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Collection: Clark, William P: Files
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Clark, William P.: Files

Archivist: smf/smf
F1999-079

File Folder: MEMCON: Mitterrand/Clark 6:30 p.m. Oct. 27, 1982
Box 4

Date: July 23, 1999

DOCUMENT NO AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. note	Re delivery of memcons 1 p partial R 11/30/99 NLSF99-079 #1	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. memcon	Re Clark and Galbraith Meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand, October 27, 1982 7p P 12/2/99 NLSF99-079 #2	10/27/82	P1/F1
3. memcon	Duplicate of doc #2, with notation 7p P 12/2/99 NLSF99-079 #3	10/27/82	P1/F1
4. memcon	Duplicate of doc #2 with notation 7p P 12/2/99 NLSF99-079 #4	10/27/82	P1/F1
5. report	Re Cheysson 1p partial P 11/30/00 NLSF99-079 #5	11/6/82	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. note	Key to Barret re Mitterrand 1p R 11/30/99 NLSF99-079 #6	11/24/[82]	P1/F1
7. memcon	Duplicate of doc #2 with date stamp 7p P 12/2/99 NLSF99-079 #7	11/5/82	P1/F1
8. memcon	Duplicate of doc #2 7p P 12/2/99 NLSF99-079 #8	10/27/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Copies sent to

The Vice President - delivered by Kay - ^{ret 11/3}
Bill Casey - delivered by Chuck Peters
General Walters - delivered by WC
Amb. Kirkpatrick - picked up by Jackie
Tillman

Larry Eagleburger - delivered by WC
Secretary Shultz - delivered by WC
Secretary Weinberger - delivered by WC
Henry Kissinger - picked up by courier
Edwin Kress - SN to Gle 11/5/82

The Press - ret - 11/2
Slater - ret. 11/2
Simon - ret. 11/2

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F99-079#1

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/26/00

To Arthur Burns (personally) 11/17/82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1982

To The Vice President

From: Bill Clark

George:

Not sure

this is what you
had in mind -

Bill -
read with keen
interest 11-2-82
shared with noon. Bigline
let's have it sometime
GB

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador
to France, notetaker

President Francois Mitterrand of France
Jacque Attali, Personal Advisor to Mitterrand
Mr. Thierry, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 27, 1982
AND PLACE: 6:30 - 8:30 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The following sequence developed as reported by Amb. Galbraith:

There was a cordial exchange of greetings, Mr. Clark referring to President Mitterrand's request for meeting in Washington on March 12 and President Reagan's pleasure at the forthright nature of President Mitterrand's remarks at that meeting. Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for accepting President's request that President Mitterrand receive Mr. Clark on such short notice to discuss issues of serious consequence. Mr. Clark noted that since that time, however, problems have occurred and we want to be certain the facts relating to these problems are correct. If correct, it may become necessary to review some of our policies as they relate to France. Mr. Clark said that he did not expect complete answers this evening to all matters and encouraged President Mitterrand to make any additional comment later by direct communication and consultation with President Reagan. (S)

Of the matters discussed on March 12, Mr. Clark stated President Reagan believes several have been positive, others negative. Mr. Clark stated with President's permission, we would consider positive matters first.

a. U.S. interest rates were cause of concern to France at the time of the March meeting but President Mitterrand had said he would not criticize the U.S. for these rates, particularly at Versailles, and we are appreciative of that. Since that time, rates have dropped from the 16 percent range to 10 percent and Mr. Mitterrand acknowledged that this drop has been beneficial. (S)

b. Mr. Clark pointed out our inflation rate has dropped substantially from the March level to a September level of only two tenths of one percent. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

c. The U.S. still has an unemployment problem and ten percent bothers us. (S)

At the March 12 meeting President Reagan was pleased that President Mitterrand supported and continues to support the U.S. effort to rearm and generally stands by our policy with respect to defense and deterrence, having noted that after ten years of neglect, the Reagan policy was welcome and was in the best interest of the West. Mr. Clark also said President Reagan was pleased Mr. Mitterrand was reiterating his opposition to the various peace and nuclear freeze movements in Europe. (S)

On the positive side the U.S., assisted by France, has done a great deal in the Middle East toward achieving peace in Beirut and withdrawal of the PLO, the Syrians and the Israeli forces. Mr. Clark thanked the President for the quick reaction of the French to participation with us in the multinational force. Mr. Clark then added that we are encouraged by the reaction of the Arab delegation in Washington to President Reagan's peace initiative in the Middle East and expressed the hope that for the first time in thirty-five years there is a chance of actually establishing true peace. (S)

