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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 1/20/2005

File Folder TRIP, PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN: JUNE 1982 PARIS,
VERSAILLES, BONN, BERLIN, LONDON (2)

FOIA

2000-147

Box Number 7

CLARK

123

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2860	NOTE	BUD MCFARLANE TO CLARK <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	1	6/1/1982	B1
2864	LETTER	DRAFT TO PM THATCHER (WITH NOTATIONS) <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	3	ND	B1
2866	TALKING POINTS	FOR USE WITH PM THATCHER <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	5/31/1982	B1
2867	LIST	OF IDEAS <i>R 11/6/2007 F2000-147</i>	2	5/29/1982	B1
2868	TALKING POINTS	WITH MITTERRAND ON 6/3/82 <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
2870	OUTLINE	RE VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT <i>R 6/23/2006</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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123

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2871	TALKING POINTS	WITH PM SUZUKI 6/6/82 R 6/23/2006	1	ND	B1
2872	NOTES	RE VERSAILLES R 6/23/2006	2	ND	B1
2873	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO CLARK, RE VERSAILLES SUMMIT R 6/23/2006	1	6/17/1982	B1
2874	LETTER	EVAN GALBRAITH TO JAMES BUCKLEY, RE VERSAILLES SUMMIT R 11/6/2007 F2000-147 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	6/23/1982	B1

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Judge Clark

I have just learned that Mike Deaver has indeed decided to have the President leave Paris Sunday night vice Monday morning.

Judge, that will be considered a terrible affront by the French. The President will suffer criticism by all his counterparts, not just the French.

This kind of rudeness is not like President Reagan. I recommend that you nip this in the bud.

Buel

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Judge Clark.

My suggestion is to use time to work with key issues:

- economic policy coordination
- trade
- E-W credits

Other issues have already been touched on & do not need further emphasis since they are less important in context of Summit for ex. tech., energy, developing countries.

If time permits, we should try to cover only one other issue:

(over) - Global Negotiations

Henry

There are two laterals to
cover

Suzuki

Thatcher

But perhaps you can begin
there this afternoon.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Judge Clark,

Block is here to comment on the attached papers which he sent to you over the weekend. If asked, you might indicate that we have received them and included them in additional background material for the Summit.

Henry

I understand Block will speak during Brock's presentation.

Judge

~~Craig~~

Sec Block asked Craig Fuller to attend this meeting to bring up our complaints over European agricultural subsidies.

That issue is subsumed in our overall position on trade and need not be singled out. Still if the meeting here is on schedule you might ask him (Block) to comment during Brock's time.

Buel

P.S. I'm going back to the office to work on trip remarks, if that's OK.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WPC HAS SEEN

June 1, 1982

Judge Clark

Subject: Leaving Paris Early?

I talked to Mike Deaver about his proposal that the President leave Paris Sunday night instead of on Monday morning as now planned.

Mike is concerned that the President will not get enough rest if he stays in Paris Sunday night. He acknowledges the damage that will be done in US-French relations but views the greater good to be the President's health.

I remain convinced that we ought not do this at this late date. I am on weak ground to the extent that the French are misbehaving at every turn as we prepare for this visit. Still the President ought not lower himself to their level. He can make his points of displeasure and we have definite leverage on them to make life difficult if they don't end up supporting us.

But for the President to cut his visit short would be viewed--not just by Mitterand but the other counterparts as well--as petulant and not befitting a great power.

I urge you to simply tell Mike that as much as you agree with him, we cannot at this late date change the plan.

Bud
Bud

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F00-147#2860

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

6/21/82

SAURAF-1

*Proposed letter from State
from TRF
We comp no
page*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Dear Margaret:

I wanted you to have my thinking on the Falklands crisis now to help set the stage for our discussion on Friday.

Courageously and at great sacrifice, the United Kingdom has successfully defended the rule of law. I can only hope, as I know you do, that British forces will complete their occupation of the Falklands swiftly and with a minimum of further bloodshed.

In frustrating Argentine aggression, you have served the cause of international order and peace. By your leadership and resolve in this crisis, you have set a standard for the West and sent an important message to aggressors everywhere. We are proud to have assisted you in this endeavor, for your cause has been ours as well. Because of this, our support, as I know you recognize, has remained steady, despite the fact that it has, thus far, been at some cost for us in the Hemisphere.

It is important now -- for the sake of both our countries -- that we look to the future. Once Argentine forces are off the Islands, Buenos Aires could well refuse a ceasefire, declaring that Argentina has lost a battle but will continue the war. Thus, if we fail to do our utmost now to shape events, the terrible costs you have borne, and the smaller price we have paid, will be but the beginning of our sacrifices rather than their end.

While I do not doubt that you are ready to deal with such an outcome should it prove unavoidable, I know that you are as determined as I to do all you can to bring peace to the South

DECLASSIFIED
NLS Feb-147# 2864

BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/23/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Atlantic. For our part, we remain willing -- as we have been throughout the conflict -- to play a role in finding a satisfactory settlement. In keeping with that position, I am, in principle, prepared to furnish a U.S. contingent for a peacekeeping force, provided we are joined in that force by at least one Latin American nation. Such an arrangement would, of course, have to be based on Security Council Resolution 502, of which negotiations on the underlying dispute are an integral part.

