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5/18 Judga, This is the copy back from bicker. by Des. Will John

My Lord Cha

My Lord Chancellor, Mr. Speaker:

Speaking for all Americans, I want to say how deeply you have honored us by your invitation for me to speak here. I feel at home in your house. Every American would, because this is one of democracy's shrines. In this House the rights of free people and the processes of representation have been debated and refined.

And I cannot allow this moment to pass without recalling the generous words of the member for Bristol, Mr. Burke, concerning conciliation with the rebellious colonists in North America.

It has been said that an institution is the lengthening shadow of a man. This institution is the lengthening shadow of all the men and women who have sat here, and all those who have voted to send representatives here. This House is the world's clearest symbol of power tamed and civilized—the preeminent symbol of government with a friendly face.

I go from here to Berlin, where there is a symbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the city, is in its third decade. It is the signature of the regime that built it. And a few hundred kilometers [please check] behind the Berlin Wall there is another symbol. In the center of Warsaw there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. One arm of the sign points toward Moscow.

The other points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western Europe's tangible unity. The sign says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland is not east or west. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland's struggle to be Poland, and to secure the basic rights we take for granted, demonstrates why we dare not take those rights for granted. Gladstone, defending the Reform Bill of 1866, declared: "You can't fight against the future. Time is on our side." But the adventure of freedom is that—for better or worse—the future is unformed. And it was easier to believe in the inevitable march of democracy in Gladstone's day—in that high noon of Victorian optimism—than it is today.

We are approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention—totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today. That is so, not because democracy is less vigorous, but because democracy's enemies have refined their instruments of repression. However, the democracies still can be soberly optimistic. Indeed, such optimism is every democrat's duty. And optimism is in order because, day-by-day, democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all fragile flower.

In El Salvador, the power of the democratic idea drew people through fields of gun-fire to polling places. In Poland, the democratic idea is not delicate. It is a flower of gleaming steel, pushing through the frozen earth of a society long oppressed but never defeated. From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, the regimes planted by our adversary have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none--not one regime--has yet been able to risk an election. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

The strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrates the truth told in an underground joke in the Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union would be a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted—because everyone would join it.

Today, the sound from the East is not the unmistakable sound of freedom—the sound of laughter, of spontaneity, of creativity. The greatest literature now written in the Russian language is written outside Russia, in the state of Vermont, among other places. Instead, the sound from the East is "dry sterile thunder," [T.S. Eliot], the thunder of militarism, masking ideological sterility.

The Soviet system poses a two-fold threat to peace.

It is founded on fear--the regime's fear of its people, and the regime's fear of every idea except the one official idea.

Furthermore, the Soviety system suffocates social energies, allowing dynamism only in military matters. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and the Solidarity movement, and the Charter 77 Organization-these should be considered enrichments of their nations. But our adversary considers them a threat.

In the United States in 1913 someone wanted to close the patent office on the ground that everything of importance had been invented. That was merely foolish. But in 1917 the Communist Party closed the mind of a great nation, clamping political and intellectual manacles on a great people. Today our adversary is locked in "the clean, well-lit prison of one idea." [Chesterton] And that idea—the grim doctrine of historical inevitability—is demoralizing. It denies a nation the adventure of sailing uncharted oceans; it deprives a nation of vigor. A closed society with a command economy and a

suffocating orthodoxy must lack the elan that comes from facing the challenge of an open future.

The Soviet Union, which takes philosophical materialism with morbid seriousness, has failed to provide even a decent minimum of material benefits for its people. The Soviet Union, which preaches "economic" determinism, is an economic failure. But, unfortunately, we in the West know that economic superiority does not automatically translate into national security.

After the Second World War, members from both sides of this House, giants of statecraft such as Ernest Bevin and Winston Churchill, contributed to an astonishing burst of creativity for the West. It produced the structure of Western security that has kept the peace. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization—that splendid cooperation between sovereign nations—is now in its fourth decade. It continues to confound sceptics who say that coalitions of nations must be short—lived. This alliance retains its vitality because its shared values are clear, and so is the threat to them. But the world has turned many times since NATO was founded, and the world has changed in many ways. We must face facts, some of them sobering.

For example, we must be strong enough to acknowledge that some hopes have been dashed, and some theories have led to disappointments.

For years the theory was that a thickened fabric of East-West economic relations would wean the Soviet regime from militarism, and turn it toward improving the conditions of life for its people. That theory has been killed by a fact. The fact is that the period of increased East-West trade has

coincided with an acceleration of Soviet military procurements. The Soviet Union has become increasingly parasitic off the technological genius of the West. It has used Western credits to finance its dependency. And it has used the imported technology to heighten the military threat—and the defense costs—to the West. In the process, the West has allowed its diplomacy to become hostage to decisions made in its commercial credit sectors.