President Mitterrand said that before Mr. Clark moved away from the positive side of the balance sheet, he would like to express a few thoughts:

a. He cannot imagine that the negative aspects are really important because in the basic things, we see things very closely. France appreciates very much the drop in the interest rates and congratulates the U.S. in its victory over inflation. France is moving in the same direction, going from the 14 percent it inherited from Giscard d'Estaing to 10 percent at the end of 1982. Mitterrand expects an inflation rate of eight percent in 1983. Four to five percent is as low as they can go because if they tried to go any more and imitated the United States, he would be pumping the bicycle too fast and wind up with a heart attack and confined to bed. *(The point being that too big a squeeze against inflation would create intolerable political consequences in France.) Mitterrand said that the U.S. is lucky in that its unions are more responsible. He went on to say that the military relations were in good harmony. France supports the US position in Geneva but if the talks fail he would actively support the deployment of the Pershing and he talks to the other members of the NATO Alliance along this line. He said that the French military budget is not being reduced for all practical purposes and that the amount of three billion francs which might be regarded as a reduction is de minimus. He underlined there would be no reduction of the troops in Germany and that they were expanding their expenditures on airborne forces (helicopters) and nuclear forces, citing the 6th SSBN which was sped up by him and the 7th which he has now

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ordered. This will give France the capability of having 4 SSBNs permanently underway. The defense budget is almost 4 percent of gross national product which is an increasing amount because the gross national product is increasing. France is not integrated into NATO but it is faithful to its alliance and will work closely with its other allies. As for the question as to how to deal with the Soviet Union he would leave that to Mr. Clark to discuss. (S)

Before allowing Mr. Clark to turn to the negative side of the ledger, Mr. Mitterrand said that he had discussed these military matters with Chancellor Kohl whose views coincided with those of Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Clark stated President Reagan was impressed with recent information that France and FRG were consulting in greater depth on national defense. (S)

Mr. Clark then addressed Latin America and Mitterrand reacted dramatically, saying that he had more or less forgotten about this region because they had greater concerns elsewhere, and implied that the United States was obsessed with the region. He backed off however and seemed impressed when Mr. Clark told him that Cuba had received one billion dollars worth of Soviet military equipment since January, comprising about four hundred thousand tons, the largest shipments ever. Mr. Clark went on to show the subversive activity of Cuba not only in Nicaragua but in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. (He offered to continue briefing designated members of the French government on these points.) Mr. Clark added that the financial problems of Mexico have also added to our concern there. (S)

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and concern the US had over Nicaragua. He mentioned that Unge was not a communist and was a friend of his and that Unge was forced into joining with revolutionary forces. (At this point Mitterrand confessed that France had a certain sympathy for revolutionary groups.) He then stated that as far as Cuba is concerned, the French relations don't amount to much. They are only verbal. He would be happy to speak of this question as to the proper politics in Latin America at a later date. His only opinion was that it might be a good idea to speak to Castro if he comes, mentioning that American Presidents meet with Soviets -- such as Nixon and Ford, with Brezhnev. He thought it a good idea to speak to one's adversary. Smiling, Mitterrand said he has had difficulties reaching the ears and hearts of the Americans with respect to his views on Central America. Mitterrand also commented that he did not think the Sandinistas were doing well because they were too divided but that he, Mitterrand, was not an expert on this subject despite his having spent fifteen minutes explaining the best policy in Central America. The impression left was that their interest in Central America and Cuba is waning. (S)

Mr. Clark then moved to Africa setting out President Reagan's early interest in the independence of Namibia and his own involvement in Southern Africa while Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Clark pointed out frankly that we felt the U.S. is in the best position to influence South Africa respecting both human rights (we agree not to berate them publicly in consideration for improvement) and Namibian independence. We feel progress has been made and that Angola appears ready to accept the concept of Cubans leaving, and the prospect for an independent Namibia is good. The U.S. has taken a very active role not for glory but out of global responsibility. However, we feel success impeded by some very unfortunate public statements made by the French at highest levels that the United States is an impediment to the development of Namibian independence causing confusion and anger on the part of a number of officials in the U.S. Government. (At this point Mitterrand appeared dumbfounded. He professed to not knowing what we were talking about even though he himself made such remarks while in Africa this month. The Ambassador referred to a statement made in Dar es Salaam, and Mr. Clark pointed out how US newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post report such statements within minutes of their having been rendered - even from the depths of African jungles. Mr. Clark said that if we fail in this effort to create a free Namibia only the USSR will gain. He further stated that if the process fails by reason of hardening by the front line states following Cheysson's statements, we will say so publicly. At this point Mitterrand intervened to say that the policy of the United States and France coincided and that we both wanted free elections in Namibia, a new independent country and removal of the Cubans. (Originally Mitterrand put the removal of the Cubans first but he changed his phraseology to put free elections first and the removal of the Cubans last as part of their three basic points. Mitterrand referred to the fact that he had recently

