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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 1/6/2005

File Folder MITTERRAND/CLARK-6:30PM 10/27/1982: I.
BACKGROUND

FOIA

2000-147

Box Number 4

CLARK

70

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1737	PAPER	FRENCH-AMERICAN RELATIONS UNDER MITTERRAND <i>R 11/6/2007 F2000-147</i>	3	ND	B1
1738	PAPER	INSIGHTS... <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	ND	B1 <i>B3</i>
1739	MEMO	WILLIAM MARTIN TO CLARK, RE SOVIET GAS... (WITH 3 PAGES OF VISUALS ATTACHED) <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	4	10/22/1982	B1
1740	CABLE	181600Z AUG 83	1	8/18/1983	B1
1741	LETTER	MITTERRAND TO REAGAN	2	8/18/1983	B1
1742	CABLE	AWACS...	2	8/18/1983	B1
1743	TRANSLATION	OF 1744 <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
1744	CABLE	090755Z AUG 83 <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	1	8/9/1983	B1

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FRENCH-AMERICAN RELATIONS UNDER MITTERRAND

Background: General DeGaulle established the broad outlines of post-war French foreign policy in the 1960s. He understood that in the crunch France stood with the United States, and during the Cuban missile crisis he proved it. However, short of these crises or fundamental East-West issues, French policy is to maneuver between the superpowers to advance French interests.

Mitterrand's Approach: President Mitterrand has inherited the fundamentals of the approach laid out by deGaulle, and added two new ingredients: his personal convictions, including a strong anti-communist streak; and Socialist ideology, which favors, for example, Third World liberation movements. The result is French policy which cooperates with the U.S. when interests coincide, and differs from us or even opposes us, when they do not. Unlike the U.K., Germans and Italians, the French are not concerned about a "special relationship." To them, the relationship with the U.S. is no more or less than the sum of its parts. Another new element is Mitterrand's approach to Europe because he recognizes France no longer has DeGaulle's clout and also that West Germany has grown relatively stronger. Thus he has an interest in promoting real European unity and Mitterrand cannot risk isolation in Europe to the extent DeGaulle was willing to.

was looking for

U.S. Evaluation: The only sensible way for U.S. policymakers to evaluate France is to look at the individual components of the relationship. The listing below arranges the issues in priority order: military deterrence is first, and rhetoric is last. This priority should be kept in mind, since the rhetoric, the most visible component, often wrongly receives the most attention. Look at what the French are doing, not what they are saying.

● Military Deterrence: In this area the French have been exemplary. They have raised their defense budget substantially, publicly supported INF deployments, increased their nuclear forces, including continuing development of enhanced radiation weapons, and, most recently, begun close cooperation with the West Germans in defense matters.

● East-West Economic Issues: Here the French record has been mixed, as economic self-interest has clashed with security considerations. On the positive side, the French are taking a harder line in COCOM, as shown in the current List Review; however, they have recently informed us that they will export a modified MT-20 digital switching system to the USSR, contrary to our high-level requests. On the negative side they have resisted elimination of subsidized exports to the Soviet Union, although their trade with the East has dropped dramatically. Finally, they have taken the lead in Europe in violating our Poland-related sanctions against the USSR, turning it into a U.S. versus France issue instead of an East-West issue.

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DATE 11/6/07

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● Geopolitical Issues Outside of Europe

-- Middle East. The French have cooperated in the formation of both the MFO and MFN; they maintain the largest military forces besides the United States in the Indian Ocean. They have publicly associated themselves with the President's peace initiative.

-- Latin America. The French-Mexican declaration on Nicaragua and the French arms sales have been contrary to U.S. interests. More recently, however, the rhetorical level on Latin America has lowered. We have reports that there is an internal debate going on in the government over Latin American policy, with the realists taking a position compatible with U.S. views, and the ideologues continuing to romanticize left-wing guerillas.

*Corsica
1 bill,
100,000 bn
Cortina
(no) wear*

-- Afghanistan. The French have continued to condemn the Soviet invasion, and have refused high-level contacts with the USSR on that basis. French doctors are the most eloquent testifiers in the West on Soviet brutality in Afghanistan. We have recent indications that the French are considering direct military assistance to the freedom fighters.