We also must face squarely the disappointing fruits of arms negotiations.

Throughout the decade of the 1970's, the United States engaged the Soviet Union in a wide range of negotiations, including negotiations about strategic nuclear weapons. In 1972 and 1979, treaties were concluded.

But these two agreements shared a serious deficiency:
Both permitted the Soviet Union to continue adding to its
already vast strategic nuclear arsenal. Under SALT I, the
growth of Soviet strategic forces resulted from exploitation
of a number of loopholes and ambiguities. SALT I was said
to freeze the Soviet strategic build-up because it "froze"
the number of launchers for ballistic missiles permitted on
either side. But SALT I was followed by the addition of some

[to come] thousand new warheads on Soviet missiles,
each of them vastly more powerful than those they replaced.

In the years since SALT I, the Soviet Union has developed some \_\_\_\_\_[to come] new stratetic weapons systems. One of them, the SS-20, was deployed immediately following the SALT I agreement. It involved a cynical modification by the

Kremlin of a missile system that would have been limited under the SALT I agreement if they had not reduced its range to just under that limited by the agreement. Today there are some 300 SS-20's deployed, each with three warheads capable of destroying targets in Europe in a matter of 5 to 7 minutes.

SALT II a u t h o r i z e d the Soviets to go on adding weapons in great numbers to a strategic offensive force that already exceeds that of the United States by a wide and growing margin. SALT II merely legitimized the continuing expansion of Soviet strategic forces. That the treaty would also have permitted some expansion of American forces was no comfort: What we sought, and what we still seek, is a significant reduction in strategic weapons—not a cosmetic treaty that obscures the reality of a relentless Soviet weapons build—up.

The United States entered the 1980's with major elements of its strategic deterrent vulnerable to attack from more numerous and, in important respects, more capable Soviet strategic forces. But in spite of these disappointments, the United States is determined to persevere with mankind's most important business—achieving substantial and mutual reductions of nuclear force levels.

The United States has proposed a "zero-option" for meditaring range ballistic missiles in Europe. Our negotiators are in Geneva with ink in their pens, willing to sign--today--a treaty that would cleanse Europe of such missiles.

The United States also has proposed substantial reductions in the numbers of ballistic missiles, the numbers of warheads, and, most important, total throwweight. Our proposal is for an

agreement fixing the balance at strictly equal and vastly lower levels in each of those three categories.

In the United States, as in other free nations, there are demonstrations expressing the yearning for peace. In the Soviet Union there is a similar yearning; but there are no demonstrations.

It will surprise most people to learn that the United States today has many fewer--in fact, 8,000 fewer--nuclear weapons than it had 15 years ago. Let the world bear that in mind when evaluating the sincerity of our commitment to reductions.

But until the Soviet Union evinces a reciprocal interest in reduction, we must keep our powder dry. As Churchill said, we do not arm to fight; we arm to parley. We intend to negotiate. However, we will not allow the negotiating process to paralyse the process of modernizing our deterrent. Agreements are but parchment barriers to danger unless we make the material sacrifices necessary to give strength to our intentions—and to give pause to our adversaries.

A generation ago, Adlai Stevenson said: "Let's talk sense to the American people. Let's tell them there are no gains without pains." If we succeed in our plan to reduce the level of nuclear forces, we can thereby raise the threshold of nuclear danger. But even that great gain will not be without pain. We can not substantially reduce the nuclear component of our deterrent forces without increasing the deterrence function of conventional forces. Today, the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact are superior to those of NATO. Warsaw Pact forces are

at levels that can not be justified by defensive anxieties or intentions.

So, if we succeed in interesting the Soviet Union in equal and substantially lower levels of nuclear forces, we must then revise a strategy adopted 30 years ago. Then, we chose to rest our security on our overwhelming scientific and technological superiority—on our nuclear near-monopoly. It then spared us the burden of matching the conventional forces of a militarist state that spans the Eurasian land—mass Today, however, our nuclear weapons advantage is not what it was so our conventional forces must become better than they are. If the people of the West will an end, they must will the means to that end. Those are the pains that go with the gains.

The optimism, reasonableness and good will of democratic peoples make them impatient with what John Kennedy called "the long twilight struggle" with our adversary. Americans, especially, are not famous for their patience. It has been said that the American prayer is: "Lord, give me patience--and I want it right now."

But our adversary must come to see that we have the patience and stamina to stay the course—and especially that we have the fortitude for frustrating negotiations. Otherwise, our adversary will know that stalemate at the negotiating table will produce in the West an ungovernable urge for agreements for their own sake.