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been in the Congo where he had seen Cubans and he thought the presence of Cubans there and elsewhere in Africa was deplorable. Mr. Clark also reminded him that there were, at the end of last year, an estimated six thousand East Germans in Angola. President Mitterrand said they too must leave. He stated he felt a breakthrough was imminent and they would continue on the Angolan-Cuban aspect. (S)

Mr. Clark moved north to Libya, stating that while Mr. Qadhafi is not a direct threat to U.S., he continues to support subversive activity in twenty different countries. Mr. Clark said that while he realized embargoes are not always the answer, the fact is that Libya is now near the bottom of the list of petroleum suppliers as the direct result of our embargoes. Mr. Mitterrand replied that his first dealings with Libya when he took office were in connection with Chad where he said France had played an important role in getting Libya out of Chad. He then said quite frankly that his policy towards Libya was ambiguous and it is not clear what France will do in connection with future relations. He made reference to a possible visit of Qadhafi to France but he repeated he did not know what their future policies would be. Mr. Clark reminded President Mitterrand that France continues to give aid, including a MAG contingent that services Libyan MIGs. (S)



Mr. Clark then stated clearly and emphatically that we were concerned by a series of recent public statements made by high French government officials, including President Mitterrand attacking the United States and its policies, and we wanted to know the reasons for this. He cited specifically the statements of Prime Minister Mauroy in the United Nations, Mr. Cheysson and President Mitterrand in Kinshasha and stated that we found it offensive to be criticized unreasonably in public by our friends

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and contrary to the way in which we did things. In the UN we historically have sat idly by while small nations, many of whom were proxies of the Soviet Union, attacked the United States, but now Ambassador Kirkpatrick speaks back and we have found that the unreasonable attacks on us have diminished. Mr. Clark stated that if such statements continue from the French government, we have no alternative but to respond to them publicly. Mr. Mitterrand intervened that Madam Kirkpatrick was well known in France and has made comments which have bothered the French. (There was some discussion on this point in which Mr. Clark said he was unaware of any such statement by Ambassador Kirkpatrick but would check. President Mitterrand would not be more precise on this point and in the end smilingly dismissed it as a peripheral item.) Mr. Mitterrand referred to Jean Kirkpatrick as having langue pendu tant. Mr. Clark responded that Jean is our greatest Francophile. (S)

President Mitterrand said that sometimes language has to be revised although in the case of the gas pipeline, while our sanctions on the pipeline do not constitute imperialism, they do constitute hegemony and an unauthorized invasion of sovereignty (up to now, no reference had been made to the Polish-Soviet sanctions or "pipeline"). (S)

Mitterrand ended this point by saying we should all, including the French, make an effort to dampen down rhetoric and he would discuss it among the others. (S)

In reference to Mr. Mitterrand's remarks on "the pipeline" Mr. Clark stated that while he had not intended to get into the area for the reason that it was being managed by "the seven," he would accept the opportunity to describe the events leading up to the imposition of the sanctions to indicate the President's feeling and as a reflection of the President's principles and personality. In summary, during the Christmas holidays in December 1981, the President asked the Vice President and Secretary Haig, on an interagency approach, to come up with a recommendation which would give high visibility against Soviet intervention in Poland, all in the name of human rights. It was determined on December 29, 1981 that an embargo against transfer of oil and gas equipment and technology would be highly visible and damaging to the Soviet Union. At that point, Mr. Clark referred to later discussions between Secretary Haig and Gromyko suggesting that by summer some movement or relief would take place in Poland, such as the release of Walesa or easing of martial law, allowing the President to review the embargo and sanctions decision. This movement, of course, did not take place and President Reagan reacted against the lack of movement in Poland or at Versailles. (At this point Mitterrand intervened fairly vigorously saying nothing can happen in Poland. The very nature of the communist movement will not allow anything to happen. If necessary, they will act brutally but it is impossible for them to allow the society to become liberal. It can only get worse.) Mr. Clark referred then to

