[The remedies, which the commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians issued on June 16, 1983, are based upon their fact-finding report and economic impact study.]

Each measure acknowledges to some degree the wrongs inflicted during the war upon the ethnic Japanese. None can fully compensate or, indeed, make the group whole again.

The Commission makes the following recommendations for remedies as an act of national apology.

1. That Congress pass a joint resolution, to be signed by the President, which recognizes that a grave injustice was done and offers the apologies of the nation for the acts of exclusion, removal and detention.

2. That the President pardon those who were convicted of violating the statutes imposing a curfew on American citizens. The Commission further recommends that the Department of Justice review other wartime convictions of the ethnic Japanese and recommend to the President that he pardon those whose offenses were grounded in a refusal to accept treatment that discriminated among citizens on the basis of race or ethnicity.

3. That the Congress direct the Executive agencies to which Japanese Americans may apply for the restitution of positions, status or entitlements lost in whole or in part because of acts or events between December 1941

and 1945.

4. That the Congress demonstrate official recognition of the injustice done to American citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese resident aliens during the Second World War, and that it recognize the nation's need to make redress for these events, by appropriating monies to establish a special foundation.

The Commission believes a fund for educational and humanitarian purposes related to the wartime events is appropriate and addresses an injustice suffered by an entire ethnic group.

5. That Congress establish a fund which will provide personal redress to those who were excluded.

Appropriations of \$1.5 billion should be made to the fund over a reasonable period to be determined by Congress. This fund should be used, first, to provide a one-time per capita compensatory payment of \$20,000 to each of the approximately 60,000 surviving persons excluded from their places of residence pursuant to Executive Order 9066. The burden should be on the government to locate survivors, without requiring any application for payment, and payments should be made to the oldest survivors first. After per capita payments, the remainder of the fund should be used for the public educational purposes as discussed in Recommendation #4.

The fund should be administered by a Board, the majority of whose members are Americans of Japanese descent appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.



This monument stands today in Owens Valley, California, and marks the site of Manzanar Detention Center.

There were ten major detention camps built by the government for the purpose of detaining Japanese Americans and aliens expelled from the West Coast during World War II. The last center was closed in October, 1946.

There were also a number of smaller detention centers where hundreds of other Japanese were interned. Most of the persons in these camps were picked up by the FBI a few days after the Pearl Harbor attack. They were mostly leaders of Japanese chambers of commerce, farm associations, martial arts groups, prefecture associations, schoolteachers and Buddhist ministers.

THE CAMPS

1. Amache, Colorado, camp. (7,318 persons)
 2. Gila River, Arizona, camp. (13,348 persons)
 3. Heart Mountain, Wyoming, camp. (10,767 persons)
 4. Jerome, Arkansas, camp. (8,497 persons)
 5. Manzanar, California, camp. (10,046 persons)
 6. Minidoka, Idaho, camp. (9,397 persons)
 7. Rohwer, Arkansas, camp. (8,475 persons)
 8. Tule Lake, California, camp. (18,789 persons)
 9. Topaz, Utah, camp. (8,130 persons)
 10. Poston, Arizona, camp. (17,814 persons)
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*Excerpts from "An American Promise
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
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**SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
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AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS**

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REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

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Summary

PART 1: NISEI AND ISSEI

On February 19, 1942, ten weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which gave to the Secretary of War and the military commanders the power to exclude any and all persons, citizens and aliens, from designated areas in order to provide security against sabotage, espionage and fifth column activity. Shortly thereafter, all American citizens of Japanese descent were prohibited from living, working or traveling on the West Coast of the United States. The same prohibition applied to the generation of Japanese immigrants who, pursuant to federal law and despite long residence in the United States, were not permitted to become American citizens. American citizens and their alien parents were removed by the Army, first to "assembly centers" — temporary quarters at racetracks and fairgrounds — and then to "relocation centers" — bleak barrack camps in desolate areas of the West. The camps were surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by military police. Departure was permitted only after a loyalty review in consultation with the military, by the War Relocation Authority, the civilian agency that ran the camps. Many of those removed from the West Coast were eventually allowed to leave the camps to join the Army, go to college outside the West Coast or to whatever private employment was available. For a larger number, however, the war years were spent behind barbed wire; and for those who were released, the prohibition against returning to their homes and occupations on the West Coast was not lifted until December 1944.