Our aim in this long twilight struggle is to produce incentives for the Soviet system to conform to the rules of the international system, and to begin attending to the needs of its people. But the Soviet leaders will have no such incentive

if they believe that the people of the West-are incapable of sacrifice, and unable to take the long view.

By issuing dogmatic prophecies, Marx gave a lot of hostages to fortune, and fortune has not been kind to them. It has been especially unkind to his prediction that capitalism's "internal contradictions" would impoverish the masses and generate revolutionary collapse. But the Soviet leaders may yet cling to the hope that the West suffers from another kind of debilitating contradiction. They may hope that the affluence and individualism of our societies will sap our capacity for collective effort. If that is the Soviet leaders' hope, they are wrong again. But we must, as mature societies, acknowledge that some of democracy's difficulties are domestic.

The very virtues of democratic societies—their openness, their individualism, their relaxed preoccupation with the immediate—put democracies at a disadvantage in competing with totalitarian societies. In those societies the appetites of the state are ravenous, and the desires of the people are ignored.

One of the glories of life in a democracy is the right of persons to pursue their own happiness in their own way. That is why our governments must take special care to take the long and broad view of the community's interests, thinking not of the next election, but of the next generation.

The task of our civilized politics is to balance important values that compete and conflict. The politics of our adversary involves no such task because our adversary

acknowledges only one value--the needs of the state as defined by a small privileged class of rulers.

We in the West are engaged in an endless debate about the proper allocation of public and private responsibilities. But about two things there is broad consensus. First, a democratic nation accepts an ethic of common provision—commitment to protect people against economic vicissitudes and the misfortunes of life. Second, all democracies know that the state must never claim a monopoly of creative energy. It must never drain the vitality of society's "little platoons," those intermediary institutions, from trade unions through churches, by which freedom functions.

As I have said, democracy is not a fragile flower. But it is a flower; it needs cultivating. To that end, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals from Western Europe and elsewhere have offered assistance to fraternal parties in countries where democracy is struggling to bloom. I wish to announce today that the United States is creating an institution to assist this campaign for democracy. It will be a bipartisan group of American leaders—leaders from the parties, the press, and the bar, from management and labor. This group shall study the prerequisites of democracy. And it shall help others enjoy its blessings. Let others see how we live —frequently divided by many things, but always united by democracy.

During the dark days of the Second World War, when this House--like this island--was incandescent with courage, Winston Churchill exclaimed about Britain's adversaries: "What kind of people do they think we are?"

Britain's adversaries found out what extraordinary people the British are. But all the democracies paid a terrible price for allowing the dictators to underestimate us. We dare not make that mistake again. So let us ask ourselves: What kind of people do we think we are? The answer is: Free people, worthy of freedom, and determined to remain so.

## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

5/19

WC:

Tony Dolan called and then sent his London speech which he prepared for the President.

He is most concerned that it get to the President. The original has been sent to Darman (the system).

John Poindexter assures me that the Preisdent will be getting Dolan's, Will's and State's draft speeches.

j

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY R. DOLAN and

SUBJECT:

LONDON SPEECH

Here is a draft for the London speech which I have been working on for a couple months. Bill Clark's office said you expressed interest in seeing this. It has been read by NSC, State and Defense and I have made their suggested changes.

This draft is based on my own research into what you have been saying about these issues -- some of it going back as far as your 1966 televised debate with Robert Kennedy -- your point about our nuclear monopoly in the fifties, for example. Also, I hope I have the "Hasty Heart" anecdote correct.

The draft also includes all of the State Department initiatives but, as you can see, the language and the rhetoric and the structure of the speech is different -- it is an attempt to bring together your past thoughts on these issues.

If you have seen an earlier copy of this draft, please ignore it, this copy reflects the suggested staff changes.

ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT BRITISH SPEECH

It is an honor to be here today on my second visit to Great Britain as President of the United States.

My first opportunity to stand on British soil occurred a year and one-half ago when your Prime Minister graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at the British Embassy in Washington. Mrs. Thatcher said then she hoped that I was not distressed to find staring down at me from the grand staircase the portrait of His Royal Majesty George III. She suggested it was best to let bygones be bygones and -- in view of our two countries' remarkable friendship in succeeding years -- she added that most Englishmen today would agree with Thomas Jefferson's suggestion that "a little rebellion now and then can be a very good thing."

Like anyone with any sense of history, I harbor a deep regard for the majesty of the words: "Great Britain." So I responded by saying that I was especially proud that my first foreign visit as President was to your country and noted that I was especially pleased that I only had to go 15 city blocks to do it. I told Mrs. Thatcher then that I finally understood the full import of the saying, "The sun never sets on the British Empire."