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the expectations of a strike on November 10 in Poland and how we expected to see the non-communist unions reassert themselves in Europe. President Reagan took his sanctions against Poland knowing that it was going to be costly in the United States, both economically and politically. (Mr. Clark said \$500 million this year) but he said the President felt strongly about it and that he would stick with sanctions unless and until another group of actions equivalent to the President's present policy is agreed to by the Alliance. (S)

President Mitterrand ended the meeting with a statement of goodwill. He complimented Mr. Clark for his being a good advisor and effective advocate, joking he wished he were on his own staff. He said that he would think on these matters and he appreciated the frank and serious discussion which had taken place. (S)

"From Ambassador Galbraith, Paris 079
To the White House for Jacquelyne Hill, Personal Secretary to
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Please add the following paragraph below to draft I dictated
yesterday. (S)

All in all Mitterrand put on quite a performance. Several times he played innocent, for example, when he poo-pooed our differences in Latin America; regarding Cheysson's public remarks on Cuban troop removal; and quoting an inoffensive passage from his eulogy on Mendes France as opposed to the offensive passage. He sprinkled in some intended humor, smiling often. He rattled off explanations and numbers with ease. He was conciliatory and generous in his attitude to Mr. Clark whose presentation obviously impressed Mitterrand. (Comment: Attali called Ambassador the next day "to clarify an important point," namely that Mitterrand's and other official comments on the dollar are not meant to be critical of President Reagan or the USG; it is the international monetary order which is at fault. (SIC))" (S)

At Mr. Clark's suggestion, we have avoided press on this visit - successfully. Two calls were received by Embassy asking who was going into the Elysee. Our press man responded he did not know - truthfully. (S)

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Reviewed by Bob Smith

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F99-079#3
By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/26/00

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador
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President Francois Mitterrand of France
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DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 27, 1982
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Declassify on: OADR

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Mr. Clark then addressed Latin America and Mitterrand reacted dramatically, saying that he had more or less forgotten about this region because they had greater concerns elsewhere, and implied that the United States was obsessed with the region. He backed off however and seemed impressed when Mr. Clark told him that Cuba had received one billion dollars worth of Soviet military equipment since January, comprising about four hundred thousand tons, the largest shipments ever. Mr. Clark went on to show the subversive activity of Cuba not only in Nicaragua but in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. (He offered to continue briefing designated members of the French government on these points.) Mr. Clark added that the financial problems of Mexico have also added to our concern there. (S)

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Mr. Clark moved north to Libya, stating that while Mr. Qadhafi is not a direct threat to U.S., he continues to support subversive activity in twenty different countries. Mr. Clark said that while he realized embargoes are not always the answer, the fact is that Libya is now near the bottom of the list of petroleum suppliers as the direct result of our embargoes. Mr. Mitterrand replied that his first dealings with Libya when he took office were in connection with Chad where he said France had played an important role in getting Libya out of Chad. He then said quite frankly that his policy towards Libya was ambiguous and it is not clear what France will do in connection with future relations. He made reference to a possible visit of Qadhafi to France but he repeated he did not know what their future policies would be. Mr. Clark reminded President Mitterrand that France continues to give aid, including a MAG contingent that services Libyan MIGs. (S)



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President Mitterrand said that sometimes language has to be revised although in the case of the gas pipeline, while our sanctions on the pipeline do not constitute imperialism, they do constitute hegemony in an unauthorized invasion of sovereignty (up to now, no reference had been made to the Polish-Soviet sanctions or "pipeline"). (S)

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President Mitterrand ended the meeting with a statement of goodwill. He complimented Mr. Clark for his being a good advisor and effective advocate, joking he wished he were on his own staff. He said that he would think on these matters and he appreciated the frank and serious discussion which had taken place. (S)

"From Ambassador Galbraith, Paris 079
To the White House for Jacquelyne Hill, Personal Secretary to
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Please add the following paragraph below to draft I dictated
yesterday. (C)

All in all Mitterrand put on quite a performance. Several times he played innocent, for example, when he poo-pooed our differences in Latin America; regarding Cheysson's public remarks on Cuban troop removal; and quoting an inoffensive passage from his eulogy on Mendes France as opposed to the offensive passage. He sprinkled in some intended humor, smiling often. He rattled off explanations and numbers with ease. He was conciliatory and generous in his attitude to Mr. Clark whose presentation obviously impressed Mitterrand. (Comment: Attali called Ambassador the next day "to clarify an important point," namely that Mitterrand's and other official comments on the dollar are not meant to be critical of President Reagan or the USG; it is the international monetary order which is at fault. (SIC))" (S)