This policy of exclusion, removal, and detention was executed against 120,000 people without individual review, and exclusion

was continued virtually without regard for their demonstrated loyalty to the United States. Congress was fully aware of and supported the policy of removal and detention; it sanctioned the exclusion by enacting a statute which made criminal the violation of orders issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066. The United States Supreme Court held the exclusion constitutionally permissible in the context of war, but struck down the incarceration of admittedly loyal American citizens on the ground that it was not based on statutory authority.

All this was done despite the fact that not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West Coast.


No mass exclusion or detention, in any part of the country, was ordered against American citizens of German or Italian descent. Official actions against enemy aliens of other nationalities were much more individualized and selective than those imposed on the ethnic Japanese.

The exclusion, removal and detention inflicted tremendous human cost. There was the obvious cost of homes and businesses sold or abandoned under circumstances of great distress, as well as injury to careers and professional advancement. But most important, there was the loss of liberty and the personal stigma of suspected disloyalty for thousands of people who knew themselves to be devoted to their country's cause and to its ideals but whose repeated protestations of loyalty were discounted — only to be demonstrated beyond any doubt by the record of Nisei soldiers, who returned from the battlefields of Europe as the most decorated and distinguished combat units of World War II and by the thousands of other Nisei who served against the enemy in the Pacific, mostly in military intelligence. The wounds of the exclusion and detention have healed in some respects, but the scars of that experience remain, painfully real in the minds of those who lived through the suffering and deprivation of the camps.

The personal injustice of excluding, removing and detaining loyal American citizens is manifest. Such events are extraordinary and unique in American history. For every citizen and for American public life, they pose haunting questions about our country and its past.

The Decision to Exclude

The Context of the Decision. First, the exclusion and removal were attacks on the ethnic Japanese which followed a long and ugly history of West Coast anti-Japanese agitation and legislation. Antipathy and hostility toward the ethnic Japanese was a major factor of the public life of the West Coast states for more than forty years before Pearl Harbor. Under pressure from California, immigration from Japan had been severely restricted in 1908 and entirely prohibited in 1924. Japanese immigrants were barred from American citizenship, although their children born here were citizens by birth. California and the other western states prohibited Japanese immigrants from owning land. In part the hostility was economic, emerging in various white American groups who began to feel competition, particularly in agriculture, the principal occupation of the immigrants. The anti-Japanese agitation also fed on racial stereotypes and fears: the "yellow peril" of an unknown Asian culture achieving substantial influence on the Pacific Coast.



The ethnic Japanese, small in number and with no political voice — the citizen generation was just reaching voting age in 1940 — had become a convenient target for political demagogues. Political bullying was supported by organized interest groups who adopted anti-Japanese agitation as a consistent part of their program: the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the Joint Immigration Committee, the American Legion, the California State Federation of Labor and the California State Grange.

Second, Japanese armies in the Pacific won a rapid, startling string of victories against the United States and its allies in the first months of World War II. In January and February 1942, the military position of the United States in the Pacific was perilous. There was fear of Japanese attacks on the West Coast.

Next, contrary to the facts, there was a widespread belief, supported by a statement by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, that the Pearl Harbor attack had been aided by sabotage and fifth column activity by ethnic Japanese in Hawaii. The government knew that this was not true, but took no effective measures to disabuse public belief that disloyalty had contributed to massive American losses on December 7, 1941. **Thus the country was unfairly led to believe that both American citizens of Japanese descent and resident Japanese aliens threatened American security.**

Fourth, as anti-Japanese organizations began to speak out and rumors from Hawaii spread, West Coast politicians quickly took up the familiar anti-Japanese cry. The Congressional delegations in Washington organized themselves and pressed the War and Justice Departments and the President for stern measures to control the ethnic Japanese — moving quickly from control of aliens to evacuation and removal of citizens. In California, Governor Olson, Attorney General Warren and Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles, and many local authorities joined the clamor. These opinions were not informed by any knowledge of actual military risks, rather they were stroked by virulent agitation which encountered little opposition. Only a few churchmen and academicians were prepared to defend the Japanese. There was little or no political risk in claiming that it was “better to be safe than sorry” and, as many did, that the best way for ethnic Japanese to prove their loyalty was to volunteer to enter detention. The press amplified



the unreflective emotional excitement of the hour. Through late January and early February 1942, the rising clamor from the West Coast was heard within the federal government as its demands became more draconian.