It will be important, I think, for the two of us on Friday ^{SAT, ?} to discuss in some depth how we might together deal with the longer term issues we will face. For example, would it be best to suggest now that the Islanders will remain British or become independent? Does this risk convincing the Argentines that they have no choice but to choose conflict rather than negotiation? Or on the other hand would ambiguity for now on this question assist the negotiations but perhaps at the same time reinforce and feed revanchist attitudes in Buenos Aires?

I look forward, Margaret, to discussing these and many other difficult questions with you on Friday. ^{SAT, ?} Our task, it seems to me, must be to decide how best to restore peace to the South Atlantic by putting Resolution 502 into practice through arrangements that do not reinforce protracted Argentine hostility.

There may well be

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

value in an early initiative, lest the Argentines and others get set on a course from which they will be unable to deviate. In the meantime, it is important to avoid staking out positions that would make a successful initiative impossible.

I am confident that we will be able to work together in the future as closely and effectively as we have in the past.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 31, 1982
2:10 p.m.

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH PM THATCHER

-- LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETING NEXT FRIDAY, WHEN WE CAN GO OVER THE FALKLANDS SITUATION IN DETAIL. BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR ME TO GIVE YOU SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FALKLANDS NOW BECAUSE YOUR IMPRESSIVE MILITARY ADVANCE COULD QUICKLY CHANGE THE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO US BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT FRIDAY.

-- YOU ARE TO BE CONGRATULATED ON WHAT YOUR BOYS ARE DOING IN THE FALKLANDS. YOU HAVE TAKEN MAJOR RISKS AND HAVE DEMONSTRATED TO THE WHOLE WORLD THAT UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY.

-- AS YOU KNOW, AL HAIG HAS PASSED ON SOME OF OUR IDEAS ON HOW WE MIGHT CAPITALIZE ON YOUR SUCCESSES WITH A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AL'S CONCEPT HAS MY FULLEST BACKING. GIVEN ARGENTINA'S PERFORMANCE THROUGH THIS WHOLE AFFAIR, A NEW INITIATIVE MAY NOT SUCCEED. BUT EVEN IF THE ARGENTINES WERE TO TURN IT DOWN, A NEW INITIATIVE WOULD STILL DO A LOT TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO OUR COLLECTIVE INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

-- IN PARTICULAR, AN EFFORT TO SHOW THAT WE WERE STILL WILLING TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES WOULD UNDERCUT THE EFFORTS OF LEFTISTS IN LATIN AMERICA WHO ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS.

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NLS FOO-147#2866
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

-- IN THINKING ABOUT OUR PLAN, I KNOW YOU RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF TIMING. YOU WILL BE THE BEST JUDGE OF WHEN THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE ISLANDS WILL PERMIT A NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE THAT AN INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE THE BEST AND PERHAPS ONLY CHANCE OF SUCCESS PRIOR TO A CAPTURE OF PORT STANLEY. OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS NO CHANCE OF THE PROPOSAL WORKING WITHOUT LATIN AMERICAN COVER IN THE FORM OF BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION. THAT MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE ARGENTINE MILITARY HUMILIATION.

-- I KNOW YOU ARE PLANNING TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS SITUATION WITH YOUR CABINET TOMORROW AND THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO TAKE SOME TOUGH DECISIONS. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE JUNTA CAN MAKE A DEAL. BUT EVEN IF A DEAL CAN'T BE STRUCK, I BELIEVE YOU WILL PUT YOURSELF IN A FAVORABLE POSITION BY OFFERING.

Ideas for an Approach

When British military success is at hand, the US and Brazil would propose an agreement to the UK and Argentina containing the following elements taken as an integrated whole.

1. General and permanent ceasefire (including provisions for the non-resupply and the regrouping of Argentine forces); establishment of a temporary British military administration; lifting of sanctions by Argentina, the UK and third countries;
2. Immediate introduction of a peacekeeping force consisting of contingents from the US and Brazil to verify the ceasefire and ensure the separation of forces;
3. Rapid withdrawal of Argentine forces;
4. Creation of a Contact Group consisting of the UK, the US, Brazil and Argentina;
5. End of military administration and start of local self-government by the local councils with the Contact Group ratifying all decisions not inconsistent with the purposes of the Agreement;
6. Phased withdrawal of British forces, with the peace-keeping force to assume responsibility for the security of the islands for a limited period;
7. Negotiations, without preconditions, on the definitive settlement of the dispute with the assistance of the other members of the Contact Group;
8. Undertaking by both parties not to take any action that would prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

SECRET
RDS-3 5/29/02

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-147#2867
BY NDS NARA DATE 11/6/07

POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY

1. RESTORATION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INCLUDE RETURN OF A GOVERNOR;
2. AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICLY ESPOUSING INDEPENDENCE OR SEMI-INDEPENDENCE AS THE BRITISH GOAL;
3. AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES.
4. CONTACT GROUP TO STAY ON INDEFINITELY.