At Mr. Clark's suggestion, we have avoided press on this visit - successfully. Two calls were received by Embassy asking who person was going into Elysee. Our press man responded he did not know - truthfully. (C)

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Sender*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F99-079 #4
By LOI, NARA, Date 7/26/00

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador
to France, notetaker

President Francois Mitterrand of France
Jacque Attali, Personal Advisor to Mitterrand
Mr. Thierry, Interpreter

DATE, TIME October 27, 1982
AND PLACE: 6:30 - 8:30 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The following sequence developed as reported by Amb. Galbraith:

There was a cordial exchange of greetings, Mr. Clark referring to President Mitterrand's request for meeting in Washington on March 12 and President Reagan's pleasure at the forthright nature of President Mitterrand's remarks at that meeting. Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for accepting President's request that President Mitterrand receive Mr. Clark on such short notice to discuss issues of serious consequence. Mr. Clark noted that since that time, however, problems have occurred and we want to be certain the facts relating to these problems are correct. If correct, it may become necessary to review some of our policies as they relate to France. Mr. Clark said that he did not expect complete answers this evening to all matters and encouraged President Mitterrand to make any additional comment later by direct communication and consultation with President Reagan. (S)

Of the matters discussed on March 12, Mr. Clark stated President Reagan believes several have been positive, others negative. Mr. Clark stated with President's permission, we would consider positive matters first.

a. U.S. interest rates were cause of concern to France at the time of the March meeting but President Mitterrand had said he would not criticize the U.S. for these rates, particularly at Versailles, and we are appreciative of that. Since that time, rates have dropped from the 16 percent range to 10 percent and Mr. Mitterrand acknowledged that this drop has been beneficial. (S)

b. Mr. Clark pointed out our inflation rate has dropped substantially from the March level to a September level of only two tenths of one percent. (S)

c. The U.S. still has an unemployment problem and ten percent bothers us. (S)

At the March 12 meeting President Reagan was pleased that President Mitterrand supported and continues to support the U.S. effort to rearm and generally stands by our policy with respect to defense and deterrence, having noted that after ten years of neglect, the Reagan policy was welcome and was in the best interest of the West. Mr. Clark also said President Reagan was pleased Mr. Mitterrand was reiterating his opposition to the various peace and nuclear freeze movements in Europe. (S)

On the positive side the U.S., assisted by France, has done a great deal in the Middle East toward achieving peace in Beirut and withdrawal of the PLO, the Syrians and the Israeli forces. Mr. Clark thanked the President for the quick reaction of the French to participation with us in the multinational force. Mr. Clark then added that we are encouraged by the reaction of the Arab delegation in Washington to President Reagan's peace initiative in the Middle East and expressed the hope that for the first time in thirty-five years there is a chance of actually establishing true peace. (S)

President Mitterrand said that before Mr. Clark moved away from the positive side of the balance sheet, he would like to express a few thoughts:

a. He cannot imagine that the negative aspects are really important because in the basic things, we see things very closely. France appreciates very much the drop in the interest rates and congratulates the U.S. in its victory over inflation. France is moving in the same direction, going from the 14 percent it inherited from Giscard d'Estaing to 10 percent at the end of 1982. Mitterrand expects an inflation rate of eight percent in 1983. Four to five percent is as low as they can go because if they tried to go any more and imitated the United States, he would be pumping the bicycle too fast and wind up with a heart attack and confined to bed.* (The point being that too big a squeeze against inflation would create intolerable political consequences in France.) Mitterrand said that the U.S. is lucky in that its unions are more responsible. He went on to say that the military relations were in good harmony. France supports the US position in Geneva but if the talks fail he would actively support the deployment of the Perishing and he talks to the other members of the NATO Alliance along this line. He said that the French military budget is not being reduced for all practical purposes and that the amount of three billion francs which might be regarded as a reduction is de minimum. He underlined there would be no reduction of the troops in Germany and that they were expanding their expenditures on airborne forces (helicopters) and nuclear forces, citing the 6th SBN which was sped up by him and the 7th which he has now

*Neither Mitterrand nor the Government refer to the fact that their present and prospective inflation rates are based on a price and wage freeze and that such rates do not mean the same thing as inflation rates freely arrived at.