Making and Justifying the Decision. The exclusion of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast was recommended to the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command with responsibility for West Coast security. President Roosevelt relied on Secretary Stimson's recommendations in issuing Executive Order 9066.

The justification given for the measure was military necessity. The claim of military necessity is most clearly set out in three places: General DeWitt's February 14, 1942, recommendation to Secretary Stimson for exclusion; General DeWitt's *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942*; and the government's brief in the Supreme Court defending the Executive Order in *Hirabayashi v. United States*. General DeWitt's February 1942

recommendation presented the following rationale for the exclusion:

The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. To concede otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these were organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.

There are two unfounded justifications for exclusion expressed here: first, that ethnicity ultimately determines loyalty; second, that "indications" suggest that ethnic Japanese "are organized and ready for concerted action" — the best argument for this being the fact that it hadn't happened.

The first evaluation is not a military one but one for sociologists or historians. It runs counter to a basic premise on which the American nation of immigrants is built — that loyalty to the United States is a matter of individual choice and not determined by ties to an ancestral country. The second judgment was, by the General's own admission, unsupported by any evidence. General DeWitt's recommendation clearly does not provide a credible rationale, based on military expertise, for the necessity of exclusion.

In his 1943 *Final Report*, General DeWitt cited a number of factors in support of the exclusion decision: signaling from shore to enemy submarines; arms and contraband found by the FBI during raids on ethnic Japanese homes and businesses; dangers to the ethnic Japanese from vigilantes; concentration of ethnic Japanese around or near militarily sensitive areas; the number of Japanese ethnic organizations on the coast which might shelter

pro-Japanese attitudes or activities such as Emperor worshipping Shinto; and the presence of the Kibei, who had spent some time in Japan.

The first two items point to demonstrable military danger. But the reports of shore-to-ship signaling were investigated by the Federal Communications Commission, the agency with relevant expertise, and no identifiable cases of such signaling were substantiated. The FBI did confiscate arms and contraband from some ethnic Japanese, but most were items normally in the possession of any law-abiding civilian, and the FBI concluded that these searches had uncovered no dangerous persons that "we could not otherwise know about." Thus neither of these "facts" militarily justified exclusion.

There had been some acts of violence against ethnic Japanese on the West Coast and feeling against them ran high, but "protective custody" is not an acceptable rationale for exclusion. Protection against vigilantes is a civilian matter that would involve the military only in extreme cases. But there is no evidence that such extremity had been reached on the West Coast in early 1942. Moreover, "protective custody" could never justify exclusion and detention for months and years.

General DeWitt's remaining points are repeated in the Hirabayashi brief, which also emphasizes dual nationality, Japanese language schools and the high percentage of aliens (who, by law, had been barred from acquiring American citizenship) in the ethnic population. These facts represent broad social judgments of little or no military significance in themselves. None supports the claim of disloyalty to the United States and all were entirely legal. If the same standards were applied to other ethnic groups, as Morton Grodzins, an early analyst of the exclusion decision, applied it to ethnic Italians on the West Coast, an equally compelling and meaningless case for "disloyalty" could be made. In short, these social and cultural patterns were not evidence of any threat to West Coast military security.

In sum, the record does not permit the conclusion that military necessity warranted the exclusion of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast.

The Conditions Which Permitted the Decision. Having concluded that no military necessity supported the exclusion, the

Commission has attempted to determine how the decision came to be made.

First, General DeWitt apparently believed what he told Secretary Stimson: ethnicity determined loyalty — that it was impossible to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal. On this basis he believed them to be potential enemies among whom loyalty could not be determined.

Second, the FBI and members of Naval Intelligence who had relevant intelligence responsibility were ignored when they stated that nothing more than careful watching of suspicious individuals or individual reviews of loyalty were called for by existing circumstances.

Third, General DeWitt relied heavily on civilian politicians rather than informed military judgments in reaching his conclusions. The civilian politicians largely repeated the prejudiced, unfounded themes of anti-Japanese factions and interest groups on the West Coast.

Fourth, no effective measures were taken by President Roosevelt to calm the West Coast public and refute the rumors of sabotage and fifth column activity at Pearl Harbor.