But let me say now that this visit to Great Britain is a great moment for me and my countrymen. The American people are fully aware of your generosity in permitting the elected representative of their Government to stand here before you.

This is an historic day and I assure you I bring with me today

their thanks and the special warmth they have in their hearts for the British people.

I hope to speak to you today about that special bond -virtually unrivalled in human history -- that the United States
and Great Britain have forged together, especially in this
century. I want to talk with you too about the great ideas and
inspirations that form our common heritage and unite us.

By common heritage, of course, I do not imply that our people are exactly similar or that our national interests or characters are ever going to be identical.

This came home to me on my first visit to England some 30 years ago. At the time, I was engaged in a profession that some have unkindly claimed is not all that different from the one I currently practice -- I thought you would like to know I always answer such criticism by pointing to the proceedings of the houses of Parliament as conclusive proof that there is no room for theatrics in politics.

We were at the time on location in Hertfordshire . . . by the way, for the sake of our friends in the French press -- the film's title was "The Hasty Heart" and there wasn't a six gun, a horse, or a "le cowboy" in it . . . I met an English army officer who explained to me his own startling discovery of the subtle differences between the Americans and the Englishmen.

One day during the war this officer was standing in a pub with another group of British servicemen. A group of American airmen entered nosily, set up a round or two, got a bit rowdy and

started making some toasts that were less than complimentary to Great Britain -- and especially to British leadership.

To heck (and I don't want you to think I'm quoting their words exactly) ". . . to heck with a prominent member of British royalty," the Yanks shouted.

Properly offended and not to be outdone -- the British officer and his friends responded with a toast of their own:

"To heck" (and again the quotation is not exact)," . . . to heck with the President of the United States."

Whereupon all the Yanks in the pub hastily grabbed their glasses, hoisted them high and shouted, "By God, we'll drink to that."

We Americans are sometimes thought of as a little rough around the edges, perhaps a bit unsophisticated in the ways of foreign nations and the world. But this is usually the case with young nations — you may recall a story about your own early days when Henry II asked one of the dukes of the realm whether it was true he had just burned down the local cathedral. "Yes," the Duke replied, "but only because I thought the archbishop was inside."

Well, it is true that America's time as a player on the stage of world history has been brief -- especially when compared to the lengthy and impressive accomplishments of British diplomacy and politics over so many centuries. I think it is this realization that has always made you patient with your younger cousins. Well, not always patient. I do recall that on

one occasion Sir Winston Churchill said in exasperation about one of our most distinguished diplomats:

"He is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him."

But then, few of us have escaped Sir Winston's wit -- I'm told he said of even one of his colleagues in Parliament:

"He has all of the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire."

But however witty Sir Winston may have been, he also had that special attribute of great statesmen. It is the gift of vision -- the ability to look beyond by understanding what has gone before -- the willingness to see the future based on the experience of the past.

It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past, that I want to talk with you about today, for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two nations can make common cause for the future.

We have not inherited an easy world -- if developments like the Industrial Revolution, which began here in England, and the gifts of science and technology have made life much easier for us -- they have also made life more dangerous. There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is, first, the threat of war. No president, no congress, no prime minister, no parliament ever spent a day entirely free of this threat. But I do not have to tell you that in today's world, the existence of nuclear weapons -- and their

dreadful capacity for destruction -- could mean if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it.

Here is a phenomenon responsible for so much of the tension and the fear we feel in modern life: It is a fear that never leaves any of us, and, if you will permit me, it follows me everywhere, in the form of a small black attache case, a grim reminder of the narrow line that our world walks everyday.

That is why the INF talks currently going on in Europe and the START talks, which we expect to commence soon, are not just critical to American or Western policy — they are critical to all nations, to mankind. Our commitment to these negotiations is firm and unshakeable; we want a settlement and we want it soon.

On the other hand, there is the threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches: rampant inflation, stringent taxation, mindless bureaucracy -- all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom. The burdens of such government excess have littered history with the wreckage of nations and empires: Imperial Rome, the 17th century empires of France and Spain, czarist Russia. Indeed, the very complaints listed in our own Declaration of Independence -- complaints whose justice were argued for in this Parliament by such great statesmen as Burke and Fox -- read in many ways like a list of complaints against the modern state. History does teach this terrible but somehow quickly forgotten lesson: the abuse

of government power has always posed the most serious and enduring threat to the freedom of man.

But in our modern era the warnings of history against excessive state power take on an even greater force -- for the development of science and technology coupled with force of modern ideology made possible total control of a people -- they have given birth to the police state, the totalitarian society.