Talks with French President Mitterrand

(June 3, 1982)

- Summits. Work of both Versailles and Bonn closely linked; successful outcome essential for both;
- Versailles. Mitterrand technology initiative impressive; look forward to discussing;
- East-West. Credit restraint vis-à-vis Soviets a prime U.S. objective; need French support;
- Also need French support to strengthen COCOM restraints on high-technology transfer and Western dependence on Soviet energy;
- Arms Control. Strong Western support for U.S. START/INF initiatives essential to counter Soviet propaganda moves;
- Strategic Cooperation. As long as we remain united on major issues, this will continue to be a key priority in our bilateral relations;
- Central America. Appreciate hold-back on French arms sales to Nicaragua; essential this continue;
- Middle East. Laud French peacekeeping contributions in Lebanon and Sinai; we committed to major effort on autonomy talks;
- Morocco. Not competing with France (brief on Hassan visit);
- Terrorism. We favor full cooperation with France aimed at tightening international controls against this scourge;
- Falklands. U.S. will continue to support UK; what are French views?

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NLS F00-147 #2868BY LOT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

Courtesy Call on Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris
(June 4, 1982)

- Particularly pleased to find you recovered from serious 1978 auto accident (which prevented meeting him then);
- Appreciate beauty and hospitality of Paris;
- (If raised). Pleased you are planning visit to U.S.
- (If raised). Would certainly hope to meet with you if visit occurs; my schedule always problematic, but will ask VP to ensure you are able make best possible use of your time.

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT
(June 4-6, 1982)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Action</u>
A. U.S. Strategy and Priorities	3 mins.	Regan <i>Schultz</i>
B. Key Economic Issues		
1. Macroeconomic/Monetary Issues	10 mins.	Sprinkel <i>Barl</i>
a. European (French) concerns about Exchange Rates		
b. President's Economic Policy Coordination Initiative		
c. Monetary Statement		
2. Trade Issues	10 mins.	Brock <i>econ - policy coordination</i>
a. Contentious Issues - steel, agriculture, reciprocity, Japan problem, European pessimism		<i>Bele</i>
b. U.S. Objectives		<i>Ballougo</i>
1) New Goals for 1980s		<i>Jack Block</i>
a) services b) high technology c) investment related trade issues d) broader investment code (Sprinkel) e) agriculture f) trade round with developing countries		<i>Suzars</i> <i>Somit</i>
2) What Versailles can do for GATT Ministerial		
c. Other ideas		
1) Mitterrand's views		
2) Fraser proposals		
3. East-West Issues <i>Cred's</i>	10 mins.	Haig
a. Status of COCOM Work		
b. Pipeline and Credits		
1) Report of last Buckley Meeting		
2) Approach at Versailles		

41884
Sover

40 *bill subsidies*

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NLS F00-147# 2870

BY LOT NARA, DATE 6/23/06

- 4. Technology 3 mins. Hormats/Nau
 - a. Interventionist Approach
 - b. President's Response
 - c. How to handle Working Group
- 5. Developing Countries 5 mins. Leland/Nau
 - a. Comprehensive U.S. Approach
 - b. Global Negotiations
 - c. IDA
- 6. Energy 2 mins. Hormats
 - a. Energy Affiliate
- 7. Economic Communique 5 mins. Hormats
- C. Key Political Issues 15 mins. Haig
 - 1. U.S. Priorities
 - 2. Political Statement

D.

Prime Minister Suzuki

10 mins. Haig

MEETING WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI
(June 6, 1982)

TO BE PROVIDED

Talks with Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki
(June 6, 1982)

- Defense. Japan is preparing defense budget for next year, and Suzuki may stress Japan's role in anti-submarine warfare but ask U.S. to fill gaps in air defense and anti-surface capabilities. We hope Japan will play major overall role in proximate sea lanes (out to 1,000 miles), while U.S. supplements with major role in Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific.
- Trade. Japan announced new package on May 28. We appreciate political commitment expressed in this package, especially Prime Minister's personal statement and involvement. But the specific gains to American and foreign businessmen still appear to be small.
- East-West Trade. We seek Japan's cooperation on credit controls and regret that we could not respond more promptly to your concerns about Sakhalin equipment but we have to consider sanctions primarily in light of U.S.S.R. behavior in Poland.
- Alaskan Oil. Japan has long complained that we refuse to sell them U.S. oil even while we do not want them to develop oil resources with U.S.S.R. U.S. is now willing to seek Congressional authority to sell Alaskan oil to Japan (FYI: There is virtually zero prospect that Congress will grant such authority.)
- Exchange Rates. Suzuki wrote you on this subject and you have replied.
- Civil Aviation Agreement: Negotiations are bogged down. Japan has not reacted to our last "mini package."
- Fishing Allocations: U.S. held back Japan's allocation to force Japan to take more of its catch in U.S. waters through joint ventures.

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NLS F00-147#2871
BY LDT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres.

V P

Trues

Baker

Deane

Hergen

Fuller/Danna

Haig

Hornets

Bunt

Byan

(plus one)

Clark

Rentschler

Han

Tyson

Wingate

Block

Brock

Baldridge

Versatile ~~leaving~~
no leads met

~~at night~~

100
100
100

Women

Sun window 6th
leads met

Embassy - Proven -
she stops there -

Roaches

~~at~~

Cape - Cut

call just her to
terrible - finally found in

DECLASSIFIED
REMOVED

NLS FOI-147-2872

BY LCF NARA DATE 6/23/06



WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

6 june 1982

DECLARATION OF THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

In the course of our meeting at Versailles we have improved our mutual understanding of the world economic situation, and we have agreed on a number of objectives for our future action.