Fifth, General DeWitt was temperamentally disposed to exaggerate the measures necessary to maintain security and placed security far ahead of any concern for the liberty of citizens.

Sixth, Secretary Stimson and John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, both of whose views on race differed from those of General DeWitt, failed to insist on a clear military justification for the measures General DeWitt wished to undertake.

Seventh, Attorney General Francis Biddle, while contending that exclusion was unnecessary, did not argue to the President that failure to make out a case of military necessity on the facts would render the exclusion constitutionally impermissible or that the Constitution prohibited exclusion on the basis of ethnicity given the facts on the West Coast.

Eighth, those representing the interests of civil rights and civil liberties in Congress, the press and other public forums were silent or indeed supported exclusion. Thus there was no effective opposition to the measures vociferously sought by numerous West Coast interest groups, politicians and journalists.

Finally, President Roosevelt, without raising the question to the level of Cabinet discussion or requiring any careful or thorough review of the situation, and despite the Attorney General's arguments and other information before him, agreed with Secretary Stimson that the exclusion should be carried out.



The Decision to Detain

With the signing of Executive Order 9066, the course of the President and War Department was set: American citizens and alien residents of Japanese ancestry would be compelled to leave the West Coast on the basis of wartime military necessity. For the War Department and the Western Defense Command, the problem became primarily one of method and operation, not basic policy. General DeWitt first tried "voluntary" resettlement: the ethnic Japanese were to move outside restricted military zones of the


West Coast but otherwise were free to go wherever they chose. From a military standpoint this policy was bizarre, and it was utterly impractical. If the ethnic Japanese had been excluded because they were potential saboteurs and spies, any such danger was not extinguished by leaving them at large in the interior where there were, of course, innumerable dams, power lines, bridges and war industries to be disrupted or spied upon. Conceivably sabotage in the interior could be synchronized with a Japanese raid or invasion for a powerful fifth column effect. This raises serious doubts as to how grave the War Department believed the supposed threat to be.

The War Relocation Authority (WRA), the civilian agency created by the President to supervise the relocation and initially directed by Milton Eisenhower, proceeded on the premise that the vast majority of evacuees were law-abiding and loyal, and that, once off the West Coast, they should be returned quickly to conditions approximating normal life. Governors and officials of the mountain states objected to California using the interior states as a "dumping ground" for a California "problem." They argued that people in their states were so bitter over the voluntary evacuation that unguarded evacuees would face physical danger. Again and again, detention camps for evacuees were urged. The consensus was that a plan for reception centers was acceptable so long as the evacuees remained under guard within the centers.

The War Relocation Authority dropped resettlement and adopted confinement. Notwithstanding WRA's belief that evacuees should be returned to normal productive life, it had, in effect, become their jailer. The politicians of the interior states had achieved the program of detention.

The evacuees were to be held in camps behind barbed wire and released only with government approval. For this course of action no military justification was proffered. The WRA contended that these steps were necessary for the benefit of evacuees and that controls on their departure were designed to assure they would not be mistreated by other Americans on leaving the camps.

It follows from the conclusion that there was no justification in military necessity for the exclusion, that there was no basis for the detention.



The Effect of the Exclusion and Detention

The history of the relocation camps and the assembly centers that preceded them is one of suffering and deprivation visited on people against whom no charges were, or could have been, brought.

Families could take to the assembly centers and the camps only what they could carry. Camp living conditions were spartan. People were housed in tar-papered barracks rooms of no more than 20 by 24 feet. Each room housed a family, regardless of family size. Construction was often shoddy. Privacy was practically impossible and furnishings were minimal. Eating and bathing were in mass facilities. Under continuing pressure from those who blindly held to the belief that evacuees harbored disloyal intentions, the wages paid for work at the camps were kept to the minimal level of \$12 a month for unskilled labor, rising to \$19 a month for professional employees. Mass living prevented normal family communication and activities. Heads of families, no longer providing food and shelter, found their authority to lead and to discipline diminished.

The camp experience carried a stigma that no other Americans suffered. The evacuees themselves expressed the indignity of their conditions with particular power:

On May 16, 1942, my mother, two sisters, niece, nephew, and I left ... by train. Father joined us later. Brother left earlier by bus. We took whatever we could carry. So much we left behind, but the most valuable thing I lost was my freedom.