Now some of us in the West have long argued against the impulse to use the power of the state for Utopian ends because we believe it leads to stagnant economies and unnecessary government intrusions into the lives of individuals. But I am also aware that among us here and throughout Europe, there is legitimate disagreement over the extent to which the public sector should play a role in a nation's economy and life. But I am equally sure that on one point all of us are united: our abhorrence of the totalitarian form of state power and all the terrible inhumanities it has caused in our time: Auschwitz and Dachau, the Great Purge, the Gulag Archipelago and Cambodia.

Too often we forget this threat; in part because it is never easy for any generation to see its own time in perspective. It is especially hard for the modern world. For though we may have conquered the age-old barriers of time and space, our world is curiously limited by its own success in this area: so much happens, so quickly, we rarely have time to think, to reflect, to see our world as future historians will see it.

Surely those historians looking back at our time will look in wonder at our own self-doubts. Surely, they will note that it was the democracies who refused to use their nuclear monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain. Surely they will conclude that had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the communist world, the map of Europe would look very different today. Surely these historians will note that it was not the democracies that intervened by proxy in Angola, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen or Central America. It was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan, or supressed Polish Solidarity or used chemical and biological warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

Surely those historians will find in the councils of those who preached the supremacy of the state, who declared its omnipotence over individual man, who predicted its eventual domination of all peoples of the earth, surely historians will see there . . . the focus of evil. It was your own C.S. Lewis of Cambridge who saw so well the virulence and the danger of the police state when he wrote:

"The greatest evil is not now done in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not done even in concentration camps and labour camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

Because these "quiet men" do not "raise their voices,"
because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and
peace, because like Hilter they are always making "their final

territorial demand," some would have us accept them at their word and accomodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But, if history teaches anything, it teaches: self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts, appearement in the face of coercion is folly — the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom. Always, the words of a former Member of this body, Hilaire Belloc, are a reminder of the danger we face today:

We sit by and watch the Barbarian, we tolerate him; in the long stretches of peace we are not afraid. We are tickled by his irreverence, his comic inversion of our old certitudes and our fixed creeds refreshes us; we laugh.

But as we laugh we are watched by large and awful faces from beyond, and on these faces there is no smile.

If then nuclear war is an impossible option, so too is the option of a world under totalitarian rule. As President Eisenhower warned free peoples when he left office: "We face a hostile ideology -- global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method."

We see around us today all the earmarks of our terrible dilemma -- on the one hand: predictions of doomsday, anti-nuclear demonstrations, an arms race begun and perpetrated, yes, by the Soviet Union but nonetheless an arms race in which the West must for its own protection be an unwilling participant. In awful counterpoint, we see the march of those who seek disruption and conflict throughout the world, conflict they hope will further a "clean," "well-lighted," thoroughly modern -- but thoroughly barbarous -- assault on the human spirit called Marxism-Leninism.

What then, is our course? In which direction do we steer?

Must civilization perish -- in a hail of fiery atoms? Must

freedom wither -- in a quiet deadening accomodation with

totalitarian evil?

One of England's and mankind's greatest leaders, a man with that gift of vision I mentioned a moment ago, speaks to us still on this point:

"I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable," Mr. Churchill said, "still more that it is imminent."

"It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement."

There is warning in these words but hope too -- hope based on the conviction that freedom can survive and without war. It is the kind of hope and conviction we do not hear too much of these days from the professional prophets or pundits who predict doomsday or the onrush of the Orwellian state. But then expert knowledge has always had one great shortcoming: it concentrates too much on the immediate data, on yesterday's events -- and not enough on long term trends, the drift of things -- it focuses on the ripples, not the waves and tides of history.

An example of just how short-sighted the doomsayers can be took place in another June some of you may remember -- but one that now seems long ago. It was 1943 -- during our desperate battle of the Atlantic. You will recall, it was a Battle we were losing -- the only event Churchill said that ever really frightened him during the war.

In March of 1943, more than 500,000 tons of Allied shipping had gone down in the Atlantic, thousands of merchant seamen lost their lives. England was left with only a two-month supply of food and material and the experts in the British Admiralty and in the Pentagon seriously doubted that that vital lifeline across the Atlantic could be kept open.

But then suddenly -- only a month later -- it all changed. Improvements in the convoy system, escort training, radio and radar use, long range aircraft and other changes -- innovations whose weight had been accumulating for months -- were finally and suddenly brought to bear. The "U" boat wolfpacks sustained enormous losses. By May, Hilter's admirals were conceding defeat in the Atlantic and by that June of 39 years ago, Allied convoys crossed the Ocean without the loss of a single ship.