We affirm that the improvement of the present situation, by a further reduction of inflation and by a return to steady growth and higher levels of employment, would strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard our security, to maintain confidence in the democratic values that we share, and to preserve the cultural heritage of our peoples in all their diversity. Full employment, price stability and sustained and balanced growth are ambitious objectives. They are attainable in the coming years only if we pursue policies which encourage productive investment and technological progress ; if, in addition to our own individual efforts, we are willing to join forces ; if each country is sensitive to the effects of its policies on others, and if we collaborate in promoting world development.

In this spirit, we have decided to implement the following lines of action :

- Growth and employment must be increased.

2

This cannot be attained on a durable basis unless we are successful in our continuing fight against inflation. This will also help to bring down interest rates which are now insupportably high and to bring about more stable exchange rates. It is essential to intensify our economic and monetary cooperation. In this regard, we will work towards a constructive and orderly evolution of the international monetary system by a closer cooperation among the authorities representing the currencies of North-America, of Japan and of the European Community in pursuing medium term economic and monetary objectives. In this respect, we have committed ourselves to the undertakings contained in the attached statement.

- The growth of world trade in all its facets is both a necessary element for the growth of each country and a consequence of that growth. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthening the open multilateral trading system as embodied in the GATT and to maintaining its effective operation. In order to promote stability and employment through trade and growth, we will resist protectionist pressures and trade distorting practices. We are resolved to complete the work of the Tokyo round and to improve the capacity of the GATT to solve current and future trade problems. We will also work towards the further opening of our markets. We will cooperate with the developing countries to strengthen and improve the multilateral system, to expand trading opportunities in particular with the newly industrialised countries. We shall participate fully in the forthcoming GATT Ministerial Conference in order to take concrete steps towards these ends. We shall work for early agreement on

3

is therefore important that a high level of financial flows and official assistance should be maintained and that their amount and their effectiveness, should be increased as far as possible, with responsibilities shared broadly among all countries capable of making a contribution. The launching of global negotiations is a major political objective approved by all participants in the Summit. The latest draft resolution circulated by the G77 is helpful, and a discussion at Versailles showed general acceptance of the view that it would serve as the basis for consultations with the countries concerned. We believe that there is now a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiations. At the same time, we are prepared to continue and develop practical cooperation with the developing countries through innovations within the World Bank, including in the area of energy, and sustaining the strength of the IDA and other multilateral development institutions. We are ready to support international arrangements to improve the conditions for private investment ; programmes designed to increase indigenous food and energy production and programs to address the implications of population growth. We are also ready to support economically sound measures to help reduce, and counter the effects of, instability in the commodity exports earnings of those developing countries especially dependent on them. Finally we favour to a further concentration of official assistance towards poorer countries.

-

- Revitalisation and growth of the world economy will depend not only on our own efforts but also to a

the renewal of the OECD export credit consensus.

Economic exchanges have an important role in the development of a stable East-West relationship. We affirm our intention so to conduct east-west economic relations as to ensure that they are mutually advantageous and that they take full account of security considerations, particularly in the technological, economic and financial areas, including the need for commercial prudence in export credits. We shall consult through the usual channels among ourselves and with existing international fora to achieving these ends. *

- The progress we have already made does not diminish the need for continuing efforts to economize on energy, particularly through the price mechanism, and to promote alternative sources, including nuclear energy and coal, in a long-term perspective. These efforts will enable us further to reduce our vulnerability to interruptions in the supply of energy and instability of prices. Cooperation to develop new energy technologies, and to strengthen our capacity to deal with disruptions, can contribute to our common energy security. We shall also work to strengthen our cooperation with both oil-exporting and oil-importing developing countries.

- The growth of the developing countries and the deepening of a constructive relationship with them are vital for the political and economic well being of the whole world. It

large extent upon cooperation among our countries and with other countries in the exploitation of scientific and technological development. We have to exploit the immense opportunities presented by the new technologies, particularly for creating new employment opportunities. We need to remove barriers to, and to promote, the development of and trade in new technologies both in the public sector and in the private sector. Our countries will need to train men and women in the new technologies and to create the economic, social and cultural conditions which allows these technologies to develop and flourish. We have considered the report presented to us on these issues by the President of the French Republic. In this context we have decided to set up promptly a working group of representatives of our governments and of the European Community to develop, in close consultation with the relevant international institutions, especially the O.E.C.D., proposals to give effect to these objectives, we have noted. The group will be asked to submit its report to us by 31 December 1982. The conclusions of the report and the resulting actions will be considered at the next Economic Summit to be held in 1983 in the United States.