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ordered. This will give France the capability of having 4 SBNs permanently underway. The defense budget is almost 4 percent of gross national product which is an increasing amount because the gross national product is increasing. France is not integrated into NATO but it is faithful to its alliance and will work closely with its other allies. As for the question as to how to deal with the Soviet Union he would leave that to Mr. Clark to discuss. (S)

Before allowing Mr. Clark to turn to the negative side of the ledger, Mr. Mitterrand said that he had discussed these military matters with Chancellor Kohl whose views coincided with those of Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Clark stated President Reagan was impressed with recent information that France and FRG were consulting in greater depth on national defense. (S)

Mr. Clark then addressed Latin America and Mitterrand reacted dramatically, saying that he had more or less forgotten about this region because they had greater concerns elsewhere, and implied that the United States was obsessed with the region. He backed off however and seemed impressed when Mr. Clark told him that Cuba had received one billion dollars worth of Soviet military equipment since January, comprising about four hundred thousand tons, the largest shipments ever. Mr. Clark went on to show the subversive activity of Cuba not only in Nicaragua but in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. (He offered to continue briefing designated members of the French government on these points.) Mr. Clark added that the financial problems of Mexico have also added to our concern there. (S)

Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for maintaining their March promise of no further arms to Nicaragua. Mitterrand replied that his arms contract with Nicaragua was not substantial and he remained faithful to his commitment not to add new contracts. Mr. Clark noted that while President Mitterrand had stated at the March meeting he would not ask Mr. Castro to Paris, we understand he may be coming. President Mitterrand said there is no immediate plan for him to come to France. However, there is a rumor that Fidel Castro will go to Sweden and if that is the case he may pass through France but he will consider our concern in the matter. Mitterrand stated he thinks our policy towards Cuba is wrong but as time goes on it may be proved right due to the fact that Nicaragua is having more and more difficulty with its revolution. Mr. Clark added this is evidenced by increasing internal suppression of the Church and press and external subversion in Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama. (President Mitterrand was slightly sarcastic at this point, stating we will only be deemed right when a tragic development takes place in Central America.) Going back to his relations with Nicaragua he said their original contract was merely symbolic, but he realized the symbol had become dangerous as far as France was concerned because of the intense interest

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and concern the US had over Nicaragua. He mentioned that Unge was not a communist and was a friend of his and that Unge was forced into joining with revolutionary forces. (At this point Mitterrand confessed that France had a certain sympathy for revolutionary groups.) He then stated that as far as Cuba is concerned, the French relations don't amount to much. They are only verbal. He would be happy to speak of this question as to the proper politics in Latin America at a later date. His only opinion was that it might be a good idea to speak to Castro if he comes, mentioning that American Presidents meet with Soviets -- such as Nixon and Ford, with Brezhnev. He thought it a good idea to speak to one's adversary. Smiling, Mitterrand said he has had difficulties reaching the ears and hearts of the Americans with respect to his views on Central America. Mitterrand also commented that he did not think the Sandanistas were doing well because they were too divided but that he, Mitterrand, was not an expert on this subject despite his having spent fifteen minutes explaining the best policy in Central America. The impression left was that their interest in Central America and Cuba is waning. (S)

Mr. Clark then moved to Africa setting out President Reagan's early interest in the independence of Namibia and his own involvement in Southern Africa while Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Clark pointed out frankly that we felt the U.S. is in the best position to influence South Africa respecting both human rights (we agree not to berate them publicly in consideration for improvement) and Namibian independence. We feel progress has been made and that Angola appears ready to accept the concept of Cubans leaving, and the prospect for an independent Namibia is good. The U.S. has taken a very active roll not for glory but out of global responsibility. However, we feel success impeded by some very unfortunate public statements made by the French at highest levels that the United States is an impediment to the development of Namibian independence causing confusion and anger on the part of a number of officials in the U.S. Government. (At this point Mitterrand appeared dumbfounded. He professed to not knowing what we were talking about even though he himself made such remarks while in Africa this month. The Ambassador referred to a statement made in Dar es Salaam, and Mr. Clark pointed out how US newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post report such statements within minutes of their having been rendered - even from the depths of African jungles. Mr. Clark said that if we fail in this effort to create a free Namibia only the USSR will gain. He further stated that if the process fails by reason of hardening by the front line states following Cheysson's statements, we will say so publicly. At this point Mitterrand intervened to say that the policy of the United States and France coincided and that we both wanted free elections in Namibia, a new independent country and removal of the Cubans. (Originally Mitterrand put the removal of the Cubans first but he changed his phraseology to put free elections first and the removal of the Cubans last as part of their three basic points. Mitterrand referred to the fact that he had recently

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Oct 27, 1982

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FBI 22

FRANCE: CHEYSSON BLAMES U.S. FOR LACK OF COMMUNICATION

NC061822 PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1810 GNT 6 NOV 82

(TEXT) PARIS, DEC 6 (AFP) -- FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON TODAY BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR A LACK OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, SAYING THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSULTATION BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON "FOR MONTHS AND MONTHS."

"IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, IN SO BASIC AN ALLIANCE, THAT WE SHOULD NOT TALK TO ONE ANOTHER," HE TOLD THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PRESS CLUB, ATTRIBUTING THE SILENCE TO THE RECENT U.S.-WEST EUROPEAN TENSION OVER THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE.

MR CHEYSSON SAID THE COMING YEAR WOULD BE "FORMIDABLE" WITH RESPECT TO MOUNTING PROTECTIONISM WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND THE UNCERTAINTY WEIGHING ON SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA.

FAILURE OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO REACH A CLEAR CONCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RESULT IN A "VERY SERIOUS SITUATION," AND WOULD CALL THE CREDIBILITY OF WESTERN DEFENSE INTO QUESTION, HE SAID.

7 DEC 1319Z



The Vice President of the United States of America

for Bill Clark / how about your visit? Cheysson absent - missed!

12-9

Maybe Cheysson doesn't know about it. J

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The following was read to Larry Barret on November 24 at 1720 by Kay.

President Mitterrand said that sometimes language has to be revised although in the case of the gas pipeline, while our sanctions on the pipeline do not constitute imperialism, they do constitute hegemony and an unauthorized invasion of sovereignty (up to now, no reference had been made to the Polish-Soviet sanctions or "pipeline"). (S)

Mitterrand ended this point by saying we should all, including the French, make an effort to dampen down rhetoric and he would discuss it among the others. (S)

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NLS F99-079#6

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/26/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Return to WPC
per Em.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F99-079#7

By LOT, NARA, Date 7/26/00

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador to France, notetaker

President Francois Mitterrand of France
Jacque Attali, Personal Advisor to Mitterrand
Mr. Thierry, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 27, 1982
6:30 - 8:30 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The following sequence developed as reported by Amb. Galbraith:

There was a cordial exchange of greetings, Mr. Clark referring to President Mitterrand's request for meeting in Washington on March 12 and President Reagan's pleasure at the forthright nature of President Mitterrand's remarks at that meeting. Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for accepting President's request that President Mitterrand receive Mr. Clark on such short notice to discuss issues of serious consequence. Mr. Clark noted that since that time, however, problems have occurred and we want to be certain the facts relating to these problems are correct. If correct, it may become necessary to review some of our policies as they relate to France. Mr. Clark said that he did not expect complete answers this evening to all matters and encouraged President Mitterrand to make any additional comment later by direct communication and consultation with President Reagan. (S)

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b. Mr. Clark pointed out our inflation rate has dropped substantially from the March level to a September level of only two tenths of one percent. (S)

c. The U.S. still has an unemployment problem and ten percent bothers us. (S)

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To the White House for Jacquelyne Hill, Personal Secretary to
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Please add the following paragraph below to draft I dictated
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At Mr. Clark's suggestion, we have avoided press on this visit - subessfully. Two calls were received by Embassy asking who person was going into Elysee. Our press man responded he did not know - truthfully. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1982

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
Dave Fisher

Subject: Attached Memcon

The Judge promised the President a copy of the memorandum of conversation covering his session with President Mitterand.

It was prepared in rough draft before he (the Judge) left town for a speech but he did not have time to review and edit it. Thus I apologize for some of the syntax and errors which he will correct upon his return.

Many thanks

Bvd


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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By Bvd NARA, Date 7/23/99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Six Ron -

Pls LDX to
Camp David
& return to
me today or Kay
on Sat for file!

Thanks

Dona

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F99-079#8
By LOS, NARA, Date 7/26/00

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador
to France, notetaker

President Francois Mitterrand of France
Jacque Attali, Personal Advisor to Mitterrand
Mr. Thierry, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 27, 1982
AND PLACE: 6:30 - 8:30 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The following sequence developed as reported by Amb. Galbraith:

There was a cordial exchange of greetings, Mr. Clark referring to President Mitterrand's request for meeting in Washington on March 12 and President Reagan's pleasure at the forthright nature of President Mitterrand's remarks at that meeting. Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for accepting President's request that President Mitterrand receive Mr. Clark on such short notice to discuss issues of serious consequence. Mr. Clark noted that since that time, however, problems have occurred and we want to be certain the facts relating to these problems are correct. If correct, it may become necessary to review some of our policies as they relate to France. Mr. Clark said that he did not expect complete answers this evening to all matters and encouraged President Mitterrand to make any additional comment later by direct communication and consultation with President Reagan. (S)