I believe we live now at such a turning point in time. It may not be easy to see but I believe that moment is upon us.

This is contrary to the current wisdom, to the cries of doom. Some of this pessimism stems from a weakening of Western resolve, the cause of which is the steady repitition of the cliches of conquest from those who proclaim themselves the "vanguard of the

future" -- who have told us over and over again that the "correlation of forces" dictates the triumph of the superstate.

In our century we have seen terrible evidence of what comes of such claims. Two incarnations of this ideology have occurred. One is past: the "thousand year" Reich left ingloriously in the ashes of a Berlin bunker; one is present: a militaristic empire whose ideology justifies any wrongdoing or use of violence if done in the name of the state.

Yet even as it attempts to snuff out freedom in Afghanistan and Poland, this empire is developing within itself more and more internal tensions and crises.

As one Soviet scholar has recently pointed out, Marx was right — we are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis — a crisis where the demands of the economic order are colliding directly with those of the political order. But this crisis is not happening in those countries with democratic forms of government or free market systems; it is happening in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union.

To begin with, the Soviet Union is in deep economic difficulty -- the rate of growth in the Soviet gross national product has been steadily declining since the fifties and is less than half of what it was then. In agriculture particularly, a country which employs one-fourth of its population in this sector is unable to feed its own people. Were it not for the tiny private sector tolerated in Soviet agriculture, the country might be on the brink of famine. These private plots occupy a bare 3 percent of the arable land but account for nearly one quarter of

the farm output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables.

The Soviet system is overcentralized with little or no incentives -- year after year it pours its best resource into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth with the growth of military production is putting an impossible strain on the Soviet people -- in important areas like health care, neglect and inefficiency are quite literally returning the country to the standards of centuries ago. Infant mortality has reached appalling levels -- the government no longer publishes the relevant statistics. Alcohol poisoning is an epidemic -- a rate roughly 100 times that in Western nations.

Medical facilities and care for the masses is inefficient and sharply declining -- I am reminded of the medical unit in Leningrad for cardiac patients -- it is located on the fifth floor . . . and there is no elevator.

What we see here is the classic situation outlined by

Marx -- when the political structure no longer corresponds to the
economic base -- when productive forces are hampered by political
ones. It is possible this internal conflict will lead to
liberalization in the Soviet Union. But there is also the great
danger that the fear of this revolutionary situation will
continue to paralyze the Soviet leadership and drive it toward
aggression -- aggression that allows it to mobilize the unhappy
masses with chauvinistic slogans and diverts them from domestic
needs.

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Yet the decay of the Soviet experiment comes as no surprise. Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies -- West Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam -- it is the democratic countries that are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. And it is one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time: of all the millions of refuges we have seen in the modern world their flight is always away from, not to the communist world.

The truth is that such comparisons have sparked an intellectual revolution. The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will. Whether it is the growth of the new schools of economics in America or England or the appearance of the so-called young "philosophes" in France, there is one unifying thread running through the intellectual work of these groups: the rejection of state power as the principal means of social change, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses. The word is out: statism is loosing the intellectuals.

In the minds of men, the cult of the state is dying -- and in their hearts, those cliches of conquest we have heard so often from the East are now known for what they are: bogus prophecies and petty superstitions, part of a sad, bizarre, dreadfully evil episode in history, but an episode that is dying, a chapter whose last pages even now are being written.

This revolution of the mind and heart is reflected in the growing demands and gathering strength of democratic political forces throughout the world. Once again, if we will but take the time to look about us, we will see today exactly what history will someday record.

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of the spectacles of freedom; those who sacrifice and struggle for liberty: the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising.

Yet have we not seen evidence of this same impulse of the human spirit in our own time -- only a few months ago in a small developing nation in Latin America? Night after night the televised-speculation had increased about the growing power of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador, the inevitability of repressive Marxist rule, the allegation that American policy has failed because we supported democratic parties and elections in that torn and bleeding land.

And then suddenly -- it was the peasants and workers of El Salvador who were heard from -- those who were breezily dismissed as too uninterested or uneducated or impoverished to care about their lives, their freedom, their way of government. They defied the threats, they braved the bullets, they streamed forth to the polls -- well over 80 percent of the population -- 1.4 million of them. Their message was clear, their message was simple: "Let us partake too of this thing called freedom."