• • •

Henry went to the Control Station to register the family. He came home with twenty tags, all numbered 10710, tags to be attached to each piece of baggage, and one to hang from our coat lapels. From then on, we were known as Family #10710.

The government's efforts to "Americanize" the children in the camps were bitterly ironic:

An oft-repeated ritual in relocation camp schools... was the salute to the flag followed by the singing of "My country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty" — a ceremony Caucasian teachers



found embarrassingly awkward if not cruelly poignant in the austere prison setting.



• • •

In some ways, I suppose, my life was not too different from a lot of kids in America between the years 1942 and 1945. I spent a good part of my time playing with my brothers and friends, learned to shoot marbles, watched sandlot baseball and envied the older kids who wore Boy Scout uniforms. We shared with the rest of America the same movies, screen heroes and listened to the same heart-rending songs of the forties. We imported much of America into camps because, after all, we were Americans. Through imitation of my brothers, who attended grade school within the camp, I learned to salute the flag by the time I was five years old. I was learning as best one could learn in Manzanar, what it meant to live in America. But, I was also learning the sometimes bitter price one has to pay for it.

After the war, through the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act, the government attempted to compensate for the losses of real and personal property; inevitably that effort did not secure full or fair compensation. There were many kinds of injury the Evacuation Claims Act made no attempt to compensate: the stigma placed on people who fell under the exclusion and relocation orders; the deprivation of liberty suffered during detention; the psychological impact of exclusion and relocation; the breakdown of family structure; the loss of earnings or profits; physical injury or illness during detention.

The Decision to End Detention

By October 1942, the government held over 100,000 evacuees in relocation camps. **After the tide of war turned with the American victory at Midway in June, 1942, the possibility of serious Japanese attack was no longer credible; detention and exclusion became increasingly difficult to defend.**

Determining the basis on which detention would be ended required the government to focus on the justification for controlling the ethnic Japanese. If the government maintained the position that distinguishing the loyal from the disloyal was possible and that exclusion and detention were required only by the necessity of acting quickly under the threat of Japanese attack in early 1942, then a program to release those considered loyal

should have been instituted in the spring of 1942 when people were confined in the assembly centers.

At the end of 1942, over General DeWitt's opposition, Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, decided to establish a volunteer combat team of Nisei soldiers.¹ The volunteers were to come from those who had passed a loyalty review. To avoid the obvious unfairness of allowing only those joining the military to establish their loyalty and leave the camps, the War Department joined WRA in expanding the loyalty review program to all adult evacuees.

This program was significant, but remained a compromise. It provided an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to the United States on the battlefields; despite the human sacrifice involved, this was of immense practical importance in obtaining postwar acceptance for the ethnic Japanese. It opened the gates of the camps for some and began some reestablishment of normal life. But with no apparent rationale or justification, it did not end exclusion of the loyal from the West Coast. The review program



¹For a further review of the military contributions of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 100th Battalion and MIS, see the CWRIC Report, Chapter 10, "Military Service," pages 253-260.

did not extend the presumption of loyalty to American citizens of Japanese descent, who were subjected to an investigation and review not applied to other ethnic groups.

Equally important, although the loyalty review program was the first major government decision in which the interests of evacuees prevailed, the program was conducted so insensitively, with such lack of understanding of the evacuees' circumstances, that it became one of the most divisive and wrenching episodes of the camp detention.

After almost a year of what the evacuees considered utterly unjust treatment at the hands of the government, the loyalty review program began with filling out a questionnaire which posed two questions requiring declarations of complete loyalty to the United States. Thus, the questionnaire demanded a personal expression of position from each evacuee — a choice between faith in one's future in America and an outrage at present injustice. Understandably most evacuees probably had deeply ambiguous



feelings about a government whose rhetorical values of liberty and equality they wished to believe, but who found their present treatment in painful contradiction to those values. The loyalty questionnaire left little room to express that ambiguity. Indeed, it provided an effective point of protest and organization against the government, from which more and more evacuees felt alienated. The questionnaire finally addressed the central question of loyalty that underlay the exclusion policy, a question which had been the predominant political and personal issue for the ethnic Japanese over the past year; answering it required confronting the conflicting emotions aroused by the relation to the government.