6 june 1982

STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY UNDERTAKINGS

1. We accept a joint responsibility to work for greater stability of the world monetary system. We recognize that this rests primarily on convergence of policies designed to achieve lower inflation, higher employment and renewed economic growth ; and thus to maintain the internal and external value of our currencies. We are determined to discharge this obligation in close collaboration with all interested countries and monetary institutions.
2. We attach major importance to the role of the IMF as a monetary authority and we will give it our full support in its efforts to foster stability.
3. We are ready to strengthen our cooperation with the IMF in its work of surveillance ; and to develop this on a multilateral basis taking into account particularly the currencies constituting the SDR
4. We rule out the use of our exchange rates to gain unfair competitive advantages.

5. We are ready, if necessary, to use intervention in exchange markets to counter disorderly conditions, as provided for under article IV of the IMF articles of agreement.

6. Those of us who are members of the EMS consider that these undertakings are complementary to the obligations of stability which they have already undertaken in that framework and recognize the role of the System in the further development of stability in the international monetary system.

7. We are all convinced that greater monetary stability will assist freer flows of goods, services and capital. We are determined to see that greater monetary stability and freer flows of trade and capital reinforce one another in the interest of economic growth and employment.

JUNE 10, 1982

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO THE NAC

IT IS A DISTINCT HONOR TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS ASSEMBLY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AND A SPECIAL PLEASURE TO EXTEND AMERICA'S WELCOME TO OUR NEW SPANISH COLLEAGUES.

THE PRESENCE HERE OF PRIME MINISTER CALVO SOTELO MAKES THIS MORE THAN AN HISTORIC MEETING OF THE COUNCIL; IT MAKES IT AN OCCASION FOR CELEBRATION.

SPAIN'S MEMBERSHIP IN OUR RANKS TODAY REPRESENTS A MUTUAL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN DEMOCRACY, IN OUR SHARED BELIEFS IN THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE RULE OF LAW, AND IN THE STRENGTH AND VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE WE HAVE BUILT TO DEFEND THESE VALUES.

THIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ALSO GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO PAUSE, FOR A MOMENT, TO REAFFIRM AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THE FIRST PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR ALLIANCE RESTS.

FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE IS AN INSEPARABLE LINK BETWEEN THE SECURITY OF ALL AND THE SECURITY OF EACH.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT TO REAFFIRM IN UNMISTAKABLE TERMS AMERICAN ADHERENCE TO THIS PRINCIPLE.

SEVEN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS BEFORE ME HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS INDISPENSABLE TO AMERICAN SECURITY.

I DECLARE TO YOU TODAY THAT A HEALTHY, VIGOROUS AND EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THE UNITED STATES IS IN NATO BECAUSE IT SUPPORTS OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. EACH OF YOUR COUNTRIES IS IN IT FOR THE SAME REASON. OUR SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE.

ALL OF US KNOW THIS; INDEED, I CANNOT IMAGINE THAT ANY ONE OF US HERE TODAY HARBORS THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT THE WORLD WOULD BE A MUCH MORE DANGEROUS PLACE FOR EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES AND FOR ALL OF OUR COMMON VALUES WERE IT NOT FOR OUR COLLECTIVE RESOLVE TO PROVIDE FOR COMMON DEFENSE.

NOR CAN ANY OF US FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE BONDS OF COMMON CIVILIZATION WHICH UNITE OUR NATIONS. WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES WE MAY HAVE OVER ISSUES OF THE DAY, EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES IS NOURISHED AND STRENGTHENED BY MEMBERSHIP IN THIS GREAT, VOLUNTARY ALLIANCE OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONS.

IT IS TIME TO CONVEY THIS FACT MORE CLEARLY TO OUR OWN PUBLICS. THE SUPPORT OF OUR PEOPLE IS THE BEDROCK OF OUR ALLIANCE, AND THAT SUPPORT REMAINS STRONG. BUT IN MANY OF OUR COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING MY OWN -- THERE IS GROWING PUBLIC QUESTIONING OF THE BASIC PREMISES AND CONTINUED VALIDITY OF NATO, PARTICULARLY BY SOME OF THE YOUNG. WE MUST MEET THIS CHALLENGE TO THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ALLIANCE AND REVERSE THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TREND.

IF WE HAVE VALUES WORTH DEFENDING AGAINST EXTERNAL THREAT -- AND WE DO -- THEN IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE AND ULTIMATELY TRAGIC IF WE FAILED TO PROTECT THEM AGAINST A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE WITHIN OUR RANKS.

FEW THINGS COULD BE MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO OUR ALLIANCE THAN FOR FRIENDS OR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES TO QUESTION AMERICA'S RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN THAT MOST VISIBLE SYMBOL OF OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO, THE AMERICAN TROOP PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR END OF WHAT OFTEN IS CALLED THE TRANS-ATLANTIC BARGAIN. THERE WILL BE NO UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE. AMERICAN FORCE LEVELS WILL REMAIN FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR SHARED SECURITY NEEDS.

BUT THIS UNSWERVING AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON DEFENSE MUST BE MATCHED BY AN UNQUESTIONABLE EUROPEAN RESOLVE TO CONTRIBUTE A FAIR SHARE TO THE ALLIANCE'S DEFENSE AND ASSUME A FAIR SHARE OF THE RISKS.