What happened in El Salvador is happening in many other parts of the developing world. Everywhere, the democratic



revolution is gathering new strength. In India, the most populous democracy, a critical test has been passed with the peaceful change of governing political parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving in remarkable and unmistakable ways to build and strengthen its democratic institutions. In the Caribbean and Central America, 16 of 23 countries have freely elected governments. And in the United Nations, eight of the ten developing nations which have joined the body in the past five years are democracies. Many other developing nations, not yet full-fedged democracies, have at least some democratic institutions, and they have emphasized their commitment to move further towards a system of government by the people.

BARD SECTION SECTION

In Europe and among the NATO countries democratic progress has strengthened nations that at the end of the last war were suffering from economic ruin and a history of dictatorial rule. Portugal and Spain have now joined in the earlier success of Germany and Japan; they are developing democratic traditions and achieving a standard of living unpredented in human experience. In Turkey as well, after several years of bloody terrorism, the current leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to democracy and its desire to hold free elections next year.

In the communist world today, man's instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again. To be sure, there are grim reminders of how quickly the police state can snuff out this quest for self rule: 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland. And yet today the Polish workers who have organized to protect their

rights to bring about a free and just society continue -- as do millions of others in communist dominated lands -- their quest for free institutions.

There will be other Polands -- and we know there are even those who struggle and suffer for freedom within the confines of the Soviet Union itself.

Yet while democratic progress is being made throughout the world, we should bear in mind that there is nothing inevitable about this -- it is only, for the moment, a trend of history.

How we conduct ourselves in England and America and in the other Western democracies will be crucial to whether this trend continues or whether it withers and fades from memory.

That is why it is time for the West to mobilize for the democratic ideal. It is time that we offer concern and open assistance to the forces of democracy and freedom -- the schools, publications, social and political organizations in other countries that nourish and foster the democratic spirit.

Over the past several decades, many of you in Western Europe have shown the way -- Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals have offered open assistance to fraternal parties in the hope of brining about peaceful and democratic progress.

I wish to announce today that the United States has decided to create a similar vehicle for the spread of democratic ideas and practices. As I speak, a bipartisan group of American leaders representing a number of our major free institutions has gathered in the Capital in Washington. They represent the National Republican and Democratic party organizations as well as

business, labor and professional groups. (Representing them here today in this audience are the distinguished hairmen of the Republican and Democratic parties and the leaders of both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States.)

These Americans and their respective institutions will participate in a joint study to determine how the United States can best contribute to the growth of representative government throughout the world.

But what is needed is more than individual national efforts -- what is needed is concerted action, an international strategy, a global campaign for democratic development.

Therefore I plan to consult with leaders of other nations to determine how we can cooperate to strengthen democratic movements and build the infrastructures of democratic reform.

In this regard, I note a proposal before the Council of Europe to invite parliamentarians from democratic countries to a meeting next year in Strasbourg. I call on this prestigious gathering, which has such a distinguished record of support for individual liberty, to consider ways to aid democratic political movements.

This struggle for the democratic ideal demands imagination, daring and confidence from all of us. We must begin to develop new methods that knit together the community of democracies in this cause. As an initial American contribution, we have begun to organize two conferences dealing with critical aspects of the problem.

This November in Washington there will take place an international meeting on free elections. Next spring we have called a conference of world authorities on constitutionalism and self-government. With the Chief Justice of the United States as host, authorities from India, Nigeria, Venezuela and other countrie -- judges, philosophers and politicians with practical experience -- have agreed to explore how to turn principle into practice and further the rule of law. This conference on constitutionalism is as vital as that on free elections; for if democracy recognizes man's rights it also recognizes the limits to those rights and the necessity for checks and balances on its branches of government and its leaders.

At the same time we invite the Soviet Union to consider with us how the competition of ideas and values -- which it is committed to support -- can be conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal basis. For example, I am prepared today to offer President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our television, if he will allow me the same opportunity with the Soviet people. We also suggest that panels of our newsmen periodically appear on each other's television to discuss major events.

I would hope these proposals would receive serious consideration. I do not wish to sound overly optimistic . . . yet the Soviet Union is not immune from the reality of what is going on in the world. It has happened in the past: a dictatorship of a small ruling elite either attempts to ease domestic unrest through foreign adventure or chooses another

course -- one that begins to lend legitimacy to their government by allowing its people a voice in their own destiny.

Consider what this would mean for the prospects of peace.

Consider what a process of democratization within the Soviet

Union might contribute. Public involvement in the peace movement

would grow as it has in the West -- the enormous Soviet military

budget -- nearly 15 percent of the gross national product would

suddenly be subjected to public scrutiny. The problem of

verification -- one of the central difficulties in negotiating

arms control agreements -- could be dramatically eased. We

could, in fact, introduce an "open land" policy to complete the

tacit "open skies" policy. This would permit much more thorough

verification and possibly lead to the abolition of whole

categories of arms such as chemical weapons. Above all, the

suspicion and distrust which is endemic to closed political

systems, and which so poisons the pursuit of peace, would be

greatly alleviated.