-- Africa. The French have been cooperating with us privately in the Contact Group, but recent public rhetoric by Cheysson has been extremely damaging to our efforts. In Chad, the French are competing with us by backing a different faction, but at least we both are working to exclude Qadafhy's influence.

● U.S.-French Economic Relations: French policy here is its usual attempt to take whatever advantage it can. The new government continues to market its Airbus commercial passenger aircraft using unfair tactics, at the expense of U.S. companies. The French continue to export agricultural products, subsidized by the EC, cutting into traditional U.S. markets. The new government, in nationalizing U.S. companies in France, is attempting to make minimum compensation payments and gain the maximum access to technology.

● French-USSR Relations: So far the French have had no high-level contact with Moscow because of the occupation of Afghanistan. Recently, however, there have been visits by lower-level cabinet members, and there are indications that Mitterrand is considering returning to the more traditional French posture of dealing with both superpowers.

● Rhetoric: We are currently in a low period from the rhetorical point of view. The recent Cheysson remarks in Africa were vintage socialist critique of the United States, and Mitterrand has let slip a few swipes at the United States. These things run in cycles. For the first few months after Mitterrand took office, the rhetoric was targetted at the Soviet Union, to our pleasant surprise. Then came the loose French high-level public comments on our Latin American policy and earlier this summer there were comments on our temporary denial orders.

Summary. French actions and rhetoric on the most important American interests - military deterrence of the Soviet Union and the Middle East-have been very supportive of U.S. policies. In the economic area, French policy has been most often at odds with the United States, and there have been differences on other geopolitical issues. The rhetorical mood has swung back and forth. This is the usual mixture that we have come to expect from France, and overall it is probably somewhat better than most would have predicted for a Socialist French president.

U.S. interests will best be served if we continue to keep a balanced view of the relationship. In many ways, French ~~policies are~~ essentially the same as our other European allies. We should let the French know that we understand that our interests coincide on the most important issues, and we should strongly assert our positions on the other issues. For example, if the French do not wish to come to an economic summit in May in the United States, we should simply hold it without them. We should not expect the French to take the same total view of their relationship with us that the British, German and Italians do. But, since the French do not wish to be isolated in Europe, we can exert indirect leverage to moderate their policies by taking the "European" responsibilities seriously. We must understand what drives the French and turn it to our own advantage and outsmart them.

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1738	PAPER INSIGHTS...	2	ND	B1

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~~USSR Transfer:~~

US Sov Bilateral Trade

US Ex port to Sov Union

1980 - \$1,512.8 mil^{bil}

1981 - \$2 bil 431.3 mil

1982 - Jan. \$398 mil

Feb 450.5 mil

Mar 421.3 mil

Apr 325.1 mil

May 265.7 mil

US Imp. fr Sov U.

1980 - \$453.2 mil

1981 - \$347.5 "

1982 - Jan \$18.4 mil

Feb \$22 mil

Mar \$18 mil

Apr \$15.5 mil

May \$10.2 mil

Comparison ~~1st half~~ 82 to 81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

John P.

1st category:

French Imports for Sov.
+ 9%

French exports to Sov.

+ 2%

}
Up
Up

~~US~~

US Import for Sov. U.

- 45% (82) - 120% more

US Export to Sov.

+ 32% more (82)

100% more

HW

7271

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Gas in European Markets

We have received a troubling CIA assessment on the potential market for Soviet gas in European markets through use of only one strand of the Siberian pipeline and full use of existing infrastructure. This illustrates very clearly that unless we can get a commitment from the Europeans to limit their gas contracts to present levels, the Soviets will capture most of the market of the 1990s and drive out the competitive alternatives.

Attached (Tab I) are three visuals which tell the story.

Case I is the no Siberian gas case. The key here is that Dutch gas would have to be increased over the short term, but over the longer term, Norwegian and North African producers can meet demand. This is the President's original alternative energy case.

Case II assumes that the first strand of the pipeline is completed but that there are no more gas contracts with the Soviet Union. As you can see, there is still room for alternatives, particularly Norwegian gas. Sufficient market is preserved to allow development of the giant Troll field.