I RECOGNIZE AND APPLAUD THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION WHICH AMERICA'S ALLIES MAKE TO THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. EACH OF YOU HAS A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO OUR COMMON EFFORT. NOWHERE IS THERE A BETTER EXAMPLE OF THIS CONTRIBUTION THAN HERE IN GERMANY. THE GERMAN PEOPLE HOST THE FORCES OF SIX NATIONS, AND DO SO WITH UNPARALLELED HOSPITALITY AND SUPPORT, AS DEMONSTRATED SO VIVIDLY BY THE RECENT U.S.-GERMAN WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT. GERMAN ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS AND GERMAN RESERVES ALSO PROVIDE THE BACKBONE OF THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

JUST AS WE ALL RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE THE SACRIFICES WHICH OUR PARTNERS HAVE MADE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, WE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OUR JOINT EFFORTS HAVE NOT PRODUCED A SATISFACTORY CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT GIVEN THE GROWTH OF THE THREAT AGAINST US. IMPRESSIVE AS THEY HAVE BEEN, THE EFFORTS WE ALREADY HAVE MADE ARE NOT ENOUGH. WE ALL MUST DO MORE TO FULFILL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE FUTURE FREEDOM AND SAFETY OF OUR CITIZENS.

THE UNITED STATES IS NOW TAKING STEPS TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCES THAT RESULTED FROM PAST NEGLECT OF OUR MILITARY POSTURE, ESPECIALLY IN OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL OF US WORK, AND WORK TOGETHER, TO REPAIR CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THAT WE COOPERATE IN MEETING THREATS TO COMMON INTERESTS OUTSIDE THE NATO TREATY AREA.

EVEN IN THESE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC TIMES, THE ALLIANCE HAS THE MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. WE HOLD THE CLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE EAST. OUR ECONOMIES BASICALLY ARE SOUND. WE HAVE THE FORCE OF CREATIVITY AND THE TRADITION OF COOPERATION ON OUR SIDE.

WE NEED MORE THAN DECLARATIONS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO MEET AGREED STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS.

WE NEED CONCRETE STEPS NOW TOWARD THAT GOAL, AND MUST DO EVEN MORE IN THE FUTURE AS MORE RESOURCES BECOME AVAILABLE. MY ADMINISTRATION VIEWS THE STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE THAT WE WILL APPROVE AT THIS MEETING AS A MANDATE -- NOT A SUBSTITUTE -- FOR ACTION.

IN THE END, OUR SUCCESS IN DETERRING WAR AND DEVELOPING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL DEPEND ON MUTUAL ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH IN TURN MUST REST ON OUR SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE.

WE ALSO CAN AND MUST PURSUE EFFORTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY AND STABILITY THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE. OUR PEOPLES EXPECT THIS -- AND COMMON SENSE DICTATES IT.

YET, JUST AS WE MUST BE SOBER IN OUR APPRAISAL OF SOVIET ARMED STRENGTH, WE MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL, CAN MAKE TO OUR SECURITY.

FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL NOT ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR A MILITARILY STRONG ALLIANCE. INDEED, IT IS ONLY IF WE HAVE THE NEEDED STRENGTH THAT OUR ADVERSARIES WILL HAVE THE INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND TO RESPECT AGREEMENTS REACHED.

ARMS CONTROL MUST NOT BE DIVORCED FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST DECADE PROVES THAT ARMS CONTROL CANNOT WORK IN ISOLATION. WE MUST USE ALL THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC & DIPLOMATIC TOOLS AT OUR COMMAND TO REINFORCE RESTRAINT & RESPONSIBILITY.

ONLY IF WE DO SO CAN ARMS CONTROL PLAY ITS PROPER ROLE.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED, VIGILANTLY MONITORED, AND BACKED BY DETERMINATION TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE, CAN LEND GREATER STABILITY TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND CONTRIBUTE -- PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY -- TO SOVIET RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY.

FOR THIS REASON, THE UNITED STATES WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO REACH EQUITABLE, SUBSTANTIAL AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS OF STRATEGIC FORCES; TO SECURE IN GENEVA A TOTAL BAN ON LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED I.N.F. NUCLEAR MISSILES; AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER ALLIES WHO PARTICIPATE IN M.B.F.R., TO ACHIEVE REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

CONSISTENT WITH OUR LONG-RANGE INTERESTS IN A HEALTHY C.S.C.E. PROCESS, WE ALSO WILL CONTINUE WORKING TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON A MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AS PART OF A BALANCED OUTCOME TO THE C.S.C.E. FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN MADRID.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST NOT SETTLE FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT ONLY BRING THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS. WE MUST SET REASONABLE BUT REALISTIC STANDARDS, AND WE MUST SEE THAT THEY BE MET.

I WELCOME ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THAT ARMS CONTROL MUST BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE.