Yet even if this process does not take place soon -- I believe the renewed strength of the democratic movement complimented by a global campaign for freedom would strengthen the prospects for arms control.

Such a campaign would make clear that we in the West do not intend to continue the mistakes of prior generations and other governments who failed to take seriously the stated intention of their adversaries, who engaged in the self-delusions that in 1938 led to the invasion of Poland or in 1980 the invasion of Afghanistan.

That is why we must continue our efforts to strengthen NATO even as we move forward with the INF talks, the START talks -- our zero option initiative and our proposal for two-thirds reductions in strategic weapons.

I cite again the wisdom of Winston Churchill:

"From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness... We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength."

It is by strengthing and extending the borders of freedom and the democratic movement that we assist the cause of peace and the permanent prevention of war.

But while our military strength is a prerequisite to

peace -- let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope

that it will never be used. For the ultimate determinant in the

struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and

rockets -- it will be a struggle of wills and ideas -- a test of

spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish,

the ideals to which we are dedicated.

We must never permit those who seek to appear fashionable or pragmatic to convince us that our belief in these things must be muted or quiet -- for it is our convictions that lend us an unconquerable strength and dictate our ultimate triumph.

"The whole world is drenched with the crude conviction that might accomplishes all, righteousness nothing," Alexander Solzhenitsyn has observed.

Surely, the British people know better. They know that given time, strong leadership and a little bit of hope the forces of good ultimately rally and triumph over evil. That after all is the legend of the men who sat at the Roundtable, or of a man who lived on Baker Street — it is the reality of London in the Blitz and the meaning of the life of Winston Churchill. Here, among you is the cradle of self-government, the mother of Parliaments. Here is the enduring greatness of the British empire, the great civilized ideas: individual liberty, representative government and the rule of law under God.

You know, I have often wondered about the shyness of some of us in the West about standing for these ideals, ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world. This reluctance to use those vast resources at our command reminds me of the elderly lady whose home was bombed in the Blitz; as the rescuers moved about they found a bottle of brandy she had stored behind the staircase, which was left standing. As one of the workers pulled the cork to give her a taste of it, the lady came round immediately and spoke up: "Here now, put it back, that's only for emergencies."

The emergency is upon us.

Let us be shy no longer -- let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not only possible but probable. Great dramatic changes have occurred in man's fate during the past two hundred years -- has pointed out we live longer today in better health and prosperity than ever dreamed of in the past. And in the next two centuries this

material progress can be matched with a progress of the human spirit. Surely, it is not too much to hope that the nations of the world can learn to live with each other in peace.

Let us dare to have faith in this future. To those who predict doomsday or the triumph of the superstate let us cite the words of one great author at a Nobel Prize ceremony some years ago. It was William Faulkner who spoke of the self-doubt that infects our age.

"Man will not merely endure," he said, "he will prevail" because he will return to the "old verities and truths of the heart."

"He is immortal," Faulkner said of man, "because he alone among creatures . . . has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance."

I recently had ocassion, perhaps like many of you, to see portrayed such a story of compassion, sacrifice and endurance. The story of two British athletes in the 1920 Olympics, a story that came in the guise of that new art form the modern world has given us -- cinema, film, the movies. It is the story of Harold Abrahams, a young Jew, whose victory -- as his immigrant Italian coach put it -- was a triumph for all those who have come from distant lands and found freedom and refuge in democracis like England. It was the triumph too of Eric Liddell, a young Scotsman, who would not sacrifice religious conviction for fame.

In one unforgettable scene, Eric Liddell reads the words of Isiah:

"He giveth power to the faint, and to them that have no might, He increased strength . . . But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength . . . They shall mount up with wings as eagles. They shall run and not be weary . . ."

Here is our formula for the struggle ahead, our ultra secret. Here is our strength as civilization and the source of our belief in the rights of men. Our faith is in a higher law and a greater destiny. We do believe in the power of prayer to change all things. And as we believe that man was meant not to be dishonored but to live in the image and likeness of him who made him.

More than four decades ago, an American President told his generation they had a rendevous with destiny; not long after a Prime Minister asked the British people for their finest hour.

Today, in the face of the twin threats of war and totalitarianism, the British and American people again face such a rendevous, and are again asked for their finest hour.

This rendevous, this finest hour is before us. Let us go then as on chariots of fire -- to seek to do His will in all things; to stand for freedom; to speak for humanity.

"Come my friends," as it was said of old by Tennyson, "and let us make a newer world."