Well, I am one of those that said "no, no" on it, one of the "no, no" boys, and it is not that I was proud about it, it was just that our legal rights were violated and I wanted to fight back. However, I didn't want to take this sitting down. I was really angry. It just got me so damn mad. Whatever I do, there was no help from outside, and it seems to me that we are a race that doesn't count. So therefore, this was one of the reasons for the "no, no" answer.

The loyalty review program was a point of decision and division for those in the camps. The avowedly loyal were eligible for release; those who were unwilling to profess loyalty or whom the government distrusted were segregated from the main body of evacuees into the Tule Lake camp, which rapidly became a center of disaffection and protest against the government and its policies — the unhappy refuge of evacuees consumed by anger and despair.

The Decision to End Exclusion

The loyalty review should logically have led to the conclusion that no justification existed for excluding loyal American citizens from the West Coast. Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and General Marshall reached this position in the spring of 1943. Nevertheless, the exclusion was not ended until December 1944. No plausible reason connected to any wartime security has been offered for this eighteen to twenty month delay in allowing the ethnic Japanese to return to their homes, jobs and businesses on the West Coast.

Between May 1943 and May 1944, War Department officials did not make public their opinion that exclusion of loyal ethnic Japanese from the West Coast no longer had any military justification. If the President was unaware of this view, the plausible explanation is that Secretary Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy were unwilling, or believed themselves unable, to face down political opposition on the West Coast. General DeWitt repeatedly expressed his opposition until he left the Western Defense Command in the fall of 1943, as did West Coast anti-Japanese factions and politicians.

In May 1944 Secretary Stimson put before President Roosevelt and the Cabinet his position that the exclusion no longer had a military justification. But the President was unwilling to act to end the exclusion until the first Cabinet meeting following the Presidential election of November 1944. The inescapable conclusion from this factual pattern is that the delay was motivated by political considerations.

By the participants own accounts, there is no rational explanation for maintaining the exclusion of loyal ethnic Japanese from the West Coast for eighteen months after May 1943 — except political pressure and fear. Certainly there was no justification arising out of military necessity.



The Comparisons

HAWAII: When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, nearly 158,000 persons of Japanese ancestry lived in Hawaii — more than 35 percent of the population. **Surely, if there were dangers of espionage, sabotage and fifth column activity by American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry, danger would be greatest in Hawaii, and one would anticipate that the most swift and severe measures would be taken there. But nothing of the sort happened.** Less than 2,000 ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were taken into custody during the war — barely one percent of the population of Japanese descent. Many factors contributed to this reaction.

Hawaii was more ethnically mixed and racially tolerant than the West Coast. Race relations in Hawaii before the war were not infected with the same virulent antagonism of 75 years agitation. While anti-Asian feeling existed in the territory, it did not represent the longtime views of well-organized groups as it did on the West Coast and, without statehood, xenophobia had no effective voice in the Congress.

The larger population of ethnic Japanese in Hawaii was also a factor. It is one thing to vent frustration and historical prejudice on a scant two percent of the population; it is very different to disrupt a local economy and tear a social fabric by locking up more than one-third of a territory's people. And in Hawaii the half-measure of exclusion from military areas would have been meaningless.

In large social terms, the Army had much greater control of day-to-day events in Hawaii. Martial law was declared in December 1941, suspending the writ of habeas corpus, so that through the critical first months of the war, the military's recognized power to deal with any emergency was far greater than on the West Coast.

This policy was clearly much more congruent with basic American laws and values. It was also a much sounder policy in practice. The remarkably high rate of enlistment in the Army in Hawaii is in sharp contrast to the doubt and alienation that marred the recruitment of Army volunteers in the relocation camps. The wartime experience in Hawaii left behind neither the extensive economic losses and injury suffered on the mainland

nor the psychological burden of the direct experience of unjust exclusion and detention.

The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it — detention, ending detention and ending exclusion — were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.