WE ALLIES HAVE LABORED HARD TO DEVISE ARMS CONTROL POLICIES AND PROPOSALS THAT ARE FAIR & REALISTIC -- AND WHICH, IF ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE, WOULD PRODUCE A SAFER WORLD FOR ALL.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD AND SUSTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT -- AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING -- OF OUR PROPOSALS. FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS, WE HAVE BEEN THE CHAMPIONS OF IMAGINATIVE, DARING, AND GENUINE ARMS CONTROL. WE MUST NOT LET SOVIET PROPAGANDA DISTORT OR MASK THIS FACT. IT IS HIGH TIME THAT WE SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

FINALLY, I THINK IT IS CRUCIAL THAT WE RECALL THAT NOT ONLY OUR OWN PEOPLES, BUT NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, FROM POLAND TO AFGHANISTAN, HAVE A STAKE IN OUR ALLIANCE. THEY RELY ON US TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE. THEY LOOK TO US FOR LEADERSHIP AND CAN DRAW STRENGTH -- & HOPE -- FROM OUR PERFORMANCE.

THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE TO THIS COIN. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, OUR ALLIANCE IS CRUCIALLY AFFECTED BY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND OUR VITAL INTERESTS ARE OFTEN AT STAKE IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD. WE ARE OF COURSE AWARE OF THIS. SOME ALLIES HAVE TAKEN INDIVIDUAL NECESSARY ACTIONS BEYOND NATO'S BOUNDARIES, WHILE OTHERS HAVE FACILITATED THESE ACTIONS. BUT THERE IS MORE TO BE DONE. WE MUST CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, AND ON THE ACTIONS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE -- INDIVIDUALLY AND IN CONCERT -- TO HELP OTHER NATIONS MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE.

IF WE DO NOT DEMONSTRATE THE WILL & THE CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN PEACE & PRESERVE OUR VALUES, NOT ONLY EUROPE BUT THE WORLD AS A WHOLE WILL BECOME A VERY PERILOUS PLACE INDEED. ONLY IF WE ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND THOSE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH PERMIT CIVILIZED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WILL WE FULFILL REASONABLE HOPES FOR A BETTER, SAFER AND MORE SECURE WORLD FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS.

ONE LAST WORD -- OUR ADVERSARIES & THE WORLD MUST BE CONVINCED BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT OUR ALLIANCE IS COMPLETELY UNITED & DETERMINED TO REMAIN SO.

#

National Security Council
The White House







220

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Package #

4229

09 JUN 17 AIO: 12

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
	<u>5</u>		


I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS



44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WPC 11/17/82

MEMORANDUM

4229

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Some
you will
not to
OK*

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

June 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *nb*

SUBJECT: Versailles Summit *(u)*

It is quite clear to me that the Versailles Summit was a failure in every important respect. We gave up our position on two important points, exchange rate intervention and global negotiations, and we got absolutely nothing in return. The failure of the Summit is attested by public and private comment from government leaders including President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt, as well as press comment. Obviously, we must put the best face possible on the results of Versailles, but we must also avoid fooling ourselves. Next year the Summit is in the United States, and we have the opportunity to have that Summit prepared for by people who combine a commitment to the President of the U.S., imagination and competence. All three of these elements to varying degrees were absent at Versailles. I remind you of the series of memoranda I addressed to you during the preparations for the Summit. All and every one of the suggestions contained therein were rejected out of hand by the National Security Council *sherpa*. I would appreciate the opportunity of discussing this with you in greater detail at your convenience. *(u)*

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NLS FDO-147#2873

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

Review on
June 17, 1988

BY MT, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

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82 JUL 1 12:33

WPC HAS SEEN

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PARIS

June 23, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable James L. Buckley
Counselor of the Department
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jim:

In your new job as Counselor there is a function you should look at with a view to taking on the responsibility, namely the economic summit of 1983.

In my opinion the Versailles Summit was a failure. It raised unwarranted expectations and created the basis for future misunderstanding and controversy. The quid pro quo for our accepting this exposure was Allied unity, an ephemeral reward at best. Indeed the result so far seems to be less unity. The commitment on Global Negotiations in the communique raises hopes that will not slip by OMB or find much support in Congress. The issue of intervention in exchange markets has already caused bitterness by the French who regard Donald Regan's clarifying remarks made after the Summit as a breach of promise. The slim pickings we got on Soviet credits has already been virtually repudiated by Mitterrand. The Germans yesterday alleged that our new pipeline restrictions are in violation of the Summit agreement on East-West relations. The initiative on high technology is a socialist approach and an effort by the French to catch up. The day is not too distant when we will be criticized by the French for our failure to cooperate as agreed at the Summit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS F00-147 #2874

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/6/07

This year the Summit spawned a bunch of working groups which are at best, duplicative and a drain on our energy and at worst, are apt to perpetuate controversy.

The problem with the communique is almost endemic. The public expects something to come out of such a major event. Thus we were forced at Versailles to compromise and to adopt language we should have avoided.

In short, the whole thing is out of hand and it does very little for the United States. The Summit can almost be compared with the United Nations, a noble experiment which turned into a Frankenstein monster.

What to do? Personally, I think we would do well to cancel the whole thing; it is not as if we don't have enough exchanges. However, assuming outright cancellation would cause too much heartburn, why not take the meeting back to what was intended eight years ago, an opportunity for the boys (plus Maggie) to have an informal chat on current economic issues? Since we are the host we could pick an isolated spot like Yosemite, allow only a pool of photographers but no journalists and have no communique. Each chief could do whatever he chooses with the press after the meeting. Shorten the meeting to one day (lunch, dinner and brunch), and have no formal agenda. Getting rid of the latter would reduce the sherpa work down to one month in advance of the meeting. Without a communique or a formal agenda, the heads of states would be free to use the meeting for their own purposes. Also the personal staffs could be reduced, thus getting rid of a lot of make-work.