Case III shows how big a chunk the Soviets can take out of the market with only one strand, if some limitation is not imposed on contracts. The results are dismaying. They can effectively block out all large scale alternatives. Only the Sleipner field in Norway is assumed to be developed. Troll is knocked out.

Bottom line: The Foreign Ministers communique is presently inadequate because it does not contain a statement to limit gas purchases over the longer term. If we do not get this commitment, then economic momentum will be on the side of the Soviets. They have all the advantages. We must even the scales. I think that the President must be made aware of this analytical evidence and the consequences of not pressing the Europeans now to limit their gas purchases over the longer term.

Attachment
Tab I Visuals

cc: Bailey, Blair, Nau, Pipes, Robinson

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
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
BY NOJ NARA, DATE 6/23/06

Continental Europe: Natural Gas Supply and Demand Forecast 1980-2000



Low Demand Scenario
Without Siberian Gas


Continental Europe: Natural Gas Supply and Demand Forecast 1980-2000



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Case III - Soviet Domination
of Gas Market with Only One
Strand and Full Use of Existing
Capacity

Continental Europe: Natural Gas Supply and Demand Forecast 1980-2000



Maximum Utilization of Existing
and Planned Soviet Pipelines

~~SECRET~~

October 27, 1982

Regarding the state dinner in Versailles on June 6, 1982.

Judge William Clark had on his

left - Senator Edouard BONNEFOUS

right - Monsieur François de GROSSOUVRE

(M. de Grossouvre is Technical Advisor - Conseiller technique -
to the President of the French Republic).

f1

~~TOP SECRET~~

5A
182155Z

~~TOP SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 56

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 172

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DEX #

DTG 182043Z AUG 83

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FASTFAX #

SAVR

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1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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1. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK/SANTA BARBARA TOR: 182155Z AUG 83

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: Deliver ASAP!

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

105
11405

JUDGE,

ATTACHED ARE THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE TWO FRENCH CABLES TODAY.
WE ARE WORKING ON A COVER MEMO SENDING THE MITTERAND CABLE TO THE
PRESIDENT. ALSO ATTACHED IS OUR CABLE TO PARIS.

JOHN

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1740	CABLE 181600Z AUG 83	13	8/18/1983	B1

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1741	LETTER MITTERRAND TO REAGAN	2	8/18/1983	B1

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THIS IS A ROUGH TRANSLATION:

~~TOP SECRET~~

Some

Dear Friend,

I received your message and found it very sensible.

I immediately informed the President of the Republic.

As you know, he himself received a message from President Reagan on the same subject, to which he will respond very soon.

In this affair we have shown up to now the greatest vigilance, and we will continue to do so in adapting our attitude to the changing situation in this area.

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NLS FDO-147#1743

BY LOT NARA, DATE 6/23/06

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ELYSEE FRANCE 0001
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Z 090755Z AUG 83
FM ELYSEE FRANCE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~T R E S S E C R E T~~ - G O U V E R N E M E N T A L

TO:

MONSIEUR WILLIAM P. CLARK

PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DE SECURITE
LA MAISON BLANCHE
WASHINGTON

FROM: MONSIEUR JACQUES ATTALI

CONSEILLER SPECIAL AUPRES
DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

PARIS, LE 08 AOUT 1983

CHER AMI,

JAI BIEN RECU VOTRE MESSAGE
AUQUEL JAI ETE TRES SENSIBLE.

JEN AI IMMEDIATEMENT INFORME
LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE. COMME VOUS LE
SAVEZ, IL A LUI-MEME RECU UN MESSAGE DU PRESIDENT
REAGAN SUR LE MEME SUJET, AUQUEL IL REPONDRA
TRES PROCHAINEMENT.

DANS CETTE AFFAIRE, NOUS AVONS
MANIFESTE JUSQUICI LA PLUS EXTREME
VIGILANCE ET NOUS CONTINUERONS A LEXERCER
EN ADAPTANT NOTRE ATTITUDE A LEVOLUTION DE
LA SITUATION SUR LE TERRAIN.

SINCEREMENT VOTRE,
JACQUES ATTALI

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

~~SECRET~~