Of the matters discussed on March 12, Mr. Clark stated President Reagan believes several have been positive, others negative. Mr. Clark stated with President's permission, we would consider positive matters first.

a. U.S. interest rates were cause of concern to France at the time of the March meeting but President Mitterrand had said he would not criticize the U.S. for these rates, particularly at Versailles, and we are appreciative of that. Since that time, rates have dropped from the 16 percent range to 10 percent and Mr. Mitterrand acknowledged that this drop has been beneficial. (S)

b. Mr. Clark pointed out our inflation rate has dropped substantially from the March level to a September level of only two tenths of one percent. (S)

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c. The U.S. still has an unemployment problem and ten percent bothers us. (S)

At the March 12 meeting President Reagan was pleased that President Mitterrand supported and continues to support the U.S. effort to rearm and generally stands by our policy with respect to defense and deterrence, having noted that after ten years of neglect, the Reagan policy was welcome and was in the best interest of the West. Mr. Clark also said President Reagan was pleased Mr. Mitterrand was reiterating his opposition to the various peace and nuclear freeze movements in Europe. (S)

On the positive side the U.S., assisted by France, has done a great deal in the Middle East toward achieving peace in Beirut and withdrawal of the PLO, the Syrians and the Israeli forces. Mr. Clark thanked the President for the quick reaction of the French to participation with us in the multinational force. Mr. Clark then added that we are encouraged by the reaction of the Arab delegation in Washington to President Reagan's peace initiative in the Middle East and expressed the hope that for the first time in thirty-five years there is a chance of actually establishing true peace. (S)

President Mitterrand said that before Mr. Clark moved away from the positive side of the balance sheet, he would like to express a few thoughts:

a. He cannot imagine that the negative aspects are really important because in the basic things, we see things very closely. France appreciates very much the drop in the interest rates and congratulates the U.S. in its victory over inflation. France is moving in the same direction, going from the 14 percent it inherited from Giscard d'Estaing to 10 percent at the end of 1982. Mitterrand expects an inflation rate of eight percent in 1983. Four to five percent is as low as they can go because if they tried to go any more and imitated the United States, he would be pumping the bicycle too fast and wind up with a heart attack and confined to bed. *(The point being that too big a squeeze against inflation would create intolerable political consequences in France.) Mitterrand said that the U.S. is lucky in that its unions are more responsible. He went on to say that the military relations were in good harmony. France supports the US position in Geneva but if the talks fail he would actively support the deployment of the Pershing and he talks to the other members of the NATO Alliance along this line. He said that the French military budget is not being reduced for all practical purposes and that the amount of three billion francs which might be regarded as a reduction is de minimus. He underlined there would be no reduction of the troops in Germany and that they were expanding their expenditures on airborne forces (helicopters) and nuclear forces, citing the 6th SSBN which was sped up by him and the 7th which he has now

*Neither Mitterrand nor the Government refer to the fact that their present and prospective inflation rates are based on a price and wage freeze and that such rates do not mean the same thing as inflation rates freely arrived at.

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ordered. This will give France the capability of having 4 SSBNs permanently underway. The defense budget is almost 4 percent of gross national product which is an increasing amount because the gross national product is increasing. France is not integrated into NATO but it is faithful to its alliance and will work closely with its other allies. As for the question as to how to deal with the Soviet Union he would leave that to Mr. Clark to discuss. (S)

Before allowing Mr. Clark to turn to the negative side of the ledger, Mr. Mitterrand said that he had discussed these military matters with Chancellor Kohl whose views coincided with those of Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Clark stated President Reagan was impressed with recent information that France and FRG were consulting in greater depth on national defense. (S)

Mr. Clark then addressed Latin America and Mitterrand reacted dramatically, saying that he had more or less forgotten about this region because they had greater concerns elsewhere, and implied that the United States was obsessed with the region. He backed off however and seemed impressed when Mr. Clark told him that Cuba had received one billion dollars worth of Soviet military equipment since January, comprising about four hundred thousand tons, the largest shipments ever. Mr. Clark went on to show the subversive activity of Cuba not only in Nicaragua but in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. (He offered to continue briefing designated members of the French government on these points.) Mr. Clark added that the financial problems of Mexico have also added to our concern there. (S)

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