There should be no formal entertainment. The required attendance at the various functions at Versailles was an imposition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Lastly, you or someone who is a strong political ally of the President should be in charge.

All the Best,

Van
Evan G. Galbraith
Ambassador

P.S. I have a better idea. Hold the Summit in Nome in December, freezing out the journalists and the camp followers.

✓ cc: Honorable William Clark, NSC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We have had many opportunities to enjoy good discussions, and to savor superb French cuisine on the occasion of the Versailles Summit. These have served well to deepen and broaden my knowledge of the economic, political and social realities of your great and remarkable country. There is absolutely no question that France and the United States, and all of the freedom-loving peoples of the world must make every effort to understand each other better. As a result of this understanding, together with our shared values of liberty, national sovereignty, peace and security, our cooperative efforts in confronting the world's problems will bear positive results.

I wish to thank you personally for your efforts in making the Versailles Summit the great success that it was, and for the many insights that you shared with me. Let us not lose the forward momentum that I feel this Summit has generated.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Pierre Mauroy
Prime Minister
Matignon Palace
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my profound appreciation for the vital role that you and your Ministry played in organizing the Versailles Summit.

While Western governments, by nature, must suffer the slings and arrows of professional critics, I have no doubt that the Versailles Summit will be recorded as a major event with many positive benefits for the world at large. The fact that we have common goals and share common values, and that we can freely discuss among ourselves problems and alternative solutions, suggests to me that there is much less "alliance disarray" than one reads or hears about.

Again, my sincere thanks for all that you have done to make the Versailles Summit the truly outstanding success that it was.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Claude Cheysson
Minister of External Relations
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Lemoine:

I extend to you my personal thanks and profound appreciation for all of your many efforts to make our stay at the Grand Trianon a most delightful experience.

I am certain that we taxed your resources in meeting our many requirements. I know, too, that our special security arrangements were a burden to your staff. Nevertheless, your staff performed with superb efficiency at all times, and always with good humor.

I would also add a special note of thanks to Messrs. Fournier, Le Cigne, Laizet and Madame Guerchois, who, I know, were most helpful to us before and during our stay.

Sincerely,

Monsieur Pierre Lemoine
Conservateur en chef du Musée National
du Château de Versailles et du
Grand Trianon
78000 Versailles

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear François:

I extend to you my heartfelt thanks for the magnificent gift you so generously gave to me. Nancy and I will cherish it always as a symbol of Franco-American friendship.

I also express my profound gratitude to you personally and to all of your compatriots who helped make the Versailles Summit the resounding success that it was. While some might complain that we did not reach complete and unanimous agreement on the letter of all the many issues on the agenda, I leave firmly convinced that we did achieve full accord on the spirit in which we approached our task. The fact that we were able to listen constructively to each other deepened and broadened our appreciation of each other's problems and perspectives.

Your diligent preparations for each and every detail of this Summit meeting, and our collective commitment to the values of freedom, liberty, peace and security, made this conference immensely useful and, in my judgment, an historic event.

Please accept my profound appreciation.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
François Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Elysée Palace
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Mayor:

I would like to thank you for your warm greeting on behalf of the people of Paris at the Hôtel de Ville. I appreciated the opportunity to talk with you and to learn your views of the world situation. It was also an honor for me to be the first American President in nearly two decades to call on the Mayor of Paris, and I will long treasure that memory.

The album of photographs demonstrating the historic links between the United States and the city of Paris is a particularly touching gift; I would be grateful if you would convey my gratitude to the craftsman whose artistic talents made it possible.

Thanks again to you and to the city of Paris for extending such a cordial welcome to me.

Sincerely,

Monsieur Jacques Chirac
Mayor of the City of Paris
Hôtel de Ville
75196 Paris RP

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Rougagnou:

Your efficient management of all of the Versailles Summit events was a highlight of our trip to France. Nancy and I wish to extend our compliments to you and your staff for a masterful performance of an extraordinarily difficult task. You have our heartfelt thanks for making us all feel both comfortable and welcome.

Sincerely,

Monsieur Michel Rougagnou
Chef du Protocole
Ministère des Relations Extérieures
37, Quai d'Orsay
75007 Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Attali:

Yours was the guiding hand and spirit in preparing for the Versailles Summit. Much of its success was the result of your talents and efforts.

Please accept my deepest appreciation for the extraordinarily fine job you did in making the Versailles Summit the truly historic event it was.

Sincerely,

Monsieur Jacques Attali
Conseiller Special auprès du
Président de la République
Palais de l'Elysée
75008 Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Arrangements for the Versailles Summit must have been an extremely complicated task. Despite all of the problems you surely encountered, the job was masterfully performed.

Nancy joins me and my staff in expressing to you our warmest thanks and gratitude.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Guy de Commines
Diplomatic Counselor for Government
Ministry of External Relations
37, Quai d'Orsay
75700 Paris