Many of those involved in the exclusion, removal and detention passed judgment on those events in memoirs and other statements after the war. **Henry Stimson** recognized that *"to loyal citizens this forced evacuation was a personal injustice."* In his autobiography, **Francis Biddle** reiterated his beliefs at the time: *"The program was ill-advised, unnecessary and unnecessarily cruel."* **Justice William O. Douglas**, who joined the majority opinion in *Korematsu* which held the evacuation constitutionally permissible, found that the evacuation case *"was ever on my conscience."* **Milton Eisenhower** described the evacuation to the relocation camps as *"an inhuman mistake."* **Chief Justice Earl Warren**, who had urged evacuation as Attorney General of California, stated, *"I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens."* **Justice Tom C. Clark**, who had been liaison between the Justice Department and the Western Defense Command, concluded, *"Looking back on it today [the evacuation] was, of course, a mistake."*

PART II: THE ALEUTS

During the struggle for naval supremacy in the Pacific during WW II, the Aleutian Islands were strategically valuable to both the United States and Japan. Beginning in March 1942, U.S. military intelligence repeatedly warned Alaska defense commanders that Japanese aggression into the Aleutian Islands was imminent. In June 1942, the Japanese attacked and held the two westernmost Aleutians, Kiska and Attu. American military commanders ordered the evacuation of the Aleuts from many of the islands to places of relative safety.

Eight hundred seventy-six Aleuts had been evacuated from Aleut villages west of Unimak Island, including the Pribilofs. Except in Unalaska the entire population of each village was evacuated, including at least 30 non-Aleuts. All of the Aleuts were relocated to southeastern Alaska except 50 persons who were either evacuated to the Seattle area or hospitalized in the Indian Hospital at Tacoma, Washington.

The evacuation of the Aleuts had a rational basis as a precaution to ensure their safety. The Aleuts were evacuated from an active theatre of war; 42 were taken prisoner on Attu by the Japanese. It was clearly the military's belief that evacuation of non-military personnel was advisable.

The Aleuts' Camps

Aleuts were subjected to deplorable conditions following the evacuation. Typical housing was an abandoned gold mine or fish cannery buildings which were inadequate in both accommodation and sanitation. Lack of medical care contributed to extensive disease and death.

The Funter Bay cannery in southeastern Alaska where 300 Aleuts were placed was one of the worst camps. The majority of evacuees were forced to live in two dormitory-style buildings in groups of six to thirteen people in areas of nine to ten feet square. Until fall, many Aleuts were forced to sleep in relays because of lack of space.

In the fall of 1942, the only fulltime medical care was provided by two nurses who served both the cannery camp and a camp at

a mine across Funter Bay. Doctors were only temporarily assigned to the camp. Medical supplies were scarce.

Epidemics raged throughout the Aleuts' stay in southeastern Alaska; they suffered from influenza, measles, and pneumonia along with tuberculosis. Twenty-five died at Funter Bay in 1943 alone. It is estimated that probably 10% of the evacuated Aleuts died during their two or three year stay.

The standard of care which the government owes to those within its care was clearly violated by this treatment, which brought great suffering and loss of life to the Aleuts.

Return to the Islands

The Pribilovians were able to get back to the Pribilofs by the late spring of 1944, nine months after the Japanese had been driven out of the Aleutian chain. The return to the Aleutians did not take place for another year. The delay may be attributed to transport shortage and problems of supplying the islands in order to resume a normal life. But the government's record, especially in the Aleutians, reflects an indifference and lack of urgency. Some Aleuts were not permitted to return to their homes; to this day, Attuans continue to be excluded from their ancestral lands.

When they first returned, many Aleuts were forced to camp because their former homes (those that had still stood) had not yet been repaired and were now uninhabitable. The Aleuts rebuilt their homes themselves. They were "paid" with free groceries.

The Aleuts suffered material losses from the government's occupation of the islands for which they were never fully compensated, in cash or in kind. Devout followers of the Russian Orthodox faith, Aleuts treasured the religious icons and other family heirlooms that were their most significant spiritual as well as material losses. They cannot be replaced.

In sum, despite the fact that the Aleutians were a theatre of war from which evacuation was a sound policy, there was no justification for the manner in which the Aleuts were treated in the camps, nor for failing to compensate them fully for their material losses.

Economic Losses

The excluded people suffered enormous damages and losses, both material and intangible. To the disastrous loss of farms businesses and homes must be added the disruption for many years of careers and professional lives, as well as the long-term loss of income, earnings and opportunity. It is estimated that, as a result of the exclusion and detention, in 1945 dollars the ethnic Japanese lost between \$108 and \$164 million in income and between \$11 and \$206 million in property for which no compensation was made after the war under the terms of the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act. Adjusting these figures to account for inflation alone, the total losses of income and property fall between \$810 million and \$2 billion in 1983 dollars.¹

Recommendations

Japanese Americans

[The remedies, which the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians issued on June 16, 1983, are based upon their fact-finding report and economic impact study.]

Each measure acknowledges to some degree the wrongs inflicted during the war upon the ethnic Japanese. None can fully compensate or, indeed, make the group whole again.

The Commission makes the following recommendations for remedies as an act of national apology.

1. That Congress pass a joint resolution, to be signed by the President, which recognizes that a grave injustice was done and offers the apologies of the nation for the acts of exclusion, removal and detention.

¹ An analysis of economic losses was performed for the Commission by ICF Incorporated. According to their study titled, "Economic Losses of Ethnic Japanese as a Result of Exclusion and Detention, 1942-46, total uncompensated economic losses of the ethnic Japanese adjusted for the corporate bond rate range from \$1.2 billion to \$3.1 billion, and at a 3% interest rate and inflation, from \$2.5 billion to \$6.2 billion.

2. That the President pardon those who were convicted of violating the statutes imposing a curfew on American citizens. The Commission further recommends that the Department of Justice review other wartime convictions of the ethnic Japanese and recommend to the President that he pardon those whose offenses were grounded in a refusal to accept treatment that discriminated among citizens on the basis of race or ethnicity.

3. That the Congress direct the Executive agencies to which Japanese Americans may apply for the restitution of positions, status or entitlements lost in whole or in part because of acts or events between December 1941 and 1945.

4. That the Congress demonstrate official recognition of the injustice done to American citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese resident aliens during the Second World War, and that it recognize the nation's need to make redress for these events, by appropriating monies to establish a special foundation.

The Commission believes a fund for educational and humanitarian purposes related to the wartime events is appropriate and addresses an injustice suffered by an entire ethnic group.

5. The Commissioners, with the exception of Congressman Lungren, recommended that Congress establish a fund which will provide personal redress to those who were excluded, as well as serve the purposes set out in Recommendation #4.

Appropriations of \$1.5 billion should be made to the fund over a reasonable period to be determined by Congress. This fund should be used, first, to provide a one-time per capita compensatory payment of \$20,000 to each of the approximately 60,000 surviving persons excluded from their places of residence pursuant to Executive Order 9066.¹ The burden should be on the government to locate survivors, without requiring any application for payment, and payments should be made to the oldest survivors first. After per

¹ Commissioner William M. Marutani formally renounces any monetary recompense either direct or indirect.

capita payments, the remainder of the fund should be used for the public educational purposes as discussed in Recommendation #4.

The fund should be administered by a Board, the majority of whose members are Americans of Japanese descent appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Aleuts

The Commissioners agree that a claims procedure would not be an effective method of compensation. Therefore, the sums included the Commission's recommendations were chosen to recognize fundamental justice.

1. The Commissioners, with Congressman Lungren dissenting, recommend that Congress establish a fund for the beneficial use of the Aleuts in the amount of \$5 million. The principal and interest of the fund should be spent for community and individual purposes that would be compensatory for the losses and injuries Aleuts suffered as a result of the evacuation.

2. The Commissioners, with Congressman Lungren dissenting, recommend that Congress appropriate funds and direct a payment of \$5,000 per capita to each of the few hundred surviving Aleuts who were evacuated from the Aleutian or Pribilof Islands by the federal government during World War II.

3. That Congress appropriate funds and direct the relevant government agency to rebuild and restore the churches damaged or destroyed in the Aleutian Islands in the course of World War II.

4. That Congress appropriate adequate funds through the public works budget for the Army Corps of Engineers to clear away the debris that remains from World War II in and around populated areas of the Aleutian Islands.

5. That Congress declare Attu to be native land and that Attu be conveyed to the Aleuts through their native corporation upon condition that the native corporation is able to negotiate an agreement with the Coast Guard which will allow that service to continue essential functions on the island.

The Commission believes that, for reasons of redressing the personal justice done to thousands of Americans and resident alien Japanese, and to the Aleuts—and for compelling reasons of preserving a truthful sense of our own history and the lessons we can learn from it—these recommendations should be enacted by the Congress. In the late 1930's W.H. Auden wrote lines that express our present need to acknowledge and to make amends:

*We are left alone with our day, and the time is short
and History to the defeated
May say Alas but cannot help or pardon.*

It is our belief that, though history cannot be unmade, it is well within our power to offer help, and to acknowledge error.

